MANAGERIAL AND SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES FRANKLIN BAKER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HONORABLE CRESENCIO B. TRAJANO, DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, FRANKLIN BAKER BROTHERHOOD ASSOCIATION (TECHNICAL AND OFFICE EMPLOYEES)-ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (ATU) G.R. No. 75039
January 28, 1988
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the order of Mediator-Arbiter Conchita Martinez of Ministry of Labor and Employment and Dir Cresencio Trajano of MOLE. On April 23, 1984 Franklin Baker Brotherhood Association filed a petition for certification election among the office and technical employees of the petitioner company with the Ministry of Labor and Employment Davao. It alleges that 90 employees in the Davao plant which is distinct from the regular rank and file employees is excluded from the coverage of the existing CBA. Petitioner company did not object on the election but manifested that out of 90 employees 74 are managerial employees and 2 are confidential employees. Med-Arbiter Martinez issued an order dated Sept. 17, 1984 granting the petition and certification election among the office and technical employees of the Davao plant. The petitioner company appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations for the order be set aside and declare the 74 employees as managerial employees. During the pendency of the appeal, 61 employees involved filed a Motion to Withdraw the petition for certification election praying for their exclusion from the bargaining unit because they are managerial employees as they are performing managerial functions. April 7, 1986 Cresencio Trajano of Bureau of Labor Relations issued a resolution affirming the order of Med-Arbiter Conchita Martinez.
ISSUE: Whether the subject employees are managerial employees under the purview of the Labor Code and it's Implementing Rules?
RULING: A managerial employee is defined as one "who is vested with powers or prerogative to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign, or discipline employees or to effectively recommend such managerial actions." It will be noted that in the performance of their duties and functions and in the exercise of their recommendatory powers, subject employees may only recommend, as the ultimate power to hire, fire or suspend as the case maybe rests upon the plant manager. The test of "supervisory" or managerial status" depends on whether a person possesses authority to act in the interest of his employer in the matter specified in Art. 212(k) of the Labor Code and Sec. 1(m) of its Implementing Rules and whether such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature, but requires the use of independent judgement. The subject employees are not managerial
employees because as borne by the records, they do not participate in the policy making but given ready policies to execute and standard practice to observe, thus having little freedom of action. Premises Considered, the petition is dismissed, and the assailed resolution and orders are Affirmed. So Ordered.
APPEAL; JUDICIAL REVIEW (EXECUTION) PIONEER TEXTURIZING CORP. and/or JULIANO LIM VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PIONEER TEXTURIZING WORKERS UNION and LOURDES A. DE JESUS G.R. No. 118651 October 16, 1997
FACTS: In an illegal dismissal case, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the complainant and ordered his reinstatement. The employer appealed. Refusing to reinstate the worker pending appeal, the employer claims that the order of reinstatement needs a writ of execution. The employer further maintains that even if a writ of execution was issued, a timely appeal coupled by the posting of appropriate supersedeas bond effectively forestalled and stayed the execution of the Labor Arbiter’s reinstatement order.
ISSUE: Is the employer’s contention correct?
RULING: No, the employer’s contention is erroneous. The law as now worded employs the phrase “shall immediately be executory” without qualification emphasizing the need for prompt compliance. The term “shall” denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. The Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement does not need a writ of execution. It is self-executory. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. After receipt of the decision ordering reinstatement, the employer has the right to chose whether to re-admit the employee to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or to reinstate the employee in the payroll. In either instance, the employer has to inform the employee of his choice.
PROCEDURE PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC. VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MR. ROBERTO NIEVA G.R. No. 124100 April 1, 1998
FACTS: Roberto was a driver of Philtranco who was assigned to the Legaspi CityPasay City route. He was dismissed from the service. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC’s National Capital region Arbitration Branch in Manila. Philtranco filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that the complaint should have been lodged with the NLRC’s Regional Arbitration Branch in Legaspi City not only because Roberto was a resident thereof but also because the latter was hired, assigned, and based in Legaspi City. ISSUE: Whether the motion to dismiss filed at NLRC NCR be denied?
