Alan Gardiner - The Theory of Proper Names: A Controversial Essay

T H E T H E O R Y OF

PROPER NAMES A CONTROVERSIAL

ESSAY

BY SIR

ALAN

G A R D I N E R

Fellow of the British Academy

L O N D O N

O X F O R D

UNIVERSITY NEW Y O R K

TORONTO

PRESS

Oxford University Press, Amen House, London GLASGOW BOMBAY

NEW YORK CALCUTTA

TORONTO

MELBOURNE

WELLINGTON

MADRAS KARACHI CAPE TOWN

IBADAN

FIRST PUBLISHED 1 9 4 O SECOND EDITION SECOND IMPRESSION

PRINTED

IN

GREAT

1954 1957

BRITAIN

E.C.4

PREFACE A p a r t from a few trifling v e r b a l changes and a couple of added footnotes the bulk of this book is the exact reprint of a paper-bound booklet published in a very small edition in 1940. Doubtless o w i n g to the circumstances of the times, but possibly also to the original publication's somewhat négligé apparel, this passed almost unnoticed, and I have knowledge of only two reviews, the second of w h i c h appeared a whole decade later than the first. H a v i n g always felt that a piece o f work that h a d cost me so m u c h trouble deserved a better fate, I decided to see whether the situation could not be remedied b y such external allurements as m y excellent friends at the O x f o r d University Press were able to offer. I a m sure I h a v e acted wisely in not attempting to alter m y m a i n text, since at the age of seventy-four m y ability to deal with an exceptionally difficult topic is certainly smaller than it was fourteen years ago. Nevertheless I h a v e been unable to dispense with some pages of fresh c o m m e n t , appended at the end of the book under the h e a d i n g ‘Retrospect 1953’. Here I h a v e found myself compelled to admit the force of an objection raised in the later o f the t w o reviews above mentioned, and to suggest some alterations in m y formal definition accordingly. H a d I thought fit to remodel m y earlier text, this w o u l d h a v e occasioned some changes also there, and particularly in m y concluding sentence (p. 67), but for the reason stated I have deemed it more prudent, as w e l l as more honest, to leave m y original formulations uncorrected.

vi

PREFACE

I n suppressing m y earlier P r e f a c e I h a v e b e e n p r o m p t e d b y the c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t at the present time it w o u l d h a v e b e e n m a i n l y i r r e l e v a n t . Its p r i n c i p a l t h e m e w a s the d i f f i c u l t y I h a d e x p e r i e n c e d in g i v i n g m y essay its final s h a p e , a n d the a c c o m p a n y i n g a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s t u r n e d m o r e u p o n the e n c o u r a g e m e n t e x t e n d e d to m e b y friends t h a n u p o n a n y fruitful suggestions they h a d to offer. A f t e r all, the c h i e f o b l i g a tion i n c u r r e d b y a controversial w r i t e r is t o w a r d s those w h o s e opinions h e a t t e m p t s to refute, n o t h i n g b e i n g m o r e s t i m u l a t i n g t h a n to e n c o u n t e r assertions w i t h w h i c h one c a n n o t a g r e e . I confess to h a v i n g w o n d e r e d m o r e t h a n o n c e w h e t h e r m y criticism o f B e r t r a n d Russell o u g h t not to h a v e b e e n r e w r i t t e n , seeing t h a t the e m i n e n t p h i l o s o p h e r has n o w restated his position in c o n s i d e r a b l y m o d i f i e d f o r m (Human Knowledge, 1948, P a r t I I , c h . iii, a n d P a r t I V , c h . viii). I f I h a v e refrained, it is b e c a u s e I a m no l o n g e r e q u a l to the task. Besides, Russell's m a i n contentions a p p e a r to h a v e rem a i n e d the s a m e ; for h i m the moon a n d this are still p r o p e r names, a n d Socrates n o m o r e t h a n a m e r e description. O n the positive side I feel t h a t m y m a i n i n d e b t e d ness is to M i l l a n d to D i o n y s i u s T h r a x .

1953

CONTENTS I . Mill's conception outlined I I . The Greek tradition I I I . Implications of that tradition. Name and Word I V . Embodied and disembodied proper names. Our discussion to turn upon the former V . Various incongruent uses found in Speech to be disregarded

I

4 5 8 I I

V I . Homonymous and common proper names. Surnames and gentile names are of the latter variety 15 V I I . Proper names involving more than one word. Use of the definite article "9 V i l i .

Collective and plural proper names. M�δos,Π�ρσης2 2

I X . Some singular names are not proper names. Criticism of Mill's account 25 X . The Greek view of proper names as names individually used is inadequate. Mill's superior criterion of meaninglessness discussed 29 x i ·

The principles involved in naming. True names. The importance as evidence of the word sun

32

X I I . Mill's failure to pay sufficient attention to the name itself, i.e. to the name in its aspect of sound-sign 38 X I I I . Proper names of clear etymology or with meaningful associations 41 X I V . Definition of a proper name X V . The conditions which give rise to proper names: (a) Celestial bodies

42

43

viii

CONTENTS XVI.

XVII.

(b)

Place-names

(e) Personal

names;

45 designations

like

Cook,

Father XVIII. XIX. XX. XXI.

(d) Ships, houses, animals,

47 &c.

50

(e) English and Latin names of birds, plants, (f)

&c.

51

Month-names and days of the week. Feast days

52

(g) Mythological andfictional names. Existence a necessary condition of all proper names, but only existence in the mind

XXII. XXIII.

54

Criticism of the views of Bertrand Russell and Prof. Stebbing Conclusion. Points wherein my view differs from those of others

57 66

A P P E N D I X . Some other definitions criticized:

68 68

(i) Keynes (2) (3) (4)

Bertelsen Funke Bröndal

69 69

RETROSPECT I953 INDEX OF AUTHORS £ ' OTED OR

71 CRITICIZED

77

T H E T H E O R Y OF PROPER NAMES

M

I

I L L ' S conception o f P r o p e r N a m e s as m e a n i n g less marks set u p o n things to distinguish t h e m f r o m one another seems, at first sight, as sensible as it is simple. A p p l i e d , for e x a m p l e , to the names o f the rock-infesting monsters S c y l l a a n d C h a r y b d i s a definition a l o n g these lines appears u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e . T h o s e n a m e s might, if c h a n c e h a d so willed it, h a v e been i n t e r c h a n g e d w i t h o u t i m p a i r i n g their demonstrative efficacy. T o us in m o d e r n times, at all events, S c y l l a a n d C h a r y b d i s m e a n , merely as names, absolutely n o t h i n g . N o d o u b t they w e r e f r a u g h t w i t h sinister m e a n i n g for a n Odysseus perilously steering his ship between t h e m . B u t M i l l explicitly excludes from his understanding o f the t e r m ' m e a n i n g ' a n y previous k n o w l e d g e of the o b j e c t denoted. I n s p e a k i n g o f proper n a m e s as meaningless m a r k s he makes ' m e a n i n g ' s y n o n y m o u s w i t h 'connotation', a n d b y a c o n n o t a t i v e n a m e he understands one w h i c h not o n l y denotes something, b u t also connotes or implies some attribute o f it : such a concrete general n a m e , for instance, as tree, w h i c h m a y b e used to denote this or that particular tree, b u t w h i c h in so d o i n g simultaneously implies o f it the attributes shared b y it with other trees. Since the n a m e s Scylla a n d Charybdis connote no such attributes, they are n o n connotative or meaningless a c c o r d i n g to M i l l ' s terminology. A n d since also these n a m e s are u n d e n i a b l y B

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T H E T H E O R Y OF P R O P E R " N A M E S

distinguishing marks, for h i m they w o u l d h a v e typical 'proper names'. 1

been

T o the objection arising f r o m the fact that p r o p e r names are usually g i v e n for a reason, w h i c h reason m a y h a v e been the possession o f characters a c t u a l l y indicated in the names, e.g. Dartmouth, Rochefort, Mont Blanc, M i l l has again a n answer. C o n c e r n i n g D a r t m o u t h he writes : 2 Ά town may have been named Dartmouth, because it is situated at the mouth of the Dart. But it is no part of the signification of the word Dartmouth, to be situated at the mouth of the Dart. If sand should choke up the mouth of the river, or an earthquake change its course, and remove it to a distance from the town, the name of the town would not necessarily be changed. T h a t fact, therefore, can form no part of the signification of the word ; for otherwise, when the fact confessedly ceased to be true, no one would any longer think of applying the name.' T h e a r g u m e n t is not c o n v i n c i n g as it stands. T h e n a m e Dartmouth seems at least to i m p l y the attribute ' l y i n g a t the m o u t h o f the D a r t ' , seems at least to be connotative. B u t if it is connotative, a n d if none the less w e continue to regard it as a proper n a m e , then M i l l ' s definition breaks d o w n . F r o m that definition c o m b i n e d w i t h the situation conjured u p b y h i m , w e m i g h t rather conclude that Dartmouth c o u l d b e c o m e a p r o p e r n a m e only after the sand or e a r t h q u a k e h a d accomplished its charactere f f a c i n g work. S u c h was, indeed, the v i e w a d v o c a t e d b y the Swedish g r a m m a r i a n Noreen, 3 w h o contended that * M i l l gives no formal definition, but the statement of his position in m y opening sentence is roughly accurate. For some qualifications see below, p. 34, n. I, and p. 35, n. 1. 2 J . S. M i l l , System• of Logic, Bk. I, ch. 2, § 5. I shorten the passage slightly, since it is mixed u p with discussion o f the n a m e John. 3 Einführung in die wissenschaftliche Bedeutung der Sprache, Halle, 1923,

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Spittal, the n a m e o f a w e l l - k n o w n p l a c e in C a r i n t h i a , w a s n o t h o r o u g h b r e d p r o p e r n a m e so l o n g as a hospital existed there, a n d a c q u i r e d t h a t r a n k o n l y w h e n the hospital disappeared. A s against this a r g u m e n t , linguistic feeling a n d the consensus o f p h i l o l o g i c a l opinion w o u l d alike assure us that Spittal w a s the n a m e o f t h a t t o w n , a n d a p r o p e r n a m e , from the v e r y start. It is easy to r e d u c e such a n a r g u m e n t ad absurdum. W i l l it be seriously m a i n tained that a M r . I r o n m o n g e r w o u l d lose his n a m e if he returned to the trade o f his forefathers, or a M r . C o w a r d if p r o v e d g u i l t y o f acts o f c o w a r d i c e ? I shall return later 1 to the p r o b l e m o f Dartmouth a n d other n a m e s like it, the d e b a t e c o n c e r n i n g w h i c h has b e e n recalled at this early stage m e r e l y to show that the theory o f P r o p e r N a m e s presents difficulties not obvious at a first g l a n c e . T h a t M i l l ' s e x p l a n a t i o n s h a v e not c o m p l e t e l y satisfied either philologists or logicians is evident f r o m the m a n y disquisitions devoted to the question since his d a y . N o n e the less I a m c o n v i n c e d that his v i e w is not far w i d e o f the m a r k , a n d needs only a little alteration a n d e l a b o r a tion in order to set it o n a solid f o u n d a t i o n . M i l l ' s c h a p t e r o n N a m e s has at least one merit n o t earned b y e v e r y subsequent b o o k o n L o g i c ; it shows that his m i n d distinguished w i t h all requisite clearness b e t w e e n n a m e a b l e things a n d the v e r b a l instruments used for reference to them. T h e defect o f his linguistic theory is that it is neither b r o a d l y e n o u g h conceived nor yet sufficiently detailed ; it is absurd to think that the h i g h l y c o m p l e x m e c h a n i s m o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n could be a d e q u a t e l y treated in the f e w p. 384. A s noted below, pp. 4 1 - 4 2 , N o r e e n barely saves his thesis b y the insertion of the epithet ' t h o r o u g h b r e d ' (1lollblut). T h e a r g u m e n t is repeated in e x a g g e r a t e d form b y V . B r ö n d a l , Ordklasserne, C o p e n h a g e n , 1928, p. 83. 1 See below, p. 4 1 .

4

T H E T H E O R Y OF P R O P E R

NAMES

pages he devotes to it. T h e purpose o f m y a d m i t t e d l y imperfect essay is threefold : first, to a d a p t M i l l ' s conception of proper n a m e s to the general theory o f Semantics I h a v e e n d e a v o u r e d to e x p o u n d e l s e w h e r e ; second, to test that c o n c e p t i o n b y the a d d u c i n g o f m a n y m o r e examples, a n d in p a r t i c u l a r to study the conditions w h i c h lead to the imposition o f p r o p e r n a m e s ; a n d last b u t not least, to a n i m a d v e r t o n a v i e w o f p r o p e r n a m e s m u c h in v o g u e a m o n g m o d e r n logicians, b u t w h i c h I regard as a w h o l l y pernicious aberration o f t h o u g h t .

II T h e term ' P r o p e r N a m e ' comes to us f r o m the Greeks, a m o n g w h o m ὄ ν ο μ α κ ύ ρ ι ο ν , rendered in L a t i n b y nomen proprium, m e a n t a ' g e n u i n e ' n a m e , or a n a m e m o r e genuinely such t h a n other names. 1 A c c o r d i n g l y the ὄ ν ο μ α κ ύ ρ ι ο ν w a s contrasted w i t h the π ρ ο σ η γ ο ρ ί α or 'appellation', a term used to describe w h a t w e c a l l 'general names' or ' c o m m o n nouns' like man, horse, tree. T h e Stoic C h r y s i p p u s m a d e a sharper distinction, c o n f i n i n g ὄ ν ο μ α to w h a t w e n o w c a l l proper names. T h e later g r a m marians, b y using the epithet κ ύ ρ ι ο ν either w i t h or w i t h out ὄ ν ο μ α , i m p l y that the π ρ ο σ η γ ο ρ ί α is a sort o f ὄ ν ο μ α , b u t not a quite g e n u i n e one. N o better a c c o u n t exists than that b y D i o n y s i u s T h r a x , a p u p i l o f Aristarchus w h o lived in the second century B.C. His statement 2 m a y be rendered : 1 S c h o e m a n n , Lehre von den Redetheilen, B e r l i n , 1862, p . 82, n. 2, p o i n t s o u t t h a t this t e r m κύριον h a s often b e e n w r o n g l y i n t e r p r e t e d to m e a n p e c u l i a r to the i n d i v i d u a l , cf. G e r m . Eigennamen, w h e r e a s the r e a l m e a n i n g is 'authentic', 'properly so called' ; so too J . W a c k e r n a g e l , Vorlesungen über Syntax, Basel, 1 9 2 0 - 4 , v o l . ii, p . 61. 2

"Ονομά

e V n μερος

λόγου

πτωτικόν,

σωμα

η ττράγμα σ-ημαΐνον,

σώμα

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Ά noun or name' (the one word δνομα is used, this covering both notions ; cf. the French nom = nom substantif, whereas the Germans, like ourselves, distinguish Nomen = 'noun' and Namen) 'is a declinable part of speech signifying a body or an activity, a body like "stone" and an activity like " e d u c a t i o n " , and may be used both commonly and individually; commonly (κοινώς) like " m a n " , " h o r s e " and individually (ίδίως "privately") like "Socrates".' Dionysius himself also uses the term κύριον, identifying it with such names or nouns as are used 'individually' (tSi'ojy) ; of the κΰριον he says it is 'that which signifies individual being' (την Ιόίαν ούσίαν) such as "Homer", "Socrates"." Ill Since a n y fruitful discussion m u s t start f r o m points o f a g r e e m e n t , w e shall d o wisely to g o b a c k to the f o u n t a i n h e a d a n d to a d o p t its standpoints as o u r o w n . It w i l l b e seen that Dionysius is c o n c e r n e d p r i m a r i l y w i t h the kinds a n d the uses o f words, a n d o n l y secondarily w i t h the n a t u r e o f the things denoted b y t h e m . A c c o r d i n g l y w e too o u g h t to regard the p r o b l e m o f p r o p e r n a m e s as essentially a linguistic p r o b l e m , a n d so l o n g as it is a question o f investigating their essential nature w e o u g h t strenuously to d e n y that there exists a n y other l e g i t i m a t e road o f a p p r o a c h . It will b e f u r t h e r observed that D i o n y sius chooses his examples f r o m the r e a l m o f daily e x p e r ience, in o n e case indeed referring to something o f a n abstract n a t u r e ( ' e d u c a t i o n ' ) , b u t otherwise c o n c e r n i n g himself o n l y w i t h w e l l - a u t h e n t i c a t e d m a t e r i a l entities. μεν olov λίθος, πράγμα Se olov naiSeι'α, κοίνώς re και ι8ίως λεγόμΐνον, κοινώς μ£ν olov ανθρωπος ΐππος, ί&ίως Be olov Σωκράτης. Dionysios Thrax, p. 634ft, Ρ·

24

t h e edition by U h l i g , L e i p z i g , 1885.

Κΰρίον μίν ovv earl, TO την lb Lav ονσίαν σημαΐνον, otov "Ομ-ηρος Σωκράτης, o p . cit., p. 636ft, p. 33 of the edition. 1

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I n contrasting the c o m m o n a n d the i n d i v i d u a l or exclusive e m p l o y m e n t s o f names, he a p p a r e n t l y failed to take into consideration that the n a m e Socrates c o u l d be, a n d certainly often h a d been, used o f other persons besides the famous philosopher. T h e other e x a m p l e ' H o m e r ' w h i c h he cites shows it w a s really the philosopher he h a d in m i n d . W e m a y , I think, fairly assume that in Dionysius' t h o u g h t at the m o m e n t the n a m e Socrates itself w a s as u n i q u e as the celebrity to w h o m he w a s referring. L e t us take, then, as o u r starting-point such p r o p e r n a m e s as are applied, in English usage at the present time, to only o n e h u m a n being, n a m e s like Jugurtha a n d Vercingetorix, or a g a i n the n a m e o f a m o u n t a i n like Popocatepetl, or that o f a city like Chicago. T a c i t l y assumed in the w o r d s o f Dionysius is the fact that the uses o f n a m e s or nouns to w h i c h he refers are constitutional a n d n o r m a l uses, not historically single or exceptional ones. T h i s is evident from his mention o f the ' c o m m o n ' use o f names, b y w h i c h he p l a i n l y m e a n s t h a t a n o u n like man w a s used sometimes o f this m a n a n d sometimes o f that, not that it w a s used o f t w o or m o r e persons o n a n y single g i v e n o c c a s i o n — h e was certainly not thinki n g o f the d u a l or p l u r a l . Dionysius was, a c c o r d i n g l y , concerned w i t h the inherent nature o f certain names, not w i t h their m o m e n t a r y uses or extensions or misapplications. T r a n s l a t e d into terms o f recent linguistic theory, this m a y be expressed b y saying that the c a t e g o r y o f p r o p e r n a m e s is a c a t e g o r y o f L a n g u a g e , not a c a t e g o r y o f Speech. 1 Jugurtha, for e x a m p l e , is a n a m e w h i c h belonged constitutionally a n d p e r m a n e n t l y to a certain N u m i d i a n king, a n d it is to b e d e p l o r e d w h e n e v e r a 1 Gardiner, Theory of Speech and Language, 2nd ed., O x f o r d , 1951, p p . 130-4.

