A. Labor Arbiter

Chapter Eight PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION

TOPICS PER SYLLABUS A. Labor Arbiter  1. Jurisdiction a) versus Regional Director  2. Reinstatement pending appeal 3. Requirements to perfect appeal to NLRC

A. LABOR ARBITER 1. THE LABOR ARBITER. The Labor Arbiter is an official in the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) who hears and decides cases falling under his original and exclusive jurisdiction as provided by law.

2. VARIOUS POWERS OF THE LABOR ARBITERS. Besides their adjudicatory power to hear and decide cases over which they have jurisdiction, the Labor Arbiters have (1) contempt power;1 and (2) power to conduct ocular inspection .2 Previously, they are also possessed of injunctive power . power .3 This grant of injunctive power, however, was deleted in recent  NLRC Rules. Rules.4 The Labor Arbiter thus has no  more injunctive power .5 Only the Commission 6 (NLRC) has that power .

1. JURISDICTION 1. NATURE OF JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS, ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE. The jurisdiction conferred by Article 217 upon the Labor Arbiters is both original and exclusive, exclusive, meaning, no other officers or tribunals can take cognizance of, or hear and decide, any of the cases therein enumerated.

2. EXCEPTIONS TO THE ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS. The following are the exceptions: 1. When the DOLE Secretary or the President exercises his power under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over national interest cases and cases  and decide them himself. 2. When the NLRC exercises its power of compulsory arbitration over similar national interest cases  cases   that are certified to it by the DOLE Secretary pursuant to the exercise by the latter of his certification power under the same Article 263(g) . 3. When cases arise from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies which shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration, as may be  provided in said agreements. agreements.7 4. When the parties agree to submit the case to voluntary arbitration before a Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators who, under Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code, are also possessed of original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases mutually submitted to them by the parties for arbitration and adjudication. The Labor Arbiters do not have jurisdiction over the cases mentioned above which are taken cognizance of  by said other labor officials or tri bunals under specific provisions of the Labor Code.

3. LAWS CONFERRING JURISDICTION ON LABOR ARBITERS. The following provisions of laws grant original and exclusive jurisdiction to the Labor Arbiters: 1. Article 217 of the Labor Code; Code;8 2. Article 124 of the Labor Code; Code;9 3. Article 128(b) of the Labor Code; Code;10 4. Article 227 of the Labor Code; 5. Article 262-A of the Labor Code; Code;11 and 6. Section 10 of  R.A.  R.A. No. 8042 ,12 as amended by R.A. No. 10022.13

4. RUNDOWN OF ALL CASES FALLING UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR ARBITERS. More particularly, Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

1. Under Article 217 of the Labor Code: (a) Unfair labor practice cases; (b) Termination disputes; (c) If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; (d) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee relations; (e) Cases arising from any violation of Article 279 [264] of the Labor Code, as amended, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; xcept   claims for employees compensation, social security, Philhealth (Medicare) and maternity (f) E xcept   benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) , whether or not accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.

2. Under Article 124 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6727: Disputes involving legislated wage increases and wage distortion  distortion  in unorganized establishments not voluntarily settled by the parties pursuant to R.A. No. 6727. 6727 . 14

3. Under Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7730: 

Contested cases under cases  under the exception clause in Article 128(b) of the Labor Code.

4. Under Article 227 of the Labor Code: 

Enforcement of compromise agreements when agreements  when there is non-compliance by any of the parties thereto,  pursuant to Article 227 of the Labor Code.

5. Under Article 262-A of the Labor Code: 

Issuance of writ of execution  execution  to enforce decisions of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, in case of their absence or incapacity, for any reason. reason . 15

6. Under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, as amended by R.A. No. 10022: 

Money claims arising out of employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract, involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment, including claims death and disability benefits and for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages as provided by R.A. No. 8042, as amended. amended . 16

7. Other cases as may be provided by law. 17 All the foregoing shall be discussed hereunder seriatim hereunder  seriatim..

I. JURISDICTION OVER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CASES 1. VARIOUS ARTICLES OF THE LABOR CODE ON ULP. Under the Labor Code, there are only five (5) provisions related to unfair labor practices, viz :

3. LAWS CONFERRING JURISDICTION ON LABOR ARBITERS. The following provisions of laws grant original and exclusive jurisdiction to the Labor Arbiters: 1. Article 217 of the Labor Code; Code;8 2. Article 124 of the Labor Code; Code;9 3. Article 128(b) of the Labor Code; Code;10 4. Article 227 of the Labor Code; 5. Article 262-A of the Labor Code; Code;11 and 6. Section 10 of  R.A.  R.A. No. 8042 ,12 as amended by R.A. No. 10022.13

4. RUNDOWN OF ALL CASES FALLING UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR ARBITERS. More particularly, Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

1. Under Article 217 of the Labor Code: (a) Unfair labor practice cases; (b) Termination disputes; (c) If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; (d) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee relations; (e) Cases arising from any violation of Article 279 [264] of the Labor Code, as amended, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; xcept   claims for employees compensation, social security, Philhealth (Medicare) and maternity (f) E xcept   benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) , whether or not accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.

2. Under Article 124 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6727: Disputes involving legislated wage increases and wage distortion  distortion  in unorganized establishments not voluntarily settled by the parties pursuant to R.A. No. 6727. 6727 . 14

3. Under Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7730: 

Contested cases under cases  under the exception clause in Article 128(b) of the Labor Code.

4. Under Article 227 of the Labor Code: 

Enforcement of compromise agreements when agreements  when there is non-compliance by any of the parties thereto,  pursuant to Article 227 of the Labor Code.

5. Under Article 262-A of the Labor Code: 

Issuance of writ of execution  execution  to enforce decisions of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, in case of their absence or incapacity, for any reason. reason . 15

6. Under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, as amended by R.A. No. 10022: 

Money claims arising out of employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract, involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment, including claims death and disability benefits and for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages as provided by R.A. No. 8042, as amended. amended . 16

7. Other cases as may be provided by law. 17 All the foregoing shall be discussed hereunder seriatim hereunder  seriatim..

I. JURISDICTION OVER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CASES 1. VARIOUS ARTICLES OF THE LABOR CODE ON ULP. Under the Labor Code, there are only five (5) provisions related to unfair labor practices, viz :

(1) Article 247 which describes the concept of unfair labor practice acts and prescribes the procedure for their prosecution; (2) Article 248 which enumerates the unfair labor practices that may be committed by employers; (3) Article 249 which enumerates the unfair labor practices that may be committed by labor organizations; (4) Article 261 which considers violations of the CBA as no longer unfair labor practices unless the same are gross  in character which means  flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic  provisions thereof . (5) Article 263(c) which refers to union-busting involving the dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, where the existence of the union is threatened thereby.

2. SOME PRINCIPLES ON JURISDICTION OVER ULPs. 

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The Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over all ULPs whether committed by the employer s 18 or the labor organizations. organizations.19 The law gives utmost priority in the resolution of unfair labor practice cases .20 The Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction only over the civil aspect of ULP, the criminal aspect being lodged with the regular courts. courts.21

II. JURISDICTION OVER ILLEGAL DISMISSAL CASES 1. LABOR OFFICIALS WHO MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF TERMINATION DISPUTES. An examination of the Labor Code shows that the following officials have the power to take cognizance of termination disputes in the exercise of their respective original and exclusive jurisdictions: 1. Labor Arbiters; Arbiters;22 2. Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators; Arbitrators; 23 3. The DOLE Secretary, in the exercise of his assumption power in national interest cases ;24 or  4. The NLRC, in national interest cases certified to it for compulsory arbitration by the DOLE Secretary . 25

2. SOME PRINCIPLES ON JURISDICTION OVER TERMINATION CASES. 

The validity of the exercise of jurisdiction by Labor Arbiters over illegal dismissal cases is not dependent on the kind or nature of the ground cited in support of the dismissal; hence, whether the dismissal is for just cause or authorized cause, it is of no consequence. consequence . 26

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In case of conflict of jurisdiction between Labor Arbiter and the Voluntary Arbitrator   over termination cases, the former’s jurisdiction shall prevail for the following reasons: (1) Termination of employment is not a grievable issue that must be submitted to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration for adjudication. adjudication. 27 The jurisdiction thereover remains within the original and exclusive ambit of the Labor Arbiter and not of the Voluntary Arbitrator . 28 (2) Even if the CBA provides that termination disputes are grievable, the same is merely discretionary on the part of the parties thereto. thereto.29 (3) Once there is actual termination, jurisdiction is conferred upon Labor Arbiters by operation of law . 30

(4) Interpretation of CBA and enforcement of company personnel policies are merely corollary to an illegal dismissal case. case.31 (5) Article 217 is deemed written into the CBA being an intrinsic part thereof . thereof  . 32 (6) Article 277(b) grants the right to the dismissed employee to contest his termination with the Labor Arbiter.

