Aircraft Hijacking and International law

1. INTRODUCTION Were half the power, that fills the world with terror, Were half the wealth, bestowed on camps and courts, Given to redeem the human mind from error, There were no need of arsenals or forts. - Henry Wadsworth Longfellow

"The Arsenal at Springfield" According to the Chinese philosophy terrorism is defined as "kill one", "frighten ten thousand", the aim is to kill, wound or threaten a small number of individuals, in order to intimidate a whole community, and even a nation, the purpose behind the killing is, strike far and wide so that no one dares to face or in- form against the terrorism. This aim is common to all the terrorists from local dada to a mafia boss to command from local, regional, national and international levels. "Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends" 1 or to say terrorism is a form of  political violence, with with a wilful and calculated calculated choice of innocents innocents as its target. target. 2 Terrorism has its deep roots in the history of nations. One can find the incidents of terrorism in the ancient, medieval, and modern history of the nations. The governments of the nations have used terrorism against the individuals, social, political or religious groups of their nationals and also against the other states. As within the sta te ―it is presumed that the normal law of any society is able to maintain order in that society.... (Thus any) threat to society  posed by some acts is enough to justify the kind of enforcement activity that would be necessary to suppress that threat. ‖3 Commenting on the terrorism Jenkins said, "Terrorism is compounded by the fact that terrorism has recently become a bad word used promiscuously and often applied to a variety of acts of violence which are not strictly terrorism by definition. It is generally pejorative. Some governments are prone to label as terrorism, all violent acts committed by their political opponents; while anti-government extremists frequently claim to  be the victims of government government terror, what is called terrorism terrorism thus seems to depend depend on point of view, use of the term implies a moral judgement, and if any party can successfully attach the label terrorism to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral view  point. Terrorism is what the bad guys do, Morgenthau observed. 4  Terrorism presents established governments with a number of problems unprecedented in modern history. Traditionally, governments have possessed a monopoly of organised physical violence which they would use against other governments mono- politically endowed in a similar war or against individual citizens violating the legal order. It is now in modern history that a group of citizens would band together challenging the monopoly of organised violence in the hands of the government. 5 Alfred P. Rubin argues that government naturally shoulder the greatest 1

 Oxford dictionary 216 (1933) international conventions on aerial hijacking: an approach to combat combat terrorism, r. S. Rajput, the the indian journal of political science, vol. 51, no. 1 (jan. - march march 1990), pp. 98-125, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41855472 3  rubin, a. 'International terrorism and international law;' in terrorism interdisciplinary perspective, p. 121-123. 4  jenkins, b. International terriorism: a new mode of conflict f crescent publishers, los angles, 1975, p. 2. 5  morganthau, hans: forward to terriorism, interdiscipli- nary perspective p. Vii. 2

responsibility for preventing and suppressing terrorism because "The act of terrorism constitutes a Common Crime under the municipal law of the territory (or of the flag state of the aircraft vessel) where it occurs. 6

1.1 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:

International terrorism is the act of international significance which directly or indirectly affects the other states or their affairs. International terrorism can also be defined as terror inspiring violence containing an international element that is i s against non-combatant civilians, states or internationally pro- tested persons or entities in order to achieve political ends. 7 Wilkinson said "when it is (a) directed at foreigners or foreign target or (b) connected by the government or functions of more than one state or (c) aimed at influencing the policies of a foreign government or the international community." 8 The oldest definition of International Terrorism as provided in the League of Nations Convention on Terrorism, 1987 referred to terrorism in Article 1 as, "Criminal acts' directed against State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general  public."9 Jenkins has defined International Terrorism more broadly as violent actions having global repercussions or lying beyond the accepted standards of war and diplomacy. 10  The International Terrorism has to meet the following conditions: 1. The act of terrorism must be committed either against the nationals of one country outside of that country's borders or by a foreigner within the country's territ ory. 2. The purpose of the act must be explicitly political. 3. The motive of the act must be to damage the interest or to obtain concessions from the government, an international company, or an international organisation. 11 Keeping the above aims in view the international terrorists manifest by kidnapping, assassinating, bombing, and skyjacking. Each of these ingredients has its own particular characteristics, some of them often interlinked. A senior officer of Regan administration has classified the doctrine of international terrorism as the hijacking aircrafts, exploding bombs in market places and other public places - kidnapping civilian officials and business- men as hostages. In the present century any terrorism belong to a recognised group of terrorists is well armed, financed and trained as any members of the establishment, such as police, and in many instances, they are better armed, trained and financed. They make full use of modern technology - wireless, television, sophisticated weaponry, air travel etc.  Now a day‘s many national treasuries actively and even openly fund terrorist groups and it will be impossible to divorce one from the other, besides this, many established governments are not only involved in terrorism, but in some instances, control or guide, or export terrorism such as Latin 6

 robin op. Cit . P. 121.  wilkinson, paul, political terriorism , halsted press, new- york, 1975, p. 310. 8  ibid. 9  the convention was adopted at geneva on 16 december 1937; also see the u.n. secretariat: study on terrorism terro rism , u.n. doc. A/c 6/418-annexture 10  jenkins. Op. Cit p. 5. 11  ernest, e. Calling a truce to terror , greenwood press, west port connectict, 1979, p. 8 . 7

responsibility for preventing and suppressing terrorism because "The act of terrorism constitutes a Common Crime under the municipal law of the territory (or of the flag state of the aircraft vessel) where it occurs. 6

1.1 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:

International terrorism is the act of international significance which directly or indirectly affects the other states or their affairs. International terrorism can also be defined as terror inspiring violence containing an international element that is i s against non-combatant civilians, states or internationally pro- tested persons or entities in order to achieve political ends. 7 Wilkinson said "when it is (a) directed at foreigners or foreign target or (b) connected by the government or functions of more than one state or (c) aimed at influencing the policies of a foreign government or the international community." 8 The oldest definition of International Terrorism as provided in the League of Nations Convention on Terrorism, 1987 referred to terrorism in Article 1 as, "Criminal acts' directed against State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general  public."9 Jenkins has defined International Terrorism more broadly as violent actions having global repercussions or lying beyond the accepted standards of war and diplomacy. 10  The International Terrorism has to meet the following conditions: 1. The act of terrorism must be committed either against the nationals of one country outside of that country's borders or by a foreigner within the country's territ ory. 2. The purpose of the act must be explicitly political. 3. The motive of the act must be to damage the interest or to obtain concessions from the government, an international company, or an international organisation. 11 Keeping the above aims in view the international terrorists manifest by kidnapping, assassinating, bombing, and skyjacking. Each of these ingredients has its own particular characteristics, some of them often interlinked. A senior officer of Regan administration has classified the doctrine of international terrorism as the hijacking aircrafts, exploding bombs in market places and other public places - kidnapping civilian officials and business- men as hostages. In the present century any terrorism belong to a recognised group of terrorists is well armed, financed and trained as any members of the establishment, such as police, and in many instances, they are better armed, trained and financed. They make full use of modern technology - wireless, television, sophisticated weaponry, air travel etc.  Now a day‘s many national treasuries actively and even openly fund terrorist groups and it will be impossible to divorce one from the other, besides this, many established governments are not only involved in terrorism, but in some instances, control or guide, or export terrorism such as Latin 6

 robin op. Cit . P. 121.  wilkinson, paul, political terriorism , halsted press, new- york, 1975, p. 310. 8  ibid. 9  the convention was adopted at geneva on 16 december 1937; also see the u.n. secretariat: study on terrorism terro rism , u.n. doc. A/c 6/418-annexture 10  jenkins. Op. Cit p. 5. 11  ernest, e. Calling a truce to terror , greenwood press, west port connectict, 1979, p. 8 . 7

American Terrorism have been financed and encouraged by the USA and as well as the USSR. 1.2 TERRORISTS AND INTERNATIONAL LINKS:

The terrorists have international links and thus they manage to obtain highly sophisticated weapons. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) managed to get USSR manufactured rockets and launchers from Arab Terrorists operating through arms supply depots in Switzerland. Initially these weapons were provided to Syria by USSR to use against Israelis. The Syrians gave to Palestinian Arab Fedayeen Fedayeen terrorist who sold it to IRA. Not only had these Algerian terrorists  bought 20 tons of weapons from Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia for IRA through Irish American organisations in US. The Israel was supplied arms by USA to use against Arabs. The terrorists have international cooperation among them- selves. They have no boundaries. The Japan terrorist of Nippons United Red Army (RENGO Sekigum) in July 1972 disembarked at Lydda Airport from Air France Flight 132 and opened fire inside the crowded terminal with Czech VZT-58 automatic rifles, killing 26 unsuspecting people and wounded about hundred for no apparent reason. But soon after information officer of P.F.L.P. announced, that this organisation P.F.L.P. had sent the Japanese to Lydda to kill as many people as possible". The  pattern of the international i nternational terrorism has become all the t he more complex and complicated due to link and cooperation between the left wing terrorism and right wing terrorism. The network of terrorism is international, they operate in United States, Canada, almost all the Latin American countries, Ireland, Britain, France, West Germany, Spain, Italy, Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, India, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, and Japan. The Terrorism by first mandate or free choice is more powerful, difficult to dislodge or overcome and is far more lethal when practiced by establishment and entrenched rule. Through the course of this paper, we have restrained ourselves to the field fi eld of aerial hijacking. 2. HIJACKING Transportation systems have historically attracted terrorist attacks. As such, the international community has come to terms with the vulnerability of modern aviation, taking sustained steps towards the protection of aviation. The earliest form of terrorism against international transportation was piracy. Pirates are considered by international law as common enemies of all mankind. The international world has an interest in the punishment of offenders and is  justified in adopting international measures for the application of universal rules regarding the control of terrorism. As we see that Piracy in the high sea has been a very old  phenomenon;  phenomenon; but the piracy in the air has its origin in the post second world war era. Aircraft hijacking is very much a crime of our time. 12 Whether, hijacking is an act of terror or not depends upon whether the intent of the hijacker is to escape from one country to another or to create terror as an ancillary affect, for example, the holding of certain persons as hostages in order to secure the release either of hijacker or of other terrorist, or to get a reward in the form of ransom.13 12

 The law and Aircraft hijacking, Alona E. Evans  freedman, lawrence zelic: terrorism , problems of the polistaraxie, the university of chicago magazine, vol. 66j no. 6 summer 1974, p. 7. 13

The harbinger of modern day aircraft seizure was seen first on February 21, 1931, when a Pan-Am Fokker F7 aircraft carrying mail was hijacked. The plane, while on the ground in Peru, was seized by armed Peruvian revolutionaries. They wanted to be taken to Lima so that they could drop their propaganda leaflets over it. The pilot refused and the deadlock in their negotiation lasted for ten days, after which the hijackers released the plane declaring that their revolution was a success. 14  Another one was seen on May 1, 1961, when an armed Cuban exile named Elphi Crosisi, who reportedly considered himself to be the reincarnation of a Spanish Main pirate by the name of Cofrisi, entered the cockpit of a United States  National Airlines aircraft on a flight from Marathon to Key West, Florida, and forced the  pilot to fly to Cuba15  and thus began what was to become a decade of concern, both domestically for the United States and eventually for the entire world, with the phenomenon of "aircraft hijacking" or, as it was more dramatically called in the earlier years of the decade, "aircraft piracy" as he flew into what was in many ways a legal vacuum. Certainly there was no recognized international law to deal with hijacking. There was not even an internationally agreed-upon solution to the jurisdiction problem in the wider area of crime aboard aircraft, although there were many theories from which to choose -the history of attempted definitions of jurisdiction over airborne crime even predates powered flight by a year. 1617 During that decade there had been over 200 attempts of aircraft hijacking. 18

One of the most serious by-products of the jet age has been the unlawful seizure of, or interference with aircraft engaged in commercial air transport. During the past few years there have been many examples of hijacking for extortion, hijacking for a joyride, hijacking for the achievement of political ends, and hijacking purely as a terrorist activity. Fortunately, many attempts have been thwarted, and in the cases of successful hijacking, most have resulted in little more than discomfort and inconvenience for the passengers, and considerable expense for the airlines involved. However, in several tragic instances, hijacking has ended in the death of innocent persons and the destruction of aircraft worth many millions of dollars. While the internal laws of many nations provide punitive sanctions that guarantee swift and sure punishment to the offenders, the same cannot be said with regard to the international scene. The  purpose of this paper is to look at the international agreements and extradition laws which are directly concerned with the hijacking problem, to determine their effectiveness as preventive and punitive measures. 19

14

 see also, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2006-07-01/open-space/27806673_1_hijacker-aircraft plane 15  n.y. times, may 2, 1961, at 1, col. 6. 16  fauchille, rvgime juridique des aerostats, annuaire de l'institut de droit international 19 (igo2). 17  the developing law of air hijacking, gary n. Horlick 18 according to the statistics maintained by the faa‘s office of air transportation security. For the period may 1, 1961 through december 29, 1970, there had been 100 hijacking attempts involving u.s. aircraft -77 successful and 23 unsuccessful. 19 different u.s. carriers have been involved and hijackers have boarded air carriers in 44 different cities. 19  A search for an international solution to the problem of aircraft hijacking, R. J. Mcgrane

Skyjacking incidents increased after Second World War. In a sense skyjacking is waging a war against another country with fewer weapons. Most of the weapons used by these hijackers are made in Soviet Russia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Syria, and East Germany. There are six types of hijacking: 1. The Jesse James type who commit crime for money. 2. The criminals who just want to get to a particular place. 3. The bluff-artist, who claims (falsely) that his toy gun is a real one, or that he has  placed a bomb in the plane, a sort of relatively harmless cousin to Jesse James‘s.

