Bataille Freud

How to Look Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille1 Liran Razinsky SubStance, Issue 119 (Volume 38, Number 2), 2009, pp. 63-88 (Article)

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Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille

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How to Look Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille1 Liran Razinsky

Death’s place in psychoanalysis is very problematic. Beginning with Freud, death can be variously said to have been repressed, reduced, pathologized, or forgotten altogether.2 Within Freud’s writings, however, one article stands in contradistinction to this trend, by making a claim for death’s centrality. Although it has received relatively little attention, “Thoughts for the times on war and death,” published in 1915, is a fascinating discussion about our attitudes towards death, which comprise both a “cultural-conventional attitude” that Freud so pertinently, almost wickedly, criticizes, and the attitude common to the unconscious and to primeval man. The cultural conventional attitude is characterized by continual rejection of death: we put it away, refuse to talk about it, attribute it to chance events (“Thoughts” 291-92). For primeval man, and in the unconscious, death is wished for when it is the death of an other but is denied as regards oneself. However, while it is exceptional in bringing the problem of death to the fore, “Thoughts for the Times” does not constitute a clear-cut alternative to the psychoanalytic sidestepping of death. It is, rather, full of sharp tensions and contradictions. Upon close reading, the text reveals itself to be the compromise formation of two different approaches. Freud’s call, in the final paragraph, “to give death the place which is its due” in psychic life, and his contention that life is impoverished when we fail to do so, simply cannot be reconciled with his stubborn insistence, in the very same paper, that no place within the mind can be allotted to death. Freud insists upon this because death cannot be represented, and because fear of death is always secondary to other psychic factors. His call to abandon the “cultural-conventional” treatment of death in favor of that of primeval man or of the unconscious is found to be devoid of any sense, the latter being no less repressive of death or ignoring it than the former (Razinsky, “A struggle”). “Thoughts for the times” then, is a major exception, but an insufficient one. One gets the feeling that there is unfulfilled potential for a change © Board of Regents, University of Wisconsin System, 2009

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here, not theoretically developed, and completely abandoned in later writings. Freud seems to be hampered by certain psychoanalytic presuppositions, reiterating old positions. What seems useful is to divert from the psychoanalytic line of thought, and address the text “sideways” with another line of thought, which will offer a new reading. This is my aim in what follows. This other line of thought will be that of Georges Bataille. Freud with Bataille? An odd couple. Such a coupling is far from intuitive, juxtaposing as it does two thinkers from separate intellectual spheres, and all the more so with regard to the issue of death: Bataille, so focused on death, and Freud, so reluctant to admit of its psychic influence. In bringing them together we can give a twist to Freud by reintroducing death into his system. My starting point here is the issue of death’s representability. That death defies representation is the basic tenet underlying Freud’s approach. Yet he seems to accept this without further investigation, and his entire analysis is biased as a result. Although he has strong tendencies in more “existential” directions, it is this proposition—that death cannot be represented—that holds him back time and again. But should it really be so? In the following pages I will focus on Freud’s paradox of the irrepresentability of death and its consequences, and on our attitude toward it, as depicted in his text. Through a reading of Freud’s text— again, probably the most important psychoanalytic paper on death—I will attempt to demonstrate that it does, in fact, provide us with some clues to a possible way out of the paradox, a praxis with specific structuring elements, but these indications are only dispersed in the text, and have to be put together and interpreted in order for the way out to be clear. Bataille struggles with similar contradictions, yet recognizes them as crucial and problematic and therefore attempts to overcome them. Interestingly enough, and without any direct link between the two authors, serious resemblances can be found between their texts on death. This paper aims to display these resemblances and to offer, in addition to a Bataillean interpretation of Freud’s text, an exploration of basic psychical dynamics regarding death. The three questions that it attempts to answer are: Can we or can we not grasp death? If we cannot, how can the knowledge of our future death gain access to our life? And, concerning the implications this impossibility or possibility may have on life itself, is there a moral to handling death or integrating it in our life?

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The Problem The argument I wish to focus on here is the one Freud brings forth in the opening lines of his paper: It is indeed impossible to imagine our own death (der eigene Tod ist ja auch unvorstellbar); and whenever we attempt to do so we can perceive that we are in fact still present as spectators (daß wir eigentlich als Zuschauer weiter dabei bleiben). Hence the psycho-analytic school could venture on the assertion that at bottom no one believes in his own death, or, to put the same thing in another way, that in the unconscious every one of us is convinced of his own immortality. (“Thoughts” 291)

This basic claim—that death, our death, is ungraspable—has been made repeatedly in philosophy. Let us examine Freud’s variation of the argument for this claim: that whenever we attempt to imagine our own death, we fail, for we are still present as spectators. The argument is built like the Cartesian cogito. One can try as much as one likes to dispose oneself of oneself; he or she will not be able to get rid of his or her presence as the person who carries this mental act. The argument creates a split within the personality. One attempts to imagine oneself as dead, but is very alive while doing that. One cannot be both the object and the subject of a thought at the same time, when being an object means being a dead one. The self is presented as a spectator, with all the distance this position entails between the one that sees and the objects of his or her perception. The citation directly continues: “When it comes to someone else’s death, the civilized man will carefully avoid speaking of such a possibility in the hearing of the person under sentence” (Freud, “Thoughts 291). We try to avoid death in any way, in behavior and in thought. Thus Freud moves directly from the impossibility of representing our own death, to a consideration of our response to the possible death of the other. True, he says we do not think either of our own or of the other’s death, but with a fundamental difference: Whereas in the first case we do so because it is impossible, in the second case we do so out of moral consideration or natural reluctance. This latter attitude of avoiding even the thought, not to say the mention of another’s death, differs radically, says Freud, from that of primeval man and that of the unconscious. Although primeval man resembled us in that he did not grasp death as annihilation in his own case, he recognized it in the case of another much more willfully than we do—indeed he wished for the other ’s death. This attitude still characterizes our unconscious today (“Thoughts” 296-297).

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It is as though Freud recognized in this rich text at once both the necessity of integrating death into life, of giving it “the place […] which is its due,” and our reluctance and inability to do so. It might seem as if these three propositions all belong to an existential frame of mind: Life is more meaningful when the thought of death is present in it; people tend to flee the issue of death and evade the thought of it; and the idea of death is so difficult to bear that we can hardly think of it. But the ideas that Freud concludes from this third tenet are that death is never a primary occupation in the mind: whenever we see fear of death or the thought of death in a person, we should always look for something else. We thus have a clash between the more existentially-oriented first two ideas and the reductionistic implications of the third one. The problem that Freud puts forth in his third proposition is that death is inaccessible to the mind. It slides on it like oil on water and cannot penetrate the deeper levels of the mind. This idea of course negates the former two. First, how can we conform to the obligation to take death into account if it is in our nature and in the nature of death that we cannot do so? Second, why do we fear death and push it aside, if it cannot reach us? Why push it away if it cannot influence our deeper levels of thought and feeling? What Freud struggles with without recognizing is explicit in Bataille. It seems, though, that Freud does give us some guidelines as to what direction to follow if we want to settle the contradictions. We can use these hints as elements in an interpretation that will render them valuable. But in order to do so, we need Bataille to guide us. With Bataille, we can draw the lines between the dots. Bataille sees a dialectic where Freud only recognizes isolated, contradictory elements. * * * Bataille wrote a number of texts that dealt with themes of death and sacrifice. I will focus here on three of them. The first is “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice” (1955). In this text, Bataille tries to solve a contradiction he sees in Hegel, a thinker whom he always read through Alexandre Kojève. The second text is “Sacrifice, the Festival and the Principles of the Sacred World,” which forms part of his “Theory of Religion” (1974 [1948]); and the third is the section on sacrifice from “Literature and Evil” (1973 [1957]). It is noteworthy that Bataille’s papers on the subject neither mention nor refer to Freud.3 Let us then follow Bataille and see both the problem that troubles him and his solution. Bataille’s interest revolves around the following