(7) Estoppel confers jurisdiction on Labor Arbiters. Arbiters . 33 (8) The phrase “all other labor disputes” in Article 262 does not automatically confer jurisdiction on Voluntary Arbitrators. Arbitrators.34 (9) The State policy of promoting voluntary arbitration does not foreclose filing of termination case with Labor Arbiter .35 (10) Failure of the employer to activate grievance machinery confers jurisdiction on Labor Arbiters. Arbiters . 36 

In other words, the Voluntary Arbitrator will only have jurisdiction over illegal dismissal cases when there is express agreement of the parties to the CBA, i.e. , the employer and the bargaining agent, to submit the termination case to voluntary arbitration. Absent the mutual express agreement of the parties, Voluntary Arbitrator cannot acquire jurisdiction over termination cases. cases . 37 This was the holding of the Supreme Court in the cases of Negros Metal Corp. v. Lamayo, Lamayo ,38 Landtex Industries v. CA, CA ,39 Atlas 40 41 Farms, Inc. v. NLRC, NLRC, and San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC. NLRC . In all these cases, the Supreme Court has categorically declared that termination cases fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and not of Voluntary Arbitrators. 42

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The express agreement must be stated in the CBA or there must be enough evidence on record unmistakably showing that the parties have agreed to resort to voluntary arbitration .43

III. JURISDICTION OVER MONEY CLAIMS CASES 1. CLASSIFICATION OF MONEY CLAIMS. Money claims falling within the original  and  and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters may be classified as follows:

1. Any money claim, regardless of amount, accompanied with a claim for reinstatement; or  2. Any money claim, regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, exceeding the amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) per claimant. The money claim in No. 1 above presupposes that it proceeds from a termination case, it being accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. Hence, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter since it is  principally a termination dispute. The money claim in No. 2 above does not necessarily arise from or involve a termination case but because the amount exceeds P5,000.00, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. If the amount does not exceed P5,000.00, it is, under Article 129, the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized hearing officers who have jurisdiction to take cognizance thereof . 44

2. DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE JURISDICTION OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS AND LABOR ARBITERS OVER CASES FOR MONEY CLAIMS. The original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters under Article 217(c) , over cases for money claims is limited only to those arising from statutes or contracts other than a CBA. The Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators will thus have original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims “arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA and, those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies,” under Article 261.

San Jose v. NLRC, NLRC,45 ruled that it was correct for the NLRC to hold that the Labor Arbiter has no  jurisdiction to hear and decide the employee’s money claims (underpayment of retirement benefits) benefits) , as the controversy between the parties involved an issue “arising from the interpretation or implementation” of a provision of the CBA. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators has original and exclusive jurisdiction over this controversy under Article 261 of the Labor Code, and not the Labor Arbiter. Citing San Jose  Jose  on the distinction between the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Voluntary Arbitrators, the Supreme Court, in Del Monte Philippines, Inc. v. Saldivar, Saldivar, 46 ruled that the Labor Arbiter in the instant case could not properly pass judgment on the money claim cited as cross-claim by petitioner against the union (Association Labor Union [ALU]) since it is a money claim arising from the CBA, hence, the Voluntary Arbitrator has jurisdiction to resolve the same.

3. SOME PRINCIPLES ON JURISDICTION OVER MONEY CLAIMS. 

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Money claims must arise out of employer-employee relationship.47 If not, jurisdiction is with the regular courts.48 Award of statutory benefits even if not prayed for is valid.49 The money claims lodged by an employee are not to be properly offset by his unpaid subscription of stocks . 50 Claim for notarial fees by a lawyer employed by a company is withi n the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter .51

(a) VERSUS REGIONAL DIRECTOR 1. LABOR ARBITERS HAVE NO JURISDICTION OVER SMALL MONEY CLAIMS LODGED UNDER ARTICLE 129. Under Article 129 of the Labor Code, DOLE Regional Directors or the duly authorized hearing officers, are empowered, in a summary proceeding, to hear and decide claims for recovery of wages and other monetary claims and benefits, including legal interest, provided the following requisites concur:

1. The claim must arise from employer-employee relationship; 2. The claimant does not seek reinstatement; and 3. The aggregate money claim of each employee does not exceed P5,000.00 .52 The  first   requisite is indispensable as labor authorities may only take cognizance of cases arising from employer-employee relationship or when the cause of action has a reasonable causal connection to such relationship under the “reasonable causal connection rule.” The  second requisite means that the remedy of reinstatement should not accompany the monetary claim  because if this is the case, the principal cause of action would be for illegal dismissal and not for monetary claim.  Necessarily, an action for illegal dismissal falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter as provided under Article 217 of the Labor Code. Needlessly, in an illegal dismissal case, the amount of any monetary claim asserted therein whether below or in excess the threshold amount of P5,000.00 - is immaterial. The third   requisite simply refers to the determination of whether the total amount being claimed is at least P5,000.00 or below, in which case, the jurisdiction is lodged with the DOLE Regional Director. If it exceeds P5,000.00, there is no doubt that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction thereover. To recapitulate, absent any of the requisites mentioned above will divest the DOLE Regional Directors of their authority to hear and decide said money claims. Consequently, the jurisdiction over the same is vested upon the Labor Arbiters.53 In Oreshoot Mining Company v. Arellano,54 the DOLE Regional Director Office No. IV issued an order in three (3) separate but consolidated cases, directing the reinstatement of private respondents and the payment to them of backwages and certain other benefits. The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner is correct as regards its claim of lack of competence on the part of the Regional Director over the cases. The Regional Director has no  jurisdiction to try and decide claims of workers arising from their illegal dismissal from employment and for their reinstatement and recovery of monetary and other benefits. It is the Labor Arbiter who has jurisdiction over said issues. Consequently, the questioned order was nullified and the case was referred to the Labor Arbiter for proper adjudication.

2. JURISDICTION OVER CONTESTED CASES UNDER THE EXCEPTION CLAUSE IN ARTICLE 128(b) OF THE LABOR CODE INVOLVING THE DOLE SECRETARY’ S VISITORIAL AND ENFORCEMENT POWERS (INSPECTION OF ESTABLISHMENTS) . a. Requisites.

For the valid exercise by the DOLE Secretary or any of his duly  authorized representatives (DOLE Regional Directors) of the visitorial and enforcement powers provided under Article 128(b) , the following requisites should concur:

(1) The employer-employee relationship should still exist;

(2) The findings in question were made in the course of inspection by labor inspectors ;55 and (3) The employees have not yet initiated any claim or complaint with the DOLE Regional Director under Article 129, or the Labor Arbiter under Article 224 [217]. b. Relation of paragraph (b) of article 128 to the jurisdiction of labor arbiters.

Paragraph (b) of Article 128 is a very controversial provision which must be discussed in connection with the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters. The provision itself expressly acknowledges the conflict of jurisdiction. Thus, the opening sentence of the first paragraph of Article 128(b) , after its amendment by R.A. No. 7730 [June 2, 1994], pertinently states: “(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, exceptin cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection. ”56

c. Jurisdictional conflict.

A survey of the cases involving Article 128(b) shows that the following jurisdictional issues have been raised: (1) Whether the DOLE Secretary or the Regional Directors have jurisdiction when the total amount of monetary claims exceeds P5,000.00 per claimant; (2) Whether the Labor Arbiters have jurisdiction over the contested cases mentioned in the exception clause in Article 128(b) ; and (3) Whether the factual findings of the DOLE Secretary or the Regional Directors a re binding on Labor Arbiters and the NLRC under the doctrine of res judicata. On No. 1 above:

The DOLE Secretary or the Regional Directors have jurisdiction regardless of whether the amount exceeds P5,000.00 or not.

In Ex-Bataan Veterans Security Agency, Inc. v. The Secretary of Labor Laguesma , 57 it was held that the Regional Director validly assumed jurisdiction over the money claims of private respondents even if the claims exceeded P5,000 because such jurisdiction was exercised in accordance with Article 128(b) of the Labor Code and the case does not fall under the exception clause. The en banc Resolution in the 2012 case of People’s Broadcasting Service (Bombo Radyo Phils. , Inc. ) v. The Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, 58 clarified that the expanded jurisdiction of

the DOLE Secretary or Regional Directors is not affected whether the case is the result of regular inspection under Article 128(b) or it originates from a complaint under either Article 129 or Article 217. On No. 2 above:

The Labor Arbiters have jurisdiction over contested cases under the exception clause   in Article 128(b) . which states: “xxx. The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection.”59 In interpreting the afore-quoted provision of the exception clause, three (3) elements must concur to divest the Regional Directors or their representatives of jurisdiction thereunder, to wit: (a) That the employer contests the findings of the labor regulations officer and raises issues thereon;

(b) That in order to resolve such issues, there is a need to examine evidentiary matters; and (c) That such matters are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. 60 Resultantly, if the said elements are present and therefore the labor standards case is covered by said exception clause, then the Regional Director will have to endorse the case to the appropriate Labor Arbiters of the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC as held in said case of Ex-Bataan Veterans. 61 The 2009 case of Meteoro v. Creative Creatures, Inc.,62  best illustrates the application of the exception clause. Here, it was held that the Court of Appeals aptly applied the “exception clause” because at the earliest opportunity, respondent company registered its objection to the findings of the labor inspector on the ground that there was no employer-employee relationship between petitioners and respondent company. The labor inspector, in fact, noted in his report that “respondent alle ged that petitioners were contractual workers and/or independent and talent workers without control or supervision and also supplied with tools and apparatus pertaining to their job. ” In its position paper, respondent again insisted that petitioners were not its employees. It then questioned the Regional Director’s jurisdiction to entertain the matter before it, primarily because of the absence of an employer -employee relationship. Finally, it raised the same arguments before the Secretary of Labor and the appellate court. It is, therefore, clear that respondent contested and continues to contest the findings and conclusions of the labor inspector. To resolve the issue raised by respondent, that is, the existence of an employer-employee relationship, there is a need to examine evidentiary matters. On No. 3 above:

The factual findings of the DOLE Secretary or the Regional Directors made in the exercise of their visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128 are binding on Labor Arbiters and the NLRC under the doctrine of res  judicata as held in the 2012 case of Norkis Trading Corporation v. Buenavista. 63

IV. JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES 1. LABOR ARBITERS HAVE JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES. It is now a well-settled rule, according to Primero v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 64 that claims for damages as well as attorney’s fees in labor cases are cognizable by the Labor Arbiters, to the exclusion of all other courts. Rulings to the contrary are deemed abandoned or modified accordingly. No matter how designated, for as long as the action primarily involves an employer-employee relationship, the labor court has jurisdiction over any damage claims.65

2. CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES OF OVERSEAS FILIPINO WORKERS (OFWs) . Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages that may be lodged by overseas Filipino workers are cognizable by the Labor Arbiters.66

V. JURISDICTION OVER LEGALITY OF STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS 1. JURISDICTION OVER LEGALITY OF STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS NOT AFFECTING NATIONAL INTEREST. In general, the Labor Arbiter has the power to determine questions involving the legality or illegality of a strike or lockout upon the filing of a proper complaint and after due proceedings . 67

The employer, in case of a strike, or the union, in case of a lockout, may file the proper petition with the Labor Arbiter to seek a declaration of the illegality thereof. It shall be the duty of the Labor Arbiter concerned to act on the case immediately and dispose of the same, subject only to the requirements of due process . 68

2. JURISDICTION OVER STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS AFFECTING INDUSTRIES INDISPENSABLE TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST. The jurisdiction over labor disputes affecting industries indispensable to the national interest is lodged with either the DOLE Secretary, in case he assumes jurisdiction thereover, or with the NLRC, in case the DOLE Secretary certifies it thereto.

