Air Power UAVs: UA Vs: The Wider Context Edited by Owen Barnes
WWII V1 flying bomb being rolled out by German crew
RAF Reaper UAV at Kandahar Airfield in Afghanistan
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UAVs: UA Vs: The Wider Context CONTENTS
Foreword
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Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy Torpy Introduction and Glossary
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Air Cdre Neville Parton The Development of UAVs and UCAVs: The Early Years
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Dr Christina J. M. Goulter Unmanned Aerial Veh Vehicle icle Operations since the 1980s
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Dr David Jordan & Ben Wilkins Unmanned Aerial Veh Vehicles icles in the Royal Air Force - 2047
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Wg Cdr Richard M. McMahon Unmanned Aerial Veh Vehicles icles – The Legal Perspective
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Wg Cdr Allison Mardell Unmanned Aerial Veh Vehicles icles – Cultural Issues
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Mr Seb Cox The Strategic Impact of Unmanned Aerial Ve Vehicles hicles
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Prof Philip Sabin Unmanned Aerial Veh Vehicles icles – Progress and Challenge
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AVM Prof R A Mason
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UAVs: UA Vs: The Wider Context
UNMANNED AIR VEHICLES : THE WIDER CONTEXT
Foreword by CAS
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he huge growth in the variety o Uninhabited Air Vehicles (UAVs) and their increasing importance in the contemporary operating environment representt one o the most signicant and dramatic advances in air power represen capability over the past decade. Whilst the hard-edged technology o UAVs UAVs has been considered in great depth in many publications, conerences conerences and seminars, the ‘soter’ issues, which in many ways are equally problematic, have been much less widely debated; the surprising richness o the historical record o UAV UAV use is also little known. Consequently Consequently,, I challenged the assembled academic experts at this Chie o the Air Sta’ Sta ’s Workshop Workshop to explore these areas in more detail, to develop our understanding o UAVs UAVs within a much broader context. Historically, the development o UAVs has been marked by sporadic periods o very rapid technological advances, usually to provide solutions to particular problems during specic conicts, punctuated by long spells o stagnation and a return to a reliance on manned aircrat between wars. wars. This process has been been cyclical, and the wheel oten needed to be reinven reinvented, ted, as previous experience was orgotten or disregarded. disregarded. While this may have been acceptable acceptable in an age o cheap, expendable and relatively relatively low-capability platorms, this is no longer always the case; current UAVs UAVs may still be small and virtually vir tually disposable, but can also be large, highly complex and capable, with a commensurate pricetag. As airmen, we thereore need to take a much longer-term longer- term view o UAV UAV procurement and employment, and accept that they will remain a permanent eature in the order o battle o any capable, modern air orce. orce. UAVs have orced us to rethink some o the basic tenets o air power. Traditionally, the ‘impermanence’ o air platorms has been a real limitation and while UAVs do not yet have the capability to stay alot indenitely, this capability may be on the horizon. Even with current platorms, platorms, ‘virtual permanence’ over signicant areas o the battlespace is possible, given the right planning. The legal and ethical perspectives and constraints constraints associated with UAVs UAVs must also be ully understood, i their employment is not to be unduly constrained. constrained. One critical aspect is the cultural context, context, not just o the air orces employing the capability, but also within those we are seeking to inuence. The psychological impact o remote warare ought ought by remote war-ghters is very dierent rom the more traditional uses o military militar y orce and the eect on the operators, the enemy, and the people amongst whom we ght, must all be assessed careully, so that threats can be countered and opportunities taken. I we accept the premise that UAV UAVss are now an integral component o air power delivery, we must be agile in our thinking to understand how we can adapt our organisations, structures, training and recruitment to exploit the military militar y possibilities they oer ully. 2
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The output rom the Workshop, Workshop, captured in this publication, may not contain all the answers, but it does at least expose the questions and highlight issues and challenges or urther analysis. This, I believe, provides provides a useul basis or a more inormed and holistic debate about how air orces can best harness the capability oered by UAVs now, and in the uture.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy Torpy
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UAVs: UA Vs: The Wider Context INTRODUCTION
Air Cdre Neville Parton
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he role o the Chie o the Air Sta ’s Workshops Workshops has remained remarkably constant since rst established in the 1980s: to bring together a mix o academics and practitioners in order to shed resh light on contemporary air power issues. The 2007 workshop was no dierent, dierent, although or the rst time the subject matter was related to a particular technological eld – that o unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) (UAVs) – rather than the historical or doctrinal subjects that had predominated predominated in the past. It did see the assembling o a unique group o individuals; comprising historians, lawyers, engineers, academics and operators, who spent a considerable period o time discussing both historical and contemporary perspectives on UAV operations, beore agreeing on the contents that would make up the breadth and depth o this t his publication. The history o UAVs UAVs is, perhaps surprisingly, almost as long as the history o ight itsel, as the rst ying bomb type t ype device was developed during the First World World War. War. Almost every decade during the intervening ninety years has seen advances in this eld, although the last ten years in particular has certainly seen an explosion in not only the numbers but also the capability o such platorms. Given such an ancestry, ancestry, one could be orgiven orgiven or wondering whether there were any aspects o UAV operations that have not already been explored over the course o such a lengthy period o operatio operations. ns. However, as the capabilities o UAVs have undergone radical changes in the last decade, driven by advances in technology, the ocus has been very much on solving the technical problems associated associated with their use. There has been an emphasis emphasis on control and communication – especially with regard to the large amounts o data that can be produced by the multi-spectral imaging systems common to many modern systems, and other prominent areas or consideration have included decision support and inormation inormation distribution. Furthermore, given given the tremendous lineage o UA UAV-type V-type platorms, it is interesting to note how requently lessons in general have had to be re-learnt as development in this eld has tendedto tendedto run in cycles. In one o the very ew publications publications to look specically at the history histor y o UAV development, development, it is noted that: “Over “Over the past 85 years, robotic aircrat have been repeatedly called by the demands o war onto the stage o history to perorm and perhaps to advance a step urther in technology; then ade back into obscurity at war’ war’ss end only to rise, r ise, phoenixlike, when the next conict arises. With each reincarnation, reincarnation, lessons learned, some trivial and some signicant, are lost in the ashes.” 1 O course problems with learning rom experience are nothing new, and hence the inclusion oa historical element to address just this aspect. Yet there is also a surprising lack o material available on the implications i mplications or non-technical areas o the advances that have been made. Topics such as the legal, moral, ethical and cultural aspects have been by and large ignored; yet these have the potential to impact on the utility o UA UAVs Vs just as much as the more technical elements, 4
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and again this gap provides part o the rationale or this publication. Indeed an observer at recent conerences on UAVs would perhaps have been orgiven or thinking that these were simply seen as an extension o current weapons systems, systems, which would have no impact on the nature o conict itsel beyond reducing the manpower losses o riendly orces and increasing the range and endurance o reconnaissance systems in part particular. icular. However the introduction o a class o weapon which allows engagement with the enemy without personal risk surely has to be considered in more than simply technical terms. The introduction o the tank in the First World World War War saw British tank crews who surrendered ater their vehicles were disabled either killed or beaten up by Germans, who had been terrorised by the vehicles and clearly elt that they oered an unair advantage.2 A requently cited Islamist view is that the Western Western approach to warare, war are, as exemplied in both Iraq I raq and Aghanistan, is that it depends upon a cowardly way o warare (air power) which is requently indiscriminate, killing women and children. Such an approach is then used to justiy the outrages practised by such groups as Al Qaeda.3 Some consideration thereore has to be given to the likely impact o UAVs on war itsel. Some ood or thought can be ound in the writings o Proes Proessor sor Coker, Proessor Proes sor o International Relations at the t he London School o Economics and Social Science, who has produced in recent years some remarkable books dealing with likely changes to the nature o warare itsel in the 21st Century. 4 These deal with not only the technological changes that may occur, occur, but also the way in which those changes may alter the very ver y nature o warare, and in particular warare between the ‘modern’ ‘modern’ (or even post-modern) world and those who would seek to challenge it. Some o his material comes rom rom the realm o ction – but ction that has very rapidly been overtaken by reality. For instance he reers to a short story which centres around soldiers who ght, completely disengaged rom the battleeld, in laser-shooting capsules orbiting the Earth. In this construct the rewards rewards o achieving command command include the luxury o being able to wear bedroom slippers and take ‘personal ‘personal preerence preerence kits’ into the capsule.5 Whilst this might have seemed ar distant in 1983, when the piece was written, we are arguably in that world now, where UAVs such as the General Atomic’s Atomic’s Reaper and Preda Predator tor y in operations over Iraq and Aghanistan, but are controlled rom an operating base just outside Las Vegas,, Nevada. The reason or Coker’s Vegas Coker’s ocussing on this particular example is to illustrate the sense o dissociation that such warriors will eel, i the term warrior can justiably be used or such individuals, and to consider the eect on both them and the conict conict in which they are engaged. engaged. But the impact is likely to be elt more broadly within a ghting service than just the individuals concerned; there is also the probability o changes in the way that this group o individuals individual s will be perceived by others. Will the UAV UAV operator operatorss be perceived as heroic by the troops they support suppor t on the ground, or dissociated technicians with no real understanding understanding o the nature o warare? warare? And what impact will that have in turn on their ability to inuence tactics, operational art and strategy? Moreover eects eects will also be produced in the wider world. The importance o 5
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propaganda in modern conict was arguably reinorced by the 2006 conict in the Lebanon between the Israeli Deence Forces Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah – a conict in which, it is worth noting, the number o UA UAV V ying hours certainly approached i not exceeded those o xed wing ast-jet aircrat.6 Here, whilst Israel undoubtedly enjoyed a tremendous level o supremacy in terms o military technology technology,, it seemed unable to translate t ranslate this into a strategic advantage, especially especially in the broader political sphere. This certainly seemed to be borne out by the Economist’s Economist’s summary o the campaign, whose banner headline in the week 19 th August 2006 proclaimed ‘Nasrallah wins the war’. And as William Arkin points out, “Some “Some even argue that Israel’ Israel’ss problem is one o perceptions: that the 2006 war was itsel a war o competing narratives and Israel ailed to “win” the public relations battle…”.7 In his recent publication on the role o propaganda in politics, poli tics, Nicholas O’Shaughnessy points to the particular eectiveness o negative propaganda in the modern world, as well as the elements that go to make up propaganda – rhetoric, myth and symbolism.8 In such a construct the use o air power against a sub-state actor is always open to portrayal in David versus Goliath terms, but how much more so i one side is not seen as even being willing to risk the lives o its servicemen in the conict.9 Given such a range o issues, the need or a debate in this subject area seems compelling. Against such a backdrop the aims o this publication are modest – to provide an introduction to some o the issues that armed orces in general, and air orces in particular, will have to come to terms with as UAV usage becomes ar more widespread. widespread. In terms o content we begin with two historical overviews, overviews, which examine the ways in which UAVs have developed, initially rom the 1920s up until the introduction i ntroduction o the rst reconnaissance vehicles in the 1950s, and then rom the 1950s to the present present day. day. Whilst accepting that this represents an arbitrary divide, it does allow or a ocus on the very dierent ways in which the role o the UA UAV V was perceived – something which will be returned to later on. This is ollowed by an examination o likely developments developments over the next 40 years, and taken together with the t wo previous chapters, provides the requisite context within which the subsequent elements are situated. The rst o these provides consideration consideration o some o the legal actors that will have to be considered considered,, particularly i i greater degrees o autonomy are sought, as well as the potential problems caused by the t he use o civilian operators or such systems. systems. This is ollowed by an overview overview o some o the ethical aspects inherent in the use o UAVs, especially i used in oensive roles, where there are potential implications or the nature o warare itsel, especially in a counter-insurgency environment. environment. However there there are also cultural aspects that need to be considered in terms o implications or the user community – or in other ot her words what the implications are or an air orce o much greater use o UAVs UAVs with regard to its traditional organisation organisation and values. This is explored in some detail, beore bringing together the various threads in order to draw not only some conclusions regarding uture developments and their implications, but also to make some recommenda recommendations tions about potentially ruitul areas or urther study. study. This latter aspect is particularly important as the 6
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workshop was intended to act as an initiator or urther work and discussion in the academic arena, rather than being the last word on the subject. At this point it is also worth recognising that the language used to describe UAVs UA Vs has gone, and is still undergoing, undergo ing, considerable change. Whilst there is no commonly agreed lexicon, apart rom those within individual armed services, there are a number o generic terms that are used, the derivation o some o which are move obvious than others. others. In order to assist understanding throughout the rest o this publication a very brie etymology is provided at the end o the chapter, in strictly alphabetical order, and with (where possible) an explanation o whence the term was derived. It should be noted that a number o the terms associated with UAV history do not, strictly speaking, reer to what would now be understood as UAVs – a point which is worth addressing. There is no generally agreed denition o what exactly constitutes a UAV. However,, there are a number o characteristics which can be considered in However terms o helping to bring the eld down to a manageable size. The rst two o these are, quite obviously, that the vehicle should be without a human occupant and reliant on aerodynamic lit or buoyancy to remain airborne. Although rom a historical perspective a number o one-way UAVs UAVs have been considered in this publication, as these provide a greater degree o understanding o how the technologies in particular have evolved, evolved, reuseability is also a actor, as this generally removes such entities as missiles and loitering munitions. Size in purely physical terms is probably not a good dierentiator dierentiator,, as ever increasing miniaturization means that smaller UAVs UAVs can now undertake roles that would have been inconceivable inconceivable only a ew years ago. ago. The US military, and others, have attempted to dierentiate in terms o perormance, looking at operational ceilings and endurance, resulting in the introduction o tier. However at present present no attempt appears to have been made to dierentiate in terms o the degree o autonomy that a UAV possesses, or o the overall system system requiremen requirements ts needed to to operate it. For instance instance vehicles such as the Predator require a considerable degree degree o operator skill to actually ‘y’, particularly parti cularly during the landing phase, albeit remotely, whereas a platorm such as Global Hawk operates entirely via keyboard and mouse actuated commands: no joystick required. required. Another set o characteristics that could be used to dene UAVs would be to identiy them by their role: reconnaissance, surveillance, weapon delivery, supply delivery, communications relay, air deence and so on. Irrespective o the precise terminology employed, or o the roles or which they may be used, it is clear that technological advances are likely to result in a signicantt increase in the usage o UAV signican UAVss by the armed orces. Whilst some o the areas o employment will be uncontroversial, others have the potential to impact signicantly both the nature o war and the nature o the armed orces. These changes will not happen immediately, but given the likely trajectory o progress in this area, the need to address the broader aspects o UAV operations operati ons is surely now beyond dispute. As ever, ever, the Royal Air Force is keen to 7
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stimulate public debate in areas where controversy controversy may arise, and where the need or a debate to identiy and clariy the issues is recognised. recognised. The aim o this publication is to stimulate and inorm the debate: replies will be welcomed via the pages o Air Power Review , the RAF’s proessional air power journal.10 NOTES 1
Laurence R. Newcome, Unmanned Aviation : A Brie History o Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2004), v. 2 Richard Holmes, Acts o War : The Behaviour o Men in Battle (London: Cassell Military Paperba Paperbacks, cks, 2004), 387. 3 “They also depend on massive air strikes so as to conceal their most prominent point o weakness, which is the ear, cowardliness, cowardliness, and the absence o combat spirit among US soldiers … We stress the importance o the martyrdom operations against the enemy - operations that inicted harm on the United States and Israel that have been unprecedented unprecedented in their history, thanks to Almighty God. ” BBC News, “Bin Laden Tape: Text,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_ east/2751019.stm. 4 Christopher Coker, Waging War without Warriors? The Changing Culture o Military Conict . (Boulder: Lynne Rieb Publishers, Inc., 2002), 130., ———, The Future o War : The Re-Enchantment o War in the Twenty-First Century (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004). 5 Don DeLillo, “Human Moments in World War Iii,” Esquire, July 1983. 6 Gp Capt Neville Parton, “Israel’s 2006 Campaign in the Lebanon,” Air Power Review 10, no. 2 (2007).. It is also worthy o note that this conict also saw the use o UAVs UAVs by both sides, with Hezbollah operating UAVs over Northern Israel. 7 William M. Arkin, Divining Victory : Airpower in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War (Alabama: Air University Press, 2007), 150. 8 Nicholas Jackson O’Shaughnessy O’Shaughnessy,, Politics and Propaganda : Weapons o Mass 2004), 65. Seduction (Ann Arbor: The University o Michigan Press, 2004), 9 “The computer chip may very well be a most useul war ghting tool. tool. For example, while it is never a good thing when we lose a Predator on the battleeld, given the alternatives I look orward to many more computer chips dying or our country. countr y.” US Secretary o the Air Force, as quoted in Coker, The Future o War : The Re-Enchantment o War in the Twenty-First Century , 130. 10 http://www.airpowerstudies.co.uk/airpowerr http://www.airpowerstudies .co.uk/airpowerreview eview.htm .htm
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UAVs: UA Vs: The Wider Context GLOSSARY
Aerial Torpedo One o the earliest terms used, reerring to a non-reusable cruise missile-type platorm, specically designed to deliver a warhead to a target. Derivation was obviously rom rom a parallel with naval torpedoes. torpedoes. Aerial Target Another early term, or a reusable (albeit generally with a limited lie expectancy) target platorm – mostly remotely controlled in nature. Automatically Piloted Vehicle A term which saw some usage predominantly in the 1950s and 1960s, generally used to reer to reconnaissance-type UAVs. Cruise Missiles A non-reusable platorm specically designed to deliver a warhead to a target. The term was used to make clear that this was very dierent to a ballistic missile, in that it depended upon aerodynamic lit in order to operate. Drones An early term or a platorm platorm generally designed designed to act as a target. A number o origins or the term have been suggested, suggested, however the most likely is that as a target they would y with a xed engine setting over a xed course, ‘droning’ along. The term was later used with a descriptor to identiy dierent types, e.g. target drone, reconnaissance reconnaissance drone and so orth.
War term or a cruise missile type vehicle. Flying Bomb A Second World War Guided Bomb Another term that has occasionally been used or a cruise missile-type vehicle. Micro Air Vehicle (MAV) A generic term or a small UAV. UAV. DARP DARPA A denes a MAV MA V as being less than 15 cm in any dimension, but this is not a generally accepted denition.1 Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) A generic term or a class o UAV that operates in the surace sur ace to 30 000 eet region, and with an endurance o up to 12-15 hours. High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) A generic term or a class o UAV that is designed to operate above 30 000 eet, and with an endurance o 24 hours plus. Pilotless Aircrat A term which saw considerable use in the 1920s and 1930s by the British aviation establishment.2 Remotely Operated Aircrat (ROA) This term was introduced by the US Federal Aviation Administration, Administration, as their legal remit extended specically to aircrat, not aerial vehicles. Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) This term has generally been used as a maritime equivalent to the RPV (see below), although it has occasionally been used in other environments. 9
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Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) A term that was used, mainly in North America, to identiy a vehicle which required a remote operator (as opposed to a completely autonomous system). Uninhabited/Unmanned3 Aerial System (UAS) This term has recently been introduced to recognise that a UAV UAV by itsel is not useul; without the associated command and control elements such as ground stations and associated relay mechanisms mechanisms (satellites) it cannot unction. The term UAS (or sometimes UAVS (UAV System)) is thereore used to reer to the entire system: the platorm, command/communication links and the associated ground (or airborne) control stations. Uninhabited /Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) A generic term or an air vehicle which has no human operator on board. This can reer to platorms which require direction rom a remote operator, operator, or those that are entirely autonomous, and can be either heavier-than-air or lighter-than-air. lighter-than-air.4 No dierentiation is made regarding the role or which the UAV is intended, other than the recent introduction o the term UCA UCAV V (see below). Uninhabited /Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV) A term intended to identiy a class o UAVs which had an oensive capability, in terms o being able to both carry and release some orm o munition. In uture this may well include directed energy weapons. NOTES 1
See http://www.defense-update.com/features/du-2-04/mav-darpa.htm or more inormation. 2 For instance the Larynx project (see AIR 5/444 in The National Archives). 3 The term was originally unmanned, but unmanned has been used more in recent years – allegedly as part o the linguistic de-sexing that has also seen the introduction o terms such as chairperson vice chairman. Current UK MoD policy is that the term unmanned be used, and hence that approach is ollowed throughout this publication. 4 In US Department o Deence denitions, lighter-than-air lighter-than-air platorms are excluded rom the UAV class.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF UAVS AND UCAVS: THE EARLY YEARS
Dr Christina J. M. Goulter
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he desire to put machinery rather than humans in harm’s way has always been a eature eature o military history. Ideas o using unmanned unmanned aerial platorms or the purposes o delivering ordnance probably pre-date Classical times, i we consider how the Chinese conceived o using explosive kites in the battlespace, but became more easible with the advent o balloons during the 19th century. As the balloon age gave gave way to xed wing aviation, the possibility o using unmanned platorms also or reconnaissance reconnaissance was investigated by a number o nations, with the United Kingdom and the USA at the oreront o research. As ever, wara warare re was the ‘mother o invention’ and great strides were made in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) (UAV) and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) (UCAV) design and conceptualisation in both the First and Second World World Wars. Wars. By 1945, Germany had overtaken other nations in unmanned platorm technology, and this technological lead was quickly acquired by the Americans at the end o the Second World War, with the transer o many many leading German aeronautical aeronautical scientists to the US. US. As the Cold War deepened, the US and NATO became interested in UAVs primarily or reconnaissance, reconnaissance, especially ater the loss o the t he U2 spyplane over the USSR in 1960. The need to conduct stealthy reconnaissance reconnaissance and surveillance surveillance using the less politically inammatory unmanned platorm was given heightened heightened impetus by the Vietnam War, War, when the US ound it necessary to monitor North and South Vietnam’s Vietnam’s border areas. It can be argued that Vietnam delineates the beginning o modern UAV and UCAV technology and conceptualisation, because the US developed unmanned platorms or a variety o roles in that conict,, including the multi-role conict mult i-role UAV. UAV. In the early 1970s, the US lead in UA UAV V development was, or a time, overtaken by Israel, but since the late 1980s, the most signicant technological advances and conceptual work have been perormed by the US. Modern UAV and UCAV technology owes its existence to a number o developmental threads, threads, including early work on guided bombs and missiles. So although the generally accepted denition o a UA UAV V or UCAV is that the platorm must be recove recoverable, rable, some discussion o non-recoverable guided systems is required in order to understand current technologies and their employment. What is more dicult to trace is the conceptual work which surrounded surroun ded some o the early UAV UAV and UCAV technolo technologies. gies. In some cases, the uses to which certain platorms were to be put remains a matter o conjecture. In other cases, very advanced conceptualisation appears not to have outlived a particular UAV or UCAV programme and important lessons were led away, only to be rediscovered comparati comparatively vely recently. However, even a brie survey treatment o early UAV and UCAV development provides a useul guide to the 11
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strengths and weaknesses o such systems, including the cost-benets o their employment compared with manned manned platorms. As a general rule, interest interest in unmanned systems has been greatest, not surprisingly, when the threat to manned platorms has been serious or when political sensitivities precluded manned surveillance sur veillance.. Early unmanned aerial vehicle development can be said to divide into two main periods. The rst encompasses encompasses balloon ight in the 19th Century Century and attempts to use balloons as unmanned aerial bombers, through to First World World War aerial torpedoes which were equipped with basic guidance apparatus.1 The second period began during the 1930s, with the advent o radio-controlled, recoverable recoverable drones. The ability both to control and recover an unmanned platorm demarcates this latter group as the true precursors o modern UAVs UAVs and UCAVs. UCAVs. However, the rst period is interesting interesti ng because some o the conceptual work was remarkably modern. One o the earliest records o the use o an unmanned aerial vehicle in the battlespace occurred during the Italian Wars o Unication. Unication. In August 1849, the Austrians attacked Venice Venice with unmanned balloons armed with high explosive. The success o these attacks was entirely dependent dependent on avourable winds and a balloon’s range was limited by the length o a copper wire, through which a detonating charge would would run. Just over a decade later, later, during the American Civil War, an inventor, Charles Perley, registered a patent or an unmanned ‘aerial bomber’ which built on the European experience. Perley’ss design comprised a hot air balloon carrying explosives, which would Perley’ arm themselves on release rom the balloon’ balloon’s basket. A pre-set timing device would dictate when the basket released its load. load. Both Union and Conederate Conederate Armies employed empl oyed the ‘Perley Bomber’ Bomber ’, with varying degrees o success. On a number o occasions, changes in wind direction caused balloons to drop their loads over riendly orces, and out o this experience came the requirement or some type o guidance system. However However,, it would be another sixty years beore remote control guidance technology became a reality, but it at least demonstrates that the idea o remote control existed well beore the First World War. In the United Kingdom, meanwhile, the possibility o using kites or aerial reconnaissance reconnaissan ce seemed easible when, in 1883, the t he photographer Douglas Archibald used cameras mounted on kites to take low altitude altit ude photographs. Archibald’ss photographs were widely published, and the rst military interest Archibald’ in the concept came rom the US Army. Army. During the Spanish-American War War o 1898, the US Army employed kite cameras to obtain essential intelligence on enemy dispositions and ortications. ortications. This was the rst recorded recorded use o the third dimension or intelligence gathering purposes, and it is interesting to note that the US Army’s edgling G2 organisation thereater considered aerial photography photo graphy as one o their key sources or ORBAT ORBAT analysis. Thereater, technical means o gathering intelligence became a very strong thread in the US intelligence trade.2 The First World War heightened interest in remote systems or both 12
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reconnaissan ce and strike purposes, with the greatest eort reconnaissance eort being expended in the latter area. The USA, Germany and the UK had very similar research and development programmes devoted to ‘glide bombs’ (orerunners o the German V-1 weapon). weapon). The Germans began their research research as early as 1915, and by the end o the war, Siemens research laboratories had produced gliders capable o carrying over 2,000 lb loads over ranges o about 5 to 7 miles. Although none o the research resulted in an operational platorm beore the Armistice, this early work laid the basis o research into the V-1 V-1 some twenty 3 years later. In Britain, the rst research into unmanned platorms platorms occurred in 1916. The three biggest aeronautical industries (Sopwith, de Havilland and the Royal Aircrat Factory) all successully produced unmanned aircrat in 1917, and the greatest successes successes were achieved by the Royal Aircrat Factory with the testing o three radio controlled aircrat. aircra t. However, with the end o the war, the RAF’s interest in unmanned aircrat ell away abruptly as budget cuts wiped out most research and development.4 Ater the American entry into the war in 1917, the US Navy took the lead in research and development in the eld and expressed particular interest i nterest in ying bombs. It sponsored development development o the so-called Sperry Aerial Torpedo, which was a 300lb bomb mounted on a remotely controlled Curtiss training aircrat. In 1917, this succeeded in ying 50 miles. A similar concept concept was sponsored by the US Army Air Corps, which resulted in the ‘Kettering Bug’, a remotely controlled bi-plane, also designed to take a 300lb ordnance load. However,, although the US military ordered large numbers o these remotely However controlled platorms, the end o the t he First World War saw a rapid winding down o research and development into ‘ying bombs’, and interest was not resuscitated until the late 1930s, in part as a result o British experiments into radio-controlled target drones.5 In the early 1930s, the Royal Navy issued a requirement or a remotecontrolled target drone or gunnery practice. This requirement came out o the inamous ‘Bomber versus Battleship’ debates over the vulnerability vulnerabilit y o the UK’s capital ships which preoccupied the Admiralty and the Air Sta during the 1920s, early 1930s. The RAF had claimed that the advent o the bomber meant that any nation’s nation’s capital ships were now under threat, whereas the Royal Navy argued that developments in armour plating, gunnery and ship speeds meant meant that aerial attack was unlikely to succeed. succeed. A series o bombing trials satised neither party, so the Royal Navy was intent on proving, beyond any reasonable doubt, that any aircrat coming within range o capital ships equipped with the latest gunre control systems would not survive. Thereore, the Navy Navy modied a number o Fairey IIIF reconnaissance reconnaissance oatplanes to act as target drones. These ‘Fairey Queens’, as they were known, were successully trialled in the Mediterranean during September 1932, and each time they were tested, they survived what was apparently heavy gunre. This prompted calls or more rigorous experimentation, and led to the development o the t he rst true recoverable and reusable UAV UAV, the so-called so- called 13
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‘Queen Bee’, which was a radio-controlled radio -controlled development o the de Havilland Tiger Moth trainer. Between 1934 and the end o the Second World War War,, no ewer than 420 ‘Queen Bees’ were built or the Royal Navy. It is worth wor th noting that ‘Queen ‘Queen Bee’ experimentation led the t he Royal Navy to conclude that it could not rely purely on large calibre guns or shipborne deence, and, as a result, the Admiralty called or increased employment o close-range ‘pom-pom’ guns to supplement the heavy guns. Thereore, it can be said that the ‘Queen Bee’ contributed to the Navy’ Navy ’s concept o layered deence, which remains the cornerstone o modern surace eet deence.6 During the late 1930s, the Americans also developed radio-controlled drones or gunnery practice. A recent British émigré, émigré, Reginald Denny, Denny, who had served as an Air Gunner in the Royal Flying Corps, ormed the Radioplane Company in the mid-1930s. Denny’ Denny’ss aim was to provide a low cost aircrat drone which he could provide to both the US Navy and the US US Army Air Corps. Ater lengthy experimentation, Denny won a contract with the US Army Air Corps in 1930 or the RP-4 Radioplane, and by the end o the Second World War, his company had manuactured 15,000 15,000 drones or or the US Services. It is unclear rom the surviving records as to how much cross-ertilisation went on between the British and American drone programmes, but it appears that the RP-4 was an independent invention based on Denny’s experiences in the First World War. However,, this work laid the oundation or wartime However war time development o radiocontrolled aircrat aircrat used as ying bombs. Both the US Navy and the US Army Air Forces experimented with unmanned bombers, such as the B-17 and B-24, loaded with 20,000lbs o high explosive or use against high value enemy targets. The USAAF programme, given given the code name o Aphrodite, involved launching a bomber, manned by a pilot and chie technician, who would set the radio-control device in ight, prime the ordnance ordnance,, and then bale out while still over the English countryside. The rst Aphrodite raid occurred on 4 August 1944 against German V-weapon V-weapon sites in France. France. Although this had limited impact, because many o the bombers were shot down beore they reached their targets or went o course, one o the t he most interesting proposals to emerge rom this programme was the idea o tting a television monitor in the nose o the Aphrodite bomber so that it could be directed onto its target with greater precision.7 At the end o the Second World War, American and British aeronautical scientists were surprised to discover the substantial lead which the Germans had in the eld eld o radio-guided missiles. missiles. Although the German military was heavily constrained by the terms o the Versailles Treaty Treaty ater the First World War,, the German Army, in particular, maintained its interest in guided bomb War research throughout throughout the 1920s. Ironically, the constraints constraints imposed by the Treaty Trea ty o Versailles, which prevented the Germans rom producing large scale conventional orces, compelled research into alternative weapons and alternative materials, including including aluminium alloys. In 1931, the Wehrmacht Wehrmacht took control over missile research, and co-opted the services o a number o gited aerospace engineers, including Wehrner Wehrner von Braun, who had come to 14
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the Wehrmacht’ Wehrmacht’ss attention in 1929 because o his rocket theorems. Not to be outdone, Hermann Goering, head o the Lutwae, established a separate rocket research acility, with the specic brie o experimenting with liquid-uel propulsion systems. The serious rivalry which existed between the Wehrmacht Wehrmacht and Lutwae high commands meant that these two main research strands were not brought together in a coherent way beore the Second World War. Had this happened, then the outcome o the Second World War may have been very dierent, and this was an important lesson noted by the Americans at the end o the war, because the US Department o Deence was placed in overall control o all military militar y technological development.8 One o the most striking strik ing eatures o German missile development is the sheer number o models produced. produced. This can be explained, in large part, by intererence rom Hitler and the climate o ear he created among his subordinates as he pushed or systems which would provide the Germans with some comparative advantage over over the Allies. In addition to the most common V-weapons, V-weapons, the Wehrmac Wehrmacht ht and Lutwae between them sponsored the development o over 200 various guided and gliding bombs, and suracesur aceto-air, air-to-surace and air-to-air air-to-air missiles. The various projects are are too numerous to discuss here, but a number o them demonstrate just how ar the German technical lead had become by the end o the Second World War, and, because o the technology transer to the Western Western Allies at the end o the war,, underpinned American aeronautical research or at least another thirty war years. One o the uncomortable acets o this technology transer transer at the end o the war is the act that most o the German secret weapons research and development was dependent dependent upon slave labour, and this is particularly true o both the V-1 and V-2. Many moral questions were swept swept under the carpet ater 1945 because o the deteriorating East-West East-West relations. relations. Although a ull discussion o the moral implications o technology transer lies beyond the scope o this discussion, discussion, it demands some mention. mention. It is also worth noting that this would not be the t he last time democracies at war aced totalitarian regimes which could, by their very nature, resource spectacular projects without most o the usual constraints.9 The German research and development to have had the greatest inuence on Western Western air power is undoubtedly the V-weapons programme, programme, so-called so- called because they were intended as ‘vengeance weapons’ (vergeltungswae). The V-1 is o particular importance to this discussion as it was the rst large scale operational employment o unmanned aircrat. aircrat. Although both the Wehrmacht Wehrmacht and the Lutwae had been experimenting with unmanned platorms during the late 1930s, the single biggest impetus to develop urther a pilotless missile was the German deeat in the Battle o Britain. The German hierarchy hierarchy wanted to maintain pressure on Britain, while preparing or the oensive in the East, against the Soviet Union. The V-weapon V-weapon was seen as a simple and relatively relatively cheap means o maintaining the pressure without expending precious trained aircrew and manned, manned, multi-role platorms. Hitler played a decisive role in speeding up V-weapons V-weapons development. development. By mid-1943, the Lutwae had allen 15
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out o avour with Hitler because o its ailure to subdue Britain, campaign reversals in North Arica, Sicily and on the eastern ront, and he was now more interested in the winning potential o secret secret weapons. So, in the summer o 1943, the V-1 programme was given priority.10 The V-1 was a relatively basic aircrat design, with a wingspan o just under 20 eet and cigar-shaped uselage uselage o 26 eet in length. The operational variants had a warhead o 1,000lbs o High Explosive and a range o 200 miles. Guidance o the weapon was provided provided by a gyroscope governed governed by a magnetic compass, compass, which was pre-set beore beore launch. Altitude was controlled by a standard aneroid barometer, which kept the V-1 at 1,000 eet en route to its target, and its range was was pre-set by an air log device. device. Once the requisite requisite range had been reached, reached, the engine was cut, orcing orcing the V-1 into a dive. dive. As the weapon ew in ree-all to the t he target, it had limited velocity, and this meant that the blast eect was maintained largely above above ground. This is what made the V-1 a substantial weapon system, especially when it i t ell into urban areas, where the blast eect tended to be disproportionately disproportionately large. The V-1 V-1 lacked the accuracy to strike targets other than t han large centres o population, but this 11 act heightened its terror value. The original German concept or V-1 was truly awesome. awesome. The plan was to bombard Britain as early as mid-December 1943, with three daily waves, with 300 missiles in each wave. wave. Fortunately Fortunately,, attacks by Bomber Command on one o the main V-weapons production sites at Kassel delayed the operational employment o the V-1 until mid-June 1944, but British intelligence had already identied the new weapon weapon threat. In November 1943, imagery analysis and SIGINT intercepts rom the main testing acility at Peenemund Peenemunde, e, on the Baltic coast, had highlighted V-1 development, and it was concluded that the weapons could be used against Britain within weeks. weeks. IMINT and other intelligence had established the rapid building o multiple launch sites along the French coast. Both Bomber Command and and the US 8th Air Force were re-tasked to devote some o their eort to attacking these sites. However However,, initial attacks proved relatively ineectual, destroying only seven out o the 69 sites identied. Thereater Thereater,, the main bombing eort was directed against the road and rail network in northern nor thern France, France, Belgium and eastern Germany with the aim o interdicting the resupply resupply o these sites. sites. In the months and weeks weeks leading up to D-Day D -Day,, this bombing became part par t o the wider ‘transportation plan’ in support o the invasion, so it is dicult to discern how much eort was devoted specically specically with the counter- V-1 V-1 campaign in mind. But the proportion o eort devoted to the destruction o these sites does become clearer ater D-Day, when up to hal o Bomber Command and the 8th Air Forces’ tonnage was dropped on V-1 launch areas and acilities associated with the emerging V-2 V-2 threat. The ocial historian o the strategic bombing campaign suggests that attacks on these sites during the second hal o 1944 ‘retarded’ and ‘reduced’ the V-weapon campaign against Britain. 12 Deence against the V-1 closer to home was also very problematic. As the V-1 could travel at speeds up to 400 miles an hour, only the latest mark o Spitre 16
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had a chance o catching the V-1s. Even then, shooting them down was hazardous, as the blast shrapnel shrapnel oten impacted on the attacker. attacker. So, a technique o intercepting and ying alongside the V-1, V-1, with the object o tipping its wing, was adopted in most cases. However However,, this was entirely dependent on timely orewarning o a V-1 assault, and as the transit time between launch and southern England was only 22 minutes, on average, this gave the interceptors interceptors little time to nd and hunt down their prey. This prompted a rapid redeployment o anti-aircrat guns to a concentra concentrated ted belt on the south coast, leaving the area behind or ‘mopping up’ by the RAF i V-1s succeeded succeeded in getting through the AAA barrage. By mid-July, mid-July, the deences in combination had succeeded in reducing the daily assault on Britain rom 70 down to about 25, but this meant that a sizeable number o V-1s were still getting through, and there was justiable concern that civilian morale was crumbling in the ace o the new threat, coming as it did on top o general war weariness.13 Once the initial V-1 assault was conrmed as a success, the Germans engaged in urther conceptual work, including the idea o launching V-1s rom manned bombers. This was given priority in case they needed to continue an oensive oensive against Britain rom bases inside Germany, ollowing an anticipated withdrawal rom France and and the Low Countries. Between 9 July and the end o December 1944, nearly 1,600 V-1s were were air launched rom Heinkel III bombers, one-th o the total number o V-1s directed against Britain, with the same rates o success as the land-launched variant. variant. O the total number o V-1s V-1s launched against Britain, 1,847 were destroyed by ghter aircrat, 1,878 by AAA, and 232 by barrage balloons. The majority o the remainder remainder ell in open countryside, countryside, but the 2,419 which reached metropolitan London caused 6,184 deaths and 17,981 others were seriously injured. The V-1 oensive oensive had also caused widespread damage in the south-east and over 1,000 actories were aected either directly or indirectly as a result o bomb damage. damage. Absenteeism was was also reported to be higher than at any other time t ime during the war, with a 10% all in industrial production being attributed just to the t he V-weapon V-weapon oensive.14 Not surprisingly, thereore, thereore, when the German V-2 rocket attacks began in September 1944, there were elaborate eorts eorts to disguise the true nature o the latest German ‘vengeance’ weapon, including press releases to pass o V-2 hits as gas explosions. It was elt that the diculty o deending against V-2 V-2 weapon, because o its supersonic speed, speed, would cause widespread widespread alarm. The V-2 development, while lying slightly outside the scope o this discussion, is worth recounting briey because it proved that the Germans were at least ten years ahead o their nearest rival, the Americans, in both rocket and radioguidance systems research, and the guidance system developed or the V-2 would later orm the basis o post-war American research research into unmanned platorms and missiles. German experimentation in rocket design went back as ar as the early 1930s, and even beore the outbreak o war war,, the German High Command issued a requirement or a high velocity velocity weapon which could hit London and Paris. Paris. The 17