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famous paragraph in Hegel’s Phenomenology which concerns the spirit’s attitude to death: to uphold the work of death is the task which demands the greatest strength. […] Now, the life of Spirit is not that life which is frightened of death, and spares itself destruction, but that life which assumes death and lives with it. Spirit attains its truth only by finding itself in absolute dismemberment. It is not that (prodigious) power by being the Positive that turns away from the Negative, as when we say of something: this is nothing or (this is) false and, having (thus) disposed of it, pass from there to something else; no, Spirit is that power only to the degree in which it contemplates the Negative face to face (and) dwells with it. This prolonged sojourn is the magical force which transposes the negative into given-Being. (Hegel 19, translation modified. Cited by Bataille, “Hegel” 331; 282-83)4

There is no need to dwell here at length on Hegel’s terminology. For the purposes of the current inquiry, the meaning of “Spirit”, according to Bataille’s reading of Hegel, resembles the human being in its higher abilities, and is opposed to nature. Hegel praises the Spirit’s ability to maintain itself in the presence of death, to be near death. In fact, when contemplating the Negative or death, the Spirit reaches its fullest realization. On the one hand, Bataille shares this worldview: Man fights against nature to establish himself as Man, and he can do so through his willingness to renounce his own animal existence. By accepting death, man turns himself from animal to human (“Hegel” 338; 288-89). Bataille carries this even further: The willingness to approach death is essential. Survival, for Bataille, is an animal quality. Every animal is concerned with its survival. Man is willing to approach death and is thereby human. He is not a slave to his survival instinct. He gains sovereignty through his willingness to risk his life.5 However, for Bataille Hegel’s description entails an inherent contradiction: the condition for the Spirit’s realization is its “absolute dismemberment,” and thus, it is at the moment of its own demolition that it becomes itself. The moment of crystallization is the moment of shattering. The animal within man—his natural nature—dies, and he is revealed to himself as man, and self-consciousness is established. But with the death of the animal that supports him, man dies as well (Bataille, “Hegel” 336; 286).6 Thus, if facing the negative is a necessity, and yet we perish in its presence, how can we fulfill our being? That life’s ultimate accomplishment will be its suicide seems to Bataille an unjustifiable dead-end. What he attempts is to find a way out. The contradiction Bataille is attempting to solve is very close to the one we met in Freud. Freud’s claim is that we cannot think of ourselves as dead, because in doing so we still have some cognizance of ourselves SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009

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as alive. This description stresses the contrast between the “aliveness” of the psyche and the “deadness” of its object. The representation is impossible because we remain alive. In Hegel we see the other side of the same problem. Maintaining the thinking mind in the presence of death is impossible. “Aliveness” and death cannot co-exist. The spirit must either renounce its attempt to contemplate death, or it will have to give up life and die in the very attempt. For both authors, then, the thinking of death is impossible. Either we survive as a thinker or we perish in death. For Bataille this impasse (in Hegel, as he understands him) is misleading and can be avoided in the phenomenon of sacrifice, and to a lesser degree, in theatre and art.7 Bataille’s focus on this paradox is not unique. It is in fact representative of a whole group of French authors, who, influenced by Hegel as mediated through Kojève’s reading, were at a certain period haunted by the problem of witnessing one’s own death (John Gregg explores the problematics in detail in his Maurice Blanchot and the literature of transgression, especially in chapters one and three), although this problem has not been linked to Freud, as is my project here. For example, the paradox finds expression in the work of Bataille’s friend Michel Leiris, in L’âge d’homme. Leiris writes: I cannot say, strictly speaking, that I die, since – dying a violent death or not – I am conscious of only part of the event. And a great share of the terror which I experience at the idea of death derives perhaps from this: bewilderment at remaining suspended in the middle of a seizure whose outcome I can never know because of my own unconsciousness. This kind of unreality, this absurdity of death, is […] its radically terrible element, and not, as some may think […], what might make it acceptable. (Manhood 50)

Elsewhere, in his autobiography, in a chapter devoted to death, Leiris develops similar notions. He links death to the persistence of the world after an individual’s disappearance and—vice-versa—one’s own survival to the disappearance of everything else (Fourbis 31, 39-40). He links it directly to the theatrical experience, a link we shall see shared by Freud and Bataille, both as spectator as performer. The theater for Leiris is the arena in which we encounter death (45-47). As an autobiographical writer, he speaks of his quest to possess himself in totality—a wish that inevitably will be frustrated by the fact that totality can only be achieved when the last gap in self knowledge—the fascinating and elusive gap of death itself—is sealed, which of course can only happen when the subject dies (22). A similar problem is explored by Bataille’s friend Maurice Blanchot, in his writing about suicide (where he mentions, in passing, the same

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paragraph by Hegel). In suicide, one mistakes two kinds of death, the voluntary and the involuntary. Blanchot explains that the expression “I kill myself” (“Je me tue”) discloses the problem: I and myself are necessarily not the same entity. The free, sovereign I is not the one who will be the object of the suicide (L’Espace 117-34). For Blanchot, this is a problem of writing itself, especially autobiographical writing, where language is used to establish a subject and to overcome death while at the same time making that subject dissolve (L’Écriture 105, cited in Gregg 44). “The book is a monument,” writes Gregg, “but an empty one” (42). In another passage by Bataille, this one from the introduction to Guilty, he insists that full consciousness is the condition of achieved death, yet such consciousness is abolished by death (241; 7). Thus we see that the stakes are high. What is at stake is the attempt of the subject to grasp itself in totality. This attempt necessitates bringing death into the account, but death itself hampers this very attempt. One never dies in the first person. Returning to Bataille, why does he believe sacrifice to be a solution to Hegel’s fundamental paradox? For him, it answers the requirements of the human, for Man meets death face to face in the sacrifice, he sojourns with it, and yet, at the same time, he preserves his life. In sacrifice, says Bataille, man destroys the animal within him and establishes his human truth as a “being unto death” (he uses Heidegger’s term). Sacrifice provides a clear manifestation of man’s fundamental negativity, in the form of death (Bataille, “Hegel” 335-36; 286). The sacrificer both destroys and survives. Moreover, in the sacrifice, death is approached voluntarily by Man. In this way the paradox is overcome, and yet remains open. We can approach death and yet remain alive, but, one might ask, is it really death that we encountered, or did we merely fabricate a simulacrum? Bataille insists elsewhere, however, that sacrifice is not a simulacrum, not a mere subterfuge. In the sacrificial ritual, a real impression of horror is cast upon the spectators. Sacrifice burns like a sun, spreading radiation our eyes can hardly bear, and calls for the negation of individuals as such (“The Festival” 313; 215). We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. Bataille’s idea of the sacrifice also addresses Freud’s paradox. It might be impossible to imagine our own death directly, but it is possible to imagine it with the aid of some mediator, to meet death through an other’s death. Yet on some level this other’s death must be our own as well for it to be effective, and indeed this is the case, says Bataille. He stresses the