Under either situation, all cases between the same parties shall be considered subsumed to, or absorbed by, the assumed or certified case, as the case may be, and shall be decided accordingly by the DOLE Secretary 69 or by the appropriate Division of the Commission.70 The exception  to this rule is when the assumption or certification order specifies otherwise. Consequent to this, the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure 71 prescribe that: “When the Secretary of Labor and Employment has assumed jurisdiction over a strike or lockout or certified the same to the Commission, the parties to such dispute shall immediately inform the Secretary or the Commission, as the case may be, of all cases directly related to the dispute between them pending before any Regional Arbitration Branch, and the Labor Arbiters handling the same of such assumption or certification. The Labor Arbiter concerned shall forward within two (2) days from notice the entire record s of the case to the Commission or to the Secretary of Labor, as the case may be, for proper disposition.”

Thus, the parties to an assumed or certified case, under pain of contempt, shall inform their counsels and the DOLE Secretary or the NLRC Division concerned, of all cases pending with the Regional Arbitration Branches and the Voluntary Arbitrators relative or incident to the assumed or certified case. 72 Further, in cases certified to the NLRC which involve business entities with several workplaces located in different regions, the NLRC Division having territorial jurisdiction over the principal office of the company shall acquire jurisdiction to decide such labor dispute; unless the certification order provides otherwise . 73

3. JURISDICTION OVER CRIMINAL CASES ARISING FROM STRIKES OR LOCKOUTS. The Labor Arbiter cannot adjudicate issues involving any crimes committed, whether related to a strike or lockout or not. Prosecution of crimes or felonies falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts of justice.

V-A. JURISDICTIONAL INTERPLAY IN STRIKE OR LOCKOUT CASES 1. NECESSITY TO DESCRIBE INTERPLAY OF JURISDICTION. At the outset, there is a need to discuss and explain the jurisdictional issues involved in strike or lockout situations because of their seeming complexity. As distinguished from other labor cases, a labor dispute involving a strike or lockout is unique as it involves an interplay of jurisdiction of several labor officials or tribunals. Confusion usually arises as to when the said labor officials or tribunals can properly take cognizance of strike-related or lockout-related issues.

2. A STRIKE OR LOCKOUT IS CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL IN NATURE. Based on the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, there is really no overlap or conflict in the exercise of  jurisdiction of each one of them. Below is an outline of the interplay in jurisdiction among said officials and tribunals. 1. Filing of a notice of strike or lockout with NCMB. -  A union which intends to stage a strike or an employer which desires to mount a lockout should file a notice of strike or notice of lockout, as the case may be, with the NCMB and not with any other office. It must be noted, however, that the NCMB, per Tabigue v. International Copra Export Corporation,74 is not a quasi-judicial body; hence, the Conciliators-Mediators of the  NCMB do not have any decision-making power. They cannot issue decisions to resolve the issues raised in the notice of strike or lockout. Their role is confined solely to the conciliation and mediation of the said issues, although they can suggest to the parties that they submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration through the Voluntary Arbitrators accredited by the NCMB. 2. Filing of a complaint to declare the illegality of the strike or lockout with the Labor Arbiter or Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrator. - In case a party wants to have the strike or lockout declared illegal, a complaint should be filed either with the Labor Arbiter under Article 217(a) (5) of the Labor Code or, upon mutual agreement of the parties, with the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators under Article 262 of the same Code. The issue of illegality of the strike or lockout cannot be resolved by the ConciliatorsMediators of the NCMB as earlier pointed out and discussed. 3. Filing of an injunction petition with the Commission (NLRC). -  In case illegal acts violative of Article 264 are committed in the course of the strike or lockout, a party may file a petition for injunction directly

with the Commission (NLRC) under Article 218(e) of the Labor Code for purposes of securing a temporary restraining order (TRO) and injunction. The Labor Arbiters or Voluntary Arbitrators are not possessed of any injunctive power under the Labor Code. In other words, the aggrieved party, despite the pendency of the case for the declaration of the illegality of the strike or lockout with the Labor Arbiter or Voluntary Arbitrator, as the case may  be, may directly go to the Commission to secure t he injunctive relief. 4. Assumption of jurisdiction by the DOLE Secretary.  –   Under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, the DOLE Secretary has the power to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes which, in his opinion, may cause or likely to cause a strike or lockout in industries indispensable to the national interest (so-called “national interest” cases) . Once he makes the assumption, he shall decide all the issues related to the labor dispute himself, to the exclusion of all other labor authorities. 5. Certification of the labor dispute to the NLRC. - Under the same provision of Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, the DOLE Secretary has the option of not assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute in national interest cases. Instead, he may certify it to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, in which case, it will be the NLRC which shall hear and decide all the issues subject of the certification order. In case at the time of the said assumption or certification, there is a pending case before the Labor Arbiter or Voluntary Arbitrator on the issue of illegality of the strike or lockout, the same shall be deemed subsumed in the assumed or certified case. Resultantly, it is no longer the Labor Arbiter or the Voluntary Arbitrator who should decide the said case but the DOLE Secretary, in the case of assumed cases, or the NLRC, in the case of certified cases. 6. Assumption of jurisdiction over a national interest case by the President. - The President of the Philippines is not precluded from intervening in a national interest case by exercising himself the powers of his alter ego, the DOLE Secretary, granted under Article 263(g) by assuming jurisdiction over the same for purposes of settling or terminating it. 7. Submission of a national interest case to voluntary arbitration. - Despite the pendency of the assumed or certified national interest case, the parties are allowed to submit any issues raised therein to voluntary arbitration at any stage of the proceeding, by virtue of Article 263(h) which provides that “(b)efore or at any stage of the compulsory arbitration process, the parties may opt to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration.” The foregoing interplay explains why Article 263(i) makes specific reference to the President of the Philippines, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission (NLRC) or the Voluntary Arbitrator in connection with the law on strike, lockout and picketing embodied in Article 263. The only labor official not so mentioned therein but who has a significant role to play in the interaction of labor officials and tribunals in strike or lockout cases, is the Labor Arbiter. This is understandable in the light of the separate express grant of jurisdiction to the Labor Arbiters under Article 217(a) (5) as above discussed.

VI. JURISDICTION OVER CASES INVOLVING LEGISLATED WAGE INCREASES AND WAGE DISTORTION 1. CASES IN ORGANIZED ESTABLISHMENTS. In establishments where there are existing collective bargaining agreements or recognized bargaining unions, R.A. No. 6727,75 vests upon the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, the jurisdiction to hear and decide wage distortion cases, after the grievance procedure in the CBA failed to settle the same .76

2. CASES IN UNORGANIZED ESTABLISHMENTS. In establishments where there are no certified collective bargaining unions or existing collective bargaining agreements, the Labor Arbiters have jurisdiction to hear and decide wage distortion cases after the parties and the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) failed to correct the distortion . 77

3. DISPUTES OVER LEGISLATED WAGE INCREASES AND WAGE DISTORTION MADE SUBJECT OF NOTICE OF STRIKE OR LOCKOUT. Wage distortion is not a proper ground to be invoked in support of a strike or lockout. Disputes arising from wage distortion resulting from wage orders issued by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board (RTWPB) which are alleged in the notice of strike or notice of lockout, should be referred to the Labor Arbiter if not settled within ten (10) calendar days of conciliation by the NCMB. 78

VII. JURISDICTION OVER ENFORCEMENT OR ANNULMENT OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS 1. LEGAL BASIS. Article 227 clearly embodies the following provisions on compromise agreements: “Article 227. Compromise Agreements. - Any compromise settlement, including those involving labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Bureau or the regional office of the Department of Labor, shall be final and binding upon the parties. The National Labor Relations Commission or any court shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in case of non-compliance thereof or if there is  pri ma  facie  evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion. ”79

Clear from the foregoing provision that, although the compromise agreement may have been entered into by the parties before the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) or the DOLE Regional Office, it is the Labor Arbiter who has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the following issues related thereto, to the exclusion of the BLR and the DOLE Regional Directors: (1) To enforce the compromise agreement in case of non-compliance therewith by any of the parties thereto; or (2) To nullify it if there is  prima facie  evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion.

2. PROVISION IN THE NLRC RULES. A similar provision is found in the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure,80 where the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters is recognized over the enforcement of compromise agreements when there is non-compliance by any of the  parties thereto pursuant to Article 227 of the Labor Code. 3. LABOR ARBITER’S JURISDICTION OVER COMPROM ISE AGREEMENTS EXECUTED BEFORE

THE NCMB. Although Article 227 refers only to compromise agreements entered into before the BLR and DOLE Regional Directors, the same rule vesting jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters also applies to any compromise settlement, including those involving labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the  National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) and its regional branches. Thus, as provided in the  Rules to  Implement the Labor Code,81 the NLRC or any court shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in case of non-compliance thereof or if there is  prima facie evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion. Upon motion of any interested party, the Labor Arbiter in the region where the agreement was reached may issue a writ of execution requiring a Sheriff of the Commission or the courts to enforce the terms of the agreement.82

VIII. JURISDICTION OVER EXECUTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF DECISIONS OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS 1. DECISIONS OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS. Article 262-A of the Labor Code prescribes the procedures that Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators should follow in adjudicating cases filed before them. Once a decision has been rendered in a case and subsequently becomes final and executory, it may be enforced through the writ of execution issued by the same Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators who rendered it, addressed to and requiring certain public officer s83 to execute the final decision, order or award.