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rst test rings o what would ultimately become the V-2 occurred in 1937, but the major constraint on development development was its guidance guidance system. Rockets were prone to go o course as soon as they were were launched. This was partly a unction o the size o the weapon (it stood at over 46 eet tall and was over 5 eet wide) and its payload. But most o the diculty arose out o having having to control combustion and exhaust velocities (the V-2 required a load o 8,300 lbs o uel and 11,000 lbs o liquid oxygen, being burnt at a rate o 275 lbs per second). So, a complex system o cybernetic controls controls was developed to keep the rocket stable in its initial launch and ight path. However However,, unlike the V-1 which was not radio-controlled, the V-2 had to have some type o radio guidance, and this was the rst instance o radar beams being used to guide the trajectory and path o a missile system. system. Had the war extended extended beyond 1945, the Allies would have developed means to interere with the radio-guidance o the V-2, as they had already achieved success against the Lutwae’s navigatio navigational nal beams earlier in the war. In all, a total o 4,320 V-2s were red between between 6 September 1944 and 27 March 1945. O these, 1,120 were red at London, and 2,500 at other Allied targets in France and Belgium.15 It is oten suggested that the V weapons caused a disproportionate amount o ear and eort. However However,, i we consider that conventional conventional bombing o Britain resulted in 51,509 killed and over 61,000 seriously injured throughout the whole o the war, the impact that these weapons had during a period o less than one year, it can be said that the German hierarchy achieved much o what it sought to achieve, namely, psychological psychological pressure on the British Brit ish populace.16 The V-weapons V-weapons programmes spawned a number o other technologies worthy o note. As the Allied bomber oensive increased increased its stranglehold over over the Third Reich, the German hierarchy called or a dual track research eort into anti-aircrat missiles. The most advanced anti-aircrat anti-aircrat missile to be developed was the Wasserall , which could reach altitudes in excess excess o 25,000 eet. This was a derivative o the V-2, and was designed to destroy bomber ormations. The missile was to be guided to its target by two radar signals, one homing in on the target and the other tracking the missile’s missile’s progress. A proximity use would then denote denote the missile. Some 35 trial launches were were made, but it is unclear rom the t he historical record as to whether Wasserall ever entered operational service and research and development was halted in February 1945. The Wasserall also beneted rom other research into guided missiles or use in air-to-surace roles. As early as 1940, the Lutwae Lutwae had submitted an operational requirement or a guided anti-shipping missile, and this led to the development o a series o radio-controlled glide bombs. The rst o these, known as the Fritz Fx-1400, was successully employed against the Italian eet in September 1943 as it prepared to surrender to the Allies, and it is interesting to note that the Allies All ies suered more ship losses to Fritz guided bombs in the Mediterranean Mediterr anean than to conventional attacks. To outward appearances, the dierentiated tiated rom the Fritz looked like a standard 3,000 lb bomb, but what dieren standard specication was that it had control suraces which were radioguided rom a ‘parent’ ‘parent’ aircrat. A similar guided bomb was the t he Henschel 293, 18
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which was based on a 1,000 lb bomb with wings and ns, and an engine suspended underneath. underneath. It relied on electrical impulses transmitted by a ‘parent’ aircrat via wire guidance to direct it onto a target, and one variant transmitted television images o the t he target to the controller. controller.17 The use o television in guided bombs predated the cruise missile guidance system by some ty years, and was also well in advance o similar American research during the Second World World War. War. In response to mounting losses among bomber aircrews o the US Army Air Forces, especially the 8th and 15th Air Forces, which operated over Europe, a call was made to increase research into glide bombs. Trials in the spring o 1944 were disappointing disappointing because guided glide bombs were not achieving anticipated anticipated rates o accuracy. accuracy. In an eort to improve accuracy, accuracy, a basic TV T V camera was tted into what became known as the GB-4 glide bomb. Others were tted with inra-red and and light-seeking devices. However, none o these entered service beore the end o the war. 18 Both the Western Allies and the Soviets were to benet greatly rom German research, and it is unlikely that either would have got into space so quickly had it not been or technology technology transer in 1945. 1945. In the meantime, in the USA, captured technology was put to good use in a variety o experimental and practical programmes. programmes. Remote control technology technology was utilised in Operation Operation Crossroads , when remotely piloted aircrat were used to take air samples during the US atomic bomb tests o 1946-47. However However,, the most signicant use o German jet engine and missile guidance systems was seen in the post-war rst generation o cruise missiles and remotely remotely piloted drones. The V-2 underpinned the development o hal a dozen early Cold-War cruise missiles, including the Snark, Navaho, Matador, Mace, and Regulus. There was a requirement or a cruise missile which could deliver a 2,000 lb warhead over a distance o at least 2,000 miles. Most o these were launched rom rom ramps, and had average average cruising speeds o 600 miles per hour. hour. In the early 1960s, these and successor systems were tted with experimental Automatic Terrain and Navigation (ATRAN) systems, orerunners o the guidance systems used in the Tomahawk Tomahawk cruise missile. This meant that the missiles equipped with ATRAN ATRAN were no longer reliant on radar monitoring or radio guidance. guidance. It marked a substantial leap orward in unmanned guidance technology which would not be improved upon until the 1980s with the advent o satellite global positioning systems. Not all o these early cruise missile variants entered entered service, and, by the late 1950s, this line o development was overtaken by what was considered to be a more promising method o delivering conventional conventional and 19 nuclear weapons, the ICBM. However, the German legacy lived on in another strand o US unmanned However, research: the drone. drone. In the early 1950s, there was a tri-Service requirement requirement or target drones or air-to-air and surace-to-air surace -to-air gunnery and missile training. Out o this requirement emerged the Teledyne Teledyne Ryan Q-2 Firebee. Powered by a turbo-jet engine, the Firebee had a wingspan o 12 eet, length o 22 eet, maximum speed o 600 knots and a range o just under 700 miles. Like the latest modern UAV platorms, the greatest advantage o the Firebee was ound 19
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to be its adaptability. It was used rst as a gunnery gunnery training drone, but was then trialled as a reconnaissance platorm and a potential UCAV, UCAV, and also like the latest generation o unmanned platorms, it was recoverable. Thereor Thereore, e, it can be said that the Firebee represen represents ts the beginning o modern unmanned 20 technology and conceptualisation. Research into drones or operational purposes began during the late 1950s, when the US recognised the requirement requirement or an unmanned platorm which could perorm high altitude reconnaissance. reconnaissance. This requirement requirement was given added impetus in May 1960 when the US lost its rst U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union, and the Soviets gained considerable political capital out o the capture o its pilot, Gary Powers. A ew months later, later, an ELINT aircrat was lost over the Barents Sea, killing all on board. The pressure was was now on to nd a platorm which could perorm a number number o intelligence collection roles. roles. The reconnaissance reconnaissan ce requirement called or a platorm which had a range o some 1,500 miles, a cruising altitude o 55,000 eet, and the abilit y to take high resolution photographs rom this altitude. It was also suggested that the UAV UAV should have a low radar signature, using radar absorbing paint and a means o disguising disguis ing the air intakes. The latest Teledyne Ryan Firebee variant (the Q2-C) won the contract, and this was put through extensive testing during 1962.21 The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 graphically demonstrated the need or timely intelligence gathering, while at the same time highlighting the political sensitivities attached to manned overight. overight. On 14 October o that year, year, a US reconnaissance reconnaissan ce aircrat detected the installation o Soviet missiles in Cuba, and daily U-2 reconnaissa reconnaissance nce o Cuba continued until two weeks later, when one o these aircrat was shot down by a SAM missile. As a consequence, consequence, the UAV UA V procurement programme programme was quickly given top priority. Over the next two months, modied Firebees perormed both photographic reconnaissance reconnaissance and ELINT missions over Cuba, and such was the success o these operations, the Firebee was then employed ocially by the USAF’s 4080 th Strategic Reconnaissance Reconnai ssance Wing. Wing. What ollowed was the most extensive use o UAVs UAVs or 22 reconnaissance reconnaissan ce purposes ever seen in air power history. Within our days o the Gul o Tonkin Tonkin incident, which prompted ocial US military involveme involvement nt in Vietnam, the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing deployed to Okinawa to begin Firebee reconnaissa reconnaissance nce missions over North Nor th Vietnam and southern China. The aim o the reconnaissance reconnaissance was to monitor the amount o war materiel being supplied by China to North Nor th Vietnam and also to assess the scale o cross-border sanctuaries being used by the North Vietnamese Army Army or training purposes. purposes. During September 1964, several several reconnaissance missions were undertaken by UAVs, launched rom parent C-130 aircrat, also based based on Okinawa. The Firebees were then recovered on Taiwan. Taiwan. As the UAV UAV had no landing gear, it deployed a parachute on completion o its mission, and was was repatriated back back to Okinawa. From the end o 1964, these reconnaissan reconnaissance ce missions were own rom bases in theatre, with the main base near Saigon, Bien Hoa, acting as the principal ocus o reconnaissance reconnaissan ce capability. Typical reconnaissance reconnaissance missions ew north out 20
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o Bien Hoa, ew over the large naval and USMC air base at Da Nang, which allowed the ground controller at Da Nang to check the parent aircrat’s course, and release o the UAV usually occurred between Da Nang and the Demilitarised Zone. The Firebee’s progress was then monitored by the Airborne Remote Control Ocer aboard the parent aircrat (usually a C-130).23 These early UAV UAV missions suered a number o losses. The rst loss occurred over China on 15 November 1964, and by the ollowing April, our others had been claimed by Chinese ground ground based deences. deences. Although the origin o the UAVs was obvious, and Firebee wreckage was put on display in Beijing, the US government made no comment and the Chinese made very little lit tle political capital out o these losses. This had proved proved the theory that unmanned platorms would be less politically inammatory than manned aircrat should they be shot down. Meanwhile, manned manned reconnaissance, reconnaissance, mainly by U-2s, continued over North Vietnam until 1965, at which point the North Vietnamese acquired SAMs rom the Soviets. Thereore, the requirement or unmanned reconnaissance reconnaissan ce grew exponentially rom this point.24 The year o 1965 also coincided with the beginning o the t he large scale coercive bombing campaign against North Nor th Vietnam, Operation Rolling Thunder , and the need or targeting intelligence and Battle Damage Assessment reconnaissance reconnaissan ce had to be given top priority. As the campaign developed, developed, the North Vietnamese posed an increasing number o challenges to US Air Superiority. Not only did the number o SAMs red increase rom rom around 400 in 1965 to and annual rate o nearly 7,000 three years later, later, but the number o AAA sites also increased exponentially. exponentially. Then, in 1966, the US Air Force Force and US Navy aircrews operating over North Vietnam noticed a mounting air-to-air threat posed by MiG-21s. MiG-21s. In the ace o these multiple hazards, Firebee drones were modied in order to meet a variety o reconnaissance reconnaissance roles. One variant was tted with a Low Altitude Barometric Control System, which allowed it to y at ultra-low levels to avoid North Vietnamese Vietnamese radar. radar. Another variant was modied to y at very high altitude, and another, another, known as the 147E, was designed to meet the requirement requirement or an ELINT platorm. This particular model proved invaluable or assessing the nature o the SAM’s guidance system and its using mechanism, and this intelligence was used subsequently by SAM suppression aircrat (Wild ( Wild Weasels) Weasels) and was, thereor t hereore, e, credited with saving scores o American aircrew aircrew and aircrat. The Firebee went on to save yet more lives in another capacity. Target drones were employed in what would be recognised today as a ‘strike package’ concept, whereby they ew below manned strike aircrat and high altitude reconnaissance drones, drones, drawing enemy re. Later in the war, Firebee target drones were used to draw re away rom B-52s operating over North Vietnam. Vietnam. Following successes successes with CHAFF dispensing drones in 1967-68, additional experimentation also proved the worth o the Firebee as an Electronic Counter-Measures platorm.25 By the middle o the Vietnam War, thereore, the drone had already proved itsel as an extremely exible exible and capable multi-role platorm. platorm. In 1969, the loss o a manned ECM aircrat, an EC-121 Super Constellation, with 31 personnel 21
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on board, spurred the development o a drone capable o data collection and transmission. This model, known as the 147TE, could collect electronic intelligence rom a range o 600 miles rom its parent aircrat. aircrat. This marked a true revolution in ECM technology, because a drone tted with ten receive receivers rs could collect the same amount o data as a manned ECM platorm, such as the EC-121, and relay the data instantaneously instantaneously..26 By the end o the Vietnam War, great strides had also been made in photographic reconnaissanc reconnaissance. e. The Firebee photographic reconnaiss reconnaissance ance models available in 1967-68 had operational ceilings o up to 66,000 eet and a range o over 400 miles, and could photograph a 22 mile wide strip along a pre-determined track o 800 miles. miles. By 1972, the 147SC 147SC model was tted with an all round horizon perspective, and the onboard cameras were capable o continuous photographic coverage coverage along a 155 mile path, with resolutions o less than one-third o a metre. metre. Course corrections in this model model were also achieved by Doppler radar. radar. The 147SC model perormed 1,651 operational missions in the last two years o the Vietnam War, War, and a late war modication also saw the 147SC Firebee used in night reconnaissa reconnaissance, nce, and some drones 27 were equipped with inra-red sensors. Throughout the whole o the Vietnam War, War, drones (mainly Firebees) perormed 3,435 sorties in their various roles. The biggest advocates advocates o UAV UAV employment, perhaps not surprisingly, became the ghter and reconnaissance aircrews, aircrews, who did not want to repeat their Vietnam experience when drones had more than proved that they could do the job. Had the American involvement involvement in Vietnam gone on or another year, it is probable that Firebees would have been employed as as unmanned bombers. bombers. Experimentation into cruise missiles had been going on since the autumn o 1971, when the US Navy red a number o Firebee Low Altitude Ship to Ship Homing Missiles (FLASH) in an attempt to match the latest Soviet anti-shipping missile, the Styx . The FLASH was designed to y at an altitude o 300 eet, descending to 25 eet in order to deliver a payload o two 500lb bombs. In other experiments, Firebees were modied to carry Maverick missiles or potential use against SAM sites. However,, the American decision in 1968 to withdraw rom Vietnam meant However that most o this experimentation was not ully unded by the US Deence Department, and it was let to another nation, Israel, to pick up the reins o UCAV development.28 During the 1970s, Israel secretly purchased twelve Firebees rom the USA, and modied them to their own specication, known as Firebee 1241s. These played important roles in i n the 1973 Yom Yom Kippur war between Israel, Egypt and Syria, acting as surveillance platorm, decoy drones drones and also UCAVs. UCAVs. On the second day o the war, the Israeli Air Force used Firebees to lead attacks on Egyptian air deences deences along the Suez Canal. The Egyptians red most o their SAMs at this rst wave o UCAVs, and the Firebees successully evaded 32 o the SAMs, and destroyed 11 others with Shrike anti-radar missiles. missiles. This success was noted by the Americans, but, remarkably, the US did not reinvigorate research research 22
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into UAVs and UCAVs until the late 1980s. 29 It was during the decade ater the Vietnam and Yom Yom Kippur Wars that the Israelis took too k the lead in UAV UAV and UCAV research and development. They quickly became world leaders l eaders in small UAV technology or surveillance o the battlespace and urban environment, environment, in particular. In 1978, Israel Aircrat Industries led the way with the Scout , a piston-engined piston- engined UAV UAV with a wingspan o 13 eet, made rom breglass. breglass. The Israelis had been conducting conducting experiments with low-radar signature aircrat, and breglass was assessed as the ideal material or a small platorm o this this type. The Scout could transmit real time, 360 degree surveillance via a television camera mounted in the central turret o the UAV UAV.. Its greatest operational operati onal success occurred during the 1982 Bekaa Valley conict between Israel, Israel, Lebanon and Syria. Syria. Israel used a eet o Scouts to search or Syrian SAM missile sites, and having located all but two t wo o these sites, the Israeli Air Force Force was able to destroy them and gain the initiative. initiative. The Israelis went on to inict serious damage on the Syrian Air Force, as they lost 86 aircrat, or the loss o just one Israeli aircrat, and this Air Superiority advantage allowed the Israelis ull reedom o manoeuvre. manoeuvre. Thereor Thereore, e, it can be said that the Scouts played an essential essential part in preparation o the battlespace. battlespace. A urther development o the Scout was called the Pioneer , and this could accommodate ECM equipment as well well as surveillance cameras. cameras. Like the Scout , this was guided either by a predetermined programme linked to an autopilot or by a ground controller. controller. During the late 1980s, the US purchased 20 Pioneers, and these were utilised extensively by the US Army during Gul War I and remain in use within the US military. milit ary.30 The rst Gul War o 1991 delineates the beginning o modern UAV and UCAV technology and conceptualisation. conceptualisation. The preceding discussion discussion demonstrates that modern platorms and their integration into the current battlespace owes much to multiple technological and conceptual threads, some o which date as ar back as the 19th Century. A broad survey o unmanned unmanned development highlights a number o important issues. First, the acceptance acceptance o UAVs UAVs and UCAVss as proper constituents o orce structure is much earlier than most UCAV people would suppose.31 Second, the idea that unmanned platorms can and should be substitutes or manned systems has been surprisingly common among aircrews. However, thirdly, interest in and government unding or unmanned platorms has been episodic in most countries, driven mainly by operational requirements. requirements. The US experience experience is a good case in point. point. The US military became very interested in UAVs and UCAVs out o necessity during the Second World War War and then again during Vietnam, but then lost l ost interest in the decade ollowing Vietnam. Given the heightened heightened sensitivity to casualties brought about by the Vietnam War War,, and the act that the main US military milit ary operations during the late 1970s, early 1980s tended to be covert (especially in South America), this is an interesting nding. Fourth, and related to the above point, is the act that nations which became leading advocates or operators o unmanned technology have been heavily dependent on the t he research and development perormed by other nations in order either to kick-start or 23
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reinvigorat e their own UA reinvigorate UAV V and UCAV UCAV programmes. Most o today’s leading unmanned platorm producers do not have uninterrupted programmes as part o their heritage. When one considers considers the great advances which which were made during some conicts, such as the Vietnam War War in areas such as ECM and high resolution photographic reconnaissance capabilities, this uneven investment has had serious serious implications. Finally Finally,, in spite o this episodic and uneven historical development, it is still possible to argue that unmanned platorms have played substantial and oten decisive roles in a number o conicts. conict s. Durin During g the Second World War War,, the German V-weapons programme, in particular, had the potential to seriously weaken British morale and certainly cer tainly caused a major diversion o air power and intelligence resources in an eort to counter the threat. During conicts such as the Vietnam War, War, unmanned unmanned platorms proved to be ar less politically inammatory than manned platorms or surveillance and reconnaissance purposes, and their worth as weapons platorms or preparation o the battlespace was amply demonstrated by the Israelis in 1982 in the Bekaa Bek aa Valley. Valley. In all o these cases, the UAVs UAVs and UCAVs UCAVs saved lives, which is the ultimate litmus test or the nations employing them. NOTES On board gyroscopic guidance. www.pbs.org-NOVA 3 Armitage, M. Unmanned Aircrat (Brassey’s, London, 1988), p. 1. 4 Ibid . 5 Ibid , pp.2-3. 6 National Archives, Archives, AIR 19/138. Bombing trials with HMS HMS Centurion, 1929: Summary o Results; Covering note by Air Sta, dd. 1 Nov 1929; Report entitled: ‘Bombing trials against HMS Centurion’ by Air Marshal E. L. Ellington, 14 Oct 1929; AIR 9/4. Air Sta memo: ‘The present position with regard to the Air versus Guns controversy’’, dd. Sept 1930. See also ADM 1/8613. Repor controversy Reports ts on bombing attacks against HMS Agamemnon, 1921; AIR 8/85. Summar Summaryy o Great Britain’s bombing trials carried out in 1921, 1922, 1923 and 1924; Goulter, CJM. A Forgotten Oensive: Royal Air Force Coastal Command’s Anti-Shipping Campaign , 1940-1945 (Frank Cass, 1995), Chaps 2-3. 7 Gatland, K. Development o the Guided Missile (London, Ilie, 1952), Chap.5; Armitage, op. cit .,., pp. 30-33. 8 i n War and Peace (Harvard University Press, Parson, N. Guided Missiles in Cambridge, 1956), p.21; Ford, B. German Secret Weapons: Blueprint or Mars (Ballantine, 1969), p.55. 9 For a discussion o technology transer at the end o the Second S econd World World War, War, see Uttley, MRH. ‘Operation Surgeon’ and Britain’s Britain’s Post-War Exploitation o Nazi German Aeronautics’, Intelligence and National Security , Vol.17, No.2, Summer 2002, pp.1-26. 10 Armitage, op. cit., pp.7-10. 11 Ibid., pp.8-9. 12 Webster, C. and Frankland, N. The Strategic Air Oensive Against Germany , Vol. III (HMSO, 1961), p.296. p.296. See also pp. pp. 36, 39, 41-48; Hinsley, H. et al. British 1 2
24
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Intelligence in the Second World War , Vol. III, Part 2 (HMSO, 1988), pp.536-545; Armitage, op. cit., pp.10-13. 13 Hinsley, op. cit . pp.533-535, 622. 14 Armitage, op. cit., p.16. 15 Gatland, op. cit., p. 137. 137. See also Chaps Chaps 5-6. 16 Ibid . 17 Gatland, K. op. cit., Chap.5; Armitage, op. cit., pp.24-28, 30-33. For the technical details o these systems, see www.ctie.monash.edu/hargrave/ rpav 18 Armitage, pp.25-27. 19 Ibid., Chap 5. 20 Ibid., p.65. 21 Ibid., p.65; Jones, C. ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): An Assessment o Historical Operations and Future Possibilities’, unpublished research paper, ACSC, Maxwell Air Force Base, 1997, pp.8-13. 22 Armitage, pp.66-69. 23 McDaid, H. and Oliver, D. Robot Warriors (Orion Media, 1997), pp.38-39 pp.38-39;; Armitage, pp.70-71. 24 McDaid and Oliver, p.38; Armitage, p.71. 25 Forcee Did in Vietnam and Why (Air University Tilord, E. Set Up: What the Air Forc Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, 1991), Chap. 3; Armitage, pp.74-75, 81. 26 Armitage, p.76. 27 Jones, C. op. cit., pp. 8-11; Armitage, pp.76-78. 28 Armitage, pp.78-81. 29 www.pbs.org-NOVA (July 2008); Jones, p.17. 30 www.pbs.org-NOVA (July 2008); Armitage, pp.82-86. pp.82-86. 31 For example, it was suggested in a US Department o Deence study, entitled ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles’, dated February 2004 (p.3), that acceptance o UAVs and recognition o their worth has always been slow, and that proper conceptualisation o unmanned systems has occurred only within the last ve or six years.
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UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE OPERATIONS SINCE THE 1980s
Dr David Jordan & Ben Wilkins
T
he successul employment o unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in Vietnam did not lead to their widespread acceptance within the United States, or in many other nations. While there was a clear appreciation o the value that could be gained rom utilising unmanned systems or battleeld observation – perhaps best exemplied in NATO by the Canadair CL-89 and its derivatives – there was a general lack o impetus i mpetus in taking orward the technologies underpinning UAVs. UAVs. Although aviation journals – oten those aimed at enthusiasts – sometimes speculated on air power becoming dominated by aircrat controlled remotely by pilots sitting in the relative comort o control bunkers, a variety o actors militated against the t he widespread development development o UAVs or the remaining years o the Cold War. However, within only a ew years o the collapse o the Soviet Union, unmanned aerial vehicles were deployed deployed on combat operations, gathering vital intelligence inormation; and a less than a decade beyond that, UAVs carrying weapons were to be ound playing a notable part in operations in a variety o locations around the world. This chapter traces the somewhat rocky development o UAVs over the course o the past quarter-century, quar ter-century, where the UAV UAV has moved rom being an idea in search o support and proper management to playing a signicant part in military operations around the globe. As the Cold War drew to a close in the late 1980s, the prospects or the uture use o UAV by armed services were not altogether clear. Although what were then reerred to as Remotely Piloted Vehicles Vehicles (RPVs) had been used with some success in the Vietnam War, War, there had been a certain loss o enthusiasm in the United States during the latter part o the 1970s. In 1975, the position had been very dierent – the US Air Force had been carrying out trials which saw RPVs carrying precision weapons and electronic warare systems, in a bid to evaluate expanding their role rom reconnaissance. Within twelve months, however, the picture had changed. Control o RPVs passed rom Strategic Air Command to Tactical Air Command (TAC). As TAC was on the verge o procuring large numbers o A-10s and F-16s, this placed considerable unding pressure on UAV projects; by 1978, the last operational USAF RPV squadron was disbanded, disbanded, and all but one American RPV/UAV RPV/UAV programmes had been abandoned by 1981, only the Army’ Army ’s Aquila mini-UAV mini-UAV remaining – and even this system ultimately 1 ailed to enter service. There were also signs o institutional resistance to the idea o new technology technology,, with the Government Accountability Accountability Oce noting in 1981 that ‘RPVs appear to suer rom the attitude o the users and not rom technological drawbacks or ineasible systems.’ 2 While interest in UAVs appeared to have waned in the United States, the same could not be said o Israel, where the development development o unmanned systems had 26
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been a source o considerable interest since the 1973 Yom Yom Kippur/October War. RPVs oered a means by which the relative small Israeli Deence Force (IDF) could expand reconnaissance reconnaissance capability without the need to expand its RF-4 Phantom eet (at considerably greater cost), while also oering the opportunity to conduct operations where the risk o losing airrames was high without the concomitant loss o aircrew.3 By 1982, the IDF had a mixture o RPVs which it went on to use to great eect in the Lebanon War o that year. The IDF’s IDF’s planning relied upon detailed inormation o enemy dispositions, much o which was obtained by a combination o manned and unmanned aerial platorms. The location o almost every Syrian radar and surace to air missile (SAM) site in the Bekka Bekk a valley was discovered, discovered, and even the mobility o some o the SAM systems was oset by regular and persistent overight, which allowed maps to be updated to the extent that inormation about the Syrian ground based air deences was no more than 48 hours old.4 RPVs were also employed in the Israeli Suppression o Enemy Air Deences (SEAD) eort which opened the Bekaa Valley campaign, being used to encourage Syrian SAM radars to come on air. Once they were emitting and located, the radars were attacked by manned aircrat and the missile batteries themselves, useless without radar guidance, bombed. 5 RPVs were not only used as decoys in the campaign to destroy the Syrian air deence system; there is evidence that Masti RPVs provided electronic intelligence which allowed IDF Boeing 707s converted or use in the electronic countermeasures role to respond quickly when the Syrians attempted to exploit the relatively limited requency agility o SAMs such as the SA-6. 6 The RPVs conducted post-strike reconnaissance, and their contribution to the IDF’s success in the opening stage o what evolved into a long and seemingly interminable insurgency was judged by some observers to be ‘one o the most important lessons o the war’. 7 RPVs were utilised not only at the operational level, but with tactical-level ormations such as artillery artiller y command posts to improve the situational awareness and responsiveness responsiveness o their guns. Coordinates o enemy positions were obtained rom the RPV systems, and this allowed rapid dissemination o the exact location o target sets to the gun batteries, which were oten able to engage targets which might otherwise have relied upon their mobility to evade destruction. The value o RPVs was not lost on senior Israeli commanders and politicians; the then-Deenc then-Deence e Minister, Ariel Sharon, later claimed that he had watched the evacuation o PLO positions in Beirut via an RPV RPV..8 The success o the employment o RPVs by the Israelis sparked new interest in the United States, both within the individual armed services and the Department o Deense. The successul and innovative innovative employment o small, low-technology and relatively low-cost systems against some o the Soviet air deence systems likely to be encountered in Europe by NATO in the event o war suggested that it would be protable to resume resume exploration o unmanned unmanned aerial technology. The The possibility that t hat relatively low-cost platorms which were 27
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relatively easy to replace i lost, and whose loss would incur no human casualties could oset the numerical superiority o the Warsaw Warsaw Pact became a notion that entered the minds o aviation authors as well as senior ocers in the US. As it transpired, t ranspired, the unmanned aerial vehicle would prove prove to be rather more sophisticated and expensive than some o the optimistic projections o the early 1980s suggested. A urther inuence upon the renewed interest in UAVs in the US came about as a result o what might be regarded regarded as ortuitous ortuitous timing. At about the same time as Israeli UAVs were proving their viability over the Bekaa Valley, the American America n Deense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) (DARPA) had begun to examine the idea o long-endurance UAVs, UAVs, partly because the agency had recently ceased to manage ‘stealth’ programmes such as the F-117, and this newly-released capacity was ree to explore new concepts and projects that appeared to be o value; more cynically, some observers suggest that DARPA DARPA 9 had ‘an almost subconscious motive: to nd the next stealth’. While DARP DARPA A began exploring the potential o marrying marr ying long endurance UAVs UAVs with new technologies – ranging rom solar power to synthetic aperture radar – the Israelis continued to develop a series o smaller, more tactically-ocused platorms to build upon the successes o 1982. The 1980s thus saw a notable increase in development o unmanned aerial platorms, although DARPA’s programmes were requently hidden rom wider view by security issues. A series o projects investigating the technologies o long-endurance UAVs ollowed. In 1984, DARPA embarked upon the complementary Project Amber, Amber, intended to develop a series o smaller UAVs. UAVs. The contract or project development was given to a small company,, Leading Systems, (which literally began lie in the garage o its company ounder’ss house). By late ounder’ l ate 1986, Leading Systems had produced six prototypes – three UAVs or reconnaissance purposes and three more which were designed to serve as loitering cruise missiles.10 Alongside development o the project Amber airrames, Leading Systems also created a simpler derivative known as the Gnat 750. Although DARPA’s UAV projects demonstrated considerable promise, by the late 1980s, none o them appeared likely to produce a platorm or platorms which would soon be in service. ser vice. In 1986, the Senate Appropriations Committee expressed serious concerns over the apparent lack o direction inherent in the services’ approach to UAVs, and directed the DoD to produce a socalled ‘master plan’ or UAVs to be considered at hearings or the Fiscal Year 1988 deence budget. This did not occur, and Congress produced a sharply worded commentary which accused the t he services o ‘pursuing programs and technologies that should be merged to avoid duplication and to ensure cost eective approaches’. It imposed unding constraints on UAV development, mandating that work on unmanned systems should be conducted on a joint basis. Release o unds even or joint programmes was not authorised until the ‘master plan’ had been submitted.11 When the plan nally arrived beore Congress,, in June 1988, the Government Accounting Oce noted that it did Congress 28
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not remove duplication o platorms across the services, and sought to delay joint acquisition projects until 1990. It also discovered that a supposedly joint project in which the US Navy had responsibility or development o the UA UAV V airrame and the USAF the sensor payload had seen the Navy develop its own payload or the system, claiming that its sensor system would be ready or use earlier, more eective and cheaper than that being developed by the USAF. However, as the GAO noted, such a claim was problematic, since the Navy had ailed to conduct any testing which would validate its claims or greater eectiveness, eectivenes s, while the service entry dates or both payloads were the same – the claim or earlier availability was measured in, at most, a ew months.12 Congress was unamused. As a result o Congressional irritation, a new authority or all US military UAVs, UAVs, the Joint Program Oce (JPO) ( JPO) was established. The JPO rationalised the variety o projects underway at the time seeking to ocus upon a short-range UAV UAV or the Army, and a joint USAF/US Navy system which was to be a mediumrange, high-speed platorm capable o being launched rom an aircrat or a shipboard ramp. Unortunately, the JPO complicated matters by concluding that urther research and development development into UA UAVs Vs should be undertaken by industry. The number o UAVs UAVs required by the US armed services at that time was insucient to interest the major deence companies, and while smaller rms were interested, they lacked the capital to conduct the level o research and development necessary. Compounding matters, Congress mandated that the JPO was the sole authority on UAV UAV technologies and would set spending priorities. DARPA DARPA and the individual services were not permitted to spend on UAVs unless directed to do so by the JPO. As a result, there was no money or research and development, and the smaller concerns which had been interested in the eld turned tur ned their attention elsewhere. The JPO had been intended to expedite UAV UAV technologies – but, by the early 1990s, it had actually retarded development.13 Congressional interest in the development o UAVs came against a background o growing interest in such systems amongst the services. The US Navy became particularly keen to obtain its own unmanned aerial vehicles ater the debacle o its involvement in Lebanon in late 1983. USN aircrat supporting the United Nations peacekeeping mission to Lebanon were targeted by Syrian ground re on a number o occasions, prompting a retaliatory strike against anti-aircrat positions on 4 December 1983. The attack led to the loss o two US Navy aircrat (an A-7 Corsair and an A-6 Intruder), and the death o the A-6 pilot and the incarceration o his bombardier-navigator, bombardier-navigator, who was released only when the Syrians negotiated with the would-be Democratic presidential candidate, Senator Jesse Jackson, having pointedly reused to have any discussions with the Reagan administration. The political complications caused by the capture o US service ser vice personnel became apparent.14 Ten days ater the air strikes, the battleship USS New Jersey bombarded suspected anti-aircrat positions, but to little eect as locating the targets was 29
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dicult (without placing manned reconnaissance aircrat aircrat at risk), and battle damage assessment assessment was similarly problematic. The diculties encountered encountered during the Lebanon operation prompted the then-Secretary o the Navy, John Lehman, to direct the to invest in o-the shel systems or operational testing.15 Since there were no readily-available American systems, the Navy turned to Israel, procuring a number o Malat Masti III RPVs. The US Marine Corps’ rst RPV platoon was established in June 1984 to operate the Mastis. Another RPV based on an Israeli design, the RQ-2 Pioneer joined the USN in 1986, and the USMC received three similar systems (each Pioneer system including eight aerial vehicles) in 1987. The US Army, meanwhile, had been pursuing its own UAV, the Lockheed MQM-105 Aquila. This had its origins in the early 1970s, as part o the Target Target Acquisition, Designation and Aerial Reconnaissance (T ( TADAR) programme, which was intended to provide a lightweight, low-cost battleeld observation system. The test programme in 1982 was aficted by serious issues regarding systems integration. The The plan to have no ewer than 995 MQM-105s in service by 1985 was clearly clearly too optimistic, as was the desired desired sensor t. t. As the manuacturers struggled to provide sensors or the Aquila, costs quintupled. Ater spending more than $1 billion on the project, it became clear that the Aquila could not be made to work without incurring disproportionate costs, and it was cancelled in 1987.16 The Army instead joined the Pioneer procurement, obtaining a single system, which arrived or testing in 1990. The USAF, meanwhile, had tested a number o UAV, but none reached operational service. Thus, as the Cold War drew to a close, none o the US services had a robust UAV capability, even though the value o such systems had been identied more than 20 years beore. However, these disappointments came against the background o growing enthusiasm or unmanned platorms; platorm s; the Reagan administration’ administrati on’ss Fiscal Fiscal Year 1987 budget requested greater greater unding or unmanned systems, marking the point at which the United States began the move rom being in possession o an array o experimental programmes which had not led to the elding o operational systems to the procurement o unmanned aerial vehicles intended or use by the armed services. 17 It became clear that the tardy and disorganised development o UAVs prior to the FY 1987 budget request had denied the US orces an extremely useul intelligence-gathering capability when the lessons learned, on 2 August 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, culminating in the ormation o an international coalition to evict Iraq rom Kuwaiti territory by orce i necessary. Saddam ignored UN mandates, and by the end o the year, it was clear that it would not be long beore military operations to achieve this goal began. While the subsequent war was a resounding military victory or the US-led coalition, the role played by UAVs was rather less than it might have been had the disorganised and oten hal-hearted approach o the previous decade been avoided. 30
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Operation Desert Storm Although events in Lebanon had pushed orward American interest in the development o UAVs, even the o-the-shel procurement o Pioneers had done little to provide the level o UAV coverage that was desired. Only 50 were in the inventory when hostilities began. The US Army had only recently acquired its system, and this was undertaking a number o tests when the need to deploy became clear. The end result was that the Army’ Army’ss Pioneer platoon did not arrive in theatre until a week ater hostilities broke out, and it did not y a mission until 1 February 1991.18 The ew air vehicles available were assigned to US VII Corps, and perormed per ormed extremely well – however however,, once the quality o inormation which could be obtained rom the systems became apparent, there were requests or UAV coverage rom the Corps sta which were simply impossible to provide because o the lack o airrames available. The ew Pioneers available managed to provide valuable intelligence about enemy positions, and delivered delivered inormation about so many targets that it i t was impossible or VII Corps to make plans to attack all o them. Cordesman and Wagner suggest ‘a relatively cheap and simple UAV provided ar more useul manoeuvre and repower allocation data than any possible combination o billions o dollars worth o satellites and manned xed-wing assets’.19 The USMC enjoyed similar levels o success with the our Pioneer companies which it deployed during the war. 138 missions were own during the build up to the conict, while another 185 missions were carried out during the ghting itsel. As it became clear that the inormation provided by the Pioneers was vital to the planning and prosecution o the USMC’s USMC’s operations, eorts were made to bring as many Pioneers as possible into theatre, sourcing additional resources rom developmental establishments. Similar value rom the Pioneers was obtained by the USN. Perhaps the best example o the eectiveness o the Pioneer in meeting its originally-intended task o enhancing the accuracy o naval gunre support was provided by one o the most peculiar incidents o the war. One o these UAVs, launched rom the battleship USS Wisconsin , became uncontrollable and headed o over Iraqi positions on Fa Faylaka ylaka Island, which had already been subjected to heavy bombardment by the Wisconsin and its sister-ship, the USS Missouri . The operators were astounded to see enemy troops pouring out o their bunkers and trenches waving any white material they could lay l ay their hands upon in a desperate bid to surrender prior – they assumed – to the arrival o yet more 16-inch shells rom the battleships. One account has it that the Pioneer operators had lost ight control over the UAV, and that ater a while, adding to the impression that the little UA UAV V had developed a mind o its own, the Pioneer seemed to tire o the situation and ew o, later crashing when it ran out o uel.20 Desert Storm conrmed the utility util ity o UAVs UAVs once more, and while the claim made by one author that ‘the UAV UAV came o age during Operation Desert Deser t Shield/ 31
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Desert Storm’ rather rather overlooks the importance impor tance o Israeli operations in Lebanon, it is not unair to suggest that events in the Persian Gul in 1991 reinorced reinorced the view in the United States that there was a need or an increased UAV capability.21 Ater-action assessments were less than avourable in their views on the approach taken by all three services to UAVs UAVs prior to 1991. Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner Wagner pulled no punches in outlining the reason or this state o aairs: One o the reasons the US Army lacked eective tactical intelligence support in Desert Storm was that it had mismanaged its development o UAVs during the preceding decade. The ailure o ...the Aquila program was only part o a much broader ailure to develop a amily o sensors, develop advanced packages o sensors, and an adequate data transmission system. The Army’s Army’s ailures in this area are widely regarded as one o the worst examples o overall program management and development development activity in i n US military history.22 Cordesman and Wagner Wagner were hardly more complimentary about the other services, noting that the USMC did not have enough systems, systems, while the ocus o the USAF upon strategic UAV UAV programmes which had ailed to deliver the sort o capability required or battleeld use meant that they had little to oer. In spite o the relatively basic nature o the UAVs available at the time, the amount o inormation which could be obtained suggested that the ability to provide real-time or near real-time data to commanders at ormation level gave the US orces benetting rom the provision o this intelligence an additional edge. The Pioneers suered ew losses to enemy re, and the level o persistence over the battleeld oered by the type was notable, although the implications o this long-term loitering ability were perhaps not ully appreciated at the time. Cordesman and Wagner Wagner lamented the act that there had been no real debate over the value o the UAV in modern warare, or over the need or more capable systems with longer range.23 In act, the recognition o just how useul UAVs might be had occurred, and there was little need or real debate – it was not a question o whether UAVs were useul and should be procured, rather one o how such systems should be procured and used. The US armed orces were orced to return to the tangled remnants o indigenous UAV procurement polity in a bid to set out a path ahead. As the author Bill Yenne Yenne observed, ‘it was not until the mid-1990s that the promise and potential o UA UAVs Vs had progressed to the point where they could be considered to be ully integrated in American military doctrine’.24
Building UAV capability ater Desert Storm With a urther ur ther illustration o the clear benets that could be gained rom UA UAVs, Vs, the general lack o progress within the US procurement system became a source o growing concern within the American deence community, community, even though it was elt by some observers that more traditionalist interests in the 32