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logician says a n y t h i n g o f this kind : ' H e r e the w o r d smith [seil. L a t i n faber) is used as a p r o p e r n a m e ' , j u s t as if the n a m e Smith were a fortuitous m o m e n t a r y a p p l i c a t i o n , a n d h a d not belonged to its o w n e r f r o m the v e r y d a y o f his birth. 1 M o d e r n philology has f o l l o w e d ancient e x a m p l e b y referring to a κύριον like Jugurtha, not as a w o r d m e a n i n g that p a r t i c u l a r individual, b u t as his ' n a m e ' . W e speak o f 'proper names', not o f 'proper nouns' or 'proper w o r d s ' . T h i s , therefore, is a fitting o p p o r t u n i t y to consider the difference between a ' w o r d ' a n d a ' n a m e ' . O f the t w o terms, ' n a m e ' is far the older. I t is indeed i n c o n c e i v a b l e that a n y h u m a n society, h o w e v e r primitive, should h a v e lacked a w o r d for ' n a m e ' . T h i s term belongs to the preg r a m m a t i c a l stage o f t h o u g h t , to a time w h e n p e o p l e h a d no interest in words for their o w n sake, b u t t h o u g h t o f t h e m solely as a means o f s p e a k i n g a b o u t the things o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d . T h e y n e v e r inquired w h a t such a n d such a w o r d meant, but only b y w h a t n a m e such a n d such a t h i n g w a s called. M a t e r i a l l y a ' w o r d ' a n d a ' n a m e ' are identical. B u t there is this i m p o r t a n t difference that the direction o f thought is opposite in each case. 2 W h e n w e speak o f a ' w o r d ' our minds travel f r o m the sound-sign to w h a t e v e r it m a y m e a n ; w h e n w e speak o f a ' n a m e ' w e i m p l y that there exists s o m e t h i n g to w h i c h a certain sound-sign corresponds, s o m e t h i n g that w a s the Jons et origo o f the n a m e , something t h a t supplies its raison d'être. 1 e.g. Joseph, Introduction to Logic, 2nd ed., O x f o r d , 1916, p. 29 : 'Smith, for e x a m p l e , as meaning one w h o works in metal, is a general term, because I m e a n the same by calling D i c k or T h o m a s a smith ; if I use it as a proper name, numerous as are the persons w h o bear it, I do not m e a n the same in each use of it.' T h e italics are mine. 2 O n this point see the interesting remarks in Dornseiff, Der deutsche Wortschatz, Berlin, 1934, p. 16.

'

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T H E T H E O R Y OF P R O P E R " N A M E S IV

N o w in v i e w o f this difference o f attitude i n v o l v e d in ' w o r d ' a n d ' n a m e ' our retention o f the designation 'proper n a m e ' seems to dictate in a d v a n c e a decision w e need to m a k e w i t h o u t further delay. It has not been recognized as clearly as it should h a v e been that linguistic science is concerned w i t h t w o closely related, b u t none the less distinct, kinds o f proper n a m e , a n d w e h a v e to m a k e u p our minds w h i c h o f these kinds is that w h e r e o f w e intend to discuss the theory. W e h a v e seen that Dionysius regarded a proper n a m e as a w o r d definitely tied d o w n to a particular entity like Socrates a n d H o m e r , a n d w e ourselves, in e m p l o y i n g the same term 'proper n a m e ' , seem c o m m i t t e d to not a l l o w i n g the entity n a m e d to vanish out o f our sight altogether. O n the contrary, it seems i n c u m b e n t u p o n us to keep that entity more or less clearly before our minds t h r o u g h o u t the ensuing discussion. N o r is the decision w e h a v e to m a k e m e r e l y a m a t t e r o f choice, since it will a p p e a r in d u e course that these ' e m b o d i e d p r o p e r names', if I m a y so call them, are historically prior to, a n d the a c t u a l originators of, the 'disembodied' variety, the separate existence o f w h i c h has n o w to be vindicated. B y 'disembodied p r o p e r names' I m e a n those w o r d sounds that are studied for their e t y m o l o g y , f r e q u e n c y , a n d distribution in such books as M a w e r ' s Place-names of Buckinghamshire, W e e k l e y ' s Romance of Names, R a n k e ' s Ägyptische Personennamen a n d m a n y similar works. 1 T h e s e scholars might, h o w e v e r , not u n r e a s o n a b l y c l a i m that the 1 T h e distinction here m a d e was pointed out in a short article contributed by me to the Mélanges de linguistique et de philologie offerts à Jacques van Ginneken, Paris, 1937, p. 308.

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subject-matter o f their books consists o f e x a c t l y the s a m e p r o p e r n a m e s that are dealt w i t h b y Dionysius a n d M i l l . T h e y w o u l d point out that the w o r d amo c o n j u g a t e d i n a L a t i n g r a m m a r is just the same w o r d as was h e a r d on m a n y a R o m a n lover's lips, t h o u g h in the g r a m m a r interest is m o m e n t a r i l y w i t h d r a w n from the notion o f 'loving', whilst a n y p a r t i c u l a r instance o f amorous e m o tion is entirely out of the p i c t u r e . I t must be c o n c e d e d f r a n k l y that the categories o f ' e m b o d i e d ' a n d 'disemb o d i e d ' p r o p e r n a m e s show a g r e a t overlap. W h e n the student o f A m e r i c a n l a n g u a g e s concentrates his attention o n a p r e s u m a b l y unique n a m e like Popocatepetl, this remains still the n a m e o f the m o u n t a i n , t h o u g h the m o u n tain itself is not e n g a g i n g the t h o u g h t s o f the philologist. B u t the position is different w i t h those p r o p e r n a m e s w h i c h h a v e been attached to h u n d r e d s o f different entities both real a n d i m a g i n a r y . T h e r e h a v e been literally thousands o f persons called Mary or John or Henry, a n d even p l a c e - n a m e s display a certain a m o u n t o f repetition, as m a y be seen under such h e a d i n g s as Sutton, Victoria, York in the index to a n y g o o d atlas. T h e m u l t i t u d e o f persons a n d places for w h i c h p r o p e r names h a v e to b e f o u n d is so great that the s a m e n a m e s must i n e v i t a b l y o c c u r a g a i n a n d again. N o w w h e n the etymologist focuses attention o n the n a m e Mary, it is evident that this n a m e is c o m p l e t e l y disembodied ; Mary is, as it were, the essence extracted f r o m a vast assemblage o f e m b o d i e d Marys. H e n c e it seems necessary, in the interests o f clear t h i n k i n g , to distinguish between the t w o classes. T h e e m b o d i e d proper names, t h o u g h w e c a n a n d indeed must investigate their theory, as b e i n g the p r i m a r y a n d o r i g i n a t i n g species, are in their multiplicity o f no concern to the philologist as such. T h e w o r k s t h a t deal w i t h this latter

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class are E n c y c l o p a e d i a s , Histories, Dictionaries o f N a t i o n a l B i o g r a p h y , G e o g r a p h y books, a n d the like. O t h e r reasons m a y be a d d u c e d for treating ' e m b o d i e d ' a n d 'disembodied' p r o p e r n a m e s as separate classes. M o s t words r e g a r d e d merely as word-sounds, word-forms, or technical terms to b e defined, are d e a l t w i t h m a i n l y in educational a n d scientific treatises, b u t disembodied proper names are often to b e f o u n d in o r d i n a r y literature or in conversation. T h u s w e frequently c o m e across sentences l i k e : He was a Shropshire farmer, whose name is variously given as Harris or Hobson. His cousin's name was Rose. H e r e Harris, Hobson, a n d Rose are word-sounds predicated o f a particular class o f w o r d - s o u n d w h i c h is called name a n d o f w h i c h I h a v e a l r e a d y a t t e m p t e d to e x p l a i n the nature. In these contexts Harris, Hobson, a n d Rose, t h o u g h ultimately referred to particular persons t h r o u g h the mediation o f the genitives whose a n d cousin's, are immediately signs o n l y for certain word-sounds o f a specific quality, not signs for persons; y o u c a n n o t predicate a person o f a w o r d - s o u n d like a n a m e . I n conclusion m e n tion m a y be m a d e o f the official c a t a l o g u e o f Christian n a m e s w h i c h enumerates the only ones that F r e n c h law will allow to be selected for the children o f F r a n c e . A s f o u n d in this c a t a l o g u e the names are obviously disembodied, t h o u g h presenting themselves as candidates for re-embodiment. F o r all I k n o w some o f t h e m m a y not h a v e been a c t u a l l y e m b o d i e d for decades. 1 1 Brunot and B r u n e a u , Précis de grammaire historique de la langue française, Paris, 1933, § 381 : ' A c t u e l l e m e n t nous devons prendre les prénoms sur une liste officielle établie en 1865 : cette liste contient Eusébiote et Rigobert, mais non Henriette, Juliette, Paulette, Pierrette.' Further, Prof. Bröndal tells m e that some years ago the Danish G o v e r n m e n t , in order to remedy the existing monotony of surnames (most of them formed b y means of -sen f r o m the father's n a m e ) , published an official N a m e - b o o k , out of w h i c h

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T H E T H E O R Y OF P R O P E R " N A M E S V

H e n c e f o r t h , accordingly, w h e n e v e r I use the t e r m 'proper n a m e ' w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a t i o n , I shall m e a n the sort o f e m b o d i e d proper n a m e that both Dionysius a n d M i l l a p p e a r to h a v e h a d in m i n d , the sort that is e x c l u sively e m p l o y e d of, a n d tied d o w n to, a p a r t i c u l a r person or p l a c e or w h a t e v e r it m a y b e . O n l y if w e a d o p t this course c a n w e hope to save their f u n d a m e n t a l distinction b e t w e e n nouns that are ' c o m m o n l y ' used a n d nouns that are used 'individually'. 1 I t has been seen that one a n d the same w o r d - s o u n d — w h a t has been described as a ' d i s e m b o d i e d proper n a m e ' — i s often a p p l i e d to different individuals. F o r e x a m p l e , I h a v e a son called John, a n d so has m y n e i g h b o u r . W h a t is the linguistic relation o f the t w o J o h n s to one a n o t h e r ? Before a n s w e r i n g this question I a m compelled to strike o f f at a t a n g e n t b y the o c c u r r e n c e o f the p l u r a l Johns in m y o w n last sentence. T h i s o c c u r r e n c e m i g h t seem to b r i n g to light a third kind o f p r o p e r n a m e intermediate b e t w e e n the t w o others, n a m e l y a n o n l y partly d i s e m b o d i e d p r o p e r n a m e . I t is clear that the singular John i m p l i e d in this p l u r a l signifies neither ( i ) a sound, nor (2) a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l ; t h o u g h the p l u r a l is used in reference to m y n e i g h b o u r ' s J o h n a n d m y o w n , its singular means in itself only 'person h a v i n g the (disembodied p r o p e r ) n a m e John'. T h i s is seen even m o r e clearly in the Marys of England, w h e r e the i n d i v i d u a l females intended are not, nor c o u l d they all be, specified. Johns a n d Marys here, to w h i c h m a y be a d d e d such e x a m p l e s as my John, your John, a John, resemble such n e w names could legally be chosen. S o m e of these names h a v e never b e e n used. 1 I n point of fact w e cannot save it at all, as w e shall see later.

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g e n e r a l n a m e s as horse a n d tree, b u t w h e r e a s these latter c o n n o t e attributes entirely distinct f r o m the sound o f the words, the assumed ' p a r t l y disembodied proper names' connote m e r e l y the possession o f a p r o p e r n a m e o f the w h o l l y disembodied t y p e . It m i g h t seem at first sight that p r o p e r n a m e s o f this third kind are derivatives at t w o removes from the e m b o d i e d p r o p e r n a m e s that are their originals, that in f a c t the d i s e m b o d i e d John w a s first distilled out o f a w h o l e collection o f Johns, a n d then p a r t l y re-embodied in w h a t to all a p p e a r a n c e is a general n a m e . S u c h a hypothesis holds pretty w e l l o f the Marys of England, but fails to d o so o f the two Johns, w h e r e Johns is evidently constructed, o n the spur o f the m o m e n t , f r o m the t w o i n d i v i d u a l persons concerned. T h e reason w h y w e must refuse to a d m i t the p a r t l y disembodied proper n a m e s as a n a u t o n o m o u s third v a r i e t y of proper n a m e is that they d o not fulfil the condition laid d o w n on p p . 6 - 7 a b o v e . T h e y are not facts o f L a n g u a g e , b u t facts o f S p e e c h , creatures o f the m o m e n t , f o r m e d to m e e t a p u r e l y t e m p o r a r y linguistic need, not p e r m a n e n t constituents o f our v o c a b u l a r y . T h e best w e c a n say o f t h e m is that they are proper n a m e s o f the one k i n d or the other used in a p a r t l y e m b o d i e d w a y like c o m m o n nouns. A s w e shall see later, it is b a r e l y disputable that some p r o p e r names possess that p o w e r o f c o m m o n a p p l i c a t i o n w h i c h w e associate w i t h c o m m o n nouns (general names), 1 b u t for the e x a m i n a t i o n o f these the m o m e n t is not yet ripe. T h i s seems a n o p p o r t u n e m o m e n t , h o w e v e r , for 1 N o t e here once and for all that the terms ' c o m m o n noun' a n d 'general n a m e ' are synonymous. T h e former is the term preferred by g r a m m a r i a n s , the latter t h a t accepted by M i l l a n d other logicians. I shall use either the one or the other according as seems most appropriate to the context.

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m e n t i o n i n g certain e m p l o y m e n t s to w h i c h , for the s a m e reason as w i t h the Johns a n d Marys a l r e a d y discussed, the title o f c o m m o n n o u n must b e refused. (1) V e r y r e m a r k able is the ease a n d virtuosity w i t h w h i c h m o d e r n E u r o p e a n l a n g u a g e s c a n e m p l o y p r o p e r n a m e s to attribute to some other person or place, w h e t h e r a c t u a l or m e r e l y postulated, o n e or more salient qualities w h i c h it is desired not to specify. E x a m p l e s a r e : He is a veritable Paderewski. We can well dispense with any more Napoleons. A Shakespeare or Goethe needs no advertisement. Only a Raphael could have painted such a picture.1 The new Jerusalem. Brussels is a little Paris. Every country has its Babylon, only few an Athens or a Florence. T h e correct g r a m m a t i c a l description o f such e m p l o y m e n t s is : a n i n d i v i d u a l proper n a m e used as a c o m m o n n o u n . I h a v e elsewhere e n d e a v o u r e d to e x p l a i n h o w Speech, i.e. the ad hoc, historically u n i q u e , utilization o f L a n g u a g e , m a y b e n d to its i m m e d i a t e purpose a w o r d not constitutionally s h a p e d to the use for w h i c h it is e m p l o y e d . B y such ' i n c o n g r u e n t ' uses p e c u l i a r nuances are c o n v e y e d , a n d it is t h r o u g h such uses that semantic a n d g r a m m a t i c a l c h a n g e s are b r o u g h t a b o u t . S o m e o f the e m p l o y m e n t s here envisaged h a v e g r o w n so h a c k n e y e d that the reference to the original entity designated b y the proper n a m e b e c o m e s first obscured a n d then c o m p l e t e l y obliterated ; in the final stage w h a t w a s once a p r o p e r n a m e has b e c o m e a c o m m o n n o u n like a n y other. T h e intermediate stage m a y b e illustrated b y the Maecenases of New York; a spa ; a Lido; the final stage b y a guy (from the images o f Guy Fawkes carried a b o u t b y 1 T h e writer intended to imply that a picture of such m a g n i f i c e n c e could h a v e been painted only by a m a n possessing the genius of R a p h a e l , a n d , since there w a s no other m a n with that degree of genius, that the picture could h a v e been painted only by R a p h a e l himself.

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children) a robin (diminutive o f Robert) ; an academy (from the A t h e n i a n g a r d e n w h e r e P l a t o t a u g h t ) . (2) A n o t h e r use o f p r o p e r n a m e s w h i c h must be r e g a r d e d as unconstitutional (if I m a y b e a l l o w e d so to express it) arises f r o m a m e n t a l d o u b l i n g or m u l t i p l i c a t i o n o f the original entity, e.g. The mirrors all around her showed a dozen separate Janes. Looking up from his place at the breakfast table, John Fortescue saw returning his gaze from above the fireplace a younger and much better-looking John Fortescue ; so too the L a t i n Joves, i.e. images o f J o v e . (3) Similar, b u t resulting f r o m the m e n t a l bisection o f the entity, is duae Galliae, i. e. Cisalpine a n d T r a n s a l p i n e G a u l . H e r e the p l u r a l is obtained b y h a l v i n g the entity a n d t h e n a p p l y i n g the n a m e o f the w h o l e to e a c h half. A curiously analogous process, b u t one l e a d i n g to the reverse result o f creating a • singular form, will be illustrated later (pp. 2 4 - 2 5 ) b y such e x a m p l e s as Μήδος, Πέρσ-ης. T h e s e latter words are, h o w ever, no mere occasional employments, n o mere p h e n o m e n a o f Speech, so t h a t consideration o f t h e m must b e deferred. (4) Y e t a n o t h e r secondary use o f p r o p e r n a m e s h a d better be dealt w i t h here, t h o u g h it gives rise to real c o m m o n nouns, in w h i c h the originating b e a r e r o f the n a m e is in some cases r e m e m b e r e d , in others forgotten or half-forgotten. H e r e the n a m e is applied to something o f a w h o l l y different species f r o m that o f the original possessor, this b e i n g the inventor or original user in the case o f persons, a n d the source o f the m o d e l in the case o f places. E x a m p l e s are : a Ford; a chesterfield; a mackintosh; a Panama (hat) ; an ulster. I t will simplify o u r task to h a v e eliminated all the a b o v e from our discussion. W h e r e a p r o p e r n a m e has 1 I d o not quote dunce, since this apparently d i d not refer originally to Duns Scotus himself, b u t only to his followers ; the early f o r m is a Duns man.

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been a d m i t t e d l y perverted f r o m its proper function to serve some other semantic purpose, the latter lies outside our i m m e d i a t e problem. T h e categorization o f Marys, Johns, a Shakespeare, Joves, Galliae, is not affected b y the a b n o r m a l f u n c t i o n or b y the use o f a p l u r a l ending. O n the other h a n d , it becomes a m a t t e r o f opinion, or r a t h e r o f linguistic feeling, w h e t h e r the status o f proper n a m e should b e a l l o w e d to cases like a Ford, a Panama. T h e e m p l o y m e n t or n o n - e m p l o y m e n t o f a c a p i t a l letter indicates the line a c t u a l l y taken in this m a t t e r b y philologists a n d printers. It is inevitable that there should be hesitation a n d disagreement as to w h a t w o r d s are proper n a m e s a n d w h a t not. W e thus find ourselves m o v i n g towards a conception in h a r m o n y w i t h the G r e e k v i e w , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h a p r o p e r n a m e is m e r e l y a n a m e m o r e g e n u i n e l y so (KvpLov) t h a n others. F o r m y p a r t I should h a v e preferred to use a different m e t a p h o r a n d to say that p r o p e r names are n a m e s that are more p u r e l y so t h a n words o f a n y other kind, since in t h e m the process a n d purpose o f n a m i n g shine forth like u n a l l o y e d m e t a l , whilst in the m a j o r i t y o f words that process a n d purpose are obscured a n d c o n t a m i n a t e d b y the a d m i x t u r e o f m e a n i n g , or b y the imperfect success w i t h w h i c h the purpose o f n a m i n g is attended.

VI T o return to the point at w h i c h I digressed, the best w a y o f m a k i n g clear the relation o f the t w o proper n a m e s exemplified in m y o w n a n d m y n e i g h b o u r ' s J o h n is perhaps b y reference to the deliberate acts o f n a m i n g b y w h i c h they o b t a i n e d their n a m e s . T h o s e acts h a v e a m a r k e d resemblance to certain n a m e - g i v i n g s w h i c h d o

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not give rise to proper names. Similarly deliberate acts h a v e been required to give their names to such a n e w d r u g as insulin a n d to the m e c h a n i c a l c o n t r i v a n c e called a typewriter, a n d no one will dispute that these acts h a v e a d d e d new words to the English l a n g u a g e . It seems to follow that every christening adds a n e w w o r d , if not to the English l a n g u a g e , at all events to the circle or linguistic c o m m u n i t y in w h i c h the n a m e is destined to pass current. E a c h o f these words has a sense, an e x c h a n g e v a l u e , as different f r o m its fellows, I will not say as the senses o f insulin a n d typewriter, b u t at least as the senses o f insulin a n d genasprin, or as those o f typewriter a n d countingmachine. M y J o h n is tall, dark, a n d differs m a r k e d l y in character a n d ability, not to speak o f age, f r o m m y neighb o u r ' s small a n d fair-haired J o h n . T h e t w o names John h a v e , accordingly, a different sense, b u t the same sound. Is it not imperative then to say that the t w o names are h o m o n y m s ? A h o m o n y m is a w o r d that has the same sound as another, b u t a different sense. 1 It c a n h a r d l y be denied that the n a m e s o f the t w o J o h n s fulfil these conditions. Since the most f u n d a m e n t a l o f all the principles governing the mechanism o f L a n g u a g e m a y b e expressed in the m o t t o 'distinctive sounds for distinctive meanings', it 1 ( U n d e r this definition, w h i c h is that of the Concise Oxford Dictionary ( 1 9 1 8 ) , ' h o m o n y m s ' include, not only words of different m e a n i n g spelt and pronounced alike (e.g. file, sound), b u t also words pronounced alike, but spelt differently (e.g. son and sun, hair a n d hare). It is doubtless useful to have so comprehensive a term, b u t w o u l d it not be profitable to reserve the term ' h o m o p h o n e ' for pairs of the latter kind? I n that case ' h o m o g r a p h ' might be e m p l o y e d for words spelt alike, but differing in both sound and meaning, like entrance, p r o n o u n c e d entrahns and entrons ; progress, pronounced progrès and progrés; produce, pronounced prodjus and pródùs. It is distressing h o w often B . B . C , announcers confound words like the last two examples.)