RULING: The Motion to Dismiss must be denied. The question of venue pertains to the trial and relates more to the convenience of the parties rather than upon the substance and merits of the case. Provisions on venue are intended to assure convenience for the plaintiff and his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice. The New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC cited by Philtranco speaks of the complainant’s workplace, evidently showing that the rule is intended for the exclusive benefit of the worker. This being the case, the worker may waive said benefit. Moreover, since Roberto was assigned to Legaspi City-Pasay City route, the filing of the complaint with the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch was proper, Manila being considered as part of Roberto’s workplace.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (JURISDICTION;PROCEDURE) ATLAS FARMS, INC.,VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JAIME O. DELA PEÑA and MARCIAL I.ABION, G.R. No. 142244. November 18, 2002
FACTS: Jaime O. dela Peña was employed as a veterinary aide by petitioner in December1975. He was among several employees terminated in July 1989. On July 8, 1989,he was re-hired by petitioner and given the additional job of feed mill operator. He was instructed to train selected workers to operate the feed mill. Peña was allegedly caught urinating and defecating on company premises not intended for the purpose.7.From the start of his employment on July 8, 1989, until his termination on March 20,1993, Peña had worked for seven days a week, including holidays, without overtime, holiday, rest day pay and service incentive leave. At the time of his dismissal from employment, he was receiving P180 pesos daily wage, or an average monthly salary of P5,402. Co-respondent Marcial I. Abion was a carpenter/mason and a maintenance manwhose employment by petitioner commenced on October 8, 1990. Like Peña, Abion worked seven days a week, including holidays, without holiday pay, rest day pay, service incentive leave pay and night shift differential pay. When terminated on October 27, 1992, Abion was receiving a monthly salary of P4,500.11.Peña and Abion filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal that were later consolidated The labor arbiter dismissed their complaints on the ground that the grievance machinery in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) had not yet beenexhausted.13.Their cases were consolidated in the NLRC. At the initial mandatory conference, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, alleging private respondents themselves admitted that they were members of the employees’ union with which petitioner had an existing CBA. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, finding that the case was one of illegal dismissal and did not involve the interpretation or implementation of any CBA provision. He stated that Article 217 (c) of the Labor Code was inapplicable to the case. Further, the labor arbiter found that although both complainants did not substantiate their claims of illegal dismissal, there was proof that private respondents voluntarily accepted their separation pay and petitioner’s financial assistance.15.Thus, private respondents brought the case to the NLRC, which reversed the labor arbiter’s decision. Dissatisfied with the NLRC ruling, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65, seeking reinstatement of the labor arbiter’s decision. The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed the NLRC resolution.
ISSUES: 1. DENYING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND IN EFFECT AFFIRMING THERULINGS OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTSWERE ILLEGALLY DISMISSED;
2. RULING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO SEPARATION PAYAND FULL BACKWAGES; 3.
RULING THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR COSTS OF SUIT
RULINGS: ATLAS contends that the dismissal of private respondents was for a just and valid cause, pursuant to the provisions of the company’s rules and regulations. It also alleges lack of jurisdiction on the part of the labor arbiter, claiming that the cases should have been resolved through the grievance machinery, and eventually referred to voluntary arbitration, as prescribed in the CBA. Records show, however, that private respondents sought without success to avail of the grievance procedure in their CBA. On this point, ATLAS maintains that by so doing, private respondents recognized that their cases still fell under the grievance machinery. According to ATLAS, without having exhausted said machinery, the private respondents filed their action before the NLRC, in a clear act of forumshopping. However, it is worth pointing out that private respondents went to the NLRC only after the labor arbiter dismissed their original complaint for illegal dismissal. Under these circumstances private respondents had to find another avenue for redress. We agree with the NLRC that it was petitioner who failed to show proof that it took steps to convene the grievance machinery after the labor arbiter first dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal and directed the parties to avail of the grievance procedure under Article VII of the existing CBA. They could not now be faulted for attempting to find an impartial forum, after petitioner failed to listen to them and after the intercession of the labor arbiter proved futile. The NLRC had aptly concluded in part that private respondents had already exhausted the remedies under the grievance procedure. It erred only in finding that their cause of action was ripe for arbitration. One significant fact in the present petition also needs stressing. Pursuant to Article 260 of the Labor Code, the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to the voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by the parties to a CBA. Consequently only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators. In these termination cases of private respondents, the union had no participation, it having failed to object to the dismissal of the employees concerned by the petitioner. It is obvious that arbitration without the union’s active participation on behalf of the dismissed employees would be pointless, or even prejudicial to their cause. Coming to the merits of the petition, the NLRC found that petitioner did not comply with the requirements of a valid dismissal. For a dismissal to be valid, the employer must show that: (1) the employee was accorded due process, and (2) the dismissal must be for any of the valid causes provided for by law. No evidence was shown that private respondents refused, as alleged, to receive the notices requiring them to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against them. Without proof of notice, private respondents who were subsequently dismissed without hearing were also deprived of a chance to air their side at the level of the grievance machinery. Given the fact of dismissal, it can be said that the cases were effectively removed from the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator, thus placing them within the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Where the dispute is just in the interpretation, implementation or enforcement stage, it may be referred to the grievance machinery set up in the CBA, or brought to voluntary arbitration. But, where there was already actual termination, with alleged violation of the employee’s rights, it is already cognizable by the labor arbiter. Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is ordered to pay private respondents (a) separation pay, in lieu of their reinstatement, equivalent to one month’s salary for every year of service, (b) full backwages from the date of their dismissal up to the date of the promulgation of this decision, together with (c) the costs of suit.
ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION; RETURN TO WORK ORDER CATALINO N. SARMIENTO and 71 other striking workers of ASIAN TRANSMISSION CORPORATION VS. THE HON. JUDGE ORLANDO R. TUICO of the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, ROBERTO PIMENTEL, NELSON C. TEJADA, and the COMMANDING OFFICER, 224th PC Company at Los Baños Laguna G.R. No. 75271-73 June 27, 1988
FACTS: Asian Transmission Corp (ATC) terminated the services of Catalino Sarmiento,VP of the Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATU), for allegedly carrying a deadly weapon in the company premises. BATU filed a notice of strike, claiming that ATC had committed an unfair labor practice. ATC, then, filed a petition asking the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the matter or certify the same to NLRC for compulsory arbitration .MOLE issued an order certifying the labor dispute to NLRC. At the same time, it enjoined the management from locking out its employees and the union from declaring a strike or similar concerted action. Proceedings could not continue in the NLRC, however, because of the acceptance by Pres. Aquino of the resignations of 8 of its members, leaving only the vice-chairman in office. MOLE set aside the previous orders and directly assumed jurisdiction of the dispute, at the same time, enjoined the company to accept all returning workers. This order was later set aside upon motion of both BATU and ATC in view of the appointment of new commissioners in NLRC. MOLE then returned the cases to NLRC and directed it to expedite the resolution of all issues relating to the dispute. Conformably, NLRC issued on Jan 13, 1987 a resolution, which it affirmed in its resolution of Feb 12, denying the motion of reconsideration. Three criminal complaints were filed against the workers, two by the personnel administrative officer of ATC and the third by Philippine Constabulary. The first two complaints were for ―Violation of Art 265 par 1, in relation to Art 273 Labor Code. ‖ The third was for coercion. In all 3 complaints, the defendants were charged with staging an illegal strike, barricading the gates of the ATC plant and preventing the workers through intimidation, harassment and force from reporting for work. Respondent Judge Orlando Tuico issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners and committed 72 of them to jail although he later ordered the release of 61 of them to the custody of the mayor of Calamba. The petitioners had earlier moved for the lifting of the warrant of arrest and the referral of the coercion charge to NLRC and later, for the dismissal of the criminal cases on the ground that they came under the primary jurisdiction of the NLRC.
ISSUES: 1. WHETHER A RETURN TO WORK ORDER MAY BE VALIDLY ISSUED BY NLRCPENDING DETERMINATION OF THE LEGALITY OF THE STRIKE;
2. WHETHER SUCHDETERMINATION, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OFCERTAIN PERSONSINVOLVED IN THE SAID STRIKE MAY BE VALIDLY RESTRAINED.