2. LABOR ARBITERS MAY ISSUE THE WRIT OF EXECUTION. In situations, however, where the Voluntary Arbitrator or the panel of Voluntary Arbitrators who rendered the decision is absent or incapacitated for any reason, Article 262-A 84 grants jurisdiction to any Labor Arbiter in the region where the winning party resides, to take cognizance of a motion for the issuance of the writ of execution filed

 by such party and accordingly issue such writ addressed to and requiring the public officers mentioned above to execute the final decision, order or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators.

IX. JURISDICTION OVER CASES OF OVERSEAS FILIPINO WORKERS (OFWs) 1. LABOR ARBITERS HAVE JURISDICTION OVER ALL MONEY CLAIMS OF OFWs. R.A. No. 8042,85 conferred original and exclusive jurisdiction upon Labor Arbiters, to hear and decide all claims arising from employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment, including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. R.A. No. 8042, specifically Section 10 thereof, was undisturbed by the latest amendatory law, R.A. No. 10022.86

2. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS HAVE JURISDICTION OVER MONEY CLAIMS IF THERE EXISTS A CBA.  I f there is a CBA between the foreign employer and the bargaining union of the OF Ws, the  juri sdiction over monetary claims of OFWs belongs to the Voluntary Arbitrator and not to the Labor  Ar biter. In at least two (2) recent 2012 decisions of the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters over monetary claims of OFWs was distinguished from that of the Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, to wit: (1) Ace Navigation Co. , Inc. v. Fernandez,87 involving the disability claim of respondent; and (2) Estate of Dulay v. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime, Inc. and General Charterers Inc. , 88 involving claim for death benefits of petitioner. In summary, it was ruled in these cases that in case there is a CBA between the employer and the  bargaining union to which the complaining OFW belongs, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over his monetary claims belongs to the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and not to the Labor Arbiters.

3. OFW-RELATED CASES OVER WHICH THE POEA, AND NOT THE LABOR ARBITERS, HAS JURISDICTION. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) has original   and exclusive  jurisdiction to hear and decide: (a) All cases which are administrative in character, involving or arising out of violation of rules and regulations relating to licensing and registration of recruitment and employment agencies or entities, including refund of fees collected from workers and violation of the conditions for the issuance of license to recruit workers.89 (b) Disciplinary action cases and other special cases which are administrative in character, involving employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino migrant workers. 90

No. 1 above covers recruitment violations or violations of conditions of license; while No. 2 above involves (a) disciplinary action cases against foreign principals or employers, and (a) disciplinary action cases against land based OFWs and seafarers.

X. OTHER ISSUES OVER WHICH LABOR ARBITERS HAVE JURISDICTION 1. JURISDICTION OVER CERTAIN ISSUES AS PROVIDED IN JURISPRUDENCE. In accordance with well-entrenched jurisprudence, the issues, claims or cases of the following fall under the  jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter s: (a) Employees in government-owned and/or controlled corporations; (b) Alien parties; (c) Priests and ministers; (d) Domestic workers or kasambahay; (e) Employees of cooperatives; (f) Counter-claims of employers against employees.

All the foregoing are discussed below  seriatim.

X-A. JURISDICTION OVER CASES INVOLVING EMPLOYEES OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND/OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS 1. PREVAILING RULE. The hiring and firing of employees of government owned and/or controlled corporations without original charters  are covered by the Labor Code while those with original charters  are basically governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.91

X-B. JURISDICTION OVER DISPUTES INVOLVING ALIEN PARTIES 1. CHOICE OF LAW BY PARTIES. A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectations of the parties . 92 Such party expectations are  protected by giving ef fect to the parties’ own choice of the applicable law. 93 The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship to the parties or their transaction.94 A manning agency, for instance, cannot be faulted for complying with the applicable foreign law. By so complying, it has discharged its monetary obligation to the employee.95

2. WHEN PHILIPPINE LAW PREVAILS. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Ople, 96 is in point. In this case, two contracts of employment were executed in Manila between Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and two Filipino flight attendants. Paragraph 10 of the contracts embodies the stipulation, among others, that the terms thereof shall be construed and governed by the laws of Pakistan and only the courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under the agreement. Prior to the expiration of the contracts, the services of the two Filipino flight attendants were terminated. They jointly filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. One of the issues raised is which law should apply and which court has jurisdiction over the dispute. The Supreme Court, in holding that the Philippine law should apply and that the Philippine court has  jurisdiction, declared that petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which, firstly, specifies the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of o r in connection with the agreement “only [in] courts of Karachi, Pakistan. ” The first clause of paragraph 10 cannot be invoked to prevent the application of Philippine labor laws and regulations to the subject matter of this case, i.e. , the employer-employee relationship between petitioner PIA and  private respondents. The relationship is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship. Neither may petitioner invoke the second clause of paragraph 10, specifying the Karachi courts as the sole venue for the settlement of disputes between the contracting parties. Even a cursory scrutiny of the relevant circumstances of this case will show the multiple and substantive contacts between law and Philippine courts, on the one hand, and the relationship between the parties, upon the other. The contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially. Private respondents are Philippine citizens and residents, while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and is actually doing business in the Philippines) and hence, is a resident in the Philippines. Lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in  between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the above contracts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as the proper forum for the resolution of the contractual disputes between the parties. Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the  petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter. It must therefore be  presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law.

X-C. JURISDICTION OVER LABOR CASES INVOLVING PRIESTS AND MINISTERS 1. WHEN LABOR ARBITERS HAVE JURISDICTION. The fact that a case involves as parties thereto the church and its religious minister does not ipso facto give the case a religious significance. If what is involved is a labor case, say illegal dismissal, the relationship of the church, as employer, and the priest or minister, as employee is a purely secular matter not related to the practice of

faith, worship or doctrines of the church. Hence, Labor Arbiters may validly exercise jurisdiction over said labor case.

Austria v. Hon. NLRC and Cebu City Central Philippines Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventist. 97 - The minister here was not excommunicated or expelled from the membership of the church but was terminated from employment based on the just causes provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code. Indeed, the matter of terminating an employee which is purely secular in nature is different from the ecclesiastical ac t 98 of expelling a member from the religious congregation. As such, the State, through the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, has the right to take cognizance of the case to determine whether the church, as employer, rightfully exercised its management prerogative to dismiss the religious minister as its employee.

2. ECCLESIASTICAL AFFAIR, MEANING. An “ecclesiastical affair”  is one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of its membership, and the power of excluding from such association those deemed unworthy of membership. 99 Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and relates to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. To be concrete, examples of these so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle, are proceedings for excommunication, ordination of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religious significance . 100

X-D. JURISDICTION OVER CASES OF DOMESTIC WORKERS OR KASAMBAHAY 1. WHEN LABOR ARBITERS HAVE JURISDICTION. The Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction if the amount of the claim exceeds P5,000.00; otherwise, the jurisdiction is vested with the DOLE Regional Director under Article 129 of the Labor Code. Incidentally, it is no longer legally correct to use the term “domestic servant” or “househelper” in reference to a person who performs domestic work. Under R.A. No. 10361 , 101 “domestic servant” or “househelper” should now be referred to as “domestic worker” or “kasambahay.” 102

X-E. JURISDICTION OVER CASES OF EMPLOYEES OF COOPERATIVES 1. WHEN LABOR ARBITERS HAVE JURISDICTION. The Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction only over monetary claims and illegal dismissal cases involving employees of cooperatives but not the claims or termination of membership of members thereof. Cooperatives organized under R.A. No. 6938 ,103 are composed of members; hence, issues on the termination of their membership with the cooperative do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters.

Perpetual Help Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Faburada. 104 - Petitioner in this case contends that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint of private respondents who are not members but employees of the cooperative. The Supreme Court ruled that there is no evidence that private respondents are members of petitioner cooperative and even if they are, the dispute is about payment of wages, overtime pay, rest day and termination of employment. Under Article 217 of the Labor Code, these disputes are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters.105 In the 2010 case of San Miguel Corp. v. Semillano,106 petitioner asserts that the present case is outside t he  jurisdiction of the labor tribunals because respondent Vicente Semillano is a member of the Alilgilan Multi-Purpose Coop (AMPCO) , not an employee of petitioner SMC. Petitioner is of the position that the instant dispute is intracooperative in nature falling within the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Committee of the Cooperative Development Authority. AMPCO was contracted by petitioner to supply it with workers to perform the task of segregating bottles, removing dirt therefrom, filing them in designated places, loading and unloading the bottles to and from the delivery trucks, and to perform other tasks as may be ordered by SMC’s officers. Semillano, together with the other respondents, filed the complaint for regularization with petitioner SMC, contending that AMPCO was a mere laboronly contractor. The High Court declared in this case that AMPCO was a labor-only contractor and consequently  pronounced that all the respondents, including Semillano, were regular employees of petitioner. On this issue of  jurisdiction, the High Court held that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction because precisely, Semillano has joined the others in filing this complaint because it is his position that petitioner SMC is his true employer and liable for all his claims under the Labor Code.

