ACTUS REUS E v Bhogilal AIR 1931 under Section 47(c) of the Bombay Salt Act, and, secondly, under Section 17(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act in that they had by the possession of salt stamped with the name of an unlawful association assisted the operations of that association.
R v Mitchell [1983] 2 WLR 938
The defendant, having become involved in an argument whilst queuing in a post office, pushed an elderly man, causing him to fall accidentally on the deceased, an elderly woman, who subsequently died in hospital from her injuries. The defendant was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter. He unsuccessfully appealed on the ground that his unlawful act had not been directed at the victim. Staughton J held that although there was no direct contact between the defendant and the victim, she was injured as a direct and immediate result of his act. Thereafter her death occurred. The only question was one of causation and the jury had concluded that the victim's death was caused by the defendant's defendant's act. The actions of the elderly man in falling on the victim were entirely foreseeable and did not break the chain of causation between the defendant's assault and the victim's death. Dalby was distinguishable on its facts as a case where the victim was not injured as a direct and immediate result of the defendant's act. In addition, the court saw no reason of policy for holding that an act calculated to harm A cannot be manslaughter manslaughter if it in fact kills B: see Latimer (1886). Sinnasamy v PP Appeal case of Sinnasamy v Public Prosecutor (‘Sinnasamy’) ,[4] ,[4] which was an appeal against a conviction of murder by the appellant of his infant child. The appellant contended that he had no recollection of performing the fatal stabbing although he remembered in considerable detail the events and circumstances immediately preceding and following the stabbing. At the t rial, a medical witness testified that the appellant was an epileptic but also that a person suffering from an automatistic state will not be conscious at the time. Based on the appellant’s own evidence that he remembered much of what had transpired immediately before and after the stabbing, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge had been correct in holding that the appellant had been conscious at the relevant time and could therefore not have been in an automatistic state. Furthermore, the court endorsed the trial judg e’s acceptance of the prosecution’s suggestion t hat the appellant had killed his child on an irresistible impulse. impulse .[5] Clearly then, the court regarded automatism as requiring a state of o f unconsciousness and that a lack of control, such as might be occasioned by an irresistible impulse, could not amount to automatism.
Re Pappathi Ammal (1959) The case set up for the accused was that she was a sleep walker or somnambulist, that during such sleep walking she must have walked into the well with the child and that by reason of that somnambulism when the offence was committed, the accused would be entitled to the benefit of
section 84 l.P.C. The learned Sessions S essions Judge therefore convicted the accused under Section 302 I.P.C. and sentenced her to imprisonment for life.
Lee Sai Yan vs. PP (Unreported. Magistrate’s Appeal No 90 of 1980 Subordinate Court of Singapore) ●Criminal Law● “The statutory duty imposed upon the accused was in s 34(8) Factories Act. His neglect was that he omitted to perform the duty imposed by law, permitting the deceased to enter the board hole when he was not wearing a breathing apparatus and when no tests were concluded”
D’Souza v Pashupati (1968) Cri LJ 405 The petitioner is the master of a sea going vessel S.S. Indian Exporter and one Sanat Kumar Sarkar, deceased, was the junior engineer in that ship. The ship arrived at Sand bead 110 miles off the part Calcutta on 5.10.1966 and had to wait there for pilotage. On 11.10.1966 Sanat Kumar reported for duty as usual and worked for sometime, but he was relieved early as he felt unwell. In the petition of complaint it was further alleged that on and from 16.10.1966 at least five ships, including some belonging to the company to which the petitioner's ship belongs, left Sand bead daily for Calcutta besides pilot ships. No medical help was sought foe from any of those ships nor from the other ships which were standing by and no information of Sanatkumar's serious illness was sent to the office of the company or to the relations of the ailing man and that as a matter of fact no medical help was even sought to-be rendered to him although the same was available from the several o ther ships moored at Sandhead and repeated requests were made in that regard. Section 304A, I.P.C. provides for punishment of the offence of causing death by a rash or negligent act. Under Section 32, I.P.C. an illegal omission would constitute an 'act' in law and under Section 43 of the Code the word 'illegal' is applicable to everything which is an offence or which is prohibited by law or which furnishes ground for a Civil action. An illegal omission thus is an 'act' under Section 304A, I.P.C. and may constitute an offence if it is negligent.