RULING: The authority for the order is found in Art 264(g) Labor Code, as amended by BP blg. 227, which provides: When in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest, such as may occur in but not limited to public utilities, companies engaged in the generation or distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and export oriented industries, including those within export processing zones, MOLE shall assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking our locked out employees shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The minister may seek the assistance of law-enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. There can be no question that MOLE acted correctly in certifying labor dispute to NLRC, given the predictable prejudice the strike might cause not only to the parties but more especially to the national interest. Thus, the return to work order was equally valid as a statutory part and part of the certification order issued by MOLE on Nov 24, 1986. The challenged order of NLRC was actually only an implementation of the above provision of the Labor Code and a reiteration of the directive earlier issued by MOLE in its own assumption order of Sept 9, 1986. It must be stressed that while one purpose of the return to work order is to protect the workers who might otherwise be locked out by the employer for threatening or waging the strike, the more important reason is to prevent impairment of the national interest in case the operations of the company are disrupted by a refusal of the strikers to return to work as directed. More particularly, it is the national economy that will suffer because of the resultant reduction in our export earnings and our dollar reserves, not to mention possible cancellation of contracts of the company with foreign investors. It is also to emphasize that the return to work order not so much confers a right as it imposes a duty; and while as a right it may be waived, it must be discharged as a duty even against the worker‘s will.Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option but of obligation. The suspension of proceedings in the criminal complaints filed is justified on the ground of prematurity as there is no question that the acts complained of are connected with the compulsory arbitration proceedings still pending in NLRC. The 3 criminal cases should be suspended until the completion of the compulsory arbitration proceedings in the NLRC, conformably to the policy embodied in Circular no.15, series of 1982 and Circular no. 9, series of 1986, issued by the Ministry of Justice in connection with the implementation of BP 227. These circulars require fiscals and other government prosecutors to first secure clearance of MOLE and/or Office of the President before taking cognizance of complaints for preliminary
investigation and filing in court of the corresponding information of cases arising out of or related to a labor dispute, including allegations of violence, coercion, physical injuries, assault upon a person in authority and other similar acts of intimidation, obstructing the free ingress to and egress from a factory or place of operation of the machines of such factory, or the employer‘s premises. It does not appear from the record that such clearance was obtained, conformably to the procedure laid down to attain the industrial peace which is the primordial objects of this law.
STRIKES (CONCEPT AND SCOPE) LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS, INC. VS. PERMANENT CONCRETE WORKERS UNION, Affiliated with the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS, HERMOGENES ATRAZO, AQUILINO DISTOR, BENJAMIN GUTIERREZ, JOSE RAMOS, TIBURCIO MARDO, ERNESTO ALMARIO and DOMINGO LEANO G.R. No. L-25003
October 23, 1981
FACTS: Permanent concrete worker’s union and its members picketed the gate leading to Liwayway's bodega. This gate is about 200 meters from the gate leading to the premises of the employer of the appellants. Liwayway is not in any way related to the striking union except for the fact that it is the sub lessee of a bodega in the company's compound. The picketers belonging to the union had stopped and prohibited the truck of the Liwayway from entering the compound to load newsprint from its bodega, the union members intimidating and threatening with bodily harm the employees of the Liwayway who were in the truck. The union members also stopped and prohibited the general manager, personnel manager including the man in-charge of the bodega and other employees of the Liwayway Publications, Inc. from getting newsprint in said bodega. The business of Liwayway is exclusively the publication of the magazines Bannawag Bisaya, Hiligaynon and Liwayway weekly magazines which has absolutely no relation or connection whatsoever with the cause of the strike of the union against their company, much less with the terms, conditions or demands of the strikers. As a consequence thereof, plaintiff rented another bodega during the time members of the defendant union prevented its employees from entering its bodega in the compound of Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. and thus incurred expenses both in terms of bodega rentals and in transporting newsprint from the pier to the temporary bodega. Liwayway filed a writ of preliminary injunction which the trial court granted. Defendant union moved to dismiss the complaint on the following ground: 1. that this case arose out of a labor dispute involving unfair labor practices and, therefore, the Court of First Instance where this action was brought has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction since this case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations.
ISSUE: Whether the Liwayway is a third party or an "innocent bystander" whose right has been invaded and, therefore, entitled to protection by the regular courts?