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must b e a d m i t t e d that a h o m o n y m o u s proper n a m e like John is h a r d l y as good a s p e c i m e n o f its class as Vercingetorix—in t h e o r y at least, a n d to some extent also in p r a c tice, as those w h o h a v e suffered f r o m the exasperating m o d e r n h a b i t o f using C h r i s t i a n n a m e s in a n d o u t o f season well k n o w . H o w e v e r , for reasons w h i c h need not here b e stated, the h a r m d o n e to comprehension b y h o m o n y m s is less than sometimes supposed, a n d since bearers or givers o f such n a m e s as John m a y i n d i g n a n t l y resent the suggestion that they are not as good as a n y others, I will pass on to m y final c o m m e n t u p o n t h e m . I f w e regard John, the n a m e o f a g i v e n J o h n , as a w o r d different from, a n d merely h o m o n y m o u s with, the n a m e John b e l o n g i n g to some other J o h n , w e are clearly thereby d e b a r r e d f r o m using these n a m e s as evidence that some p r o p e r n a m e s c a n be c o m m o n l y used. T h i s brings us to the question : d o a n y proper n a m e s exist w h i c h simultaneously are c o m m o n n o u n s ? A little farther on I shall a d d u c e such w o r d s as Πέρσης a n d Μήδος as fairly good testimony to that contention, or to describe m y thesis more a c c u r a t e l y , I shall a r g u e that these w o r d s c a n quite n o r m a l l y a n d in c o n g r u e n c e w i t h their constitutional nature be a p p l i e d to various individuals, w i t h o u t thereby losing their status o f p r o p e r n a m e s . A t this point, however, I must confine myself to p r o p e r names w h i c h started b y b e i n g designations o f single individuals, a n d in following o u t that p r o g r a m m e , the next items for consideration must b e surnames a n d L a t i n gentile names. It m a y , I think, safely be assumed that the p r i m a r y purpose o f these w a s the identification o f some individual, a purpose w h i c h in the right e n v i r o n m e n t , e.g. in a school w h e r e there are no t w o boys w i t h the s a m e surname, is entirely successful. T h e absence of the p l u r a l

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e n d i n g in the F r e n c h les Petitjean, les Hamel seems to hint at a n awareness that the n a m e is p r o p e r l y the distinctive b a d g e , not o f the f a m i l y as a w h o l e , b u t o f e a c h o f its c o m p o n e n t members. B u t there is a g o o d reason to deter us f r o m r e g a r d i n g a n a m e like Boileau, w h e n serving as a designation o f t w o m e m b e r s o f the Boileau family, or Claudius, w h e n f o u n d a p p l i e d to t w o different R o m a n s o f the gens Claudia, as a h o m o n y m in e a c h respective case. T h a t reason is that there h a v e been n o deliberate acts o f n a m i n g to justify such a n interpretation. T h e n a m e s are not p u r e l y arbitrary, b u t pass o n f r o m father to son a u t o m a t i c a l l y a n d compulsorily. O u g h t w e then to call Boileau a n d Claudius c o m m o n nouns, a n d to p u t t h e m on a level w i t h horse a n d tree ? C l e a r l y not, for the i n d i v i d u a l entities called horse are b o u n d together b y p a l p a b l e resemblances w h i c h m i g h t be s u m m e d u p in a n abstract t e r m horsiness or horsehood, w h i l e a b o u t different Boileaus a n d C l a u d i i there is no corresponding resemblance that c o u l d be s u m m e d u p as Boileauness or C l a u d i u s h o o d . E v e n c o m m u n i t y o f b l o o d is not implied, since one m i g h t b e c o m e a Boileau b y m a r r i a g e a n d a C l a u d i u s b y a d o p tion. O n e is therefore t h r o w n b a c k on the c o m m o n possession o f a p a r t i c u l a r n a m e or significative word-sound as the sole resemblance, so far as L a n g u a g e is concerned, b e t w e e n the i n d i v i d u a l bearers o f surnames or m e m b e r s o f the R o m a n gentes, a n d , as w e shall see w i t h ever increasing clearness, it is d e p e n d e n c e u p o n the sound alone for their significative force w h i c h really m a r k s the distinction b e t w e e n proper n a m e s a n d c o m m o n nouns. O n the other h a n d , one c a n n o t reject the a r g u m e n t that surn a m e s a n d gentile n a m e s are used c o m m o n l y (κοινώς) o n the g r o u n d that their plurals, like Johns a n d Marys, are m e r e facts o f S p e e c h , not o f L a n g u a g e . S o m e at least o f

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these plurals, e.g. the Plantagenets, the Romanoffs, are m o r e familiar, m o r e stabilized as units o f the English l a n g u a g e , than the corresponding singulars. I f a special g r a m m a t i cal term must be f o u n d for surnames, L a t i n gentile names, a n d examples like Mrjhos, Περσης, p r o b a b l y the most a p p r o p r i a t e term w o u l d b e ' c o m m o n p r o p e r names'.

VII A m o n g the postulates w i t h w h i c h w e started w a s o n e to the effect that a n a m e is a kind o f w o r d , only looked u p o n in the reverse direction, i.e. starting w i t h the thing designated a n d thence proceeding to the linguistic instrument serving for its designation. T h i s postulate involves, o f course, the v i e w that a p r o p e r n a m e is likewise a w o r d o f a p a r t i c u l a r kind. C o n s e q u e n t l y if w e find, as w e n o w shall, that certain proper n a m e s are composed, not o f one, b u t o f several words, that will be a v a l i d g r o u n d for considering t h e m rather less legitimate specimens o f the category t h a n one-word proper names. T h i s d i s p a r a g i n g verdict c a n n o t , however, b e e x t e n d e d to examples w h i c h are really no less c o m p o u n d w o r d s than Dartmouth or Oxford, t h o u g h written separately w i t h o u t even so hesitating a link as a h y p h e n . W e m a y u n d o u b t e d l y r a n k Mont Blanc a n d Buenos Aires as a d m i r a b l e e x a m p l e s o f a p r o p e r n a m e , or at all events it is not their writing as t w o w o r d s w h i c h c o u l d prevent us f r o m g r a d i n g t h e m a m o n g the purest o f their kind. 1 M a n y more c o m p l e x examples o f the kind o c c u r , b u t with v a r y i n g degrees o f inseparability in 1 O n the other h a n d , the fact that these n a m e s h a v e some significance does detract a little, but only a little, f r o m their purity. T h e purest of proper names are wholly arbitrary and totally without significance.

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the c o m p o n e n t elements. T h e s e elements m a y comprise one or more simple p r o p e r names, e.g. Piero dei Medici, Stow-on-the-Wold, or m a y dispense w i t h t h e m altogether, e.g. Les Pays Bas, the Black Prince. N o t all the c o m p o n e n t s are o f e q u a l significative v a l u e ; in the p l a c e - n a m e Sutton Scotney, for e x a m p l e , residents in the n e i g h b o u r h o o d m a y drop the purely a u x i l i a r y Scotney, b u t Sutton is indispensable. C o m p o u n d p r o p e r n a m e s often contain a n adjective or a c o m m o n n o u n , e.g. Lord Melbourne, le Duc d Aumale, Market Harborough, New Jersey, Long Island. S o m e names o f persons c a n n o t be r e g a r d e d as c o m p o u n d s at all, b u t m a y be t e r m e d 'composite p r o p e r names'. T h e s e are combinations o f Christian a n d s u r n a m e like Roger Bacon, or complete L a t i n names like Marcus Tullius Cicero. T h e m o d e o f f u n c t i o n i n g here arises, as often in samples o f S p e e c h that h a v e not the v a l u e o f proper names, e.g. a very poor widow, f r o m the presentation o f successive word-clues, w h i c h c u m u l a t i v e l y b r i n g to light the entity m e a n t b y the speaker. T h e reason for composite p r o p e r names obviously lies in the h o m o n y m i t y o f the components ; there w e r e other Rogers a n d Bacons besides Roger Bacon, a n d other Tullii besides the f a m o u s orator. A s in the c o m p o u n d Sutton Scotney, so too in the composite Edgar Allan Poe, one o f the elements is p u r e l y auxiliary ; Edgar and Poe h a v e doubtless served, each in its o w n milieu, to identify the bearer, b u t Allan c o u l d never h a v e d o n e so. I n certain composite proper names, as well as in c o m p o u n d ones (the t w o classes merge into one another, showing h o w v a g u e the b o u n d a r i e s of linguistic categorization m a y often be), some honorific elements b e l o n g to the proper n a m e , a n d some not ; for instance, Sir in Sir Walter Raleigh is a m o r e or less integral p a r t o f the n a m e , b u t Esq. in John Henderson, Esq. is not.

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T h e a b o v e desultory remarks o n c o m p o u n d or c o m p o site p r o p e r n a m e s seemed a p p r o p r i a t e in a w i d e survey o f the theme, b u t no a t t e m p t c a n here be m a d e to classify the countless varieties. It is, h o w e v e r , necessary to d w e l l on the f u n c t i o n o f the definite article. A b s e n c e o f the article is in m a n y languages a g o o d criterion as to w h e t h e r a w o r d is a proper n a m e or not, so m u c h so that the use o f the article in the sun, the moon (so too in F r e n c h , G e r m a n , Italian, H e b r e w , Arabic,, a n d E g y p t i a n ) is w e l l - n i g h p r o o f that these words are not p r o p e r names, a fact w h i c h will be s h o w n later to h a v e g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e for o u r theory. A l m o s t e v e r y w h e r e , h o w e v e r , there is great inconsistency a n d diversity o f c u s t o m in the use or a v o i d a n c e o f the definite article. In L a t i n , o f course, this does not exist. I n G r e e k o Άλΐξαν&ρος m e a n s 'the aforesaid A l e x a n d e r ' a n d in G e r m a n die Anna has something like the force o f 'our A n n ' in English. O n the other h a n d , in some l a n g u a g e s the definite article is regularly f o u n d w i t h names o f rivers a n d mountains, e.g. la Seine, the Thames (note in Swedish Themsen), der Rhein, il Po, 6 Αΐγυπτος (the Nile, contrast ή Αΐγυπτος for E g y p t ) , the Alps, les Alpes, die Alpen, the Pamirs, the Himalayas. C o m b i n a t i o n s such as the Fraser River a n d variants like the Himalaya Mountains show, in c o m p a n y w i t h the g e n d e r o f the article, w h a t is left implicit in the a b o v e n a m e s , b u t it w o u l d b e w r o n g to assume earlier forms in w h i c h the words for river or m o u n t a i n s w e r e expressed. T h e same holds good for the n a m e s o f groups o f islands like the Hebrides, the Orkneys, the Seychelles, a class in w h i c h a g a i n are f o u n d e x a m p l e s w i t h the implicit w o r d expressed, e.g. the Leeward Islands, or w i t h it as a variant, e.g. the Orkney Islands. I n several E u r o p e a n l a n g u a g e s names o f countries affect the article, e.g. la Russie, die Schweiz, VInghilterra, les Indes, t h o u g h

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custom is vacillating, contrast die Schweiz w i t h Belgien, la France with en France. VIII M y last p a r a g r a p h has included a n u m b e r o f p l u r a l p r o p e r names, a n d this brings us face to face w i t h the question h o w far p r o p e r n a m e s m a y b e considered as individual names. It is incontestable that i n d i v i d u a l persons a n d places f o r m the p r i n c i p a l source o f supply, b u t negative instances are so frequent that application to individuals c a n clearly not be m a d e a conditio sine qua non in defining proper names. Dionysius, indeed, t h o u g h citing no examples of a non-individual kind, does not commit himself to the statement that all p r o p e r names a p p l y to individuals. A l l he says is that p r o p e r n a m e s are used 'individually' ( ί δ ί ω ς ) — n o t e the a d v e r b — o r that they signify 'individual b e i n g ' (τήν IS lav ούσίαν), a n d this might m e a n o n l y that the w o r d s called p r o p e r names a p p l y globally a n d exclusively to a n y t h i n g to w h i c h they do a p p l y . M i l l likewise quotes no non-individual examples, b u t he goes further than Dionysius inasmuch as his statements show h i m to h a v e regarded proper names as a sub-class o f singular or individual names, a c a t e g o r y w h i c h he defines as f o l l o w s : ' A n i n d i v i d u a l or singular n a m e is a n a m e w h i c h is only c a p a b l e o f b e i n g truly affirmed, in the same sense, o f one thing.' 1 L o g i c i a n s since M i l l h a v e often instanced proper names o f w h i c h the objects are not individuals in a n y n a t u r a l sense o f the term, but a p p a r e n t l y w i t h o u t a t t a c h i n g a n y great importance to the fact. A l o n e the school o f m o d e r n logicians o f w h o m Bertrand Russell a n d Miss S t e b b i n g h a v e been 1

M i l l , op. cit., Bk. I, ch. 2, § 3.

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the c h i e f exponents definitely t a k e as their point o f d e p a r ture the notion that a p r o p e r n a m e , to b e really such, must b e the n a m e o f a n i n d i v i d u a l thing. 1 N o t h i n g , it is true, prevents a n y p l u r a l i t y b e i n g t h o u g h t o f as a unity, if w e wish to think o f it in t h a t w a y , a n d such appears to b e the w a y in w h i c h m a n y o f the f o l l o w i n g e x a m p l e s are t h o u g h t of. T h e clearest cases are collectives, i.e. nouns o f singular g r a m m a t i c a l n u m b e r referring g l o b a l l y to a collection o f similar individuals, e.g. the Mafia, the Camorra, the Duma, the Dodecanese, the Heptarchy, others to w h i c h some m i g h t refuse either the title o f p r o p e r n a m e or that o f collective are Parliament, Congress, the Atlas Insurance Company. A t least one F r e n c h philologist 2 has claimed France as a collective, b u t w h e t h e r o n a c c o u n t o f its thirty-three p r o v i n c e s (in the e i g h t e e n t h century) or its eighty-six d e p a r t m e n t s or its f o r t y - t w o million inhabitants I d o not k n o w . N o t all g r a m m a r i a n s w o u l d a c c e p t France as a collective, b u t the o p i n i o n thus v o i c e d at least hints at the troubles in w h i c h w e m a y inv o l v e ourselves if w e m a i n t a i n t h a t p r o p e r n a m e s c a n a p p l y o n l y to individuals. It is surely w o r t h y o f reflection that E u r o p e comprises a n u m b e r o f countries o f w h i c h G e r m a n y is one, that Prussia is a p r o v i n c e o f G e r m a n y , t h a t Berlin is in Prussia, a n d t h a t t h a t same c a p i t a l houses several million persons. L e a v i n g collectives, w e n o w c o m e to plurals o f w h i c h no singular is recorded, e.g. the L a t i n Quirites, Luceres, Ramnes ; m o u n t a i n - r a n g e s like the Andes ; g r o u p s o f islands like the Azores ; groups o f stars like the Pleiades. I pass over such a n a m e as Athenae, since this, 1 T h a t t h i n g being unlike a n y t h i n g t h a t w e call an individual t h i n g , proper n a m e s being restricted b y these authors to 'particulars'. See b e l o w , p. 58. 2 M a r o u z e a u , Lexique de la terminologie linguistique, Paris, 1933, p . 128.

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t h o u g h in developed L a t i n o f p l u r a l f o r m , refers to a single city, whereas in the other n a m e s I h a v e q u o t e d the plurality of the entities n a m e d is b e y o n d dispute. T h e thesis that p r o p e r n a m e s referring to pluralities refer to them g l o b a l l y a n d for that reason m a y be considered individual names becomes u n t e n a b l e w h e n proper n a m e s are o f plural f o r m a n d h a v e nevertheless singulars o f their o w n . I n quite early times tribal n a m e s like Veneti, Helvetii a p p e a r to h a v e h a d no corresponding singulars, b u t that they were not, or not always, t h o u g h t o f g l o b a l l y is s h o w n b y the possibility o f sentences like Venetorum alii fugerunt, alii occisi sunt. W e m a y dismiss f r o m the discussion n a m e s like Δαναοί, Παλασγοί, the singulars o f w h i c h designate the e p o n y m o u s hero. E x c e p t for the reason a b o v e m e n t i o n e d Veneti m i g h t seem pretty well on a p a r w i t h the Seychelles, the Pyrenees ; one c a n n o t speak o f α Seychelle or a Pyrenee. Difficulties arise, however, over Mfßoi a n d Πέρσαι, w h i c h at first encounter us in the guise ofpluralia tantum, but later evolve the singulars Μήδος a n d Πίρσψ, no m o m e n t a r y creations, b u t p e r m a n e n t forms that h a v e well earned their status as words o f the G r e e k l a n g u a g e . H e r e w e find a p h e n o m e n o n rather similar, e x c e p t that it is no m o m e n t a r y creation, to duae Galliae, b u t w h e r e a s there a singulare tantum has developed a p l u r a l b y c u t t i n g the designated entity, like a w o r m , into t w o parts a n d m a k i n g these into t w o similarly n a m e d entities, here a plurale tantum has been resolved into its c o m p o n e n t individ u a l members, each o f w h o m is thus represented as a b e a r e r o f the p r o p e r n a m e in question. It must b e clearly understood that Μήδος a n d Πίρσης are o n l y in a restricted sense n a m e s o f i n d i v i d u a l M e d e s a n d Persians, since these will h a v e possessed particular n a m e s o f their o w n . Nevertheless, since ol Mffioi m e a n s 'the M e d e s ' ,

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MfjSos will m e a n 'a M e d e ' , j u s t as it m i g h t c o n c e i v a b l y b e c o m e possible one d a y to speak o f a Seychelle or a Pyrenee. T h e p l u r a l o f MfjSos forbids us to regard the singular as signifying 'one belonging to the M e d e s ' , t h o u g h w e m u s t regard Romanus as m e a n i n g 'one b e l o n g i n g to R o m e ' , un Français as 'one belonging to F r a n c e ' , a n d Englishman as 'a m a n b e l o n g i n g to E n g l a n d or the English'. T h e s e last, like the adjectives identical or c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e m (cf. also gens Claudia), are no m o r e t h a n derivatives o f p r o p e r names, since they d o not identify the m a n to w h o m they refer, b u t m e r e l y describe h i m as b e l o n g i n g to the c o u n t r y identified b y the proper n a m e . MfjSos, I m a i n t a i n , is m o r e o f a p r o p e r n a m e than Romanus a n d belongs, like surn a m e s a n d gentile names, to the class o f ' c o m m o n p r o p e r names', t h o u g h surnames, for the reason that they w e r e designations o f individuals at the start, are even m o r e indisputably e x a m p l e s o f the c a t e g o r y 'proper n a m e ' .