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element of identification: “In the sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies himself with the animal that is struck down dead. And so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287). “There is no sacrifice,” writes Denis Hollier, “unless the one performing it identifies, in the end, with the victim” (166). Thus it is through identification, through otherness that is partly sameness, that a solution is achieved. If it were us, we would die in the act. If it were a complete other, it would not, in any way, be our death. Also noteworthy is Bataille’s stress on the involvement of sight: “and so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287), which brings him close to Freud’s view of the nature of the problem, for Freud insists on the visual, recasting the problem as one of spectatorship, imagining, perceiving. Bataille’s description recapitulates that of Freud, but renders it positive. Yes, we remain as a spectator, but it is essential that we do so. Without it, we cannot be said to have met death. Significantly, meeting death is a need, not uncalled-for. We must meet death, and we must remain as spectators. Thus it is through identification and through visual participation in the dying that a solution is achieved, accompanied by the critical revaluation of values, which renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.” Note that both possibilities of meeting death—in the sacrificial-ritual we have just explored, and in theatre or art, to which we now turn—are social. In Hegel and in Freud the problem was stated as relevant to the individual alone, whether facing reality or within the cosmos of his thought. Bataille’s solution is achieved through an expansion of the horizons into social existence. The two modes through which the contradiction can be avoided involve the presence of other people.8 A Visit to the Theater We have seen that Freud argues that death is ungraspable, and that in his struggle with a related paradox, Bataille offers a solution applicable to Freud’s argument. We shall now see ambiguous hints in Freud’s own text toward a similar solution, and examine the issue of the possible encounter with death in a more modern context than that of sacrifice, perhaps one that is closer to us. Let us first return to Freud’s argument of the impossibility of the representation of death. The point in the argument is that we remain spectators. Not specters, as one could imagine one should be, having survived one’s own death, but spectators. Speculation or thought about death fails because of the position of the spectator. Having tried to mirror ourselves in a specular way and failed, we note that we are still in there, watching. SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009


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But more than the visual, the use of the term of spectators (Zuschauer) carries us swiftly into the domain of the theater. Less than two pages later, Freud stumbles on the idea of theater more directly. Having described our tendency to push death away from life and thus to live an impoverished life, Freud continues: It is an inevitable result of all this that we should seek in the world of fiction, in literature and in the theatre compensation for what has been lost in life. There we still find people who know how to die— who, indeed, even manage to kill someone else. There alone too the condition can be fulfilled which makes it possible for us to reconcile ourselves with death: namely that behind all the vicissitudes of life we should still be able to preserve a life intact. For it is really too sad that in life it should be like it is in chess, where one false move may force us to resign the game, but with the difference that we can start no second game, no return-match. In the realm of fiction we find the plurality of lives which we need. We die with the hero with whom we have identified ourselves; yet we survive him, and are ready to die again just as safely with another hero. (“Thoughts” 291)

Although the passage is compelling, one should note that it is marginal in Freud’s text, with much poetic force yet of little relevance to the entire article. Freud does not return to it, does not treat it in depth; neither do those who have studied the question of death in Freud (Rank, Schur, Becker, Lifton, Hoffman, Yalom and Piven, among others). In any event, it is not in relation to the problem of the representation of death that he pens this passage that looks, at least at first, like a burst of literary imagination rather than a serious discussion. More important than the question of its marginality, attention should be given to what Freud does in this passage. For Freud, as can be seen from the context of this passage, what takes places in the theater belongs to the cultural-conventional attitude to death, which tries hard to ignore it. In his description theater is a sort of bourgeois solution, superficial and limited, that replaces meeting death in person. More lip-service to death than a true encounter, it is, again as the context shows, the solution of the coward. He who is unwilling to risk his life, being controlled by fear (Freud’s point in the passage that precedes the one on the theater) finds some surrogate satisfaction, a mild compensation, by proxy, in seeing others pretend to die. Freud’s description stresses another point: the survival of the spectator and the necessary detachment implied by the possibility of replacing one hero for another. Theater does not reveal anything to us about death, for “behind all the vicissitudes of life we should still be able to preserve a life intact.” Thus not only do we survive the hero, we even benefit from his death: this is what we seek, our own survival. In that SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009

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description, we come to the theater in order to make sure that we keep death away. We come to meet our “aliveness” again, once again to confirm ourselves in our complete rejection of death. Night after night in the theater, we convince ourselves of our immunity and invulnerability. The entire artistic setting helps us: we can always step out of the enchanted dream, out of the willing suspension of disbelief, and tell ourselves: “After all, it is only a show, only a story.”9 Thus there is no real danger, no real undermining of our security. Theater, Freud seems to suggest, is just a play. But is theater really that meaningless? Is the encounter with death there really a missed encounter? We shall now turn to Bataille, who offers an alternative view, where theater is regarded as much more serious. Theatrical art, Bataille reminds, is the heir to religion. Theatrical representation evolved from the sacrificial rite and still maintains its essence, which is, as we have seen, to enable us to come close to death (La Littérature 214; 69). Theater, literature in general, and the sacrificial rituals are essential to us: through them we become human, for we can familiarize ourselves with death and distance ourselves from our animal nature. Theater, according to Bataille’s description, overcomes Hegel’s paradox: “In tragedy, at least, it is a question of our identifying with some character who dies, and of believing that we die, although we are alive (Bataille, “Hegel” 337; 287). Bataille’s phrasing is almost identical to that of Freud. But the perspective differs. It is a delicate yet crucial nuance. Bataille, in contrast with Freud (under the above reading), stresses that we really do get a glimpse of dying there, that it is not merely a game. He also views the encounter with death as an existential necessity, crucial for Man to be human, not as some entertainment. And third, there is a twist of value: for Bataille we actively try to bring death closer, trying to force ourselves to represent it, in various cultural ways (sacrifice, art). Theater, be it tragedy or comedy, is very serious for Bataille, and he attempts to explain why: if, he says, the goal of all life is to push death aside, to head away from it, theater offers an element in life that goes in the opposite direction. Instead of moving us away from death, it brings us nearer. It serves a deep need in us. “…Just as certain insects, in given conditions, flock towards a ray of light,” Bataille writes, “so we all flock to an area at the opposite end of the scale from death. The mainspring of human activity is generally the desire to reach the point farthest from the funeral domain.” Yet it is sometimes necessary for life not to “flee from the shades of death,” but to “allow…them to grow within it” (La