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air orce and navy were ar rom unhappy at the slow rate o development. The JPO was seen as an obstacle to progress, and revelations by the GAO o high spending on UAV UAV projects with only the problematic BQM/AQM-145 BQM/AQM-145 medium range UAV and the army’s Hunter short-range UAV to show or it. Inormed observers were unsurprised when the JPO was, to all intents and purposes, abandoned when it was subsumed into the Deense Airborne Reconnaissanc Reconnaissance e 25 Oce (DARO), ormed in 1994. DARO took over just one active UAV UAV programme, the Gnat-750, which, ater the ailure o the original design authority, Leading Systems, had been acquired by General Atomics. A number o Gnat-750s and their ground stations were soon ordered by the Central Intelligence Agency’ Agency ’s (CIA) Directorate o Science S cience and Technology. Beyond the auspices o the Pentagon, the CIA was not bound by the restrictions placed on UAV procurement by Congress, and pressed ahead with the project. A number o Gnat-750s were deployed deployed in 1994, rst to Albania, and then to a still-publically undisclosed location, believed to be Hungary. Although weather conditions are thought to have adversely aected the Gant-750’s Gant-750’s perormance during the rst deployment, the results o the second overseas operation were encouraging.26 This perormance appears to have helped to contribute to the Gnat-750’s Gnat-750’s selection as part o DARO’s DARO’s rst major project, which was another attempt at a long endurance UAV. To reduce risk, DARO decided that it would divide the programme into two ‘tiers’, with Gnat-750 serving as the ‘Tier I’ UAV. An evolution o the Gnat-750, built by General Atomics’ Aeronautical Aeronautical Systems Inc division would orm Tier Tier II – this was to be known as the Predator. Predator. The next step, Tier II+ , would be ullled by a type capable o loitering at altitudes o up to 65,000 eet or 24 hours at a range o almost 3,500 miles rom its home base. The competition to provide the Tier II+ and Tier III capabilities was ercer than anticipated, but culminated with Teledyne Teledyne Ryan being given the contract to produce what would become the RQ-4 Global Hawk. The impressive RQ-4 was soon overshadowed by the emergence o the Tier III platorm, the RQ-3 DarkStar [sic], produced by an alliance between Boeing and Lockheed Martin, and which attracted considerable attention or its unusual appearance: It was so unusual that the trade publication Deense News, which acquired a leaked drawing o the aircrat beore the roll-out, helpully added an arrow to indicate the direction o ight – and got it backwards. Even Even one Lockheed Martin Mart in company publication printed a photo o the vehicle upside down.27 DarkStar rst ew in March 1996, but on its second ight, it crashed, and the entire programme came to a halt. The Global Hawk programme continued, rst ying in 1998. These two new and technologically impressive programmes rather overshadowed the act that the simpler Predator, Predator, had already entered th USAF service. The 11 Reconnaissanc Reconnaissance e Squadron activated in July 1995, receiving ten Advance Advanced d Concept Technology Technology Demonstration airrames. 33
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Several were deployed deployed to the Balkans to support United Nations operations over the ormer Yugoslavia Yugoslavia between July 1995 and March 1996. A month ater a ter the return o the demonstration Predators to the United States, the USAF was conrmed as the operating service ser vice or the Predator, Predator, receiving production airrames rom 1997. While Predator numbers increased, increased, the promise shown by the Global Hawk led to the withdrawal o unding or DarkStar in early 1999. DARO also disappeared as part o the Deense Reorm Initiative. There There had been some criticism o DARO’s handling o UAV development which helped contribute to this decision, although some observers later questioned whether or not all o the criticism had been deserved. 28 While the bureaucratic progression o UAV UAV management turned in yet another direction, the actual deployment o American UAVs UAVs on operations in the Balkans may, perhaps, perhaps, be seen as the point at which the value o employing unmanned systems nally began to be given greater credence. credence. The ability o UAVs to provide reconnaissance inormation regarding activities by the warring parties in the Balkans had been demonstrated to good eect, despite the act that UAVs were less robust than manned aircrat. UAVs oered major advantages in terms o their ability to loiter relatively unobtrusively over areas o interest or long periods, and because o the act that the loss o an unmanned airrame was ar less politically loaded than suering attrition amongst manned aircrat; the loss o the F-16 piloted by Captain Scott O’Grady to a Serbian surace to air missile in June 1995 and the subsequent public reaction to his recovery illustrated just how greatly reduced the political risks o employing unmanned platorms might be (although it should be noted that the sortie O’Grady was ying was to maintain the UN No-Fly Zone over Bosnia, which was not a task a UA UAV V could undertake). Although relatively limited, the role played by the Predator system sent to the Balkans in 1995 was worthy o note. As the Director o DARO noted: In July 1995, a Predator system was deployed to Albania to support Joint Task Force (JTF) Provide Promise. That deployment clearly demonstrated the potential o UAVs UAVs to support military militar y orces by monitoring civilian activities, troop locations, artillery positions, garrison activities, and compliance with agreements agreements.. Predator was instrumental in veriying that Bosnians were not complying with agreements to garrison their orces orces.. When air orces were employed in Deliberate Force, Predator was used or real time targeting and retargeting. As a result o the Deliberate Force operation, Bosnian compliance was achieved and the Dayton Peace Accord was signed by all parties. par ties.29 The urther deployment to Hungary in 1996 in support o operations by the UN Implementation Force (IFOR) and then the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) which maintained the terms o the Dayton Accords proved successul, successul, although as already noted weather was an issue or UAV operations. Just as with the Gnat750s, the harsh winter created serious problems or the Predators, and this 34
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led to moves to introduce a de-icing capability on two specially modied air vehicles. Unortunately, Unortunately, the weather proved so inclement that neither was able to y.30 However, the inherent value o the Predator was appreciated, and when the next stage in the Balkan conicts played out in Kosovo, the act that UAVs UAVs would be o considerable utility was ully ull y appreciated. As the situation in Kosovo deteriorated, deteriorated, the international community attempted to bring about a diplomatic solution to the crisis, but this could not be achieved achieved.. As a result, the NATO NA TO member nations concluded concluded - with considerable reluctance on the part o some – that it would be necessary to carry out coercive air attacks attacks on the Yugoslavia Yugo slavia in a bid to bring Preside President nt Slobodan Milosevic’s compliance with the terms o the Rambouillet R ambouillet agreement which attempted to bring about a settlement to the crisis.31
Operation Allied Force – Kosovo, 1999 In the build-up to Operation Allied Force, the diplomatic manoeuvring that occurred as the Organisation or Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) endeavoured endeavour ed to monitor events in Kosovo saw the deployment o a number o USAF Predators, Predators, ying rom Hungary in a bid to provide the OSCE with as much inormation as possible on events in the disputed province. The Predators Predators conducted a number o overights during October and November 1998, but had to be withdrawn and replaced by CL-289 UAVs operated by the German army during the winter as a result o icing problems which militated against the Predators ying.32 The CL-289s, CL-289s, operating rom Macedonia, were still in place when the decision to coerce President President Milosevic’s Milosevic’s regime by air attack was taken. Predictions that Milosevic would be orced to the negotiating table ater a ew days o bombing proved ill-ounded, and the need or additional ISTAR assets became obvious. There had been no attempt to deploy Predators to the Balkans again, not least because the USAF was concerned over the act that the technical manuals or the type had not been validated, an issue which had led to delays in the Initial Operational Testing Testing and Evaluation programme.33 The requirement or additional ISTAR assets overrode these concerns, and it was not long beore elements o the 11th Reconnaissanc Reconnaissance e Squadron had been despatched to support operations in the Balkans. They were joined by US Navy RQ-2A Pioneers, which were to be used to locate targets or attack by naval aircrat (most notably P-3 Orions using the AGM-84E Stand-o Land Attack Missile) and to maintain a watch on Yugoslavian Yugoslavian naval units based in Montenegro.. The German army reinorced Montenegro reinorced its CL-289 battery that was already in place. The French army sent a number o its CL-289s, while the British prepared to deploy the much-lampooned Phoenix UAV system, operated by the Royal Artillery.34 The US Army also despatched UAVs, in the orm o the recently-rejuvenated recently-rejuvenated RQ-5 Hunter, which had enjoyed a new lease l ease o lie ater improvements to components which had been responsible or a spate o crashes in 1995. The rst Hunter mission was conducted on 4 April 1999. 35
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Used as a means o providing real-time surveillance o tactical targets such as artillery artiller y positions and Yugoslavian Yugoslavian army positions, Hunter imagery imager y was downlinked to Skopje, and then sent on either to NATO headquarters, the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) (CAOC) in Belgium, or direct to the Pentagon Pentagon.. The targets o interest i nterest or the Hunters were requently well-deended, with hal o the eight losses sustained by the type being to surace-to-air missiles.35 Although the air campaign lasted rather longer than envisaged envisaged,, the part played by UAVs was notable in terms o the contribution made to ISTAR. It may not be unreasonable to suggest that as ar as the United States and the United Kingdom were concerned, Operation Allied Force marked the point at which it became clear that UAVs UAVs were valuable orce multipliers which had to be brought into much more widespread use than had been the case beore (the Israelis, o course, had reached this conclusion over teen years previously). Ater a delay in getting the Predato Predators rs ready or operations, they proved particularly successul in the location o Yugoslav army ormations, ormations, which allowed NATO NATO attack aircrat to be sent in to engage these targets beore they dispersed or moved on to new locations. NATO’s UAVs were also put to work conducting Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), but despite the best eorts o the UAV operators, the overall BDA coverage was later elt to have allen short o the ideal.36 Nevertheless, the work o the UAVs available was noted or its general ecacy, even though Predator and Hunter were both ound to be in need o better optical sensors i they were to provide eective imagery rom heights above 8,000 eet.37 The British Phoenix system ared rather better, even though it was employed or tasks it was not designed or: On the D-day D- day when they crossed over, the Phoenix detected 12 Mig 21s at Pristina as the Serbs were withdrawing, these were detected at some considerable range. It is interesting that a previous RPV had own over the same location and had not located that, it had declared the area clear. clear. It has a much better resolution than comparable systems. Now when the Russians occupied the airport the Phoenix overew the complete area and was able to identiy vehicles and give inormation on their activity. Because o the low cloud in that area, Phoenix was oten the only UAV in theatre that was able to provide any inormation on a regular basis. It was tasked with monitoring the ground security zone and it did that eectively eectively.. Prior to D-day D- day it conducted a search o all known Serb positions and this proved in act in the majority o cases the Serbs had withdrawn. It gave our orces a tremendous capability which we did not have beore.38 While the Phoenix provided much useul inormation, it did so at a high cost in airrames, with 13 being lost during both the campaign and the atermath where the platorm was in use to monitor Serb compliance with the peace agreement which had brought Allied Force to a conclusion. By the time the Select Committee on Deence report on Kosovo had been published, a number 36
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o UAV programmes or the British orces were in place, most notably the move to replace Phoenix with the Watchkeeper Watchkeeper system.39 The success o UAVs UAVs encouraged the Americans Am ericans to give even greater consideration to the elding o such systems. The using o imagery rom Predators with inormation obtained rom E-8C Joint STARS surveillance aircrat greatly enhanced USAF targeting options. However However,, this added a urther complication in that it soon became clear that employing Predators to cue attack aircrat demanded that the operators o the system be trained in the arts o orward air control. As Secretary o the Air Force James Roche recalled in 2003: When we rst elded the Predator, Predator, the intelligence community owned it. So in Kosovo, when the Predator ound Serb orces in a village there, we d have one o those rustrating, yet predictable conversations as we tried to come up with ways to make these new systems work or the warghters. When they’d see a tank between two red-rooed buildings, the Predator pilot or systems operator would try to talk the eyes o the A-10 pilot onto the tank. But the people ying the Predator were not people who were schooled in close air support or the tactics o orward air control.40 This problem was quickly addressed thanks to the intervention o the Commander o US Air Forces in Europe, General John P Jumper: So, as [General ] John [Jumper] likes to tell it, you’d have this “dialogue o the dea” between the Predator crew and the A-10 crew: “Sir, it’s the tank between the two red rooed buildings.” O course, the A-10 sees 40 villages all with red roos. The operator o the Predator is looking through a soda straw at 10-power magnication. He says, Well, Well, i you look over to the let there’s a road right beside the two houses. A tree line is right next to that. A river is running nearby ...” Forty-ve minutes later,, the A-10 might be in the same Zip code, but certainly hasn’ later hasn’tt gotten his or her eyes on the target. Ater too many o these t hese exasperating exchanges, exchanges, John said, “let’s put a laser designator on the Predator.” The rapid reaction part o the acquisition community came in and did just that. It took them just two weeks to put a laser designation device on the Predator. Then, we quickly learned l earned how to do target designation and talk others onto a target.41 Jumper’s intervention intervention led to the t he procurement o a number o Raytheon AAS-44 sensor systems, which contained a laser ranger and a laser designator. This This provided Predator Predator operators with the t he ability to designate targets directly or suitably armed attack aircrat. The capability arrived just too late to see use, but proved eective when tested in the United States ater the air campaign had nished. nished. Had the campaign continued, continued, it had been intended to send the Predators below the cloud base to locate and designate targets 37
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or attack aircrat, which were not permitted to descend to the altitudes necessary to bring them out under the clouds, even though this meant that their laser-guided weapons could not be employed. The decision to bar low level operations had been taken in a bid to ensure that NATO casualties were minimised, but this compromised the eectiveness o the air operations; although the use o UAVs UAVs with suitable designation equipment oered one solution to the problem, the US also chose to pursue the development o weapons guided through the use o the Global Positioning System, System, leading to the creation o the all-weather all-weather Joint Direct Attack Munition Munition (JDAM) series o bombs, a solution ollowed by the RAF with the decision to introduce a GPScapability on its i ts Enhanced Paveway Paveway series o bombs. Once Allied Force came to an end, the prospect o employing Predators or designation purposes aced a notable threat: [T]he tyranny o our acquisition process engaged again, and that laser designator came o the aircrat because it wasn’t “in the program”. 42 General Jumper, Jumper, who moved rom his post in Europe to become chie o USAF Air Combat Command in February 2000, soon discovered that the upgraded sensor systems had been removed, and directed that they should be put back again. He also made a decisive contribution to the way in which Predator would be employed in uture, by calling or Predator Predator to be tted with a weapon – as the aircrat had a laser designator Jumper reasoned that it was olly or the Predators not to carry laser-guided l aser-guided weapons o their own, in the orm o the AGM-114 AGM-114 Hellre anti-armour missile. missile. Jumper was told that such a project would take ve years to implement and cost around $15 million. Unimpressed,, Jumper gave the project team $3 million and three months to Unimpressed conduct preliminary testing.43 Jumper’ Jumper’ss timeline was met, giving the Predator a signicant capability which will be discussed urther below. Although the ability to use Predator as a targeting system was one o the positive outcomes rom Allied Force, another issue arose, namely that o the presence o a system which could provide real-time imagery being misapplied by commanders seeking to employ a ‘long screwdriver’ screwdriver’ approach to operations. The most notable oender appears to have been General Clark himsel, as according to ocers working in the CAOC: [General Clark] would on occasions telephone the CAOC demanding that UAVs UAVs break o rom their tasking and go and look at things o interest to him. Clark was in daily telephone contact with Kosovo Liberation Army chie, Hashim Thaci, Thaci, and immediately ater these conversations convers ations would dispatch a UAV to look at what oten turned out to be spurious targets.44 This presented a number o diculties, since a number o airmen argued that SACEUR’ss intervention in the tasking process meant that a number o critical SACEUR’ targets, careully chosen by the intelligence community as being worthy o urther examination went without coverage as a result; urthermore, ur thermore, some 38
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suggested that Clark occasionally succumbed to a temptation to micromanage based upon what he could see rom UAV eed, orgetting that his view was that o a man ‘looking through a soda straw at 10-power magnication’. This hazard was outweighed by the value o the imagery imager y that could be provided by UAVs, although the dangers o a commander demanding so much coverage that the apportionment o assets became a live issue which remains to be resolved. Perhaps the most important aspect o UAVs in Allied Force, however, was the act that it was obvious that the value they added to operations was substantial, even i there were some limitations arising rom technology and procedural issues that arose: UAVs such as USAF Predator and US Army Hunter could identiy targets through their real time video output. Limits on the ecient use o UAVs during Allied Force were due mostly to the lack o integration with the conventional operational orces. UAVs had never been integrated into the air tasking order (ATO) (ATO) with strike packages and the lack o training between UAVs and FACAs made tasks such as altitude deconiction and target talk-ons dicult. Even so, the ability o UAVs to locate and identiy Serbian orces was a much sought ater capability and operational techniques were quickly patched together. together. One example was the eort to connect Predator with the FACA. A Tactical Air Control Party (T ( TACP) controller located at the CAOC, monitored Predator Predator video and perormed real time target t arget talk-ons via a radio link through the Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) to FACAs overying the target area. The occasions when these missions were successul provided a glimpse into the potential o ully integrated UAV UAV platorms with conventional strike aircrat. But UAV-FACA employment techniques were in their inancy at the end o Allied Force and did not produce a signicant number o target engagements.45
Ater Allied Force Whatever the issues raised by the access commanders could gain rom ootage provided by UAVs, the Kosovo campaign could be said to have marked a turning point or the widespread use o UAVs. Although Predator gained most o the publicity, publi city, the work done by the t he diering systems employed illustrated that the UAV oered an enormously benecial increase in ISTAR capability i employed correctly; the ability to cue strike aircrat against targets was also a powerully seductive prospect or air operations planners. The ability to cue ‘shooters ‘shooters’’ against targets was not all that emerged rom the lessons identied orm Allied All ied Force. The The experience only reinorc reinorced ed General Jumper’s view that the next logical step was to t the crat themselves with armament was a timely one. The lessons o Kosovo were identied and digested against a backdrop o militaries – particularly par ticularly in the United States 39
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- considering the way way in which technological technological transormation might render render their operations more eective. Amongst the discussions underpinning these broad concepts lay the idea i dea o reducing the time in the ‘kill chain’ by improving ‘sensor-to-shooter’ links, to which UAV operations over Kosovo had given added impetus. Jumper’s directive that the USAF’s Predators should be given the ability to carry carr y their own weapons represented the ultimate logical conclusion to the desire to compress the links between ‘sensor’ ‘sensor’ and ‘shoote ‘shooter’ r’ through the elegant expedient o making the sensor itsel it sel into the shooter so that it could deal with time sensitive target sets which required engaging immediately,, rather than waiting or manned platorms to be sent to attack. By immediately early 2001, test launches l aunches o Hellre missiles rom Predat Predator or had gone well. Development o the Global Hawk had also progressed satisactorily. In late 2000, it had been suggested that the pace o Global Hawk development should be increased by the expedient o diverting unds rom the U-2 programme; the USAF decided against increasing the pace o the U-2’s retirement to the extent that the proposal suggested, but it became clear that the Global Hawk’ss capabilities were likely to make it the long-term replacement or the Hawk’ reconnaissance reconnaissan ce aircrat.46 The arrival o Donald Rumseld at the t he Pentagon as part o President George W Bush’s Bush’s rst administration meant that the issue o transormation was high on the political agenda rom the outset, and the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on 9 September 2001 created a situation where Rumseld’s vision o a much ‘lighter’ US military drawing heavily upon technology came to be tested on operations ar earlier than might otherwise other wise have been the case. As UAVs were amongst the systems at the cutting edge o transormational technology,, it should be no surprise that the intervention technology inter vention in Aghanistan and the subsequent US-led invasion o Iraq saw UAVs come into their own.
UAVs UA Vs and ‘the War on Terror’ The attacks by Al Qaeda on 11 September 2001 transormed not only the global strategic context, but helped to drive orward the widespread employment o unmanned aerial vehicles. Far removed rom the early reluctance to engage with unmanned technology in the 1980s, the United States has been at the oreront o operational developments and deployments. The Israeli Deence Forces have continued to exploit their unmanned aerial systems, and a number o ‘new’ players have materialised. The Italian Air Force has obtained and deployed Predators, while Britain has become an enthusiastic proponent o UA UAVs, Vs, employing them alongside the Americans in both Aghanistan and Iraq – literally alongside, because o the establishment o the Joint Predat Predator or Task Task Force (JPTF), within the 57th Operations Wing Wing at Nellis AFB containing both British and American personnel. On 7 October 2001, the United States began operations against Aghanistan. The opening phase o operations relied heavily upon special operations orces,, in conjunction with air power. Working in conjunction with AC-130s orces 40
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gunships, Predators were used to send inormation across to the ‘shooter’ as it approached the target, allowing the crew to orientate much more quickly, allowing switer engagement o the enemy.47 The armed Predators, although equipped to tackle what General Jumper reerred to as ‘eeting and perishable targets’, caused some conusion amongst legal advisors attempting to reconcile the rules o engagement (ROE) with the employment o ordnance released by operators thousands o miles rom the battleeld.48 This allegedly led to some high-value targets not being struck until the ROE were made more permissive.49 Operation Enduring Freedom also saw the Global Hawk in use, with its ability to remain alot above a battleeld or hours at a time making it an invaluable tool, providing real time inormation o the kind commanders have sought or centuries. By the time o the invasion o Iraq in March 2003, the importance impor tance o UAVs UAVs to operations was rmly established. established. While the destruction o an Iraqi ZSU-23-4 sel-propelled anti-aircrat gun near al-Amarah by a Hellre launched by a Predator attracted press attention, the work o ISTAR UAVs tended to go unnoticed. Yet again, however, the scale o inormation that could be obtained rom the unmanned platorms provided commanders with the ability to make inormed decisions based upon near-real time or real time reconnaissance product. Even when the advance into Iraq I raq was held up by erce sandstorms, use o Global Hawks ying well above or oset rom the t he storms enabled a constant stream o intelligence to be provided, ensuring that coalition commanders were not let making educated guesses based upon a mixture o partial inormation, experience and instinct. Although the Taleban and Saddam Hussein were removed rom power, the enduring nature o operations in both Aghanistan and Iraq provided plenty o opportunities or the unique characteristics o UA UAVs Vs to come to the ore. The value o aircrat in providing overwatch in low intensity conicts, giving advanced warning o ambushes or obstacles along the route o a convoy, had been proven years beore, beore, and it was natural to turn t urn the Predator to this task.50 Its small size, low noise signature and ability to loiter gave it a considerable advantage over manned aircrat, aircrat, while the ability abilit y to strike targets immediately ensured that the enemy was unable to enjoy a window o oppor tunity as air support was despatched. UAV UAV surveillance also came to play a part in the eort to reduce the threat posed by insurgent improvised explosive devices, which have become a avoured weapon both in Iraq and Aghanistan. The ability o UA UAVs Vs to provide a detailed picture o an area o interest thanks to constant surveillance represented a major change in the way in which air power could support counter-insurge counter-insurgency ncy operations; it also represents a proound change in the characteristics o air power itsel – a platorm able to loiter over a battlespace or up to twenty-our hours at a time mitigates mit igates one o the proound limitations o air power, power, namely impermanence. It is not impossible to envisage this level o persistence expanding as more capable armed UAVs UAVs enter service, providing the ability to garner inormation over an extended period o time, while being able to carry out time-sensitive attacks 41
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on targets o opportunity. I evidence o how attitudes to UAVs UAVs have altered over the last quarter century were required, required, it is perhaps worth noting that the American Predator eet reached 100,000 hours during a routine patrol over Iraq in September 2004, with 70 per cent o those hours being achieved achieved on operational operational taskings.51 Furthermore, since 1999, Britain Britain – as just one example – has has become increasingly eager to develop a UA UAV V capability ar beyond that provided by the Royal Artillery’s Phoenix UAV.52
Conclusion As well as the undoubted benets o UAVs UAVs in terms o their ability to spend long hours loitering above the battleeld, the political aspects o such systems are also worthy o note. As Rod Thornton observed, the ‘ultimate advantage’ advantage’ o UAVs is that they are ‘able to do the “dirty, dull and dangerous” work’ which may place aircrew at risk.53 A shot-down UAV UAV does not carry carr y the same political ramications as that which would accompany a downed aircrat carrying a pilot. As Patrick Eberle notes; ‘With a UAV, you do not have pilots shot down, being dragged through the streets, and globally televised.’ 54 There are no casualties to account or to the public and, arguably o a ar greater value strategically,, no potential or captured pilots to be used as political pawns by strategically oreign regimes. Such hazards have been apparent apparent since the shooting down o a U-2 over the Soviet Union in 1960 and the subsequent show trial o its pilot, Gary Powers. His capture led to the t he collapse o the Paris summit between the superpowers, and was a proound embarrassment embarrassment to the United States. The US ound itsel in a similar situation with China in April 2001, as a US Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane was hit by Chinese ghter aircrat, orcing the crew to land on the Chinese island o Hainan and inaming tense relations between Washington Washington 55 and Beijing. Although not discussed widely, there is evidence that the US has moved away rom potentially dangerous manned overights, and instead has opted to use UAVs on reconnaissance missions over Iran, thus immunising itsel rom the danger o letting its service personnel become political tools or negotiations.56 The US has even gone as ar as incorporating stealth technology into specically designed intelligence gathering UAVs. According to “aerospace ocials” the US has already used a classied Lockheed-Martin stealth UAV UAV in operations over Iraq during the main invasion.57 Conversely, the Iranians appear to have returned the avour, conducting UAV operations over Iraq since 2003; one UAV was shot down early in 2009 ater interception by USAF F-16s.58 Thus, the rst decade o the 21 st Century has, in many ways seen the unmanned aerial vehicle take its place as an essential element o air power power.. Yet despite the impressive achievements o UAVs, diculties remain. As discussed elsewhere in this book, the legal and ethical issues surrounding UAVs UAVs are an area still to be explored. The use o a Predator to kill a leading al Qaeda 42
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member in Yemen in 2002 was denounced by the Swedish oreign minister as ‘a summary execution that violates human rights’, while the employment o an unmanned platorm to carry out this strike raised a number o concerns about ‘remote kill killing’ ing’.59 These concerns have not, to date, aected the use o UAVs in such operations, most notably those by the US against militants in Pakistan in support o Operation Enduring Freedom, Freedom, and by the Israelis, who conducted their own UAV attacks against Hamas militants in 2005.60 Furthermore, UAVs, UAVs, rather akin to the rst military aircrat, can only provide their essential inormation, or attack enemy targets when the weather is reasonable. UAVs are subjected to weather limitations, which can severely aect perormance. They are still relatively ragile crat, and the inevitable lack o complete situational awareness o operators has seen them suer a high level o attrition. Also, there is debate over who should control UAVs and how they should be operated – some UAV proponents proponents bemoan the act that the air orces utilising this technology have insisted on the more complex systems being operated by rated pilots. Opponents o this view, however, point out that operating in airspace which is occupied (even i only temporarily) by other aircrat requires the operator to possess the same degree o comprehension as a trained pilot. Near misses between cargo aircrat and UAVs over Aghanistan and instances o combat aircrat being surprised at the presence o a UAV which was thought to be more than t han twenty miles away suggest that , at least or the moment, the possession o airmanship skills is necessary or those operating UAVs at any notable altitude.61 Nevertheless, the Israeli experiences o the early 1980s helped to illustrate the value and viability o the UAV UAV as a tool o war. Although there had been some reluctance to ollow suite in the United States – and, as a result, amongst many o its Allies – the value o the inormation obtained even by only a small orce o unmanned platorms during Operation Desert Storm pointed the way orward. Operation Allied Force, or all the diculties associated with that campaign, provided the springboard as military commanders began to ully appreciate the way in which UA UAVs Vs could dramatically enhance their access to vital inormation. By the time the US and its Allies came to deploy to Aghanistan and then Iraq, there t here was little doubt that the UAV had arrived as a major player in modern conict. It may still, in 2008, be an emergent technology in many ways, but UAV at last has a oothold as an essential component within modern military orces, taking air power in new directions and oering a new spectrum o capabilities to commanders at all levels. There will inevitably be hazards along the way, but the past decade has seen the UAV nally come o age. NOTES 1
Gunilla Herol, ‘The Future o Unmanned Aircrat’, in Frank Barnanby and Marlies Ter Borg, Emerging Technologies Technologies and Military Doctrine: A Political Assessment (London: Macmillan, 1986), p.148. The term ‘RPV’ remained in widespread use throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, and is used interchangeably with the 43
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term ‘UAV’ in this chapter when reerring to events during this period. 2 DOD’ss use o Remotely Piloted Vehicle technology General Accounting Oce, DOD’ oers opportunities or saving lives and Dollars (Washington, GAO, 1981), p.8. The GAO changed its name to the Government Accountability Oce in 2004, and the old name, as the issuing authority, is used here. 3 As a urther ur ther instance o the importance o reducing casualties amongst armed orces numerically inerior to those o neighbouring Arab nations driving Israeli military planning, the development o the heavily-armoured Merkava main battle tank is instructive. Although the weight o the vehicle compromised the speed and mobility that were otherwise useul in the sort sor t o armoured desert warare the IDF embarked upon in 1967 and 1973, the benets o heavy armour were deemed to oset this disadvantage. 4 Anthony H Cordesman and Abraham R Wagner, The Lessons o Modern War, Volume 1: The Arab Israeli Conicts 1973-1989 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p.189. 5 Ibid, p.190. 6 Ibid, p.191. 7 Ibid, p. 208 8 Ibid, p.209. 9 Bill Sweetman, ‘HALE/MALE Unmanned Air Vehicles: Vehicles: Part 1: History o the Endurance UAV’, in International Air Power Review , Volume 15 (2005), p.59. 10 Ibid, pp.60-61. 11 U.S. Government Accounting Oce, Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment o DOD’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master Plan,( Washington: GAO 1988), p. 6. 12 Michael T Jordan, ‘Merging the Tribes: Streamlining DoD’s Acquisition o Unmanned Aerial Systems’, US Army War College College Strategy Research Project, 2006. Available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA449383&Location= U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pd [accessed 20 June 2008].. U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pd 13 Ibid, pp.64-65. 14 The captured airman, Lieutenant Robert Goodman, is reputed to have been told by a Syrian guard: ‘Jackson is coming to get you.’ To this, Goodman is alleged to have sarcastically replied ‘Oh yeah – which one? Reggie or Michael?’ See Mark Morgan and Rick Morgan, Intruder: The Operational History o Grumman’s A-6 (Atglen: Schier Military History, 2004), p.163, n.3. 15 Major Doug Thrash, Remotely Piloted Vehicles: The Unexploited Force Multiplier, US Marine Corps Command and Sta College Thesis, 1989, http://www. globalsecurity.org/intell/l globalsecurity .org/intell/library/reports/1989/TGD ibrary/reports/1989/TGD.htm. .htm. 16 US General Accounting Oce, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DoD’s Demonstration GAO/NSIAD-99-33 3 (Washington: GAO, Approach Has Improved Project Outcomes GAO/NSIAD-99-3 1993), p.2. 17 Harlan Geer and Christopher Bolkcom, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Backgrou Background nd and Issues or Congress, Congressional Research Service report or Congress, November 21, 2005, p.3. 18 Anthony H Cordesman and Abraham R Wagner, The Lessons o Modern War, Volume IV: The Gul War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p.321. 19 Ibid. 44
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20
Richard P Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gul War (Washington: Smithsonian Institute, Institute, 1992), p.312. It should be noted that while the attempted surrender is not in doubt, Hallion’s account slightly conicts with others which suggest that the Pioneer was under control when the incident occurred. 21 John L Trez, From Persistent ISR to Precision Strikes: The Expanding Role o UAVs (Newport, RI: Naval War War College, 2003) p.7. 22 Cordesman and a nd Wagner, Wagner, Lessons o Modern War , IV , p. 320 23 Ibid, p.323. 24 Bill Yenne, Attack o the Drones: A History o Unmanned Aerial Combat (St Paul: Zenith Press, 2004), p.59. 25 Sweetman, ‘Endurance UAV part 1’ (Note 9), p.67. 26 Ibid 27 Sweetman, Endurance UAV Part 1 (note 9), p.70. 28 Geer and Bolkom, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Note 17), p.11. 29 Major General Kenneth R Israel, ‘Modeling and Simulation Employed in the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program’ (Washington: Deense Airborne Reconnaissance Reconnaissan ce Oce, 1997) available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/daro/ product/predms.htm [accessed 16 June2008]. 30 Ibid. 31 The Rambouillet talks were held by some to have been pointless, in that the terms on oer were impossible or Milosevic to accept – see the evidence to the House o Commons Select Committee on Deence given by Lord Gilbert, Question 1086 in House o Commons Select Committee on Deence, Lessons o Kosovo: Minutes o Evidence and Appendices (London: TSO, 2000), in which he suggests that the Rambouillet terms were designed to be unacceptable and thus provoke a ght – Lord Gilbert was a minister in the Ministry o Deence at the time o the conict. For a contemporar contemporaryy account o the Rambouillet conerence, Internationall Aairs, see Marc Weller, ‘The Rambouillet Conerence on Kosovo’, Internationa Vol.75, No.2 (April 1999, pp.211-251). 32 Tim Ripley, ‘UAVs over Kosovo – did the earth move?’ Deence Systems Daily , 1 December 1999, http://defence-data.com/features/fpage34.htm [accessed 21 June 2008]. 33 Benjamin S Lambeth, NATO’s Air War or Kosovo (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), p.95 and Director, Operational Test & Evaulation, Fiscal Year 99 Report, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/budget/fy1999/dot-e/ airforce/99predator.html [accessed 17 June 2008]. 34 The Phoenix experienced experienced a number o unortunate problems during its early development and initial operational use, not aided by its conguration which required it to invert beore landing, under parachute, on an air bag which was meant to cushion the sensor group rom damage. It acquired the nickname o ‘the bugger o’ amongst some users ‘because it requently did, never to return’. Michael Evans, The Times 12 August 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ news/politics/article4510403.ec news/politic s/article4510403.ece e [accessed 12 August 2008]. 35 Lambeth, NATO’s Air War , (note 32) pp.96-97. 36 For instance, see House o Commons Select Committee on Deence, Fourteenth Report: Lessons o Kosovo (London: TSO, 2000), Paragraph 127. 45
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Lambeth, NATO’s Air War , (Note 32) p.96. Brigadier Andrew Figgures, evidence to House o Commons Select Committee on Deence, 12 April 2000, in Select Committee on Deence, Lessons o Kosovo: Evidence (Note 30), Question 517. 39 The Ministry o Deence decided not to proceed with the smaller Watchkeeper 180 variant, and all the British Army’s Watchkeepers will now be based on the Hermes 450. A small number o Hermes 450s are, at time o writing (2008) in use under an Urgent Operational Requirement. 40 ‘Applying UAV lessons to transorm the battleeld’, Speech by Secretary o the Air Force James Roche to the Association o Unmanned Vehicles Systems International, Baltimore, Baltimore, July 15, 2003. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 Tim Ripley, ‘UAVs over Kosovo - did the Earth move?’ Deence Systems Daily, 1 December 1999 http://deence-data.com/eatures/page34.htm [Accessed 26 May 2008]. 45 Major Phil M. Haun, USAF, Air Power Versus A Fielded Army: A Construct For Air Operations In The 21st Century (Maxwell, 2001), p.19 Available at https:// research.au.a.mil/papers/ay2001/acsc/01-054.pd [accessed 22 May 2008] 46 Bill Sweetman, ‘HALE/MALE Unmanned Air Vehicles Vehicles Part 2: 21st Century Warghters’, International Air Power Review , Volume 16, p.43. 47 Bill Yenne, Attack o the Drones: p.87. 48 David Martin, ‘The Predator: The Most Valuable Weapon Weapon in the American Arsenal?’, CBS News website, 7 January 2003, available at http://www.cbsnews. com/stories/2003/01/07/60II/main535569.shtml [accessed 28 June, 2008]; Yenne, Attack , p.88. 49 Ibid. 50 David Jordan, ‘Countering Insurgency rom the Air: The Postwar Lessons’, Contemporary Contempor ary Security Policy , Volume 28 No.1 (2007), p.103. 51 Sweetman, ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Part 1’ (Note 9), p.43. 52 Command 6041-I Delivering Security in a Changing World: Deence White Paper (London: TSO, 2003), p.10 and Command 6269, Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities (London: TSO, 2004). 53 Rod Thornton, Asymmetric Warare; Threat and response in the 21st Century ’ (Cambridge: Polity press, 2007), p.94. 54 Capt Patrick Eberle, ‘To UAV UAV or not to UAV: UAV: That is the Question: Here is One Answer’ Air & Space Power Journal (October 2001) , http://www.airpower.maxwell. a.mil/airchronicles/cc/eberle.html. 55 Congressional Congressi onal Research Service (2001) ‘China-U.S. ‘China-U.S. Aircrat Collision Incident o April 2001: Assessments and Policy Implications’ (The Library o Congress Congress,, 2001), p.2 - http://www.as.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30946.pd. 56 Dana Linzer, ‘U.S. Uses Drones to Probe Iran or Arms’ Washington Post, 13 February 2005. 57 DA Fulchum, ‘Stealth UAV goes to war’ Aviation Week & Space Technology , Vol. 159, no. 1 (July 2003), pp. 20-21. 38
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58
‘Coalition Jets shoot down Iranian UAV over Iraq’ American Forces Press Service, 16 March 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=53495 (accessed 19 March 2009). 59 CBS News, Remote Controlled Spyplanes, 6 November 2002 at http://www. cbsnews.com/stories/2002/11/06/attack/main528396.shtml [accessed 17 June 2008]. 60 Aaron Klein ‘Israel’s secret drone revealed’ (03/06/05) World Net Daily , http:// www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=44566 61 Ade Orchard, with James Barrington, Joint Force Harrier: The Inside Story o a Michael Joseph, 2008) 2008) pp.238-2 pp.238-240. 40. Royal Navy Fighter Squadron at War (London: Michael
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UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES IN THE ROYAL AIR FORCE - 2047
Wg Cdr Richard M. McMahon ‘In the development o air power power,, one has to look orward and not backward to gure out what is going to happen’ Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, Deputy Chie o the US Air Service, 1919-24
Introduction The task to predict how the RAF will develop and exploit Unmanned Air Vehicles (UA (UAV) over the next 40 or so years provides a ascinating opportunity to consider developments based upon the combination o known technological advances and those that could be possible in the uture. While While looking backward may go against the opening quote, it should be recognised that advances in aviation and space technology have been ar greater and more rapid than any any o those achieved achieved by man on land or at sea. sea. In the early years o aviation development, technological advances rom the Wright brothers rst ight1 to the ‘Supermarine’ Spitre do not appear that great. 2 However,, even over this relatively short period in terms o war ghting, the However man in the machine has proved a signicant constraining actor on range and endurance. The eect o removing crews rom the Avro Lancaster and replacing them with additional uel and ordinance could have enabled Air Marshal ‘Bomber Harris’ to achieve similar eects against Nazi Germany with an aircrat eet one third o the t he size.3 With the advent o the Jet engine, the endurance constraints became less o a actor while physiological issues started to limit aerial platorm development. Advances Advances rom the sub-sonic 4 Canberra Mk1 to the hugely expensive and capable B2 bomber have been considerable.. Platorm speed, range and payloads have increased along with considerable the accuracy o air-to-ground weapons. However However,, the man-in-the-loop (MIL) has remained the constant constraining actor. actor. Equally, advances advances in the more agile combat aircrat rom the single role English Electric Electr ic Lightning5 to the multi-role F35 Lightning II (Joint ( Joint Strike Fighter6 ) while impressive, are still constrained constrai ned by the requirement or a ‘c ‘cockpi ockpit’ t’ and lie support systems. Indeed, the agility o these modern platorms is not limited by aircrat design but by the physiological physiologi cal ‘g ‘g’’ tolerance o pilots. pilot s. Thereore, the prospect o designing and building unmanned combat air vehicles unettered unettered by human constraints is both exciting and daunting. daunting. On one hand, replacing replacing complex lie lie support systems with advanced communication and control systems seems entirely easible; while on the other, dealing with the implications o removing the pilot creates an even greater greater challenge. In particular, there are understandable understandable saety concerns. concerns. These come rom the civilian pilot unions, military aviators 48
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and national and international regulators. Many o these concerns, while open to accusations o sel-preservation, actually provide useul benchmarks or the development o UAV which must all be met. ‘Predicting the uture is easy, the hard part is getting it right!’ Anon Equally daunting is the breath o this military topic and its civil dependencies. Although the civil sector o employment and development is not covered in detail, without this involvem i nvolvement ent and the desire to exploit unmanned capabilities, unding and technological resource would be scarce indeed. Fortunately,, the business and service sectors have recognised the huge Fortunately potential and breadth o capability aorded by UAV. Many uses are obvious such as the monitoring o lines o communication7 , however, policing o these and other key assets could be aster and easier while also detecting and possibly preventing vandalism and other activity rom unexpected threats in this uncertain world. Unlike many other air and space capabilities, the civil sector is leading the way on many areas o UAV development such as the requirement or a ‘Sense & Avoid’ (S&A) system that is at least as comparable in its perormance with man in the cockpit. Building upon uture plans or military militar y UAV UAV activity in 2007 and based upon the current rate o technological development, the role or UAV UAV in 2047 may not be so obvious or apparent. Indeed, uture advances advances in nanotechnology may transorm the way people, weapons and equipment are tracked and identied, potentially nulliying the current conventions which drive our military need or active ISR. Continuing this theme, the dependence dependence upon space and satellites or communications and data usion should not be overlooked. Western Weste rn dominance in this environmen environmentt arena cannot be assumed8 and the need or a rapid development in autonomous unmanned systems may be critical. criti cal. Currently we categorize UAV UAV into HALE, MALE9 , Tactical, Mini and Micro-UAV Micro-UA V and generally generally,, we align these categories with Strategic, Operational and Tactical Tactical roles. In line with known technological advances, advances, it may be necessary to review these roles. roles. There may be a similar requirement requirement as the impact o developments in propulsion systems and Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) start star t to take eect. Also, while we should celebrate the the collaborative UK UAV UAV industrial eorts, we should not discount the advances made by our allies both in Europe and USA. USA. Finally Finally,, without international regulatory regulatory approval, UAV UAV development will be limited and constrained to combat arenas (eectively segregated segregated airspace), we cannot aord to discount this issue. As with any emerging capability, clear and agreed terminology is vital or the understanding o discussion. While UAV UAV reers to individual unmanned platorms, Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) is a better discriminator or discussing management o the end-to-end capability, i.e. rom the control consul via the unmanned cockpit to the t he war ghter below. As we look at the development o UAS, the uture o manned combat aviation remains a constant constant underlying theme. That question is examined 49
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throughout this essay by discussion o issues such as data processing, tactical decision making and the complexity o military operations. The intent is to provide pointers to the uture, based upon commonly expected advances in technology and combat operations.