4. The Lunatic 5. The political fanatic, and 6. The Angel of death-dedicated to killing and to being killed who come somewhere  between the lunatic and the fanatic. 20 Although the initial instance of aircraft seizure occurred in Peru in the year 1930, 16 Rajinsky noted that "first real rash of this disease breaks out in four years 1947 to 1950 during which there were 14 attempts, all in the Eastern Hemisphere. Out of these 14 crimes, 7 were committed in Europe in the year 1948. Nothing happened 21 in 1951, and only two in the years 1952 and 1953, both of which were also in the Eastern Hemisphere. 22 By the early 1960's the number of aircraft seizure attempts rose in both the Eastern and Western Hemispheres, while the legal situation of hijacking of aircraft did not become a genuine threat to world peace until 1970, by the time hijacking problems have assumed proportions sufficiently significant to engage the attention of the entire world community, the leading aviation states had already initiated action in International Civil Aviation organisation. A specialized agency of the United Nations, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was created in 1944 to promote the safe and orderly development of international civil aviation throughout the world. It sets standards and regulations necessary for aviation safety, security, efficiency and regularity, as well as for aviation environmental protection. The Organization serves as the forum for cooperation in all fields of civil aviation among its 191 Member States. 23 The hazards to aviation safety posed by this activity were summarized by the Acting Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration [hereinafter FAA] in testimony before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. He pointed out that: ―Hijacking has involved physical danger to the passengers and the crew. Passengers have

 been held as hostages or intimidated and crewmembers have been subjected to minor assaults. It is obvious that should a bomb or other form of explosive discharge aboard an aircraft that the aircraft could be lost. Gunplay aboard could involve injury or death among 20 21

glyňe, peter, an anatomy of skyjacking, abelard schu - men, london, 1973, p. 193.

international conventions on aerial hijacking: an approach to combat terrorism, r. S. Rajput, the Indian  journal of political science, vol. 51, no. 1 (jan. - march 1990), pp. 98-125, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41855472 22  Rajinsky, m. A. Secretary-general of the igao at an airport security seminar in London November 29 -30, 1971 on hijacking p. 1. 23 see also, http://www.ICAO.int/about-ICAO/pages/default.aspx

the crew or passengers. As to the possible effects of bullets penetrating the aircraft fuselage, there is little danger of catastrophic effects regarding cabin pressurization; however, there is danger that critical aircraft parts could be hit and rendered inoperable (hydraulic or electrical systems, radios, or fuel tanks). There is always the danger that the hijacker could insist on diverting the flight to a destination beyond the range of the aircraft's fuel supply. This could result in a ditching, a crash landing, or an emergency landing at an airport without the required runway length for the aircraft involved. The aircraft could be diverted to an airport at which bad weather and a lack of navigational aids would make an approach and landing unsafe. The hijacker could divert the aircraft to an unfriendly or hostile country where the  passengers would be subject to imprisonment. The action of the hijacker in exploding a bomb or firing a gun or the general commotion caused by the seizure could cause a fire on board the aircraft with resulting injuries, death, or accident. The act of seizing the aircraft by the hijacker might cause certain passengers to react in an imprudent manner resulting in injuries to themselves or other passengers on the aircraft. ‖24 Hijacking has repeatedly been condemned by international organisations. The United Nations has on several occasions called on member countries to draw up arrangements that will deal with the menace effectively. 25 The international civil aviation organisation at its seven tenth assembly session held in Montreal, June 16-30, 1970, noted that the unlawful seizure of civil aircraft posed a grave menace to the safe operation of international civil air services and undermines the confidence of the peoples of the world in the safety of international civil aviation.26 The recent aircraft hijacking that shook the entire world was on 29 June 2012: an attempt was made to hijack Tianjin Airlines Flight GS7554 from Hotan to Ürümqi. Six people tried to hijack the aircraft 10 minutes after take-off. There were 6 police officers on board. Four were in plain clothes, taking the plane for a business trip. The hijackers used aluminium canes with sharpened tips to attack the members of the crew. The police officers and civilians on board subdued the hijackers, all of whom were of Uyghur ethnicity. The plot was foiled and the  plane returned to Hotan in 22 minutes after takeoff. 27  There was also the major one that shook the entire world and that was 2001, September 11: American Airlines Flight 11, United Airlines Flight 175, American Airlines Flight 77, United Airlines Flight 93, were hijacked on the morning of September 11 by Al-Qaeda-affiliated extremists. Flight 11 and 175 were deliberately crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Center, Flight 77 was crashed into the Pentagon and Flight 93 crashed into a field in Pennsylvania after hijackers crashed the plane due to a revolt by passengers. Both towers of The World Trade Center collapsed; in

24

 house colm. On interstate and foreign commerce, preliminary riep., a r r piracy, h.r. rei. No. 91-33, 91st cong., ist sess. 3 (1969). 25  2in september of 1970, the security council passed a resolution condemning air hijacking. See security council resolution and united nations letter to ICAO in united states department of state bulletin 63: 341-343 (1 970) 26  3see ICAO resolution adopted by the assembly - seventeenth session 16-30 June 1970 (extraord) prelim ed July 1970. 27 "plane hijacking fouled in west". Foxnews.com. June 29, 2012. Retrieved June 29, 2012.

total 2,996 people, including the 19 hijackers, were killed and over 6000 people were injured. The attacks led to the War on Terror. 28 The frequency of hijacking events continues to underline the need to develop effective international arrangements binding on each and every state to deal with the problem of air  piracy. The purpose of this paper is to examine the existing state of the law governing the unlawful seizure of aircraft and to indicate the extent to which acceptable legal solutions may  be found.

3. PROTOCOLS AND CONVENTIONS: LORD WILBERFORCE once said that "there are very few subjects connected with the law of the air on which lawyers have written so much or which they have discussed so often at International Conferences as Crimes on Aircraft." 29 This statement cannot be more true today vis-à-vis the subject of hijacking of aircraft. Till date there have been the following conventions which we will be discussing about and they are as follows: 1. The Geneva convention on the high seas (1958), 2. The Tokyo Convention(1963), 3. The Hague Convention (1970): and its Protocol (2010), 4. The Montreal Convention (1971), 5. The Bonn Declaration (1978), 6. Protocol to Montreal Convention (1988), 7. Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (1991) and 8. Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (2010)  Now we would be discussing about the above conventions. 3.1 THE GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE HIGH SEAS (1958):

The Geneva Convention of the High Seas of 1958 30 was the first attempt at an international accord to harmonize the application of rules of both piracies at sea and in air. 31  The Convention adopted authoritative legal statements on civil aviation security, as it touched on  piracy over the high seas 32 Article 5 of the Convention inclusively defines piracy as follows:

28

see also, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/list_of_aircraft_hijackings#cite_ref-87.  See Sir Richard Wilberforce (as he then was), “Crime in Aircraft "' (1963) 67 Journal of the Royal  Aeronautical Society (hereinafter referred to as Jnl.Ryl.Aero. Soc.) 175. 30  The Geneva Convention Was Opened For Signature At Geneva On 16 November, 1937. See Hudson,  International Legislation, Vol. Vii At 862, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/418, Annex 1, At 1. 31  Attempts At Ensuring Peace And Security In International Aviation, R.I.R. Abeyratne. 32  League Of Nations, Official Journal, 1934, At 1839. 29

Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 1. Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for  private ends by the crew or the passenger of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or  property on board such ship or aircraft; against a ship, aircraft, persons, or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state; 2. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 3. Any act of inciting or of internationally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph 2 of this article. 



As provided for by Article 14 of the Convention, there is incumbent on all States a general duty to "co-operate" to the fullest extent in the repression of piracy as defined by the Convention. Article 14 seemingly makes it a duty incumbent upon every State to take necessary measures to combat piracy by either prosecuting the pirate or extraditing him to the State which might be in a better position to undertake such prosecution. The Convention, in Article 19, gives all States universal jurisdiction under which the person charged with the offense of aerial or sea piracy may be tried and punished by any State into whose jurisdiction he may come. This measure is a proactive one in that it eliminates any boundaries that a State may have which would preclude the extradition or trial of an offender in that State. Universal  jurisdiction was also conferred upon the States by the Convention to solve the somewhat complex problem of jurisdiction, which often arose under municipal law where the crime was committed, outside the territorial jurisdiction of the particular State seeking to prosecute an offender. The underlying salutary effects of universal jurisdiction in cases of piracy and hijacking, which were emphasized by the Convention, has been described by one commentator: ―The absence of universal jurisdiction in  relation to a given offense, means that, if a

 particular State has no jurisdiction either on the basis of territoriality or protection, or on the  personality principle, whether passive or active, it will not be authorized to put the offender on trial, even if he is to be found within the territorial boundaries of the State.‖ 33 The essential features of the definition of piracy incorporated in the Geneva Convention are as follows: (1) the pirate must be motivated by "private" as opposed to "public" ends; (2) the act of piracy involves an action affecting a ship, an aircraft; (3) the acts of violence, detention, and depredation take place outside the jurisdiction of any State, meaning both territorial jurisdiction and airspace above the State; (4) acts committed on board a ship or aircraft, by the crew or passengers of such ship or aircraft and directed against the ship or aircraft itself, or against persons or property, do not constitute the offense of piracy. Upon close examination, it appears that the definition of piracy does not apply to the phenomenon 33

 S.Z. Feller, Comment On Criminal Jurisdiction Over Aircraft Hijacking, 7 Israel L. Rev., 207, 207, (1992).

of aerial piracy or hijacking. It is a fact that most hijackings are not carried out in pursuance of private ends. INTERPOL reported in 1977 that the percentage of cases in which political motives had impelled the offender was 64.4%, 34 during that time. Hijacking of aircraft for  political motives would thus not relate to Article 15(1) of the Convention, since acts solely inspired by political motives are excluded from the notion of  piracy jure gentium. Sami Shubber has observed of the 1958 Convention that its inapplicability to the notion of aerial  piracy may lie in the fact that private ends do not necessarily mean that they can affect  private groups acting either in pursuance of their political aims or gain. The fact that it is not always possible to distinguish between private ends and public ends in defiance of the  political regime of the flag State may be said to be covered by Article 15(1) of the Convention; the reason given by Shubber was that "private ends" do not necessarily equal  private gain. 35 Under the definition of piracy, the act of illegal violence or detention must be directed on the high seas against another ship or aircraft. It is obvious therefore that this interpretation does not apply to hijacking since the offense of hijacking is committed by the offender who travels in the aircraft. It is hard to imagine that an offender could enter an aircraft from outside while the aircraft is in flight. The Convention also excludes acts committed on board a ship by the crew or passengers and directed against the ship itself, or against persons or property on the ship, from the scope of piracy, 36 which will also make the definition inconsistent with the exigencies related to the offense of aerial piracy. 37

Although piracy, according to the Convention, must be committed on the "high seas", instances of hijacking may occur anywhere. Furthermore, piracy under Article 15 of the Convention must involve acts of violence, detention or depredation. Most hijackings, however, have been carried out simply by the use of threats, and may even be carried out through a variety of means other than those involving violence or force. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that hijacking does not necessarily and absolutely fall within the definition of "aircraft piracy" as defined by the Geneva Convention. 38  The hopes of the international community to control the crime of hijacking through the application of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas may therefore have been frustrated by the exclusivity of the nature of the two offenses of aerial piracy and piracy related to the high seas. The Convention therefore remains to be of mere academic interest for those addressing the issue of aerial piracy. 3.2 THE TOKYO CONVENTION (1963):

34

 Interpol Had Submitted To The Legal Committee Of Icao In 1977 T hat Out Of Recorded Hijackings Up To That Year, The Percentage Of Instances Of Hijackings Which Were Motivated Politically Was 6.2 At A Ratio Of 64:4. See Icao Doc 8877-Lc/161, At 132. 35  Sami Shubber, Jurisdicion Over Crimes On Board Aircraft 226 (1973). 36  Gary N. Horlick, The Developing Law Of Air Hijacking, 12 Harv. Int'l L.J. 33, 65 (1971). 37  Attempts At Ensuring Peace And Security In International Aviation, R.I.R. Abeyratne. 38 See Haro F. Van Panhuys,  Aircraft Hijacking And International Law, 9 Colum. J. Transnat'l. L. 1, 13 (1970).