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Littérature 212-13; 66-67). Moreover, this should not be done passively, in spite of ourselves: “we must,” Bataille insists, “revive [the shades of death] voluntarily.” One of our ways to do so is art. “The arts […] incessantly evoke these derangements, these lacerations, this decline which our entire activity endeavors to avoid,” and it is done in order to arouse anxiety in us. Sacrifice is of the same nature (213-14; 67-68). Not that we die in the theater. Bataille is aware, as is Freud, that by surviving the protagonists we only affirm life once again. Our laughter or our tears signify that for a moment, “death appears light to us” (La Littérature 214; 68). Yet if it appears light, it is because for a moment it is as though we have risen beyond the horror, for a moment we are not busy fearing death: at that moment we come to understand something about the presence of death. It teaches us that “when we flee wisely from the elements of death, we merely want to preserve life,” whereas, by entering those “regions that wisdom tells us to avoid, we really live it.” By coming close to death, to the symbols of its emptiness, we get “a heightened consciousness of being.” When we laugh in the theater, such laughter “brings us out […] from the impasse in which life is enclosed by those whose only concern is to preserve life” (214; 68, italics in original). Theater thus has a liberating power. It frees us from the concern of pushing death aside, it brings us into contact with it and thus illuminates the rest of our life, constantly busy with fleeing death, in a peculiar light. For a moment we are, as it were, free from that compulsive need, and can have a different perspective on life. Returning to Freud, we can try to read his passage through Bataille’s lens and ask whether the theatrical-artistic possibility is really so superficial. Reading against the grain, we can see that Freud does actually offer something there. Even if what we wish in theater is to “be able to preserve a life intact,” it is noteworthy that we seek it. Although the result is similar to that described in the paradox of the impossibility of the representation of death, namely our survival after the representation, there is a difference. There, it was a limitation we encountered, that we remained alive (or was it? We shall see later), whereas here, concerning the theater, it is something we seek: to meet death and yet “preserve a life intact.” Even if only to reaffirm our “aliveness,” we do display a certain magnetic attraction towards death. We might have remained alive, but with some integration of death into this “aliveness.” Theatrical representation, according to Freud’s text, also provides us with a model for another approach to death, one that does not shun it. “There we still find people who know how to die – who, indeed, even

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manage to kill someone else.” Those people do not embrace our own cowardly evasive attitude to death, they are not obsessed with keeping themselves at a distance from death. They approach it. Theater may not represent death, but it does manage to present us with a model of how to approach it. The crucial element here is that death, in the theater, is the death of an other. Blind as we are to our own death, and in other circumstances blind to the death of the other, in theater we manage in some way, albeit limited, to experience death. For if we identify, as Freud says, with the hero, it means that there is a certain link between him and us. It means that although the overall outcome is that we are only reassured during the spectacle itself, we might still be temporarily seized with apprehension of death. Although turning to the other looks protective at first, it might still shake our affirmation of ourselves to a certain degree. In part this seems due to the hybrid status—split between otherness and sameness—of the hero in the theatrical representation or the literary work: on the one hand, different, estranged from ourselves; on the other hand, close to us through our identification with him. In a sense, we are the same. This hybrid position seems to be the opening through which recognition of death might enter our sheltered, protective person.10 Thus Freud’s text, although it insists on the irrepresentability of death, actually offers, unintentionally perhaps, a possible way out of the paradox through turning to the other. Death perhaps cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped sideways, indirectly, vicariously through a mirror, to use Perseus’s ancient trick against Medusa. The introduction of the other, both similar to and different from oneself, into the equation of death helps break out of the Cartesian circle with both its incontestable truth and its solipsism and affirmation of oneself. The safety that theater provides, of essentially knowing that we will remain alive, emerges as a kind of requirement for our ability to really identify with the other. In that, it paradoxically enables us to really get a taste of death. Bataille radicalizes that possibility. Although Freud deems the estrangement of death from psychic life a problem, as we have seen and shall see, theater is not a solution for him. With Bataille however, theater emerges as a much more compelling alternative. Again, it is a matter of a delicate nuance, but a nuance that makes all the difference. The idea common to both authors—that we can meet death through the other and yet remain alive—is ambiguous. One can lay stress on that encounter or on the fact of remaining alive.11 Freud

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tends to opt for the second possibility, but his text can also be read as supporting the first. The benefit in bringing Freud and Bataille together is that it invites us to that second reading. An Encounter with Death Death in Freud is often the death of the other. Both the fear of death and the death wish are often focused on the other as their object. But almost always it is as though through the discussion of the other Freud were trying to keep death at bay. But along with Bataille, we can take this other more seriously. Imagining our own death might be impossible, yet we can still get a glimpse of death when it is an other that dies. In one passage in his text, the death of the other seems more explicitly a crucial point for Freud as well—one passage where death does not seem so distant. Freud comments on the attitude of primeval Man to death, as described above—namely that he wishes it in others but ignores it in himself. “But there was for him one case in which the two opposite attitudes towards death collided,” he continues. It occurred when primeval man saw someone who belonged to him die—his wife, his child, his friend […]. Then, in his pain, he was forced to learn that one can die, too, oneself, and his whole being revolted against the admission. (“Thoughts” 293)

Freud goes on to explain that the loved one was at once part of himself, and a stranger whose death pleased primeval man. It is from this point, Freud continues, that philosophy, psychology and religion sprang.12 I have described elsewhere (Razinsky, “A Struggle”) how Freud’s reluctance to admit the importance of death quickly undermines this juncture of the existential encounter with death by focusing on the emotional ambivalence of primeval man rather than on death itself. However, the description is there and is very telling. Primeval man witnessed death, and “his whole being revolted against the admission.” ”Man could no longer keep death at a distance, for he had tasted it in his pain about the dead” (Freud, “Thoughts” 294). Once again, it is through the death of the other that man comes to grasp death. Once again, we have that special admixture of the other being both an other and oneself that facilitates the encounter with death. Something of myself must be in the other in order for me to see his death as relevant to myself. Yet his or her otherness, which means my reassurance of my survival, is no less crucial, for if it were not present, there would be no acknowledgement of death, one’s own death always being, says Freud, one’s blind spot.13

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I mentioned before Heidegger’s grappling with a problem similar to Bataille’s paradox. It is part of Heidegger’s claim, which he shares with Freud, that one’s death is unimaginable. In a famous section Heidegger mentions the possibility of coming to grasp death through the death of the other but dismisses it, essentially since the other in that case would retain its otherness: the other’s death is necessarily the other’s and not mine (47:221-24). Thus we return to the problem we started with—that of the necessary subject-object duality in the process of the representation of death. Watching the dead object will no more satisfy me than imagining myself as an object, for the radical difference of both from me as a subject will remain intact. But the possibility that seems to emerge from the discussion of Freud and Bataille is that in-between position of the person both close and distant, both self and other, which renders true apprehension of death possible, through real identification.14 As Bataille says, regarding the Irish Wake custom where the relatives drink and dance before the body of the deceased: “It is the death of an other, but in such instances, the death of the other is always the image of one’s own death” (“Hegel” 341; 291). Bataille speaks of the dissolution of the subject-object boundaries in sacrifice, of the “fusion of beings” in these moments of intensity (“The Festival” 307-11; 210-13; La Littérature 215; 70). Possibly, that is what happens to primeval man when the loved one dies and why his “whole being” is affected. He himself is no longer sure of his identity. Before, it was clear—there is the other, the object, whom one wants dead, and there is oneself, a subject. The show and the spectators. Possibly what man realized before the cadaver of his loved one was that he himself is also an object, taking part in the world of objects, and not only a subject. When he understood this, it seems to me, he understood death. For in a sense a subject subjectively never dies. Psychologically nothing limits him,15 while an object implies limited existence: limited by other objects that interact with it, limited in space, limited in being the thought-content of someone else. Moreover, primeval man understood that he is the same for other subjects as other subjects are for him—that is, they can wish him dead or, which is pretty much the same, be indifferent to his existence. The encounter made primeval man step out of the psychological position of a center, transparent to itself, and understand that he is not only a spirit but also a thing, an object, not only a spectator; this is what really shakes him.16 The Highest Stake in the Game of Living Thus far we have mainly discussed our first two questions: the limitation in imagining death and the possible solution through a form SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009