Current Capability As we look to the uture, it is interesting to examine the potential impact o Moore’s Law10 upon UAV/S UAV/S development. development. Although this empirical observation was made in 1965, the doubling o computer power has continued to this day. So ar, the eect upon computer equipment and sotware has been seismic. I we look orward another 40 years, the ‘doubling in 18 months law’ would see a actor o a 32 million increase in perormance/capability.11 O course, while it may be unrealistic to see these advances transer transer in their totality to aviation technology,, it is reasonable to expect signicant progress in the coming years. technology Although this essay ocuses upon RAF developments and should acknowledge that MOD resource will always be a constraining actor, the global civil sector involvementt in research and development is likely to generate many solutions involvemen which could see UAV become more capable and aordable in the near uture. Thereore, Thereor e, RAF uture aspirations should not be constrained by resource and, in line with current Deence Industrial Strategy, the MOD will look to exploit every opportunity to achieve best value or money. money. Examination o current operations in Iraq and Aghanistan highlights the enduring need or an ISR capability that can provide services ranging rom 24/7 ‘pattern o lie’ monitoring to short-term shor t-term Full Motion Video dissemination in support o specic troop actions. Between these two boundaries, boundaries, there lies a broad range o ISR requirement dependant dependant upon the t he mission, the environment and the threat. The longstanding longsta nding catchphrase catchphra se o the our ‘D’s’ - ‘Deep, Dull, Dirty and Dangerous’ will continue to underpin the ISR requirement, the challenge is to identiy how this will be delivered over the next 40 years. In parallel with the advances in our unmanned ISR capability, rising cost and competing demands or resource and skilled personnel will only increase the demand or the delivery o ‘multi-role’ ‘multi-role’ unmanned capabilities. In the manned environment, the RAF has recognised this in the development o plans or Typhoon12 and JCA. We should not orget, however, that ISTAR ISTAR13 is but one o the 6 enduring Core Air and Space Power Roles (CASPR) and while tempting to examine this activity within the environmental bounds o the FASOC, FASOC, the immediate and enduring purpose o UAV UAV ISR will continue to be the provision o timely and critical support to joint operations. The challenge is how we best manage the two potentially conicting capabilities o enduring ISR and high value asset attack. All uture UAV enhancements enhancements will depend upon developments in the key components o the UAV UAV amily. One useul benchmark or these components can be ound in the US Joint Concept o Operations or Unmanned Aircrat Systems14 and they are categorized as ollows: the unmanned aircrat, the payload15 , communications, the control element, 50
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support equipment and the human component. component. As with the deence deence lines o development, it is logical to expect appropriate attention to all the components i military orces are to ully exploit this emerging capability. Following the deeat o Saddam Hussein’s orces, UK and US stabilising orces encountered signicant signicant terrorist threats, asymmetric in nature and driven by suicidal belies. It was quickly recognised that our orces aced a signicant capability gap in terms o ISR. Ideally, the coalition would like the ability to monitor patterns o lie, 24/7 across across all o Iraq. However However,, resource in terms o platorms and the ability to analyse such a huge quantity o data currently make such an option both impracticable and unaordable. unaordable. Part o the UK response came in Mar 04 with the ormation o a USAF/RAF Combined Joint Predator Task Force (CJPTF) to support land operations in key areas o Iraq. Originally based at Nellis AFB and operating the MQ-1 Predator A UAV UAV16 , the unit has enjoyed considerable operational success while also contributing signicantly to USAF and RAF decisions to acquire the larger and ar more capable successor to Predator, the MQ-9 Reaper.
UK Reaper When compared with Predator A, the Reaper represen represents ts a major evolution o the UAV. It is our times heavier, at a gross weight o ve tons and is similar in size to the USAF A-10 Thunderbolt Thunderbolt II aircrat. The plane can carry many more weapons than the Predator A, having the ability to carry carr y 14 AGM-114 Hellre II anti-armour missiles, or our Hellre and two 500 pound bombs. The MQ-9 Reaper is also designed to deploy precision guided weapons such as the GBU-12 and the 500lb GBU-38 JDAM.17 Operational cruise will be at around 260 kts while the platorm will avoid ‘MANPADS’18 and small-arms threats by operating at around altitudes o 25000 t or sortie durations o up to 18 hours. Key to the capability is the onboard sensor suite. In parallel with the USAF, USAF, the RAF has opted to employ the MTS-B Sensor Ball and Lynx SAR/GMTI. This will incorporate imaging sensors to provide video and still-rame, Electro-Optical (EO), inrared and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) radar, inrared, inrared, laser and radar targeting. In general terms, the tasking or Reaper will ollow normal coalition activities within a standard NATO NATO planning cycle. As with all air platorms, Reaper will be tasked through the Air Tasking Order (ATO) and crews will work with both Joint Force and Air Component assets to co-ordinate eort and the best delivery o eect. Once tasked, the Launch Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) oversee oversee the preparation, launch, recovery, reuelling, rearming and maintenance o the Reaper rom its secure orward operating base. Ater take-o and normally while within LOS o the LRE, the Reaper is ‘handed-o’ to the Mission crew (pilot & sensor operator19 ) via satellite communications. Although this may seem hazardous, high levels o communications redundancy and auto ight control systems minimize the risk during this process. As with any other air platorm, the Mission crew have access to a normal suite o communications which allows them to coordinate their sortie with other key Air C2 elements 51
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such as airborne platorms like the E3 AWACS or with ground units through orward air controllers or coalition equivalents. equivalents. Indeed, by having a ull ATC ATC service, the Reaper can ‘roam’ an AOR with high levels o saety and with the capacity to take avoiding action against other riendly or hostile conicting air trac. This roaming ability provides the Joint Force Force Commander (JFC) with additional operational exibility and the opportunity oppor tunity to respond to developing threats outside the original planning AOR. It is important, however, however, to recognise that the rapid rate o UA UAV V evolution, presents both operators and commanders with a growing and complex challenge. In its earliest orm, the Phoenix UAV UAV was employed primarily as an organic ISR platorm and due to its short range and endurance, it did not gure in the ATO. ATO. However, with emerging tactical tacti cal platorms operating operati ng at ranges in excess o 50km rom control stations, at altitudes over 5000 t and with an on-task time o over 5 hours, mission planners must take careul account o tactical UAV operations. operations. Equally, owners o these organic capabilities will need to integrate their systems into the broader ATO process, potentially exposing their capability to the demands o other coalition partners. In contrast, strategic/operational UAV UAV that possess an ability to roam while tted with kinetic weapons, demand that the planners balance the requirements or ISR tasking with capabilities to provide direct eects in support o Land operations such as ‘Troops in Contact’ (TIC (TIC). ). With an ability 20 to combine all unctions o the targeting cycle, F2E2EA , command o such a capability presents a mouth-watering mouth-watering challenge. While tempting to suggest that a TIC scenario should always have a higher priority, other actors must be taken into consideration. Platorm response, response, other FJ FJ or AH CAS options or, 21 most telling, competing strategic ISR requirements are certain to complicate the decision process. Equally, as UAV become aster, can carry more weapons and remain on task or longer, the complexity o this problem increases. Thereore, Thereor e, concept documents covering the operations, employment and use o platorms will be vital. Integration into Joint Operations will be a key issue, while the authors must also take account o diering and emerging UAV UA V employment policies and identiy the best t or the UK military model.22 Furthermore, continually evolving platorm and attack capabilities will demand that these documents are updated on a regular basis. Once on station, careul management o the broad array o sensors is essential i the Reaper platorm is to deliver its ull potential and provide operational and tactical commanders with high quality data resolution combined with a range o perspectives suitable or exploitation, analysis and possibly targeting.23 Outputs must be available to the ull range o tactical actors to improve the realisation o Eects. 24 At times, the delivery o Full Motion Video in support o TIC will be the priority task. However However,, given the paucity o ISR assets, operational control o Reaper will be a signicant command challenge, particularly when the platorm is armed. Equally, ground orces must understand the capability, appreciate its signicant advantages in terms o combining ‘sensor & shooter’ while also accepting the 52
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limitati ons in terms o weapons limitations weapons payload and platorm speed. In short, Reaper should be seen as one part o the air capability and not, quite simply, as the only all encompassing solution. With Mission crews based based in the US, they ace a number o challenges. The most immediate is the perception rom those under direct hostile re that supporting rear-elements such as 39 Squadron Reaper crews are unaected by the threats and dangers o operations.25 O course, once the platorm has demonstrated its capability, by identiying emerging threats, by delivering its own weapons or by providing laser designation or a weapons drop rom a coalition ghter in support o TIC, the attitude will change. However, However, the challenge or these crews will not change. While personnel operating Reaper are in constant support o combat operations, they ace a recurring education challenge as troop roulements occur. The benets o sustained crewing o Reaper are tangible. tangible. Levels o expertise, expertise, amiliarity with the environment, environment, the terrain, the threat and operational procedures remain at a constant high. Predator Predator/Reaper /Reaper Mission Crews are probably probably the best qualied to contribute to mission planning pl anning while also ully ull y exploiting the UA UAV V capability. Similar benets accrue rom the dissemination o data to home-based home -based Image Analysts (IA) where they can prot rom the application o highly advanced and sensitive sotware sotware tools to carry out detailed analysis and targeting. One o the additional benets o this ‘Reachback’ ‘Reachback’ is that data can be shared and exploited to meet diering demands and then stored or uture reerence in support o later operations. As ever, ever, bandwidth, exploitation acilities and available expertise may limit how, where and when such data can be treated and disseminated disseminated.. The RAF’s acquisition o Reaper has ollowed the UOR 26 process commencing with a submission in Jul 06. As Reaper is a US capability, capability, the purchase purchase was complicated by laws covering Foreign Military Sales (FMS) which involves an approvals process process requiring Congressional Congressional review. review. Given that the rst platorm deployed to Aghanistan in October 07 – the 15-month period between dening the requirement to the delivery o an operational capability demonstrates a remarkable level o both international and inter-departmental cooperation and eort to achieve this success. Beneting rom the considerable experienced gained rom CJPTF ops, the organisation, training, personnel and inrastructure DLODs, while challenging to resolve, have been relatively straight orward to address. As ever, UK Deence Equipment & Sustainment (DE&S) stas have relished the tight timelines, although ‘normal’ best practice or equipment programmes has, at times, contrived to protract the UOR process. In sum, the delivery o a ully weaponized UAV UAV capability to the RAF in less than 18 months has been an outstanding out standing achievement achievement which may yet set new standards and challenges or our deence acquisition organisations.
Future Capability - Near-term Moving away rom a US ‘Commercial o the Shel’ (COTS) solution, UK industries in partnership with the MOD are working on a number o other 53
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UAV capability developments. For example, BAE Systems are currently experimenting with a small UAV UAV known as High Intensity Rapid R apid Technology Technology Insertion (HERTI). In collaboration with the Air Warare Centre, Centre, the platorm platorm has been deployed to Aghanistan Aghanistan under the guise o Project Morrigan. The aim is to investigate and evaluate the limitations and potential o an autonomous UAV UA V in the Joint Battlespace. Additional objectives and tasks should contribute contribute to the orce protection and saety saety o our ground orces. This ambitious private venture project gives a clear indication o the high level o interest rom UK industry in delivering added value to basic UAV UAV ISR capabilities. Levels o autonomy enhanced by on-board data processing and mission management will be vital to help avoid an over dependence on lines o communication and should allow operators to exploit the ull potential o the UAV. UAV. Indeed, Indeed, as we look to the uture, resource constraints constraints are certain to limit the number o UAV UAV systems in use with the MOD preerring, no doubt, to build upon the capabilities o emerging eets. Thereor Thereore, e, assuming the lack o a more aordable alternative, platorms such as the Reaper and Watchkeeper, could, like many other venerable ISR platorms27 , be expected to withstand the test o time and deliver eect or a minimum period o 25 years. The challenge within this essay is to identiy a capability which alls outside the planning or High Level Operational Concepts(HLOC) Concepts(HLOC) – as pointed out in the HLOC,28 ‘No reliable methodology or technology has been developed that can ensure accurate predictions about the uture’ Despite that alibi, there are some good indications i ndications o how UAV UAV will be developed in the uture. BAE Systems in concert concert with MoD’s Strategic Unmanned Air Vehicle (Experiment) (SUAV(E)) IPT, are exploring and demonstrating how emerging technologies and systems can deliver battlewinning capabilities or the UK armed orces. orces. They are the prime contractor and industry lead or the development o ‘TARANIS’ ‘TARANIS’ which will be the largest UAV UA V yet built in the UK. Included in the consortium are other leading UAV UAV exponents in the guise o QinetiQ, QinetiQ, Rolls-Royce and Smiths Aerospace. Aerospace. The ollowing BAE press release provides a clear indicator o the state o UAV UAV autonomy today: “The brains o TARANIS are now designed and coherent and the system can autonomously control the aircrat to taxi, take o, and navigate its way to a search area while reacting to any threats or other events. It will then route its way around the search area in whichever way it wants to, locate the target, and then use its sensor system to transmit a series o images and views back to the operator to conrm it is the target to be attacked. Then, Then, once it has been authorized to do so, it autonomously attacks that target, routes its way back home, lands and taxies back.’ Subsequent comment also ocused on the targeting and attack capability rather than the surveillance and reconnaissance roles. roles. Given that ight trials are due to commence in 2010, the prospects or building a completely 54
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autonomous UAV by 2047 seem assured. Conrming the pedigree o the UK’s UAV exponents, QinetiQ have recently enjoyed demonstrable success with their recent29 unocial world worl d endurance record or the Zephyr Zephyr UAV. UAV. Powered by the sun and solar batteries, the platorm, which weighs less than 32 Kgs and can carry and operate lightweight digital ISR systems. Zephyr Zephyr ew or over 82 hours at altitudes in excess o 55000 t, beore achieving a sae landing at the US military Yuma Yuma Proving Grounds Grounds in Arizona. O note was that the aircrat used its solar electrical power system through three complete diurnal cycles – another good indicator o what should be possible in 40 years.30 Whether such a system is used as an alternative or satellite systems or as an emergency all-back option will depend upon cost and the t he growing threat to space satellite operations. A vital requirement that allows operators to exploit this extended capability will be autonomy autonomy.. In this arena, QinetiQ engineers recently publicised an emerging capability by demonstrating the ability to operate and control our UAV rom the backseat o a Tornado F3 under Project TIARA.31 Underpinning these individual company initiatives, UK companies are collaborating under the ASTRAEA32 banner to work with non-military UK government departments depar tments to und specic research into UAV UAV.. Amounti Amounting ng to a £32m investment over 3 years, companies are working with academia on 16 issues covering UAV Technology, Regulation and Demonstration. These subjects, which will be crucial to uture UAV UAV development, include communications, collision avoidance avoidance and propulsion. Furthermore, the output should underpin much o the ongoing work to develop platorms such as TERRANIS, HERTI, UK Reaper, H450 and its planned successor Watchkeeper. 32 Other exploratory UA UAV V activity includes the UK Army investigations into Loitering Munitions. Where such a system system would t into the Joint Battle space and how it could be saely exploited and integrated needs careul examination. Key issues such as airspace control, Sense & Avoid, C2, ROE and ‘ownershipo-the-bomb’ will not be easy to resolve with competing Service doctrines demanding dierent dierent conclusions. Furthermore, while it may seem possible to allow such a system a high level o autonomy another considerable challenge will be the development o systems and TTPs that ensure eective direct support to Land operations in a non-permissive non-permissive air environment. environment. Air Deence o a routinely static system which has a roving capability would be extremely complex. However However,, the benets o this system could bring into question the long-term uture o the traditional artillery battery. With troop commanders commanders potentially having the ability to call upon a buet o airborne weapons eects they may wish to see resource spent on more o these platorms rather than on orce protection, protection, logistics and sustainment sustainment or artillery units. Finally Finally,, while issues such as ‘platorm ownership’ and executive authority may appear as ‘sot issues’, they could present a challenge which is ar more complex than any technical issue, particularly in a collation environment. environment. On the international stage, interest in UAV UAV continues apace. In terms o expenditure, the USA lead the way with billions o dollars earmarked or UA UAV V 34 development in support o Homeland Deence and the GWOT GWOT.. However, 55
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while much o this unding is ocused upon organic equipment programmes, US military and civil contractors are working closely with NATO NATO and European allies to develop standards and protocols to enable international UAV UA V operations. Even at this early stage o UAV UAV evolutio evolution, n, there is clear international agreement on the potential and need or civil unmanned systems. Initially, roles will ocus on government government activities ranging rom trac surveillance to counter terrorism within wit hin national borders. As condence in UAV grows, other national national civilian/industrial developments will ollow. ollow. Although the airline pilots associations can identiy credible and reasonable objections to unpiloted airline eets, these merely present useul and additional saety hurdles which engineers and scientists are sure to overcome. The real challenge will be cultural and there is certain to be a need or a transitional ‘saety-pilot’ period to help overcome these natural concerns. 35 However, once unmanned aviation has a demonstrable saety record, the acceptance acceptance and commercial demand or unmanned systems will certainly grow. Within Europe, there is recognition that collaboration is the only answer to delivering a pan-European solution solu tion to challenges challeng es such as ‘Sense & Avoid’. Indeed, this orm o collaboration should help to convince regulators such as Eurocontrol to accept the minimum saety requirement identied by a coalition o national contributors. Although ocusing upon Europe, a regulatory environment which recognises the international dimension o airspace use and the pivotal role o ICAO should be sel-evident. It is in this global arena that military UAV UAV operations will get very dicult. However However,, while not wishing to underestimate the complexity o national UAV UAV activity and approvals, once civil UAV UAV start to cross national borders regulatory agreement in some areas such as requency spectrum appear as a ar o nirvana. For example, such a proposition requires agreement upon access to a local R/F spectrum which does not generate conicts with other operators like the ambulance service or mobile phone network. International progress progress in this area will require require extra-ordinary levels o agreement at the World Radio Conerence which meets only every 4 years.36 In civil aviation, a solution to requency spectrum issues should be ound. However, i we then add the very signicant complication o a UAV proponent employing military UA UAV V (ISR or armed), international agreement or cooperation is more dicult and alternative methods o C2 will be required. From a national and European perspective, we should be aware o other soter concerns raised by organisations such as Liberty. Concerns regarding regarding the ‘Big ‘Big Brother’ culture culture will only increase and development in UAS will have to take account o national laws covering ‘Freedom o Inormation’ and ‘Human Rights’. How is the data data stored? Who has access access to it? How is inormation inormation exploited? These are all examples o the questions that will arise. While While not attempting to address these issues, they give a useul indicator o the legislative challenges associated with the general acceptance o military militar y UAV UAV operations.
Future Capability - Medium Term Following the early struggles over the next 10 to 15 years, the civil airline 56
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industry could be at the oreront o regular commercial UAV UAV ights. ights. Freight carrying airliners ollowing minimum risk ri sk routes over the sea and avoiding areas o dense population could allow operators to reduce costs and improve eciency while generating public condence. Thereater Thereater,, national operators may chose to provide services ser vices within their borders beore exploring European and other suitably equipped and controlled airspace. airspace. The period between 2020 and 2030 could see a major transormation transormation in the AT industry. industry. Indeed, one wonders why this progress has not been made with other orms o transport such as the railways – it may be that the cost o training and retaining train drivers appears insignicant when set alongside the initial investmen investmentt costs required to automate an entire entire rail network. The same cannot be said or the cost o employing employing and training airline pilots. A sae and successul successul commercial unmanned airline operation will depend upon a mature and proven ight management system that is ully integrated into both the aircrat and ground control systems. With such a system, we could also expect to see the gradual automation o air trac t rac control systems. systems. Again, the major hurdle will not be technology; rather it will be the requirement or international agreement on standards. standards. With it, there will have to be certain mandatory regulatory requirements or all airborne systems.37 Thereater, it could be that the most probably risk to an unmanned commercial aircrat will come rom a bird strike. So by 2025, we could be on the verge o unmanned airline transport systems. The The introduction o the system will need a spiral development strategy starting or example with reight transport and then ollowed by commercial operators employing pilots merely to monitor aircrat systems. Ater such a proving period, only then will unmanned airline transport systems gain public acceptance. acceptance. On the military side, things may not be so simple. Global agreement or acceptance or military UA UAV V operations appears a less likely outcome. What country earing a threat rom a military neighbour or super power is going to make airspace and RF spectrum available to a potential aggressor? Without secure communications, communications, military UAV UAV ops will be constrained. However, assumin assuming g continued Western domination in space, actors such as platorm antennae position, requency encryption and low probability o detection techniques could overcome overcome such resistance. resistance. Given the pace o technological advance, advance, only the most powerul nations could combat 38 such technology. However However,, the MIL, whether in a ground control station or an airborne platorm will remain critical to all oensive operations. operations. The laws o armed conict (LOAC) set particularly high standards or war ghting and as with soldiers and sailors, aircrews have to pay due regard to actors such as necessity,, proportionality, discrimination (collateral damage) and humanity. necessity Thereore, Thereor e, it is not possible to accredit a completely autonomous UAV without acknowledging both the complexities and uidity o sustained combat operations.39 An autonomous system may be able to discriminate between a hostile APC and one that marked with a red cross and moving casualties. However, until a UAV possesses sensors with peripheral vision and runs onboard computer programs that have the capacity and ‘intelligence’ to make inormed judgements regarding wide area collateral damage estimates (CDE)40 ; 57
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a totally autonomous unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) is unlikely to be employed in the medium term. As one part o medium term planning, Reaper is likely to play a key part in the EC DTA41 assessment o how they deliver DPOC. 42 Challenges will be those that ace the operation and employment o all unmanned platorms but urther complicated by the tting o weapons. Static strategic targets should present no more complex problems than those or a cruise missile launch. l aunch. However,, UCAV attacks on mobile or transient high value targets, generate However positive identity (PID) requirements which, when combined with ROE and collateral damage concerns, make C3 bandwidth an essential pre-requisite. pre -requisite. Accepting the continuing need or MIL in the medium term, ront-line UK orce structures are unlikely to see signicant change. change. For the RAF, RAF, it is likely that the Reaper orce will be based in the UK supporting operational tasks while also contributing both to homeland deence and collective Trg Trg on exercises involving Maritime ops, Land CT and Joint Air exercises such as Neptune Warrior.. The Sqn is likely to be collocated with other ISR assets while LRE43 and Warrior maintenance personnel personnel will be deployed to support operational theatres. In parallel, No 32 Regt R egt RA will have welcomed the introduction o Watchkeeper. Watchkeeper. During this interim period, plug-and-play capabilities and spiral development opportunities could, subject to resource, see these UAV UAV broaden their range o activities. Much o this work will also contribute to the development o more advanced UAV systems. However, with the growth in data capture, support activities rom personnel such as image analysts will increase in importance. During this interim period, the transmission, dissemination, exploitation, cataloguing, storage, and classication o data will generate a major challenge. Nothing is more compelling than the live l ive video eed o an on-going operation. Known within the ISR community as ‘Predator porn’ or ‘CAOC Crack’ the challenge will be to ensure that the right inormation is disseminated to the right person at the right time. Strategic and operational operational commanders will will have to resist the opportunity to micro-manage particular engagements, no matter matter how compelling the picture, rarely will they have the ull tactical situation and put bluntly, such activity is not their job. Equally, eective eective management o imagery will be critical so that stored data is ully exploited thus ensuring the ecient use o what will continue to be a limited ISR resource.44 Although much o the early UAV operations will ocus on ISR, oensive capabilities are certain to grow with technological advance. In particular, par ticular, the small diameter bomb (SDB) will be a standard t or UCAVs. UCAVs. The USAF is developing 2 variants. One version (GBU-39) is equipped with a GPS-aided inertial navigation system which makes it ideal or xed/stationa xed/stationary ry targets such as uel depots and bunkers while the second variant (GBU-40), (GBU-40), includes a thermal seeker with automatic target recognition eatures which makes it ideal or striking eeting targets such as tanks and mobile command posts. These are weapons openly openly discussed in the public domain. Thereor Thereore, e, it seems reasonable to speculate about weapon systems that could be in common use in 20 years. Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) currently require considerable 58
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levels o power, i this challenge can be overcome overcome,, they are certain cer tain to gure in uture UCAV developments. Once these weapons prove their eectiveness, an enduring air combat presence could be sustained in permissive airspace. One interim option between UCAV employment o kinetic weapons and DEW could be the deployment o micro-UAVs launched rom a UAV as a weapon. Fitted with local data links and loaded with computer algorithms, such a system could support vital ‘swarm-like’ ‘swarm-like’ search and destroy unctions while also providing immediate Battle Damage Assessments Assessments.. Assuming that the UA UAV V employs a standard propulsion system, the development o AAR will be another important impor tant challenge. Currently, Currently, Reaper can y or over 18 hours without reuel; based upon potential advances with propulsion systems it should be possible to extend sortie times considerably. However,, as ever with spiral development, as one part o a capability improves However so other users o the platorm look to exploit this t his situation. Thereore, Thereore, while engine eciency may improve, other adoptions o technological advances may combine to limit the expected increase in platorm endurance. endurance. Thereor Thereore, e, planners should expect UAV to sustain routine ISTAR ops or 24 hours beore requiring a reuel. Current planning or UAV UAV describes a prole o orward deployment to maximise loiter time in the AOR. While this does save transit transit times, UAV UAV platorms remain vulnerable while on the ground and attract their own orce protection burden. Furthermore, operating rom xed locations can limit response times while also providing advance warnings o coalition activity. Thereore, it may be necessary to nd other ways to deploy UAV. It is likely that we will see the development o disposable or recyclable mini and micro-UAV. micro-UAV. Delivered to the AOR by either other UAV or conventional conventional air platorms, these systems could provide simple and aordable platorms to complete specic tasks ranging rom the strategic to tactical in eectc.45 Some o these systems may be pre-programmed against specic targets while others may hide and ‘hibernate’46 awaiting activation and specic ISR or targeting instructions. Such systems could make a signicant contribution to intelligence service activities; it will also become necessary to have protocols to counter such systems. Some o these operations could could have a signicant signicant political risk and impact, thereore, ownership in terms o operational control and employment will be an additional strategic challenge. While these platorms may appear aordable or some countries, the potential requirement or a complex C2 architecture may make there there routine use impractical. Converse Conversely, ly, autonomous systems tasked with simple ISR activity could exploit local internet or telecom systems to relay inormation. inormation. Here again, advances advances in cyber warare technology will be critical and could help overcome the dependencies dependencies on satellite systems and technology technology.. In line with these advances, advances, we should not overlook the many ways that supported orces may exploit these systems. systems. Given a secure communications communications architecture that is similar to the US Global Inormation Grid (GIG)47 , it should be possible to equip the oot soldier with a acility to plug into an 59
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UAS to demand some orm orm o immediate kinetic eect. How dierent dierent is this rom calling or or artillery support against a specic target? target? This supposition generates some signicant command and control control issues. Currently Currently,, weapons release responsibility against ground targets sits exclusively with the aircrat commander,, whether he is in the cockpit or sitting at a console. Once a soldier commander takes ownership o the bomb, responsibility or collateral damage becomes a contentious issue. issue. Does it lie with the soldier or the aircrat aircrat commander? While this may appear straight-orward, the issue is urther complicated i we allow a soldier to ‘direct’ an attack rom a UCAV while under re rom hostile orces without any any other C2 interaction. As with the use o artillery, it should be possible to develop overarching overarching CONOPS and TTP48 to address this issue, however,, the work is certain to identiy signicant C2 issues. For example, as however NATO stas examine the concept o employment or armed UAV, the issue o weaponization generates its own discreet problems. Weapon integration, integration, saety and operating system system security are key issues or the MIL. Once you transer that capability to the ‘man-in-the-eld’ ‘man-in-the-eld’, you complicate the original challenges while also potentially increasing the exposure o the UAS to cyberattack rom opponents in an eort to ‘deny’ the platorms capability. Away rom the conventional ISR and attack role, the development o UAS could see the RAF exploring other unmanned unmanned capabilities. Currently Currently,, all air platorms are manned with highly trained and experienced ight deck crews. In line with civil operations, it may be possible to congure some o our aircrat or unmanned operations, particularly or operations in permissive airspace. For example, by exploiting spiral technological advances, advances, stand-o systems such as E3D and ASTOR could exploit emerging C3 technology so allowing both the ight deck and a number o mission crew to remain on the t he ground or at their home base. As condence condence grows in communication networks the natural next step will be to replace the entire crew with additional systems and an automated FCS. That said, the unquantiable capacities o the human brain (including instinct or gut eeling) are never likely to be replicated by computer technology, thereore, thereore, an onboard/on-sce onboard/on-scene ne Mission Commander (MC) will remain essential. However However,, we should recognise that that utilisation o one o these platorms or trials could provide an ideal testing ground or UA UAV V technologies such as Sense & Avoid and autonomous ight management systems. Once proven, proven, these technologies should easily transer transer both to other military platorms and civil systems. systems. The RAF aircrat most likely to contribute contribute to these developments are the Airbus Industries A330-200 Future Strategic Tanker Aircrat (FSTA) and A400M Tactical Transpor Transport. t. With their modern FCS, it should be relatively straight orward to integrate S&A hardware along with various sotware enhancements to allow unmanned strategic AAR & AT air operations. As part o that process, autonomous AAR to supply other UAV UAV should be possible day or night with the option o all ac operating ‘lights-out’ ‘lights-out’.. However,, the Tactical missions are likely to be more complex with threats rom However small-arms re and MANP MANPADS ADS aecting mission proles. Also, certain A400M missions that demand tactical arrivals at austere airelds with damaged runways and changing ground threats will undoubtedly exceed the capabilities 60
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oered by early autonomous platorms. platorms. Given that most large ac missions will not be exposed to such threats, the number o aircrew within the ‘specialist ‘specialist manned core’ could be small. On a more positive note, it should be reasonable to expect strategic AAR platorms such as FSTA to support routine operations automatically with only occasional tactical inputs rom CAOC stas. Finally, Finally, while the modern C130J ight control systems could accommodate automatic mission management, the variety and complexity o task, could make such an option both unaordable and impracticable. In line with C130J operations, the conversion o our current eet o rotary aircrat also appears unlikely. While the technology is likely to be available, cost, a requirement or detailed mission management and the needs or op agility and exibility, will make such proposals unattractive. However However,, as platorms such as the Puma and the Chinook Mk2 reach the end o their service lie it is likely that their replacements will operate with higher hig her levels o automation. One major challenge will be to construct a orce mix o Heavy and Tac-lit Tac-lit platorms that can allow pilots to manage the most complex missions. A cursory examination o helicopter operations in Aghanistan suggests that autonomous night-time ‘low-level’ rotary ops or logistics support, could be a viable option. Equally, in the area o SAR, a rotary system that can sustain long endurance missions at night in dangerous weather conditions could be viable. However However,, while it should be possible to replicate the highest levels o pilot aircrat handling skills, simple examination o the military/civil SAR and Coastguard role conrms that any operation is rarely routine and that an onboard MC supporting a winch-man/paramedic will be a pre-requisite or success. Finally, it is necessary to complete a review o medium term developments Finally, by examining the impact that unmanned systems will have on the ghter/ attack capability. Within Within this group we could expect to see developments aect the last years o the Apache Attack Helicopter, Typhoon Typhoon and JCA. Given the complexity o attack missions, the role o the MC is certain to remain. Although advanced communication networks could ensure robust C3 links to the platorms, mission success will still depend upon traits such as ingenuity, imagination and exibility, to name but three. In the medium term, while it should be reasonable to expect computer technology to achieve simple levels o articial intelligence, actors such as secure communications, peripheral vision, ‘on-scene’ on-scene’ analytical analytical skills and the Laws o Armed Conict will continue to dictate the need or an ‘on-board’ ‘on-board’ brain. As with rotary operations, piloting tasks are certain to be let to computers with the man in the cockpit ocusing on specic mission related related and emerging emerging tactical issues. Accepting this premise, the man-machine interace between the ‘pilot-less’ ‘pilot-less’ platorms and the MC will be vital, as will the controlled presentation o only mission essential inormation. Emerging improvements in Ground Control Stations are certain to contribute to these developments, as will the development o simulations to train, test and rehearse rehearse the MC. Given both the complexity complexity o the tasks 49 and the increased breadth o responsibility , MC will need to be high calibre 61
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ocers who understand ully, the aims o their mission and the array o system capabilities under their control. The MC’s most oten and demanding challenge will probably come rom his own or other unmanned platorms seeking approval to attack or engage. In theory, advances in weapons technology, should ensure that issues such as CDE and CEP 50 will be less challenging while understanding understa nding o Cdr’s Intent, ROE and LOAC will have to be exemplary. No doubt, however, ‘reach-back’ communications should ensure that many o the more dicult strategic/operational decisions will rest with air stas in the CAOC.51 Having ocused on ground attack capabilities and associated eorts to operate in dicult terrain while bringing orce/s to bear against targets that are relatively static, the nal piece o the jig-saw comes with addressing the challenge o unmanned ghters to support Oensive O ensive and Deensive Deensive Counter Air (OCA/DCA) operations. It seems attractive to suggest that in i n line with complex ground attack missions, all AD ghter ops could be suppor ted by unmanned systems. In many routine AD policing missions such an approach seems reasonable, particularly i the target platorm is also unmanned. However,, it is reasonable to accept that, as with SAR missions, the term ‘routine’ However ‘routine’ 52 rarely applies to AD ops. While the domestic part o (10% ) o sorties could be executed by an unmanned system, experience suggests that the operational part (90%) o the sortie sor tie is ar more complex, requiring judgemental activity, activity, ROE decisions, visual ID and oten close escort both to provide direction and to demonstrate intent. Most o these sorties will involve involve escorting and monitoring aircrat ranging rom potential hostile bomber/ISR platorms to general air trac such as light aircrat. In almost all these situations, a man in the cockpit will be critical to the sae outcome o an intercept. There is also the issue o public acceptance, or example, the extreme prospect o an unmanned ghter shooting down an unmanned passenger carrying commercial aircrat would generate equally extreme public reactions. reactions. That said, whether that cockpit incumbent will require the piloting skills o our current stock o ghter pilots will, as ever, be dependent upon advances in technology. Advocates o the unmanned ghter also need to appreciate that o-board decision making would require high levels o delity and control response that currently cannot match the perormance and response levels o the human brain. Furthermore, successul unmanned combat operations against airborne targets closing at supersonic speeds depend upon constant, robust and secure communications to succeed. Although pure piloting skills are likely to become less and less relevant, as with all other air platorms requiring rapid tactical decisions, the unmanned ghter appears a long way o.