Shocked by the rising trend of aircraft hijacking in the early 1960s and the failure of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas to offer rules applicable to the offense of hijacking, the international community considered adopting the Tokyo Convention of 1963, which was adopted under the aegis of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). This Convention attempted to provide certain rules that would address the offense of hijacking. 39 By the early 1960's the number of aircraft seizure attempts rose in both the Eastern and Western Hemispheres, while the legal situation of hijacking of aircraft did not become a genuine threat to world peace until 1970, by the time hijacking problems have assumed  proportions sufficiently significant to engage the attention of the entire world community, the leading aviation states had already initiated action in International Civil Aviation organisation.40 International civil Aviation Organisation a specialized agency of United Nations since 1947 is comprised of 122 States, including Cuba, and all States of which aircrafts have been closely associated itself with all the significant organisations of air travel. This I.C.A.O. in the year 1952 under its Legal Sub-Committee began a study to survey various responsibilities of the aircraft commander vis‘-a-vis‘ jurisdictional problems of crimes committed aboard aircraft. Its efforts eventually led to a full scale inquiry into the problems, culminating into the Tokyo convention of 1963. The Convention represented a fresh international legal approach to cope with aircraft seizures by segregating the legal niceties of 'air piracy' in contrast to the implications stemming from traditional 'Sea piracy'. 41 In March-April 1962 a meeting of the ICAO Legal Sub- committee at Montreal, focused on rationalization of various State claims to prescriptive jurisdiction over airborne crimes. The  problem was manifest in the creation of an international law dealing with the aircraft seizures - a law which would clearly define state jurisdiction over those who commit the crime. Jurisdiction remained the core of the hijacking problem for international law. 42 In 1950, the Legal Committee of ICAO, upon a proposal from the Mexican Representative on the ICAO Council for the study of the legal status of airports, referred the subject to the ad hoc Sub-Committee established by the Legal Committee. 43 After a survey had been made of all the problems relating to the legal status of aircraft, it was decided by the Committee that the best course would be to confine the work to a detailed examination of some particularly important matters, namely crimes and offenses committed on board aircraft, jurisdiction relating to such crimes and the resolution of jurisdictional conflicts. 44 The Sub-Committee thought that resolving these problems was of vital importance for the following reasons:

39

 Supra.  Association International Conventions On Aerial Hijacking: An Approach To Combat Terrorism, R. S. Rajput 41  Seeking A Definition For Piracy In The Air, Ita Bulletin Vol. 13 March 30, 1970 Pp. 321-24. 42  Documents Of The Legal Committee: Fourteenth Session Igao Doc. 8302, Lg/ 150 2 At 71 (1963). 43 See Robert P. Boyle & Roy Palsifer, The Tokyo Convention On Offenses And Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft, 30 J. Air L. & Comm. 305 (1964) [Hereinafter Tokyo Convention]. 44 Transportation Law Journal, [Vol. 24:27] 40

1. One characteristic of aviation is that aircraft fly over the high seas or overseas having no territorial sovereign. While national laws of some States confer jurisdiction on their courts to try offenses committed on aircraft during such flights, this was not the case in others, and there was no internationally agreed system which would coordinate the exercise of national jurisdiction in such cases. Further, with (the) high speed of modem aircraft, the great altitudes at which they fly, meteorological conditions, and, the fact that several States may be over flown by aircraft within a small space of time, there could be occasions when it would be impossible to establish the territory in which the aircraft was at the time a crime was committed on  board. There was, therefore, the possibility that in such a case, and in the absence of an internationally recognized system with regard to exercise of national jurisdiction, the offender may go unpunished; 2.  National jurisdictions with respect to criminal acts are based on criteria which are not uniform; for example, on the nationality of the offender, the nationality of the victim, on the locality where the offense was committed, or on the nationality of the aircraft on which the crime occurred. Thus, several States may claim jurisdiction over the same offense committed on board aircraft, in certain cases. Such conflict of  jurisdictions could be avoided only by international agreement;[and] 3. The possibility that the same offense may be triable in different States might result in the offender being punished more than once for the same offense. This undesirable  possibility could be avoided by a suitable provision in the Convention. 45 After sustained deliberation and contradiction, the Sub-Committee on the Legal Status of Aircraft produced a draft convention which was submitted to the Legal Committee on 9 September 1958. 46 The Legal Committee in turn considered the draft convention at its 12th Session held in Munich in 1959, 47 undertaking a substantial revision of the draft The revised text was subsequently submitted to the ICAO Council, which in turn submitted the draft to Member States and various international organizations for their comments. A new SubCommittee was formed to examine the Convention of State organization in 1961, in order to examine and prepare a report. This report was studied by the Legal Committee in its 14th Session held in Rome in 1962. A final text of a Convention was drawn up at this meeting and communicated to Member States with a view towards convening a diplomatic conference in Tokyo with the long-term prospect of adopting a Convention on aerial rights. This Convention was signed in Tokyo on 14 September 1963 by the representatives of 49 ICAO Member States, and entered into force after six years, on 4 December 1969. 48  This slow  process of ratification of the Convention (5 years) was by no means due to the ineptitude of the Convention, as has been claimed, but was due to the fact that the Convention was drafted  prior to the series of hijacking in the late sixties and was not implemented with due dispatch  by most States. Another reason for the delayed process was the complicated legal and 45

 The Report Of The Sub-Committee, Lc/Sc Legal Status, Wd No. 23, October 10, 1956.  Ibid 47  Ibid 48  Robert P. Boyle, International Action To Combat Aircraft Hijacking, Lawyers Of The Americas, At 463 [Hereinafter International Combat]. 46

 political issues facing many countries at the time of the adoption of the Convention. 49 A significant feature of the Tokyo Convention was that although at first States were slow in acceding to or ratifying the Convention, 80 States ratified the convention within one year (1969-70), presumably in response to the spate of hijackings that occurred during that  period.50

3.2.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF TOKYO CONVENTION, 1963 The purpose of the Tokyo Convention was to promote aviation safety through establishment of continuity of jurisdiction over criminal acts occurring board aircraft. Turner had proposed an additional purpose viz "...to define the rights and status of a person detained in a foreign state after commission of offence. ‖51 Scope of the convention is covered under Articles 1 and 2, which includes the offences against penal law, offences committed by the persons on board while the aircraft is in flight. The hijackers could be tried only for the extraditable offences, which must be listed in the treaty as a crime under both the laws of the surrendering and receiving states. 52 The main purpose of the Tokyo Convention was to secure the collaboration of States in restraining terrorist activity directed at air transport. It has therefore been said that "[t]he first action taken by the international community to combat hijacking was the Tokyo Convention 1963. This Convention was originally designed to solve the problem of the commission of crimes on board aircraft while in flight where for any number of reasons the criminal might escape punishment.'' 53 The objectives of the Tokyo convention may be summarized into four  principal areas: 1. The Convention makes it clear that the State of registration of the aircraft has the authority to apply its laws. From the standpoint of States such as the United States, this is probably the most important aspect of the Convention, since it accords international recognition to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the circumstances contemplated in the Convention; 2. The Convention provides the aircraft commander with the necessary authority to deal with persons who have committed, or are about to commit, a crime or an act  jeopardizing safety on board his aircraft through use of reasonable force when required, and without fear of subsequent retaliation through civil suit or otherwise; 3. The Convention delineates the duties and responsibilities of the contracting State in which an aircraft lands after the commission of a crime on board, including its

49

See Abraham Abramovsky, Multinational Convention For The Suspension Of Unilateral Seizure And  Interference With Aircraft Part I: The Hague Convention, 13 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 381, 389 (1974). 50

 Supra  Turner, James, S. G. "Piracy In The Air", Naval War College Review , Vol. 22, 1969 P. 101. 52  Attempts At Ensuring Peace And Security In International Aviation,R.I.R. Abeyratne. 53  International Combat, Supra  Note 18, At 463, In Attempts At Ensuring Peace And Security In International Aviation,R.I.R. Abeyratne. 51

authority over, and responsibilities to, any offenders that may be either disembarked within territory of that State or delivered to its authorities; 4. The crime of 'hijacking' has been addressed in some degree of depth. 54

 Provisions of Hijacking

Article 11 of the convention has been included as the first codified attempt to specifically, seizure, or other wrongful exercise of control of an aircraft in flight when such an act is about to be committed. Contracting States shall take all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander or to preserve his control of the aircraft. In the above article no effort is made to describe hijacking as an international crime, nor does this Tokyo convention grant any kind of universal jurisdiction for the apprehension and the punishment to the hijackers. In nutshell, the Tokyo convention recognises a legitimate right of the state in which the incident occurred and the flag State to request extradition of the offender. Theoretically 'Articles 13-15 provide a pattern which officials of the State in which the aircraft lands may follow; it suggests that the hijacker be taken into custody and a preliminary inquiry be made. Article 4 indicates that the offender be expelled at the wishes of the receiving state; and Article 15 calls for extradition or prosecution of the offender at the discretion of the landing State. If circumstances warrant and the offender evades each of these conventional provisions, he is virtually assured of liberty. Mckeithan remarked "Because of this wide latitude which the convention gives to contracting State……… (it)

recognises and legitimizes their right to do as they wish hijackers." 55 It would be fair to say that Tokyo convention was the first modest step in combating crimes on the board of the aircraft with regard to the hijacking; it did not tackle this offence specially, but dealt it with only incidentally and in a limited manner. Hijackers are treated just like any other offenders, and the hijacked aircraft is, under convention to be restored to the lawful commander. Hijacking and other terrorist offences against the safety of the aircraft held to be specifically dealt with by other special conventions. According to international legal expert D.J. Harris, the Tokyo convention was largely concerned with "the long standing problems of jurisdiction over all crimes aboard aircraft ‖,56 and languished for some years until an upsurge of hijacking in the late 1960's brought into force. The convention was held on September 14, 1963 and has opened the same day for signatures but it could not effectively be enforced as most of the states have not signed the convention till December 1969. Only those states, who had been the victim of hijacking,  became the signatories. This attitude proved to be very shallow one. After the Tokyo convention, the incidents of hijacking have increased, and the global community was convinced on this phenomenon. No less than 210 hijacking attempts had been made in this 54

 Tokyo Convention, Supra Note 14, At 328-29, In Attempts At Ensuring Peace And Security In International Aviation ,R.I.R. Abeyratne. 55  Mckeithen, R. L. Smith, "Prospects For The Prevention Of Aircraft Hijacking Through Law" Columbia Journal Of Transnational Law, Vol. 9 Spring 1970, P. 64. 56  Harris, D. J. New Terrorism, Messne, Julian, 1983.