IX I t appears to b e equally true that not all singular n a m e s are proper names. T h i s w a s also M i l l ' s opinion, for it will be r e m e m b e r e d (see p p . 2 2 - 2 3 ) that held p r o p e r n a m e s to b e merely a sub-class o f singular names. His remarks on the other sub-class are, h o w e v e r , unsatisfactory, a n d it is necessary to subject t h e m to careful analysis. Since in his a c c o u n t of p r o p e r n a m e s he lays all the stress on their b e i n g non-connotative, it w a s n a t u r a l for h i m to emphasize the connotative n a t u r e o f such singular n a m e s as are not p r o p e r names. B u t one c a n h a r d l y refrain f r o m astonishment to find h i m q u o t i n g as authentic e x a m p l e s the f o l l o w i n g : the only son of John Stiles·, the first emperor of Rome ; the author of the Iliad ; the murderer of Henri Quatre. H e

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does not note, nor w i l l I d w e l l on, the fact that all these examples contain p r o p e r as well as g e n e r a l names. T h e sole objection I shall m a k e is that M i l l here introduces a liew kind o f linguistic p h e n o m e n o n not strictly c o m p a r a b l e to the n a m e s that h a v e been the m a i n subject o f his c h a p t e r . T h i s has been chiefly d e v o t e d to discussing the constitutional nature o f isolated words, t h o u g h it must b e confessed he sometimes mixes u p w i t h t h e m ad hoc c o m binations like this table. I f it be retorted that in m y m a n y w o r d proper names I h a v e been guilty o f the same error o f m e t h o d , I shall reply that there is a w o r l d o f difference b e t w e e n designations o f a c k n o w l e d g e d p e r m a n e n c e , w h i c h are genuine word-equivalents, a n d collocations o f w o r d s capriciously p u t together on the spur o f the m o m e n t for a set c o m m u n i c a t i v e purpose. I n m y o w n terminology M i l l ' s examples are facts o f Speech, not o f L a n g u a g e , a n d it w a s stipulated at the beginning o f this essay (pp. 1 2 - 1 3 ) that our investigation should extend o n l y to the latter. I t is true that in some o f m y m a n y - w o r d n a m e s (e.g. Edgar Allan Poe) the coherence o f the parts is m u c h slighter t h a n in others (e.g. Mont Blanc), b ü t if required, I a m quite r e a d y to jettison the former. A t all events, M i l l ' s e x a m p l e s are o f entirely different quality, a n d must, a c c o r d i n g l y , be dismissed as irrelevant. I shall return to such 'descriptions' in another context. M i l l h a d previously suggested sun a n d God as e x a m p l e s o f connotative singular names, a n d the former is really w o r t h y o f the most serious consideration, t h o u g h it m a y be d o u b t e d w h e t h e r c o n n o t a t i v e is e x a c t l y the right w o r d to describe its m e a n i n g f u l q u a l i t y . T h a t sun is not a proper n a m e will b e a d m i t t e d b y all w h o h a v e a feeling for l a n g u a g e , w h i c h is n o t so b a d a criterion as some w o u l d h a v e us suppose. O n e has only to p u t the w o r d s sun a n d

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moon alongside Sam a n d Munro to feel their difference o f status, a n d indeed our task m a y b e defined as to discover a sound intellectual basis for w h a t w e a l r e a d y k n o w instinctively. A l s o the e m p l o y m e n t o f the definite article w i t h the w o r d for 'sun' in a n u m b e r o f different l a n guages, is, as I h a v e already p o i n t e d out (p. 2 1 ) , v a l u a b l e testimony to that conclusion. N o r does M i l l c l a i m sun as a p r o p e r n a m e ; his rejection o f it is o n the g r o u n d that it is not really a singular n a m e . H i s a r g u m e n t runs as follows :* 'These, however, (i.e. sun and God) are scarcely examples of what we are now attempting to illustrate, being, in strictness of language, general, not individual names : for, however they may be in fact predicable only of one object, there is nothing in the meaning of the words themselves which implies this ; and accordingly, when we are imagining and not affirming, we m a y speak of many suns; and the majority of mankind have believed, and still believe, that there are many gods.' It is a curious, a n d obviously unjustifiable d e m a n d , perhaps inspired b y the words only a n d first in t w o o f the c o m binations o f w o r d s w h i c h w e r e q u o t e d a b o v e as M i l l ' s authentic e x a m p l e s o f c o n n o t a t i v e singular names, t h a t the m e a n i n g o f these should h a v e to contain some suggestion o f their singularity. It is a d e m a n d discountenanced b y the p r o p e r names w h i c h he admits to b e singular names, since proper n a m e s a c c o r d i n g to his o w n v i e w h a v e no m e a n i n g , a n d their m e a n i n g , therefore, c a n contain no such suggestion. H i s a r g u m e n t that sun is not really p r e d i c a b l e only o f o n e o b j e c t , because at w i l l w e c a n i m a g i n e several suns, w o u l d e q u a l l y exclude p r o p e r names f r o m b e i n g singular n a m e s , since, as w e h a v e seen (pp. 13—15), there is no difficulty at all in i m a g i n i n g t w o Shakespeares or t w o Goethes. A better a r g u m e n t w o u l d 1

Mill, op. cit., Bk. I, c h . 2, § 5.

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h a v e been that astronomers h a v e n o w p r o v e d that the stars are really suns, these like our sun p e r h a p s the centres o f solar systems o f their o w n . But this a r g u m e n t too is not a g o o d one, since in speaking o f the stars as suns, w e d o not use sun in its n a t u r a l a n d n o r m a l sense o f the large a n d brilliant celestial b o d y w h i c h , e x c e p t to the m i n d o f Science, rises in the east a n d sets in the west. M i l l himself has defined a n i n d i v i d u a l or singular n a m e as o n e ' w h i c h is o n l y c a p a b l e o f b e i n g truly affirmed, in the same sense, [the italics are mine] o f o n e thing'. 1 If, none the less, sun is refused the r a n k o f a singular n a m e on a c c o u n t o f the stellar suns that astronomers h a v e so inconveniently discovered, I shall fall b a c k on the L a t i n sol,2 the G r e e k ήλίος, a n d the H e b r e w shemesh. T h e r e is not a scrap o f evidence to suggest that either o f the t w o latter w a s ever used in the plural, or t h o u g h t o f otherwise than as a singular n a m e . N o r w e r e a n y o f these n o r m a l l y taken as p r o p e r names, t h o u g h Sol a n d "Ηλιος b e c a m e so on the occasions w h e n they w e r e personified, i.e. e n d o w e d w i t h a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c attributes. S i n g u l a r n a m e s that are not proper n a m e s are far f r o m numerous. A s other e x a m p l e s I submit for consideration moon, paradise, hell, ecliptic, zenith, nadir, sky, zodiac, demiurge, Zero, chaos, pole-star ; b u t zodiac will possibly b e c l a i m e d as a collective, a n d chaos a n d pole-star are sometimes regarded as p r o p e r names. It is not quite clear, m o r e o v e r , w h y n a m e s o f diseases like cholera a n d tuberculosis should b e e x c l u d e d , or a g a i n n a m e s o f elements like strontium or o f materials like wood.* S o m e h a v e d e c l a r e d strontium, helium, See above, p. 22. Soles in the sense of 'days' is another e x a m p l e of the type of duae Galliae, b u t with a superadded temporal nuance. 3 M i l l (op. cit., Bk. i, c h . 2, § 5) points out that abstracts are non-connotative, but declares that some at least are general (§ 4), e.g. colour. 1

2

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a n d so forth to be proper names, b u t here w h a t I should like to call the L a w o f Serial U n i f o r m i t y stands in the w a y on a c c o u n t o f such names o f elements as gold a n d silver. T h e d o u b t f u l categorization o f several o f the a b o v e e x a m p l e s y e t once a g a i n shows t h a t w e must not r e g a r d the c a t e g o r y o f proper n a m e s as a rigidly d e m a r c a t e d d o m a i n , b u t rather as a sort o f e m i n e n c e attained b y a large n u m b e r o f words, t h o u g h their foothold is often s o m e w h a t insecure a n d m a y b e m a d e more so b y a n incautious step in one direction or another. X S u m m i n g u p the results a l r e a d y o b t a i n e d w e see that the identification o f proper n a m e s (κυρια) w i t h those t h a t are i n d i v i d u a l l y (Ihiws) used, a n d the contrast o f these w i t h those used c o m m o n l y (κοινώ?) does not p r o v i d e a w a t e r tight definition, since there exist i n d i v i d u a l l y a p p l i e d n a m e s (e.g. ηλως) w h i c h are not p r o p e r names, a n d c o m m o n l y a p p l i e d n a m e s (surnames a n d MfjSos, & c . ) w h i c h are. A t best Dionysius' a c c o u n t describes an a p p r o x i m a t e l y true state o f affairs. T h u s m u c h m a y be a l l o w e d in its f a v o u r , since most i n d i v i d u a l l y used single-word n a m e s are in fact proper n a m e s — t h e y include a m a j o r i t y o f singular names a n d some collectives, see a b o v e — w h i l e most c o m m o n nouns are not. 1 I t is n o w evident that the Abstracts like propinquity and homogeneity are presented to us by L a n g u a g e as singular names, b u t Speech might c o n c e i v a b l y use even these, like all singular nouns whatsoever, as general names, i.e. a writer might choose to write There exist many propinquities, a propinquity of place and a propinquity of kinship, for example. 1 In m y book on Speech and Language, p. 4 1 , I wrongly defined a proper n a m e as a w o r d referring to a single i n d i v i d u a l . In this mistake, h o w e v e r , I a m in g o o d c o m p a n y , both the Oxford English Dictionary a n d Prof. W y l d ' s Universal English Dictionary sharing in the error.

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secret o f the proper n a m e is not to b e discovered a l o n g the lines followed b y Dionysius, a n d w e consequently fall b a c k u p o n the criterion o f meaninglessness a d v o c a t e d b y M i l l . B u t this criterion a g a i n will not suffice in its present f o r m . It is easy to show that proper n a m e s h a v e m e a n i n g in various c o m m o n non-technical senses o f the term, a n d that their m e a n i n g m a y be a c q u i r e d in different ways. A t this point w e h a d better p a r t c o m p a n y w i t h M i l l ' s m u c h disputed term 'connotation', w h i c h has c o m e in for p e r h a p s even more t h a n its fair share o f criticism. I f ' m e a n i n g ' be t a k e n to signify simply ' e x c h a n g e v a l u e ' , then obviously all proper n a m e s h a v e m e a n i n g , since they are w o r d s a n d every w o r d is a sound-sign standing for something, this something b e i n g its e x c h a n g e v a l u e . It must be carefully observed that the m e a n i n g or e x c h a n g e - v a l u e o f a w o r d can never, in strict p a r l a n c e , be a material thing, b u t is simply the m e n t a l c o u n t e r p a r t o f that thing, if indeed the w o r d refers to a n y t h i n g material at all. T h e m e a n i n g m a y comprise a visual or other i m a g e a n d must consist o f k n o w l e d g e o f w h a t e v e r the w o r d means. B u t in the case o f a p r o p e r n a m e , say the n a m e o f a person or p l a c e , w e m a y k n o w next to n o t h i n g a b o u t that person or place. I n such circumstances are w e entitled to say that the m e a n i n g o f the w o r d is nil ? I d o not think so, a n d comparison w i t h other w o r d s that are not p r o p e r n a m e s shows w e are not entitled to take that v i e w . W h e n d e a l i n g w i t h foreign l a n g u a g e s w e are often at a loss for the m e a n i n g o f a w o r d , a n d the like sometimes happens even w h e n concerned w i t h English. F i n d i n g ourselves in this embarrassment, w e d o not assert that t h e w o r d has no m e a n i n g , but w e h a v e recourse to the dictionary. I f w e d o not k n o w the m e a n i n g , s o m e b o d y does, a n d w e n a t u r a l l y seek help from those best informed

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on the subject. T h e r e is no reason w h y proper n a m e s should be r e g a r d e d in a different light. For a p r o p e r n a m e to exist, it is necessary that there should be someone interested in, a n d h a v i n g at least some k n o w l e d g e of, that w h i c h it names, a n d this k n o w l e d g e , w h e t h e r g r e a t or small, must evidently be a c c e p t e d as the m e a n i n g . A n d since m a n y p r o p e r names n a m e things o f extreme c o m plexity like persons and places, it is little w o n d e r that Jespersen argues, 1 in conscious contradiction o f M i l l , t h a t such names, so far from being meaningless, are absolutely the most m e a n i n g f u l o f all. B u t M i l l has anticipated this a r g u m e n t , a n d meets it as follows : 2 'When we predicate of anything its proper name ; when w e say, pointing to a man, this is Brown or Smith, or pointing to a city, that it is York, we do not, merely by so doing, convey to the reader 3 any information about them except that those are their names. By enabling him to identify the individuals, we may connect them with information previously possessed by· him ; by saying, This is York, w e m a y tell him that it contains the Minster. But this is in virtue of what he has previously heard concerning York ; not by anything implied in the name.' M i l l goes on to contrast the p r o p e r n a m e s a l r e a d y discussed w i t h the ' m a n y - w o r d e d c o n n o t a t i v e n a m e ' built of marble in the sentence The town is built of marble. O f the latter c o m b i n a t i o n o f words he says, in conclusion : ' T h e y are not mere marks, b u t more, t h a t is to say, significant m a r k s ; a n d the connotation is w h a t constitutes their significance.' ' O . Jespersen, The Philosophy of Grammar, L o n d o n , 1924, p p . 6 4 - 7 1 . M i l l , op. cit., Bk. I, ch. 2, § 5. 3 ' R e a d e r ' in Mill's text is, of course, a slip ; he meant 'listener'. 2

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A t first sight the conclusions o f the last t w o p a r a g r a p h s a p p e a r both true, b u t contradictory. A r e these c o n c l u sions really i r r e c o n c i l a b l e ? C a n a p r o p e r n a m e be b o t h m e a n i n g f u l a n d meaningless? I believe it possible, a n d that the seeming contradiction lies in the v a r y i n g degree o f i m m e d i a c y (in b o t h the e t y m o l o g i c a l a n d the t e m p o r a l senses o f the term) possessed, o n the one h a n d b y proper names, a n d on the other h a n d b y w o r d s that are not. O r d i n a r y words, a m o n g w h i c h general n a m e s p l a y a prom i n e n t part, directly c o n v e y information ; p r o p e r n a m e s merely provide the key to information. T o hark b a c k to M i l l ' s o w n e x a m p l e , York certainly does not m e a n cathedral-town, b u t it provides any k n o w l e d g e a b l e listener w i t h a d a t u m w h i c h , after only the slightest interval for reflection, will b r i n g to his consciousness the fact that the t o w n he is b e h o l d i n g possesses a c a t h e d r a l ; the same n a m e will doubtless recall to his m e m o r y other information as well. U l t i m a t e l y York will p r o v e m u c h more inf o r m a t i v e t h a n cathedral-town, b u t in itself it does no more t h a n establish the identity o f the t o w n spoken a b o u t . I n order to describe the q u a l i t y in the possession o f w h i c h cathedral-town has the a d v a n t a g e over York, M i l l has wisely chosen the term ' c o n n o t a t i o n ' , h o w e v e r disputable his further doctrines in c o n n e x i o n w i t h that t e r m m a y be. Doubtless one m o t i v e for that choice w a s to g u a r d himself against the o b j e c t i o n that the i d e n t i f y i n g p o w e r o f a p r o p e r n a m e is, o f itself, ' m e a n i n g ' .

XI W e must n o w inquire into the principle u n d e r l y i n g the practice of n a m i n g , a n d following u p o u r answer to this question ask in w h a t sense a p r o p e r n a m e is more

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g e n u i n e l y a n a m e than other n a m e s . For this p u r p o s e it will be necessary to cast a r a p i d g l a n c e at the n a t u r e o f L a n g u a g e a n d at its m o d e o f f u n c t i o n i n g . L a n g u a g e owes its existence to the fact that e x c e p t in a v e r y g e n e r a l a n d indefinite w a y the minds o f h u m a n beings are closed to one another. S y m p a t h y there often is, a n d o c c a s i o n a l thought-transference o f a mysterious kind need n o t b e denied, b u t b r o a d l y speaking, if a m a n wishes to b r i n g something he has perceived or t h o u g h t o f to the notice o f a c o m p a n i o n he c a n effect this o n l y b y recourse to signific a n t signs accessible to the senses o f both a n d b e a r i n g for both the same m e a n i n g or reference to thought. S u c h a sign m a y in theory be a n y t h i n g perceptible to the senses a n d easily p r o d u c e d b y the m a k e r o f the c o m m u n i c a t i o n , b u t w h a t w e call L a n g ü a g e provides far a n d a w a y the most effective code, its instruments b e i n g distinctive sound-signs, so intimately b o u n d u p e a c h w i t h its o w n distinctive t h o u g h t or m e a n i n g t h a t the purposeful utterance i m m e d i a t e l y evokes in the listener the c o r r e s p o n d i n g thought. T h e m e c h a n i s m o f L a n g u a g e , i.e. the process called S p e e c h , is c o m p a r a b l e to t h a t o f a p i a n o . I f the performer strikes the w h i t e key l y i n g b e t w e e n t w o isolated b l a c k keys, the note D is o b t a i n e d , w h i l e the note E results j u s t as i n e v i t a b l y f r o m striking the next w h i t e key to the right. I n L a n g u a g e the fixed c o m b i n a t i o n o f sound-sign a n d corresponding t h o u g h t is c a l l e d a ' w o r d ' , a n d the relation b e t w e e n these t w o constituents o f a w o r d is e v e n m o r e a r b i t r a r y than that b e t w e e n the key o f the p i a n o a n d its resultant note. T h e r e s e m b l a n c e b e t w e e n a d o g a n d a w o l f is so great that, if L a n g u a g e h a d b e e n m o r e deliberately created, one m i g h t h a v e e x p e c t e d a corresp o n d i n g resemblance b e t w e e n the t w o names. S u c h correspondences are not alien to L a n g u a g e altogether, as

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the declensions a n d c o n j u g a t i o n s clearly show. But on the whole, linguistic signs are a r b i t r a r y , so that diverse l a n g u a g e s show v e r y diverse w o r d s for the same object, e.g. F r e n c h maison, L a t i n domus, G r e e k οΐκος, A r a b i c bayt for w h a t w e call a house. T h e house w e speak o f w i t h a n y one o f these w o r d s need not b e present to our senses, a n d indeed w h a t the w o r d calls u p to our minds i m m e d i a t e l y , w h e t h e r or not it is referred an instant later to a n actual house, is the impression left b y the houses w e h a v e seen in the past, or w h a t w e h a v e learnt a b o u t t h e m in some other w a y . S i n c e one house differs from a n o t h e r , a n d as most objects designated b y c o m m o n nouns show similar differences, the impression left b y the w o r d m a y (unless represented b y a visual image, as in m a n y minds) be v a g u e a n d s h a d o w y , a n d all that the w o r d c a n then d o is to p u t the listener on the right track a n d p r e v e n t h i m thinking o f a c o w or a d o g w h e n desired to b e thinking a b o u t a house. N o w w h e t h e r the t h o u g h t or impression corresponding to a w o r d , i.e. w h a t w e m a y call the w o r d ' s ' m e a n i n g ' , b e something v a g u e or s o m e t h i n g precise, the f u n d a m e n t a l principle involved is, as I h a v e a l r e a d y mentioned, 'distinctive sounds for distinctive m e a n i n g s ' , a n d such sounds are called 'words'. 1 I n cases w h e r e the m e a n i n g is v a g u e , it is obviously less usual to think b a c k from the m e a n i n g to the sound, a n d a c c o r d i n g l y the term ' n a m e ' finds its greatest utility w h e r e the t h i n g n a m e d is precise, 1 It is of importance to note that the immediate effect of a word-sound c a n only be to identify, and that its distinguishing p o w e r is only secondary and consequential. M i l l seems to h a v e been a w a r e of this, b u t does not state it explicitly. S p e a k i n g o f proper names, he m o r e often stresses their identifying function, but occasionally, as in his comparison with the act of M o r g i a n a (see below, p. 39), h e alludes to their distinguishing function, so that the opening sentence of the present essay can stand.

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a n d w h e r e the utterance o f the w o r d - s o u n d points t o w a r d s earlier memories o f the s a m e thing, not towards some impression w h i c h , o w i n g to its vagueness, w o u l d b e e q u a l l y a p p l i c a b l e to a n y n u m b e r o f r o u g h l y similar things. O t h e r w i s e expressed, a true n a m e o u g h t to call u p the t h o u g h t o f something d e t e r m i n a t e a n d definite, so m u c h so that w e n o r m a l l y forget that all a w o r d c a n d o is to c o n j u r e u p a thought. F o r g e t t i n g this, w e n a t u r a l l y a n d conveniently say that a true n a m e is the n a m e o f a definite thing. 1 I n the last p a r a g r a p h the expression 'true n a m e ' has been e m p l o y e d , since a true n a m e is not necessarily a proper n a m e , as must n o w be explained. I t is a w e l l k n o w n psychological l a w that the m i n d selects f r o m e v e r y experience that w h i c h is useful to it, a n d allows all else to fade o u t completely, or at least to b e relegated into the b a c k g r o u n d o f the subconscious. A g o o d e x e m p l i f i c a t i o n o f this l a w has j u s t been q u o t e d : e x c e p t u p o n reflection, or in scientific analysis, w e are unconscious that all a w o r d c a n o f itself d o is to refer us to a n associated t h o u g h t ; w e , h a v i n g received that thought, a u t o m a t i c a l l y refer it to t h e thing that seems relevant in t h e context or situation. H e n c e the t h i n g is often supposed to be the m e a n i n g o f the w o r d , t h o u g h , o n an a c c u r a t e analysis, that it c a n n e v e r be. B u t the psychological l a w h a s another e q u a l l y i m p o r tant consequence. So intent are w e o n the things referred to b y the words w e hear, t h a t unless some p e c u l i a r circumstance like a m i s p r o n u n c i a t i o n or a p a r t i c u l a r 1 M i l l (op. cit., Bk. I, ch. 2, § 1) w a s quite clear on this point, b u t sensibly prefers to speak in general of names as being the n a m e s of things, not of ideas of things. For this reason it c a n n o t be quoted against the opening statement of this essay that op. cit., Bk. I, ch. 2, § 5, he says of proper names : ' W e p u t a mark, not indeed u p o n the object itself, but, so to speak, u p o n the idea of the object.'