Future Capability - Long Term Having identied the challenges acing UAS in the short and medium term, i t is reasonable to expect that emerging technology will eventually provide all the solutions. Howeve However, r, the status quo in terms o military capability rarely exists and we should recognise that asymmetric threats to UAS C3 architecture and parallel advances in opposing technology could threaten all uture UA UAV V operations. Equally, by 2047, 2047, other space-based ISR systems and weapons weapons 62
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could render the UAS, and even airpower in its current orm, obsolete. Indeed, examination o the other ot her environments suggests that autonomous system technology could deliver unmanned land and naval platorms thus changing the global perspective and understanding o conventional conventional war. war. In addition to the conven conventional tional war-ghting environments, mobile integrated space platorms protected both by advanced protective and deensive systems including DEW are certain to transorm domination o the entire battlespace. In parallel with these advances, it seems reasonable to expect that the exploitation o nanotechnology will change the way the Joint Recognised Picture is generated. The challenge lies with data gathering and tracking such that terra-bytes o inormation can be assimilated and ully exploited in a covert but strategic way. way. Exploitation o internet-technology internet-technology and support systems (Cyber-warare) could make it possible to exploit opponent communications networks such that passive data gathering becomes the norm. Detecting such activity could be very dicult with the only indication indication being an opponent’s reduction in conventional ISR activity – by then; o course, the damage may have been done. Mindul o constraints such as the Laws o Armed Conict, advances in warghting technology may generate demands or review – however unpopular. unpopular. With autonomous air vehicles potentially at the oreront o operations, the spread o technology is certain to impact upon Maritime and Land operations. For example, today today the complex power source within a nuclear nuclear submarine demands constant care and attention – will this be the case in 40 years? I not, ‘wither’ at least hal a submarine’s company? Suggestions that a man is required to re nuclear missiles ts well with the Air environment requirement or a MC. However, However, that is but one role. In I n the submarine, the many and varied ‘piloting’ ‘piloting’ and and engineering skills skill s could all be subsumed by an autonomous system exploiting advanced underwater S&A systems – arise the autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV). Further Further,, ISR operations in littoral or shallow waters could be urther delegated by deployable deployable mini-AUVs. mini-AUVs. On the surace, the conventional RN ‘bridge’, could become redundant with crews saely accommodated accommodated in the t he bowels o the ship ocusing on mission related activities under the command o the MC. Finally Finally,, what o the Land environment? Is it some science ction ction dream to suggest that technology technology will deliver a combat robot, again, under the command o well equipped, dataused combat MC? The US Army and Marine Corps have just53 issued an urgent operational needs statement or 1000 bomb-detecting robots with a plan to have over 3000 systems in use in 5 years. While not providing an autonomous system, the levels o automation provide early indicators o what could be achieved in 25 years. Similarly, US Army plans to acquire remotely operated Unmanned Ground Vehicles Vehicles (UGV) equipped with automatic weapons such as the M16 rie, 40 mm grenade launchers and anti-tank rocket systems, reinorce this view. While there will continue to be a MIL, his location or presence will depend entirely upon the threat, t hreat, the geographic environment, the level o risk and, ultimately, the complexity o the mission. A actor that will probably apply to the planning or all unmanned maritime, land and air missions in the uture. 63
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Finally, although not a specic topic o discussion, simulation will play a key Finally, part in these developments. A Mission Training Training Distributed Systems (MTDS) (MTDS) ramework is certain to inorm the uture planning and orce structures or the UAV UA V orce. Further, mission rehearsal, ATO ATO testing, airspace integration and saety are also certain certain to benet. It will also be in this arena that autonomous system T&E may occur.
Conclusion Unbounded by current concepts and convention, and admittedly inuenced by science ction, the prospects or the employment and exploitation o unmanned air system capabilities appear unlimited. NA NATO TO countries have have been quick to recognise the benets o UA UAV V and European industries have been working hard to match the US lead in this area. Current indicators suggest that while military requirements are driving the need or UAV development, long-term nancial success will be ound in the commercial arena. In the interim, developments in military capability when combined with support suppor t rom accredited T&E organisations may generate a need to review air orce structures. Where will the MC t into this construct? How do we justiy a MIL? We should not not underestimate other other issues. Although technology is certain certain to advance UAV capabilities, other constraints such as resource and requency bandwidth are certain to slow the rate o progress. progress. In addition, opposing orce capabilities will not stagnate; they will take advantage o our advances, identiy vulnerabilities and pursue similar technologies to support asymmetric attacks. Our dependence on communication systems and nodes will grow and how we respond to breakdowns or attacks will be critical to operational eectiveness. eectiveness. These architectural actors, when combined with statutory issues such as the LOAC LO AC and the complexity o war-ghting are sure to sustain the need or MIL. In particular parti cular,, our early quick wins based upon Reaper and Watchkeeper Watchkeeper could be negated by political and military militar y demands or greater exibility, accuracy accuracy and responsiveness in an increasing increasingly ly complex battlespace. Stealthy UAV UAV will require direction; swarming attack systems will require mission command, long-endurance ISR platorms will require monitoring while data capture will require detailed assimilation and exploitation. Tactical Tactical attack missions will need MC to respond to unoreseen situations and changes across the war ghting environments. environments. Unmanned commercial commercial or military AT & AAR systems will always require require some orm o human interaction. interaction. While ully automatic systems should be capable o supporting routine operations, in almost all cases, manual input at some stage will be essential. The challenge will be to decide where to place that man – how do we exploit his capacity, how do we avoid overloading overloading him and how do we empower him? Ultimately, with assured communications, total local environmen environmental tal sensor coverage and complete sensor usion, UK military unmanned air operations could, in theory, be run rom PJHQ, ront line commands or, on occasions, by the soldier on the ground. Delivery o such a concept concept that has so many uncertainties uncertainties and 64
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dependencies is likely to be unaordable unaordable,, unacceptable and unachievable over any term. While technological advances advances may allow coalitions to shape the battlespace, individual actors and threats such as those currently in Iraq and Aghanistan may nd asymmetric asymmetric tools to deliver strategic counters. counters. The ingenuity o vengeul war ghters knows no bounds; while norms may be countered,, actions outside the expected will still require human interaction countered and command. Although the days o the ‘seat-o-the-pants’ ‘seat-o-the-pants’ aviator maybe numbered, the man in the military militar y air vehicle, in almost every orm, has a long and vital uture. NOTES 1
17 Dec 1903. The rst ight took place 5 Mar 1936 and the aircrat ew in RAF Service until 9 Jun 57. 3 This proposition ignores the requirement or modern avionics. 4 First ight 13 May 1949. 5 Introduced to Service by the RAF in Dec 1959. 6 Known in the UK as the Joint Combat Aircrat (JCA). 7 Road, Rail, Gas and Electricity lines, Communication Towers. 8 China’ss anti-satellite missile test on 11 Jan 2007 not only demonstrated an China’ ability to destroy space platorms rom earth but the destruction produced a huge trail o identiable debris (1335 pieces) which could still either damage or impact other low-earth space sensors. 9 HALE – High Altitude Long Environment, MALE – Medium Altitude Long Environment. 10 Moore’s Law : ‘The most popular ormulation is o the doubling o the number o transistors on integrated circuits every every 18 months. It is also common to cite Moore’s Law to reer to the rapidly continuing advance in computing power per unit cost, because increase in transistor count is also a rough measure o computer processing power. On this basis, the power o computers per unit cost - or more colloquially, “bangs per buck” - doubles every 24 months (or, equivalently, increases 32-old in 10 years). 11 A more conservative interpretation interpretation o a doubling every 2 years would see this increase at a mere actor o 1 million. 12 Original plans or Typhoon involved the ormation o 7 RAF Sqns with 4 tasked with Air Deence (AD), 2 with Ground Attack (GA) and 2 with a Multi-role mission (AD/GA). Operations in Iraq and Aghanistan have reinorced the need or a multi-role capability – all RAF Typhoon Typhoon Sqns will train as Multi-role. 13 Air power’s contribution to: the coordinated acquisition, processing and dissemination o timely, accurate, relevant and assured inormation and intelligence intelligenc e which supports the planning and conduct o operations, targeting and the integration o eects and enables commanders to achieve their goal throughout the Spectrum o Conict. – JWP 0-01.1. 14 Published Mar 07. 15 The payload is broken down into: Sensors, Communications Relay, Weapons, Cargo and Payload Support. 2
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It is reasonable to consider the Predator Predator A as the rst, long-range BLOS BLOS Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle – it entered service in 1995. 17 Joint Direct Attack Munition with a stand-o capability o around 15 nm 18 Man Portable Air Deence Systems Systems such Stinger IR Missiles. 19 On most sorties the crew will be joined by an Intelligence Analyst to assist with imagery exploitation. 20 Find, x, track, target, engage, assess. 21 Special Forces pattern o lie monitoring oten have an unrecognised but strategic impact upon operations operations.. 22 For example, the USAF employ the Reaper as primarily an Attack, Sur veillance and Recce Platorm while UK planning ocuses on the persistent ISR capability with an Attack option. 23 ‘Reachback’ to National acilities reduces deployed support costs while also allowing better use o limited analytical resource. resource. 24 FASOC – Para 37. 25 There is no doubt that this issue will remain a constant challenge or Commanders delivering strategic eect. 26 Urgent Operational Requirement Requirement – normally in response to changing threats or environments which require specialised equipment or additional capabilities. 27 Canberra PR9, Nimrod Mk II, Tornado GR4. 28 HLOC Commentary - Preace, para 3. 29 August 08. 30 Boeing and QinetiQ are currently in talks with US Deense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to develop a UAV capable o staying airborne or 5 years while carrying a 1000lb payload. 31 Tornado Integrated Avionics Research Aircrat - In Apr 07, QinetiQ completed a successul airborne demonstration o this capability. An F3 crew controlled a BAC 1-11 aircrat and 3 other surrogate UAV. 32 Autonomous Systems Technology Related Airborne Evaluation and Assessment. 33 Watchkeeper is destined to succeed H450 and is due to enter service in 2010. The acquisition o this platorm has ollowed conventional MOD procurement processes. 34 On 11 Sep 07, the US Senate Deense Appropriations Appropriations Subcommittee approved the purchase o an additional 24 Predator and 5 Global Hawk UAV. 35 As a minimum, there is at least one civil general air trac incident/crash per week in the UK – the majority o these involve human error, yet there is no clamor to stop manned aviation. That is the UAV conundrum. 36 UAV Frequency spectrum issues are on the agenda or WRC in 2011, however, this only addresses the issue o C2 or civilian/commercial civilian/commercial air platorms. 37 All air vehicles will be required to carry carr y equipment that emits critical ight data. Given the recent advances in networked communications, GPS and mobile phone technologies, such a requirement should be aordable, reliable and ailsae by 2020. 38 We should not discount asymmetric attacks against key communication nodes which are based either on land or in space. Equally, as military dependence on 66
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space grows, so will the vulnerability. 39 A cruise missile ying or 3-4 hours against a xed strategic targets conorms conorms to LOAC, a UCAV on station or many days is less likely to meet such standards. 40 Other vignettes could include NGO activities involving involving the Red Cross or the Media. Any autonomous system would need wide area data to understand the CDE implications o attacking a high value asset as it crossed a strategically important river dam. 41 Equipment Capability – Deep Target Attack. 42 Deep, Persistent, Oensive Capability. 43 Launch and Recovery Element – Responsible R esponsible or local air operations including take-o and recove recovery. ry. 44 On the assumption that a platorm such as Global Hawk gathers unknown terabytes o ISR data, one wonders what percentage o this is properly catalogued and stored or uture exploitation. 45 The US Deense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has launched an exploratory development program with the goal o placing a high-altitude, long endurance UAV anywhere on the planet within one hour, delivered by means o an intercontinental ballistic missile. 46 DARPA are also unding an Expandable Local Area Sensors in a Tactically Interconnected Interconnect ed Cluster (ELASTIC) initiative initiative.. This eort builds upon the dramatic gains in battleeld technology such as communications and cameras. They are planning to use systems with a power-consumption o no more than several hundred nanowatts to manage a network o sensors communicating sporadically to a mere milli-watt to deliver compressed FMV allowing or batterypowered sensors to survive or a considerable time. 47 A soldier with a specic IP address could have the ability to view all (airborne) support assets within his local area o operation. 48 Training Tactics and Procedures. 49 Routinely, the MC could be expected to control a additional combat/attack platorms as well as his own. 50 Circle o Error Probability. 51 Although not addressed in this essay, the complexity o using numerous UAV/UCAV UA V/UCAV operations should not be underestimated. Data usion and mission cohesion will depend upon resilient lines o communication and a clear understanding understandin g – both by CAOC sta and the MC - o mission aims and objectives. 52 Scramble instruction, auto taxi and taxi-o, climb, descend, recovery, recovery, landing and auto taxi. 53 Aug 07.
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UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES – THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
Wg Cdr Allison Mardell
T
he concept o a ully autonomous Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) (UAV) would likely oer airpower airpower a step change in capability. capability. But is a ully autonomous UAV UA V ever technologically easible, especially when many o the legal implications o airpower, particularly the application o oensive orce under the Laws o Armed Conict (LOAC), (LOAC), are rarely black bl ack and white, even with a human decision-maker in the loop? Whilst the employment employment o these high-end, articially intelligent, vehicles is technologically dubious (but not impossible), this certainly does not rule out the wider use o UAVs, UAVs, at varying levels, on a sliding scale o autonomy. autonomy. We have have already seen the signicant signicant impact o UAVs on contemporary operations-witness the UK’s contribution to Predator operations rom the US-and undoubtedly the unmanned domain is here to stay. Thereor Thereore, e, not withstanding the aspirations to achieve ull autonomy, the legal implications o operating UAVs are relevant now, as clearly there is a need to remain within the law as we continue UAV operations, both now and in the uture. This paper, paper, thereore, seeks seeks to identiy various potentially problematic legal issues concerning the operation o UAVs, UAVs, in order to expose them and raise awareness o the possible implications they might have. These issues include autonomous capability and the application o LO LOAC; AC; a discussion regarding the extent o legal liability o UAV UAV operators; the possible use o civilians as operators o military milit ary UAVs UAVs and air space regulation and saety matters. It is hoped that the issues raised raised within this paper will provide provide a base line o inormation i normation and opinion that will assist with the development o unmanned capabilities, not least the Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle Vehicle (UCAV) and the policy or their t heir employment.
Autonomous UA UAVs Vs and the LOA LOAC C The concept o ’autonomy’ seems to have become increasingly synonymous with the development o UAVs. UAVs. The recent press release1 or Taranis rom BAE Systems, or example, illustrates this preoccupation with autonomous capability and reers throughout to the UAV’s autonomous ability and ‘brains’. UAVs UA Vs are not a new phenomenon, but their importance, development and use have increased signicantly signicantly due in part par t to their ability abilit y to remove the human rom harm’s harm’s way during an attack. Technologi echnological cal advances have enabled UAVs UAVs to be used not only or traditional Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) tasking but also as a weapon system that can engage in attack; hence the distinction distinc tion between UAV and UCAV. UCAV. Using UAVs UAVs in either an ISR or attack capacity does not, by itsel, contravene the Laws o Armed Conict2 (LO (LOAC). AC). It is only when one introduces introduces the concept concept o an autonomous autonom ous UCAV that controversies arise. This is because UCAVs UCAVs can attack 3 the enemy, either deensively or oensively, through the use o armed orce; 68
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thereore, the provisions o LO thereore, LOAC, AC, particularly concerning the protection o civilians and civilian objects during an armed conict, will directly apply to the employment o UCAVs. UCAVs. The technology associated associated with autonomous capability o a UCAV, UCAV, thereore, would need to acilitate compliance with the requirements o the LOAC LOAC i it is to be acceptable rom a legal standpoint. Arguably, there are two main areas that require consideration consideration regarding the development o an autonomous capability or UCAVs. UCAVs. Firstly Firstly,, what is meant by ‘autonomy’ in this context and, secondly, what considerations and decisions are required under LOAC LOAC prior to an attack. One needs to ask the latter question in order to ascertain what would be required o computer sotware sot ware i the human were removed removed rom the decision cycle or an attack, even in part. Autonomy should be viewed viewed as a sliding scale. scale. At the top o the scale will will be a ully autonomous system that can do everything humans are required to do within LOAC, LOAC, prior to and during an attack, including the ability abilit y to make the necessary decisions, and engage in the thought processes that this decision making involves. involves. At the other end o the scale scale will be those systems systems that require human input in order or their use to comply with LOAC, LOAC, but which may have some autonomous capability. capability. For example, a weapon weapon system that has an autonomous ability to identiy and conrm an enemy target, without any human intererence, intererence, but without being able to make any other decisions, such as where to search or the target in the rst place, what weapon to use and whether to attack, has some autonomous capability but is not a ully autonomous system. In order or a ully autonomous system to be able to comply with LOAC, it must be able to make the qualitative assessments and decisions required under this area o law; or, put another way way,, the precautions in Article 57 must be capable o being taken, and while with a person in the loop this is easy to demonstrate (usually), the removal o that person rom the crucial qualitative decisions (proportionality is a good example) means you have to ensure that the required precautions are taken somehow. LOAC has developed exponentially over the last 150 years, gathering speed LOAC throughout the Twentieth Century, and particularly ater WWII.4 The main sources o LOAC are customary international law5 and international treaties. Arguably, some o the most prominent milestones in treaty law have been the 4 Geneva Conventions o 1949 6 and the 2 Additional Protocols o 19777; with Additional Protocol 1 (AP1)8 adding signicant detail to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Conven tions, particularly in relation to the protection o civilians against the eects o hostilities. hostilities. AP1 also introduced new denitions and most commentators would accept that AP1 has increased the obligations upon Parties to a conict, particularly in relation to the protection o civilians, and a number o its Articles are now accepted as being declaratory o customary international law.9 It is easy, when considering the rules and restrictions that the LOAC places on the warghter, to overlook the spirit and intent behind the legal parameters. It cannot be doubted that one o the main reasons or or the LOAC LO AC is to provide a system o protection or certain vulnerable categories o individuals and objects, that are not part o the direct warghting machinery 69
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o the State, or combatants that have become hors de combat, but remain vulnerable to the ghting. This raison d’être or the LOAC LOAC is demonstrated by the basic customary law principles o military necessity, distinction, proportionality and humanity. The principle o military necessity prescribes that Parties to an armed conict are prohibited rom engaging in destruction merely or destruction’ destruc tion’ss sake. There must be a military reason why an attack is required against a particular object, and Parties must use only that level and type o orce, not otherwise prohibited by the LOAC, which is necessary necessary to achieve the objective object ive o the conict. It is now well established in treaty treaty and customary law that civilians and civilian objects must not be made the object o attack. 10 In order to adhere to this principle and ensure, as ar as possible, protection or the civil ian population and civilian objects, Parties to a conict must distinguish between civilians/civilian objects and combatants/military objectives to ensure, as ar as possible, that only combatants and military objectives are attacked. 11 The principle o Proportionality12 requires the number o expected civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects to be weighed against the military advantage anticipated rom rom an attack. An attack will be lawul only when when it is believed that the collateral damage would not be excessive in relation to the concrete and and direct military advantage anticipated. In practice such decision-making is not easy since it is dicult to quantiy a military advantage especially when judged against civilian loss o lie or injury.13 No matter how challenging the application o the principle o proportionality is, its application is imperative to ensure the lawul justication o each target. Once a military purpose has been achieved any urther iniction o suering in relation to that purpose will be unnecessary, and thus in breach o the military necessity principle. The principle o humanity additionally prescribes that parties to a conict must not cause unnecessary unnecessary suering and superuous injury. These basic principles o the LOAC LOAC now underpin the provisions contained in many treaties, specically AP1. The UK ratied AP1 in 1998, and the Articles within AP1 in relation to the protection o the civilian population, namely Articles 48-58 inclusively, are generally accepted as having become declaratory o customary international law and, thereore, apply to all States regardless o whether they have ratied AP. AP. However, there are some notable notabl e exceptions e.g. the US does not accept Article 55 regarding the protection protectio n o the environment nor does it accept Article 56 regarding the protection protection o dams, dykes etc; the US also blows hot and cold on the precise terms o the militar y objective denition. However However,, it is to AP1 that one must turn to determine much o the detail regarding the decisions and qualitative qualit ative assessments required within the LOAC during the use o armed orce. There are clear requirements in AP1 or certain considerations and decisions to be made prior to an attack to ensure ensure that the attack will be lawul. lawul. A number o these requirements are neatly summarised within Article 57 concerning precautions in attack. Article 57 rearms and draws draws together the overriding overriding obligations placed upon the Parties to a conict, in relation to the protection o 70
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the civilian population, and states as ollows: 1.
In the conduct o military operations operations,, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.
2.
With respect to attacks, the ollowing precautions shall be taken: (a)
Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall: (i)
do everything easible to veriy that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are military objectives within the meaning o paragraph 2 o Article 52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions o this Protocol to attack them;
(ii) take all easible easible precautions precautions in the choice o means and methods o attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss o civilian lie, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects; (iii) rerain rom deciding to launch launch any attack attack which may may be expected to cause incidental loss o civilian lie, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combinatio combination n thereo, which would be excessive in relation to concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; anticipated; (b)
an attack shall be cancelled or suspended i it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss o civilian lie, injury injur y to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereo, thereo, that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;
(c)
eective advanced warning shall be given o attacks which may aect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.
3.
When a choice is possible between several military objectives or obtaining a similar military advantage advantage,, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lie and civilian objects.
4.
In the conduct o military operations at sea or in the air, each party to the conict shall, inconormity to it’ it ’s rights and duties under the rules o international law applicable in armed conict, take all reasonable precautions precautions to avoid losses o civilian lives and damage to civilian objects.
5.
No provision o this article may be construed as authorizing any 71
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attacks against the civilian population, civilians or civilian objects.
Thereore, the rst precaution required under Article 57(2)(a) is or the Parties Thereore, to a conict to do everything easible to veriy that the objectives to be attacked are not civilian or civilians, or objects subject to special protection.14 This rearms the principle o distinction.15 The second precaution is the requirement to use methods and means o warare that avoid or minimise collateral damage and the third precaution introduces the proportionality principle. Also o signicance signicance is the requirement requirement in Article 57(2)(b) to cancel or suspend an attack under certain circumstances.16 Thereore, a decision is required regarding the verication o the targets to be attacked, how each target is to be attacked to avoid or minimise collateral damage, whether the attack would be proportionate and whether due, or example, to new inormation or change in circumstances circumstances,, the attack should be cancelled or suspended. Also, where there there are several targets that i attacked individually individually would provide a similar military advantage, there is the requirement requirement within Article 57(3) to choose the target that is likely to cause the least amount o collateral damage i attacked. For a UCAV UCAV to be ully autonomous it would have to be capable o considering these precautions and deciding upon the appropriate actions to take. take. For example, example, it would have to be able to determine the likely amount o collateral damage that may be caused rom an attack and determine whether the military advantage anticipated rom the attack would justiy that amount o collateral damage. LOAC does not speciy that decision making must be carried out by humans, LOAC thereore,, providing the relevant decisions are made, it does not seem to thereore matter whether this process process is undertaken by humans humans or machines. Article 57(2)(a) does not reer to a specic decision maker, but reers to ‘those’ who decide upon an attack. This could include any person who at some stage may have the ability and authority, to make a decision regarding the prosecution o an attack. This will, o course, include the commander commander who may authorise the attack, but the ability and authority may also may all to the troops on the ground or in the air who actually carry out the attack: those who actually re a rie or release a bomb. When Article 57 was drated there was much debate17 about the scope o the phrase “those who plan or decide upon an attack”,, particularly regarding who it was meant to include. Some argued it attack” placed too much responsibility on subordinates and that it should only apply to commanding ocers. However, many others recognised that, in some ghting, especially in circumstances o timeliness, decisions would be taken at the lowest level and this provision needed to cover all eventualities in order or the precautions to be eective. eective. Certainly planners and commanders commanders will all into this category but so may others who, due to the circumstances, have some discretion regarding the way the attack is carried out.18 Depending on the t he circumstances, thereore, thereore, there may be several decision makers, at dierent dierent levels, in one kill chain. The same reasoning also applies to those who plan the t he attack; all those involved in this regard bear the responsibility to consider and take the precautions listed within Article Art icle 57, 72
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including the concomitant decisions that have to be made which are integral to compliance. Whilst this may seem a wide interpretation to some, some, arguably it is the only one that allows ‘constant care’ to be taken, as required under Article 57(1). I the line o responsibility to comply with these these precautions was was drawn at a particular part icular level o command, it would allow the precautions to be ignored at all other levels, l evels, thereby thereby diluting the protection meant or civilians. However, recognition o the reality o conict, particularly the act that people However, can only do so much in dicult circumstances and within the bounds o technology, technolo gy, is acknowl acknowledged edged through the inclusion inclus ion o the word ‘easible’. The UK has interpreted ‘easible ‘easible’’ to mean “that which is practicable or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, ti me, including 19 humanitarian and military considerations considerations..” Thereor Thereore, e, there will come the point at which time it i t will not be possible under the circumstances to take any more care, but the acceptable threshold, in relation to the precautions, must have been reached or the attack to be lawul. The UK adopted the same pragmatic approach, in relation to Article 57(2)(b), when it included the ollowing statement o interpretation upon ratication o AP1: “The UK understands that the obligation to comply with paragraph 2(b) only extends to those who have the authority authorit y and practical possibility to cancel or suspend the attack.” However, this statement should not be interpreted as an attempt to usurp However, the provisions o AP1, by encouraging the development o technology that is not capable o cancelling or suspending an attack, in order to argue that, as it is not ‘practically ‘practically possible’ to take this precaution, the requirement to do so is removed. removed. Rather it should be interpreted interpreted as an attempt to incorporate incorporate the reality o war ghting into the interpretation o AP1. For example, example, in some circumstances, despite despite all precautions being taken prior to an attack, once a weapon system has been released, like a ballistic missile, it would not be practically possible to suspend or cancel that attack, however, however, it is still necessary to take all o the precautions prior to the release o the weapon. Thereore, Thereor e, developing a weapon system that cannot take precautions is not the answer, answer, because i the system cannot take the t he precautions the requirement to do so does not disappear disappear,, the human will have to take them, until it is no longer easible easib le to do so. The point is that the ‘one one way missile’ makes no decision and is red by a human at a target chosen by a human who knows when it may be expected to hit it and who has considered all available target specic inormation and made the necessary qualitative evaluations, i the autonomous UCAV removes removes the human rom these activities the issue i ssue is whether it achieves them itsel. it sel. As well as the precautions within Article Ar ticle 57 o AP1, there are also other rules within LOAC LOAC that require qualitative decisions during an attack. For example, the requirement under Article 41 o AP1 not to attack those who have been recognised as hors de combat or as surrendering, or who, under 73
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the circumstances, circumstances, should have been recognised recognised as such. A ully autonomous system would have to be capable o recognising those who were hors de combat or who had surrendered in order to maintain the protection intended or these categories categories o person. O course the system may not be operating alone. There may be other systems systems securing awareness awareness o what is going on in the target area and which may ensure compliance with the precautions requirement. Or Or,, the nature o the search area may enable enable those who plan the attack to have a sucient level o assurance that collateral risks can be obviated – remote land areas, areas, seas, deserts deserts etc. I the weapon system could not distinguish combatants rom surrendered combatants, then a human would be required to monitor the battle space in order to identiy surrendered combatants etc, or another mechanical system that can do this may be usable. As reerred to above, there are already weapon systems that have a certain amount o autonomous capability, but remain reliant upon the ‘human ‘human in the loop’ to comply with the requirements requirement s under LOAC. LOAC. For example, the autonomous element o Brimstone is the ability, abilit y, through its sensor, sensor, to seek out, identiy and attack the enemy target. The group o objects at which the pilot res is the composite target and thereore he the pilot or the planners do the proportionality etc checks beore it is red at the composite target and the individual search just makes it more discriminating. Once an appropriate target set has been detected in a particular par ticular area, Brimstone is programmed, programmed, by a human, to start its search at a particular par ticular point within the search area, end its search at particular par ticular point and then, i it ails to nd a target t arget within this area, it is programmed, again by a human, to sel-destruct at a particular point. Thereor Thereore, e, the target and its position will have been identied and determined beorehand by a human, and the search area and destruction point will be calculated calculated and determined determined by a human. In relation to the precautions under LOAC, LOAC, the target will have been veried by humans upon detection; it is designed to search a limited area or a specic target and sel destruct in a pre-programmed and benign area, all controlled by humans, thereby complying with the principle o discrimination; and the proportionality and collateral damage implications o the t he attack will have been considered by humans humans beorehand, beorehand, or by the pilot in the cockpit. Brimstone’s autonomous capability is the ability abilit y to search the area and nd the target, t arget, by which I mean locate a pre-designated target group, group, and attack. Thereor Thereore, e, through a mixture o machine and man, all precautions will have been met. Due to the current limitations limit ations o technology, it seems that a ully autonomous system is still an aspiration, but some autonomous capabilities have been and are still being developed, albeit that human input is still required in order to comply with LOAC. The level o human input will depend not only upon the level o technology but also condence in that technology. technology. For example, with Taranis, BAE Systems claim to have developed a system that can “autonomously control control the aircrat to taxi, t axi, take o and navigate its way to a search area while reacting to any threats threats or other events. events. It will then route its way around the search area in whichever way it wants, to locate the target and 74
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then use its sensor system to transmit a series o images and views back to the operator to conrm that it is the target to be attacked. Then, once it has been authorised to do so, it autonomously attacks that target, routes its way back home, lands and taxis back.” 20 Whilst this system may be able to act autonomously in the ways described, it is still a long l ong way rom having the level o ‘articial ‘articial intelligence intelligence’’ required required to address the qualitative decisions required under LOAC. LOAC. For example, the human is still required required to monitor the imagery, identiy the target, t arget, assess the expected collateral damage and authorise the attack. A urther issue i ssue to consider is the actual benet a ully autonomous UCAV can bring to the warghter. warghter. Arguably it removes removes the human, or at least the human human aircrew, rom harm’s harm’s way and it may limit the scope or human error. However, this must be weighed against the amount o condence in the autonomous system to always unction correctly and the possibility o its decision process being aected by the environment e.g. extreme weather conditions or jamming by the enemy. enemy. Also, in some circumstances circumstances humans may be better able to respond to the dynamic environment o an armed conict with initiative and agility that would be extremely dicult, i not impossible, to replicate in a machine. A better approach may be to concentrate concentrate on how degrees o autonomy within weapon systems can enhance the capability o the warghter, not least o all by removing him or her rom the immediate danger o the ront line, as opposed to concentra concentrating ting on removing him or her completely rom the decision process. However However,, In some circumstances an autonomous system may be able to cope better than a human or example in situations o extreme pressure where a decision is required in seconds seconds,, whilst in other circumstances human intuition, exibility and experience may eclipse any benet the autonomous system system has to oer. oer. Currently Currently,, in relation to compliance with the LOAC LOAC the human remains an integral part o the decision making process, and will do so, until such time that technology produces sucient ‘articial intelligence’ or a autonomous system to comply with the decisions required to ensure an attack is lawul under the LOAC.
Legal Liability and UAV Operations There are dierent dierent types o liability liabilit y in law e.g. criminal liability and tortious liability; each requiring the t he presence o dierent dierent elements beore legal liability attaches to an individual. Whether an individual will be liable in law or either a crime or a tort will always depend on the acts o each case and whether whether the elements o the crime or tort can be established. The ollowing is a simple example illustrating the way that dierent circumstances can alter the responsibility, and potential liability, or a decision. I a pilot is given a xed target rom the Air Tasking Order (ATO) he must rely on the xed targeting process, and it would be reasonable or him to expect others, namely those involved in the targeting cycle, to have veried the target, ensured its lawulness and have have produced accurate accurate co-ordinates etc. I, or example, the co-ordinates turn out to be incorrect and a civilian object is hit, 75
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and there is no evidence to show that the pilot should have realised that the co-ordinates were incorrect, then the pilot will not bare responsibility or the incident; responsibility will lie elsewhere, even though it is not with the person who actually released the weapon. The individual who produced the wrong coordinates may have been negligent or, i he or she intended the consequences that occurred through providing the wrong co-ordinates, may be criminally liable. O course, i the pilot is in a position position to visually identiy the target, target, or has enough inormation or situational awareness to raise his or her concern regarding the target, then he or she must be satised that it is appropriate to release the weapon. weapon. In short, i the pilot has doubts, he must resolve resolve these rst and only attack when the military status o the target is clear. Where a Forward Air Controller (FAC) (FAC) is engaged, then he or she will usually be in a better position than the pilot to assess a threat and identiy a target and apply LO LOAC, AC, whereupon the pilot will rely on the FAC’s FAC’s judgement judgement and the t he responsibility or weapon release will lie with the latter. latter. However However,, i the pilot can see something that the FAC FAC cannot, or example, civilians sheltering behind a building out o view o the FAC, but who will be caught up in the attack, the onus then shits to the pilot to act accordingly upon this inormation. Thereor Thereore, e, who bears responsibility or the decision, and whether any legal liability ows rom that t hat decision, will depend on acts o the incident and who was involved. involved. Indeed, there may be several people that bear responsibility or one incident.21 O course, a person may be responsible or a decision or activity that causes harm or damage but, due to the circumstances, may not bear any liability in law. In relation to the application o LOAC, LOAC, an individual’s individual’s actions will not be judged in hindsight, but with regard to the circumstances at the time o the incident, including the pressure they were under and the inormation they had at the time. This is conrmed by the ollowing statement statement o understanding to AP1 made by the UK: “Military commanders and others responsible or planning, deciding upon or executing attacks necessarily have to reach decisions on the basis o their assessment o the inormation rom all sources which is reasonably available to them at the relevant time.” During an armed conict concerns in relation to legal liability usually centre on individual criminal liability or war crimes. crimes. Whether a person will will be criminally liable or a war crime will depend on the circumstances surrounding each case and the nature nature o the alleged crime. Military UCAV operators operators will be subject to the same criminal law, both domestic and international, as any other combatant and must, thereore, comply with LOAC. The ollowing are examples o war crimes to illustrate the nature and scope o criminal issues that may arise as a result o attacks against the enemy. enemy. The 4 Geneva Conventions o 1949 list several ‘grave breaches’ which i committed may amount to a war crime; these war crimes were incorporated into the UK’ UK’ss domestic legislation through the enactment o the Geneva Convention Convention Act 1957. Article 85, within AP1, adds to the list o war war crimes, and, and, inter alia, reers reers 76
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specically to Article 57: “…The ollowing acts shall be regarded as grave breaches o this Protocol, when committed wilully, in violation o the relevant provisions o this Protocol, causing death or serious injury to body or health: (a)
making the civilian population or individual civilians the object o attack;
(b)
launching an indiscriminat indiscriminatee attack aecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive excessive loss o lie, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, as dened in Article 57, paragra paragraph ph 2 (a ) (iii);
(c)
launching an attack against works or installation installationss containing dangerous orces in the knowledge that such an attack will cause excessive excessive loss o lie, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, as dened in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a) (iii);…”
The 1993 Statute establishing the International Criminal Tribunal or the Former Yugoslavia Yugoslavia (ICTY ) lists, inter alia, as grave breaches o the Geneva Conventions Conven tions the ollowing: “… extensive destruction and appropriation o property, not justied by military necessity and carried out unlawully and wantonly… the wanton destruction o cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justied by military necessity; attack or bombardment, by whatever means o undeended towns, villages, dwellings or buildings.”
Finally, the war crimes within the 1998 Rome Statute or the International Finally, I nternational Criminal Court (Rome Statute) are listed as those “Grave “Grave breaches o the Geneva Conventions Conventions o 12th August 1949” and include: wilul killing; extensive destruction and appropriation o property, not justied by military milit ary necessity and carried out unlawully and wantonly; intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities; intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects that is, objects which are not military mil itary objectives; intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss o lie or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long term and severe damage to the natural environmen environmentt which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated ; attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undeended and are not military objectives; killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or having no longer means o deence deence,, has surrendered at discretion.22 A constant element within the war crimes listed li sted above is the requirement that they are committ committed ed ‘intentional ‘intentionally’ ly’, ‘wantonl ‘wantonly’ y’, ‘wilu ‘wilully lly’’ or ‘with knowledge’ knowl edge’. Thereore, Thereor e, in most cases, to be guilty guilt y o a war crime, the perpetrator must have intended to bring about the consequences that have resulted rom his actions; 77
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which is more than just being reckless or negligent. ‘Intention ‘Intention’’ is the highest threshold in relation to the mental element required or a criminal oence, and thereore,, oten the most dicult to establish. thereore establish. Individual criminal liability or a war crime contingent upon the perpetrator o the oence having the intention to commit the act that amounts to the crime. In practice, thereore, i a commander, or those who plan an attack, decide upon an attack or execute an attack do all that is practical in the circumstances to gather and review the intelligence available to them and conclude in good aith that the object o attack is a legitimate military target and have done everything practicable to avoid or minimise collateral damage, then they will have complied with the LOAC.23 Providing they have acted in good aith, based on the inormation available to them at the time, they will be able to justiy their actions and decisions.24 O course one should remember that not all breaches o the LO LOAC AC will amount to a war crime, such breaches, however, however, may still have a signicant impact on the individual, and strategically in relation to the operational campaign; the most obvious example being media and public opinion. The principles discussed above, regarding war crimes, will apply to the employment o weapons rom a UCAV in the same way as they apply to the employment o any other other lawul weapon system. system. In relation to an autonomous UCAV, or a UCAV that has some element o autonomous capability, its characteristics and limitations will need to be understood by its operator to ensure that it is used in compliance with the LOAC. LOAC. A level o condence must have already been reached in relation to the autonomous element o the system, or example through successul trials – meaning that it must be capable o being used in such a way as allows o the precautions in attack required by the law; the human input must then reach the threshold required by the LOAC. Even Even with a ully autonomous UCAV the actual decision to use it at a particular place and time within the battle may still have to be made by a human, who will be responsible or that decision and may at a later date have to explain and justiy it.