duration. Eighty incidents occurred in 1970 alone. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) carried out the most famous series of hijacking in September 1970 in which a TWA 709 a Swissair DC 8 and BOAC-VC-lO were hijacked to Dawson outfield in  Northern Jordan while a Pan Am 747 was hijacked to Cairo. 57 This act of political blackmail  pointed out the need for immediate international cooperation, not only to fill the prosecution voids inherent in the Tokyo convention, but also to reach viable solutions that world prevent such acts from separation. 58 3.3 THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON HIJACKING (1970): AND ITS PROTOCOL (2010):

The International Civil Aviation organisation and the Inter- national Air Transport Association suggested to the Legal Committee to review and revision of the legal status of hijacking, hopefully to elevate it to the level of an international crime", and the incorporation of mandatory prosecution. The Legal 'Committee of ICAO included the following objective in its report. 1. Recognition of unlawful aircraft seizures as a penal offence, subject to the jurisdiction of every state. 2. Encouragement of States to establish such jurisdiction; and 3. Proposition to States of alternative for penal measures viz., extradition, prosecution or under select circum- stances, asylum. 59 Accordingly a special diplomatic conference was convened from December 1 to 16, 1970 at Hague to consider the draft proposal. This convention was titled as "convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of Aircraft." The Hague convention was represented by seventy seven States representatives, and other organisations interested in international civil aviation. Soviet and Arab countries also attended the convention but Cuba was missing there. The preamble of the convention contains the urgency and mission of the conference, such as Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft in-flight, safety of person and property, and the confidence of the people of the world on civil aviation. The definition of unlawful Seizure of Aircraft as decided by Hague convention was less vehement than that desired by United States or Soviet Union. In contrast to Tokyo contention, the wordings of the Hague convention are more closely approximates a law of nations definition. The basic elements of crime are spelled out to confirm with most national legislation, without exaggerated interpretation. The unlawful nature of the act is well described in Article 1, but no specific name is given to the crime. It is designated as "the offence" Article 2 mentions that". Each contracting States undertake to make the offence punishable, by severe penalties. But what is severe penalty is not defined. The Article 2 has to accommodate disparate municipal penalties in accordance with their national legislations. It is interesting to note that national courts have largely been unwilling

57

 Evans, Ernest, Calling A Truce To Terror, Op. Cit. P. 26.  Supra. 59  Igao Doc 8838, Lg/ 157, 35, 36, (1969). 58

to sentence convicted hijackers to the maximum punishments provided in their penal laws. 60 Some states have chosen to return hijackers to the country in which the aircraft was seized or to the flag states, even in the cases where extradition treaties were not applicable; while as West Germany, Denmark, and Austria have seen fit to grant asylum to hijackers apparently with the understanding that they will not be returned to the country from which they come,  but in the cases of theft of aircraft (without political implication) or illegal possession of dangerous weapons which endanger the lives of passengers, these states have denied the right of asylum to the offenders. 61  Some states persist in welcoming "offenders" as heroes, for example Syria printed a special stamp in 1969 to commemorate the seizure of TWA Boeing 737 Jetliner to Damascus. Pakistan set ablaze the hijacked Indian Fokker Friendship at Lahore under TV coverage in February 1971; the hijackers were projected as heroes by the Pakistani media. Algeria and Jordan have refused to prosecute or extradite hijackers  particularly when the aircraft seizure had political over- tone. As a reaction to this decision American Society of Travel Agents (A.S.T.A.) suspended consumer travel service to Algeria, Iraq, Jordan and Syria until these nations evidenced their willingness to take necessary steps to these acts of skyjacking.

4. JURISDICTION OVER HIJACKING An individual who hijacks an aircraft commits an international crime against the laws of the contracting states. Since long element required for customary international law wants to achieve true universal jurisdiction but, conventional law has made evident the international consensus that skyjacking is an illegal act subject to prosecution under municipal legal codes. 62 The provision of Article 4 of the Hague convention assert that jurisdiction may be wilfully exercised by the contracting States. The jurisdiction over the offender is subject to: 1. The State in which the aircraft is registered, 2. The state of a lessee‘s domicile under a bare hull character i.e. the aircraft leased without crew. 3. The State in which the hijacked aircraft lands;

60

 In The Usa Maximum Punishment Of 25 Years Have Been Awarded To One Skyjacker Till May 1971. In Ussr Several Persons For Attempting To Hijack Soviet Aircraft Were Sentenced To Death But It Was Reduced To 15 Years Imprisonment After Appeal. These Persons Were Not Charged Under The Law For Hijacking The Aircraft, But Under A Law Forbidding Departure From The Country Without Permission. A French Statute Categorizes Hijacking Into Three, And Designated Appropriate Penalties For Each; For Simple Hijacking It Is Five To Ten Years; If In The Course Of Hijacking Any Offender Injures Another Party, The Punishment Is 10 To 20 Years Imprisonment. In Case Of Any Death, Death Or Life Imprisonment, See; Lissitzyn, Oliver J; International Control Of Aerial Hijacking Pp. 80-85. 61  Evans, Alona E, Comments, American Journal Of Inter* National Law Proceeding , Vol. 65, No. 4. September 1971 P. 91. 62  Morlick, Gray, "The Public And Private International Response To Aircraft Hijacking;" Vanderbilt Journal Of Transitional Law , Vol. 6, 1972 P. 164.

The Article further extends state jurisdiction that any party to the convention in whose territorial limits an alleged hijacker is found can assume jurisdiction over him, or extradite him according to their stated municipal provisions sanctioning nation-states legislation. This convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law.63  This paragraph further reaffirms that local authorities are to deal with successful seizure that occur solely within the territory of the flag State. The jurisdictional provision granted to "take off" state and the landing state to be applicable,  both locations must be external to the flag state territory i.e. if the hijacked flight occurs wholly within the territorial jurisdiction of the state of registry, the incident is excluded from the aegis of the Hague convention, it being ... immaterial whether the aircraft is engaged in an inter- national or domestic flight. This convention provides to the contracting parties to  prosecute the offender if he is not extradited. Extradition is not specifically required, but Article 7 make it clear that it is the only acceptable option for prosecution. The individual rights of the accused offender are safeguarded. Article 6 provides the guidelines to be followed by jurisdictional state; only upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant 'may the accused be taken into custody. A fact finding inquiry of the incident must be made and both the flag state and the alleged hijackers' nationality state be notified of his detention. If the State holding the offender considers proper it should notify any other interested State of the fact that such person is in its custody and of the circumstances which warrant the detention. The Article 7 of the Convention provides to extradite, or prosecute obligations as binding upon all contracting states, in- spite of the location of the offence. The aim of the Article 7 is to deny sanctuary to any alleged offenders, in every part of the world community. In this way the rewards and the opportunities to escape punitive actions would be eliminated for potential hijackers, thereby discouraging future attempts. But this provision has not been fully materialized. Extradition has been grossly underused in jurisdictional settlements, whereas the legal anti- thesis-asylum- has been all too often the case. Extradition involves denial of asylum and the surrender of an individual to a requesting State. 64 Customary international law  provides no rule which imposes a duty to extradite, 65  hence extradition becomes either a matter of comity or treaty between the states. 66  In spite of the provisions, the fact is that hijacking has been largely omitted as an offence in the list of most of the extradition treaties. Whether an offender be provided asylum as the municipal right of a State, thus the asylum  provides a safe haven for an offender as designated in the receiving states, municipal codes, if the asylum is granted the extradition request will be rejected.

63

 Hague Convention Article 4 Paragraph 3.  Oppenhein Lassa, F.L.: International Law, Longmans London, 1905, P. 696. 65  Draft Convention Of Extradition And Comments; Ameri - Can Journal Of International Law , Vol. 29, 1935, Pp. 416-34. 66  Factor V. Lauben Leimer 290 Us 276 (1933) Quoted In Bishop W. W, International Law : Cases And Materials , Little Brown And Co,Jboston, 1962, P. 471. 64

Political asylum is hindrance in cornering the hijackers. Art 14 of the universal declaration of Human rights states that "Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from prosecution". The United Nations in its General Assembly has resolved that the situation of persons invoking such a right is of concern to the international Community, and such a person shall not be subject to expulsion or compulsory return to any state where he may be subject to persecution. 67  An important question of extradition and asylum, now emerges. Most of the contracting states of Hague convention have also supported the universal declaration of Human Rights; they have to provide asylum for certain refugee hijackers in violation of Article 7, which obligates prosecution or extradition without exception what so ever? But in practice the terminal States decision to extradite, prosecute or grant asylum to an offender depends upon the following four factors: (1) the nationality of the offender; (2) the States of the incidents as a political offence; (3) the motivation of the offender; (4) the success or failure of the seizure. Article 8 of the Convention states: 1. The offense shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offense in any extradition treaty existing between contracting States. Contracting States undertake to include the offense as an extraditable offense in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them. 2. If a contracting State which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another contracting State with which it has no extradition treaty, it may as its option consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of the offense. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested state. 3. Contracting states which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize the offense between themselves subject to the conditions  provided by the law of the requested state. 4. The offense shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between Contracting States, as if it had been committed not only in the place in which it occurred, but also in the territories of the states required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1. Thus, according to Article 8, if a contracting State receives a request for extradition from a State with which it has no extradition treaty the Convention shall be considered as the legal  basis for extradition. The effect of this provision is to enlarge the scope of existing international treaties on extradition to include hijacking. Where a State is usually prohibited  by domestic law from extraditing a hijacker in the absence of a treaty, the State must extradite the offender under the provisions of the Convention. 68

67

 General Assembly Resolution No. 2312 Of 1967 U.N. Doc A/6716 (1967)  Attempts At Ensuring Peace And Security In International Aviation, R.I.R. Abeyratne

68

The obligation to extradite an airline hijacker is subject to all other customary and conventional rules of law governing extraditable offenses. As a general rule, extradition is denied where an individual is accused of committing a political offense. Most states recognize the granting of political asylum as a right to be determined by the state from which it is requested. As the laws of a state may preclude extradition of an airline hijacker if the offense is regarded as political, the existence of hijacking in an extradition treaty may not result in mandatory extradition. However, if a state does not extradite the offender, according to Article 7, the case must be submitted to the proper authorities for prosecution. I.D. Johnston has stated the following in relation to Article 8: ―The Convention obliges the parties to include hijacking in extradition treaties to be

concluded between them and insert it retrospectively into existing extradition treaties. Parties which have not concluded extradition treaties but which make extradition conditional on a treaty can regard the Convention itself as a legal basis for extradition. These provisions increase the possibility of extradition but by no means make it a certainty. The Russian Proposal, supported by the U.S.A., that hijackers be returned in all cases was rejected at the Conference. Automatic extradition, though probably the best deterrent, was considered too drastic a commitment by most of the negotiating States. What they are prepared to accept however, was the duty to prosecute offenders whom they did not extradite as provided for by Article 7.‖69 There is no indication in the Convention as to what the position is regarding the extradition of nationals. Shubber believes that even though there is no mention of the extradition of the States own nationals according to the Convention or to the term "offender" in Article 8, such extradition possible: ―There is no reason to suppose that hijackers who happened to be nationals of the State

requested to extradite him should be excluded from the scope of extradition under the Convention, provided that course of action is compatible with the national law of the State concerned. This interpretation is not incompatible with the intention of the drafters and the  purpose for which the Convention has been created.‖ 70

The Hague convention is a hallmark in international co- operative efforts to suppress "skyjacking". The urgent need to free commercial air transport from the threat of seizure  prompted nations to respond with a vigorous denunciation of the (Un- named) "offences", and to provide more vehement punitive measures, contracting states were now required to establish jurisdiction over the offender when apprehended even if the offence did not occur within their territorial borders. The 88 members of the international community have formally sanctioned the deterrent provisions condemning unlawful aircraft seizure has elevated this act to the status of international crime. The Hague's convention became the

69

 I.D. Johnston, Legislation, 5 New Zealand L. Rev. 307 (1973).  Sami Shuber, Aircraft Hijacking Under The Hague Convention, 22 I.C.L.Q. 725 (1973).