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of praxis, in either a channeled, ritualized or a spontaneous encounter with the death of an other, overcoming the paradox of the impossibility of representation by involving oneself through deep identification. We shall now turn to our third question, of the value of integrating death into our thoughts. We have seen that Bataille’s perspective continuously brings up the issue of the value of approaching death. The questions of whether we can grasp death and, if we can, how, are not merely abstract or neutral ones. The encounter with death, that we now see is possible, seems more and more to emerge as possessing a positive value, indeed as fundamental. What we shall now examine is Freud’s attempt to address that positive aspect directly, an attempt that betrays, however, a deep ambivalence. As mentioned, Freud’s text is very confused, due to true hesitation between worldviews (see Razinsky, “A Struggle”). One manifestation of this confusion is Freud’s position regarding this cultural-conventional attitude: on the one hand he condemns it, yet on the other hand he accepts it as natural and inevitable. For him, it results to some extent from death’s exclusion from unconscious thought (“Thoughts” 289, 296-97). Death cannot be represented and is therefore destined to remain foreign to our life.17 But then Freud suddenly recognizes an opposite necessity: not to reject death but to insert it into life. Not to distance ourselves from it, but to familiarize ourselves with it: But this attitude [the cultural-conventional one] of ours towards death has a powerful effect on our lives. Life is impoverished, it loses in interest, when the highest stake in the game of living, life itself, may not be risked. It becomes as shallow and empty as, let us say, an American flirtation, in which it is understood from the first that nothing is to happen, as contrasted with a Continental love-affair in which both partners must constantly bear its serious consequences in mind. Our emotional ties, the unbearable intensity of our grief, make us disinclined to court danger for ourselves and for those who belong to us. We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but in fact indispensable, such as attempts at artificial flight, expeditions to distant countries or experiments with explosive substances. We are paralyzed by the thought of who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children, if a disaster should occur. Thus the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions. Yet the motto of the Hanseatic League ran: ‘Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse.’ (“It is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live.”) (“Thoughts” 290-91)

Readers unfamiliar with Freud’s paper are probably shaking their heads in disbelief. Is it Freud who utters these words? Indeed, the oddity of this citation cannot be over-estimated. It seems not to belong to Freud’s

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thought. One can hardly find any other places where he speaks of such an intensification of life and fascination with death, and praises uncompromising risk-taking and the neglect of realistic considerations. In addition to being unusual, the passage itself is somewhat unclear.18 The examples—not experimenting with explosive substances—seem irrelevant and unconvincing. The meaning seems to slide. It is not quite clear if the problem is that we do not bring death into our calculations, as the beginning seems to imply, or that, rather, we actually bring it into our calculations too much, as is suggested at the end But what I wish to stress here is that the passage actually opposes what Freud says in the preceding passages, where he describes the cultural-conventional attitude and speaks of our inability to make death part of our thoughts. In both the current passage and later passages he advocates including death in life, but insists, elsewhere in the text, that embracing death is impossible. In a way, he is telling us that we cannot accept the situation where death is constantly evaded. Here again Bataille can be useful in rendering Freud’s position more intelligible. He seems to articulate better than Freud the delicate balance, concerning the place of death in psychic life, between the need to walk on the edge, and the flight into normalcy and safety. As I asserted above, where in Freud there are contradictory elements, in Bataille there is a dialectic. Bataille, as we have seen, presents the following picture: It might be that, guided by our instincts, we tend to avoid death. But we also seem to have a need to intersperse this flight with occasional peeps into the domain of death. When we invest all of our effort in surviving, something of the true nature of life evades us. It is only when the finite human being goes beyond the limitations “necessary for his preservation,” that he “asserts the nature of his being” (La Littérature 214; 68). The approaches of both Bataille and Freud are descriptive as well as normative. Bataille describes a tendency to distance ourselves from death and a tendency to get close to it. But he also describes Man’s need to approach death from a normative point of view, in order to establish his humanity: a life that is only fleeing death has less value. Freud carefully describes our tendency to evade death and, in the paragraph under discussion, calls for the contrary approach. This is stressed at the end of the article, where he encourages us to “give death the place in reality and in our thoughts which is its due” (“Thoughts” 299). Paradoxically, it might be what will make life “more tolerable for us once again” (299). But since Freud also insists not only on a tendency within us to evade death, but also on the impossibility of doing otherwise, and on how

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death simply cannot be the content of our thought, his sayings in favor of bringing death close are confusing and confused. Freud does not give us a reason for the need to approach death. He says that life loses in interest, but surely this cannot be the result of abstaining from carrying out “experiments with explosive substances.” In addition, his ideas on the shallowness of a life without death do not seem to evolve from anything in his approach. It is along the lines offered by Bataille’s worldview that I wish to interpret them here. Sacrifice, Bataille says, brings together life in its fullness and the annihilation of life. We are not mere spectators in the sacrificial ritual. Our participation is much more involved. Sacrificial ritual creates a temporary, exceptionally heightened state of living. “The sacred horror,” he calls the emotion experienced in sacrifice: “the richest and most agonizing experience.” It “opens itself, like a theater curtain, on to a realm beyond this world” and every limited meaning is transfigured in it (“Hegel” 338; 288). Bataille lays stress on vitality. Death is not humanizing only on the philosophical level, as it is for Hegel or Kojève. Bataille gives it an emotional twist. The presence of death, which he interprets in a more earthly manner, is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and other related elements (violence) bring life closer to a state where individuality melts, the mediation of the intellect between us and the world lessens, and life is felt at its fullest. Bataille calls this state, or aspect of the world, immanence or intimacy: “immanence between man and the world, between the subject and the object” (“The Festival” 307-311; 210-213). Moments of intensity are moments of excess and of fusion of beings (La Littérature 215; 70). They are a demand of life itself, even though they sometimes seem to contradict it. Death is problematic for us, but it opens up for us something in life. This line of thought seems to accord very well with the passage in Freud’s text with which we are dealing here, and to extend it. Life without death is life lacking in intensity, an impoverished, shallow and empty life. Moreover, the repression of death is generalized and extended: “the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions.” Freud simply does not seem to have the conceptual tools to discuss these ideas. The intuition is even stronger in the passage that follows, where Freud discusses war (note that the paper is written in 1915): When war breaks out, he says, this cowardly, conservative, risk-rejecting attitude is broken at once. War eliminates this conventional attitude to death. “Death could no longer be