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elegance o f diction distracts our attention, w e b a r e l y perceive the sound o f the w o r d , t h o u g h this sound remains all the while the instrument b y w h i c h c o m m u n i c a tion is actually effected. I n j u s t the same spirit, w h e n w e travel to L o n d o n b y train, w e m a y w e l l be thinking o f L o n d o n a n d w h a t w e shall d o w h e n w e get there, b u t it seldom crosses our thoughts that a c o m p l e x steam-driven m e c h a n i s m is w h a t is b r i n g i n g a b o u t the fulfilment o f our purpose. A t this point the e v i d e n c e o f the w o r d sun proves o f inestimable v a l u e . N o o n e c a n deny the definiteness o f the sun, or the fact that the w o r d sun directs o u r attention to that celestial b o d y , or to the t h o u g h t o f it, b y m e a n s o f o u r previous memories o f that selfsame b o d y , i.e. b y means o f the m e a n i n g o f the w o r d sun. N o one c a n d e n y that sun is the 'true n a m e ' o f the sun in the sense a b o v e attributed to the term. B u t not only logicians, b u t also the c o m m o n consent o f m a n k i n d , as attested b y the use o f the definite article the sun, agrees that 'sun' is not a proper name. 1 Surely the reason is that w h e n the w o r d sun is heard, w e usually a n d p r e d o m i n a n t l y are unconscious of the sound o f that w o r d ; the w o r d to us is all m e a n i n g . It is difficult to define e x a c t l y the j u m b l e o f visual, tactile, a n d c o n c e p t u a l impressions w h i c h the w o r d sun resuscitates in our minds, b u t that notions o f brightness, w a r m t h , vitalizing p o w e r , superior size to all other celestial bodies e x c e p t the m o o n , association w i t h d a y a n d so forth are a m o n g t h e m no one will dispute. Further, it is o f great importance that these notions 1 (It is on this point that philologists and at least one philosopher definitely part c o m p a n y . Russell, Human Knowledge, p. 87, explicitly states the moon—this of course on the same footing as the sun—to be a proper name.)

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should be c o m m o n to all m a n k i n d , so m u c h so that they spring into consciousness in a n u n m i s t a k a b l e , t h o u g h u n differentiated, w a y as soon as the w o r d is p r o n o u n c e d . So p r o m i n e n t is all this m e a n i n g that beside it the sound o f the w o r d is as n o u g h t ; the m i n d passes right t h r o u g h the sound a n d is arrested only b y the m e a n i n g . M i l l misses the point in his discussion o f the w o r d sun as a g e n e r a l n a m e . It is i n d e e d potentially a g e n e r a l n a m e , because if any other entity except our o w n sun h a d the same qualities the s a m e w o r d sun w o u l d h a v e to b e used to denote it w i t h brevity a n d inclusiveness. B u t it is p r e d o m i n a n c e o f the m e a n i n g over the sound that makes it a g e n e r a l n a m e , not the factual or i m a g i n a r y existence o f other objects possessing the same qualities. L e t us n o w , however, consider w h a t w o u l d h a p p e n if there existed in the heavens a second celestial b o d y almost identical in nature w i t h o u r sun, but w h i c h w e w e r e interested to distinguish f r o m it. O b v i o u s l y to use the same w o r d sun of both w o u l d be o f no avail ; the m e a n i n g o f the w o r d w o u l d then serve m e r e l y to m a r k the resemb l a n c e o f the t w o suns, b u t w o u l d not help t o w a r d s distinguishing them. For that purpose a distinctive n a m e w o u l d h a v e to be found for the second sun, the n a m e sun b e i n g reserved for our o w n . It is easy to see w h a t w o u l d h a p p e n to the w o r d sun in that case. T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f its distinctive sound w o u l d b e greatly e n h a n c e d , since it w o u l d b e precisely that sound, a n d n o t h i n g else, w h i c h b y identifying each w o u l d distinguish the one celestial b o d y f r o m the other. It is clear that in this case Sun w o u l d h a v e b e c o m e a proper n a m e . A p r o p e r n a m e is, then, a w o r d w h i c h identifies its object b y virtue of its sound alone, and w h e n w e c o m e

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to survey the various classes o f t h i n g to w h i c h p r o p e r n a m e s belong, w e shall find t w o constant features that were mentioned in o u r supposed transformation of the w o r d sun. In the first place, the things called b y proper n a m e s are mostly m e m b e r s o f a set in w h i c h the resemblances considerably o u t w e i g h the differences, so that special labels, as it were, are required to m a r k the distinction. A n d in the second place, the a c t u a l n a m e forces itself u p o n o u r attention more p r o m i n e n t l y t h a n d o other words. T h i n k o f the place in our lives o c c u pied b y christenings a n d introductions o f persons b y n a m e , inquiries after the names o f places, a n d so forth. C l e a r l y a p r o p e r n a m e is a w o r d in w h i c h the identifying, a n d consequently the distinguishing, p o w e r o f the word-sound is exhibited in its purest a n d most c o m p e l l i n g form. 1

XII I t is strange that M i l l has taken so little a c c o u n t o f the indicative p o w e r o f the distinctive sounds o f p r o p e r n a m e s a n d has insisted almost exclusively on the negative criterion o f their meaninglessness. T h i s s o m e w h a t distorted attitude towards the p r o b l e m is one o f the chief points u p o n w h i c h , in m y opinion, his otherwise correct analysis needs rectification. T o justify m y criticism it is needful o n l y to recall the passage in w h i c h he c o m p a r e s a proper 1 F u n k e and M a r t y seem to stand almost alone in emphasizing the prominence of the sound as a n essential feature of proper names : '. . . hat M a r t y betont, d a ß M i l l d o c h insofern richtig gesehen hat, als j e n e Vorstellung des 'so und so Bezeichnetseins' z u m psychischen Wesen des Eigennamens gehöre,' F u n k e , ' Z u r Definition des Begriffes " E i g e n n a m e " , ' in Probleme der englischen Sprache und Kultur, Festschrift für Johannes Hoops, Heidelberg, 1925, p. 77. Further on Funke's views, see .below, A p p e n d i x , p. 69.

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n a m e to the u n m e a n i n g m a r k c h a l k e d u p o n a house-door to indicate that the house is to b e r o b b e d . ' M o r g i a n a ' , he tells us, 1 'chalked all the other houses in a similar m a n n e r , a n d defeated the scheme : h o w ? simply b y o b l i t e r a t i n g the difference o f a p p e a r a n c e b e t w e e n that house a n d t h e others. T h e chalk was still there, b u t it no longer served the purpose o f a distinctive m a r k . ' T h e comparison is n o t a h a p p y one. I t w o u l d h a v e been apposite o n l y if M o r g i a n a h a d placed different c h a l k marks u p o n all the doors, thus m a k i n g it needful for the robber to k n o w , not merely that the house to b e p l u n d e r e d w a s m a r k e d w i t h c h a l k , b u t t h r o u g h w h a t p a r t i c u l a r m a r k the house c o u l d be identified. T h e n a m e John serves to distinguish its bearer f r o m Philip a n d A r t h u r a n d Percival, not because these c o m p a n i o n s o f his are nameless, b u t because his n a m e is different f r o m theirs. I f it b e objected that the distinctiveness o f the sound is true o f all words, n o t o f p r o p e r n a m e s alone, b u t o f all w o r d s whatsoever, w e c a n n o t o f course d e n y that truth, b u t must point o u t that it m a k e s a vast a m o u n t o f d i f f e r e n c e w h e t h e r the distinctive sound is a self-sufficient m e a n s o f identification, or w h e t h e r it has to b e assisted, as in general names, b y consideration o f the m e a n i n g . A w o r d like man c a n n o t b y itself identify any p a r t i c u l a r m a n . It serves to c o n c e n t r a t e the attention u p o n a c o m p l e x o f characters not possessed b y the beings designated b y woman. T h i s c o m p l e x o f characters is that p a r t o f the m e a n i n g o f the w o r d man w h i c h holds the attention o f the listener w h e n man is used in contrast w i t h woman, a n d so i m p o r t a n t a role does that m e a n i n g p l a y in identifying the i n d i v i d u a l m e a n t t h a t the sound o f the w o r d , t h o u g h really o f prior a n d f u n d a m e n t a l importance, vanishes f r o m consciousness as soon 1

Mill, op. cit., Bk. I , ch. 2, § 5.

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as it has a u t o m a t i c a l l y fulfilled its f u n c t i o n o f d r a w i n g attention to the c o m p l e x o f characters in question. T h e purest o f p r o p e r n a m e s are those o f w h i c h the sounds strike us as w h o l l y arbitrary, yet perfectly distinctive, a n d a b o u t w h i c h w e should feel, if i g n o r a n t of their bearers, no trace o f m e a n i n g or significance. S u c h n a m e s are Vercingetorix a n d Popocatepetl. O f course these possess m e a n i n g in the sense that they are k n o w n to refer to something, the m e n t a l c o u n t e r p a r t o f that something constituting the ' m e a n i n g ' . W e m a y even k n o w a g r e a t d e a l a b o u t the entities designated b y those w o r d s , b u t such k n o w l e d g e is completely inoperative in the f u n c t i o n i n g o f the n a m e . W e must realize that the term p r o p e r n a m e has reference to the m o d e o f functioni n g w h i c h certain w o r d s possess w i t h i n the m e c h a n i s m o f Speech. T h e i m p o r t a n c e here a t t a c h e d to the sound o f p r o p e r n a m e s m i g h t possibly be misunderstood w i t h o u t further e x p l a n a t i o n . It is o f course not m e a n t that p r o p e r n a m e s are p r o n o u n c e d more l o u d l y or e m p h a t i c a l l y t h a n other words. By speaking o f the p r o m i n e n c e o f the sound I h a v e chosen w h a t seemed the clearest a n d shortest w a y o f expressing the f a c t that a p r o p e r n a m e functions b y means o f its external distinctiveness, its o u t w a r d contrast w i t h other words. ' S o u n d ' has here been taken to include the visible a p p e a r a n c e in writing, w h i c h i n d e e d to m a n y readers m a y b a r e l y resuscitate the original sound-sensation at all. N o r does it detract f r o m the truth o f m y a r g u m e n t that personal names, whert m o d i f i e d into pet-names (.Kosenamen), are apt to u n d e r g o deformations w h i c h m a y disguise them almost o u t o f recognition, e.g. Bobby for Robert, Harry for Henry. A n extreme instance is the substitution o f Polly for Mary, in w h i c h the stress I h a v e laid

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u p o n the 'distinctive sound', if misinterpreted, m i g h t seem to r e d u c e m y thesis to nonsense. L e t it b e u n d e r stood, therefore, that w h e n I d w e l l u p o n the 'sound' o f p r o p e r names, I a m referring o n l y to the p r e p o n d e r a t i n g attention p a i d to their distinctive sensible externals as opposed to the associated m e a n i n g s . Proper n a m e s are identificatory marks r e c o g n i z a b l e , not b y the intellect, b u t b y the senses.

XIII W e must n o w return to those p r o p e r names w h i c h , like Dartmouth incompletely discussed at the b e g i n n i n g o f this essay, possess as mere w o r d s a n obvious m e a n i n g . I t w a s seen that the claim o f Dartmouth to b e a p r o p e r n a m e is not vitiated b y the fact that the t o w n still lies at the m o u t h o f the D a r t , a n y more t h a n Mont Blanc c o u l d fail to b e a p r o p e r n a m e because its s u m m i t is covered w i t h snow. T h e s e n a m e s are proper n a m e s b e c a u s e they are a c c e p t e d as the designations o f the t o w n a n d the m o u n t a i n in question, a n d because they are k n o w n to be the r i g h t linguistic instruments for i d e n t i f y i n g them. H o w e v e r little logicians m a y like i n t r o d u c i n g p s y c h o l o g i c a l factors into their cut-and-dried definitions, here it is necessary. O u r p r o f o u n d skill in the art o f using a n d interpreting w o r d s has led us to acquire a n i m p l i c i t awareness o f their different species a n d o f the w a y in w h i c h they are to b e taken. Unless that awareness w e r e a n objective reality, the task o f the g r a m m a r i a n w o u l d be n u g a t o r y a n d his distinctions w h o l l y artificial. I f a n ordinary m a n w i t h o u t pretensions to g r a m m a t i c a l k n o w l e d g e were asked w h y he called D a r t m o u t h Dartmouth, the most likely a n s w e r w o u l d be, 'Because that is its n a m e ' . Possibly, if he

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suspected that y o u wished for a less obvious reply, he m i g h t say, 'Because it lies at the m o u t h o f the D a r t ' ; b u t it will, I think, be a c k n o w l e d g e d that in using the n a m e t h a t position w o u l d seldom cross his m i n d , a n d it is conc e i v a b l e he m i g h t n e v e r think o f it at all. Nevertheless, I s u b m i t that p r o p e r n a m e s that h a v e a clear e t y m o l o g y or recall some similarly constructed p r o p e r n a m e are slightly less p u r e e x a m p l e s o f the c a t e g o r y t h a n c o m p l e t e l y arbitrary a n d unintelligible names, because for listeners i g n o r a n t o f the o b j e c t to w h i c h t h e y refer the m e a n i n g thus a f f o r d e d m i g h t p r o v i d e some identificatory help. F o r instance, a sharp-witted peasant w h o k n e w W e y m o u t h , b u t h a d never h e a r d o f D a r t m o u t h , m i g h t , as w e say, p u t t w o a n d t w o together, a n d c o n c l u d e that a town was intended. A n d for e x a c t l y the same reason names like John a n d Mary, Heinrich a n d Giovanni, Freiburg a n d Deauville are less p u r e p r o p e r n a m e s t h a n the purest because o f the assistance that, o n rare occasions, they m i g h t give b y their suggestion o f sex, nationality, or c o u n t r y .

XIV A f e w pages farther b a c k a definition o f p r o p e r n a m e s w a s incidentally g i v e n w h i c h w o u l d suffice if all w o r d s b e a r i n g the title w e r e u p to the s t a n d a r d o f Vercingetorix or Popocatepetl. H o w e v e r , both g r a m m a t i c a l custom a n d the necessities o f the case m a k e it reasonable to extend the term to e x a m p l e s o f less absolute p u r i t y , a n d it becomes consequently necessary to f o r m u l a t e the definition in a longer a n d m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d w a y . I submit the f o l l o w i n g to the consideration o f philologists a n d logicians :

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A proper name is a word or group of words recognized as indicating or tending to indicate the object or objects to which it refers by virtue of its distinctive sound alone, without regard to any meaning possessed by that sound from the start, or acquired by it through association with the said object or objects.

A f e w glosses are required to e x p l a i n w h y the definition has h a d to be expressed in so c u m b e r s o m e a f o r m . O r g r o u p o f words' needs to b e a d d e d o n a c c o u n t o f w h a t I h a v e called 'composite p r o p e r names' (p. 20). ' R e c o g n i z e d as indicating' instead o f ' w h i c h indicates' is d e m a n d e d b y the considerations a d d u c e d o n p. 4 1 . ' T e n d i n g to indicate' is d u e to the existence o f h o m o n y m s a m o n g p r o p e r names (p. 16), ' o b j e c t or objects' to the existence o f collective a n d p l u r a l specimens (pp. 2 2 - 2 5 ) . I n stating that a proper n a m e b e c o m e s such b e c a u s e the indication it gives is given ' b y v i r t u e o f its distinctive sound alone' I wish to i m p l y t h a t 'the term proper n a m e has reference to the m o d e o f f u n c t i o n i n g w h i c h certain w o r d s possess within the m e c h a n i s m o f S p e e c h ' , a thesis e x p l a i n e d in the p a r a g r a p h t h a t concludes w i t h that sentence (p. 40). ' M e a n i n g possessed b y that sound f r o m the start,' see p p . 4 1 - 2 ; ' t h r o u g h association w i t h the said o b j e c t or objects', see the discussions o f York (pp. 3 1 - 3 2 ) a n d o f sun (pp. 3 6 - 3 7 ) .

XV T h e constructive side o f our task is not yet ended. Before criticizing the views p r o m u l g a t e d b y B e r t r a n d Russell a n d his school w e must survey the classes o f objects t h a t call for designation b y p r o p e r names, a n d must e x p l a i n the reasons for w h i c h they d o so. O n a c c o u n t o f the

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i m p o r t a n c e that has b e e n a t t a c h e d to the w o r d sun it w i l l be well to consider first o f all the n a m e s o f other celestial bodies, the more so since b o t h p r o p e r a n d g e n e r a l names are to be f o u n d a m o n g them. S u n a n d m o o n differ so conspicuously f r o m o n e another a n d f r o m the stars a n d planets that insistence o n their distinctive n a m e s is not required. T h e w o r d s sun a n d moon i m m e d i a t e l y s u m m o n u p mental pictures a n d other psychic responses so distinct, that no difference o f quality is felt b e t w e e n t h e m a n d other c o m m o n nouns, a n d the o n l y reason that there c o u l d be for p l a c i n g t h e m in a n o t h e r c a t e g o r y is their f a c t u a l uniqueness. V e r y different are the stars, whose multitude a n d similarity are so g r e a t that p r o p e r n a m e s are urgently n e e d e d to assert a n d m a i n t a i n their individuality. N o t all the stars, o f course, h a v e n a m e s o f their o w n , a n d for the most p a r t they are taken in groups within w h i c h each special star is distinguished b y the e q u i v a lent o f an ordinal n u m b e r , e.g. Gamma Pegasi, Alpha of the Plough. T h e n a m e s o f the groups or constellations are collective proper names, e.g. Cassiopeia, Perseus, Virgo. T h e Pleiades p r o v i d e a g o o d e x a m p l e o f a p l u r a l p r o p e r n a m e . O n l y the planets a n d a f e w o f the most conspicuous stars, i.e. those w h i c h attract to themselves more interest than the rest, e.g. Sirius, Fomalhaut, Vega, h a v e n a m e s o f their v e r y o w n . N a t u r a l l y all the stars, b y those w h o are experts in astronomy, c o u l d be identified b y means o f descriptions, b y the successive ordered a n d interrelated presentation o f general n a m e s intermingled w i t h words for spatial relations a n d the like, t h o u g h one or more proper n a m e s c o u l d h a r d l y fail to b e present. B u t such descriptions, necessary as they are in order to instruct the u n l e a r n e d as to the applications o f the indiv i d u a l star-names, w o u l d be v e r y c u m b r o u s linguistic

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instruments if utilized o n e v e r y occasion. O n l y in r a r e instances c a n the description o f a star b e m a d e so short as to compress it into a single w o r d ; pole-star is such a n instance, a n d this c o m p o u n d w o r d is best taken as a c o m m o n n o u n , since most o f us, I presume, w o u l d r e g a r d the n a m e , not as b e i n g a mere meaningless designation, b u t as signifying that star w h i c h is nearest to the n o r t h pole. F r o m the different w a y s in w h i c h the celestial bodies are n a m e d m u c h c a n be l e a r n t a b o u t the conditions g o v e r n i n g the d e m a n d for p r o p e r names. A m o n g those conditions are : ( 1 ) a vast m u l t i t u d e o f entities so similar that the distinctions b e t w e e n t h e m are difficult to seize or to describe within brief c o m p a s s ; (2) a n interest a m o n g a section o f the c o m m u n i t y so u r g e n t t h a t a single-word designation is sought a n d f o u n d ; (3) g r e a t utility in a f f o r d i n g fixed points b y reference to w h i c h other entities c a n b e identified, or in defining the g r o u p or class w i t h i n w h i c h those other entities c a n b e f o u n d ; a n d (4) there is a n obvious a d v a n t a g e in a designation w h i c h c o m p l e t e l y covers its o b j e c t in all its aspects a n d w h i c h economizes t h o u g h t b y r e n d e r i n g unnecessary e x p l a n a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g the n a t u r e a n d relations o f that object.