70

foundation of all similar future inter- national efforts pertaining to various categories of terrorist offences. 71

5. OTHER PROVISIONS The Hague Convention imposed further obligations on the contracting State to preserve the security and efficiency of air transport. States are obliged to take reasonable measures to restore control of aircraft to its lawful commander or to preserve his control over it and to facilitate the continuation of the journey of the passenger and the crew In addition, States are obliged to return the aircraft and its cargo to those entitled without delay (Article 9) and report promptly as possible to the Council of ICAO any relevant information (Article 11). Article 10 imposes an obligation on all contracting States to give one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with the criminal proceedings. When comparing the contents of the Hague Convention with that of the Tokyo Convention, one observes that the two Conventions overlap and are even contradictory on some issues and their i nter-relation is far from clear. The Hague Convention may be considered as a significant step forward in the endeavour of the international community to suppress the hijacking of aircraft and remove the threat caused by it to international civil aviation. The Convention has enlarged the number of the States competent to exercise jurisdiction over a hijacker and included the introduction of new basis for the exercise of jurisdiction of the State where the charterer of an aircraft has his principal place of business or permanent residence. Another encouraging fact is that the Hague Convention grants every Contracting State the power to exercise  jurisdiction over a hijacker if such States are affected by an offense committed under the Convention, thus making it impossible for a hijacker to escape the normal process of the law. The Hague Convention, despite its efficiency in some areas, is not without its weaknesses. Mankiewicz comments, the Hague Convention deals only with "unlawful seizure committed on board aircraft" and does not apply to sabotage committed on ground, nor does it cover unlawful interference with air navigation, facilities and services such as airports, air control towers or radio communications. Attempts made further to extend the scope of the Convention were unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the Seventeenth Session of the Assembly of ICAO, held in Montreal in June, 1970, adopted a Resolution directing the Council of ICAO to convene the Legal Committee, if possible not later than November, 1970, in order to  prepare ... a draft Convention on Acts of Unlawful Interference Against Civil Aviation with the view to its adoption ... as soon as practicable. Consequently, the draft Convention was  prepared and was opened for signature at Montreal on September 23, 1971. 7273 In order to suppress unlawful acts of seizure or exercise of control of aircraft and to improve its effectiveness, a protocol supplementary to The Hague convention was adopted on

71

 International Conventions On Aerial Hijacking: An Approach To Combat Terrorism, R. S. Rajput Attempts At Ensuring Peace And Security In International Aviation, R.I.R. Abeyratne 73  Mankiewicz, Supra Note 48, At 209, In Attempts At Ensuring Peace And Security In International Aviation, R.I.R. Abeyratne 72

September, 10, 2010 at Beijing. The protocol replaced Article 1 of the convention by stating that: 1. Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally seizes or exercises control of an aircraft in service by force or by threat thereof, or by coercion, or by any other form of intimidation, or by any technological means; 2. Any person also commits an offence if that person: Makes a threat to commit the offence set forth in Para 1 of this article or, Unlawfully and intentionally causes any person to receive such a threat, under circumstances which indicate that the threat is credible.  

Article 3 of the Protocol lay‘s down that an aircraft is considered to be a service from the

 beginning of the ore-flight preparation of the aircraft by ground personnel or by the crew for a specific flight until twenty four hours after any landing. In the case of forced landing, the flight shall be deemed to continue until the competent authorities take over the responsibility for the aircraft and for the persons and persons on board. The Protocol has replaced many articles of the convention in order to deal with new types of threats against civil aviation.

5.1 THE MONTREAL CONVENTION (1971): (Convention for the suppression of Unlawful Acts against the safety of civil Aviation: 23 Sept. 1971)

International civil Aviation drafted a multilateral convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the safety of civil aviation. This was a supplement to the Hague convention. This convention was designed to deal with sabotage and terrorist incidents directed against aviation facilities. One of the most serious offences banned by the Montreal Convention was destruction of air navigation facilities. Any airport which serves international flights is vulnerable to acts of politically motivated terrorism, disrupting communication equipments, radio service, meteorological services, runway lightings or radar installation. Paragraph 1 (b) commits contracting states against such illegal acts to ensure the safety of airport personnel and passengers. Since both the Tokyo and the Hague Conventions dealt only with unlawful seizure committed on board aircraft, it did not cover sabotage committed on the ground, nor unlawful interference with air navigation facilities and services. The Montreal Convention was drafted to remedy those lapses. The objectives of the Montreal Convention are best discussed as follows: The primary aim of the Montreal Convention was to arrive at a generally acceptable method of dealing with alleged perpetrators of acts of unlawful interference with aircraft. In general, the nations represented at the Montreal Conference agreed that acts of sabotage, or violence and related offenses interfering with the safety and development of international civil aviation constituted a global problem which had to be combated collectively by concerned nations of the international community. A multilateral international convention had to be adopted which

extended both the scope and efficacy of national legislation and provided the legal framework for international co-operation in the apprehension, prosecution and punishment of alleged offender.74 DEFINITION OF THE OFFENSE Another approach adopted by the Montreal Convention in its endeavours to curb hostile acts against civil aviation is to define the offense broadly in order to embrace all the possible acts that might occur. The first issue which faced the drafters of the Convention in this respect elated to the provision of substantial coverage of serious offenses and at the same time avoiding the difficulties that may arise in connection with the listing of specific crimes in a convention intended for adoption by a great many States. After much debate and deliberation, this issue was settled and the final conclusion of the meeting is reflected in Article I. G.F. Fitzgerald described the method of enumerating the offenses in the Convention as being "novel": "[a]rticle I is novel in that it describes a number of penal offenses within the framework of a multilateralconvention." Article 1 of the Convention defines and enumerates the offenses of unlawful interference with aircraft as follows: 1. Any person commits an offense if he unlawfully and intentionally: Performs an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight if that act is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft in flight, or Destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an aircraft in flight if that act is likely to endanger its safety in flight, or Places or causes to be placed on board an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it which renders it incapable of flight, or to cause damage to it which is likely to endanger its safety in flight, or Destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safety or aircraft in flight, or Communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight. 







2. Any person also commits an offense if he: Attempts to commit any offences mentioned in Para 1 of this Article; Is an accomplice of who commits or attempts any such offence.  

It should be noted that while Article 1 delineates several different offenses, the dual requisites of unlawfulness and intent apply to act of the offenses enumerated. Fitzgerald further observes:

74

 Abraham Abramovsky, Multilateral Conventions For The Suppression Of Unlawful Seizure And Interference With Aircraft Part Ii: The Montreal Convention, 14 Colum J. Transnat'l L. 268, 278 N.2 (1975).

―The introductory language of paragraph 1 makes it clear that the dual element of

unlawfulness and intention must be present in all of the acts covered by sub-paragraphs (a) to (e); otherwise those acts will not be offenses. The dual element would also apply to attempts and complicity covered by sub- paragraph. Sub-paragraph (a) of Article 1 is designed to deter and punish acts of violence committed against persons on board aircraft in flight. It should be noted that not all acts of violence come within the scope of the offense; only those likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft are within the scope as well. The notion of an act of violence referred to in this subparagraph includes armed attacks, as well as attacks against the lives of persons on board the aircraft by other means, such as, blows, strangling, poisoning or lethal injection. The word "violence" used in sub-paragraph (a) can be interpreted as including not only an armed attack or physical assault, but also administration of poison through, for example, its introduction into the food or drink served on board aircraft. 59 The manner in which sub-paragraph (a) is worded, when it is read with the opening language of Article 1, would lead one to conclude that the person  performing the act of violence does not have to be on board the aircraft in order to come under the Convention. This means that the convention would apply to a person who, being outside the aircraft (for example a low flying and slow-moving helicopter or light aircraft) in flight or who, while on the ground, has poisoned food which is later consumed by a person on  board such aircraft. 75 According to this sub-paragraph, the act of violence is not restricted to those acts which imperil the life of the victim. Any act of violence perpetrated against a person on board and which is likely to interfere with the safety of the aircraft falls within the scope of the offense. Hence, the standard for determining whether the Convention is applicable in a given situation does not hinge on the gravity or the heinousness of the act but rather on its effect on the safety of the aircraft in flight. The same definition as given in Article 3 of the Hague Convention for an "aircraft in flight" applies in Article 2(a) of the Montreal Convention. The two offenses which can be committed on board an aircraft in service are enclosed in sub paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article 1 of the Montreal Convention. Sub-paragraph (b) is designed to deter and penalize acts of sabotage perpetrated against the aircraft itself. The sub paragraph encompasses attacks both from within and without the aircraft. The destruction and damage referred to in the sub-paragraph must occur while the aircraft is "in service," as the  particular act, the consequence of which is the destruction of the aircraft, may be performed  before the aircraft is "in service." Destruction includes substantial destruction of the aircraft  beyond the possibility of rendering it airworthy through repair while the concept of "causing damage" is intended to cover "the damaging of a vital but inexpensive piece of wiring would render the aircraft incapable of flight. It could also cover any damage, whether caused to an aircraft on the ground or in the air, where there is likelihood that the safety of the aircraft in flight would be endangered. 76

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 Attempts At Ensuring Peace And Security In International Aviation, R.I.R. Abeyratne  Attempts At Ensuring Peace And Security In International Aviation, R.I.R. Abeyratne

76

 Sub-paragraph (c) is an attempt by the Convention to encompass, through using the term "by any means whatsoever", all situations in which explosives or other devices are placed on  board an aircraft. The words "by any means whatsoever" cover the placing of explosives on board an aircraft whether carried on board by the author of the act or any unwitting accomplice, sent on board in air cargo or by mail, or even attached to the outside of the aircraft before it undertakes its  journey. Sub-paragraph (d) is intended to address hostile acts against "air navigation facilities" which may include airports, towers, radio services and meteorological services used in international flights. Sub-paragraph (e) is concerned with making it an offense for anyone to pass, or cause to pass false information relating to an offense (for example, the presence of an explosive device or would-be hijacker on board the aircraft). Although most national legislatures may have already enacted legislation concerning this subject, it was felt that measures to restrain such acts could especially be included in this Convention, as it was intended to cover a type of offense which very definitely interferes with the orderly conduct of commercial air services. In order for the act to fall within the Convention, the offender who communicates the information must know that the information is false. Article 1(2) covers the attempt to commit an offense and being an accomplice to commit one of the offenses listed in the sub-paragraphs of the Article. During the debate on the Montreal Convention, there was an attempt to include conspiracy in the definition, but some delegations, including France, were of the view that since conspiracy was not an offense under their national systems of penal law, it should not be included in the convention. After long deliberations, it was decided by a vote that reference to conspiracy would not be made in the Convention. 77 The application and jurisdiction provisions are identical to those of Hague convention. In the case of air navigation facilities Para 1 (d) of the convention empowers the application of the facilities which are destroyed, damaged, or interfered, which come in use of international navigation. Article 5 attempts to establish a form of universal jurisdiction over the alleged offender. The contracting States are obliged to take necessary measures to establish  jurisdiction over offences in these instances. Regarding alleged offenders, the convention  provides the provision for air transport cooperation organisation or international agencies subject to international registration, continuation of the journey by the passengers, crew, and aircraft; assistance between states to facilitate criminal proceedings, and reports to the council.78 77

 Attempts At Ensuring Peace And Security In International Aviation, R.I.R. Abeyratne  Fitz Gerald, Towards Legal Suppression Of Acts Against Civil Aviation: International Conciliation No. 585 (November 1971) P. 75. 78