X-F. JURISDICTION OVER COUNTER-CLAIMS OF EMPLOYERS 1. EMPLOYERS MAY ASSERT COUNTER-CLAIMS AGAINST EMPLOYEES FILED BY THE LATTER BEFORE THE LABOR ARBITERS. Almost all labor cases decided by labor courts involve claims asserted by the workers. The question that may be propounded is whether the employers can assert counter-claims against their employees before the Labor Arbiters. The Supreme Court answered this poser in the affirmative.

Bañez v. Hon. Valdevilla. 107 - The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the NLRC is comprehensive enough to include claims for all forms of damages “arising from the employer -employee relations. ” By this clause, Article 217 should apply with equal force to the claim of an employer   for actual damages against its dismissed employee, where the basis for the claim arises from or is necessarily connected with the fact of termination, and should be entered as a counter-claim in the illegal dismissal case. This is in accord with paragraph 6 of Article 217(a) , which covers “all other claims, arising from employer -employee relations.” 108 But such counter-claim, being a factual issue, must be asserted before the Labor Arbiter; otherwise, it can no longer be passed upon by a reviewing court.109

XI. ISSUES AND CASES OVER WHICH LABOR ARBITERS HAVE NO JURISDICTION 1. LABOR ARBITERS HAVE NO JURISDICTION OVER CERTAIN ISSUES AND CASES. The following issues or cases do not fall under the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters: (a) Claims for damages arising from breach of a non-compete clause and other post-employment  prohibitions; (b) Claims for payment of cash advances, car, appliance and other loans of employees; (c) Dismissal of corporate officers and their monetary claims; (d) Issues involving suspension of payment of debts (rehabilitation receivership) ; (e) Cases involving entities immune from suit; (f) Cases falling under the doctrine of forum non conveniens; (g) Quasi-delict or tort cases; (h) Criminal and civil liabilities arising from violations of certain provisions of the Labor Code; (i) Constitutionality of CBA provisions. All the foregoing issues or cases are discussed below seriatim.

XI-A. CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM BREACH OF NON-COMPETE CLAUSE AND OTHER POST-EMPLOYMENT PROHIBITIONS 1. JURISDICTION IS LODGED WITH THE REGULAR COURTS.

In case of violation of the non-compete clause and similar post-employment bans or prohibitions, the employer can assert his claim for damages against the erring employee with the regular courts and not with the labor courts.110

XI-B. EMPLOYER’S CLAIMS FOR CASH ADVANCES, CAR, APPLIANCE

AND OTHER PERSONAL LOANS OF EMPLOYEES 1. LABOR ARBITERS HAVE NO JURISDICTION. With respect to resolving issues involving loans availed of by employees from their employers, it has been the consistent ruling of the Supreme Court that the Labor Arbiters have no jurisdiction thereover but the regular courts. Where the claim to the principal relief   sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In such situations, resolutions of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall

outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to Labor Arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies disappears.” 111 The following loans may be cited: a. Cash loans/advances are in the nature of simple collection of a sum of money brought by the employer, as creditor, against the employee, as debtor. The fact that they were employer and employee at the time of the transaction does not negate the civil jurisdiction of the trial court. The case does not involve adjudication of a labor dispute but recovery of a sum of money based on our civil laws on obligation and contract.112  b.

Car loans such as those granted to sales or medical representatives by reason of the nature of their work. The employer’s demand for payment of the employees’ amortizations on thei r car loans, or, in the alternative, the return of the cars to the company, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves debtorcreditor relations, rather than employee-employer relations.113

c. Appliance loans concern the enforcement of a loan agreement involving debtor-creditor relations founded on contract and do not in any way concern employee relations. As such it should be enforced through a separate civil action in the regular courts and not before the Labor Arbiter . 114 d.

Loans from retirement fund  also involve the same principle as above; hence, collection therefor may only be made through the regular courts and not through the Labor Arbiter or any labor tribunal. 115 XI-C. DISMISSAL OF DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE OFFICERS

1. LABOR ARBITERS HAVE NO JURISDICTION.

The dismissal of a director or corporate officer is an intra-corporate dispute cognizable by the Regional Trial Court116 and not by the Labor Arbiter.

2. MATLING DOCTRINE. Under this doctrine,117 the following rules should be observed: (1)

The dismissal of regular employees   falls under the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters; while that of corporate officers falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

(2)

The term “corporate officers” refers only to those expressly mentioned in the Corporation Code and By-Laws; all other officers not so mentioned therein are deemed employees.

(3)

Corporate officers are elected or appointed by the directors or stockholders, and those who are given that character either by the Corporation Code or by the corporation’s by-laws. 118

(4)

The Corporation Code119 specifically mentions only the following corporate officers , to wit:  president, secretary and treasurer  and such other officers as may be provided for in the by-laws.

(5)

The Board of Directors can no longer create corporate offices because the power of the Board of Directors to create a corporate office cannot be delegated. Therefore, the term “corporate officers” should only refer to the above and to no other. A different interpretation can easily leave the way open for the Board of Directors to circumvent the constitutionally guaranteed security of tenure of the employee by the expedient inclusion in the By-Laws of an enabling clause on the creation of just any corporate officer position.

(6)

Distinction between a corporate officer and an employee. - An “office” is created by the charter of the corporation and the “corporate officer”  is elected by the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an “employee” occupies no office and generally is employed not by the action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines the compensation to  be paid to such employee.

(7)

Because of the  Matling   doctrine, the rulings in Taban g 120 and Nacpil,121 are no longer controlling  because they are “too sweeping and do not accord with reason, justice, and fair play.”

(8)

The status of an employee as director and stockholder does not automatically convert his dismissal into an intra-corporate dispute.

(9)

Two (2) elements to determine whether a dispute is intra-corporate or not. (a) The status or relationship of the parties; and (b) The nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy. (Nature of controversy test) . In the absence of any one of these factors, the RTC will not have jurisdiction.

(10) The criteria do not depend on the services performed but on the manner of creation of the office. In Matling, respondent Corros was supposedly at once an employee, a stockholder, and a Director of Matling. The circumstances surrounding his appointment to office must be fully considered to determine whether the dismissal constituted an intra-corporate controversy or a labor termination dispute. It must also be considered whether his status as Director and stockholder had any relation at all to his appointment and subsequent dismissal as Vice President for Finance and Administration. Obviously enough, the respondent was not appointed as Vice President for Finance and Administration  because of his being a stockholder or Director of Matling. He had started working for Matling on September 8, 1966, and had been employed continuously for 33 years until his termination on April 17, 2000. His first work as a bookkeeper and his climb in 1987 to his last position as Vice President for Finance and Administration had been gradual but steady. 122 Even though he might have become a stockholder of Matling in 1992, his promotion to the position of Vice President for Finance and Administration in 1987 was by virtue of the length of quality service he had rendered as an employee of Matling. His subsequent acquisition of the status of Director/stockholder had no relation to his  promotion. Besides, his status of Director/stockholder was unaffected by his dismissal from employment as Vice President for Finance and Administration. 123

3. SIGNIFICANT CASES DECIDED BASED ON THE MA TL I NG D OCTRI NE . a. Cosare v. Broadcom Asia, Inc. ,124 In this 2014 case, the Supreme Court ruled that the Labor Arbiter, not the regular courts, has original  jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case filed by petitioner Cosare who was an incorporator 125 of respondent Broadcom and was holding the position of Assistant Vice President for Sales (AVP for Sales) and Head of the Technical Coordination at the time of his termination. The following justifications were cited in support of this ruling: (1) The mere fact that a person was a stockholder and an officer of the company at the time the subject controversy developed does not necessarily make the case an intra-corporate dispute. (2) A person, although an officer of the company, is not necessarily a corporate officer thereof. (3) General Information Sheet (GIS) submitted to SEC neither governs nor establishes the nature of office. (4) The  Nature of the Controversy Test : The mere fact that a person was a stockholder at the time of the filing of the illegal dismissal case does not make the action an intra-corporate dispute.

b. Other cases:

(1) Barba v. Liceo de Cagayan University (2012) ;126 (2) Marc II Marketing, Inc. and Lucila V. Joson v. Alfredo M. Joson (2011) ;127 (3) Real v. Sangu Philippines, Inc. (2011) . 128

XI-D. SUSPENSION OF PAYMENT OF DEBTS (REHABILITATION RECEIVERSHIP) 1. JURISDICTION LODGED WITH RTC. It is no longer the SEC which has jurisdiction over this case. It is now the Regional Trial Court which has  jurisdiction.129

2. EFFECTS OF SUSPENSION OF PAYMENT OF DEBTS (REHABILITATION RECEIVERSHIP) OR LIQUIDATION ON JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS. 