Om Prakash v Stt of Punjab AIR 1961 Facts The victim was married to the appellant in 1951 but few years later their relationship got strained. She went to stay with her brother. Being assured that she will not be maltreated in the future, she returned to her husband. However, she was il l-treated, not allowed to leave the house and denied food for days. On o ne occasion, she managed to go out but the appellant’s brothers managed to catch her and forcibly dragged her inside the house. She was severely beaten and being l ocked inside a room. When her mother-in-law and husband away, he happened to find her room unlocked. She then went out o the house and managed to reach the Civil Hospital where she met a doctor and told her of her sufferings. The appellant and his mother tried to take her back but were not allowed to do so by the doctor. Her brother being informed about what had happened and then make a police po lice report. Principle The Last Act Test However, this case gives illustration on how the test operated but do not applying it. The test is not
practical because it was impossible to determine the last act, except for cases of firearms. Issue Attempt to commit murder under S.307 of Indian Penal Code. 1) Only when a person is helpless and is unable to look after himself that the person having control over him is legally bound to look after his requirements. Such persons does not include wife and it is not part of a husband’s duty to spoon feed his wife. However, the victim had being confined and being deprived of regular food, starved in i n order to accelerate her end.
2) The ingredients of an offence under S.511 are materially different from S.307. In S.511, it not need to be the last act towards the commission while for an offence under S.307, it is the last act which is effective to cause death. The court held that under S.307, a person commits an offence when he has intention to commit murder and in pursuance of that intention does an act towards i ts commission irrespective the fact whether that act is the penultimate act or not.
Judgment The conviction of the appellant under S.307 is correct and the appeal dismissed.
R v Instan [1893] 1 QB 450 A sick woman died while living with her niece. The niece was an adult, and had been living with her aunt because she had no means of supporting herself. Her 72-year-old aunt suffered a debilitating disease and for ten days, the young woman did not supply her aunt food or medical attention, and did not inform anyone of her aunt's ailments. The aunt, who was physically incapable of leaving her bed, died from exhaustion brought on by the gangrene gangrene..
The niece was found guilty of manslaughter manslaughter,, on the basis that there was a blood relation between the niece and aunt. This generated a duty of care of the niece for the aunt to help. The intentional neglect of the aunt was consequently a crime. Lord Coleridge CJ wrote that despite the lack of statute or precedent, it would be "a slur on justice" were t he niece's behaviour to go unpunished “It would not be correct to say that every moral obligation involves a legal duty; but every legal duty is founded on a moral obligation.” R v Pittwood (1902) A gatekeeper of a railway crossing opened the gate to let a car through and forgot to shut it when he went off to lunch. As a result a hay cart crossed the line while a train was approaching and was hit, causing a number n umber of deaths the gatekeeper was convicted of manslaughter. R v Miller [1982]
Miller, a vagrant, accidentally set fire to a mattress in a house in which he was sleeping. Rather than taking action to put out the fire, he moved to a different room; the fire went on to cause extensive [2]
damage to the cost of £800. £800.
He was subsequently convicted of arson, under Sections 1 and 3 of the
Criminal Damage Act 1971. 1971. Miller's defence was that there was no actus reus coinciding with mens rea.. Although his reckless inattention to the fire could be said to constitute mens rea, it was not rea associated with the actus reus of setting the fire. Nevertheless, the defendant was convicted under the for recklessly causing damage by omission.
R v White (1910) ^[Causation - but for test - causal link between actions and consequences must be shown] D put cyanide into his mother's lemonade drink, but she died of heart failure before the poison could kill her. The answer to the question 'But for what the defendant did would she have died?' is 'No'. She would have died anyway. Held: Held: He was acquitted acquitted of murder because he had not actually actually caused his mother's death.
R v Smith
Facts: Smith stabbed the victim who died 4 hours later; A fellow member of his company had dropped the stab victim on the way to the hospital to get treatment. Once in emergency care, there was no blood transfusion. The victim was given saline solution (which, m edically, is a gross error), and used artificial respiration - not knowing that the victim was suffering from a pierced lung). It was stated that with proper treatment, chances of the victim's survival was about 75%. Issue: Did Smith cause the death of the stab victim? Defence: argued that death was not the sole and natural consequence of wound, and hence, did not flow directly from it.
– is that if at the Court: Essence of causation test – is t he time of death, the wound is still an operating and substantial cause, then death is caused by the wound, even though another operating cause may be present. present. This is often referred to as the chain of causation. causation . If the original wound is merely a setting in which another cause operates, then it cannot be said that death resulted from the stab wound. Is the second cause so overwhelming so as to make the first wound merely part of the history? One question to ask is: Can you show a new cause which disturbs the sequence of events? Held: The Court looked to particular facts of the case, and Smith was convicted, as he satisfied the Essence of causation test . If the stabbed soldier had received proper treatment while in emergency care, he would have had a good chance of a complete recovery. Smith was consequently convicted of manslaughter because the wound was in fact the “operating and substantial cause of death”. The University students must aware with this case.