The Montreal convention (the "Sabotage Convention") covers offences against civil aircraft other than hijacking an aircraft in flights and in particular: 1. Violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight, likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft, 2. Destroying or causing damage to an aircraft in service, 3. Placing explosive devices on an aircraft in service, 4. Destroying or damaging air navigation facilities or interfering with their operation; and 5. Bomb hoax extortion and similar acts. Montreal convention applies only if an international element is involved, namely if the place of takeoff or landing is located outside the territory of the state of registry or the offence is com- mitted in the territory of a state other than the state of the aircrafts registry. The convention also applies if the offender is found in the territory of a non-registry state. As far as destruction or damaging air navigation facilities is concerned, convention applies only if international facilities are the target of the offender. Each signatory country undertakes to establish its jurisdiction over the offences covered by the convention. Such jurisdiction is exercised when an offence is committed in a country‘s territo ry or against on board an aircraft registered in that country or when the aircraft on which the offence is committed lands in its territory with the offender still on board; and if the offence is committed against or on boards an aircraft leased by contracting state without crew to a lessee who has his  principal place of business or permanent residence in that State. ―Generally speaking, the provisions of the Montreal convention regarding the taking into

custody of alleged offenders and their extradition and prosecution follow the rules of Hague Air Hijacking convention of 1970, suffering from the same weakness of enforcement  provisions at that convention. Attempts to institute together and more far-reaching international legal obligations in the matter of aircraft offences, covered by the Montreal convention, have so far proved unsuccessful.‖ 79

5.2THE BONN DECLARATION (1978):

‗Bonn Economic Summit was held on July 16 -17, 1978. The heads of States and

Governments of U.S.A., U.K., Canada, France, West Germany, Italy and Japan participated in it. The participant countries had reached consensus on countering acts of terrorism involved in aircraft hijacking. The communiqué declared that when a country refuses the extradition or prosecution of "those who have hijacked an aircraft and/or does not return such aircraft", their governments will take action to cease all flights to that country. The  participant countries in addition to expressing concern over lacuna in the law and the legal  processes, they extend to the policy factors; the claim relating to States that support terrorism or those that give asylum to persons and groups involved in air- craft offences. They called 79

 Attempts At Ensuring Peace And Security In International Aviation, R.I.R. Abeyratne

for cooperation and consultation, essential steps in moving towards shaping law to be enforced. Shortly after Bonn Summit U.S. declared "a major advance in its efforts to combat aircraft skyjacking" and noting that the seven summit participants are the major aviation  powers of the free world, their airlines carry two thirds of the free world passengers. U.S. stated as host government for the summit meeting the German Government had convened a meeting of experts in Bonn to develop scientific procedure under the initiative of Bonn declaration to deter air hijacking.80 5.3LONDON SUMMIT:

‗On June 7-9, 1984 the heads of the NATO states raised the question of gaps in the law with

regard to regulating the conduct of terrorists. The communiqué issued at the close of that conference declared that while hijacking and kidnapping had declined since declaration of  previous Economic Summit at Bonn (1978), Venice (1980) and Ottawa (1981), the signatories expressed their resolve to counter "by every possible means, the problem of international terrorism and its techniques developed sometimes in association with traffic in drugs." They viewed with serious concern the increasing involvement of states and governments in the acts of terrorism, including the abuse of diplomatic immunity; security by each country of gaps in its national legislation which might be exploited by terrorists; action  by each country to review the sale of weapons in states supporting terrorism, consultation as for as possible, cooperation over the expulsion or exclusion from their countries of known terrorist including persons of diplomatic status involved in terrorism.41 The three international conventions and the efforts of the United Nations convinced most of the nations to legislate anti- hijacking laws. The penal laws have also been amended by the countries to  provide punitive punishments to the hijackers. Consequently, India also enacted: (1) Antihijacking Act 1982, to give effect to the provisions of Hague Convention; (2) The Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Civil Aviation Act 1982 to give effect to Montreal Convention. The Indian Government had also been the victim of aerial hijacking. The first Indian aircraft, a Fokker Friendship named 'Ganga of Indian Airlines was hijacked  by two Pakistanis, Hashim Qureshi and Altaf Qureshi from Srinagar to Lahore on January 30, 1971 and was watched by the millions of Television viewers, as it was blown up mercifully after the 30 passengers and crew had been released. After that an Air India Jumbo was hijacked on December 24, 1974, while flying over Rome in Europe, a Boeing 737 scheduled from Bombay to Delhi via Jaipur was forced to head for Lahore on September 10, 1976. Fortunately the Pakistani authorities returned the aircraft with crew unharmed. The Punjab militants who hijacked the Delhi-Amritsar- Srinagar flight to Lahore on September 29, 1981, are till remaining lodged in Pakistani Jail. An Air India Boeing 707 was commandeered from Seychelles to Durban where it was released by the South African authorities. On June 23, 1985 an Air India Jumbo Jet 747, 'Kanishka* exploded in the air with 329 people on board of the South West Coast of Ireland, it bears all the hallmarks of pre-planned sabotage. The inquiry by Justice Kirpal Singh could not succeed in providing punishment to the saboteurs. 80

 International Conventions On Aerial Hijacking: An Approach To Combat Terrorism, R. S. Rajput

The aircraft hijacking has become the most serious problem for the travellers, and they do not feel safe on the international flights. To curb this menace a few suggestions have been given  by the ICAO at its Regional Seminar at Carcus. 1. The national civil aviation authorities should implement security system, based on the standards and recommended practices, procedures for air navigation services and guidance material developed by ICAO. 2. The respective national administration should adopt regulations to strengthen effective security system, if they have not done so they should adopt within suitable legal framework of civil aviation security. 81

5.4 PROTOCOL TO THE MONTREAL CONVENTION (1988):

A protocol supplementary to the Montreal convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971) was adopted on February 24, 1988 by the International Conference on Air held at Montreal Headquarters of the ICAO. The Protocol came in force on August 6, 1989. The Protocol stipulated severe penalties for unlawful international acts of violence against person at an airport serving international civil aviation which causes or is likely to cause serious injury or death or destruction or serious damages to the facilities or disruption if services at such airport. Severe penalties are also foreseen for an attempt or complicity in the commission of such offence. Parties to the protocol would be expected to establish their own jurisdiction over the offence not only if the offence is committed in their territory but also when the alleged offence is present in their territory and the offence is present in their territory and the offence was committed elsewhere. They would have the choice either to extradite the offender to the state where the act was committed or to  present the case to their own authorities for the purposes of prosecution. 5.5 CONVENTION ON THE MARKING OF PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETECTION (1991): Background: In December 1988, Pan American flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie,

Scotland. To prevent future explosions onboard aircraft, the ICAO Council passed a resolution urging its Member States to expedite current research and development on detection of explosives and on security equipment during its regular session meeting in February 1989. Also deeply concerned about preventing terrorist bombing of aircraft, the UN Security Council (SC) met on 14 June 1989 to discuss the marking of plastic or sheet explosives for the purpose of detection. On the same day, the SC unanimously adopted Resolution 635 condemning all acts of unlawful interference against the security of civil aviation and calling on Member States to co-operate in devising and implementing measures to prevent all acts of terrorism, including those involving explosives. The SC urged the ICAO to intensify its work 81

 International Conventions On Aerial Hijacking: An Approach To Combat Terrorism, R. S. Rajput

to prevent all acts of terrorism against international civil aviation, and in particular its work on devising an international regime for the marking of plastic or sheet explosives for the  purpose of detection. Also in June, the ICAO Council decided to include preparation of a new legal instrument regarding the marking of explosives for detect ability as a priority in the general work program of the Legal Committee. From 9-19 January 1990, the ICAO Sub-Committee for the Preparation of a New Legal Instrument Regarding the Marking of Plastic Explosives for Detectability met in Montreal, Canada and drafted a new international agreement to ensure that plastic explosives were marked with an additive to enhance their Detectability. The ICAO Legal Committee considered this draft during its 27th session, which met from 27 March-12 April. This meeting resulted in a final text of six articles for a draft convention. From 12 February-1 March 1991, the International Conference on Air Law met in Montreal to consider the draft articles prepared by the ICAO Legal Committee in 1990. The Conference adopted the Convention by consensus and without a vote. By the end of the year, 45 States had signed the Convention and one State had submitted an instrument of approval. Obligations: This Convention calls on States Parties to take the necessary and effective

measures to prohibit and prevent the manufacture of unmarked explosives in their territories, to prevent the movement of such explosives into or out of their territory, to exercise strict control over the possession and transfer of unmarked explosives made or imported prior to the entry into force of the Convention, to ensure that all stocks not held by the military or  police are destroyed or consumed, marked, or rendered permanently ineffective within three years of the Convention‘s entry into force, with respect to a State, and to ensure the timely

destruction of any unmarked explosives manufactured after the entry into force of the Convention for that State. States Parties agree to mark plastic explosives with a chemical agent that can be detected by commercially available vapour or particle trace detectors and/or canines. There are four such chemical agents identified in the Convention. All plastic explosives have to be marked by the manufacturers with any one of four ‗detection agents‘ agreed upon by the conference. The convention also provided that within three years, plastic explosive stock not specifically held for military or police functions are to be destroyed, used or rendered ineffective. Those for military or police functions are to be similarly disposed of within 15 years. Compliance and Enforcement: The Convention establishes an International Explosives

Technical Commission composed of members appointed by the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (based on nominations of States Parties to the Convention). The  parameters for membership allow between 15 and 19 experts with direct experience in matters relating to the manufacture, detection of, or research in explosives. Members will serve three-year renewable terms. Sessions of the Commission shall be convened at least once a year at the ICAO Head-quarters or as directed or approved by the ICAO Council. The Commission is tasked with evaluating technical developments relating to the manufacture, marking, and detection of explosives, reporting findings to the States Parties and international organizations involved, and making recommendations for amendments to the Technical

Annex to the Convention. Under Article 13, States are requested to declare whether they are  producer States when depositing their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. 82 Though they were successful in containing to some extent the aircraft hijacking but the act of hijacking has not been suppressed altogether. It was submitted that in order to suppress hijacking first and immediate task before those states which have not yet become parties to the above conventions is to ratify or accede to the conventions. Secondly, suggestion for the creation of the International Court of Criminal Justice or an International Tribunal 83 was also given. Such a court is likely to defend the interests of all the people and nations. Thirdly, cooperation amongst the states is of foremost important aspect in curbing the air hijacking. Cooperation is required in returning the aircraft, crew and passengers as soon as possible and in  providing facilities and assistance in resuming the air flight without causing much delay. Fourthly, the principle of prosecution or extradition is required to be strictly followed. In case of prosecution, punishment is required to be serious and a wide publicity should be given so that it may have deterrent effect. Fifthly, security system at national airports must be made more effective. The security system may include careful checking of passenger‘s lists, the

magnetometer 84 to detect weapons, armed guards, armed flight crew, non-access to the flight deck and concealed trap door on the threshold of the crew door over which the hijacker might  be maneuvered. 5.6 CONVENTION ON THE SUPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION OR BEIJING CONVENTION 2010: 85

Introduction

On September 10, 2010, the Diplomatic Conference on Aviation Security, organized under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization ("ICAO"), adopted two new aviation counter-terrorism instruments — the Beijing Convention, replacing the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation 1971 (known as the ―Montreal Convention‖), and the Beijing Protocol, amending the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970 (known as the ―Hague Convention‖). 86 The

new instruments update the existing conventions in light of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and developments in counter-terrorism law over recent decades. The Beijing Convention provides for key new offenses of using an aircraft as a weapon (such as occurred on September 11), using weapons of mass destruction or dangerous substances against, on, or from an aircraft, and transporting dangerous materials. The instruments also provide for new ancillary offenses, expanded jurisdiction, and strengthened extradition and mutual assistance regimes. These developments aim to ensure that a wider range of perpetrators can be brought to justice in aviation-related terrorist or proliferation activities than is currently possible. The 82

Also See, www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/conventions/Conv10.pdf  Proposal was made by the former Secretary-General of the United Nations U Thant on September 14, 1970 for the trial of hijackers by an International Tribunal. 84  Also See, http://www.securitymanagement.com/article/new-views-airport-screening-004586?page=0%2C1 85  September 11 Inspired Aviation Counter-terrorism Convention and Protocol Adopted, Damien van der Toorn 86  These instruments are available at www.icao.int/DCAS2010. 83

instruments are part of a series of UN conventions aimed at combating international terrorism. This  Insight  provides background on the development of these new instruments and describes their key provisions. Impetus and Process for Review of the Montreal and Hague Conventions