Civilians as Military UAV Operators Given that many UAVs will allow operators to be removed rom the battleeld and be placed out o harm’s way, this might raise the question o whether UAV UA V operators need to be combatants or whether civilians can undertake this role. The most obvious legal issue regarding the use o civilians in this role is the application o the LOAC in relation to the protection o civilians and the circumstances that give give rise to the loss o this protection. As reerred reerred to above, under the LOAC, civilians cannot be made the object o attack. However, However, in the t he same way as civilian objects can become military militar y objectives, civilians can loose their protected status “or “or such time as they take a direct part in 25 hostilities.” Unortunately, the phrase “direct part in hostilities” has never been claried in treaty law and has consequently been subject to diering interpretations and resultant controversy. controversy. 78
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Whilst it is not unlawul in itsel or civilians to play a direct part in hostilities, there are certain consequences consequences that ow rom such activity. The rst consequence is that their immunity rom attack will be lost or such time as they so participate part icipate and the civilian or civilians involved can be made the object o attack; i captured by the enemy they may not (levee) be entitled to prisoner o war status, as they will not be recognised combatants, they will remain as civilians who have lost their protective status; and nally, they may also be subject to criminal prosecution i their ‘direct part in hostilities’ amounts to a criminal oence e.g. murder is it worth spelling out that any intentional causing o a death that is not sel deence is likely to be murder. Thereore, allowing civilians to operate UAVs UAVs during armed conict may have signicant implications or them i their activity amounts to a direct part in hostilities. Looking at the varying interpretations o ‘direct ‘direct part par t in hostilities’,26 the commentary or AP1 states that the behaviour o civilians must constitute a direct and immediate military threat t hreat to the adversary, beore beore it can be said they are playing a direct part par t in hostilities. I ‘direct direct participation’ is required then ‘indirect participation’ must be acceptable. Whilst neither is a war crime as such, it is important thereore to establish the ault line between direct and indirect participation, but what activity constitutes either? I the term ‘hostilities’ ‘hostilities’ is interpreted too widely (i.e. any activity that may help the enemy) this may remove the protection or civilians in many circumstances circumstances,, signicantly eroding their protection. protection. However However,, i it is interpreted too narrowly, it may prevent the military rom taking sucient measures to counter threats or activities rom the civilian population. For example, should ‘hostilities’ include the activities o civilians engaged in the collection o materials to donate to the war eort eort e.g. tin cans. it were to include such such activities then any other similar activity, carried out by civilians, aimed at helping the war eort in general, could amount to a direct part in hostilities, thereby usurping much o the protection intended or civilians during an armed conict. Arguably, this type o activity can be categorised as an ‘indirect ‘indirect activity’ and merely ‘war sustaining’, not a direct and immediate military threat, thereore, should not be included within a denition denition o hostilities. It has been suggested that ‘hostilities’ ‘hostilities’ should only include activities that are intended to actually cause harm and destruction as opposed to activities that only develop the capacity to do so.27 Arguably, civilians are allowed allowed to support their armed orces in times o conict, or example, by sending ood parcels to deployed troops or being engaged in making military ration packs28 , without losing their protected status? However, at the other end o the scale, it can be saely argued that civilians However, actually engaged in an attack, thereby physically ghting the enemy enemy,, are playing a direct part in hostilities. There remains, remains, however, however, a grey area o activity, which supports the military but is short o actual ghting. ghting. For example, civilians involved involved in logistical support suppor t or intelligence collection or the military, or guarding either either a military unit or prisoner o war camp. There is also debate about the exact exact duration o taking a direct part in hostilities. For 79
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example, does such participation start when the attack is being planned and end when the attacker reaches saety, saety, or does direct participation par ticipation in hostilities only last during the actual attack which causes a threat to the adversary? The discussion above demonstrates the ambiguity that characterises the notion o ‘taking a direct part in hostilities’. In relation to the civilian operation o UCAVs UCAVs during an armed conict one could successully argue that this will amount to ‘taking a direct part in hostilities”, hostilities”, as it would include a direct and immediate threat to the enemy. enemy. However However,, could civilian contractors legitimately launch the vehicle and pass it to a military controller to y to the combat zone? While deployment orward clearly is ‘taking a direct part in hostilities’, I am not sure that the launching necessarily is, but bu t it may depend on the nature o the machine. Perhaps launching is ‘taking a direct part in hostilities’ i, once launched, the machine ies itsel to its zone o operations. An area o even less certainty is the status o civilian UAV operators engaged in ISR tasking. There is a divergence divergence o views in this regard as it alls squarely into the ‘grey grey area’ reerred to above. On the one hand some argue arg ue that intelligence gathering is not directly related to an attack and thereore, does not amount to hostilities; hostili ties; and on the other, some argue that intelligence gathering has a direct connection to the ability to attack or deend, and thereore alls within scope o playing a direct part in hostilities.29 Whatever the UK’s interpretation, however, however, there will always be the risk ri sk that the enemy adopts a wide interpretation and includes ISR tasking as playing a direct part in hostilities, and will thereore view civilians engaged in such activity as lawul objects o attack. Any proposal to use civilians as UAV operators, thereore, should take into account the likely risk to them, particularly in relation to the loss o immunity rom attack. It is accepted that the risk to the operators in this regard regard may be slight where they are thousands o miles rom the area o operations at a home base in relative saety; however however,, this may not always be the case, and there is always the possibility o the enemy attacking UK territory. There is also the risk that by employing civilians in ambiguous roles, the wider protection o them may be compromised, not least i conusion as to who is and who is not participating in the hostilities is created.
Air Space Regulation and Saety Standards The saety and operational standards or UAV ights is a major issue,thereore, this brie outline o the body o rules governing the use o airspace is intended to highlight the potential diculties associated with UAVs and ying regulations. Since the introduction o the Paris Convention in 1919, a number o international treaties30 and institutions31 have been created that provide comprehensive comprehensiv e regulations and oversight o the use o airspace.32 The main Treaty Treaty in relation to civilian aircrat is the Chicago Convention 1944 on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention). Convention).33 As a signatory o 80
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the Chicago Convention and member o the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the UK undertakes to comply with the provisions o the Chicago Convention Convention and its Annexes. However However,, Article 3 o the Chicago Convention Conven tion stipulates that it only applies to civil aircrat and not to State aircrat. State aircrat are dened as those aircrat aircrat used in military, customs customs and police services.34 Thereor Thereore, e, the MOD has been let to develop its own regulatory standards in relation relation to military aircrat. This has resulted resulted in the development o 2 regulatory regimes within the UK: civilian and military. The military regime within the t he UK is governed by the Ministry o Deence (MOD), which has produced JSP 550, the Military Aviation Policy Regulations and Directives, and JSP 553, the Military Airworthiness Regulations. The main civilian requirements or the UK are set out in the t he Air Navigation Order 2005 (ANO) and the rules o the Air Regulations 2006 (both all under the Civil Aviation Act 1982). As reerred reerred to above, the majority o national civil aviation legislation does not apply to UK military aircrat. However However,, MOD policy is to provide military regulations that correspond to the civilian rules, rul es, and to ensure the same eective level o regulation to the regulations contained within the ANO. The policy o the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) is that UAVs UAVs operating in the UK must meet the same or better saety and operational standards as manned aircrat ‘in ‘in so ar as they must not present or create a hazard to persons or property in the air or on the ground greater than that attributable to the operations o manned aircrat’.35 This has been mirrored by MOD policy, which supports the view that military UA UAVs Vs must show an equivalent level o compliance with the regulations or manned aircrat. At present, to ensure that the equivalent level o saety to that required or manned ying is achieved, UAV operations are restricted to segregated airspace. Currently Currently,, there are no national procedures procedures that permit either civil or military UAVs UAVs to routinely y in non-segregated airspace. airspace. One o the main areas o concern surrounding UAVs UAVs seems to be their t heir ability, or lack o ability, to ‘sense and avoid’ avoid’ other aircrat. At present the CAA require a similar ability abilit y or UAVs to ‘sense and avoid’ as achieved by manned aircrat, which remains a technological technolo gical issue. Arguabl Arguably, y, thereore, it is unlikely that UAVs UAVs will be allowed to y routinely in segregated airspace until they reach the same threshold o ‘see and avoid’ capabili capability, ty, equivalent to that reached by manned aircrat. This o course is likely to have a number o implications regarding the development o UAVs in general as well as the ability to train personnel to operate UAVs and acquire ying experience. However, given their proven utility, I have no doubt that, within time, the civilian and military mil itary authorities, with the assistance o technology,, will reached a solution that may ultimately allow the routine ight technology o UAVs within UK airspace.
Conclusion The utility o UAVs, UAVs, in particular their ability to remove the human rom harm’s way and provide increased persistence, means that they are here to stay. The aspiration or a ully autonomous UCAV may not be technically? possible 81
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today but systems are already being developed with levels o autonomous capability. The autonomous capability being planned or Taranis, Taranis, or example, may enhance operational eectiveness by removing the more mundane considerations rom the human, allowing more concentration on complex decisions, however, the human must still remain ‘in the loop’, to veriy and authorise the attack. A ully autonomous system would would have to be capable capable o making the qualitative assessments currently required by LOAC, LOAC, until this is possible the human must remain within the decision-making process. process. The law applies to UA UAV V and UCAV operators in exactly the same way as it applies to all other military personnel operating dierent weapon systems, systems, thereore, UAV UA V and UCA UCAV V operators must understand the characteristics and capabilities o the system they are operating to ensure that these systems are used appropriately and in accordance with the law. Whether or not consideration will be given to using civilians as UA UAV V and UCAV operators remains to be seen, but i it is, then the possible consequences or those civilians under LOAC LOAC must be borne in mind. Civilians operators used during an armed conict are likely to loose their protected status, and will denitely do so i operating a UCAV that is in the combat zone or deploying to or rom it. They may also ace criminal prosecution prosecution i captured by the enemy and will have no right to PW status. We could certainly be criticised as a State or placing civilians in such a precarious position. Finally, progress with the development o UAVs and training may be hindered by the current approach to UAV UAV ights in UK airspace. However, once the technology or ‘sense and avoid’ capability or UAVs is accepted it is likely that the regulations may be relaxed allowing more routine UAV UAV ights and the increased acceptance acceptance o their t heir presence in our skies. sk ies. Without doubt UAVs are here to stay, and i we wish to take advantage o increasingly sophisticated technology, technology, perhaps resulting in ull autonomy autonomy,, then throughout the development o any UAV UAV capability we must be mindul o the very real constraints that legal requirements can place upon these capabilities. These constraints are not necessarily insurmountable but currently it would appear we are still some way o. NOTES 1
18 Jun 2007/ Re. 178/2007 ‘UK Taranis UAV Passes First Major Milestone’. 2 The title o the Law o Armed Conict (LO (LOAC) AC) and International Humanitarian Humanitarian Law (IHL) reer to the same body o law. 3 Article 49 AP1 denes ‘attacks’ as ‘acts o violence against the adversary whether in oence or in deence’. ‘Deence’ was included to make mak e the scope and application o AP1 as wide as possible. possible. Article 49 continues to state that ‘The provisions o this protocol with respect to attacks apply to all attacks in whatever territory conducted, including the national territory belonging to a Party to the conict but under the control o an adverse Party’. 4 A number o important treaties were ratied prior to WWII including including,, or 82
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example, the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration, viewed as the rst major internationall Treaty internationa Treaty prohibiting the use o a particular weapon during warare, namely explosive projectiles under 400 grams o weight; the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs o War on Land, still relevant today; and the 1925 Geneva Protocol or the Prohibition o the Use in War o Asphyxiating, Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other O ther Gases, and o Bacteriological Methods o Warare. 5 Customary law develops through State practice and is created when extensive State practice exists together with Opinio Juris: the belie by States that there is a legal obligation or right to to act in a particular way. All States are bound bound by customary international law, whereas only those States that ratiy a Treaty are bound by the terms o the Treaty, unless provisions within a treaty have also crystallized into customary internationa internationall law law.. 6 1949 Geneva Convention Convention I or the Amelioration o the Condition o the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field: 1949 Geneva Convention II or the Amelioration o the Condition o the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members o Armed Forces at Sea: 1949 Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment o Prisoners o War: 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection o Civilians in Time o War. 7 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions o 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection o Victims o International Armed Conicts (AP1) and 1977 Geneva Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions o 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection o Victims o Non-International Armed Conicts (AP1I). 8 The UK ratied AP1 on 28 January J anuary 1998. 9 See Parks, W. Hayes, ‘Air ‘Air War and the Law o War’, the Air Force Law Review, Revi ew, Volume 32, Number 1, 1990 - Hays’ point within this article is that certain o the obligations in the Protocol are inappropriate or the reasons he explains, and his argument now is that a number o the AP1 provisions are not customary law. 10 This is conrmed in the recent study by the International Committee o the Red Cross (ICRC), see Henckaerts, Jean-Marie, Doswald-Beck, Louise, ‘Customa ‘Customary ry International Internati onal Humanitarian Law’, ICRC, Cambridge Universit Universityy Press. Press. However, civilians and civilian objects may be attacked under certain circumstances. circumstances. Civilian objects may become legitimate targets i they all within the denition o military objectives ound in Article 52 (2) o AP1 which states that “Attacks “Attacks should be limited strictly to military military objectives. In so ar as objects are concerned, concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an eective contribution contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances circumstances ruling at the time, oers a denite military advantage.” Civilians Ci vilians may be attacked i they lose their protected status ‘or such time as they take a direct part in hostilities hostilities’’ (Article 51(3) o AP1). There There is also the question o reprisals. 11 The principle o distinction is now codied in article 48 o AP1, which states as ollows: “In order to ensure respect or the protection o the civilian population population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatan combatants ts and between civilian objects 83
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and military objectives and accordin accordingly gly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.” 12 Article 57 (2) (b) o AP1 states that “An attack shall be cancelled or suspended i it becomes apparent that the object is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss o civilian lie, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combinatio combination n thereo, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” 13 The Committee established to review the NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic o Yugoslavia conrmed that the ‘determination o relative values’ in relation to proportionality must be that o the ‘reasonable military commander’’. Thereore, the question to be addressed by decision makers prior commander to an attack is: would a reasonable military commander, under the circumstances at the time o the attack, have considered that the expected damage to civilians/ civilian objects was proportionate to the expected military advantage? 14 Within AP1 Articles 53, 54, 55 and 56 gives special protection rom attack to cultural objects, objects indispensable to the survival o the civilian population, the natural environment and works and installations containing dangerous orces. 15 The principle o distinction is rearmed in Article 48 o AP1 as ollows: “In order to ensure respect or and protection o the civilian population and civilian objects, the parties to the conict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.” 16 Upon ratication o AP1 the UK entered the ollowing statement o interpretation interpretati on in relation to Article 57, AP1: “The UK understands that the obligation to comply with paragraph 2(b) only extends to those who have the authority and practical possibility to cancel or suspend the attack.” 17 See Y Sandoz, C Swinarski, and B Zimmerman (eds) ‘Commentary ‘Commentary on the Additional Protocols o 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions o 12 August 1949’, (1987). 18 This is also the view adopted in the JSP 383 – ‘The Joint Service Manual o the Law o Armed Conict’ 2004 Edition. 19 Taken rom one the 16 statements o interpretation the UK made beore it ratied AP1. 20 18 Jun 2007/ Re. 178/2007 ‘UK Taranis UAV Passes First Major Milestone’. 21 Art 3 to Hague IV 1907. 22 These are just some examples that appear the most relevant to this particular matter, there are many more crimes listed within the Geneva Conventions and Rome Statute. 23 This o course is the issue i the technology prevents them rom doing something that perhaps less sophisticat sophisticated ed technology would permit! 24 There are other areas o liability that a person may be subject to, even though they don’t have the sucient intent to have committed a war crime, or example, they may have committed a military oence, namely, ‘negligently perorming a 84
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duty’, or there actions may justiy administrative action. 25 Article 51(3) o AP1. 26 To assist in this area a series o Expert Meetings co-organised by the ICRC and the TMC Asser Institute are endeavouring to clariy the precise meaning o the notion o “direct “direct part par t in hostilities. 27 See the Third Expert Meeting on the Notion o Direct Participation in Hostilities, Summary Report, Oct 2005. 28 A acility used or the production o military ration packs could be attacked as a military objective, but individual civilians working in the acility could not be attacked unless this type o activity was viewed as amounting to playing a direct part in hostilities hostilities.. 29 See the Third Expert Meeting on the Notion o Direct Participation in Hostilities, Summary Report, Oct 2005. 30 For example the Warsaw Convention 1929 or the Unication o Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air (Warsaw Convention); Convention); the Chicago Convention 1944 on International Civil Aviation; Tokyo Convention1963 on Oences and Certain Other Acts Committe Committed d on Board Aircrat ( Tokyo Convention); the Montreal Convention 1999 or the Unication o Certain Rules or International Carriage by Air (Montreal Convention Convention 1999). 31 For example the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), a Specialised Agency o the United Nations pursuant to Article 64 o the Chicago Convention; the International Air Transport Association (IATA), a private organisation o scheduled airlines and the European Aviation Saety Agency (EASA) ormed under EC Regulation 1592/2002 and or national regulation the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). 32 Article 1 o the Chicago Convention states that ‘every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territor y.’ At present there is no internationally accepted denition o airspace and many States have tended to adopt a practical view o the extent o airspace, or example JSP 383 ‘The Joint Service Manual o the Law o Armed Conict’ provides that ‘For practical purposes, it can be said that the upper limit to a state’s rights in airspace is above the highest altitude at which an aircrat can y and below the lowest possible perigee o an earth satellite in orbit.’ orbit.’ Aircrat have reedom o overight in ‘international airspace’ which comprises exclusive economic zones and airspace over the high seas. 33 It should be noted that Article 8 o the Chicago Convention Convention states that no aircrat capable o being own without a pilot shall be own over the territory o a contracting State without special authorisation o that State. 34 Article 3b o the Chicago Conve Convention. ntion. 35 UAV aerial vehicle operations – guidance CAP722.
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UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES – CULTURAL ISSUES
Mr Seb Cox HIGH FLIGHT Oh I have slipped the surly bonds o earth And danced the skies on laughter-silvered wings; Sunward I’ve climbed, and joined the tumbling mirth mir th O sun-split clouds – and done a hundred things You have not dreamed o – wheeled and soared and swung High in the sunlit silence. Hov’ring there I’ve chased the shouting wind along, and ung, My eager crat through ootless halls o air. Up, up the long, delirious burning blue I’ve topped the windswept heights with easy grace Where never lark, or even eagle ew. And, while with silent, silent, liting mind I’ve trod The high untrespassed sanctity o space, Put out my hand, and touched the hand o God P/O John Gillespie Magee Jr [1922-1941] 1
“What ’s the Dierence between God and pilots? God doesn’t think “What’ he’s a pilot.” Anon2
T
he ot-quoted poem High Flight, written by RCAF Spitre pilot John Gillespie Magee epitomises epitomises the joy and reedom reedom o ight. It is also a metaphor or escape rom earthbound cares, the “surly bonds” o humdrum existence. Written in the rst person, it explicitly links ying to Heaven and to God, and implicitly links the activity activit y to a superior existence accessible only to a ew – “a hundred things you have not dreamed dream ed o…” o…”. It is, in other words, words, unashamedly unashamedly elitist: the airman really can reach out and touch the ace o God, where others cannot. cannot. The anonymous quote that ollows ollows on the other hand is surely written by a non-pilot; be he a long-suering engineer, engineer, navigator or perhaps met man. Yet both speak to the image o the aviator, and especially especiall y the pilot. The spoken or unspoken assumption o superiority; o a natural order o things in which pilots are the only ones who matter. matter. This is not simply a reection o the personality-types who join the Air Forces as pilots (although that may raise a smile amongst non-pilots), but also a reection o a simple historical truth. From the start o the First World World War War until today only a very small cadre o the RAF, and its predecessors the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service, have have actually ought. On 1st May 1945, a week beore the Second 86
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World War in Europe came to an end, there were 144488 aircrew [all men] in the RAF compared with wit h 988827 men and women in “ground trades”. trades”. O the total strength o 1,133315 men and women approximately one in eight [12.75%] were thereore aircrew. However, only 73,897 aircrew were ully trained, compared compared to 815540 trained groundcrew groundcrew o 831541 in total [excluding women]. The percentage o the trained manpower manpower strength o the RAF who were aircrew aircrew was thereore less than 10% [9.06]. [9.06]. O these 26556 were pilots, or 3 2.3% o the total trained manpower. The above gures relate relate to all aircrew. aircrew. On 1st July 1945 [no data is available or May] there were 40973 pilots in the RAF. RAF. O these 41000 men, 12000 or 29% were in operational operational units. The total male strength o the RAF at that point was 940867 so only 1.3% o men in the RAF were pilots in rontline units. Yet historically it is men rom this statistically very small pilot-aircrew segment o the service who have dominated the upper echelons o the Royal Air Force. There has never been a Chie o the Air Sta in the entire ninety year history o the RAF who was not a pilot, never never mind an airman. A handul o navigators navigators have made it to the highest ranks, but never to CAS, and a ew engineers have also served on the Air Force Board, Board, but always in a technically-related post. This also represents a much narrower “gene-pool” rom which to draw than a comparable percentage o say “teeth-arms” ocers in the Army rom which the CGS is traditionally drawn. This is not an historical accident. Both services perceive that the head o the service must be rom the combat arm and the perception is that this is the only background that can give the necessary credibility to lead an armed servi service. ce. This, however, however, does not ully explain why non-pilot aircrew have so consistently ailed to attain the highest positions in the RAF. RAF. In act there is little logic in this position. It is, however, however, a prejudice o long-standing and a persistent persistent one. In the early years o the Royal Royal Flying Corps it was assumed that Observers would all eventually want to become pilots and that their status as what would now be termed “backseaters” “backseaters” (though in some early aircrat the observer sat in ront o the pilot) was merely temporary. The act that many o the primary missions o the RFC required higher levels o skill rom the observer than they did the pilot was largely ignored. ignored. Indeed, as late as 1917 it was impossible or an observer to be promoted above the rank o Lieutenant, or given any executive position, whatever qualities he might otherwise possess. Even where high level level policy decisions apparently avoured avoured an equality o treatment it was not always properly implemented. implemented. Thus, whilst the Air Council decided in 1949 to admit navigators to Cranwell, it was another seven years beore a navigator actually entered the College. 4 Such attitudes can only be explained by the perception within the Service that as the pilot takes t akes the aircrat into action and is usually, through the technical and demanding action o ying it, the person who ensures the success o the mission, only pilots can truly appreciate the nature and demands o aerial warare. war are. There may be a grudging admission admi ssion that navigators navigato rs [or “obser observers” vers” or “weapons system operators”] in multi-seat aircrat share some o demands and responsibilities, but the identication o potential high yers has always been 87
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perormed relatively early in their careers, and pilots will have been channelled directly along routes leading to the top where others will have had a more ercely competitive struggle. I these, sometimes ormal, more oten unspoken, assumptions have dominated the culture o the Service Ser vice throughout its ninety year existence, then the advent o the unmanned aircrat clearly has ar-reaching implications or the uture Royal Air Force, implications that challenge the very nature o the Service, its sel-image and the way it is perceived by the other two services and the general public. public. Flying is not a natural activity or man: man: in order to y, y, he or she is entirely reliant on some orm o mechanical assistance, usually o a air degree o sophistication. sophistication. Early man could and did swim and utilise logs as otation aids, graduating to dug-out canoes and eventually sail-powered sail-powered vessels. Even relatively relatively sophisticated design ideas ideas or achieving ight, such as those sketched out by Leonardo da Vinci, had to await developments in technology sucient to conquer the problem o the power to weight ratio. From the very earliest days o the RFC and the RAF, RAF, ight was a dangerous activity even without the added dimension o military combat and its associated risks. risks. Simple technical ailure, ailure, all too common until airly recently recently and not unknown even now [c the recent descent o a US Air ways airliner into the Hudson River in New York York in January 2009 ater a multiple birdstrike], was potentially atal, and relatively straightorward misjudgements could also kill the unwary. Whilst the sea is also a potentially hostile medium, man can survive on it or short periods under his own power, power, or with simple buoyancy bu oyancy aids; it does not automatically kill those whose technical means o support have ailed – vessels which suer a loss o propulsive power due to mechanical ailure do not automatically sink. This is not true o the air, where loss o power power almost invariably removes lit and thus makes prolonged ight unsustainable, at which point, recent miraculous examples notwithstanding, survival sur vival becomes problematic, particularly or those not seated on a piece o MartinBaker, or similar, technology. These simple truths underpin some cultural assumptions and attitudes towards military airmen. Many people are rightened o ying even even in relatively relatively sae commercial airliners, whereas ew indeed are rightened o sea voyages in ocean going ships. Such ear o ying may be exaggerated exaggerated but, as the Hudson River incident shows, shows, it is not irrational. Society has traditionally held the bravery o military men in some esteem, particularly in those previous eras when the whole o society was perceive perceived d to have beneted rom their t heir prowess. Today ew in wider society are more than vaguely aware o the benets they enjoy as the result result o the sacrice o previous previous generations. generations. Although military aviation is a relatively recent phenomenon in historical terms, it might be argued that military militar y airmen have beneted rom a perception that they possess a double helping o bravery as both intrepid explorer o the “dangerous” third dimension, and as courageous combatants. There are some very deep atavistic attitudes underlying the historical admiration o warriors and it is arguable that only in very recent times, 88
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particularly as a result o the industrialised warare o the twentieth century, have such attitudes begun to change, change, at least in the West. West. As Christopher Coker has pointed out: “What distinguishes humans rom nonhumans is that the ormer are not programmed to act by instinctual behaviour. behaviour. They are 5 prepared to die or honour or a ag.” The philosopher Hegel pointed out that war between civilized as opposed to tribal societies meant that “Warriors “Warriors were now people who realized the nature o their own reedom through courage…” They were, in other words, words, willing to die or a value. Hegel also stated that “Freedom dies or ear o dying”. 6 I we accept these strictures then we are led to the belie that there are two undamental elements present in warare – the instrumental and the existential. existential. The instrumental is the rational, rational, political element which underpins most, and certainly most Western, perceptions perceptions o war.. This is the idea that any war is ought to achieve certain war certain rational ends – in Clausewitz’ss amous dictum, that “War is merely the continuation o policy Clausewitz’ by other means”.7 However, this is not the only element present in war. Clausewitz himsel, the arch-exponent o the rational in war, wrote “I war is an act o orce, the emotions cannot ail to be involved …”. 8 Hence there is also the existential element element in warare. Men and women are undoubtedly motivated to join the armed services ser vices not merely to advance the rational element, but also to experience the existential aspect – to test themselves and be tested against an idea. They subscribe, unconsciously unconsciously perhaps, to an ideal that in order to be truly human, one must be tested and not ound wanting, and that most people are not not so tested in civil aairs. aairs. It is arguable that it is this motivation, allied to the idea o service, itsel an existential concept, that drives most people who enlist enlist in the armed orces. orces. I the existential elements elements o warare relate to concepts relating variously to bravery, sel-discovery, selimage, action, vitality, adversity and trial, where does this leave the literally chair bound warrior ying a UAV, whose war is ought rom a padded seat many thousand o miles away rom his or her adversary? In circumstances such as these, what is let o the concept o the serviceman or woman as being extraordinary, o bearing additional risk selessly on behal o others? And what o the traditionally elevated elevated position o aircrew? I a ar higher proportion o the rontline inventory is unmanned, who will y them? At the moment, such aircrat are piloted by aircrew who have previously own and qualied on manned aircrat. The question then becomes whether whether this is either desirable or sustainable sustainable in the long term. The argument in avour avour o aircrew is essentially that the unmanned vehicles will continue to operate in airspace with other aircrat, whether civil or militar y, and that an understanding and appreciation o the unusual and challenging physical environment and the eect o such actors as weather weather,, the perormance and reactions o other aircrat and pilots in a given situation and ATC ATC procedures are crucial to their sae operation, and also to their eective military employment. However, or the medium to long term sustainability o the Reaper unmanned However, aerial system [UAS] the Royal Air Force has already announced a trial involving the training o non-pilot ocers as UAS pilots. The ve personnel personnel selected or 89
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the trial are to consist o two Fast Jet Weapons System System Operators and three ocers rom the Operations Operations Support Branch. The training will include an extensive ground-school phase “to produce a baseline o ‘air mindedness’ to complement compleme nt the basic pilot skills.” skills.” The Commanders Brieng Note announcing the trial itsel indicates the degree o hesitancy, hesitancy, even discomort, with which the Service has set o down this road. Hence, it contains contains the ollowing prominent caveat: It is strongly emphasised that this activity is a trial and no decisions have been made with regard regard to the uture policy in this area. The trail will inorm any uture decisions and there are no changes to extant policy regarding Branches, Branches, employment, MES or career elds, all o which will require much detailed work and AFBSC [Air Force Board Standing Committee] level approval ollowing any emerging trial results.9 The long term implication may well be that the percentage o aircrew in the Service will shrink. Whilst there has always always been a dierential risk between between those at the point o the spear and those in the shat, and the more so in air orces or reasons alluded to at the start o this essay, essay, what are the implications i an ever greater proportion o airmen or women are remote rom risk, so that the 10 per cent o the RAF who were operationally operationally trained aircrew aircrew in 1945 shrinks even urther and the aircrew who y unmanned vehicles bear no greater, greater, or even lesser lesser risk than the support personnel? What reasons or regarding them as a race apart remain, i their risk is, in act, no dierent to that o the citizens in i n whose comortable and unthreatened environs environs they continue to live, and indeed do not leave when they “go to war”? These changes are, or the Royal Air Force, amongst the most signicant in cultural terms that t hat it has ever aced, and are potentially more proound than similar challenges acing the other two services. ser vices. Furthermore, i leadership o the service is based on the t he ability to lead in the ace o adversity and in potentially dangerous and stressul circumstances, where will the uture “airman” “airman” obtain his credibility i his only experience o command, and indeed o warare, is through an existence isolated not only rom the battleeld, but rom the war itsel? High command remoteness is not a new phenomenon. Generals in the rst World World War War were criticised or being remote – despite the act that they were within a ew miles o the rontline and could and and did visit it, and that not a ew ew were killed. In addition, they nearly all had some experience o warare rom earlier in their careers. Potentially, however, the UAV airman could remain remote and isolated rom warare throughout his or her career career,, not simply at high command level. What understanding o war as act o struggle, o its dynamic, o its complex interaction, o the spiritual dimension inherent in the concept o triumph o will, does a UAV/ UAV/UCAV UCAV culture culture oer? Is it any more valid valid than a non-military actor viewing war rom a comortable chair through the medium o nightly TV news beamed beamed to his plasma TV screen? What qualities qualiy the uture leaders o such a orce to be leaders – the technocratic skills o the IT manager, 90
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or the leadership skills o the military man, and i it is the latter, where where will they be gained? Indeed, the nature o leadership leadership where where the delivery delivery o air power is achieved increasingly increasingly remotely will itsel change and it may take a little while to establish what new qualities may be required o the leader o the uture. As we have discussed above, manned military ight has always had an element o danger, danger, even without the malign attentions o the enemy. enemy. In part to avoid those very attentions it has been conducted at the edge o the permissible envelope,, but minimising risks rom the envelope t he enemy increased risks rom other actors, so that the inherent risks o low ying were balanced against the lessened threat rom ground ground based air deences. deences. The lie o the airman was thus physically and mentally testing even even outside war. war. Furthermore, although during the Second World War War support personnel oten bore an element o risk, especially in expeditionary operations, this was generally and reasonably considered to be less than that borne by the aircrew. Now, however, however, whilst the aircrew o 39 Squadron may be ying the aircrat rom the reasonably assured saety o Nevada, the support personnel who oversee the launch and recovery o the aircrat are in theatre with all the attendant risks which that brings. Furthermore, there there is historical evidence evidence to suggest that the era era o cold war air operations rom well ound main operating bases produced a culture that was in part perceptibly “unmilitary” and that this was a problem which particularly aected air orces. orces. The new expeditionary era o Royal Air Force operations operations ushered in during the 1990s by operations in the Middle East and the Balkans exposed attitudes amongst some personnel which the RAF hierarchy ound disturbing and which led to the adoption o the ethos o ‘warghter ‘war ghter rst, specialist specialis t second’. This was intended to reinorce the message that all personnel were in the military and subscribed to a military ethos. However, i the existential element o warare is reduced by its increasingly However, digital and robotic nature, what path does this suggest or the military ethos? What will be be the ethos ethos o cyber-warriors? cyber-warriors? They take no risk. They do not engage directly with the enemy, as nearly all previous military men have done. They are probably probably largely immune rom retaliation. retaliation. How will they be imbued with a military spirit and ethos? ethos? The heritage o their orebears orebears in Camels, Camels, Lancasters, Vulcans Vulcans or Tornado GR1s will have less resonance than the video games they played in childhood and may may continue to play as adults. We may reer to their unit as No. 39 Squadron and award it the standard o its illustrious predecessors, predecess ors, but what meaning will it have have to him or her? her? What, indeed, indeed, will be their ethos? I it is purely utilitarian and and instrumental then their task becomes an employment, like any other. other. “Indeed, Hegel is quick to tell us that war cannot be centred on utilitarian motives alone, such as the deence o lie or property, or this would would lead to an absurd situation. It would be impossible to demand that soldiers sacrice both their property propert y and their lives and at the t he same time declare that war is waged to preserve them. I we ask why soldiers are willing to put their lives at risk, we must look at why they nd it a necessary eature o their general humanity. humanity. Thus Hegel concluded that war will only come to an end when human beings no longer have need o it to express their 91
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humanity, when no one will esteem them as warriors, and thus they will no longer esteem themselves.”10 Will there be serious issues o sel-respect and motivation or such “warriors” “warriors” i they come to regard it as just a job, or, conversely, conversely, will it dilute the meaning or the concept concept o the warrior? There are are signs that such dilution is already already under way. In a presentation to the recent RAF Centre or Air Power Power Studies Conerence Coneren ce at Shrivenham Colonel Mark Wells, the Head o History at the USAF Academy at Colorado Springs has some pertinent observations on changing attitudes within the USAF.11 Colonel Wells, Wells, himsel a qualied KC-135 pilot, reerred to a recent incident in which one o the young military militar y ocers serving on the teaching sta in his department had told him that he was a veteran o “combat” who had seen service in our wars. Since he knew the ocer involved to be a relatively junior intelligence specialist, Colonel Wells asked him to elucidate. elucidat e. All o the examples o “combat” cited by the ocer actually involved deployments which, in Wells’s words, were “several hundred miles rom actual combat””, such as a deployment in Italy during the Kosovo campaign. The combat ocer was surprised and upset when he was told that such deployments did not count as a s “combat combat”” in Wells’s lexicon. Colonel Wells’s Wells’s denition o o a combatant was that o a ghter, a warrior i you will, but one who denitely ghts. He understood “Air combat … to be the use o military militar y aircrat and other ying machines in warare or the close-range aerial combat between military aircrat themselves. themselves. Centuries o warare warare and military history strongly suggest that being in combat actually actu ally puts a combatant at some personal risk.” This was the traditional view with which Colonel Wells Wells ound himsel in sympathy, sympathy, but he also quoted the ollowing words rom the US Air Force Ofcers’ Guide, which he described as a quasi-ocial guide or newly qualied USAF ocers: Combat is too oten described as being only the event o deadly encounters between between two adversaries. adversaries. Not so. Combat is more [sic] oten the tiresome struggles to supply aviation material, such as uel, at the proper time and place in the combat zone. zone. Combat is requently requently the eort to produce sanitary water and potable ood in an area where it is almost impossible to do so … to urnish needed par ts or inoperable aircrat aircrat … to operate a decent eating acility in indecent … combat is doing the best you can under the circumstances
Colonel Wells Wells also identied other elements which had traditionally been the preserve o “warrior” aircrew aircrew and which were now suering similar dilution. He highlighted uniorm, or perhaps more accurately clothing, as one example, saying that “Not “Not too many years ago, or example, ying gear and ight suits were the sole domain o aviators. aviators. Occupying as they did the status o warriors in the Air Force, these aircrew members went to some lengths to distinguish themselves themsel ves rom non-yers”. non-yers”. He suggested that it might be argued that many recent changes which have seen non-aircrew increasingly wearing ight suits “have come as a deliberate attempt to urther narrow the distinction between traditional warriors … and the other members o the service.” He also 92
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pointed to the existence o sub-cultures among aviators – a phenomenon also prevalent in the RAF, with its various sub-tribes o “mud-movers”, “truckies” and “the kipper eet”. Wells also quoted a recent USAF Chie o Sta as stating that being a “warrior” was more “a state o mind” than actual experience. exper ience. I combat in uture is accepted as merely doing ones best under dicult circumstances then the range o combat “veterans” will increase exponentially. exponenti ally. Whilst conceding that neither view would necessarily meet with universal acceptance in the USAF, USAF, they indicate the extent to which traditional views o warare and warriors, orged quite literally over over millennia, are being challenged. Such trends are by no means limited to the USAF. USAF. The RAF is increasingly inclined to allocate squadron numberplates, previously erociously deended as the preserve o rontline ying squadrons, to units who have no rontline combat task in either peace or war. war. Similarly, during the deliberations deliberations over the award o RAF Battle Honours in the wake o the Kosovo conict, with which the author was intimately involved, some senior ocers questioned whether the regulations on the award o Battle Honours contained in AP3327 AP3327 were too restrictive. In particular they questioned whether the regulations governing the right to “emblazon” an Honour on the standard were outdated in requiring that this accolade be limited to squadrons which had been in direct conrontation with the enemy and had demonstrated gallantry and spirit “under re”. 12 It was suggested to the Battle Honours Committee that this approach no longer took account o the realities o modern air warare, in that modern, ground-based air deence systems posed a potential threat to aircrat at very long range and that the term “under “under re” thereore had little litt le meaning. Thus a potential threat to the operators was equated with the actual threat and by extension with combat itsel, itsel, using Colonel Wells Wells’’s denition. It seems reasonable to conclude that these already very perceptible cultural shits within Air Force Forcess will potentially be highlighted and accelerated by the increasing prevalence o unmanned systems. systems. In this respect the allocation o the 39 39 Squadron numberplate to a unit ying unmanned vehicles should surely be seen as a signicant pointer or the uture. Yet comparatively speaking “combat” or modern ground orces can still be a dangerous pursuit and the existential element is very much present, as the casualty gures rom Aghanistan Aghanistan demonstrate only too clearly. clearly. This may increase the cultural gap which has developed in recent years between airmen and soldiers. Interestingly Interestingly,, or the RAF (excepting the RAF Regiment) it has been helicopter and air transport aircrat which have been most exposed in recent conicts and which have have suered suered losses to hostile causes. There is little doubt that the crews o these aircrat are warriors engaged in combat. To be humanistic, war and warriors must respect the enemy; not necessarily their ideas or methods, but their humanity. Yet respect requires personal engagement at some level. War has historically been an intersubjective intersubjective activity. “War [has] involved involved a dialogue with the adversary on the intersubjective plane.”13 The language o the dialogue is o course violence. 93
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This raises the question o whether unmanned vehicles, whose operators can only experience war through a datalink, are in any meaningul sense involved in a “dialogu dialogue” e” with their adversary. adver sary. Does the UAVs UAVs inherent lack o personal engagement encourage a lack o respect or one’s enemy and through that, a dangerous dangerous degree o detachment? detachment? Nietzsche identied this conundrum conundrum when he wrote “You may have only enemies you can hate not enemies you despise. You must be proud o your enemy: then the successes o your enemy are your you r success su ccess also” al so”..14 Are UAVs the reductio ad absurdum o the Western obsession with technology? Speaking o the Romans, Josiah Ober described the t he siege o Jerusalem, which included endless and senseless killing kill ing as personiying “the long, complex, ugly western tradition t radition o war … as a technological problem”. problem”.15 In UAVs, have we reached a point where we have become so smart technologically that we are unable to see concomitant conceptual and philosophical dangers inherent in them? Rather than a Deus ex machina are the machine and its operator becoming Deus in machina? I war really does does become become a system, system, systematized in the way UAV UAVss suggest, is it war? And i war is unilaterally depersonalized and dehumanised to that extent, what does that speak to in the society or service that wages it? The Roman Empire collapsed when the Roman citizen was no longer required to deend it as par t o its own legions, which were instead instead sub-contracted out to the German tribes. I western society views the military as something apart, and with some suspicion because o the increasing perception that military militar y activity is itsel unworthy, how will it view ‘airmen ‘airmen’’ whose military activity involves taking little or no personal risks; what ‘military covenant’ or respect will there be or a technocrat who ‘ghts’ such wars? Additionally, i UAV crews are entirely divorced rom the reality and the context o what they are doing, i they perceive no dierence between their actions and those in a computer game or simulation, what eects eects will this have? have? Will it make warare increasingly and literally “inhuman”, so that by removing the possibility o riendly casualties, an act which can be perceived on one level as “humane” (though it can also be perceived simultaneously as politically shrewd in a casualty averse society), it will remove necessary and age old restraints? I war or the airman, and the concomitant killing, becomes “just a job”, with no risk, and no reward in terms o sel-knowledge, what eects will that have, both on how how it is waged and on those who wage it? To remove remove man rom rom the equation as UAVs UAVs do is in one sense to allow war to become in a quite literal way inhuman, with potentially proound consequences consequences.. Furthermore, with no context and no reality what perception o possible disadvantage in terms o the eects eects o the action can can the operator have? There are are innumerable instances in history o the exercise o restraint restraint in military militar y situations because the physical presence o the operator has allowed him to exercise his wider human understanding o context to perceive the military advantage o oregoing or limiting the application o orce orce.. It might be argued that Rules O Engagement provides some insurance 94
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against this tendency, but ROE can only provide guidance as to when it is permissible to engage a target, they cannot provide assurance that it is the correct action to take in a given given situation. The distinguished military historian John Terraine Terraine has pointed out that the aircrews o Bomber Command during the Second World War War went cheerully about their business o raining death and destruction on civilians in the t he cities o Germany, but that in all probability they were only capable o doing so because the physical separation rom the eects o their eorts produced a similar distancing in psychological terms.16 This is not the place to debate the morality o the t he strategic bomber oensive, oensive, although this author is rmly o the opinion that it was a necessary evil. However,, there can be no doubt that However t hat the young aircrews o Bomber Command most certainly put their own lie and limb on the line in the cause o duty, and that they paid a consistently high price in terms o casualties. Whilst they may have been distanced rom the results o their bombs, they were all too uncomortably close to the considerable eorts o their enemies to similarly immolate them or blast them into oblivion. In that sense they were were denitely warriors, but it is dicult to argue that UCAV crews merit the same accolade. And as the latter’s physical and thus psychological distancing is even greater, it is legitimate to ask what eects it might have on the waging o war. Although in the short to medium term the manned aircrat will still orm the core o the RAF’s inventory, in the long term the UAV may come to predominate. The questions posed here about the inherent inherent cultural structure and attitudes o the Service, Ser vice, which are only just beginning to impinge on traditional attitudes, will then come come sharply into ocus. ocus. Indeed, the question question which lurks unasked in the background is surely the most undamental one o all. In the era o unmanned predominance “What need o a separate air orce?” orce?” By its nature this essay has raised many questions and provided ew i any answers: but to do so was was not its intention. Instead it is intended to stimulate debate about the impact o unmanned aerial systems on the ethos and military culture o the Royal Air Force Force.. NOTES 1
Dave English, Slipping The Surly Bonds – Great Quotations on Flight (McGraw-Hill, NY, 1998) p.2 2 English, p.129 3 All statistics in this and the ollowing paragraph taken rom Royal Air Force Personnel Statistics or the period 3 September 1939 to 1 September 1945. 4 C G Jeord, Observers and Navigators (Shrewsbury (Shrewsbury,, 2001) pp. 51 & 223. This work charts in some detail the history o navigators in the RFC and RAF and gives urther insights into the supremacy o the pilot-oriented culture o the Service. 5 War Without Warriors? Warriors? The changing culture o Christopher Coker, Waging War military conict (Lyne Reiner, Colorado 2002) p.55. 6 Quoted in Coker p.55. 7 Carl von Clausewitz, On War , edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton 1989) p.87. 95
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On War p.76. RAF Commanders’ Brieng Note 020/09 “Trial to select and train non-pilot junior ocers to meet Reaper Operational Conversion Course entry standard”, 17 February 2009. 10 Quoted in Coker pp.54-55. 11 All quotations are rom Colonel Mark Wells, Wells, Calling Ourselves Warriors: Dodging a Bullet and Becoming a Hero, paper presented to the RAF Centre or Air Power Studies/Kings College Conerence on Air Power and Strategy, Joint Services Command & Sta College, 12-13 June 2008. I am grateul to Colonel Wells Wells or providing me with a copy o his paper. 12 D/AHB(RAF)3/2. 13 Coker p.37. 14 Nietzsche ‘Thus Spake Zarathustra’ – quoted in Coker p.38. 15 Quoted in Coker p.58. 16 John Terraine, The Right o the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War19391945, (London, 1985) p.512. 9
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THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES Pro Philip Sabin
U
nmanned air vehicles (UAVs) have or decades been making a small but growing contribution to the panoply o aerospace power in general (especially in the Western world), and this contribution is set to increase urther in the t he decades to come as the computing power on which UAV capabilities are based continues to improve. improve. This chapter takes a broad look at the phenomenon, and asks what (i any) dierence the essentially tactical innovation o a diminished need or human crews in aircrat themselves makes to the characteristics o aerospace power at the strategic level. The chapter begins by reviewing the distinctive attributes o aerospace power as a whole, and how these have developed by the early 21 st century, a hundred years ater powered powered ight was rst achieved. It goes on to analyse the strategic impact o UAVs UAVs in terms o two t wo osetting dimensions – rst their potential benets compared to other orms o aerospace power, and then their potential problems in the same context. The chapter concludes concludes by addressing several undamental issues, namely whether the advent o UAVs is more o an evolution or revolution in aerospace power, power, whether their relationship with other air and space systems is more one o competition or complementarity, what impact the growing use o UAVs will have on the presently overwhelming US aerospace dominance, and nally how it will aect traditional service specialisations.
Aerospace Power in General A clear trend in military militar y doctrine has been towards an inclusive and maximalist perspective on the various components o air and space power power.. Hence, Britain denes ‘air power’ as ‘The ability abilit y to project military orce in air or space by or rom a platorm or missile operating above the surace o the earth’, and it goes on to explain that ‘Air ‘Air platorms are dened as any aircrat, helicopter or unmanned air vehicle’.1 This maximalist perspective has three important consequencess – that air and space are usually treated as part o a continuum consequence despite the dierent physical physical properties o the atmospheric and orbital environments,, that air power is spread across all services rather than being environments limited to traditional air orces, and that UAVs UAVs are already rmly encompassed within the existing doctrinal ramework. There have been many attempts to identiy the distinguishing characteristics o aerospace power, power, and these eorts are oten heavily inuenced by advocacy or ‘politi ‘political cal correctness’ correctnes s’. Britis British h Air Power Doct Doctrine, rine, or instance, lists no ewer than 17 dening characteristics, putting them in alphabetical rather than priority order, and including such elements as ‘Aircrat Carriers’ and ‘Coalition Capability’.2 For our purposes, it is probably better to go back to basics and 97
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to ocus on what really distinguishes aerospace rom surace power, so as to identiy the undamentals on which other ot her so-called ‘dening ‘dening characteristics’ are built. I would argue that there there are three such such undamental strengths strengths o aerospace power, which are as ollows: Perspective
From the earliest days o balloons, the height which ight makes possible has granted a perspective much less constrained by terrain and limited surace horizons (though inhibited by vegetation and cloud cover), allowing direct lines o sight over a very wide area at the cost o increased distance distance rom the ground. In the ultimate case, a geosynchronous satellite can observe over a third o the Earth’ Earth’ss surace rom 36,000 km up. Speed
The lower rictional resistance o the air allows air vehicles to attain speeds around an order o magnitude higher than their land or naval counterparts. In space, the virtual absence absence o atmospheric resistance resistance allows speeds o well over an order o magnitude higher still (28,000 km per hour or satellites in low Earth orbit).3 Overight
Height also rees air and space vehicles rom the constraints which surace vehicles ace by being limited to either the land or sea environments environmen ts and (on land) o being urther constrained by multiple terrain obstacles and oten dependent on specic linear routes. Aerospace platorms platorms can move reely in three dimensions dimensions regardless o geography, geography, making it all but impossible to block their progress at specic ‘choke ‘choke points’. It is rom these three undamental physical physical attributes that other aerospace power characteristi charac teristics cs ow. ‘Reach’ and ‘Penetratio ‘Penetration’ n’, or instance, stem rom ro m the combination o Speed and Overight, O veright, allowing air vehicles to avoid deences and strike quickly against targets deep in enemy territory, even though they may actually possess less absolute range and endurance than (say) a nuclear attack submarine. Indeed, there is one urther physical attribute which which is a undamental limitation o aerospace power, power, as ollows: Energy Needs
Overcoming gravity gravity without resting on land or water requires large energy expenditure per unit o payload, either constantly (to maintain the necessary airow over wings or rotor blades) or in the initial surge (to give ballistic missiles or satellites the enormous height and speed required or or sub-orbital or orbital ight). Since the uel needed needed to provide the energy is itsel heavy, a vicious circle o escalating energy needs is created. 98
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From this undamental limitation ow several other ot- cited characteristics o aerospace aerospa ce power. ‘Imper ‘Impermanence’ manence’ and ‘Base Dependence’ Depende nce’ reect the need o air vehicles to return to base more requently than deployed surace sur ace orces to reuel and rearm, as well as the inability o satellites in their ballistic trajectory to loiter over a single point except through the unique circumstance o a distant geostationary orbit. ‘Fragility’ and ‘Payload Cost’ reect how energy needs increase sharply with vehicle weight, and hence how dicult it is or air or space platorms to carry thick armour or very heavy loads as surace vehicles oten do. ‘Flexibility’ is requently claimed as a key attribute attr ibute o aerospace power, and it is certainly true that their distinctive Speed allows air vehicles to be re-tasked re -tasked quickly across a wide battle area. However However,, it is hard to argue that an aircrat is inherently any more exible and versatile than a surace warship or an inantry battalion, given the ability o these latter to interact sensitively with the local environment across across the spectrum rom peace to war. war. Satellites, with their very limited ability to change their trajectory and role once deployed into orbit, seem even less deserving o the claim that t hat they are any more exible than other orms o military power. This does not mean that aerospace orces orces are not exible, just that they are not uniquely so. Whereas the above characteristics have applied throughout the entire histor y o aerospace power, some other eatures have become especially prominent over the past two decades. I would identiy two main areas o growing aerospace strength, and two osetting areas o growing aerospace problems. problems. The strengths are as ollows: Precision
As demonstrated above all in the 1991 Gul War, the advent o precision guidance has increased by orders o magnitude the potential accuracy o air-delivered munitions, and so has made target identication rather than payload limitations the key constraint on the dominance o aerial repower repower..4 Precision surveillance capabilities have improved commensurately, overcoming overcomin g some o the trade-o between range and breadth o vision, and allowing aerospace platorms to ocus on a chosen area in ne detail even rom great heights. Network Integration
Increasingly eective networking has become the dominant characteristic o both air and surace sur ace orces in the modern era, but the aerospace contribution has become even more important thanks to this ever-growing ever-growing exchange exchange o data in real real time. Not only is the Perspective which aircrat and satellites provide more useul than ever when it is transmitted immediately to other orces, but satellite based positioning systems are becoming increasingly vital or navigation and weapon guidance, guidance, and aircrat are able to use their 99
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Speed to approach and engage eeting targets as soon as they are observed by other air or surace orces.5 The two osetting problems or modern air power are as ollows: Cost
Air power has always been costly due to its position at the leading edge o technology, but the continuing oence-deence race has combined with the end o the Cold War to produce a situation in which programmes or new manned combat aircrat such as Euroghter or the F-22 drag on or decades o uncertainty as countries try to come to grips with the enormous costs involved. involved.6 Military space capabilities are just as expensive, and even such a leading air power as the UK has a very limited panoply o satellites.7 Casualty Sensitivity
Whereas aerial attrition in the era o the World Wars Wars reached terriying proportions, the combination o less than vital interests and media amplication o the slightest loss has made air arms even more sensitive than surace orces to taking casualties in modern campaigns, as illustrated by the shooting down and subsequent rescue o Scott O’Grady in Bosnia in 1995.8 Not only that, but (as recent experience in Aghanistan and Pakistan demonstrates all too clearly) unintended ‘collateral ‘collateral damage’ rom air attack has or similar reasons become equally problematic, unlike in the World Wars Wars when the prospect o civilian casualties did not inhibit the wholesale bombing even o riendly cities under enemy occupation.9 The current prevalence o ‘asymmetric warare’ rather than the more symmetrical conrontations o the t he World War War and Cold War War eras thus has distinctly double-edged double -edged consequences or aerospace power. power.10 On the one hand, technological and political trends have combined to give Western Western (especially US) aerospace capabilities virtually unchallenged dominance in any conict, without the bloody and drawn-out attritional air contests o previous eras.11 On the other hand, the growing pervasiveness o what Rupert Smith has termed ‘Wars among the People’ has orced Western air power into a reactive and constabulary mode in which (as in the continuing operations in Iraq and Aghanistan) less than 1% o sorties sort ies involve the actual dropping o ordnance. 12 Even in more intensive air campaigns like those in Kosovo in 1999 or Lebanon in 2006, able adversaries have been able to conceal their elded orces in tangled terrain and employ political countermeasures so as to make it ar harder than expected or the superior air power to prevail.13 Having outlined the advantages and problems o aerospace power in general in the early 21st century, it is now time to ocus in on the growing contribution o UAVs, UAVs, starting with the strengths they may bring to military capability at the 100
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strategic level.
Potential Benefts o UAVs To my mind, the main strategic advantages o UAVs all into three broad categories – Cost-Eectiveness, Cost-Eectiveness, Pervasiveness, Pervasiveness, and Casualty Avoidance. Avoidance. I will discuss each o these areas in turn. Cost-Efectiveness US spending on UAVs currently stands at over $2 bn per year.14 This is a lot o money, but it is only around one-tenth o what the US spends on military space capabilities, and less than hal a percent o US deence spending as a whole. 15 The real question concerns the eciency o the investment in generating military militar y capability, compared to alternative uses o the resources concerned. concerned. This is a hard question to answer because o the complexity o the comparative process, process, but two useul observations may be made.
First, there is a clear trade-o between cost and capability across the very wide range o UAV types, rom hand-launched tactical vehicles like Dragon Eye, costing only tens o thousands o dollars each, all the way to sophisticated strategic platorms such as Global Hawk which cost tens o millions o dollars per copy, a similar price to that o manned ghter aircrat.16 With no simple metric to compare the diverse contributions o UAVs UAVs across this enormous cost and capability range, and with only the high end o the range being easily comparable to the alternative capabilities provided by manned aircrat or satellites, the diculty o measuring cost-eectiveness becomes apparent. apparent. Second, one must examine the through-lie costs o entire UAV systems, rather than ocusing ocusing too narrowly on the airrames themselves. themselves. Doing without on-board crew obviously yields signicant savings in loaded weight thanks to the absence o cockpits, but overall manning requirements are likely to be unaected given the support and maintenance burden and given the need or remote operators who may have to use a shit system to sustain the increased endurance endurance o the vehicles. Similarly, lower platorm platorm acquisition costs may be oset by higher loss rates through accidents and enemy action.17 Considerations such as these have led some observers to suggest that, rom an overall perspective, the apparent nancial advantages o UAVs may prove illusory.18 On the other hand, the continuing prominence o UAVs such as Predator (costing a ew million dollars each) in the campaigns in Iraq and Aghanistan suggests a highly worthwhile return on the relatively modest current investment. The sheer number o UA UAV V development programmes, and the speed with which innovations such as Predator B (Reaper) have been brought into service, stand in stark contrast to the paucity and inertia o current manned combat aircrat programmes, especially ater the onset o the global nancial crisis.19 UA UAV V technology is still stil l in its inancy compared to more traditional aerospace systems, and uture developments seem likely to mitigate such current problems as high mishap rates and intensive demands 101
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or skilled operators.20 Although one should certainly not exaggerate the costeectiveness benets o UAVs compared to manned aircrat or satellites, UAVs do seem to oer at least a partial answer to the endemic aerospace problems o cost escalation which I discussed earlier. Pervasiveness I have already mentioned the enormous range o capability oered by dierent UAVs, and this diversity is in itsel a major strategic benet. Manned vehicles have to be above a certain minimum size and weight i they are to accommodate their crew, crew, and their endurance (even with in-ight reuelling) is limited by that o the humans on board. Although some UAVs UAVs are essentially just like crewless versions o manned platorms (literally so in the case o the convers conversions ions o existing airrames air rames which have taken place sporadically since beore World War Two), most UAVs exploit their liberation rom the constraints o human presence to ‘push the envelope’ o capability in various strategically signicant ways.21
One approach which has already become well established is to create smaller and lighter airrames than manned manned vehicles would would allow. Almost all UAVs weigh considerably less than the 10,000 kg or so o modern ghter jets, and although some such as Predator at around 1,000 kg are similar in weight to light utility utilit y aircrat or scout helicopters, others are much lighter still, down to just 2 kg or the US Raven and Dragon Eye systems.22 This has two important consequences. First, even the relatively relatively limited current spending on UAVs has already allowed NATO to eld around 6,700 operational airrames (all but 500 or so being small, tactical vehicles).23 Second, the small UAVs can be launched, operated and recovered by deployed surace orces,, giving even tiny detachments their own organic access to the elevated orces Perspective which has always been one o the core benets o air power. Continuing advances in miniaturisation are prompting the t he development o still smaller ‘micro air vehicles’ weighing only 0.2 kg, though more radical predictions o insect-sized UAVs UAVs snooping covertly on enemy buildings seem to be some way rom realisation.24 A second approach which capitalises on reedom rom the constraints (and weight) o a human crew is to increase the ight endurance o UAVs. The categorisation o larger UAVs UAVs as either MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) or HALE (High Altitude Long Endurance) already emphasises this aspect, and maximum ight times o 20-30 hours are typical.25 Although manned heavy bombers have matched such ight times t imes on an exceptional basis during intercontinen intercontinental tal missions using multiple in-ight reuelling, UAVs UAVs employ such endurance routinely to oset their usually slow transit speeds (around 100 knots or Predator A and 200 knots or Predator B) and to increase their persistence in the combat area well beyond that o manned platorms. Increased endurance and satellite control relays also allow UAVs to operate at extended range, as in the recent Israeli strike on an arms convoy in Sudan. 26 There are schemes to use high altitude airships to boost UAV endurance by a urther order o magnitude or even more, and projects such as Britain’s Zephyr programme make true capital out o the absence o human crew by employing 102
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solar cells and storage batteries to overcome completely the vicious circle o uel dependence and to keep an ultra-light airrame air rame alot or projected missions o months at a time.27 The net strategic impact o this pushing o the envelope o capability is that t hat UAVs increase the pervasiveness o aerospace power by making it more likely that hostile activity will be observed rom above. above. Just as the prolieration prolieration o CCTV cameras has made it virtually impossible or citizens in developed countries to avoid being caught repeatedly on camera, so the prolieration o smaller (so more numerous) and larger (so more persistent) UAVs UAVs makes it harder or surace combatants to expose themselves outside buildings or orests without the risk o detection.28 Whereas manned aircrat are constrained by limited uel and by the saety o their crew, and satellites have no choice but to ash across the sky in their predictable orbital trajectory, t rajectory, UAVs can aord to loiter and stare and even to move in closer to investigate and track suspect movements. movement s. This is why UAV UAVss have come into their own during the continuing conicts against elusive insurgents in Iraq and Aghanistan, and the process seems likely to continue (at least in similar conicts) in years to come. Western Casualty Avoid Avoidance ance I mentioned earlier the increased sensitivity o Western nations to the loss o aircrat aircrat in modern campaigns. campaigns. This is in large part a product o these nations’ very success in avoiding the earul aerial attrition attriti on o earlier eras, thanks to the technological dominance which Western Western air power now enjoys. Hence, when a single F-117 was shot shot down during Operation Allied Force in 1999, it provided a signicant propaganda boost to the Serbs, even though the pilot was rescued.29 Fear o losing aircrew (and especially o having them taken hostage) contributed to the non-employment non- employment o the Apache helicopters o Task Force Hawk during the Kosovo campaign, and also to the controversial (though oten misrepresen misrepresented) ted) reluctance to send jets into the anti-aircrat danger zone below 15,000 t. 30 UAVs have demonstrably provided a way around this sensitivity about air losses, since they have been placed much more at risk than manned platorms have been in recent campaigns, campaigns, and their loss in combat has not produced anything like the media interest or propaganda value associated with the shooting down o manned manned aircrat. The US used (and oten lost) many UAVs over communist territory during the Cold War, with nothing o the embarrassment associated with the capture o U-2 pilot Gar y Powers in central Russia in 1960. UA UAVs Vs continue to be especially especially suited or such politically delicate missions, as in their current extensive utilisation by the CIA to target al-Qaeda and Taleban Taleban militants in Pakistan.31 In 1999, 45 UAVs o all types were lost to enemy action and technical ailure during the 78 days o Operation Allied Force, but this act was hardly noticed compared to the remarkable achievement o not losing a single member o NATO aircrew in combat. 32 UAVs have even been sent on suicidal missions to draw enemy re, as with the two Predators sent over Baghdad on the rst day o Operation Iraqi Freedom, when the main reaction o commentators was to ridicule the Iraqis or ailing to 103
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shoot them down and then or trying to nd the non-existent pilots when the Predators ditched or lack o uel.33 There could be no clearer contrast with the added costs and risks o combat search and rescue missions i manned aircrat are downed.34 Not only do UA UAVs Vs remove the risk o aircrew casualties during their own missions, but their contribution can also help to protect other riendly air and surace sur ace orces during the campaign as a whole. Israel’s use o Scout UAVs UAVs to provoke and pinpoint Syrian SAMs in the Bekaa valley in 1982 amously helped them to destroy around 20 SAM batteries or the loss o only a ew manned aircrat during the campaign, in stark contrast to the 1973 war when several dozen Israeli jets were lost to the ormidable Arab air deences.35 As regards surace orces, although the US alone has suered around 4,000 atalities during the continuing conicts in Iraq and Aghanistan, these losses would surely have been higher still i it were not or the surveillance and warning provided by UAVs – in November 2007, General James Simmons in Baghdad described these systems as a ‘decisive actor’ in the dramatic recent drop in attacks by improvised explosive devices.36 All in all, the reduction o riendly casualties must be accounted a signicant strategic benet o the increasing contribution made by UAVs to modern campaigns.
Potential Problems o UAVs UAVs have several strategic disadvantages to set against these positive aspects, and I would highlight in particular par ticular the ‘Revolution o Rising Expectations’ which which they may uel, the Limitations o Unmanned Systems compared to those with human crews, and the risk o Adversary Employment o UAVs themselves. Again, I will discuss each o these dimensions in turn. Revolution o Rising Expectations Any improvement in human conditions tends very quickly to be taken or granted and established as the new norm, with any slippage or reversal being seen as a serious crisis. crisis. This explains the changing absolute denitions o poverty, and the preoccupation with ever more remote health and saety risks (such as ‘mad cow’ disease or child abduction) as earlier more common dangers are overcome. overcome. In exactly the same way, the strategic benets which UAVs bring may be taken or granted in ways which actually undermine the t he benets themselves.
One way in which this may occur is through reinorcement reinorcement o casualty sensitivity. sensiti vity. UA UAVs Vs have played a signicant role in the sharp reduction in Western Weste rn aircrew losses over the past three decades compared to earlier experience during the Vietnam and Yom Yom Kippur wars, but zero aerial casualties has now become very much the norm and expectation, so there may be little choice but to employ UAVs UAVs more and more while using manned platorms with great caution to avoid any resurgence o risk as air deence deencess become more 37 capable in the uture. Whenever ground orces suer casualties, politicians, polit icians, journalists and bereaved relatives now routinely demand better protective measures such as body armour, on the grounds that everything possible 104
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should be done to protect ‘our boys’ (and girls). 38 A British Army recruitment video shown hundreds o times on UK television in recent years ocuses squarely on the contribution o tactical UA UAVs Vs in keeping oot patrols saer saer,, so it is hardly surprising i such overhead protection becomes seen as the norm, and its absence a matter o criminal negligence. It is already the case that ground convoys convoys in Iraq and Aghanistan are reluctant to deploy without UA UAV V support, and this risks creating an over-depende over-dependence nce which may make Coalition actions more constrained and predictable, and which could even be exploited through deliberate distraction o the UAV’s UAV’s narrow ocus by a spoo threat while the real attack comes rom elsewhere.39 The networked distribution o compelling real-time UAV UAV video is also encouraging even distant senior commanders to look over their subordinates’ shoulders and to micro-manage tactical engagements (or to postpone them until the video eed is available), so much so that such live video has been termed ‘Predator porn’ or ‘CAOC crack’ crack ’.40 It is all very well saying that ocers at all levels should be more robust robust and exible and more willing to delegate and take risks, but the point is that the t he UAV UA V genie is already out o the bottle, and cannot simply be ignored. Just as the availability o precision-guided munitions has in itsel made Western Western nations much more sensitive to collateral damage now that it is actually practical to minimise it in a way that it never was beore, beore, so UAVs UAVs bring with them not just capabilities but also responsibilities which shape the way in which war is conducted. conducted. The Revolution o Rising Expectations is a real and powerul phenomenon, as is clearly illustrated by the traumatic nature o the air campaigns in Kosovo in 1999 and Lebanon in 2006 despite signicantly lower levels o riendly losses and civilian casualties than in many previous wars.41 Like most military milit ary advances, UAVs UAVs will have some o their positive contribution oset by the need to run harder just to stay in the same place. Limitations o Unmanned Systems Just as computers can do some calculations ar better than humans but have nowhere near the all-round competence o the super-intelligent androids o science ction, so UAVs have some serious limitations compared to manned aircrat, to set against their t heir advantages in areas like weight and endurance. Althou Although gh UAV UAV cameras can zoom in and handle multi-spectral imagery, imager y, it is hard or them to mimic the human eye’s eye’s wonderul combination o central acuity and wide peripheral 42 vision. An even more important import ant and intractable limitation limit ation on UAVs UAVs today lies in the very restricted capacity o articial intelligence to think and process inormation as does the human brain.
The current response to this problem is to retain an o-board human crew and to exploit network integration to download sensory inputs rom the UA UAV V and upload ight commands in real time (even at intercontinental distances). However, this ‘remote control’ approach has serious weaknesses besides the high manning and operating costs which I have have already mentioned. mentioned. The communications links and relay platorms are vulnerable to mishap or to 105
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intererence by a sophisticated opponent, either o which could cause loss o the vehicle (and in the worst case o the entire entire eet). Downloading a continuing ood o raw video data also uses up massive communications bandwidth – so much so that a single Global Hawk consumes 5 times as much bandwidth as all the US orces engaged in Operation Enduring Freed Freedom om 43 in 2001! Although the bandwidth available has also been expanding by successive orders o magnitude in order to cope with such massive data ows, this expansion now seems to be reaching its limits, so the pure ‘remote ‘remote control’ approach is clearly not ideal or the uture development o UAVs. 44 Much current eort is being devoted to giving uture UAVs more autonomy, so as to reduce the exhausting and manpower-intensive need or remote piloting, and to allow the vehicles themselves to analyse and act on at least some o the data they receive, rather than handing it all o mindlessly and in such a bandwidth-intensive ashion ashion or interpretation elsewhere. elsewhere. The extreme possibility o entirely independent vehicles which make their own automatic decisions on where to y and what to attack seems unlikely to be realised in the oreseeable uture, since it raises all sorts o legal and political problems as discussed elsewhere in this volume, and since it goes against the whole trend o network integration within modern armed orces as a whole. However, an intermediate level o autonomy which allows UAVs to make their own way between selected waypoints and to sort the wheat rom the cha in the data they receive would greatly ease the remote manning and bandwidth burden and would reduce the risk o vehicle loss i communications links were disrupted. This level o autonomy seems perectly achievable achievable in due course, and should allow the development o an optimal balance between articial intelligence and human insight and direction.45 Experience to date has ound UAV mishap rates to be at least 10 times higher than or manned military aircrat. aircrat. This is a serious concern, concern, since military jets themselves are around 100 times less sae than commercial airliners – by 2005, the US had lost only 6 F-16s in combat but nearly 300 in accidents. However, the UAV accident rate has been declining sharply over time as more experience has been gained with these t hese vehicles, and this decline seems likely 46 to continue. A key need is or a ‘sense and avoid’ capability to stop UAVs crashing blindly into other aircrat in increasingly crowded airspace, due to the very limited eld o vision o their their sensors. This is just one o the many many technical and procedural improvements which will be needed i UAVs are to be accepted as sae or ight in ordinary civilian airspace, as manned military aircrat already are.47 O even greater importance rom a strategic perspective is the vulnerability o UAVs UA Vs to enemy air deences. Existing models model s benet rom their small size and limited radar cross section, but suer rom their low speed and lack o threat awareness. 18 Pioneer UAVs UAVs were shot down during Operation Operati on Desert Storm, and 26 UAVs o various types were downed during Operation Allied Force, not counting those destroyed in accidents accidents..48 UAV combat losses in Aghanistan and Iraq started out at only around 2 per year year,, but in 2007 several Predators Predators 106
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were lost, and in 2008 Georgia had several UAVs shot down over Abkhazia in the run-up to the war with Russia.49 More sophisticated air deence deencess clearly pose the greatest threat, and there is a very dicult trade-o t rade-o between giving UAVs UA Vs the kind o survivability eatures possessed by manned aircrat (speed, countermeasures and stealth) and maintaining the lightness and cheapness which make UAVs so attractive (and relatively expendable) in the rst place. Adversary Employment Historically, unmanned aircrat and missiles have been the weapons o the weak at least as much as the strong, since they have oered a way o striking back against a superior air power without losing scarce skilled pilots or relying on vulnerable airelds. Nazi Germany’s Germany’s V-1s and V-2s, Iraq’s modied Scud missiles and the rockets o Hizbollah and Hamas all t into this pattern o unmanned long range bombardment systems which can be red rom concealed or mobile launchers as an indiscriminate response to enemy dominance in the air.50 When inerior air powers have desired greater terminal accuracy, they have tended to use not unmanned systems but highly committed and sel-sacricial human volunteer aircrew, as with the Japanese Kamikazes and the September 11 th hijackers, and as with the raids by light aircrat belonging to the t he beleaguered Tamil Tamil Tigers more recently recently..51
There have been a ew instances in recent years o UAVs proper being used against Western Western nations, as with the lming by the Iranians o a US carrier in in the Persian Gul and the sporadic overights o northern Israel by Hizbollah UAVs.52 Downed Western UAVs may even be captured and reverse engineered by more sophisticated adversaries, as China did when it copied US Firebee systems which crashed or were shot down while on covert spying missions during the Vietnam war.53 However However,, it seems unlikely that inerior air powers will seek to use UAVs UAVs or anything like the continuous and closely networked real time surveillance which the West West has pioneered. pioneered. Although it would not be easy or Western powers to intercept small and elusive enemy UAVs or to jam their encrypted encr ypted line o sight communications, the task should not be impossible i the adversary really does try to ght a ully-edged two-sided network war. war. The most that the majority o enemies could reasonably expect is to get a ew uncoordinated uncoordinated glimpses o the battle area, and the added value this would provide is questionable given that xed sites can already be examined at leisure using reely downloadable satellite imagery. The one role in which UAV-type UAV-type technology does pose a very serious threat in the hands o inerior air powers is that or which they have already employed other unmanned systems on many occasions in the past, namely one-way retaliatory strikes. It is surprising that such antagonists have not yet made much use o modern cruise missile mi ssile technology, since it oers greater terminal accuracy than rockets or Scud-derivatives, as well as the ability to evade the burgeoning threat o ballistic missile deences.54 UAVs employ much the same airrame, air rame, propulsion and guidance technology as cruise missiles,and perhaps the biggest risk o their t heir continued prolieration is that this will nally tempt ‘underdogs ‘underdogs’’ to include an air-breathing ai r-breathing element within their asymmetric retaliatory means. While Western Western experts preoccupy 107
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themselves with the ethical and legal questions surrounding the possible incorporation o ully autonomous UAVs UAVs into their own arsenals, the real problem may lie in the threatened acquisition o ‘kamikaze’ UAVs by their adversaries, especially especially in the context o continuing concern about the linkage with non-conven non- conventional tional payloads.
Conclusion Now that I have outlined the principal strategic benets and problems which UAVs bring to the existing panoply o aerospace orces, I will close by addressing several several key summary summar y issues. Evolution or Revolution? Commentators are ond o discussing weapons advances in terms o successive ‘revolutions in military aairs’. 55 UAVs certainly contain some revolutionary elements, in particular their increasing miniaturisation and extended endurance, endurance, but it is hard to argue that they themselves themsel ves truly revolutionise aerospace power. They have been around or decades in various orms, and are still only at the periphery in terms o unding compared to other platorms like satellites and manned manned aircrat. In some ways their contribution is less to introduce new ways o war than to turn the t he clock back to the early years o the twentieth century, when large numbers o light aircrat based in elds near the ront line ranged the skies looking or targets below, beore beore cost escalation and casualty sensitivity concentrated manned air power into much smaller numbers o higher value platorms. pl atorms.