RULING:
The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phrase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully carried out, it cannot be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship. The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an exercise of free speech, we believe that courts are not without power to confine or localize the sphere of communication or the demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related interest, and to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus, the right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or "innocent bystanders" if it appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists between them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights. This Court ruled that Liwayway was an “innocent bystander” and thus entitled to enjoin the union’s strike because Liwayway’s only connection with the employer company was the fact that both were situated in the same premises. Innocent bystanders' - are entitled to seek protection of their rights from the courts and the courts may, accordingly, legally extend the same. Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
BAR TO CERTIFICATION ELECTION VASSAR INDUSTRIES EMPLOYEES UNION (VIEU) VS. HON. FRANCISCO L. ESTRELLA; as Acting Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU), and VASSAR INDUSTRIES, INC. G.R. No. L-46562
March 31, 1978
FACTS: There was in existence a collective bargaining agreement between private respondents Associated Labor Unions and Vassar Industries, Inc. which expired on May 15, 1977. Prior to such date, 111 of a total number of 150 employees of such firm disaffiliated from the former labor organization and formed their own union. Thereafter, they filed an application for registration of their union with the Bureau of Labor Relations, complying with an the requirements of both the Labor Code and its implementing regulations. While such application was pending, petitioner Union filed a petition for certification as bargaining agent for the rank-and-file employees of the company. The Med-Arbiter, on May 24, 1977, denied their plea on the ground that the union was not duly registered with the Department of Labor. Then came a motion for reconsideration praying that the dismissal be set aside until action be taken on its pending application for registration. On July 5, 1977, respondent Estrella, then Acting Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, denied, as previously noted, the application for registration "on the ground that there is a registered collective bargaining agent in the company." Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the refusal of respondent Francisco L. Estrella, then the Acting Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, to register petitioner Vassar Industries Employees Union was proper?
RULING: No. Petitioner Union should be registered, there being no legal obstacle to such a step and the duty of the Bureau of Labor Relations being clear in this regard. "Once the fact of disaffiliation has been demonstrated beyond doubt, as in this case, a certification election is the most expeditious way of determining which labor organization is to be the exclusive bargaining representative." In U.E. Automotive Employees and Workers Union v. Noriel, reference was made to the fact that a notable feature of our Constitution is that
"freedom of association is explicitly ordained; it is not merely derivative, peripheral or penumbral, as is the case in the United States. It can trace its origin to the Malolos Constitution." In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Pan American Employees Association: "There is both a constitutional and statutory recognition that laborers have the right to form unions to take care of their interests vis-a-viz their employees. Their freedom to form organizations would be rendered nugatory if they could not choose their own leaders to speak on their behalf and to bargain for them." It cannot be otherwise, for the freedom to choose which labor organization to join is an aspect of the constitutional mandate of protection to labor. Prior to the Industrial Peace Act, there was a statute setting for the guidelines for the registration of labor unions.” Furthermore, the Court in Philippine Labor Alliance Council v. Bureau of Labor Relations held that: "It is indisputable that the present controversy would not have arisen if there were no mass disaffiliation from petitioning union. Such a phenomenon is nothing new in the Philippine labor movement. Nor is it open to any legal objection. It is implicit in the freedom of association explicitly ordained by the Constitution. There is then the incontrovertible right of any individual to join an organization of his choice. That option belongs to him. A workingman is not to be denied that liberty. He may be, as a matter of fact, more in need of it the institution of collective bargaining as an aspect of industrial democracy is to succeed. No obstacle that may possibly thwart the desirable objective of militancy in labor's struggle for better terms and conditions is then to be placed on his way. Once the fact of disaffiliation has been demonstrated beyond doubt, as in this case, a certification election is the most expeditious way of determining which labor organization is to be the exclusive bargaining representative. It is as simple as that."
BARGAINING PROCEEDINGS
AGENT
AND
CERTIFICATION
ELECTION
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA PERMEX (SMP-PIILU-TUCP) VS. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, PERMEX PRODUCER AND EXPORTER CORPORATION G.R. No. 107792
March 2, 1998
FACTS: A certification election was conducted among employees of respondent Permex Producer and Exporter Corporation with ‘No Union’ winning [NFL lost]. Later however, some employees of Permex Producer formed a labor organization known as the Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex (SMP) which they registered with the Department of Labor and Employment and then affiliatedwith the Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union (PIILU). (SMP-PIILU) wrote the respondent company requesting recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of employees at the Permex Producer and was granted. They then entered into a CBA. A year later, NFL filed gain for a petition for certification election but was dismissed. Two arguments are put forth in support of the petition. First, it is contended that petitioner has been recognized by the majority of the employees at Permex Producer as their sole collective bargaining agent. Petitioner argues that when a group of employees constituting themselves into an organization and claiming to represent a majority of the work force requests the employer to bargain collectively, the employer may do one of two things.
ISSUE: Whether the employer has the authority to determine the union of the employees?