The jurisdiction conferred by law upon Labor Arbiters and the NLRC would not be lost simply because the assets of a former employer have been placed under receivership or liquidation. This jurisdiction carries with it the concomitant power to execute their decisions. 130



The pendency of the rehabilitation proceedings does not affect the Court’s jurisdiction to resolve the case, but merely suspends the execution of its decision.131



The suspension of all actions covers all claims against the corporation which is undergoing rehabilitation receivership, whether for damages founded on a breach of contract of carriage, labor cases, collection suits or any other claims of a pecuniary nature. No exception in favor of labor claims is mentioned in the law. 132



Likewise, the suspension of all actions for claims against a corporation embraces all phases of the suit, be it  before the trial court or any tribunal or before the Supreme Court. No other action may be taken, including the rendition of judgment during the state of suspension. Once the process of rehabilitation, however, is completed, the Court should proceed t o complete the proceedings on the suspended actions . 133



Even execution of decisions that are already final and executory may be stayed if the corporation has been  placed under rehabilitation receivership.134

 



Execution of final decisions during the period of rehabilitation and suspension is null and void. 135 Duration of automatic stay has no limit. The suspension shall last up to the termination of the rehabilitation  proceedings.136 Remedy is to lodge the labor claims with the Rehabilitation Receiver .137

XI-E. LABOR CASES INVOLVING ENTITIES IMMUNE FROM SUIT 1. IMMUNE ENTITIES CANNOT BE SUED FOR LABOR LAW VIOLATIONS. In this jurisdiction, the generally accepted principles of international law are recognized and adopted as part of the law of the land.138 Immunity of a State and international organizations from suit is one of these universally recognized principles. It is on this basis that Labor Arbiters or other labor tribunals have no jurisdiction over immune entities.139

2. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES. There are quite a number of cases that may be cited but the following would be the most ideal examples: In Department of Foreign Affairs v. NLRC,140 involving an illegal dismissal case filed against the Asian Development Bank (ADB) , it was ruled that said entity enjoys immunity from legal process of every form and therefore the suit against it cannot prosper. And this immunity extends to its officers who also enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges to the ADB are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government which must be respected. In Lasco v. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration [UNRFNRE], 141 involving an illegal dismissal case filed against the respondent which is a specialized agency of the United Nations, the said immunity rule was asserted and reiterated by the Supreme Court. In dismissing the case, the High Court said that being a member of the United Nations and a party to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, the Philippine government adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Both treaties have the force and effect of law . 142 The same doctrine was earlier applied in Jusmag Philippines v. NLRC,143 a case involving illegal dismissal of a Filipino employee of the  Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the Republic of the  Philippines (JUSMAG-Philippines) . In upholding the Labor Arbiter’s dismissal of the case, the High Court enunciated that since the employment contract was entered into by JUSMAG in the discharge of its  governmental  functions, JUSMAG being an entity performing a governmental  function on behalf of the United States Government  pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated March 21, 1947, the illegal dismissal suit is one against the

latter, albeit it was not impleaded in the complaint. Considering that the United States has not waived or consented to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper. JUSMAG is beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine courts. In Larkins v. NLRC,144 involving the dismissal of workers who worked in the maintenance of dormitories at the former US Clark Air Base in Pampanga, the Supreme Court, in dismissing the case, invoked, among other reasons, lack of jurisdiction in the light of the fact that their suit was against the United States Government which,  by right of sovereign power, operated and maintained the dormitories at Clark Air Base for members of the U.S. Air Force.

3. EXCEPTION TO THE RULE. There is an exception to the immunity rule as exemplified by the case of United States v. Hon. Rodrigo,145 where it was held that when the function of the foreign entity otherwise immune from suit partakes of the nature of a  proprietary activity, such as the restaurant services offered at John Hay Air Station undertaken by the United States Government as a commercial activity for profit and not in its  governmental capacity, the case for illegal dismissal filed by a Filipino cook working therein is well within the jurisdiction of Philippine courts. The reason is that by entering into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its  proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.

4. ESTOPPEL DOES NOT CONFER JURISDICTION OVER AN IMMUNE ENTITY. An entity immune from suit cannot be estopped from claiming such diplomatic immunity since estoppel does not operate to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. 146

XI-F. DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS 1. REQUISITES.

This doctrine is an international law principle which has been applied to labor cases. The f ollowing are the requisites for its applicability: (1) That the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort; (2) That the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) That the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision . 147

2. APPLICATION TO LABOR CASES. a. Case where doctrine was rejected. Petitioners’ invocation of this principle was rejected in Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc. v. 148 Petitioners’ insistence was based on the fact that respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a repatriate. In so rejecting petitioners’ contention, the Supreme Court cited the following reasons that do not warrant the application of the said principle: (1) the Labor Code does not include  forum non conveniens as a ground for the dismissal of the complaint;149 and(2) the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, it is properly considered as a defense.

Schonfeld.

b. Case where doctrine was applied. This doctrine was applied in the case of The Manila Hotel Corp. and Manila Hotel International Limited v. NLRC, where private respondent Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker employed as a printer in a printing press in the Sultanate of Oman when he was directly hired by the Palace Hotel, Beijing, People’s Republic of China to work in its print shop. This hotel was being managed by the Manila Hotel International Ltd. , a foreign entity registered under the laws of Hong Kong. Later, he was terminated due to retrenchment occasioned by business reverses brought about by the political upheaval in China (referring to the Tiananmen Square incident) which severely affected the hotel’s operations. 150

In holding that the NLRC was a seriously inconvenient forum, the Supreme Court noted that the main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions and the case involves purely foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines has with the case is that the private respondent employee (Marcelo Santos) is a Filipino citizen. The Palace Hotel and MHICL are foreign corporations. Consequently, not all cases involving Filipino

citizens can be tried here. Respondent employee was hired directly by the Beijing Palace Hotel, a foreign employer, through correspondence sent to him while he was working at the Sultanate of Oman. He was hired without the intervention of the POEA or any authorized recruitment agency of the government. Hence, the NLRC is an inconvenient forum given that all the incidents of the case - from the time of recruitment, to employment to dismissal - occurred outside the Philippines. The inconvenience is compounded by the fact that the proper defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL, are not nationals of the Philippines. Neither are they “doing business in the Philippines. ” Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt (General Manager of the Palace Hotel) and Mr. Henk  (Palace Hotel’s Manager) are non-residents of the Philippines.  Neither can an intelligent decision be made as to the law governing the employment contract as such was  perfected in foreign soil. This calls to fore the application of the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract was made) . It must be noted that the employment contract was not   perfected in the Philippines. Private respondent employee signified his acceptance thereof by writing a letter while he was in the Sultanate of Oman. This letter was sent to the Palace Hotel in the People’s Republic of China. Neither can the NLRC determine the facts surrounding the alleged illegal dismissal as all acts complained of took place in Beijing, People’s Republic of China. The NLRC was not   in a position to determine whether the Tiananmen Square incident truly adversely affected the operations of the Palace Hotel as to justify respondent employee’s retrenchment. Even assuming that a proper decision could be reached by the NLRC, such would not have any binding effect against the employer, the Palace Hotel, which is a corporation incorporated under the laws of China and was not even served with summons. Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired. This is not to say that Philippine courts and agencies have no power to solve controversies involving foreign employers. Neither could it be said that the Supreme Court does not have power over an employment contract executed in a foreign country. If the respondent employee were an “overseas contract worker”, a Philippine forum, specifically the POEA, not the  NLRC, would protect him. He is not an “overseas contract worker”, a fact which he admits with conviction. 151

XI-G. QUASI-DELICT OR TORT CASES 1. LABOR ARBITERS HAVE NO JURISDICTION OVER QUASI-DELICT OR TORT CASES.

Damages arising from quasi-delict or tort are often confused with damages that may be claimed under labor laws and labor agreements. Consequently, quasi-delict or tort damages are asserted, though erroneously, in labor cases filed with the Labor Arbiters. As earlier emphasized, however, Labor Arbiters and the NLRC have no power or authority to grant reliefs in claims that do not arise from employer-employee relationship such as those emanating from quasi-delict or tort cases per Article 2176 of the Civil Code that have no reasonable causal connection to any of the claims provided in the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements.

2. THE TOLOSA CASE. The best example to cite on this point is the case of Evelyn Tolosa v. NLRC.152 Because of the death of her husband, Captain Virgilio Tolosa, a complaint for damages was lodged with the Labor Arbiter by the surviving wife  but the Supreme Court ruled that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case because it was established that the same was in the nature of an action based on quasi-delict or tort, it being evident that the issue presented therein involved the alleged gross negligence of Captain Tolosa’s shipmates ,  Pedro Garate and Mario Asis, with whom Captain Tolosa had no employer-employee relationship. Hence, this case does not involve the adjudication of a labor dispute, but the recovery of damages based on quasi-delict. Notably, the jurisdiction of labor tribunals is limited to disputes arising from employer-employee relations.

XI-H. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ACTIONS ARISING FROM VIOLATIONS OF THE PENAL PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR CODE 1. REGULAR COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION.

The Labor Code has expressly conferred jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases arising from violations of the Labor Code with the regular courts. The relevant provisions are as follows:

1. Article 241  –   which provides that criminal and civil liabilities arising from violations of rights and conditions of union membership provided for thereunder shall continue to be under the jurisdiction of ordinary courts. 2. Article 247 - while the jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative and civil aspects of unfair labor  practices is lodged with the Labor Arbiters, the jurisdiction over the criminal aspect thereof is vested in the regular courts. 3. Article 272 - Although Article 272153 does not mention expressly that the jurisdiction over the criminal violation of its provision is vested in the regular court, it, however, mentions the word “court ” in  paragraph [a] thereof, obviously referring to the regular court. Further, in the Rules to Implement the  Labor Code, as amended,154 it is provided that the regular courts shall have jurisdiction over any criminal action under Article 272 of the Labor Code, as amended, but subject to the required clearance from the DOLE on cases arising out of or related to a labor dispute pursuant to the Ministry of Justice 155 Circular No. 15, Series of 1982, and Circular No. 9, Series of 1986 .156 4. Article 288 - It is provided therein that any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any criminal offense punished in the Labor Code shall be under the concurrent jurisdiction of the Municipal or City Courts and the Courts of First Instance (now RTC). 157

XI-I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LABOR CONTRACT STIPULATIONS 1. THE HALAGUEÑA DOCTRINE. In Halagueńa v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,158 it was pronounced that it is not the Labor Arbiter but the regular court which has jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of labor contracts such as a CBA. Petitioners were female flight attendants of respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL) and are members of the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) , the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the flight attendants, flight stewards and pursers of respondent. The July 11, 2001 CBA between PAL and FASAP provides that the compulsory retirement for female flight attendants is fifty-five (55) and sixty (60) for their male counterpart. Claiming that said CBA provision is discriminatory against them, petitioners filed against respondent a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. In ruling that the RTC has jurisdiction, the Supreme Court cited the following reasons: (1) (2)

The case is an ordinary civil action, hence, beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals. The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it requires the application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) . The power to apply and interpret the constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction. (3) Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. Actions between employees and employer where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts. Here, the employeremployee relationship between the parties is merely incidental and the cause of action ultimately arose from different sources of obligation, i.e. , the Constitution and CEDAW.