The proposals before the Diplomatic Conference were developed through a review of the Montreal and Hague Conventions in a series of ICAO meetings commencing in 2007 and involving key states. The review was sparked by the September 11 attacks. It concluded that the existing international regime did not cover notable aspects of these attacks  — for instance, the use of an aircraft to cause death and destruction; other types of foreseeable terrorist acts, such as the use of weapons of mass destruction onboard, from, or against aircraft; and ancillary offenses, such as organizing or conspiring to commit such offenses. Delegations also proposed to update the Conventions to take into account developments in international criminal and counter-terrorism law since the 1970s — for instance, to exclude the activities of armed forces from the Conventions‘ scope, to add jurisdictional grounds, and to

insert extradition safeguards. During these preparatory meetings, Australia, supported by several other states, proposed that the transport of weapons of mass destruction and other dangerous materials by civil aircraft be criminalized. Several states also suggested that  providing assistance to fugitives following the commission of an offense is criminalized. These proposals were referred to the Diplomatic Conference. Negotiation of the Amendments to the Montreal and Hague Conventions

Seventy-one states attended the Diplomatic Conference. 87 The negotiations focused on issues that had been most controversial in the preparatory ICAO sessions: inclusion of a transport of dangerous materials offense and addition of a provision excluding the activities of armed forces in armed conflicts from the scope of the Conventions. Other key issues were the inclusion of an offense criminalizing assistance to fugitives and the form of the new instruments. Several of these issues were referred to working groups. In the transport-ofdangerous-materials working group, the African group and India raised concerns relating to the need to preserve rights under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 88 ("NPT"). After extensive discussions, the working group developed a compromise text attempting to balance the concerns of its major members. India still objected, arguing that it considered the text discriminatory against non-parties to the NPT. The activities-of-armed-forces working group was unable to reach a compromise. The majority of states in this group focused on exempting the activities of armed forces from the scope of the Conventions in favour of international humanitarian law ("IHL"), which would instead govern the conduct of armed forces during armed conflict. However, the Middle East 87

See Diplomatic Conference on Aviation Security, Aug. 30-Sept. 10, 2010,  Final Act of the International Conference on Air Law (Sept. 10, 2010), available at,

http://www.icao.int/DCAS2010 /restr/docs/beijing_final_act_multi.pdf. 88

 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.

group argued that both the Conventions and IHL should apply to this type of conduct. These differing views could not be reconciled. The Middle East group continually blocked consensus on this issue when it was returned to the Conference. The assistance-to-fugitives working group quickly reached a compromise provision, later unanimously accepted by the majority. Meanwhile, the plenary debated the form of the instruments, with no consensus. After wrapping up the working groups, the Chairman then proposed an overall compromise to the Conference, including new principal offenses (e.g., the transport offense), an exemption for the activities of armed forces, and a new Beijing Convention to replace the amended Montreal Convention. The Middle East group, India, and Pakistan opposed this  proposal. The matter proceeded to a vote, where the requisite majority adopted the instruments. Overview of the Amendments to the Montreal and Hague Conventions

 New Principal Offenses

The Beijing Convention includes several new principal offenses. The first criminalizes the use of a civil aircraft to cause death, serious bodily injury, or serious damage to property or the environment. 89 In other words, using aircraft as a weapon is now a specific offense. This would cover such conduct as flying an aircraft into a building as occurred in the September 11 attacks. The second new offense criminalizes the releasing or discharging from a civil aircraft any biological, chemical, or nuclear ("BCN") weapon or explosive, radioactive or similar substances in a manner that is likely to cause death, serious bodily injury, or serious damage to property or the environment. 90 The third new offense is similar to the second, but specifically criminalizes the use of the same dangerous items against or on board a civil aircraft. In this scenario, the target is the actual aircraft and the persons on board, rather than anything outside the aircraft. This is a situation that has occurred with some frequency over the recent years. 91  A major development is the inclusion of a provision criminalizing the transport of dangerous materials — such as explosive or radioactive material, a BCN weapon, or source or special fissionable material — if proof is shown of specific mental elements in relation to the transport of each type of dangerous material. For instance, the provision makes an individual liable under this offense if the person transported the explosive or radioactive materials knowing  they will be used for a terrorist purpose, or if the person transported source or special fissionable material knowing that they will be used in a nuclear explosive activity. These requirements restrict the scope of the offenses to cover only transport connected with illicit proliferation or terrorism. The changes also preserve the rights of states parties to the

89

 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Related to International Civil Aviation art. 1(1)(f), Sept. 10, 2010, available at http://www.icao.int/DCAS2010/restr/docs/beijing_convention_multi.pdf [hereinafter Beijing Convention]. 90  Id. Art. 1(1)(g), September 11 Inspired Aviation Counter-terrorism Convention and Protocol Adopted, Damien van der Toorn 91 See, e.g ., Anahad O‘Connor &  Eric Schmitt, Terror Attempt Seen as Man Tries to Ignite Device on Jet , N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2009, available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/26/us/26plane.html (discussing the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on December 25, 2009).

 NPT, ensuring that state officials are not prosecuted for transporting nuclear materials as  permitted by the NPT. 92 For those not party to the NPT, the offense will apply, except that transport of source or special fissionable material is permitted if done pursuant to a ―safeguards agreement‖

concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency. This includes comprehensive, as well as voluntary or facility-specific, safeguards agreements. The rationale for the transport offense is to deter and punish movement of materials of proliferation around the world by air into the hands of state or non-state actors in circumstances that would pose a threat to international peace and security. The offense parallels a similar transport offense contained in the 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts. 93 Accordingly, transportation of these materials by sea or air is now an international criminal offense subject to the extradition or prosecution requirements of the Convention.  New Ancillary and Inchoate Offenses

The Beijing Convention and Protocol include several new ancillary and inchoate offenses. They provide that it is an offense to directly or indirectly threaten to commit one or more of the principal offenses, 94 or to organize or direct the commission of an offense. 95  These  provisions are meant to harmonize recent UN counter-terrorism conventions. In addition, the instruments include a ―fugitives offense‖ which criminalizes any assistance to persons

evading investigation, prosecution, or punishment, knowing that he or she has committed one of the offenses or is wanted for prosecution or to serve a sentence. 96 This crime is akin to an ―accessory after the fact‖ offense known to many common law jurisdictions and will help

restrict the movement of those seeking to flee states where they may face prosecution. The instruments also incorporat e a ―conspiracy‖ or ―association de malfaiteurs‖ offense which criminalizes the planning of an offense in conjunction with others 97 — reflecting both the common law and civil law traditions. This is the first time a UN counter-terrorism convention has included such a provision. It is designed to allow enforcement officers to apprehend and  prosecute offenders before terrorist attacks can be carried out.  Expanded Jurisdiction

Both the Beijing Convention and Protocol include nationality of the offender as a mandatory ground for jurisdiction for states parties. 98 This will help to expand the extra-territorial scope of the instruments and ensure that a greater number of states parties will have jurisdiction to

92

 Beijing Convention, supra note 4, arts. 1(1)(i), and 7.  Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation art. 3, opened for signature Oct. 14, 2005, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/21 (entered into force July 28, 2010). 94  Beijing Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(3); Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft art. 1(2), Sept. 10, 2010, available at http://www.icao.int/DCAS2010/restr/docs/beijing_protocol_multi.pdf [hereinafter Beijing Protocol]. 95  Beijing Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(4)(b); Beijing Protocol,  supra note 9, art. 1(3)(b). 96  Beijing Convention, supra note 4, art.1(4)(d); Beijing Protocol,  supra note 9, art. 1(3)(d). 97  Beijing Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(5); Beijing Protocol,  supra note 9, art. 1(4). 98  Beijing Convention, supra note 4, art. 8(1)(e); Beijing Protocol,  supra note 9, art. 4(1)(e). 93

 prosecute or extradite known offenders. The instruments also include optional jurisdiction on the basis of nationality of the victims of offenses. 99  Activities of Armed Forces

The Beijing Convention and Protocol exclude from their scope the activities of armed forces during an armed conflict. 100  This provision was the most controversial aspect of the negotiations. Essentially, it means that members of armed forces cannot be prosecuted if they undertake an act that would amount to an offense under the instruments. For example, the use of a bomb against a civil airliner by military forces during an armed conflict could not be  prosecuted under the Beijing Convention. However, if this conduct amounted to a violation of IHL (because it was not a legitimate military objective), then it could be prosecuted under that body of law.  Extradition Safeguards

The instruments include new provisions aimed at supporting extradition and mutual legal assistance obligations. In particular, none of the offenses can be considered a ―political 101 offense‖ in order to avoid these obligations.   However, no state may be compelled to

extradite a person or provide mutual legal assistance if there are substantial grounds to  believe that it would lead to prosecution on discriminatory grounds. 102  Entry into Force

The Beijing Convention and Protocol will enter into force two months after the twenty second ratification.103 Implications

The adoption of the Beijing Convention and Protocol is a significant development in international counter-terrorism and aviation law. The new principal offenses combined with the ancillary offenses, expanded jurisdiction, and strengthened extradition and mutual assistance regimes will help to ensure that a range of individuals can be brought to justice for their role in terrorist or proliferation activities — including those who participate before, during, and after such acts. If the instruments are widely accepted, they can help prevent a repetition of the September 11 attacks.

6. SOME CASES OR INCIDENTS OF HIJACKINGS:   El El Al F li ght 426 (1968): 

Al Airlines, based in Israel, has always been a target for  prospective hijackers. For that reason, it has taken thorough measures in recent decades to ensure passenger safety, and as a result, it‘s one of the safest airlines around. Its biggest 99

 Beijing Convention, supra note 4, art. 8(2)(a); Beijing Protocol,  supra note 9, art. 4(2)(a).  Beijing Convention, supra note 4, art. 6; Beijing Protocol,  supra note 9, art. 3bis. 101  Beijing Convention, supra note 4, art. 13; Beijing Protocol,  supra note 9, art. 8bis. 102  Beijing Convention, supra note 4, art. 14; Beijing Protocol,  supra note 9, art. 8ter. 103  Beijing Convention, supra note 4, art. 22; Beijing Protocol,  supra note 9, art. XXIII. 100

 blemish, one that changed its procedures for the better, occurred when Flight 426 was commandeered by three members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Initially travelling from London to Rome, the plane was diverted to Algiers, where war had  been declared on Israel a year earlier. All Non-Israeli passengers were released, leaving 12 Israeli passengers —   10 women and children were released at the end of the week  —   and the crew of 10. It took 40 days of negotiations to reach an agreement, and everyone  —  including the hijackers were freed. A conflict between Israel and Algiers could‘ve resulted without a

resolution.  Dawson’s Field Hijackings (1970):  In a single day, four planes were simultaneously seized  by the PFLP gunmen, who forced two to fly to Dawson‘s Field in the Jordanian desert. All

310 passengers were freed, but Jewish passengers and the flight crews consisting of 56 members were kept behind. Expecting a hostile effort to free the hostages, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) blew up the empty planes, demanding the release of the body of Patrick Arguello and the detained Leila Khaled, both of whom failed in their attempt to hijack El Al Flight 219. Conditions were met, and a conflict ensued between Hashemite King Hussein of Jordan and Palestinians known as Black September. Air F rance F li ght 139 (1976): Six years after the Dawson‘s Field incident, two members of

the PFLP and two members of German Revolutionary Cells took control of Air France Flight 139 en route from Athens to Paris and diverted it to Benghazi, Libya. After releasing a female hostage who was pretending to have a miscarriage, the 247 remaining passengers and crew of 12 were taken to Entebbe Airport in Uganda, where four more hijackers joined the effort. Demanding the release of 40 Palestinians detained in Israel and 13 in other countries, they threatened to kill hostages if they were ignored. Operation Entebbe followed, as 100 elite commandos from Israel travelled to the site and stormed the scene amid a haze of gunfire to rescue the hostages. When the smoke cleared, three passengers, an Israeli commando and 45 Ugandan soldiers were killed. One passenger who was at the hospital was later murdered. Overall, 105 passengers were saved. L uf thansa Fl ight 181 (1977):   Destined

from Palma de Mallorca to Frankfurt Lufthansa with 86 passengers and five crew members aboard, Lufthansa Flight 181 was hijacked in midair  by four militant Palestinians —  members of the PFLP  —  who called themselves "Commando Martyr Halime." One invaded the cockpit with a pistol and demanded the flight to Larnaca, Cyprus, but it was diverted to Rome due to insufficient fuel. After travelling to Cyprus, Bahrain, Dubai and Aden, it settled in Mogadishu, and Operation Feuerzauber, primarily undertaken by West German counter-terrorism group GSG 9, resulted in a hostile raid of the  plane and the killing of two hijackers and the injuring of the others, one of whom was mortally wounded. All 86 passengers survived. M alaysia Ai rl in es F li ght 653 (1977):   The

hijacking of Malaysia Airlines Flight 653 remains a mystery more than three decades later. Not long after departing Penang for Kuala Lumpur, Captain G.K. Ganjoor reported an "unidentified hijacker" was aboard and later reported they were "proceeding to Singapore." Eventually all communication was lost, and the plane crashed in Kampong Ladang, Tanjong Kupang, killing all seven crew members and 93  passengers, including Malaysian Public Works Department Head Dato‘ Mahfuz Khalid,

Malaysian Agricultural M inister Dato‘ Ali Haji Ahmadand, and Cuban Ambassador to Japan Mario Garcia. Some suspected that a member of the Japanese Red Army was to blame, though no evidence exists to prove it. TWA F li ght 847 (1985):    Six

members of Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad were responsible for the infamous two-week ordeal involving TWA Flight 847. En route from Athens to Rome, the plane was overtaken just after takeoff and diverted to Beirut, where 19 passengers were released, and Algiers, where 20 passengers were released. The plane returned to Beirut, and the hijackers proceeded to single out United States Navy Seabee diver Robert Stethem, beat him, fatally shoot him and dump his body onto the ramp. Seven American passengers with Jewish-sounding names were removed from the plane and held hostage elsewhere in Beirut. The plane travelled back to Algiers, released 65 passengers, and returned to Beirut. The hijackers made several demands, including the release of the "Kuwait 17" involved in the 1983 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kuwait and international condemnation of the U.S. and Israel. Eventually, the 40 remaining hostages were released and nobody else was harmed. EgyptAi r F li ght 648 (1985): Remembered as one of the world‘s bloodiest and scariest plane

hijackings, the events aboard EgyptAir Flight 648 will forever serve as a reminder of how not to deal with terrorists. After three Palestinian members of the Abu Nidal Organization took control of the plane destined from Athens to Cairo, an Egyptian Security Service member opened fire, killing one of the hijackers. In return, he was shot dozens of times and killed. As a result of the exchange of bullets, the fuselage of the plane was punctured, and the pilot was forced to descend so that everyone on board could breathe. Low on fuel, the plane landed in Malta against the wishes of Maltese authorities, and a stand-off commenced. Eleven  passengers and two injured flight attendants were released, but Maltese Prime Minister Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici‘s hard -line approach resulted in the execution of two American  passengers. Egyptian commandos later stormed the plane, causing a chaotic, fiery scene  —  from either the explosives from the commandos or grenades from the terrorists  —   in which 56 of the 88 remaining passengers were killed. Sixty of the 92 passengers initially on board were killed. Pan Am F li ght 73 (1986):    While

preparing to depart for Frankfurt from Karachi, Pakistan, four members of the Abu Nidal Organization, dressed as Karachi airport security guards, hijacked Pan Am Flight 73. The crew immediately escaped through an overhead hatch in the cockpit, grounding the plane. In response, an Indian-American passenger was executed after demands that the crew return to the plane weren‘t met. Later, as the plane sat in darkness

without power and Pakistani authorities prepared to storm in, a grenade was tossed and random shooting began. In the end, 20 passengers will killed, but many escaped due in part to the heroics of 22-year-old flight purser Neerja Bhanot, who helped them off the plane and shielded three children from bullets.   Air I raqi Ai r ways F li ght 163 (1986): 

safety was a major concern in the Middle East in the mid-1980s, as deadly hijackings were becoming more common  —   see the previous three  paragraphs. Iraqi Airways Flight 163, travelling from Baghdad to Amman with 91 passengers and 15 crew members, was taken by four men affiliated with Hezbollah. Security personnel immediately attempted to neutralize them, but they responded by detonating grenades in the

 passenger cabin and cockpit, causing the plane to crash near Arar, Saudi Arabia. Sixty  passengers and three crew members died. Ethi opian Ai rl in es F li ght 961 (1996):   Captured on camera by

a South African honeymooner on a beach in the Comoros Islands, the video of the descent and crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 961 stunned the world. It was hijacked by three nervous and disorganized Ethiopians who were seeking political asylum in Australia. Knowing he didn‘t have enough fuel to make

such a trip, Captain Leul Abate travelled toward the Comoros Islands, hoping to find an available runway. When both engines failed, he was unable to locate Prince Said Ibrahim International Airport and was forced to ditch in shallow waters. Numerous residents and tourists swam to the aid of the passengers. Even still, the ordeal was costly, as 122 of the 172  passengers and crew members died. Northwest Orient Airlines Flight 305:    In

what would become the only still unsolved hijacking case in US history, on November 24, 1971 the now famous DB Cooper hijacked a  Northwest Orient Airlines flight, a Boeing 727-100 which was flying from Portland, OR to Seattle WA. The hijacker checked i n as ―Dale Cooper,‖ paying cash for his ticket. He  boarded the airplane and hijacked it. When the first news wire reporter from the Washington area picked up on the unfolding hijacking over police radio, he asked if the police had a name for a suspect. In fact, they did. The police had interviewed the man who sold Cooper the ticket and asked him if any of the passengers looked suspicious. Without hesitating, the airline employee responded  –  ―yes, Dale Cooper.‖ The police told the news reporter the suspect‘s name was ―D. Cooper‖. The reporter asked if that was a ―D or a B?‖ The person responded, ―Yes.‖ And thus the legend of ―DB Cooper‖ was born.

On board the plane, shortly after takeoff, Cooper claimed to have a bomb in his briefcase and, showing it to an airline stewardess, it sure looked convincing with red sticks that may or may not have been dynamite, and a battery and lots of wire. The pilots took the threat seriously and the owner of the airline agreed to Cooper‘s demands –  $200,000 cash, any denomination, in a satchel, plus two front and two rear parachutes (plus food for the flight crew). This was to be delivered to the plane when it landed and was refuelled. Marked $20 bills were loaded into a satchel and handed over to the stewardess who delivered the money to Cooper. The entire time Cooper remained mostly calm and congenial at the rear of the plane. At no time did he harm anyone on board. Everyone but the flight crew and the stewardess were allowed to leave the plane. Cooper gave orders for the plane to take off and fly south towards Reno at no more than 10,000 feet and with the hydraulically operated rear staircase lowered and extended. The plane could not take off with the rear staircase deployed so Cooper allowed the flight crew to take off with it raised and secured. Somewhere over the woods of Oregon/Washington, Cooper opened the rear staircase and jumped out with his parachutes and cash  –   the cash strapped to his chest with the cords of one of the parachutes. It was dark and though other planes were trying to tail the hijacked plane, no one actually saw Cooper jump. Cooper had forced the flight crew to stay forward behind the drawn first class curtain so they too did not see Cooper jump. Therefore, no one could say the exact time Cooper bailed out. The best estimate was he

 jumped at 8:13PM but given the many changes in the flights air speed, the bad weather, and other factors, the search area for Cooper was huge, well over a hundred square miles of some of the most inaccessible and rugged terrain in the continental United States. The search turned up no trace of Cooper or the money. In February 1980, an eight year-old boy named Brian Ingram, vacationing with his family on the Columbia River about 9 miles downstream from Vancouver, Washington uncovered three  packets of the ransom cash, significantly disintegrated but still bundled in rubber bands. FBI technicians confirmed that the money was indeed a portion of the ransom. The boy and his family sue to get the money they found and the judge rewards them half of it. Later, needing alimony money, a now grown Brian sells some of the Cooper loot to raise needed funds. No other traces of Cooper have so far been found. Did he survive the jump? Some believe he did. Later tests by the FBI demonstrated that it was possible to jump from the rear staircase platform of a 727 and survive. Others believe he  jumped out of the plane at a different point than the FBI originally calculated and landed in the Columbia River and drowned. There, some of the money washed up on the beach where young Brian discovered it. Others believe Cooper lost the money in midair or landed with it and stashed it in the ground. Later, rain carried the money down creeks that flow into the river. But whatever his fate, DB Cooper became an American folk hero. This flight was travelling from Canada to India on the 23 June 1985. While this airline was flying over the Atlantic Ocean, the air plane got blown up by a secretly  planted bomb in the airline, leading to the flight go straight crashing into the Atlantic Ocean. This incident remains one of the most impactful and dangerous air plane hijacking in the Canadian history as a totally number of 329 people were killed, all the passengers comprising of 280 Canadians, 22 Indians and about 27 British population. When this air hijack took  place, not much was known of the reason and cause behind this accident. But after almost 20 years of investigation, it was apparently claimed that this hijack terrorism was done by a Sikh group staying in Canada. Air I ndia Flight 182:

Destru ction of Pan American and UTA F li ghts:

Destruction of the two civilian aircrafts- Pan American flight on December 21, 1988 and the Union Transport Aeriens (UTA) flight on September 12, 1989 are two incidents that shook the world. While 270 persons were killed in the Pan American flight which exploded over Lockerbie (Scotland), on December 21, 1988, 170 persons died in UTA explosions in Niger on September 19, 1989. Persons responsible for the destruction of the above were suspected to be Libyans. The Security Council unanimously condemned the destruction of the two civilian aircrafts and the resultant loss of life. The council requested the Libyan government to co-operate fully in establishing responsibility for the terrorist acts that led to the

destruction of the aircrafts. Libya was urged immediately to provide a full and effective response to those requests so as to constitute to the elimination of international terrorism. 104 When the Libyan government did not respond to the request for co-operation in establishing responsibility for those terrorist acts, the Security Council on March 31, 1992 imposed aerial embargo against Libya 105 under Article 41 of the U.N. Charter which became effective from April 15, 1992. The Council also decided to establish a committee consisting of all the members of the council to consider and decide on any application by states for approval of the flights on grounds of significant humanitarian needs. 106  Member states were asked to report to the Secretary-General by May 15, 1992 on measures instituted by them to meet their obligations under the resolution. The Council decided that it would review the sanction every 120 days or sooner should the situation so requires. The above action of the Security Council got a favourable response from Libya. On May, 1992 Libya informed the Secretary-General 107  that it accepted Resolution 731 and decided that it ‗definitely renounces all forms of international terrorism of whatever origin‘. Libya

also told the Secretary-General that it would undertake to deport from its territory any person who was proved to be involved in terrorist act. 108 When Libya did not co-operate with the authorities in establishing responsibility, the Security Council on November 11, 1993 imposed new sanctions against Libya, widening the air and arms embargo 109 which came into force from December 1, 1993. However, when the Secretary-General informed the Council that the two Libyan suspects arrived in Netherlands to stand Trial under Scottish Law and when the Libyan Government satisfied the French authorities investigating the 1989 bombing of UTA Flight 772, the Security Council on April 5, 1999 suspended the sanction imposed against Libya. The Scottish Court on January 31, 2001 while convicted Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi of murder, another Libyan, Lamen Khalifa Fhimah was found innocent and was acquitted. Both decisions were unanimous. 7. AIRCRAFT HIJACKING AND INDIA: India is a party to the three conventions, namely Tokyo Convention, The Hague Convention and The Montreal Convention. In order to give order to the conventions, enabling legislatures have been enacted by the parliament which is as follows:

104

 Security Council Resolution 731 (1992), January 21, 1992.  Security Council Resolution 748 (1992), dated March 31, 1992. 106  The Committee was established on April 25, 1992 to handle issues relating to the implementation of sanctions against Libya. 107  S/23918. 108  S/23917. 109  Security Council Resolution 883 (1993) Dated November 11, 1993. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 11 to none with 4 abstentions. 105