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denied. We are forced to believe in it. People really die. . . . Life has, indeed, become interesting again; it has recovered its full content” (“Thoughts” 291). Thus what is needed is more than the mere accounting of consequences, taking death into consideration as a future possibility. What is needed is exposure to death, a sanguineous imprinting of death directly on our minds, through the “accumulation of deaths” of others. Life can only become vivid, fresh, and interesting when death is witnessed directly. Both authors speak of a valorization of death, and in both there is a certain snobbery around it. While the masses follow the natural human tendency to avoid death, like the American couple or those who are busy with the thought of “who is to take our place,” the individualists do not go with the herd, and by allowing themselves to approach death, achieve a fuller sense of life, neither shallow nor empty.19 Yet again, Freud’s claims hover in the air, lacking any theoretical background. Bataille supplies us with such background. He contests, as we have seen, the sole focus on survival. Survival, he tells us, has a price. It limits our life. As if there were an inherent tension between preserving life and living it. Freud poses the same tension here. Either we are totally absorbed by the wish to survive, to keep life intact, and therefore limit our existence to the bare minimum, or else we are willing to risk it to some extent in order to make it more interesting, more vital and valuable. Our usual world, according to Bataille, is characterized by the duration of things, by the “future” function, rather than by the present. Things are constituted as separate objects in view of future time. This is one reason for the threat of death: it ruins value where value is only assured through duration. It also exposes the intimate order of life that is continuously hidden from us in the order of things where life runs its normal course. Man “is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things” (“The Festival” 312; 214). Sacrifice is the opposite of production and accumulation. Death is not so much a negation of life, as it is an affirmation of the intimate order of life, which is opposed to the normal order of things and is therefore rejected. “The power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral image of life […]. Death reveals life in its plenitude” (309; 212). Bataille’s “neutral image of life” is the equivalent of Freud’s “shallow and empty” life. What Freud denounces is a life trapped within the cowardly economical system of considerations. It is precisely the economy of value and future-oriented calculations that stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life. “Who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his

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children.” Of course there is an emotional side to the story, but it is this insistence on replacement that leaves us on the side of survival and stops us sometimes from living the present. “The need for duration,” in the words of Bataille, “conceals life from us” (“The Festival” 309; 212). For both authors, when death is left out, life “as it is” is false and superficial. Another Look at Speculation Both authors, then, maintain that if elements associated with death invade our life anyway, we might as well succumb and give them an ordered place in our thoughts. The necessity to meet death is not due to the fact that we do not have a choice. Rather, familiarization with death is necessary if life is to have its full value, and is part of what makes us human. But the tension between the tendencies—to flee death or to embrace it—is not easily resolved, and the evasive tendency always tries to assert itself. As seen above, Bataille maintains that in sacrifice, we are exposed through death to other dimensions of life. But the exposure, he adds, is limited, for next comes another phase, performed post-hoc, after the event: the ensuing horror and the intensity are too high to maintain, and must be countered. Bataille speaks of the justifications of the sacrifice given by cultures, which inscribe it in the general order of things. Thus, sacrifice is said to foster more rain, to appease the gods, or to help in war. These explanations, he insists, are always secondary (“Hegel” 342-3; 291-2), contrary to the very essence of sacrifice, which entails a glimpse into the intimate order of the world, characterized by intensity, lack of distinctions and “immanence between man and the world, between the subject and the object” (“The Festival” 307; 210). And still, the explanations are essential and cannot be eliminated.20 Thus, crossing over into the realm where Man is revealed to himself through getting a glimpse at nothingness, where life’s immanence is exposed in its totality, is possible, says Bataille, but only for a limited time and to a limited degree. Sacrifice is a gesture that is not directed towards an aim, thereby achieving a certain amount of autonomy or sovereignty. Yet discourse is immediately brought up to seal what has been opened. The sacrifice is always subjugated to some discourse that binds it to the utilitarian system. Thus Bataille’s solution—or actually the solution of the cultures that sacrifice—is only limited, partial. (This seems to echo Derrida’s famous critique of Bataille in his analysis of that text. According to Derrida, Bataille seems to want to step out of the system of signification, but, ultimately, he remains within it. With relation to the Hegelian system, one could say that transgression, as a form of

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sublation, remains essentially bound to what it transgresses [Trahair 164, 167]). But in fact, can it be otherwise? Is this partiality coincidental? If our starting point, in Freud and Hegel, was that death is either pushed away or gains full control, we seem to be back to square one. Once again death cannot be looked at, once again life has won over it, once again we remain spectators. This failure seems more and more to be rooted in the nature of death, rather than in the clumsiness of our attempts. Yet this failure does not mean the whole enterprise is valueless, for three reasons. The first is that indeed there was a meeting with death, in the sacrifice or theatrical act. We did approach it. The necessity to seal the breach made in the fabric of reality is inevitable, but it only comes into play after some encounter with death has already taken place, and testifies to that encounter. We immediately try to tame death, but only at the second stage. Moreover, this is not a one-time act, but an ongoing process. Bringing in discourse to push away death will not prevent man from engaging again in the act of sacrifice, or, more generally, from trying to approach death again, and failing again. Third, this time, we ourselves have made the effort to meet death. It has not infiltrated our lives in spite of ourselves. Rather, we approached it ourselves. So, we might be back to square one, but in a different manner. We are human, Bataille would say, because we have that necessity to familiarize ourselves with death. Both the limitations and the reservations are valid to Freud’s case as well, and can be applied to his text. Death cannot be represented qua death; yet this failure in representation is not an end point, but rather a beginning—a starting point for much psychic work, and a starting point for more attempts at representation. There is a process involved here. In a way, one should only take Freud’s words literally. “It is indeed impossible to imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to do so we can perceive that we are in fact still present as spectators.” Death might be irrepresentable. But why do we “attempt to do so”? What disposes us to try to figure out death for ourselves? If Freud’s descriptions of how we avoid death were the sole truth, how would he explain that? The idea that there is a necessity for human beings to try to integrate death into their thoughts and into their lives seems more fitting here. The attempt might be unsuccessful, yet we keep repeating it: “whenever (so oft) we attempt to do so.” Why do we repeat the act if it is doomed to failure? Why do we not understand that death simply cannot be grasped? It seems we are not satisfied with something. Possibly, we only try to do so because we know we will find ourselves as spectators, thereby abating

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the anxiety. The attempt at representation will therefore be similar to the sacrificial act or the theatrical experience: it brings us close to death and satisfies that need, yet assures us in advance that it is only “make believe,” that we will not be personally touched by it. But it is also possible that the necessity to come close to death is what drives us to attempt representation. The attempt to understand death, to imagine it to ourselves, to represent it, fails. We discover that we are still there. As a result of the impossibility of representation, Freud concludes that in our unconscious we are immortal, that “no one believes in his own death.” There is a gap here, and the conclusion does not follow logically, as is already noted by Hoffman (236). But there is more than flawed logic here. The nature of our attitude to death is at stake. The failure to represent, to imagine, should not mean death is unavailable to us. It only means it is unreachable through understanding. We cannot grasp it. But death is presented to us in the terror it inflicts on us in certain events; it can be very present to us when it breaks into our world, as seen above, through the mediation of an other. Trying to imagine death, to grasp it as it were consciously, is to try and clothe it with sense. This, as Bataille explained, is doomed to failure. The attempt to impose sense on it will necessarily distort death. Binding what in its nature defies representation, the pure negative, into discursive thought must result in failure. That we remain spectators is only a manifestation of the problem. Grasping it would give us something else. It does not mean anything about the availability of death to us, only about its availability to conscious, discursive thought, or as an object of thought or imagination. Therefore Freud’s jump is all the more unjustified. The problem is not that the attempt to imagine fails. The problem is that we attempt. Thus the failure to grasp death is significant. There is an internal contradiction in trying to do so, for it immediately seals any true apprehension of it. Death’s presence is too unsettling anyway. In the same manner that sacrifice enables a transgression of the common order, while reinstating that order through the meaning given to the sacrifice, we attempt to meet death, and miraculously the natural state of things is reinstated. We look around and make sure: yes, we are still here as spectators, everything is OK. We try to avoid thinking of death, yet we are also attracted to it, sensing its importance; we try to grasp it in our thought, but fail, and then avoid it again. There is this back-and-forth movement between us and the idea of death, not just rejection. Representation fails, but so does repression. Freud grapples with it in his paper, not always knowingly.