RULING: First, if the employer is satisfied with the employees’ claim the employer may voluntarily recognize the union by merely bargaining collectively with it. The formal written confirmation is ordinarily stated in the collective bargaining agreement. Second, if on the other hand, the employer refuses to recognize the union voluntarily, it may petition the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct a certification election. If the employer does not submit a petition for certification election, the union claiming to represent the employees may submit the petition so that it may be directly certified as the employees’ representative or a certification election may be held.
Challenged decision AFFIRMED. The case of Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. Ferrer-Calleja is particularly apropos: “. . . Ordinarily, in an unorganized establishment like the Calasiao Beer Region, it is the union that files a petition for a certification election if there is no certified bargaining agent for the workers in the establishment. If a union asks the employer to voluntarily recognize it as the bargaining agent of the employees, as the petitioner did, it in effect asks the employer to certify it as the bargaining representative of the employees — A CERTIFICATION WHICH THE EMPLOYER HAS NO AUTHORITY TO GIVE, for it is the employees’ prerogative (not the employer’s) to determine whether they want a union to represent them, and, if so, which one it should be.” In accordance with this ruling, Permex Producer should not have given its voluntary recognition to SMP-PIILU-TUCP when the latter asked for recognition as exclusive collective bargaining agent of the employees of the company. The company did not have the power to declare the union the exclusive representative of the workers for the purpose of collective bargaining. It is not enough that a union has the support of the majority of the employees. It is equally important that everyone in the bargaining unit be given the opportunity to express himself. The effect is one union only.
PROCEDURE ALEMAR’S SIBAL & SONS, INC.VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NLM-KATIPUNAN (representing the group of CHARITO ALIMORONG) G.R. No. 114761. January 19, 2000
FACTS: Private respondent NLM Katipunan filed with the Dole a notice of strike raising charges of ULP and illegal dismissal against petitioner. The charges were elevated to NLRC for compulsory arbitration. The Labor Arbiter ordered petitioner to pay private respondent separation pay of ½ month pay for every year of service. Private respondent filed a motion for execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Rehabilitation Receiver of petitioner submitted a Manifestation with Motion, alleging that petitioner was not yet in a position to comply with the directive of the Labor Arbiter as it was still under Rehabilitation Receivership by virtue of the order of the SEC. The Labor Arbiter granted the motion for execution. Petitioner contends that public respondent should have denied the order of the LA for the immediate payment of separation pay because of the order of the SEC suspending all claims against petitioner pending before any court, tribunal or body. However, the NLRC emphasized that the order of execution made by the LA had reached finality and that petitioner’s succeeding motions had been filed out of time. At the time this petition had been filed on May 4, 1984, petitioner had been placed under rehabilitation receivership. ISSUE: Whether the order of the SEC can stay the execution of judgment against petitioner?
RULING: No. A stay of execution may be warranted by the fact that a petitioner corporation has been placed under rehabilitation receivership. However, the Sec issued an order approving the rehabilitation plan of petitioner and placing it under liquidation pursuant to PD 902-A. Since receivership proceedings have ceased and petitioner’s rehabilitation receiver and liquidator, Ledesma, Saludo and Associates has been given the imprimatur to proceed with corporate liquidation, the cited order of the Sec has been rendered functus oficio. Petitioner’s monetary obligation to private respondent is long overdue and thus cannot delay the satisfaction of private respondent’s claim. However, due to events subsequent to the
filing of this petition, private respondent must present its claim with the rehabilitation receiver and liquidator in the SEC, subject to the rules on preference of credits.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (JURISDICTION; PROCEDURE) LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK VS. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR G.R. No. 120319
October 6, 1995
FACTS: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE)arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue: whether or not the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April1994, on promotion. At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers on December 1-15, 1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE's Position Paper on January 18, 1995.LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB. On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on promotion. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same.
ISSUE: Which court has the jurisdiction for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities?
RULING: Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise: (B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi- judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph of the third paragraph and subparagraph of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the afore quoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that this functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi- judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein. This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities not expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the Constitution or another statute. In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in the contract or submission, or if none be specified ,the Regional Trial Court for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction. A party to the controversy may, at any time within one (1) month after an award is made, apply to the court having jurisdiction for an order confirming the award and the court must grant such order unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected. In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the regional trial court. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals
