LDB vs. ALDBE G.R. No. 120319. October 6, 1995 FACTS: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue of "Whether or not the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and the Memorandum of Agreement, on promotion." At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers. Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE's Position Paper. LDB, on the other hand, failed to t o submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. The Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision in favor of ALDBE. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same. ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator. HELD: Article 261 of the Labor Code accordingly provides for exclusive original jurisdiction of such voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators over (1) the interpretation or implementation of the CBA and (2) the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. Article 262 authorizes authorizes them, but only upon agreement of the parties, to exercise jurisdiction over other labor disputes. The voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but independent of, and apart from, t he NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the latter. An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency.The word "instrumentality," with respect to a state, contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the performance of a state function. The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein.
The decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein.
CHRISTIAN GEN. ASSEMBLY vs. SPOUSES IGNACIO G.R. No. 164789. August 27, 2009 FACTS: CGA entered into a Contract to Sell a subdivision lot 4 (subject property) with Spouses Ignacio (respondents). Under the Contract to Sell, CGA would pay P2,373,000.00 for the subject property on installment basis. According to CGA, it religiously paid the monthly installments until its administrative pastor discovered that the title covering the subject property suffered from fatal flaws and defects. CGA learned that the subject property was actually part of two consolidated lots that the respondents had acquired from Nicanor Adriano (Adriano) and Ceferino Sison (Sison), respectively. Adriano and Sison were former tenant-beneficiaries of Purificacion S. Imperial (Imperial) whose property had been placed under PD No. 27's Operation Land Transfer. According to CGA, Imperial applied for the retention of five hectares of her land under Republic Act No. 6657, which the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) granted. CGA filed a complaint against the respondents before the RTC claiming that the respondents fraudulently concealed the fact that the subject property was part of a property under litigation; thus, the Contract to Sell was a rescissible contract under Article 1381 of the Civil Code. CGA asked the trial court to rescind the contract. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. Citing PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344, the respondents claimed that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB since it involved the sale of a subdivision lot. CGA opposed the motion to dismiss, claiming that the action is for rescission of contract, not specific performance, and is not among the actions within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, as specified by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344. ISSUE: Which of the two — the regular court or the HLURB — has exclusive jurisdiction over CGA's action for rescission and damages. HELD: The Court held that the CGA has to file its complaint before the HLURB, the body with the proper jurisdiction. PD No. 957, enacted on July 12, 1976, was intended to closely supervise and regulate the real estate subdivision and condominium businesses in order to curb the growing number of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators. Section 3 of PD No. 957 granted the National Housing Authority (NHA) the "exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the r eal estate trade
and business". Thereafter, PD No. 1344 was issued on April 2, 1978 to expand the jurisdiction of the NHA to include the following: Sec. 1 (b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman EO 648 transferred the regulatory and quasi-judicial functions of the NHA to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. Pursuant to EO No. 90, the HSRC was renamed as the HLURB. HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations to make the subdivision a better place to live in. In the cases of Fajardo Jr. v. Freedom to Build, Inc . , 22 and Cadimas v. Carrion, 23 we upheld the RTC's jurisdiction even if the subject matter was a subdivision lot since it was the subdivision developer who led the action against the buyer for violation of the contract to sell. The only instance that HLURB may take cognizance of a case filed by the developer is when said case is instituted as a compulsory counterclaim to a pending case filed against it by the buyer or owner of a subdivision lot or condominium unit. In the present case, CGA is unquestionably the buyer of a subdivision lot from the respondents, who sold the property in their capacities as owner and developer. the main thrust of the CGA complaint is clear — to compel the respondents to refund the payments already made for the subject property because the respondents were selling a property that they apparently did not own. In other words, CGA claims that since the respondents cannot comply with their obligations under the contract, CGA is entitled to rescind the contract and get a refund of the payments already made. This cause of action clearly falls under the actions contemplated by Paragraph (b), Section 1 of PD No. 1344
DADUBO vs. CSC G.R. No. 106498. June 28, 1993 FACTS: Petitioner Lolita A. Dadubo, Senior Accounts Analyst and Rosario B. Cidro, Cash Supervisor, of the Development Bank of the Philippines, Borongan Branch were administratively charged with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. DBP found Dadubo guilty of dishonesty for embezzlement of bank funds. She was penalized with dismissal from the service. Dadubo appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which affirmed the decision of the DBP. However, DBP was reversed by the Civil Service Commission which reduced Dadubo's penalty to suspension for six months. DBP moved for reconsideration. The Commission acting favorably on the motion, promulgated Resolution No. 92-8789 affirming the earlier findings of the DBP as to Dadubo's guilt. Dadubo has brought her case to this Court in this petitioner for certiorari. She claims that CSC Resolution No. 92-878 failed to comply with the constitutional requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the decision is based ISSUE: WON the Civil Service Commission’s resolution failed to comply with the constitutional requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the decision is based HELD: The rule is that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing authority. It is settled that it is not for the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Administrative decisions on matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. None of these vices has been shown in this case. As this Court has held, "the standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the element of fairness is not ignored." Appreciation of the evidence submitted by the parties was, to repeat, the prerogative of the administrative body, subject to reversal only upon a clear showing of arbitrariness. Nevertheless, the allegations and the evidence presented sufficiently proved her guilt of embezzlement of bank funds, which in unquestionably prejudicial to the best interest of the bank. The Court also dismissed the petitioner's complaint that CSC Resolution No. 92-878 failed to comply with the constitutional requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which a decision is based. We have held that this provision applies only to courts of justice and not to administrative bodies like the Civil Service Commission.