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Thus, when in the last paragraph he advocates taking death again into consideration, yet contends at the beginning of the text that it is impossible, for there is no place for it, he is perhaps delineating this back-and-forth movement. Looking back at our three questions, what emerges is their interconnectedness. First we saw that the question of how we can grasp death is intrinsically related to the question of whether we can do so at all, not for the obvious reason that the second answers the former, but since part of the difficulty in grasping it is precisely the attempt to grasp it in thought, while the encounter with it is done in praxis, taking place in life. We also see that the question of the possibility or impossibility of grasping death stands in a serious dialectic relationship with the question of the value of integrating death in life; the latter both motivates the need for grasping and is motivated by its failure. It is the integration of Bataille’s ideas with those of Freud that helps illuminate these connections, enriching the limited picture Freud presents of contradictory elements whose contradiction, moreover, is not recognized. The current paper, through reading Freud together with Bataille, was concerned with exploring some of the complexity of the attitude to death, with both its evasive pole and its attraction to it.21 I have examined both the elusive difficulty of grasping death itself, and the solution that seems to emerge from the texts of both authors—namely that death could be grasped through some praxis that involves the concrete other as a mediator, half-self, half-other. At a higher level, the difficulty of grasping death was discussed as part of the attempt to get a hold on it, a hold that necessarily distorts its object. Above all, the attempt to represent, whether successful or failing, is important for what it is—an attempt to approach death—for leaving death out requires too high a price. It is now, having come this far, that Freud’s concluding words become more loaded with meaning: We recall the old saying Si vis pacem, para bellum. If you want to preserve peace, arm for war. It would be in keeping with the times to alter it: Si vis vitam, para mortem. If you want to endure life, prepare yourself for death. (“Thoughts” 299-300)

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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Works Cited Bataille, Georges. “Le Coupable.” 1961. Œuvres Complètes, Paris: Gallimard, 1988. Vol 5, 235-392. —. “Guilty.” Trans. Bruce Boone. Intro. Denis. Hollier. Venice, San Francisco: The Lapis Press, 1988. —.“Hegel, Death and Sacrifice.” The Bataille Reader. Eds. Fred. Botting and Scott Wilson. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. 279-95. —. “Hegel, la Mort et le Sacrifice.” 1955. Œuvres Complètes. Paris: Gallimard, 1988.Vol. 12, 326-45 —. “Le Sacrifice.” From La Littérature et le Mal. 1957. Œuvres Complètes. Paris: Gallimard, 1988. Vol. 9, 212-16. —. “The Sacrifice.” Literature and Evil. Trans Alastair Hamilton. New York and London: Marion Boyars, 1973. 66-70. —. “Le Sacrifice, la Fête et les Principes du Monde Sacré.” From Théorie de la Religion. 1974 [1948]. Œuvres Complètes. Paris: Gallimard, 1988. Vol. 7, 281-361 —. “Sacrifice, the Festival and the Principles of the Sacred World.” From Theory of Religion. The Bataille Reader. Eds. Fred. Botting and Scott Wilson. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. 210-19. Becker, Ernest. The Denial of Death. New York, NY: The Free Press, 1973. Blanchot, Maurice. L’espace Littéraire. Gallimard, 1955 Derrida, Jacques. “From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism without Reserve.” Bataille: A Critical Reader. Eds. Fred Botting and Scott Wilson. Trans. Alan Bass. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998. 102-138 Freud, Sigmund. Totem and Taboo. 1913. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Ed. James Strachey. London: Hogarth Press. Vol. 13, 1-161. —. (1915). “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death.” Standard Edition. Vol. 14, 273300. Gregg, John. Maurice Blanchot and the Literature of Transgression, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. Hegel, G. W. F.. Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. A.V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977. Heidegger, Martin. Being and time. 1927. Trans Joan Stambaugh. New York, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996. Hollier, Denis. Against Architecture. The Writings of Georges Bataille. Trans. Betsy Wing. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 1989 [1974]. Hoffman, Irwin. Z. “Death Anxiety and Adaptation to Mortality in Psychoanalytic Theory.” The Annual of Psychoanalysis 7 (1979): 233-69. Leiris, Michel., Fourbis (La règle du jeu II). NRF, Gallimard, 1955. —. Manhood. Trans Richard Howard. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992. Lifton, Robert. J. The Broken Connection: On Death and the Continuity of life. New-York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1979. Piven, Jerry. Death and Delusion: A Freudian Analysis of mortal Terror. Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing, 2004. Rank, Otto. Will Therapy and Truth and Reality. Trans. JessieTaft. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950 [1945].. Razinsky, Liran. “Driving Death Away: Death and Freud’s Theory of the Death Drive. 2009, in review. —. “On the Strange Case of the Attitude of Psychoanalysis towards Death.” Contemporary Psychoanalysis 43.1 (2007): 149-64. —. “A Psychoanalytic Struggle with the Concept of Death: A New Reading of Freud’s ‘Thoughts for the Times on War and Death’.” Psychoanalytic Review 94.3 (2007): 35588.

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Roudinesco, Elisabeth. “Bataille entre Freud et Lacan: Une Expérience Cachée.” Georges Bataille Après Tout. Ed. Denis Hollier. France: Éditions Belin, 1995. 191-212 Schur, Max. Freud, Living and Dying. New York, NY: International Universities Press, 1972. Trahair, Lisa. “The Comedy of Philosophy. Bataille, Hegel and Derrida.” Angelaki 6.3 (2001): 155-69. Yalom, Irvin. D. Existential Psychotherapy. New York, NY: Basic Books, 1980.