XVI O n e o f the t w o largest classes o f p r o p e r n a m e s is t h a t w h i c h provides designations for p l a c e s — f o r continents, countries, provinces, towns, villages, a n d even p r i v a t e residences, not to speak o f expanses o f water, m o u n t a i n s , promontories, a n d so forth. I n this class all the four conditions m e n t i o n e d a b o v e c o m e into p l a y , b u t w i t h

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differences deserving o f c o m m e n t . ( i ) T h e r e are b u t few localities in the w o r l d so different f r o m the rest that they eschew proper n a m e s a n d are h a b i t u a l l y represented b y brief descriptions ; i n d e e d I c a n instance only the N o r t h a n d S o u t h Poles. A s regards the similarity o f the entities n a m e d there is not that degree w h i c h exists b e t w e e n the stars as seen b y a terrestrial observer, b u t it w o u l d b e a grievous misrepresentation o f m y p o i n t if someone obj e c t e d that the M e d i t e r r a n e a n a n d L o n d o n h a v e n o t h i n g in c o m m o n except that both are localities. W h e n sea is c o m p a r e d w i t h sea a n d t o w n w i t h t o w n the difficulty o f selecting features characteristic e n o u g h to serve as basis for differentiating descriptions will b e a p p r e c i a t e d to the full. T h e fact that places c h a n g e f r o m c e n t u r y to century is another reason for g i v i n g t h e m i m m u t a b l e names o f their o w n to e m p h a s i z e their continuity, t h o u g h this cause o f p r o p e r n a m e s exercises less influence in placen a m e s than it does in n a m e s o f persons. (2) T h e interest w i t h o u t w h i c h no p l a c e w o u l d b e g i v e n a n a m e does not spring from e x a c t l y the same kind o f source as the interest that p r o m p t e d the n a m i n g o f the stars. T h e r e the needs o f mariners a n d o f those concerned w i t h the m e a s u r e m e n t o f time h a v e co-operated w i t h the scientific p r e o c c u p a tions o f a small b o d y o f specialists. A s regards places, there is scarcely a n y o n e w i t h o u t a h o m e or h a u n t o f his o w n w h i c h is a vital interest to him, w h e r e a s his concern w i t h distant places varies greatly a n d in the m a j o r i t y o f cases is simply non-existent. For this reason most places are for h i m 'mere n a m e s ' . A g a i n it accords w e l l w i t h M i l l ' s v i e w o f the meaninglessness o f p r o p e r n a m e s that place-names c a n p r o v e serviceable w i t h o n l y a m i n i m u m o f k n o w l e d g e . W h e n a r a i l w a y - j o u r n e y is b e i n g p l a n n e d one does not stop to inquire details a b o u t the j u n c t i o n s at

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w h i c h one has to change, nor is m o r e information req u i r e d in g i v i n g a n address t h a n to specify the larger a n d smaller regions within w h i c h the p a r t i c u l a r p l a c e is located. T h e interest that different persons display in a given p l a c e is a p t to be e x t r e m e l y heterogeneous a n d the virtue o f a p r o p e r n a m e is that, since it e m b r a c e s the w h o l e o f its object, it caters to all requirements w i t h o u t bias in a n y direction. (3) It is superfluous to waste w o r d s over the utility o f p l a c e - n a m e s in l o c a t i n g other p l a c e s t h a n those designated b y t h e m s e l v e s ; the p o s t m a n a n d the pedestrian are here the best witnesses.

XVII I t w o u l d b e tedious to cover the s a m e g r o u n d a g a i n in reference to personal names, the largest class o f all. Still it is w o r t h p o i n t i n g out that there is n o h u m a n b e i n g so w r e t c h e d as to h a v e no n a m e o f his o w n , a n d y e t the great m a j o r i t y o f people w h o m w e m e e t in the streets o f a city are o f supreme i n d i f f e r e n c e to us. W h a t is m o r e , they look alike, or at all events the distinguishing m a r k s are not conspicuous e n o u g h for the individuality o f e a c h to b e u p h e l d b y w o r d s m o r e m e a n i n g f u l t h a n p r o p e r names. It is o f i m p o r t a n c e for the theory o f personal names that these a c c o m p a n y their owners, as a rule, f r o m the c r a d l e to the g r a v e , a n d consequently i d e n t i f y these owners at every c o n c e i v a b l e stage a n d in e v e r y situation. I n d e e d , w e m a y pertinently note that a personality sometimes undergoes t e m p o r a r y eclipse b y c h a n g e o f n a m e , as in the case o f girls w h o m a r r y or p r o m i n e n t m e n w h e n elevated to the p e e r a g e . T h u s m u c h h a v i n g been said, it m a y seem p r o f i t a b l e to discuss a f e w special p r o b l e m s a n d traits in c o n n e x i o n

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w i t h persons a n d their names. P e r h a p s someone m i g h t think fit to ask w h y the n a m e o f some almost universally k n o w n person, like N a p o l e o n or Shakespeare, does not lose its quality o f b e i n g a proper n a m e as a consequence o f a c q u i r i n g m e a n i n g a n d b e c o m i n g a household w o r d . I c a n picture some r e a d e r o b j e c t i n g : ' I f y o u r hypothesis concerning sun a n d moon is correct, w h y does not the n a m e Napoleon present itself to us as a c o m m o n n o u n , seeing that here, if a n y w h e r e , the m i n d travels right t h r o u g h the sound to the m e a n i n g ? ' B u t does i t ? F o r the generality o f m a n k i n d , a n d it is they w h o confer their m e a n i n g u p o n words, w h e n the sun's roundness, a n d brightness, a n d w a r m t h , a n d a f e w other traits h a v e been e n u m e r a t e d , the m e a n i n g of the w o r d sun is p r a c t i c a l l y exhausted. W i t h a personal n a m e like Napoleon it is far otherwise. W h o l e books are r e q u i r e d to set forth the m e a n i n g o f Napoleon, a n d w h a t the bearer o f the n a m e h a s signified to his contemporaries a n d to later generations. T h e m e a n i n g o f his n a m e b y no m e a n s confines itself to those traits that h a v e b r o u g h t h i m celebrity. H i s c h i l d h o o d , his experiences as a lover, his life at St. H e l e n a h a v e all to b e b r o u g h t into the a c c o u n t . A n o t h e r reason w h i c h w o u l d suffice to u p h o l d the position o f Napoleon a m i d the ranks o f proper names is w h a t I h a v e proposed to call the L a w o f Serial U n i f o r m i t y ; this is at b o t t o m o n l y a manifestation o f the g e n e r a l i z i n g t e n d e n c y o f the h u m a n m i n d , w h i c h assimilates p h e n o m e n a w i t h a v a l i a n t disregard o f the differences that m a y exist b e t w e e n t h e m . A l l persons h a v e names o f their o w n , a n d Napoleon is the n a m e o f the great Corsican. A n d that n a m e c a n n o t fail to b e regarded b y the linguistic consciousness as a proper n a m e , no m a t t e r h o w m u c h m o r e significant it m a y b e to the p u b l i c at large t h a n that o f a n y o r d i n a r y person.

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L e t us n e x t ask h o w far designations like Cook a n d Father, w h e n e m p l o y e d as v o c a t i v e s or as m e a n s o f reference, c a n b e considered to b e p r o p e r names. T h e y resemble these b y not h a v i n g the article prefixed to t h e m . H e r e w e c a n n o t avail ourselves o f the antithesis b e t w e e n L a n g u a g e a n d Speech w h i c h stood us in good stead w h e n d e a l i n g w i t h examples like a Goethe (p. 13). W e c a n not say that Cook is a mere p h e n o m e n o n o f S p e e c h , for w i t h i n the limited circle w h e r e t h e w o r d serves as substitute for a personal n a m e it has m o r e than a mere ad hoc, m o m e n t a r y application ; it m a y indeed be stabilized for years in a f a m i l y as the r e c o g n i z e d designation o f the s a m e person. T h e g r a m m a r i a n must here forge a n o m e n c l a t u r e that does justice to the special case, a n d I should propose to classify Cook, w h e n thus e m p l o y e d , as 'a c o m m o n n o u n adopted (not merely used) as a p r o p e r n a m e ' . T h e c o n c e p tion o f a p r o p e r n a m e as liable to gradations b e c o m e s imp e r a t i v e in such instances. U s u a l l y Father is still less o f a real p r o p e r n a m e t h a n Cook, since, e x c e p t w h e n the other p a r e n t imitates the p a r l a n c e o f her offspring, Father is e m p l o y e d only b y those to w h o m its bearer stands in the p a t e r n a l relation. I pass o v e r the interesting topic o f nicknames, b u t it is necessary that something should b e said a b o u t examples like Richard le Spicer a n d Robert le Long, q u o t e d from a m e d i e v a l roll b y W e e k l e y to illustrate the w a y in w h i c h c o m m o n E n g l i s h surnames originated. H e r e it w o u l d be fitting, in m y o p i n i o n , to say that Spicer a n d Long are a l r e a d y p r o p e r names, i n a s m u c h as their bearers or else the c o m m u n i t y in w h i c h they lived h a d evidently decreed it that these designations should b e the official m e a n s o f establishing their identity. N a t u r a l l y the spicer (Γépicier) h a d every incentive to advertise his t r a d e , a n d it w o u l d be w r o n g h e a d e d to suppose that he wished

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the m e a n i n g o f that epithet to be ignored. B u t Richard le Spicer m a y possibly h a v e been l o n g o f l i m b , a n d it is b y no means certain that Robert le Long w a s not a spicer. T h e fact that R i c h a r d took le Spicer a n d not a n y other applicable attribute to be his epitheton constans p l a i n l y confers o n le Spicer the right to be considered a p r o p e r n a m e , t h o u g h o n e rather more questionable t h a n Dartmouth (pp. 4 1 - 4 2 ) , a n a m e o f l o n g standing in w h i c h the m e a n i n g doubtless seldom comes to consciousness.

XVIII A n u m b e r o f other categories o f p r o p e r n a m e s c a n b e d e a l t w i t h v e r y r a p i d l y , since o n l y in one particular d o they teach us a n y t h i n g n e w . A l l ships a n d boats receive p r o p e r names o f their o w n o n a c c o u n t o f the c o m m e r c i a l a n d other interest w h i c h they possess for their owners, t h o u g h not necessarily for the c o m m u n i t y at large. Houses are not quite so universally a c c o r d e d this m e a n s o f distinction, since t e m p o r a r y tenants c a n feel little objection to their place o f residence b e i n g identified b y a n u m b e r . T h e effective m o t i v e here comes into v i e w . T h e m a n w h o builds a n e w house for himself or u n e x p e c t e d l y becomes the p r o u d possessor o f one is specially apt to m a r k his satisfaction b y choosing a n a m e for it, a n d the n a m e chosen is likely to recall some scene o f the name-giver's previous activity or to reflect some subject o f peculiar interest to him. T h e like holds good o f the n a m i n g o f animals, pets, a n d indeed a n y o b j e c t o f h u m a n pride or affection.

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T H E T H E O R Y OF P R O P E R " N A M E S XIX

I pass o n to more dubious cases. A n eminent F r e n c h philologist has c l a i m e d that the n a m e s o f birds w h i c h h e personally is u n a b l e to identify o n sight are in reality p r o p e r names. 1 A s previously r e m a r k e d (p. 30), personal i g n o r a n c e o f the m e a n i n g o f a w o r d — a n d this is a failing for w h i c h everyone o u g h t to feel the greatest s y m p a t h y c a n carry n o w e i g h t in d e t e r m i n i n g its categorization. T o w h a t c a t e g o r y a w o r d belongs is decided b y the linguistic feeling o f those best a c q u a i n t e d w i t h the object a n d the m a n n e r o f its reference, a l t h o u g h the assistance o f g r a m m a r i a n a n d dictionary-maker must be i n v o k e d to find the technical term a p p r o p r i a t e to the definition o f the feeling. N o w everyone w h o k n o w s that linnets a n d c o r n crakes a n d shrikes a n d w h i n c h a t s are birds, a n d that these are the ordinary English designations o f t h e m , must sub-consciously place those designations in the s a m e c a t e g o r y as sparrow a n d thrush, a n d no one w i t h g r a m m a t i c a l k n o w l e d g e will d o u b t that sparrow a n d thrush are c o m m o n names. E x t e r n a l e v i d e n c e for this is f o u n d in the use o f the articles and the f o r m a t i o n o f plurals w i t h o u t a n y sense o f incongruence. I f whinchat is felt to b e m o r e o f a p r o p e r n a m e than sparrow, it is because a p r o p e r n a m e is m e r e l y a w o r d in w h i c h one feature c o m m o n to all w o r d s w h a t s o e v e r — t h e p o w e r o f c o n v e y i n g distinctions b y m e a n s o f distinctive s o u n d s — i s discerned in its purest form, a n d our attention is d r a w n to the distinctive sound or w r i t i n g (which is merely sound translated intp a n o t h e r m e d i u m ) more urgently in the case o f a rare w o r d t h a n in that o f a c o m m o n one. 1

Vendryes, Le Langage, Paris, 1921, p. 222.

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N o n e the less I think a g o o d case m a y be m a d e out for r e g a r d i n g the scientific L a t i n n a m e s o f birds a n d plants as more o f proper n a m e s than their c o m m o n English equivalents. 1 T h e n a m e Brassica rapa easily evokes the t h o u g h t of a botanist classifying a n u m b e r o f specimens w h i c h to the l a y m i n d are m u c h alike, a n d to one o f w h i c h he gives the n a m e Brassica rapa, j u s t as a p a r e n t n a m e s his b a b y . W e h a v e no such t h o u g h t a b o u t the w o r d turnip, and Brassica rapa is simply the scientific n a m e for the ordinary turnip. W e m a y find c o n f i r m a t o r y support for r e g a r d i n g Brassica rapa as a p r o p e r n a m e , or at least as m u c h more o f a p r o p e r n a m e t h a n turnip, in the fact that w e do not say This is a Brassica rapa or These are Brassica rapas, t h o u g h w e m i g h t say These are fine specimens of Brassica rapa. I n so saying w e a p p e a l to the n a m e o f a n y single e x a m p l e o f the type, w h e r e a s in speaking o f a certain v e g e t a b l e as a turnip w e a p p e a l to the similarity o f that vegetable to others o f its kind. T h e difference o f linguistic attitude is a mere n u a n c e , b u t it is a real one. I n the one instance the sound o f the n a m e , w h a t w e usually describe as 'the n a m e itself', is more in the foreg r o u n d than in the other instance.

XX W h e t h e r or no w e classify the L a t i n n a m e s o f plants a n d animals as p r o p e r n a m e s — a d m i t t e d l y they are borderline cases—it is u n d e n i a b l e that in fact those names refer to things existent in great n u m b e r . I f the contention o f the last p a r a g r a p h b e deemed w o r t h y o f consideration, 1 Prof. Bröndal (see below p. 69) is the philologist w h o has most clearly taken this view.

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it is inevitable that the d e b a t e should b e extended to n e w g r o u n d . T h e question w h e t h e r the names o f the m o n t h s a n d o f the d a y s o f the w e e k should b e r e g a r d e d as p r o p e r n a m e s is one o f m u c h interest, since different l a n g u a g e s take different lines a b o u t it. W h e t h e r a l a n g u a g e uses c a p i t a l letters or not is no proof, t h o u g h it is a s y m p t o m that m a y b e e m p l o y e d as e v i d e n c e , if care be taken not to a t t a c h o v e r m u c h i m p o r t a n c e to it. T h e F r e n c h write jeudi a n d janvier w h e r e w e write Thursday a n d January, a n d I believe I a m right in s a y i n g that most F r e n c h g r a m m a r i a n s w o u l d not a d m i t m o n t h - n a m e s a n d d a y n a m e s as p r o p e r names. T h a t at all events these n a m e s are also g e n e r a l names 1 is clear f r o m the facility a n d l a c k o f strain felt in tous lesjeudis (note the article a n d the p l u r a l ending) a n d in Mrs. Brown is at home on Thursdays. Nevertheless, there are details o f usage, e.g. jeudi le 15 mars, w h i c h seem to p l a c e these n a m e s on a d i f f e r e n t footing f r o m other c o m m o n nouns. I f the p r o b l e m b e stated in a n o t h e r w a y , it seems likely that the same answer w o u l d be o b t a i n e d f r o m b o t h F r e n c h m e n a n d E n g l i s h m e n . I f w e were to ask : ' W h i c h o f the t w o w o r d s hiver (winter) a n d décembre (December) is m o r e o f a p r o p e r n a m e t h a n the o t h e r ? ' it w o u l d p r o b a b l y be a d m i t t e d that the latter should h a v e the preference. T h e reason is b o t h o b v i o u s a n d interesting. T h e stretches o f time indic a t e d b y the names o f the seasons are felt to b e m o r e contrasted in their nature t h a n those indicated b y the month-names. Contiguous months m a y be m u c h of a muchness, b u t there is a n u n m i s t a k a b l e difference b e t w e e n the seasons. C o n s e q u e n t l y in the n a m e s o f the 1 Here I a v o i d the term ' c o m m o n nouns', since personally I should classify them, not as such, b u t as ' c o m m o n proper n a m e s ' , see p. 19.

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seasons the m e a n i n g plays a greater p a r t in m a r k i n g the distinction than is p l a y e d b y the m e a n i n g attaching to the month-names, a n d in the latter correspondingly the distinctive n a m e , i.e. the distinctive w o r d - s o u n d , exercises a more i m p o r t a n t role in i n d i c a t i n g the period m e a n t . T h e m o n t h - n a m e is for that reason more o f a proper n a m e than the n a m e o f the season. It is a peculiarity o f the months a n d the d a y s o f the w e e k that a fixed o r d e r belongs to their m e a n i n g . I t is u n d e n i a b l e that W e d n e s d a y implies the d a y after T u e s d a y a n d that before T h u r s d a y . Still that m o d i c u m o f constant m e a n i n g does not compensate for the fact that the other characters o f the d a y designated b y the n a m e Wednesday are v a r i a b l e a n d intangible a n d differ f r o m person to person, so that the n a m e itself is the only thing w h i c h w e c a n cling to in order to u p h o l d the distinction b e t w e e n one d a y a n d a n o t h e r . It is superfluous to discuss feast d a y s like Easter, W h i t sunday, L u p e r c a l i a . T o the E n g l i s h m a n at all events the n a m e s o f these are p r o p e r names, t h o u g h on a c c o u n t o f their recurring e v e r y y e a r they must j o i n the ranks of the ' c o m m o n proper n a m e s ' .

XXI T h e r e must be a limit to every discussion, a n d I shall not linger over the n a m e s o f patent medicines, trade products, a n d the like, 1 b u t shall turn to some aspects o f the probl e m that h a v e thüs far b e e n a c c o r d e d b u t scanty notice. 1 T o K . Sisam I owe the interesting remark that 'curious examples of trade names b e c o m i n g c o m m o n occur and create legal difficulties. Vaseline is a case in point, w h i c h led to a long quarrel between the c o m p a n y concerned a n d the editors of our Oxford English Dictionary'.