2. REINSTATEMENT PENDING APPEAL 1. PIONEER TEXTURIZING DOCTRINE: REINSTATEMENT ASPECT OF LABOR ARBITER’S DECISION, IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY EVEN PENDING APPEAL; NO WRIT OF EXECUTION REQUIRED. According to the  Pioneer Texturizing   doctrine,159 an order of reinstatement issued by the Labor Arbiter under Article 223160 of the Labor Code is self-executory or immediately executory even pending appeal.161 This means that the perfection of an appeal shall stay the execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter except  execution of the reinstatement pending appeal.162

As a consequence of  Pioneer Texturizing , the rulings in earlier cases163 that the reinstatement aspect of the Labor Arbiter’s decision needs a writ of execution as it is not self -executory, are deemed abandoned.164

2. REINSTATEMENT PENDING APPEAL, APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE LABOR ARBITER; WRIT OF EXECUTION REQUIRED WHEN REINSTATEMENT IS ORDERED BY NLRC ON APPEAL, OR SUBSEQUENTLY BY THE COURT OF APPEALS OR SUPREME COURT, AS THE CASE MAY BE. By way of distinction, the rule on reinstatement pending appeal applies only to the order of reinstatement issued by the Labor Arbiter and to no other. This means that if the reinstatement order is issued by the NLRC on appeal, or by the Court of Appeal s165 or by the Supreme Court ,166 there is a need to secure a writ of execution from the Labor Arbiter of origin to enforce the reinstatement of the employee whose dismissal is declared illegal . 167

3. TWO (2) OPTIONS OF EMPLOYER. To implement the reinstatement aspect of a Labor Arbiter’s decision, there are only two (2) options available to the employer, to wit:

1. Actual reinstatement. - The employee should be reinstated to his position which he occupies prior to his illegal dismissal under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, if no longer available, to a substantially-equivalent position; or  2. Payroll reinstatement.  –   The employee should be reinstated in the payroll of the company without requiring him to report back to his work . 168

4. DUTY OF EMPLOYER TO NOTIFY EMPLOYEE ORDERED REINSTATED. It is required169 that in case the decision of the Labor Arbiter includes an order of reinstatement, it should contain: (a) A statement that the reinstatement aspect is immediately executory; and (b) A directive for the employer to submit a report of compliance within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the said decision .170 Disobedience of this directive clearly denotes a refusal to reinstate. The employee need not file a motion for the issuance of the writ of execution since the Labor Arbiter is mandated thereafterto motu proprio issue the writ. With the new rules in place, there is hardly any difficulty in determining the employer’s intransigence in immediately complying with the order .171

5. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER FOR DISOBEYING LABOR ARBITER’S REI NSTATEMENT ORDER. Under any of the two (2) circumstances described above, the Labor Arbiter shall immediately issue a writ of execution, even pending appeal, directing the employer to immediately reinstate the dismissed employee either  physically or in the payroll.172 As a consequence of such disobedience, the employer has the following liabilities, 173 to wit: 1. He shall be liable to pay the accrued salaries of the reinstated employee as a consequence of such nonreinstatement in the amount specified in the decision; and 2. He may be cited for contempt, in accordance with the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure ,174 for his refusal to comply with the writ of execution ordering the reinstatement. 175 This remedy, however, is available only after the Sheriff shall have served the writ of execution upon the employer or any other person required by law to obey the same.176 On No. 1 above, the employer should pay the accrued salaries in case of disobedience because the employee should not be left without any remedy in case the employer unreasonably delays or refuses reinstatement. The unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate an illegally dismissed employee entitles the employee to the  payment of his salaries.177 The entitlement of the dismissed employee to his salaries occasioned by the unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate him becomes effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution.178 On No. 2 above, the remedy available to the employee whose reinstatement ordered by the Labor Arbiter was not implemented by the employer is to file for contempt against the latter and certainly not the institution of a separate action in the regular court or with the Labor Arbiter. Such recourse will violate the well-settled principle of res judicata. It would give rise to multiplicity of actions which the law abhors and exerts every effort to eschew . 179 6. INSTANCES WHEN WRIT OF EXECUTION OF LABOR ARBITER’S REINSTATEMENT ORDER STILL REQUIRED.

Under the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure ,180 there are two (2) instances when a writ of execution should still be issued immediately by the Labor Arbiter to implement his order of reinstatement, even pending appeal, viz : (1) When the employer disobeys the prescribed directive181 to submit a report of compliance within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the decision; or (2) When the employer refuses to reinstate the dismissed employee. The Labor Arbiter shall motu proprio issue a corresponding writ to satisfy the reinstatement wages as they accrue until actual reinstatement or reversal of the order of reinstatement. 182

7. SOME PRINCIPLES ON REINSTATEMENT PENDING APPEAL. 

Employer has no way of staying execution of immediate reinstatement. He cannot post bond to prevent its execution.183

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Reinstatement pending appeal applies to all kinds of illegal dismissal cases, regardless of the grounds thereof .184

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Reinstatement pending appeal does not apply when the dismissal is legal but reinstatement is ordered for some reasons like equity and compassionate j ustice. 185

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The failure of employee ordered reinstated pending appeal to report back to work as directed by the employer does not give the employer the right to remove him, especially when there is a reasonable explanation for his failure.186

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When former position is already filled up, the employee ordered reinstated pending appeal should be reinstated to a substantially equivalent position.187

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Reinstatement to a position lower in rank is not proper .188 In case of two successive dismissals, the order of reinstatement pending appeal under Article 223 issued in the first case shall apply only to the first case and should not affect the second dismissal. According to Sevilla v. NLRC,189 the Labor Arbiter was correct in denying the third motion for reinstatement filed by the petitioner  because what she should have filed was a new complaint based on the second dismissal. The second dismissal gave rise to a new cause of action. Inasmuch as no new complaint was filed, the Labor Arbiter could not have ruled on the legality of the second dismissal. Reinstatement pending appeal is not affected by the reinstated employee’s employment elsewhere. 190

Effect of grant of achievement award during reinstatement pending appeal. In the 2014 case of Garza v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. ,191 it was pronounced that the act of

respondent CCBPI in giving an award of a Certificate of Achievement to petitioner for his exemplary sales  performance during his reinstatement ordered by the Labor Arbiter ,192 while respondent’s appeal with the  NLRC was still pending, constitutes recognition of petitioner’s abilities and accomplishments. It indicates that he is a responsible, trustworthy and hardworking employee of CCBPI. It constitutes adequate proof weighing in his favor.  The issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO)  by the Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court, as the case may be, merely suspends the implementation and enforcement of the reinstatement order but it does not have the effect of nullifying the right of the employee to his reinstatement and to be paid his reinstatement wages.193

3. REQUIREMENTS TO PERFECT APPEAL TO NLRC I. APPEAL IN GENERAL 1. APPEAL, MEANING AND NATURE. The term “appeal” refers to the elevation by an aggrieved party to an agency vested with appellate authority of any decision, resolution or order disposing the principal issues of a case rendered by an agency vested with original jurisdiction, undertaken by filing a memorandum of appeal. 194

2. SOME PRINCIPLES ON APPEAL. 

Appeals under Article 223 apply only to appeals from the Labor Arbiter’s decisions, awards or orders to the Commission (NLRC) .

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There is no appeal from the decisions, orders or awards of the NLRC. Clearly, therefore, Article 223 of the Labor Code is not the proper basis for elevating the case to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court .195 The proper remedy from the decisions, awards or orders of the NLRC to the Court of Appeals is a Rule 65  petition for certiorari  and from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari.

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Appeal from the NLRC to the DOLE Secretary and to the President had long been abolished. 196

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Appeal is not a constitutional right but a mere statutory privilege. Hence, parties who seek to avail of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it.197

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A motion for reconsideration is unavailing as a remedy against a decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter should treat the said motion as an appeal to the NLRC.198

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A “Petition for Relief” should be treated as appeal.199

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Affirmative relief is not available to a party who failed to appeal. A party who does not appeal from a decision of a court cannot obtain affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the appealed decision . 200

3. GROUNDS FOR APPEAL TO THE COMMISSION (NLRC) . The appeal to the NLRC may be entertained only on any of the following grounds: a. If there is a prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion  on the part of the Labor Arbiter;  b. If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and corruption; c. If made purely on questions of law; and/or  d. If serious errors in the findings of fact are raised which, if not corrected, would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant. 201 

NLRC has certiorari power.

The first ground above regarding  prima facie  evidence of abuse of discretion   on the part of the Labor Arbiter is actually an exercise of certiorari power by the NLRC. The case of Triad Security & Allied Services, Inc. v. Ortega, 202 expressly recognized this certiorari power of the NLRC. 203 Clearly, according to the 2012 case of Auza, Jr. v. MOL Philippines, Inc.,204 the NLRC is possessed of the power to rectify any abuse of discretion committed by the Labor Arbiter.

II. PERFECTION OF APPEAL 1. EFFECT OF PERFECTION OF APPEAL ON EXECUTION. To reiterate, the perfection of an appeal shall stay the execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter except  execution for reinstatement pending appeal.205

2. PERFECTION OF APPEAL, MANDATORY AND JURISDICTIONAL. The perfection of appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and noncompliance with the legal requirements is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory, hence, unappealable.206

3. REQUISITES. The requisites for perfection of appeal to the NLRC are as follows:

(1) Observance of the reglementary period ; (2) Payment of appeal and legal research fee ; (3) Filing of a Memorandum of Appeal ; (4) Proof of service  to the other party; and

(5) Posting of cash, property or surety bond , in case of monetary awards. The foregoing are discussed below.