That being said, modern UAVs are actually creatures o a very dierent strategic context, and make sense only in the world o network integration when it is easible to go sniper-hunting over Baghdad rom an air-conditioned oce outside Las Vegas.56 Whereas the biplanes o World War One lent themselves to the symmetrical attritional bloodbaths o industrial conict, UAVs UAVs today orm part o a undamentally asymmetric strategic situation characterised by one dominant antagonist using its web o networked assets to pinpoint and strike precisely at technologically inerior opponents who have ewer scruples and greater individual commitment, and who respond with concealment, decentralisation decentrali sation and a hit and run approach. Althoug Although h UAV UAVss themselves may not be entirely revolutionary, the networked and computerised global military system which has given rise to them in their modern orm certainly is. Competition or Complementarity? The standard view which airmen usually espouse about UA UAVs Vs is that they t hey perorm an increasingly useul complementary role, carrying carr ying out the ‘dirty, dirty, dull and dangerous’ missions without undermining the continuing mainstream need or manned aircrat and satellites.57 This stance has a great deal o logic, since UAVs have indeed historically been most useul in roles such as reconnaiss reconnaissance ance and the suppression o enemy air deences, where their limited payload capacity has been least problematic and their low cost and lack l ack o vulnerable crew has allowed bolder overight o enemy positions. positions. The prolieration o tiny tactical UAVs UA Vs provides a new add-on capability without impinging on an existing 108
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aerospace role. role. The direct arming o Predators Predators with light weapons made available by the precision revolution does tread more on the toes o manned combat aircrat, but as soon as one starts to create true unmanned u nmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) with enhanced speed, sensors, payload capacity and perhaps stealth, the cheapness and endurance associated with UAVs UAVs quickly wither away, and the dierences between manned and unmanned platorms become marginal at best. However, in an age o increasingly constrained deence budgets, a ‘belt However, and braces’ approach becomes unaordable, and there will inevitably be tension between unding UAVs UAVs and unding other systems which perorm per orm an 58 overlapping mission. The US Congress has routinely voted more money or UAVs than the Pentagon requested, earing that protectionist impulses were inhibiting innovation.59 In uture, there is likely to be more and more direct competition between traditional programmes and UAV or UCAV contenders or the contracts and unding concerned. concerned. Aerial reconnaissance reconnaissance is already an area where unmanned systems have a very strong prole, placing manned reconnaissance reconnaissan ce platorms in signicant jeopardy. jeopardy. New satellite programmes will also have to justiy themselves against claims that persistent high altitude UAVs could do the same job at a less exorbitant cost. 60 Armed UA UAVs Vs have considerable potential to challenge uture restocks or upgrades o cruise missiles, by oering a good chance o reusability while retaining a lack o human exposure.61 New manned bombers and even ghters will likewise ace sti competition rom UCAV alternatives, and there may well be an attractive intermediate approach o a mix o manned and unmanned platorms working togetherr in a single squadron. Since UAVs togethe UAVs do not seem to oer unanswerabl unanswerable e overall advantages across across the ull capability range, the inertia embodied in the current dominance o manned aircrat and satellites guarantees that any shit will be gradual at best, but it would be very surprising surpr ising i the proportion o aerospace spending devoted to UAVs UAVs does not continue its it s upward trajectory 62 as the century proceeds. Impact on US Aerospace Dominance Just as Britain’s industrial strength allowed it to retain naval primacy a century ago despite the obsolescence o its existing battleeet in the ace o the Dreadnought revolution, so it is the United States itsel which is very much in the lead o the present prolieration o UAVs.63 In 2008, the US owned about 5,700 o the roughly 6,700 operational UAVs in the entire NATO alliance, including around 425 o the 520 or so HALE or MALE vehicles.64 As regards major peer competitors, China seems to place little littl e emphasis on UAV UAVs, s, despite elding a number o dierent types. Russia’s UAV UA V programmes are now more prominent ater a rather belated start, and they include the t he Tu-300 Tu-300 reconnaissance vehicle which is apparently capable o over 500 knots, and which may well orm the basis o a uture attack vehicle. However,, since Russia and the United States both now spend only around 4% However o their GDP on deence, Russia’ Russia’s eorts are inevitably constrained by the act that its GDP is less than 15% o America’s, s, even using avourable comparators 65 such as ‘Purchasing Power Parity’. 109
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There is a strong case that the increasing prominence o UA UAVs Vs will actually enhance the aerospace dominance o the US, by playing to its strengths o high technology and network-centric warare, and by nessing its residual casualty sensitivity (already much lower than it was a decade ago due to the twin blows o September 11th and the bloody wars in Iraq and Aghanistan). It is theoretically possible that a computer-savvy opponent could use the potential o unmanned systems to overcome its dearth o experienced aircrew and to surprise US orces with an overwhelming swarm o precisely targeted air vehicles.66 It is also just about conceivable that a clever antagonist, through some combination o hacking, jamming and physical attack, could inict catastrophic disruption on the t he entire networked inrastructure on which the US war eort (and especially its i ts UAVs) UAVs) depends. However However,, it seems more likely that the real challenge to US aerospace dominance will continue to lie in grinding and drawn out asymmetric resistance by elusive insurgents, always keen to damn the US or a misplaced strike or to inict a spectacularly bloody attack o their own. Impact on Service Specialisations Ballistic and cruise missiles, helicopters and satellites have all served to muddy the waters o the once airly clear unctional subdivision o military orces into soldiers, sailors and airmen. UA UAVs Vs are no exception to this pattern, and by relocating aircrew rom cockpits to remote video consoles on the other side o the world, while also providing soldiers with their own miniature hand-launched ‘eye in the sky’, they call even urther into question the utility o a distinct category o air or aerospace power within the increasingly integrated and joint web which is modern military power as a whole. It was already the case case that the proportion o actual ight crew within air orces was diminishing apace due to the concentration on ewer, more capable manned platorms, and, at the same time as British Army television adverts were (as I mentioned) highlighting the chance to control a tactical UAV, the Royal Air Force was championing its diverse ground branches under the recruiting slogan, ‘Y ‘You ou don’t have to be a pilot to y in the RAF’! This juxtaposition illustrates perectly the blurring o traditional service ser vice roles in the new technological environment.
As one might expect, some aircrew have expressed serious reservations about the wisdom o a progressive shit rom manned aircrat towards UAVs.67 Encouragingly, however, most ocers (including aircrew) seem to take a much more productive stance, avoiding inammatory topics such as air orce abolition, and ocusing instead on the best and most eective way o employing UAVs within the overall joint orce structure.68 This contrasts signicantly with British experience in the inter-war period, when battles over the independence o the newly-ormed RAF spilled over into doctrine and inhibited inter-service cooperation, somewhat compromising British military eectiveness in the early years o World War Two. 69 There does still need to be clearer thinking about how to integrate UAV UAV operation into service career tracks, and there are still some branches o service (especially navies) where UAVs Vs has perhaps not yet been taken fully on the potential contribution o UA 110
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board, but overall, the t he depth and seriousness of the discussion of UA UAVs Vs in Western defence literature (as referenced in this chapter) bodes well for a positive strategic impact from their increasing adoption in the years and decades to come.70
NOTES 1
Directorate o Air Sta, British Air Power Doctrine, AP 3000, 3 rd edition, (London: Ministry o Deence Deence,, 1999), p.1.2.1. 2 Ibid , pp.1.2.3-9. 3 Wayne Lee, To Rise rom Earth, (London: Cassell, 2000), p.11. 4 See Richard Hallion, ‘Precision Air Attack in the Modern Era’, in Richard Hallion (ed.), Air Power Conronts an Unstable World , (London: Brassey’s, 1997). 5 See Paul Mitchell, Network Centric Warare, Adelphi Paper 385, (London: Routledge or IISS, 2006). 6 On attempts to limit this vicious cycle, see Gerard Keijsper, Joint Strike Fighter , (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2007), ch.8. 7 Annual US military spending on space exceeds $22bn, compared to only around $2bn or Western Europe as a whole (primarily (primari ly France). See Strategic Survey 2007 , (London: Routledge or IISS, 2007), pp.69-84. 8 See Mark Wells, Courage and Air Warare , (London: Frank Cass, 1995), C. Hyde, ‘Casualty Aversion: Implications or Policy Makers and Senior Military Ocers’, Aerospace Power Journal 14/2, Summer 2000, and Mary Kelly, “Good to Go” , (Annapolis MA: Naval Institute I nstitute Press, 1996). 9 See Philip Sabin, ‘Western ‘Western Strategy in the New Era: The Apotheosis o Air Power?’, in Andrew Dorman, Mike Smith & Matthew Uttley (eds.), The Changing Face o Military Power (London: Palgrave, Palgrave, 2001), ‘US condemned as airstrike kills nine allies in another deadly blunder’, The Times, October 23rd 2008, and ‘US says sorry ater wedding party is bombed in ambush’, The Times, November 6th, 2008. 10 See J Olsen (ed.), Asymmetric Warare (Oslo: Royal Norwegian Nor wegian Air Force Academy, 2002). 11 See Philip Sabin, ‘The Counter-Air Contest’, in Andrew Lambert & Arthur Williamson (eds.), The Dynamics o Air Power , (Bracknell: RAF Sta College, 1996). 12 Rupert Smith, The Utility o Force, London: Allen Lane, 2005), and Harry Kemsley, ‘Combat Air Power in Irregular Warare’, RAF Air Power Review 10/2, Summer 2007, pp.28-9. 13 See Benjamin Lambeth, NATO’s Air War or Kosovo , (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2001), Neville Parton, ‘Israel’s 2006 Campaign in the Lebanon’, RAF Air Power Review 10/2, Summer 2007, and Stephen Biddle & Jerey Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future o Warare , (Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Institu te, 2008). On the general techniques which may be used to combat superior air power, see Philip Sabin, ‘Air Strategy and the Underdog’, in Peter Gray (ed.), Air Power 21, (London: The Stationery Oce, 2000). 14 Unmanned Aircrat Systems Roadmap, 2005-2030 , (Wash ( Washington ington DC: Oce o the Secretary o Deense, 2005), pp.37-8 15 Strategic Survey 2007 , (London: Routledge or IISS, 2007), pp.74-5, and The Military Balance 2008, (London: Routledge or IISS, 2008), p.29. 111
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Unmanned Aircrat Systems Roadmap, 2005-2030 , (Wash ( Washington ington DC: Oce o the Secretary o Deense, 2005), pp.56-7. 17 Ibid, Appendices H & K, and John Drew et al , Unmanned Air Vehicles End-to-End Support Considera Considerations tions, (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2005). 18 Andrea Nativi, ‘Manned vs Unmanned’, JAPCC Journal 3, 2006, and The Military Balance 2008, (London: Routledge or IISS, 2008), pp.455-60. 19 See the Unmanned Aircrat Systems Roadmap, 2005-2030 , (Wash ( Washington ington DC: Oce o the Secretary o Deense, 2005), pp.3-40. 20 See James Homan & Charles Kamps, ‘At the Crossroads: Future “Manning” or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles’, Air & Space Power Journal , Spring 2005. 21 See Hugh McDaid & David Oliver, Robot Warriors, (London: Orion, 1997), Laurence Newcome, Unmanned Aviation, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, Sword, 2004), and Chip Thompson, ‘F-16 UCAVs’, Aerospace Power Journal , Spring 2000. 22 Unmanned Aircrat Systems Roadmap, 2005-2030 , (Wash ( Washington ington DC: Oce o the Secretary o Deense, 2005), pp.26 & 56. 23 The Joint Air Power Competence Competence Centre Flight Plan or Unmanned Aircrat Systems in NATO, (Cleve: JAPCC, March 2008), Annex B. 24 Unmanned Aircrat Systems Roadmap, 2005-2030 , (Wash ( Washington ington DC: Oce o the Secretary o Deense, 2005), pp.29-30, and Hugh McDaid & David Oliver, Robot Warriors, (London: Orion, 1997), pp.138-41. 25 Unmanned Aircrat Systems Roadmap, 2005-2030 , (Wash ( Washington ington DC: Oce o the Secretary o Deense, 2005), p.58. 26 Ibid , pp.4 & 10, Jerey Ethell & Alred Price, Air War South Atlantic , (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1983), ch.3, Benjamin Lambeth, NATO’s Air War or Kosovo , (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2001), pp.89-94, and ‘Israeli drones destroy rocketsmuggling convoys in Sudan’, The Sunday Times, March 29th 2009. 27 Unmanned Aircrat Systems Roadmap, 2005-2030 , (Wash ( Washington ington DC: Oce o the Secretary o Deense, 2005), pp.32-6, Dan Lewandowski, Lewandowski, ‘Exploiting ‘Exploiting a New High Ground’, JAPCC Journal 3, 2006, Laurence Newcome, Unmanned Aviation, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2004), ch.14, and The Military Balance 2008, (London: Routledge or IISS, 2008), p.458. On the technological technological challenges acing high altitude airships, see Kurt Hall, Near Space, Maxwell Paper 38, (Maxwell AL: Air University Press, 2006). 28 On the blurring o the boundary between civilian and military surveillance, see ‘Look Out and Up or New Spy in Sky’, The Times, November 6th 2007, and ‘Spy drone to patrol coast in hunt or people smugglers’, The Sunday Times, December 2nd 2007. 29 Benjamin Lambeth, NATO’s Air War or Kosovo , (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2001), pp.116-20. 30 Ibid , pp.136-43 & 147-58. 31 Hugh McDaid & David Oliver, Robot Warriors, (London: Orion, 1997), pp.32-47 & 68-9, Laurence Newcome, Unmanned Aviation, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Sword,, 2004), ch.10, and ‘Secrecy and denial as Pakistan lets US use airbase to hit its own militants’, The Times, Feb.18th, 2009. 32 Ibid , pp.61-5 & 94-7, and Unmanned Aircrat Systems Roadmap, 2005-2030 , (Washington DC: Oce o the Secretary o Deense, 2005), Appendix K. 112
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33
Williamson Murray & Robert Scales, The Iraq War: A Military History , (Cambridge Williamson MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), p.169. 34 See Andy Evans, Combat Search & Rescue, (London: Arms & Armour, 1999), and Darrel Whitcomb, ‘Rescue Operations in the Second Gul War’, Air & Space Power Journal , Spring 2005. 35 See Kenneth Werrell, Archie, Flak, AAA, and SAM, Maxwell AL: Air University Press, 1988), pp.139-47, Lon Nordeen, Air Warare in the Missile Age, 2nd edition, (Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution, 2002), pp.123-63, and Yair Yair Dubester & Ido Pickel, ’30 Years o Israeli UAV Experience’, JAPCC Journal 3, 2006. 36 Douglas Harpel, ‘UAVs are Decisive Factor in Decline in Iraq IED Attacks’, Deence Systems Daily , November 6th 2007, at http://defence-data.com/current/ page38536.htm. 37 On the continuing evolution o the air deence threat, even rom lesser powers, see Benjamin Lambeth, NATO’s Air War or Kosovo , (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2001), pp.102-16, and Michael Knights, Cradle o Conict , (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), pp.230-5. 38 ‘Family o Marine killed by bomber demand better armour or troops’, The Glasgow Herald , June 28th 2008. 39 On the importance o surprise and seizing the initiative initiative,, see ‘Secret convoy convoy dees Taleban in epic blu’, The Times, September 3rd 2008. 40 Interview with Wg Cdr Rich McMahon, DAS Ops UAV, Ministry o Deence, December 21st 2007. (CAOC stands or Combined Air Operations Centre.) 41 Benjamin Lambeth, NATO’s Air War or Kosovo , (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2001), and Sarah Kreps, ‘The 2006 Lebanon War: Lessons Learned’, Parameters, Spring 2007. 42 On the problems this poses or UAVs in dogghts, see Je Mustin, ‘Future Employment o Unmanned Aerial Vehicles’, Aerospace Power Journal , Summer 2002. 43 The Military Balance 2008, (London: Routledge or IISS, 2008), p.459. 44 Kurt Klausner K lausner,, ‘Will Bandwidth be the Major Limiting Factor o Future Air Operations?’, RAF Air Power Review 6/2, Summer 2003. 45 ( Washington ington DC: Oce o the Unmanned Aircrat Systems Roadmap, 2005-2030 , (Wash Secretary o Deense, 2005), pp.47-51. pp.47-51. 46 Ibid , pp.70-1 & Appendix H, and Deence Science Board, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles, (Washin ( Washington gton DC: Oce o the Under Secretary o Deense or Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, February 2004), ch.3. 47 ( Washington ington DC: Oce o the Unmanned Aircrat Systems Roadmap, 2005-2030 , (Wash Secretary o Deense, 2005), Appendix F, and Mike Strong, ‘Integrating UAV With Other Airspace Users’, JAPCC Journal 3, 2006. 48 Unmanned Aircrat Systems Roadmap, 2005-2030 , (Wash ( Washington ington DC: Oce o the Secretary o Deense, 2005), Appendix K. 49 Ibid , p.K-1, ‘Georgian spy drones “shot down”’, The Times, May 5th 2008, ‘The “rozen conict” that is thawing rapidly and could lead to a new war’, The Times, May 20th 2008, and ‘Predator Attrition’ At trition’, Strategy Page, December 20th 2007, at http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairfo/articles/20071220.aspx 113
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Philip Sabin, ‘Air Strategy and the Underdog’, in Peter Gray (ed.), Air Power 21, (London: The Stationery Oce, 2000), Neville Parton, ‘Israel’ ‘Israel’ss 2006 Campaign in the Lebanon’, RAF Air Power Review 10/2, Summer 2007, and ‘Gaza ‘Gaza rockets put Israel’s nuclear plant in battle zone’, The Times, Jan. 2nd, 2009. 51 Strategic Survey 2007 , (London: Routledge or IISS, 2007), p.362, and ‘Besieged rebels retaliate with air raid on capital’, The Times, Feb. 21st, 2009. 52 ‘Iran uses UAV to Watch US Aircrat Carrier on Gul Patrol’, Space War , November 11th 2006, at http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Iran_Uses_UAV_To_Watch_ US_Aircraft_Carrier_On_Gulf_Patrol_999.html , ‘Terrorists Develop Unmanned Control,, Energy and Environmenta Environmentall Studies at Aerial Vehicles’, Center or Arms Control th MIPT , December 6 , 2004, at http://www.armscontrol.ru/UAV/mirsad1.htm and ‘Iranian UA UAVs Vs over Israel’ Israel’,, Strategy Page, August 9th 2006, at http://www. strategypage.com/htmw/htairfo/articles/20060809.aspx 53 Hugh McDaid & David Oliver, Robot Warriors, (London: Orion, 1997), pp.32-47 & 68-9. 54 John Stillion & David Orletsky, Airbase Vulnerability to Conventional CruiseMissile and Ballistic-Missile Attacks, (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 1999), and Rex Kiziah, ‘The Emerging Biocruise Threat’, Air & Space Power Journal , Spring 2003. 55 For a critical perspective, see Lawrence Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Aairs, Adelphi Paper 318, (New York: Oxord University Press or IISS, 1998). 56 ‘Changing ace o war: now a pilot in Las Vegas can blast a sniper in a Baghdad apartment’, The Times, March 14th 2008. 57 Tom Hobbins, ‘Unmanned Aircrat Systems: Reocusing the Integration o Air & Space Power’, JAPCC Journal 3, 2006. For a similar similar view rom a non-military non-military and non-Western observer, see Manjeet Pardesi, ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicles/ Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles: Likely Missions and Challenges or the PolicyRelevant Future’, Air & Space Power Journal , Fall 2005. 58 There may also, o course, be overlaps between UAV missions themselves – see Integration n o Weapon Weaponized ized Unmanned Aircrat into the Air-to-Ground David Hume, Integratio Press, 2007). System, Maxwell Paper 41, (Maxwell AL: Air University Press, 59 US General Accounting Oce, Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DoD’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Eorts, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House o Representat Representatives, ives, GAO-04-342, (Washington DC: GAO, March 2004). 60 Mark Steves, ‘Near Space 2015’, Air & Space Power Journal , Summer 2006. 61 Robert Chapman, ‘Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles: Dawn o a New Age?’, Aerospace Power Journal , Summer 2002. 62 On likely ways ahead in the near term, see The Joint Air Power Competence Centre Flight Plan or Unmanned Aircrat Systems in NATO , (Cleve: JAPCC, March 2008). 63 Robert Massie, Dreadnought , (New York: Random House, 1991). 64 The Joint Air Power Competence Competence Centre Flight Plan or Unmanned Aircrat Systems in NATO, (Cleve: JAPCC, March 2008), Annex B. 65 Hugh McDaid & David Oliver, Robot Warriors, (London: Orion, 1997), pp.639, Phillip Saunders & Erik Quam, ‘China’s Air Force Modernization’, Joint Force Quarterly 47, 2007, The Military Balance 2008, (London: Routledge or IISS, 114
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2008), pp.18-29, 205-25 & 376-81, and Eugene Kogan, ‘Russian UAVs making a comeback’, at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=15032 66 See Francois Heisbourg, The Future o Warare, Predictions 2, (London: Phoenix, 1997), pp.26-9. 67 Je Mustin, ‘Flesh and Blood: The Call or the Pilot in the Cockpit’, Air & Space Power Journal , Chronicles Online, 2001, at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ airchronicles/cc/mustin.html 68 James Fitzsimonds & Thomas Mahnken, ‘Military Ocer Attitudes Toward UAV Adoption: Exploring Institutional Impediments to Innovation’, Joint Force Quarterly 46, 2007. A good example o this constructive constructive approach approach is David Deptula, ‘Unmanned Aircrat Systems: Taking Strategy to Task’, and ‘Air and Space Power Going Forward’, both in Joint Force Quarterly 49, 2008. 69 Brian Bond & Williamson Murray, ‘The British Armed Forces, 1918-39’, in Allan Millett & Williamson Murray (eds.), Military Eectiveness, vol.II, (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988). 70 For a more detailed and ocused treatment o specically British aspects o unmanned air systems, see the House o Commons Deence Committee’s 13th report o Session S ession 2007-08, The contribution o Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to ISTAR Capability , (London: The Stationery Oce, HC 535, August 2008).
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UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES – PROGRESS AND CHALLENGE AVM Pro R A Mason
Prologue
O
n February 25th 2009 a USAF ghter shot down an unmanned Iranian surveillance drone over Iraq, 60 miles north east o Baghdad.1 The incident, which provoked no reaction rom Iran, was not reported until March 16th. Six days later the British Press described the RAF’s RAF’s No 39 Squadron carrying out its historical reconnaissance role. Now however, however, its aircrat were unmanned MQ-9 Reapers, controlled and “own” rom Creech Air Force Base in Arizona, turned round on an air eld in Aghanistan, and delivering precision munitions as well as reconnaissance.2 In April 2009 the US Marine Corps was reported to be seeking an unmanned cargo aircrat or resupply o orward operating bases.3
Assumptions amid Uncertainty As explained in earlier chapters in this volume, UAVs already discharge many roles, rom short range reconnaissance reconnaissance to long endurance surveillance and weapon delivery. They are operated by air orces, armies, and navies. How ar they will replace manned aircrat remains uncertain. In its second century, century, air power must be prepared to contribute to policy and strategy across a very wide potential spectrum o conict, rom insurgency to inter-state conict. Amid the uncertainty, actors may be condently identied which will inuence UK decisions about the procurement and employment o UAVs and associated systems. systems. Some will encourage their speedy development, others may be more problematical.
Resource Constraints Resources allocated to deence are likely to reduce in real terms. Inevitably, procurement and lie cycle cost comparisons will heavily inuence every debate about investment in UAVs. As they incorporate more and more on-board systems and probably stealth technology, the gap between their procurement costs and those o comparable manned aircrat will decrease, as Philip Sabin has explained. Lie cycle costs will however oer savings. savings. For example, the endurance or combat radius o a UAV, like the manned aircrat, is inuenced by weight, payload and uel capacity. UA UAV uel consumption will be substantially less than that o its manned equivalent. Predator Predator B can y or 17 hours, much o them on auto pilot, and until a UAV UAV becomes completely autonomous, it will probably require our or six crews in sequence to control it remotely. In comparison, the B-2 Spirit can reach much ur ther ther,, but to do so requires not just a two man crew but all the personnel, aircrat, inra-structure and resources associated with in-ight reuelling. 116
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The comparative ground support costs are also likely to avour the UAV, even though ground crew numbers are dicult to compare when the maintenance costs o even the most complex aircrat systems may be reduced by replacement items, computerised ault identication and repair and multiskilled personnel. Moreover, UAV “ground crew” include the remote controllers, usually pilot and systems operator. In No 39 Squadron in early 2009, a Reaper R eaper crew comprised a combat experienced, commissioned pilot and a senior NCO weapon systems operator. operator. In the same period the United States Air Force began a trial to train non-rated personnel as UA UAV V controllers. The question o how ar qualied aircrew are needed to control UAVs has more than just nancial implications, which will be addressed below. below. Personnel costs are however a major budgetary actor and undoubted savings would accrue rom a reduction in the numbers o trained pilots. Overall, the substitution o UA UAVs Vs or manned aircrat in similar roles is likely to oer signicant resource savings. savings. Such savings are particularly par ticularly attractive to governments under acute pressure to reduce deence expenditure. Other UAV advantages will increase that attraction.
Casualty sensitivity Between the end o the Cold War and the Iraq conict which began in 2003, very ew casualties were sustained by the UK armed orces and allies. Casualty sensitivity has become and will remain a permanent eature o conict. But, ater 9/11 the US was prepared to accept a much higher level l evel o casualties in Aghanistan and Iraq than in the previous conict over Kosovo. In reerring to that conict, General Wesley Wesley Clarke wrote: “But we had to move the campaign along some general paths, in addition to minding the legal constraints in the order order.. I termed these ‘measures o merit’… I dropped them onto the command: ‘As we start working through this, there are three measures o merit or the operation overall rom the military standpoint. The rst measure o merit is not to lose aircrat, ‘minimize the loss o aircrat.’ This addressed Mike Short’s biggest concern - to prevent the loss o aircrews.. It drove our decisions on tactics, targets, and which air aircrews planes could participate.4 To much o the US general public, the Kosovo campaign seemed to be peripheral to its national interests. Casualty tolerance was low. Conversely, Conversely, ater September 2001, the “war on terrorism” was driven by core perceptions o national security, and public acceptance o military casualties expanded proportionately. To a certain cer tain extent UK casualty sensitivity in all operations will also reect the issues at stake, and inuence the evaluation o the UAV. There is however a more persistent consideration about casualties. General Clarke went on to observe: ‘But I was motivated by a larger political-military polit ical-military rationale. I we wanted 117
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to keep this campaign going indenitely, we had to protect our air eet. Nothing would hurt us more with public opinion than headlines that screamed, ‘NATO ‘NATO LOSES TEN AIRPLANES AI RPLANES IN TWO DA DAYS’ YS’. Take losses like that, divide it into the total number o aircrat committed, and the time limits on the t he campaign would be clear. Milosovic could wait us out.”5 The General coupled public perception with the potential operational impact o losses in a limited l imited conict. As the armed orces have been reduced in numbers, the operational value o the remainder has increased. The RAF no longer has a large l arge pool o trained aircrew on ground duties available or rapid operational rereshing and reinorcement reinorcement o the ront line. Nor does a greatly reduced training structure have the potential or rapid expansion, as it did in Trenchard’ Trenchard’ss day. It is not so much the loss o aircrat, but o highly and expensively trained aircrew. Whatever the issues at stake, the ability o the UAV to reduce aircrew vulnerability will remain a hard nosed resource attraction, quite apart rom its it s obvious impact on aircrew morale.
Diplomatic Advantage UAVs not only obviate the risk o aircrew casualties, they have a much lower political prole. By the nature o their activities, surveillance and reconnaissance reconnaissan ce ights usually go unreported. But the t he shooting down o Gary Power’s U-2 near Sverdlovsk in 1960 had an immediate and dramatic impact on US-USSR relations. Several other Cold War incidents o intercepted over-ights o sovereign air space prompted diplomatic conrontation. The loss or internment o aircrew heightened public concern, publicised ailure and embarrassed the parent Service. The remains o Gary Powers’ aircrat were or many years a popular exhibit in the Soviet Air Museum in Moscow. The interception o a single “Stealth” USAF F-117 in 1999 made international headlines and gave President Milosovic a rare military militar y and media coup. In contrast, the remains in the Serbian Air Museum in Belgrade o a USAF Predator, also shot down in 1999, are an unremarked curiosity. In early 2009, in a period o acute US-Iranian tension, the shooting down o the Iranian reconnaissance UAV well inside Iraqi air space passed without comment by both US and Iran governments and was largely unreported by the media when it was nally disclosed.
Vulnerability While the Iranian Ababil 3 was shot down over Iraq, British and other allied UAVs were operating with comparative impunity over Aghanistan, where there was no opposition in the air, and no coordinated air deences deences below them. At the moment, UAVs are deenceless: slow moving, scarcely manoeuvrable and probably announcing their presence by electronic communication or sensors. As their size has increased increased,, so has their visibility. The Predator Predator C is more than 43 eet long with a wing span o 66 eet. The The Harrier GR9 is 47 eet long with a wing span o 30 eet. The incorporation o stealth technology 118
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will reduce combat vulnerability to a certain extent, but control o the air will remain an essential prerequisite or UAV operations at any level o conict. For the oreseeable uture, that control will depend in the air on manned aircrat capable o establishing it. Aircrat such as Typhoon 2 will remain indispensable to all operations in the t he air, on the ground and at sea. It is dicult to avoid the conclusion that just as the massive contribution o the manned reconnaissance reconnaissance aircrat in World War War One switly swit ly stimulated measures to destroy them, in this century UAVs UAVs will ace a similar response. While stealth conguration will reduce their vulnerability to detection and attack rom the air or ground, as Philip Sabin observed, their communications will be vulnerable to intererence intererence,, however stealthy their conguration. Any system which depends on electronic control is vulnerable to electronic disruption. The acquisition by irregular orces o localised jammers or example, is inevitable. UAVs UA Vs will become involved in electronic warare war are recalling that waged by manned aircrat and their opposition in World War War 2. Autonomous operation would reduce hostile opportunities or intererence but deny opportunities or over-riding human recovery recovery.. Even in a benign environment, UAVs are reported to have suered a “signicant” accident rate. By April 2009, o 195 Predators purchased by the Pentagon, 55 had been lost in “Class A mishaps” which by inerence excluded any casualties to hostile action. The overall loss rate was 10 accidents per 100,000 ying hours or Predator and 12.7 or Reaper Reaper,, with one third o the losses attributed to pilot error error,, others to hardware ailure and landing problems.6 The UK lost 71 UAVs in Iraq between 2003 and 2007 7 and a urther 27 in Aghanistan by February February 20098 . These losses were incurred in the comparatively early years o UAV but dependence on remote control inevitably reduces opportunities and time or reaction to an emergency or miscalculation. Autonomous take os and landing would help and stealth technology could reduce combat losses, but not necessarily accidents rates. rates. Even i a UAV UAV cost one third o a manned aircrat perorming similar roles, losses at several times the rate o the manned alternative could quickly erode any cost benet. The hub o the UAV system is the ground control centre (GCC). In early 2009 the RAF No 39 squadron’s GCC in Arizona was several thousand miles away rom its combat theatre in Aghanistan. In World War One, Trenchard amously sought to win air superiority by seeking out German aircrat on their own airelds: the origins o the counter-air role. I the UK and its allies continue to retain command o the air, that option will not be available to an enemy, either against UAV orward operating bases or GCCs. It may be assumed that operating bases in theatre will benet rom the air eld protection given in Aghanistan by the RAF Regiment and other ground deences. Duplication and mobility will reduce the vulnerability o GCCs, but to an opponent, Creech AFB is a military militar y target, however ar away rom the combat theatre. Just as the western domination by manned aircrat o recent conicts has stimulated hostile asymmetric responses, so the increasing importance o 119
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the UAV UAV will stimulate countermeasures which will seek to render command o the air irrelevant. GCCs will be threatened t hreatened by kinetic, cyber and even hostile media attack.
War fghter or remote controller? In a previous chapter on the UA UAV V in the context o the Laws o Armed Conict (LOAC), (LO AC), Alison Mardell largely l argely concentrated concentrated on the legal responsibilities o the authorising and controlling decision makers. She demonstrated conclusively that UAV operations must conorm to the LOAC even when the UAV, such as Taranis, Taranis, was operating autonomously. She also explained the ambivalent legal position o civilian controllers or support services. The contemporary problem o LOAC interpretation is that they were conceived in an age and or circumstances when the distinction between combatants and civilians was comparatively straightorward. Even then, protagonists o strategic bombing held that arms industry and oil reneries, together with their civilian work orces, were legitimate targets. Now, the combatant targets o the UAV are oten indistinguishable rom their civilian neighbours while the opposition makes no distinction between combatants and civilians in its own war ghting. The UAV controller may be well away rom combat. There are sound military and morale reasons or enhancing the capability o the war ghter by removing him/her rom immediate danger. Whatever Whatever the view o the international lawyers, there will be little military militar y doubt that the UAV controller is a combatant. A “civilian” UAV controller becomes a contradiction in terms, even when clothed with the t he ambiguity o the CIA. The most recent precedent is the ballistic missile controller in the silo beneath the Nebraska hills or Russian steppes. The The UAV UAV controller is a war ghter; a denition which will present more diculties to parent Services than to international i nternational lawyers. In the Royal Air Force, as Seb Cox explained in his Chapter, there has always been a shadow hierarchy within the ocial hierarchical structure. Only a very small proportion o the Service has ever been involved in combat even though ground crew requently suered casualties rom enemy air attack, and rom the later stages o the Cold War War onwards have carried arms and been trained to withstand attacks on airelds air elds and other installations. In recent years, navigators have shared many o the responsibilities o high command, until in 2009 Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach became Chie o UK Operations, but RAF Commanders-in-Chie and Chies o the Air Sta have been drawn almost exclusively rom ghter or bomber pilots. pilot s. Operationally however, the distinction between “combat” aircrat and others has become increasingly blurred. In the whole o the Balkan Wars the only western aircrew to be shot down and killed were ying an Italian I talian Air Force G-222 transport. Numerous decorations or valour in Iraq and Aghanistan have reected helicopter helicopter and xed wing transport operations in hostile environments,, perhaps best epitomised by the award o a Distinguished Flying environments Cross, or valour in the ace o the enemy, to helicopter pilot Flight Lieutenant 120
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Michelle Goodman in 2008. It is highly likely that the broadening o combat experience across dierent dierent roles will sooner or later be reected in the high command o the RAF, as it is already in the USAF and other air orces. I, as may be condently assumed, the UCAV makes an increasing contribution to UK air power, where will “war ghting” UCAV controllers t in the uture hierarchy? Will controllers continue to be pilots on ground tours? Perhaps the undamental question should be: “How best can the RAF develop the expertise, judgement and command experience essential or the most operationally cost eective integration o the UCAV with manned aircrat?” Alternating ront line squadron appointments with UCAV control would enhance expertise in joint UCAV-manned UCAV -manned aircrat operations but would raise questions about training costs and even about sustained ight pay. Employing aircrew other than pilots would draw upon operational awareness but would require additional pilot training. Employing ground crew would create the most complex career management problems unless a new specialist Trade Trade or Branch was established, which in turn would complicate subsequent usion o operational experience at high command level. Those considerations apply equally to UAV UAV reconnaissance/ surveillance and air to surace attack operations. I however the UCAV comes to operate in the airto-air role, the argument or a trained t rained combat pilot controller becomes much stronger.. Such practical issues may in the longer term be more important stronger impor tant than the more philosophical question o who is a warrior and who isn’t.
Roles Wing Commander McMahon imaginatively and comprehens comprehensively ively explores the possibilities o UA UAV V operations. Their basic attributes have been amply discussed in previous chapters. In the near uture their primary contribution will be to reconnaissa reconnaissance nce and surveillance. Air power has moved on, rom an age when locating a target was relatively straightorward but hitting it precisely was not, to environmen environments ts where precision strike is almost taken or granted but locating and conrming a target can be much more dicult. The demand in all theatres or ISTAR ISTAR will continue to exceed supply. As with early warning o hostile activity in the last century, anomaly detection, whether in human activity or in i n the appearance o roads and culverts, will remain essential in counter insurgency, but not so easy to acquire. Now, as then, intelligence rom human sources will be a valuable component. Operational awareness must lead to understanding understanding.. Extended surveillance, preerably covert, over lengthy periods, short range reconnaissa reconnaissance nce and battle damage assessment will be essential or all operations. In the air it can best be achieved by medium or high level long endurance UAS such as Predator, Reaper or Global Hawk or repeated shorter range sorties sor ties by Watch Keeper, Keeper, Desert Hawk, Herti and their successors, procured within an integrated UAV programme. The extent o UCAV development development is more debatable but it will increasingly i ncreasingly share the combat roles hitherto the exclusive domain o the manned aircrat. 121
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The oensive potential o a UCAV which could loiter or many hours without detection, identiy a target and strike precisely and switly is obvious. So much so that the decision in 2009 by US Deense Secretary Robert Gates to include armed UAVs UAVs within the USAF ghter (ie ghter/bomber) structure, prompted ears in the USAF that “Reapers “Reapers and later Predator Cs, would 9 substitute or F-35 JSFs”. The UK Minister o Deence or Equipment and Support Quinton Davies indicated in April 2009 that UCAV would gure prominently in uture equipment programmes.10 RAF considerations or a uture deep strike capability inevitably include UCAV, UCAV, equipped with kinetic and non-kinetic weapons. In the UK however, a orce mix o UCAV and manned aircrat may not be so easy to achieve because the procurement decision would not rest with the RAF alone. In the ace o constrained and probably reduced Deence expenditure, expansion expansion o the contemporary manned combat combat aircrat ront line by the addition o UCA UCAVs Vs is inconceivable. inconceivable. I the CAS C AS or Commander in Chie o Air Command o the day sought to reduce the number o manned aircrat in order to release unds or UCAV purchase, purchase, there is no guarantee that such unds would be allocated in that t hat way. Not only would the Treasury be looking or benets but the UCAV proposals would have to compete with programmes in the other services. I however the RAF is to derive the greatest operational advantage rom the integration UCAV into the ront line, such a guarantee, however however rail, is essential. The UCAV can be expected to play an increased role in deence suppression. suppression. Christina Goulter notes the use o Israeli UAVs UAVs in 1982 to trigger Syrian Air deences beore beore their destruction by manned aircrat. In uture, utu re, UCAVs UCAVs will attack air deences by themselves, a role which would be considerably enhanced by stealth conguration. There There are likely to be progressive stages in the development o UCA UCAVs Vs or air-to-air combat. The rst might be the installation o inra-red or early warning radar sel deence systems which would autonomously react to threats, while the UCAV otherwise remained under remote control. That stage would entail resolving a relatively straightorward weight, payload, and risk cost/benet equation. The second stage might be the incorporation o air-to-air weapons which, coupled with on-board sensors, would allow the controller to engage identied targets. That would require a urther, more complex technological solution but still within the envelope o remote control. The The third stage, almost certainly more than a generation away, would be the delegation o deensive systems to an autonomous UCAV which would discharge all the aggressive tasks o the air superiority manned ghter. Alison Mardell examines the sensitive legal issues surrounding autonomy, autonomy, which would need to be added to the ormidable technological advances required required to replicate the contribution o the aircrew in a manned air superiority aircrat. It is dicult to envisage RAF introduction o unmanned transport aircrat, although the USMC initiative is likely to be careully scrutinised. Presumably Presumably the Marine Corps is considering the potential reduction in air crew exposure in 122
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short range supply sorties in a hostile environment. UAV UAV savings in endurance and payload are unlikely to be signicant in simply omitting aircrew rom transport aircrat. The RAF may be expected to concentrate on ISTAR UAV and multi-role UCAV.
Conclusion Air power is about the military exploitation o air and space by man, not necessarily with man. The UAV is already evolving into the multi-role UCAV, reecting trends in manned combat aircrat. The advantages o lower costs, reduced casualty risk, long endurance and low political prole, will encourage UAV UA V increasingly to replace, not just ju st complement, the manned aircrat in i n many traditional roles. Technology Technology and experience may be expected to increase capabilities and reduce attrition rates. Problems o air space integration and international legality are likely to be soluble. Autonomous operation is more likely to be constrained by the need or human presence in the control system in conicts where complex situational awareness and reaction to the unexpected are likely to be required. It is not the technology o the UCAV which presents the challenge, but its intellectual mastery. The RAF must devise a structure which will develop the expertise, exper tise, judgement and command experience essential or the most eective operational integration o the UCAV with manned aircrat. NOTES 1
The Guardian Tuesday 17 th March 2009. 2 The Sunday Telegraph 22 nd March 2009. 3 Aviation Week and Space Technology, 13 th April 2009.4 General Wesley K Clarke, “Waging Modern War”, Public Aairs New York 2001, pp 182-3. 5 ibid. 6 Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 4 th 2009. 7 Flight International, International, June 6th 2007. 8 Statement to House o Commons by Secretary o State or Deence, 27 th February 2009. 9 Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 20 th 2009. 10 Addressing a Royal Aeronautical Society Conerence, London, “Aerospace 2009”, 21st April 2009.
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The Hermes 450 Medium Size Multi-Payload UAV
British Army Phoenix UAV in Kosovo
ISBN 978-0-9552189-5-8 Designed by Air Media Centre, HQ Air Command and printed by AIDU, RAF Northolt. 0138_09AJ © Crown Copyright/MOD 2009