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I n e x p l a i n i n g the distinction b e t w e e n a w o r d a n d a n a m e I c o m m i t t e d myself to the statement that ' w h e n w e speak o f a n a m e w e i m p l y that there exists something to w h i c h a certain sound-sign corresponds' (p. 7). O f w h a t k i n d is this existence implied w h e n e v e r w e a d m i t the existence o f a n a m e (an e m b o d i e d p r o p e r n a m e , p. 8) as a n i t e m b e l o n g i n g to o u r accepted v o c a b u l a r y ? W i t h the e x c e p tion o f Scylla a n d Charybdis m e n t i o n e d in the o p e n i n g p a r a g r a p h I h a v e been careful to d r a w all m y e x a m p l e s f r o m the m a t e r i a l w o r l d , b u t they m i g h t in m a n y cases h a v e b e e n e q u a l l y well t a k e n f r o m m y t h o l o g y or fiction. T h e f a c t is, as I m a i n t a i n e d in m y book on Speech and Language (p. 296) : 'Speech refers to actual a n d i m a g i n a r y things w i t h strict impartiality. L a n g u a g e has created no forms to distinguish the real f r o m the unreal.' T h e context o f t h a t quotation shows that the reality I h a d there in m i n d w a s 'conformity w i t h the facts o f the (external) universe', a n d that 'the u n r e a l ' w a s taken as s y n o n y m o u s w i t h 'existence only in the i m a g i n a t i o n ' . It w o u l d not b e helpful to b e c o m c e n t a n g l e d in a n ontological a r g u m e n t , a n d I must ask m y readers not to interpret m y contention in this essay as signifying m o r e t h a n that, if w e a d m i t the possession o f a n a m e in o u r vocabularies, w e simultaneously i m p l y the possession in our minds o f s o m e t h i n g w h e r e o f it is the n a m e . It is true that the s o m e t h i n g in question m a y b e as unsubstantial as a soap-bubble. S u c h a n a m e a b l e thing is a l r e a d y there w h e n , w i t h no f u r t h e r details in our heads, w e start a limerick w i t h There was an old fellow called Brown. I n this case w e b u i l d u p , or discover, if y o u prefer it, B r o w n ' s personality as w e g o a l o n g . T h e characters in a n o v e l h a v e naturally r e c e i v e d m u c h o f their substance before p e n is p u t to p a p e r . I t must be realized that a p r o p e r n a m e is not one w h i t less

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o f a t h o r o u g h b r e d p r o p e r n a m e if its subject 1 is unsubstantial. I f I think o f a n i m a g i n a r y m o u n t a i n a n d choose to call it b y the utterly meaningless n a m e Karimankow, this n a m e will be e v e r y bit as g o o d a p r o p e r n a m e as Popocatepetl. T h e w o r l d o f the i m a g i n a t i o n is a replica o f the w o r l d o f experience, a n d the p r o p e r n a m e s o f the former belong to m u c h the same classes as those o f the latter. B u t F a n c y climbs to higher altitudes, a n d populates its universe w i t h the gods of O l y m p u s as well as w i t h h u m a n beings. I n the r e a l m o f m y t h fantastic creatures like the M i n o t a u r a n d the C e n t a u r s call for n a m e s o f their o w n . T h u s far the w o r l d created b y the i m a g i n a t i o n m i g h t seem richer than that o f reality. H o w e v e r , not every t y p e o f real entity that receives a p r o p e r n a m e c a n be paralleled in fiction. O n e m i g h t b e h a r d p u t to it to cite the n a m e o f a n i m a g i n a r y planet, t h o u g h a m o n g birds w e h a v e the Phoenix a n d there is a m y t h i c a l ship called the A r g o . T a k i n g a w i d e r perspective t h a n hitherto, w h e r e shall w e seek the ultimate source o f p r o p e r names ? M y answer is imperfect a n d provisional : that source derives f r o m the v e r y nature o f o u r universe. F o r g o o d or evil the things o f the universe, a n d more especially its living things, manifest themselves in localized i n d i v i d u a l f o r m , e a c h d e e p l y rooted in its o w n environment, b u t less a n d less c o n c e r n e d w i t h alien environments in p r o p o r t i o n to the distance. M a n alone has the p o w e r a n d the desire to talk a b o u t the i n d i v i d u a l things he possesses, a n d his interests b e i n g self-centred, it is not o f other m e n ' s p r o p e r t y that he is so likely to 1 I n other parts of this essay I h a v e used ' o b j e c t ' in the same sense, since it seemed the more easily comprehensible term. H e r e for once I write 'subject' h a v i n g in m i n d that, in speaking o f a w o r d as a ' n a m e ' the direction of thought is f r o m the thing to its sound-sign, not vice versa.

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speak. T o d o h i m justice, the limitations o f time a n d space p r e v e n t him from even k n o w i n g most o f the things vital to his fellows farther afield. T h e proprietary instinct is the seed-ground o f proper n a m e s . E v e r y m a n has his o w n h o m e a n d family, his o w n goods a n d chattels, his o w n neighbours and t o w n , his o w n c o u n t r y . A c c o r d i n g as these are d e a r to h i m , a n d a c c o r d i n g as they are too i n d i v i d u a l l y distinct to be g r o u p e d in a mere class, he gives t h e m n a m e s w h i c h enables h i m to foist t h e m u p o n the attention o f the linguistic c o m m u n i t y at large. T h i s b r i e f statement e n d e a v o u r s to explain w h y p r o p e r n a m e s a d h e r e most o f all to i n d i v i d u a l things. L e t it b e e m p h a s i z e d , however, that it is o n l y a v e r y tiny fraction o f the i n d i v i d u a l things in the w o r l d w h i c h are e v e r a c c o r d e d n a m e s o f their o w n . H e n c e the notion that not m e r e l y all individual things, b u t also their m o m e n t a r i l y p e r c e i v e d parts, are the p r e - o r d a i n e d subjects o f p r o p e r names, seems a stupendous illusion. F o r most i n d i v i d u a l things the proper m o d e o f reference is description, the g e n e r a l n a t u r e o f w h i c h I h a v e a t t e m p t e d r o u g h l y to s u m m a r i z e a b o v e (p. 44) ; a n d there is no t h i n g h o w e v e r small or u n i m p o r t a n t that c a n n o t be r e a c h e d b y description. 1 B u t these generalizations b r i n g m e to the final topic of m y inquiry. XXII Assuredly the most fantastic t h e o r y o f p r o p e r n a m e s that has ever c o m e to birth is that p r o p o u n d e d b y B e r t r a n d Russell in a set of lectures subsequently published in a 1 I n m y book on Speech and Language, p. 33, I h a v e c o m p a r e d the method of L a n g u a g e to the g a m e of a n i m a l , vegetable, or mineral. T h i s , mutatis mutandis, or rather odditis addendis, is perhaps as good a w a y o f describing description as could be briefly a t t a i n e d .

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periodical. T h e r e it m i g h t a p p r o p r i a t e l y h a v e been left to slumber undisturbed b u t for its h a v i n g received w i d e publicity, t h o u g h in m u c h modified f o r m , in Prof. Stebbing's w e l l - k n o w n Modern Introduction to Logic, second edition, L o n d o n , 1933, p p . 23-6. S i n c e Prof. S t e b b i n g explicitly admits her d e p e n d e n c e on Russell, it seems fairer, in offering criticism, to g o b a c k to the fountainh e a d . I start w i t h a quotation : l ' T h e only kind of word that is theoretically capable of standing for a particular is a proper name, and the whole matter of proper names is rather curious. Proper Names = words for particulars. Definition. Ί have put that down although, so far as common language goes, it is obviously false. It is true that if you try to think how you are to talk about particulars, you will see that you cannot ever talk about a particular particular except by means of a proper name. Y o u cannot use general words except by way of description. How are you to express in words an atomic proposition ? A n atomic proposition is one which does mention actual particulars, not merely describe them but actually name them, and you can only name them by means of names. Y o u can see at once for yourself, therefore, that every other part of speech except proper names is obviously quite incapable of standing for a particular. Y e t it does seem a little odd, if, having made a dot on the blackboard, I call it " J o h n " . Y o u would be surprised, and yet how are you to know otherwise what it is that I am speaking of? If I say, " T h e dot that is on the right-hand side is w h i t e " that is a proposition. If I say " T h i s is white" that is quite a different proposition. ' 'This' ' will do very well while we are all here and can see it, but if I wanted to talk about it tomorrow it would be 1 Betrand Russell, ' T h e Philosophy of L o g i c a l A t o m i s m ' , in Monist, 1918, p p . 5 2 3 - 5 .

The

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convenient to have christened it and called it ' 'John". T h e r e is no other way in which you can mention it. Y o u cannot really mention it itself except by means of a name. ' W h a t pass for names in language, like "Socrates", " P l a t o " , and so forth, were originally intended to fulfil this function of standing for particulars, and w e do accept, in ordinary daily life, as particulars all sorts of things that really are not so. T h e names that we commonly use, like "Socrates", are really abbreviations for descriptions ; not only that, but what they describe are not particulars but complicated systems of classes or series. A name, in the narrow logical sense of a word whose meaning is a particular, can only be applied to a particular with which the speaker is acquainted, because you cannot name anything you are not acquainted with. Y o u remember, when A d a m named the beasts, they came before him one by one, and he became acquainted with them and named them. W e are not acquainted with Socrates, and therefore cannot name him. W h e n we use the word "Socrates", we are really using a description. O u r thought m a y be rendered by some such phrase as " T h e Master of Plato", or " T h e philosopher who drank the hemlock", or " T h e person whom logicians assert to be mortal", but we certainly do not use the name as a name in the proper sense of the word. ' T h a t makes it very difficult to get any instance of a name at all in the proper strict logical sense of the word. T h e only words one does use as names in the logical sense are words like " t h i s " or " t h a t " . O n e can use " t h i s " as a name to stand for a particular with which one is acquainted at the moment. W e say " T h i s is white". If you agree that " T h i s is w h i t e " , meaning the " t h i s " that you see, you are using " t h i s " as a proper name. But if you try to apprehend the proposition that I am expressing when I say " T h i s is white", you cannot do it. If you mean this piece of chalk as a physical object, then you are not using a proper name. It is only when you use " t h i s " quite strictly, to stand for an actual object of sense, that it is really a proper name. A n d in that it has a very odd property

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for a proper name, namely that it seldom means the same thing two moments running and does not mean the same thing to the speaker and to the hearer. It is an ambiguous proper name, but it is really a proper name all the same, and it is almost the only thing I can think of that is used properly and logically in the sense that I was talking of for a proper name.' Russell's a p p r o a c h to the topic o f p r o p e r n a m e s is philosophical, not philological, a n d h e insists w i t h almost p a i n f u l iteration that he is speaking o f t h e m o n l y from the logical point o f v i e w . H o w e v e r , close e x a m i n a t i o n o f the a b o v e passage, w i t h others in the same series o f lectures, shows h i m to be at least as m u c h interested in v e r b a l symbolization as in the things s y m b o l i z e d , a n d his w h o l e discourse is a b o u t w o r d s a n d names, n a m i n g a n d description. T h e fact is t h a t logic a n d linguistic t h e o r y hold a large tract o f c o u n t r y in c o m m o n , a n d w i t h i n that tract it is impossible to d e a l w i t h the o n e w i t h o u t the other. I n all that Russell says a b o u t John, Socrates, a n d this he is, despite his implicit disclaimer, t a l k i n g linguistic theory, a n d m y a i m here is to show that his linguistic theory is unsound. L e t us a d m i t there c o u l d b e no objection, if it took our f a n c y , to e m p l o y i n g a p r o p e r n a m e in order to indicate a p e r c e i v e d entity such as a d o t c h a l k e d o n a b l a c k b o a r d . T h i s w a s Russell's o w n e x a m p l e o f a particular, chosen because he w a s able to demonstrate it to the a c t u a l eyes o f his a u d i e n c e . H e w o u l d h a v e b e e n within his rights h a d he m e r e l y stated that, for the purpose o f his logic, he h a d decided to use p r o p e r n a m e s in no other w a y . But w h e n he goes further a n d defines p r o p e r names as w o r d s for particulars, he commits himself to a n evident suggestio falsi to the effect that n o w o r d for w h a t is not a particular is a p r o p e r n a m e , a n d that p r o p e r n a m e s that

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are w o r d s for particulars are different f r o m all o t h e r words, i n c l u d i n g such a p p a r e n t p r o p e r names as Socrates. N o w this is a philological contention, a n d it w o u l d b e idle for Russell to reply that he has not been w r i t i n g a b o u t words at all. W h e n Russell's statements are scrutinized in detail they will b e f o u n d l a m e n t a b l y confused. H e thinks it w o u l d h a v e b e e n useful to christen his dot on the b l a c k b o a r d John, b u t decides not to d o so o n the g r o u n d that it w o u l d be a little odd. In v i e w o f the extreme o d d i t y o f Russell's definition o f proper n a m e s , it seems strange that such a consideration should h a v e deterred him. T h e n a m e John w o u l d , he pointed out, h a v e the a d v a n t a g e o f e n a b ling h i m to speak of his dot t o m o r r o w . M e a n w h i l e he has succeeded perfectly in s p e a k i n g a b o u t it to his readers m u c h later t h a n tomorrow, a n d in the absence o f the d o t itself their picture o f it w o u l d not h a v e been e v o k e d o n e w h i t more clearly h a d he used a p r e a r r a n g e d n a m e like John. T h e fact is that Russell, obsessed o n m a t h e m a t i c a l g r o u n d s b y his desire for v e r b a l s y m b o l i z a t i o n , has failed to realize that the function o f L a n g u a g e is p u r e l y instrum e n t a l , a n d that p r o v i d e d w o r d s c a n be f o u n d to m a k e a listener think o f something to w h i c h the speaker wishes to m a k e reference it matters not w h e t h e r a p r o p e r n a m e is used or a description c o m p r i s i n g several words. T h e words are mere scaffolding, to be r e m o v e d w h e n its p u r pose is fulfilled. M o r e o v e r , it is rather difficult to understand w h y , if proper n a m e s are defined as w o r d s for particulars, the w o r d s the dot on the blackboard should not be a c c e p t e d as a proper n a m e , since in their c o n t e x t it c a n n o t be d e n i e d that they indicate the p a r t i c u l a r in question. B u t p e r h a p s Russell has been careless in f o r m u l a t i n g his d e f i n i t i o n ;

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perhaps w h a t he i n t e n d e d to say is that a p r o p e r n a m e must be a single w o r d . H a v i n g rejected John as too o d d for his purpose, he falls b a c k o n this, w h i c h he declares to b e a proper n a m e in spite o f its ' a m b i g u i t y ' , a term here taken in the sense that 'this seldom m e a n s the same t h i n g t w o moments r u n n i n g ' . Philologists w i l l be a m a z e d to find this p a r a d i n g as a proper n a m e , since one has only to p l a c e John a n d this alongside one a n o t h e r to realize that they are words o f entirely different calibre. Nevertheless, since Russell insists that this is 'really a p r o p e r n a m e ' , albeit a n a m b i g u o u s one, w e must try to grasp w h y he considers it such. T h e o n l y reasons I c a n think o f are, firstly because it is a single w o r d , a n d secondly because it indicates w i t h some degree o f sureness a p a r t i c u l a r imm e d i a t e l y presented, especially if a c c o m p a n i e d b y a demonstrative gesture. O n the other h a n d , since this, w h e n uttered tomorrow a n d in the absence o f the particular in question, will fail to indicate it, clearly Russell has n o w a b a n d o n e d his quest for a proper n a m e w h i c h will perf o r m that useful function. T h e p r o p e r n a m e he is left w i t h in this appears a pretty useless w o r d , for it will only w o r k w h e n the particular is a c t u a l l y present, a n d consequently resembles a shilling in the pocket that m a y only be spent o n a cake one is a l r e a d y eating. T h e w h o l e tenor o f Russell's r e m a r k s shows that he regards description a n d n a m i n g as directly antithetical, a n d that he w o u l d not consider a w o r d really a proper n a m e if it merely stated the kind to w h i c h a n entity belongs or a relationship in w h i c h it stands. B u t the latter is precisely w h a t this does, a n d I a m a t a loss, therefore, to understand h o w Russell c a n regard it as a proper n a m e . I f this be not descriptive, h o w comes it that, as Russell admits, this indicates different objects on different

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occasions o f its use ? For that to b e possible, s u r e l y — t h o u g h the expression is u n u s u a l — t h e r e must be a 'thisness' c o m m o n to all the objects designated b y this such as to v i n d i c a t e each separate successful application. W h a t that 'thisness' is a n y schoolboy c o u l d explain. 'Thisness' is relative nearness to the speaker, j u s t as 'thatness', its contrary, is relative remoteness f r o m h i m . It is not m a i n t a i n e d that this is quite o n the same footing as a n o r d i n a r y c o m m o n noun. A m o n g other differences, the extreme generality o f this is responsible for the i n f r e q u e n c y o f its use as a g r a m m a t i c a l predicate. O n the w h o l e , h o w ever, its f u n c t i o n i n g is similar to that o f a substantive or adjective. I n e m p l o y i n g this as g r a m m a t i c a l subject the speaker implicitly says to the listener ' L o o k o u t for somet h i n g near m e ' , j u s t as the R o m a n using urbs in the s a m e syntactical position implicitly said ' L o o k out for some place that is a city.' T h u s the descriptive intention o f this is v e r y a p p a r e n t . Professor S t e b b i n g , w h o has taken o v e r a n d systematized most of Russell's views o n p r o p e r names, states that this is e q u i v a l e n t to a d e m o n s t r a t i v e gesture. 1 This a n d a demonstrative gesture are not e q u i v a l e n t b u t c o m p l e m e n t a r y . S u c h is the vagueness o f both that in reference to things physically present t h e y are usually e m p l o y e d together, t w o clues b e i n g better than one. T h e demonstrative gesture has a m e a n i n g different f r o m this, since it indicates direction. T h e gesture says ' L o o k out for something in the direction o f m y pointing finger or m y n o d d e d h e a d . ' T h e gesture gives the line, this the relative distance a l o n g it. Russell is right, o f course, in r e g a r d i n g n a m i n g a n d description as antithetical, b u t his p e c u l i a r v i e w o f p r o p e r names beguiles him into d r a w i n g strange conclusions 1

O p . cit., p. 25.

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f r o m the antithesis. H e refuses (doubtless w i t h g o o d reason) to consider persons as particulars, a n d accordingly will not allow that words for persons are proper names. I f Russell prefers to restrict his o w n use o f proper names to particulars that is his concern, t h o u g h it is rather a burlesque situation that, w h e n he comes to look for p r o p e r names o f the kind he requires, he finds none a n d has to fall b a c k u p o n a w o r d that obviously is not a proper n a m e . Russell's decision not to r e g a r d Socrates as a proper n a m e a p p a r e n t l y leaves h i m w i t h a b a d conscience, for he feels impelled to tell us w h a t kind o f a w o r d Socrates really is. N a t u r a l l y he j u m p s to the conclusion that it must be a description, a n d he tells us that our t h o u g h t m a y b e rendered b y some such phrase as ' T h e M a s t e r o f P l a t o ' , or ' T h e philosopher w h o d r a n k the h e m l o c k ' , or ' T h e person w h o m logicians assert to be m o r t a l ' . N o t h i n g o f the kind ! A l l t h a t the w o r d Socrates tells us w h e n it is pron o u n c e d is that reference is b e i n g m a d e to a certain entity called Socrates. T o a p p l y the t e r m 'description' to a w o r d w h i c h m a y i n d e e d a w a k e n the m e m o r y o f sundry bits o f information, b u t w h i c h does not itself point to a n y one o f them, is a strange abuse o f terms. T h e w o r d Socrates is a mere sound-label, a n d as such is a n alternative to a n y description o f Socrates complete e n o u g h to identify h i m , b u t is not a description itself. W h i l s t discussing the n a m e Socrates, I c a n n o t refrain f r o m astonishment that Russell should h a v e chosen as his e x a m p l e o f w h a t is not a proper n a m e the v e r y w o r d taken b y Dionysius T h r a x to illustrate his definition. It is as t h o u g h a zoologist were to start his treatise b y s a y i n g that he was g o i n g to exclude horses from his p r o g r a m m e , since horses were really plants. A specialist no d o u b t has the right to a d a p t the m e a n i n g o f a technical term to his special purpose if he does not

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think fit to coin a n e w one o f his o w n , a n d his justification is the greater if he believes the c u s t o m a r y use to c o n c e a l a fallacy. B u t really it is g o i n g b e y o n d the m a r k to p l a y skittles w i t h a time-honoured t e r m w h i c h in its o r d i n a r y acceptation has done g o o d service for a couple o f thousand years. T h a t is w h a t Russell has done, a n d his treatm e n t o f p r o p e r names c o m p a r e s v e r y d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s l y w i t h the sober a n d closely reasoned a c c o u n t g i v e n b y Mill. S o u n f a m i l i a r to m e is the philosophic p l a n e u p o n w h i c h B e r t r a n d Russell m o v e s that I a m a little nervous a b o u t d o g m a t i z i n g u p o n the basis o f his t h o u g h t . T h e impression I h a v e , however, is that he desires to d e n y the reality o f e v e r y t h i n g w i t h w h i c h o n e is not ' a c q u a i n t e d ' , a c q u a i n t a n c e a p p a r e n t l y b e i n g t a k e n as identical w i t h direct sense-perception. Russell asserts that o n e c a n n o t n a m e a n y t h i n g w i t h w h i c h o n e is not a c q u a i n t e d ; the animals c a m e before A d a m , a n d so he w a s able to n a m e t h e m . I n a n o t h e r passage 1 he asserts that Romulus is not a n a m e b u t a sort o f t r u n c a t e d description 'because a n a m e has got to n a m e something or it is not a n a m e , a n d if there is no such person as Romulus there c a n n o t be a n a m e for that person w h o is not there'. H e r e , unless Russell is simply repeating himself, R o m u l u s is i n v o k e d , not as a second e x a m p l e o f the s a m e type as Socrates, b u t as a p u r e l y fictional character. It is difficult to g r a p p l e w i t h a theory w h i c h in one b r e a t h maintains that y o u c a n n o t n a m e w h a t is fictional, b u t that y o u c a n describe it. O r c a n descriptions exist w i t h o u t describing a n y t h i n g ? T h e truth is that, w h e t h e r y o u n a m e or w h e t h e r y o u describe, w h a t is n a m e d or described has to be present to the m i n d . T h a t is all that is n e e d e d for a n a m e or a 1

O p . cit., 1919, p. 208.