LIANGA BAY LOGGING, CO., INC., G.R. No. L-30637. July 16, 1987 FACTS: The parties herein are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are adjacent to each other. Since the concessions of petitioner and respondent are adjacent to each other, they have a common boundary — the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary — whereby the eastern boundary of respondent Ago's concession is petitioner Lianga's western boundary. Because of reports of encroachment by both parties on each other's concession areas, the Director of Forestry ordered a survey to establish on the ground the common boundary of their respective concession areas. Forester Cipriano Melchor undertook the survey and fixed the common boundary and ruled that the claim of the Ago runs counter to the intentions of the Office in granting licenses to Mr. Lansang and Lianga. In appeal, the then Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Jose Feliciano, set aside the appealed decision of the Director of Forestry and ruled that, the common boundary line of the licensed areas of the Ago and the Lianga should be that indicated by the green line on the same sketch which had been made an integral part of the appealed decision. Petitioner elevated the case to the Office of the President (OP) which then affirmed the ruling of Secretary Feliciano. On motion for reconsideration, the OP issued another decision reversing and overturning the decision of Secretary Feliciano and affirmed the decision of the Director of Forestry. Ago fi led a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the OP but after written opposition of petitioner Lianga, the same was denied. A new action was commenced by Ago, as plaintiff, in the Court of First Instance of Agusan against Lianga, Assistant Executive Secretaries Jose J. Leido, Jr. and Gilberto M. Duavit and Director of Forestry, as defendants, for "Determination of Correct Boundary Line of License Timber Areas and Damages with Preliminary Injunction" reiterating once more the same question raised and passed upon the previous case and insisting that "a judicial review of such divergent administrative decisions is necessary in order to determine the correct boundary line of the licensed areas in question." Respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order and Lianga moved for dismissal of the complaint and for dissolution of t he temporary restraining order on grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that the court has no jurisdiction over the person of respondent public officials and respondent corporation. The motion was denied. Hence, this petition praying of the Court (a) to declare that the Director of Forestry has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the common boundary of the licensed areas of petitioners and respondents and that the decision of the Office of the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case. HELD: Respondent Judge erred in taking cognizance of the complaint filed by Ago, asking for the determination anew of the correct boundary line of its licensed timber area, for the same issue had already been determined by the Director of Forestry, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the President, administrative officials under whose jurisdictions the matter properly belongs. Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code vests in the Bureau of Forestry, the jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, reforestation, occupancy, and use of all public forests and forest reserves and over the granting of licenses for game and fish, and for the taking of forest products, including stone and earth therefrom. A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines in an administrative office the power to determine particular questions or matters, upon the facts to be presented, the jurisdiction of such office shall prevail over the courts. The general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction, is that decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except when the former have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Findings of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality of such findings are supported by substantial evidence. As recently stressed by the Court, "in this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable."
LARIN vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. 112745, October 16, 1997 FACTS: Aquilino Larin (Petitioner), was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of the crimes of violation of Section 268 (4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019. The fact of his conviction was reported to the President of the Philippines and acting by authority of the latter, then Sr. Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo Quisumbing issued Memorandum Order No. 164 which provides for the creation of an Executive Committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner. The Committee directed the petitioner to respond to the administrative charge. Meanwhile, the President issued the challenged Executive Order No. 132 which mandated the streamlining of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Under said order, some positions and functions are either abolished, renamed, decentralized or transferred to other offices, while other offices are also created. The Excise Tax Service or the Specific Tax Service, of which petitioner was the Assistant Commissioner, was one of those offices that was abolished by the said executive order. The President found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of all benefits and disqualification for reappointment in the government service. In this petition, petitioner challenges the authority of the President to dismiss him from office arguing that insofar as presidential appointees who are Career Executive Service Officers are concerned, the President exercises only the power of control and not the power to remove. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s dismissal from office is valid. HELD: The Supreme Court granted the petition and reinstated petit ioner with full backwages. The Court held that where the very basis of the administrative case against petitioner is his conviction in the criminal action which was later on set aside by the Court upon a categorical and clear finding that the acts for which he was administratively held liable are not unlawful and irregular, the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative action against him, because in such a case, there is no more basis nor justifiable reason to maintain the administrative suit. The Court also ruled that the reorganization of the Bureau was tainted with circumstances considered as evidences of bad faith.