Yohannan v Stt AIR 1958
Criminal – murder - Section 164 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Sections 24 and 26 of EvidenceAct, 1872 and Sections 299 and 300 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 – appeal filed challenging convictionof appellant for committing murder of his wife – in his confessional statement accused admitted thatas his wife declined to return home despite of his repeated demands he stabbed her – intention tocause murder established – murder was cruel and deliberate – fact hat death caused after months of suffering from day on which incident took place does not make any difference – held, accused guiltyof committing murder.
R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr. Roberts, R v (1971) CA R v Roberts (1971) ^[Assaults - escape cases - Mens rea - ABH - "occasioning" refers to causation - not the assault] D in a car with V a not inexperienced 21 year old woman. They were travelling between two parties. D made advances towards V who then jumped out of the th e car (travelling at 20 mph), sustaining injuries. Held: Held: "Occasioning" in ABH relates to causation, and is an objective te st. If the (common assault) was intentional there is no need to consider Recklessness. The proper test for "occasioning" is not whether D actually foresaw the conduct of the victim which resulted in the actual bodily harm, but whether that conduct could have reasonably been foreseen as the consequence of what he was saying or doing. ABH requires proof of an assault together with actual bodily harm occasioned by the assault. The prosecution are not obliged to prove that D intended to cause some actual bodily harm or was reckless as to whether such harm would be caused. Stephenson LJ On Causation: The victim's reaction does not break the chain of causation if it was reasonably foreseeable, i.e. provided it was not
Basappa v Stt AIR 1960
The case for the prosecution is a very simple one. According to them, when deceased Fakirappa was sitting on the katta of his house, the accused-appellant came to the place burling abuses at him; when Fakirappa got down from the katta and asked the accused to keep quiet, the accused clashed agaiast Fakirappa and when Fakirappa Faki rappa further asked him whether he proposed to beat him, he said that he had come for the very purpose and immediately plunged a knife into the left side of Fakirappa's abdomen. Fakirappa did not die immediately. An attempt was made to take him to the hospital at Hubli, 14 miles away from the place of o f occurrence, and an ambulance van from the hospital was brought down to Arlikatte about a mile from the t he place; because the road between the village Inamkop and Arlikatte was not a motorable one, Fakirappa was carried to Arlikatte but he succumbed to his injury before he could be put into the van.
R v Blaue The defendant entered the home of an 18 year old woman and asked for sex. When she declined his advances, he stabbed her four times; the wound penetrated her lung which necessitated both a blood transfusion and surgery in order o rder to save her life. After refusing treatment because of her religious beliefs (as a Jehovah's Witness) she died. Medical evidence showed that she would not have died if she had received treatment. In his final speech to the jury, counsel for the Crown accepted that the girl’s refusal refusa l to have a blood transfusion was a cause of her death. The prosecution did not challenge the defence evidence that the defendant was suffering from diminished responsibility. The defence argued that the victim’s refusal to accept medical treatment broke the chain of causation between the stabbing and her death. Lawton LJ ruled r uled that, as a matter of public of public policy, policy, those "who use violence on others must take their v ictims as they find them.", invoking the thin-skull rule. rule.
R v Lewis [Assault escape case mens rea - result foreseeable escape case] D shouted threats that he would kill his wife. She locked herself in her flat and refused access to D as as he had previously assaulted her. her. She heard the sound of breaking glass and, terrified of what he might do, she jumped out of their third floor flat and broke both her legs. The issue before the court was whether it could be said that the husband had "caused" her injuries. –
–
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Held: D was liable for the injuries sustained by the wife. Although her injuries were selfinflicted, D had set the chain of events i n motion. He had done this thi s through his previous acts of violence towards towards her and also his present threat to kill her. D "caused" her
R v Hayward (1833)
The defendant chased his wife out of the house shouting threats at her. She collapsed and died. He did not physically touch her. She was suffering from a rare thyroid condition which could lead to death where physical exertion was accompanied by fright and panic. Both the defendant and his wife were unaware she had this condition.
Held: The defendant was liable for constructive manslaughter manslaughter as his unlawful act (assault)
caused death. The egg shell (thin) skull rule applied. He was therefore fully liable despite the fact an ordinary person of reasonable fortitude would not have died in such circumstances.