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description to be possible, a n d for L a n g u a g e it is a m a t t e r o f complete indifference w h e t h e r the t h i n g n a m e d or described has or o n c e h a d external existence, or rather, to meet Russell o n his o w n g r o u n d , w h e t h e r or not it has ever 'come before' its n a m e r or describer. B u t w h y waste words ? T o refute Russell's v i e w that y o u c a n n o t n a m e a person w h o is not there, it is necessary only to quote Romulus as e v i d e n c e that y o u c a n . A n d the thousands o f names o f fictional or m y t h o l o g i c a l characters w h i c h w e m a y r e m e m b e r will not i m p r o v e u p o n that answer.

XXIII It is w i t h some d i s m a y that I look b a c k u p o n the length o f this essay, a n d w o n d e r w h a t verdict will be passed u p o n it b y those critics w h o censured for its prolixity m y really v e r y concise book on Speech and Language. I will conclude by stating in few w o r d s the m a i n points in w h i c h I believe m y theory to differ f r o m that o f M i l l a n d the logicians w h o with minor modifications h a v e c o n c u r r e d in his v i e w . In the first p l a c e , I hold that the q u a l i t y o f a p r o p e r n a m e is nothing absolute, b u t that the term merely segregates and puts in a class b y themselves those words in w h i c h the p o w e r o f distinctive word-sounds to identify distinct things is exhibited in a pure or n e a r l y pure state, without that p o w e r b e i n g assisted to a n y great degree b y such m e a n i n g as m a y attach to the w o r d . Stated in a m o r e general w a y , m y thesis is that the term refers to the modus operandi o f the words included in this c a t e g o r y , a n d that t h o u g h the ability to m a r k distinctions depends in all words u p o n their distinctive sounds, in p r o p e r names it depends on that alone, or nearly alone. I n the second

i8


place, I utterly reject the v i e w that a p r o p e r n a m e is necessarily a singular n a m e . A n d lastly, I m a i n t a i n that the operative p o w e r o f p r o p e r n a m e s is reflected in, a n d facilitated b y , our recognition o f t h e m as such. T h a t recognition instructs us c o n c e r n i n g the w a y in w h i c h such w o r d s are to be taken. T h i s final point is o n e in w h i c h , unless I a m mistaken, the p u r e l y logical v i e w o f w o r d s is seriously at fault. A s I tried to m a k e clear in m y b o o k o n Speech and Language, the f o r m o f w o r d s is f u n d a m e n t a l l y a n overtone o f m e a n i n g w h i c h has evolved o u t o f l o n g experience o f their functions a n d w h i c h has b r o u g h t a b o u t a m o n g s t them differentiations o f kind. J u s t as a n o u n is not merely a w o r d that denotes a thing, b u t is one that views a thing as a thing, so too a proper n a m e is a w o r d that is recognized as i d e n t i f y i n g its object b y v i r t u e o f the distinctive sound exclusively.

APPENDIX SOME

O T H E R

D E F I N I T I O N S

AMONG the definitions of' a Proper Name propounded by others, there are some which at first sight appear to bear close resemblance to my own, but which on careful examination will be found to possess deficiencies of one kind or another. I select for criticism the views of four writers. 1. Keynes, Formal Logic, 4th ed., London, 1928, p. 13. Ά proper name is a name assigned as a mark to distinguish an individual person or thing from others, without implying in its signification the possession of any special attributes.' Keynes himself subsequently contradicts parts of this, for he tells us on the same page that many proper names 'are as a matter of fact assigned to more than one individual', and he instances John and Victoria. O n the next page (n. 2) he quotes Dr. Venn as pointing out 'that certain proper names may be regarded as collective, though such names are not common', the instance given being 'the Seychelles'. [Note the misuse of the word 'collective', which ought never to be applied to a plural.] O n p. 42, n. 3, he admits that a proper name may have suggestive force, e.g. may imply human being and male. O n p. 44 he tells us that a particular name 'may have been chosen in the first instance for a special reason', e.g. Smith ; he does not seem, however, to deny that Smith is a proper name even when the bearer is still plying his trade as a smith. Lastly, it is not strictly accurate to say that a name is assigned as a mark to 'distinguish' ; primarily it only identifies, distinction being merely the consequence of the identification. 2. Bertelsen, Fxllesnavne og Egennavne, Copenhagen, 1911, p. 14, gives a definition that may be translated as follows : Ά proper name denominates its object without indicating circumstances that are characteristic of that individual or those

APPENDIX

69

individuals of whom the name is used.' This definition seems contradicted by le Mont Blanc, and is expressed so negatively that one obtains no inkling how a proper name accomplishes its aim. Nor is it made clear that a proper name is a fact of Language, possessing its quality apart from any context or any special syntactical position. A merit of Bertelsen's brochure is, however, that he stresses the affective interest which plays so large a part in the creation of proper names. 3. Funke, on p. 79 of the article quoted above, p. 38, n. 1. 'Eigennamen sind Individualnamen, die eine Individualvorstellung (sei es eines einzelnen Gegenstandes oder eines individuellen Kollektivs) bedeuten und zu deren Bedeutung weiter die Vorstellung des " so und so Genanntseins" gehört ; sie nennen Individuen oder individuelle Kollectiva, die existieren oder als existierend gedacht werden (wurden).' T h e virtue of the inclusion of the 'so und so Genanntsein' has been admitted above, p. 38, n. 1, but otherwise the definition teems with obscurities and repetitions. I have pointed out that very often a proper name conveys nothing but existence of an entity possesssing the name ; what becomes of Funke's Ί η dividualvorstellung' in such a case? T h e term 'individuelle Kollektiva' is hopelessly obscure without further explanation ; if it excludes plurals like Seychelles this is a serious omission, and if it includes them the term 'Kollektiv' is wrongly used. Another regrettable lacuna is the lack of any clear indication how much meaning a proper name may or has to possess. 4. Bröndal, Ordklasserne, Copenhagen, 1928, pp. 41-49, criticizes previous theories in detail, but not always rightly. He regards the theories of Mill and Bertelsen with some favour, but finds their standpoints too psychological and too regardless of the language-system as a whole. In my view, on the contrary, the difference between proper names and substantives that are not proper names is almost purely psychological, and depends on the importance attached to the sound of the former by the linguistic community generally. Bröndal's

7o

APPENDIX

own constructive explanation (pp. 81-85) extremely difficult to criticize, largely because it forms part of an abstractly conceived system of parts of speech at variance with all traditional views. H e excludes from the category of proper names all compounds, all words that still have significance as names of occupations, &c. (e.g. Smith), and even a name like Venus, besides separating the category from that of nouns ('Nominer', p. 81). O n e point which definitely creates a chasm between Bröndal's linguistic theory and my own is that he makes his system of word-classes entirely dependent upon the logical quality of the entities (in the widest sense) designated, whereas I, whilst believing that the word-classes depend to a considerable extent upon the nature of those entities, attach great importance to the way in which human beings, largely for facility of linguistic communication, look upon the said entities, e.g. a substantive is a word referring to a thing viewed as a thing. Thus Bröndal's statement that proper names 'obviously correspond to the "eternal objects" of Whitehead's philosophy' seems to me inacceptable. He refrains from any formal definition.

R E T R O S P E C T

1953

THE principal matter here to be discussed is whether, in my definition and elsewhere (pp. 38 foil.), I have done right in laying so much emphasis on the sound of proper names. In a very friendly and scrupulously fair criticism S. U l l m a n n wrote The second objection is more serious : by emphasizing the relative prominence of distinctive sound in our recognition of proper names, Sir Alan has introduced a psychological element, a subjective and variable factor difficult to verify. He is of course quite right in claiming that 'unless our awareness of the various types and functions of words were an objective reality, the task of the grammarian would be nugatory and his distinctions wholly artificial' (p. 41 ; cf. also pp. 66 f.) ; z but it may be doubted whether linguists and logicians, even those free from any anti-mentalistic bias, will be satisfied with this criterion. T h e operative words here are 'in our recognition of proper names' and I have to admit that my formal definition deliberately used the expression 'recognized3 as indicating or tending to indicate the object or objects to which it refers by virtue of its distinctive sound alone . . .'. Previously U l l m a n n had accepted my answer to the possible objection that the entire mechanism of language is based on distinctive sound-features by means of which we differentiate between words, that answer being that 'it makes a vast amount of difference whether the distinctive Archivum Linguisticum, iv. i (1952), 67. T h e page-numbers have here been altered to agree with the p a g i n a tion of the present edition. 3 M y italics. 1

2

R E T R O S P E C T 1953 73 sound is a self-sufficient means o f identification, or w h e t h e r it has to b e assisted, as in g e n e r a l names, by consideration o f the m e a n i n g ' . H o w e v e r , m y acute critic has in fact p o u n c e d u p o n a really serious objection, a n d it will emerge that I a m u n a b l e to do otherwise t h a n meet it w i t h a considerable measure o f a g r e e m e n t . F r o m the w a y in w h i c h U l l m a n n has v o i c e d his objection it is clear that he w a s thinking j u s t as little as myself a b o u t w h a t h a p p e n s in the conversational traffic o f daily life. For there the w o r d s are mere m a c h i n e r y , a n d as little present to the minds o f the persons c o n c e r n e d as are the goings on of the l o c o m o t i v e to the m i n d o f a traveller b y train. It is only w h e n there is a hitch in comprehension, w h e n a w o r d is b a d l y p r o n o u n c e d , w h e n a n i n a p p r o priate w o r d is used, or in such similar cases, that the spoken w o r d springs into consciousness, 1 a n d even then, I f a n c y , it is only seldom that the a c t u a l sound comes to m i n d . O f t e n the listener will be a w a r e m e r e l y that somet h i n g has gone w r o n g . A l l this is as true o f p r o p e r names as o f other words, e x c e p t that w i t h p r o p e r names there are certain special occasions like a christening or a f o r m a l introduction w h e n the a c t u a l sound assumes a n import a n c e not b r o u g h t into the foreground o f attention at other times. U l l m a n n ' s criticism a n d m y o w n definition h a v e been alike concerned r a t h e r w i t h the status o f proper names as facts o f L a n g u a g e , i.e. w i t h their p e r m a n e n t a n d constitutional nature. A n d here U l l m a n n has laid his finger u p o n a real flaw in m y formulation. I t is true to say that the linguistic c o m m u n i t y has an instinctive awareness o f the identificatory purpose o f proper names, 2 a n d it is also 1 2

Speech and Language, § 15, end. See a b o v e , § x n , pp. 39 foil.

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73

true that here the distinctive sound provides the exclusive m e c h a n i s m . B u t it was false to declare, as m y definition did, that the linguistic c o m m u n i t y recognized the latter fact, this b e i n g the more e v i d e n t since I myself c o m plained (p. 38, n. I ; p. 40) that e v e n logicians a n d g r a m marians h a d all too often o v e r l o o k e d the i m p o r t a n c e o f the sound-aspect. T h a n k s to U l i m a n n I n o w realize that m y f o r m u l a t i o n has illicitly fused together t w o propositions e a c h true in itself, b u t false w h e n thus c o m b i n e d . L o a t h as I naturally a m to t a m p e r w i t h m y f o r m e r carefully f r a m e d definition, this a p p e a r s to be necessary, a n d I n o w propose the following ievision : A proper name is a word or group of words which is recognized as having identification as its specific purpose, and which achieves, or tends to achieve, that purpose by means of its distinctive sound alone, without regard to any meaning possessed by that sound from the start, or acquired by it through association with the object or objects thereby identified.

It is relatively easy to pick holes in a n y definition, a n d I d o not p r e t e n d that the a b o v e is a n exception to a w e l l n i g h universal rule. Nevertheless I believe that m y fresh effort a p p r o x i m a t e s to the truth as nearly as is h u m a n l y possible. I will, however, recall t w o possible lines o f attack. I n speaking o f p r o p e r n a m e s as h a v i n g so clearly m a r k e d a n identificatory purpose, I ignore their distinguishing p o w e r . But this, as w a s pointed o u t p . 34, n . . i , is o n l y secondary and consequential. S e c o n d l y , I - m a y find myself reproached for h a v i n g insisted so one-sidedly o n the sound-aspect a n d for h a v i n g ignored the w r i t t e n a p p e a r a n c e altogether. It w o u l d , indeed, h a v e b e e n m o r e a c c u r a t e to substitute 'its physical (or " s e n s o r y " ) q u a l i t y '

R E T R O S P E C T 1953 73 for 'its distinctive s o u n d ' , b u t such a substitution w o u l d h a v e tended rather to obscure t h a n to clarify, a n d I consider this point to h a v e been sufficiently d e a l t w i t h o n m y p. 40. M o r e fruitful, t h o u g h o f e q u a l l y little intrinsic weight, is the possible objection that m y definition is artificial a n d unreal since it analyses p r o p e r n a m e s only in isolation a n d ignores the living situations in w h i c h they are a c t u a l l y encountered. B u t this evokes the obvious retort that m y procedure is no less legitimate than that o f the entomologist w h o dissects a d e a d beetle instead o f contenting himself w i t h w h a t e v e r c a n be learnt a b o u t it whilst it still lives to ' w i n g its d r o n i n g flight'. Nevertheless, this possible objection indicates the desirability o f studying p r o p e r names, not m e r e l y as a p a r t i c u l a r c a t e g o r y o f L a n g u a g e , b u t also f r o m the point o f v i e w o f their utility in a c t u a l Speech. H e r e at the end o f m y R e t r o s p e c t o n l y a few rather c o m m o n p l a c e observations c a n b e set d o w n . I n the first place, it is obvious that the user o f a proper n a m e must a l w a y s k n o w more a b o u t the bearer o f it than is c o n v e y e d b y the n a m e itself. I n m a k i n g a n introduction a host m a y p e r h a p s h a v e only little m o r e k n o w l e d g e o f the person he is i n t r o d u c i n g t h a n that such a n d such is his n a m e ; b u t a l w a y s there is at least some k n o w l e d g e . O n m a n y occasions the k n o w l e d g e is g r e a t a n d intimate ; for e x a m p l e , the r a i l w a y porter w h o salutes a n i n - c o m i n g train w i t h the cry o f Basingstoke! will p r o b a b l y be a native o f that t o w n a n d t h o r o u g h l y familiar w i t h it in all its aspects. T h e same disparity o f k n o w l e d g e is f o u n d in the listeners. O n e o f the passengers m a y be a foreigner w h o has never heard o f the p l a c e before, a n d w h o n o w in the darkness knows o n l y that he has arrived there. A n o t h e r passenger m a y b e c o m i n g h o m e a n d be as well a c q u a i n t e d

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73

w i t h the t o w n as is the porter himself. A supreme v i r t u e o f p r o p e r n a m e s is that they cater for all degrees o f k n o w ledge. A c t u a l l y they c o n v e y n o n e ; the sole k n o w l e d g e that they c a n c o n f e r — a n d it is m o r e often t h a n n o t alr e a d y k n o w n — i s that something in the situation o r rev e a l e d b y the v e r b a l context bears that n a m e . A s I h a v e expressed it a b o v e , p. 32, ' o r d i n a r y words, a m o n g w h i c h g e n e r a l n a m e s p l a y a p r o m i n e n t p a r t , directly c o n v e y i n f o r m a t i o n ; proper n a m e s m e r e l y p r o v i d e the k e y to information'. B u t n o w observe that the speaker n o r m a l l y h a s a quite definite notion o f the a m o u n t o f k n o w l e d g e w h i c h he wishes his proper n a m e s to c o m m u n i c a t e to the listener, a n d his skill in speech, c o n s u m m a t e even in the clumsiest o f yokels, has gifted h i m w i t h all kinds o f resources for attaining his desire. H i s c o m m u n i c a t i v e p u r pose is at its smallest w h e n , for e x a m p l e , h e says to a friend : Mrs. Simpson told me the other day.... T h e personality o f M r s . Simpson is possibly o f no interest either to the speaker or to the listener, a n d the n a m e m a y h a v e b e e n m e n t i o n e d o n l y to forestall such a n irrelevant question as Who told you that? O n the other h a n d , t h r o u g h the tone o f voice, the choice o f a p p r o p r i a t e a c c o m p a n y i n g w o r d s , a n d the speaker's k n o w l e d g e o f w h a t the listener k n o w s , a p r o p e r n a m e m a y b e c o m e c h a r g e d w i t h intense significance, as w h e n an irate b r o t h e r s a y s : Isn't that just like Tom? T h e s e few examples sufh.ce to show h o w intensely useful p r o p e r names are, in spite o f the f a c t that b y their v e r y n a t u r e all they c a n a c t u a l l y p e r f o r m is to p o i n t to a n entity that bears the n a m e . L a s t l y note that, in t h e o r y at least, descriptive words, t h o u g h possibly o n l y a n a b u n d a n c e o f them, c a n a l w a y s c o n v e y e x a c t l y the s a m e i n f o r m a t i o n as a proper n a m e , e x c e p t o f course the

R E T R O S P E C T 1 9 5 3 73 information that the entity spoken o f possesses that n a m e . I n practice, h o w e v e r , this alternative m a y not w o r k , since, if the r e q u i r e d v e r b a l description is long, the listener m a y end b y ceasing to tolerate the speaker's prolixity, a n d m a y indeed cease to listen. T h i s possibility brings to light w h a t is p e r h a p s the v e r y greatest v i r t u e o f p r o p e r n a m e s : they are the most e c o n o m i c a l o f all words, inasm u c h as they m a k e o n l y a v e r y small d e m a n d u p o n the eloquence o f the speaker, a n d a n e q u a l l y small d e m a n d u p o n the attention o f the listener.

INDEX

OF OR

AUTHORS

QUOTED

CRITICIZED

Bertelsen, H . , 68-69. B r ö n d a l , V . , 2, n . 3; 10, n. 1 ; 52, n . I ; 69.

M i l l , J . S., v i ; 1 - 3 ; 11; 12, n. 22, n. 1 ; 2 5 - 2 8 ; 3 1 ; 38-39. N o r e e n , A . , 2.

Brunot, F . , 10, n. I.

R a n k e , H . , 8. Russell, Bertrand (Earl), v i ; 36, n . I ; 57 ff.

Dionysius T h r a x , v i ; 4 - 6 ; 1 1 ; 64. Dornseiff, F., 7, n. 2.

S c h o e m a n n , G . F . , 4, n. 1. F u n k e , O . , 38, n . 1; 69. G a r d i n e r , A . H . , 6, n. 1; 29, n. 1; 5 5 ; 57, n. 1 ; 66-67. Jespersen, O . , 31. J o s e p h , H . W . B., 7, n. 1. K e y n e s , J . N . , 68.

Sisam, K . , 54, n. 1. S t e b b i n g , S., 58, 63.

Ullmann, S., 71-73. V e n d r y e s , J., 5 1 , n. I.

M a r o u z e a u , J . , 23, n. 2. M a r t y , A . , 38, n. 1. M a w e r , A . , 8.

V e n n , J . , 68. W a c k e r n a g e l , J . , 4, n. 1. W e e k l e y , E . , 8, 49. W y l d , H . C . , 29, n. 1.

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Alan Gardiner - The Theory of Proper Names: A Controversial Essay

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