DARIO vs. MISON G.R. No. FACTS: President Cory Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS mandate
of
the
MANDATED
BY
THE
PEOPLE...”, the
people to Completely reorganize the government. A brand new
constitution was adopted. Thereafter, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a Memorandum, in the nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders," prescribing the procedure in personnel placement. It also provided that, all employees covered by EO 127 and the grace period extended to the Bureau of Customs by the President on reorganization shall be: a) informed of their reappointment, or b) offered another position in the same department or agency, or c) informed of their termination. A total of 394 officials and employees of the Bureau of Customs were given individual notices of separation. They filed appeals with the CSC. CSC promulgated its ruling for reinstatement of the 279 employees. Mison, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. ISSUE: WON Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a grant of a license upon the Government to remove career public officials it could have validly done under an "automatic"-vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason. HELD: NO. The State can still carry out reorganizations provided that it is done in good faith. Removal of career officials without cause cannot be done after the passing of the 1987 Constitution. Section 16 Article XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution: “Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general application in force at the time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for employment in the Government or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and
their
subsidiaries. This provision also applies to
whose resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy.”
career officers
The above is a mere recognition of the right of the Government to reorganize its
offices, bureaus,
and instrumentalities. Under Section 4, Article XVI, of the 1935
Constitution. Transition periods are characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They are dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to the new Constitution free from the "fetters" of due process and security of tenure. Since 1935, transition periods have been characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. We take the silence of the 1987 Constitution on this matter as a restraint upon the Government to dismiss public servants at a moment's notice. If the present Charter envisioned an "automatic" vacancy, it should have said so in clearer terms. Plainly the concern of Section 16 is to ensure compensation for "victims" of constitutional revamps - whether under the Freedom or existing Constitution - and only secondarily and impliedly, to allow reorganization.
The canon for the removal or suspension of a civil service off icer or employee is that it must be FOR CAUSE. That means "a guarantee of both procedural and substantive due process. Basically, procedural due process would require that suspension or dismissal come only after notice and hearing. Substantive due process would require that suspension or dismissal be 'for cause'.
The right granted by EO 17 to an employee to be informed of the ground for his separation must be deemed to have been revoked by the repealing clause of EO 127 (Section 67) providing that "all laws, ordinances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Executive Order, are hereby repealed and modified accordingly.
BUKLOD NG KAW EIIB vs. ZAMORA G.R. No.
BAGAOISAN vs. NTA G.R. No.
DOMINGO vs. ZAMORA G.R. No.
MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE vs. SEC G.R. No. L-23004 June 30, 1965 FACTS:
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) denied the registration of Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. (MSE) to operate as a stock exchange company on the ground of the rule against double listing wherein a new stock exchange company is not permitted to list for trading on its board, securities already listed in another Stock Exchange such as the Manila Stock Exchange in the instant case. Objecting to the requirement, MSE contends that SEC has no power to impose such requirement. Under the law, no stock exchange may do business in the Philippines unless it is previously registered with the Commission by filing a statement containing the information described in Sec. 17 of the Securities Act (Commonwealth Act 83, as amended). But the SEC contends that it merely acted "in the public interest" because operation of two or more exchanges adversely affect the public interest. It is assumed that the Commission may permit registration if the section is complied with; if not, it may refuse. And there is now no question that the section has been complied with, or would be complied with, except that the Makati Stock Exchange, upon challenging this particular requirement of the Commission (rule against double listing) may be deemed to have shown inability or refusal to abide by it s rules, and thereby to have given ground for denying registration. ISSUE: WON the SEC has the power to promulgate rules HELD: The SEC has no power to promulgate rules. It is fundamental that an administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him by the statute, and these necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. The Commission cites no provision expressly supporting its rule. Nevertheless, it suggests that the power is “necessary for the execution of the functions vested in it”; but it makes no explanation, perhaps relying on the reasons advanced in support of its position that trading of the same securities in two or more stock exchanges, fails to give protection to the investors besides contravening public interest. The Legislature has specified the conditions under which a stock exchange may legally obtain a permit (sec. 17, Securities Act); it is not for the Commission to impose others. If the existence of two competing exchanges jeopardizes public interest — which is doubtful — let the Congress speak. Undoubtedly, the opinion and recommendations of the Commission will be given weight by the Legislature, in judging whether or not to restrict individual enterprises and business opportunities. But until otherwise directed by law, the operation of exchanges should not be so regulated as practically to create a monopoly by preventing the establishment of other stock exchanges, and thereby contravening.
TAULE vs. SANTOS G.R. No.
SOLID HOMES vs. PAYAWAL G.R. No.