Notes 1. I would like to thank Betty Rojtman for her illuminating comments on Bataille’s work, to which the current paper owes much. I also wish to thank Denis Holier for his helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 2. See Rank, Becker, Lifton, Hoffman, Yalom, Piven, and Razinsky (“A Struggle”; “On the Strange Case”; “Driving Death Away”). 3. I will not deal here with other influences on Bataille relevant to the issues discussed here, such as Artaud or Nietzsche. Heidegger is only briefly discussed. For the question of Bataille’s use of Freud see Roudinesco. 4. Here, as later, the first page number refers to the original French text of Bataille, the second to the English translation. 5. In order to fully understand the necessity for the spirit to be in the vicinity of death and to have it as a content of thought one needs to examine both Hegel’s philosophy and Kojève’s interpretation. While doing so in any depth would take us too far from the aim of this paper, I shall here give a brief explanation, based on the descriptions of both Bataille and Kojève. The spirit’s essential nature is nothingness, manifested in the form of negation, transformation, destruction. It is negation that differentiates the human being from the animal (Bataille, “Hegel” 327, 332; 280, 283-84). This negative action, which is man’s most salient attribute, does not stop at man himself, before the negating agency, but is rather applied to man’s own existence. For man is nature as well, and if he negates nature, he also negates himself, or the animal within him (33132; 283). Another point that needs elaboration concerns the consciousness of death. The discourse of the speaking subject must encompass reality in its totality. The subject himself is part of reality and thus should also be an object of the discourse. From here the idea develops that it does not suffice that man dies, he must also be conscious of that death. Self-consciousness must include consciousness of negativity and of the death that makes Man Man (Bataille, “Hegel” 336; 286-87). This is part of the paradox, since consciousness of death can only be of death in the future, and not of being dead. The presence of death does not suffice; it must be accompanied by the consciousness of it. Mere dying will not do the job. The paradox Bataille points to, and which one can already find in Kojève, is already clear to Hegel, who therefore replaces the necessity of death itself with the revelation of Man to himself by the willingness to risk one’s life. 6. Heidegger grapples with a similar problem in Being and Time (46:219-21). Dasein’s totality, required for a full understanding of Being, is to be achieved only in its death and never before, while in death, Dasein no longer exists, and can make no use of its totality which, under that description, seems never accessible to it. 7. The impasse or difference between Hegel and Bataille can be described in terms of discourse and conceptualization of death. As Denis Hollier succinctly notes (50-1), Hegel sees death as already involved in the work of the mind, which consists of dividing and abstracting. Death is thus the essential element of discursive knowl-

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edge. Only later do the abstract concepts become a rigid system. For Bataille, in contrast, the systematic petrifaction is in a way part and parcel of thinking itself, and death—which works against rigidity—is necessarily missed by it rather than integral to it. “Death fluidifies, it liquefies.” Conceptualization necessarily eludes it. It does not remain preserved in death as Hegel would want it. 8. In Hegel’s master and slave dialectics, facing death can be seen as imbedded in an interpersonal context, although we see this neither in the passage cited here, nor in Bataille’s commentaries on Hegel. It is perhaps worth noting that while Freud himself thoroughly analyzed sacrifice and other rituals in his Totem and Taboo, and linked it directly with death, his analysis does not resemble that of Bataille in that he does not see sacrifice as a means to meet death, but rather as a means of pushing it away, of defending oneself against it. He makes an interesting point, however, noting that in the invention of souls and in attributing so much power to them, primitive man might have tried to dismiss the importance of death and to defend himself against it, but actually yielded to its power by relinquishing some of his power in the world in favor of the world of spirits (93). 9. The artistic setting is limited in time and space, and even there, within the limits of the theater hall, it is not real: the hero does not really die; moreover, he is not himself, but an actor playing him, and the death of the one is not the death of the other, and so we are as safe as can be. 10. In theater there is an other with whom we identify, and in that identification we are both him and ourselves, we are both ourselves and different from ourselves. Thus not only is there a difference, self-other, from the point of view of the situation, but there is an internal difference due to identification. We ourselves are split. 11. The difference reflects a distinction between two conceptions of the theatrical impact: an Aristotelian conception that focuses on catharsis; and the conception, of Artaud and others, which stresses the disturbance of normal life achieved in theatre. 12. It is noteworthy that the first result of this recognition of death is the invention of the soul, “the division of the individual into a body and a soul” (Freud, “Thoughts” 294). Thus we have reestablished the first di-vision implied in ourselves having to be spectators. 13. Thus Freud’s stress on ambivalence is nevertheless interesting. It can be enriched if we combine it with Bataille’s own concept of an emotional ambivalence that is also part of the experience of facing death. There is more to facing death than sadness. Bataille describes customs in which the relatives of the deceased dance and drink in front of the body (“Hegel” 341; 290-91). The emotions aroused by sacrifice are complex: both horror and pleasure, anxiety and elation. Gaiety is no denial. It does not cancel death, says Bataille. It necessarily accompanies anxiety and exacerbates it; they reinforce one another (340-42; 289-91). This adds to the description in the above paragraph, and to Freud’s insistence on ambivalence, which might indeed have played a crucial role in forming primeval man’s attitude towards death, albeit on a different level than the one originally proposed by Freud. The mixture and ambivalence regarding the dear one are necessary. For if it were only his enemy he would reject it, and in rejecting, would remain defensive. If it were his own self that had died he would, of course, not be there to experience it, and if it was the danger alone for himself and not the actual death, he would be anguished but not gay; he would not approach death of his own volition. In the case of a loved one, he both willed it and was afraid of it, and this is why his whole being revolted: death could really touch him. His gaiety made him more open to the experience and therefore all the more anxious. 14. Note that from a psychoanalytic point of view, in the case of real death, the above qualification, being both close and distant, holds for any loved one who dies. Re-

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member that Freud characterizes the unconscious attitude as similar to that of primeval man, which is what makes the discussion of it so relevant for us here. 15. This is of course true only from a certain point. Subject also implies being subject to, and from a sociological point of view appears as limited as can be. Yet from a certain philosophical perspective, which overlaps the psychoanalytic idea of omnipotent narcissism, the subjective point of view is indeed unlimited. In Totem and Taboo Freud cites, and does not dispute, the idea that “a sort of Solipsism, or Berkleianism . . . operates in the savage to make him refuse to recognize death as a fact” (90n). 16. Returning to Freud’s original paradox one may note that the failure to imagine oneself dead is only a partial failure. Although the paradox stresses the impossibility of stepping out of the subject’s position, the spectator, it does present oneself as divided, being at once in the position of a subject and that of an object. 17. Freud is caught here in confusion between the “can not” and “will not” regarding the representation of death, and treats them as one (Razinsky, “A Struggle”). As put by Hoffman, regarding some of Freud’s formulations in that article: “the language of cognitive limitation is hopelessly entangled with the language of defensive avoidance” (237). But it remains that Freud describes our tendency to reject death, to place ourselves, in thought and behavior, as far from it as possible. 18. This passage can be added to several others in Freud’s writings that demonstrate how his insistence on keeping death away from the psychoanalytic theory is opposed to the overwhelming reality of death in human life, and biases him time and again into somewhat strange statements that remain unique, estranged from the rest of the corpus of his writings. Here then is one such case. 19. Actually Freud is mocking two types here. First are those who ignore death, bury their head in the sand and do not think of the consequences. On the other hand there are those who are too preoccupied with it, who fear it too much. The tendency in both is to move away from death. In the one, we avoid the thought; in the other, we avoid the thing (death). 20. As we have seen, it is also the case that Freud’s description of the encounter with physical death does not end with the horror itself, but rather in a post-hoc stage, which is for him of the birth of culture. The soul, religion and philosophy are invented out of necessity to overcome the encounter with death. 21. Some readers might feel that Freud’s theory of the death drive is relevant to the current paper. It is intentional that it was not linked to the ideas on attraction to death presented above, for it is my position that the death drive has nothing to do with the necessity of approaching death for human life to be full, or with the role of death as constitutive of humanity as presented here, a position whose justification would however be beyond the scope of the current paper. See Razinsky, “Driving Death Away,” for a fuller discussion of this.

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