III. REGLEMENTARY PERIOD 1. TWO (2) KINDS OF REGLEMENTARY PERIOD. The reglementary period depends on where the appeal comes from, viz : 1. Ten (10) calendar days  –   in the case of appeals from decisions of the Labor Arbiters under Article 223 of the Labor Code; and 2. Five (5) calendar days  –  in the case of appeals from decisions of the DOLE Regional Director under Article 129 of the Labor Code.207

Calendar days and not working days. The shortened period of ten (10) days fixed by Article 223 contemplates calendar days and not working days.208 The same holds true in the case of the 5-day reglementary period under Article 129 of the Labor Code. Consequently, Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays are included in reckoning and computing the reglementary

 peri od. 209

2. EXCEPTIONS TO THE 10-CALENDAR DAY OR 5-CALENDAR DAY REGLEMENTARY PERIOD RULE. Certain procedural lapses may be disregarded where there is an acceptable reason to excuse tardiness in the taking of the appeal.210 It is always within the power of the court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it. 211 Thus, procedural rules may be waived, dispensed with or relaxed in the interest of substantial justice. The Court may deign to veer away from the general rule if, on its face, the appeal appears to be absolutely meritorious. 212 The following are the specific instances where the rules on the reckoning of the reglementary period have not been strictly observed: 1) 10  day (or 5  day) falling on a Saturday,213 Sunday or holiday,214 in which case, the appeal may be filed in the next working day. 2) Reliance on erroneous notice of decision215 as when the notice expressly states “working days” and not “calendar days.” 3) Appeal from decisions of Labor Arbiters in direct contempt cases –  five (5) calendar days.216 4) Filing of petition for extraordinary remedies  from orders or resolutions of Labor Arbiters or on third party claims –  ten (10) calendar  days.217 5) When NLRC exercises its power to“correct, amend, or waive any error, defect or irregularity whether in substance or form”in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, as provided under Article 218(c) of the Labor Code,218 in which case, the late filing of the appeal is excused. 6) When technical rules are disregarded under Article 221.219 7) When there are some compelling reasons that justify the allowance of the appeal despite its late filing such as when it is granted in the interest of substantial justice. 220 th

th

3. SOME PRINCIPLES ON REGLEMENTARY PERIOD. 

The reglementary period is mandatory and not a “mere technicality.” 221

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The failure to appeal within the reglementary period   renders the judgment appealed from final and executory by operation of law.222 Consequently, the prevailing party is entitled, as a matter of right, to a writ of execution and the issuance thereof becomes a ministerial duty which may be compelled through the remedy of mandamus.223

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The date of receipt of decisions, resolutions or orders by the parties is of no moment. For purposes of appeal, the reglementary period shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, resolutions, or orders by the counsel

or representative of record.

224

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Miscomputation of the reglementary period will not forestall the finality of the judgment. It is in the interest of everyone that the date when judgments become final and executory should remain fixed and ascertainable . 225

Date of mailing by registered mail of the appeal memorandum is the date of its filing .226 Motion for extension of time to perfect an appeal is not  allowed.227 This kind of motion is a prohibited  pleading.228

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Motion for extension of time to file the memorandum of appeal is not allowed.229

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Motion for extension of time to file appeal bond is not allowed.230

IV. APPEAL FEE AND LEGAL RESEARCH FEE 1. PAYMENT OF APPEAL FEE AND LEGAL RESEARCH FEE, MANDATORY AND JURISDICTIONAL. The payment by the appellant of the prevailing appeal fee and legal research fee  is both mandatory and  jurisdictional.231 An appeal is perfected only when there is proof of payment of the appeal fee . 232 It is by no means a mere technicality.233 If not paid, the running of the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal will not be tolled .234

2. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE ON PAYMENT OF APPELLATE COURT DOCKET FEES. The following are the recognized exceptions to the strict observance of the rule on appeal fee: (1) most  persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the appellant's fault; (10) peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge, guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort, on the part of the party invoking liberality, to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his failure to comply with the rules. 235 Consequently, in instances where the appeal fee was paid belatedly, it was held that the broader interest of justice and the desired objective of deciding the case on the merits demand that the appeal be given due course.236

V. MEMORANDUM OF APPEAL 1. REQUISITES. The requisites for a valid Memorandum of Appeal are as follows: 1. The Memorandum of Appeal should be verified by the appellant himself in accordance with the  Rules of Court , as amended;237 2. It should be presented in three (3) legibly typewritten or printed copies; 3. It shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof, including the relief prayed for; 4. It shall contain a statement of the date the appellant received the appealed decision, award or order; and 5. It shall be accompanied by: (i) proof of payment of the required appeal fee and legal research fee; (ii) posting of a cash or surety bond (in case of monetary awards) ; and (iii) proof of service upon the other party.238

2. REQUIREMENTS NOT JURISDICTIONAL.

The aforesaid requirements that should be complied with in a Memorandum of Appeal are merely a rundown of the contents of the required appeal memorandum to be submitted by the appellant. They are not  jurisdictional requirements.239 But it must be emphasized that per Navarro v. NLRC,240 the perfection of an appeal includes the filing, within the prescribed period, of the Memorandum of Appeal containing, among others, the assignment of error/s, arguments in support thereof, the relief sought and, in appropriate cases, posting of the appeal  bond.

3. SOME PRINCIPLES ON MEMORANDUM OF APPEAL. 

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Mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the  period for perfecting an appeal.241 Memorandum of appeal is not similar to motion for reconsideration. 242

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Lack of verification in a memorandum of appeal is not a fatal defect. It may easily be corrected by requiring an oath.243

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Supplemental appeal need not be verified.244  Neither the laws nor the rules require the verification of the supplemental appeal.245 Furthermore, verification is a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement. It is mainly intended as an assurance that the matters alleged in the pleading are true and correct and not of mere speculation.246

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An appeal will be dismissed if signed only by an unauthorized representative .247 Only complainants who signed the memorandum of appeal are deemed to have appealed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. The prevailing doctrine in labor cases is that a party who has not appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted, if any, in the decision of the lower tribunal . 248

Certificate of non-forum shopping is no longer provided in the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. It is only required in the initiatory complaint or petition filed with the Labor Arbiter . 249

VI. PROOF OF SERVICE TO ADVERSE PARTY 1. FAILURE TO SERVE COPY TO ADVERSE PARTY, NOT FATAL. While it is required that in all cases, the appellant shall furnish a copy of the Memorandum of Appeal to the other party (appellee) ,250 non-compliance therewith, however, will not be an obstacle to the perfection of the appeal; nor will it amount to a jurisdictional defect on the NLRC’s taking cognizance thereof . 251 It has long been settled that mere failure to serve a copy of a Memorandum of Appeal upon the opposing  party does not bar the NLRC from entertaining an appeal. 252 It may even be dispensed with since in appeals in labor cases, non-service of a copy of appeal memorandum to the adverse party is not a jurisdictional defect which calls for the dismissal of the appeal.253

VII. POSTING OF BOND 1. WHEN POSTING OF BOND REQUIRED. Only in case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the DOLE Regional Director (under Article 129 of the Labor Code) involves a monetary award , that an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond, which shall either be in the form of (1) cash deposit, (2) surety bond or (3) property bond,254 equivalent in amount to the monetary award, exclusive  of damages and attorney’s fees .255 In other words, only monetary awards (such as unpaid wages, backwages, separation pay, 13  month pay, etc. ) are required to be covered by the bond. Moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees are excluded. th

2. POSTING OF BOND, MANDATORY AND JURISDICTIONAL. The provision of Article 223 requiring the posting of a bond is self-executory and does not need any rule to implement it. The reason for this rule is that the filing of a supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional.256

3. SOME PRINCIPLES ON POSTING OF BOND. 

The cash or surety bond required for the perfection of appeal should be posted within the reglementary  period.257 If a party failed to perfect his appeal by the non-payment of the appeal bond within the 10-calendar day period provided by law, the decision of the Labor Arbiter becomes final and executory upon the expiration of the said period.258



In case the employer failed to post a bond to perfect its appeal, the remedy of the employee is to file a motion to dismiss the appeal and not a petition for mandamus for the issuance of a writ of execution.259



Surety bond must be issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission (NLRC) or the Supreme Court.260



The bond shall be valid and effective from the date of deposit or posting, until the case is finally decided, resolved or terminated, or the award satisfied. 261



Posting of a bank guarantee or bank certification is not sufficient compliance with the bond requirement. It is not equivalent to nor can be considered compliance with the cash, surety or property bond. 262



Cooperatives are not exempted from posting bond. 263



Government is exempt from posting of bond; government-owned and/or controlled corporations , however, are not exempt therefrom.264



Bond is not required for the NLRC to entertain a motion for reconsideration . 265 An appeal bond is required only for the perfection of an appeal of a Labor Arbiter’s decision involving a monetary award. 266



Bond is not required to file a Rule 65 petition for certiorari .267

4. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR NON-POSTING OF BOND. 

No monetary award, no bond required. The rule is clear that when the judgment of the Labor Arbiter does not involve any monetary award, no appeal bond is necessary. 268



There is no duty to post a bond if the monetary award is not specified in the decisions. The Labor Arbiter’s decision or order should state the amount awarded. If the amount of the monetary award is not contained or fixed in the judgment, the appeal bond is not required to be posted .269



In case of conflict between the body and the fallo of the decision, the latter should prevail. 270

5. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL DESPITE DELAY IN POSTING OF BOND. 

The rules on posting of bond have been liberally construed and relaxed considering the substantial merits of the case and the existence of exceptional cir cumstances justifying the same, such as : 271 (1) Fundamental consideration of substantial justice; (2) Prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment; and (3) Existence of special circumstances in the case combined with its legal merits as well as the amount and the issue involved.272

Relevant cases. The 2011 case of Semblante and Pilar v. CA, Gallera de Mandaue, 273 where the respondents’ failure to  post the required appeal bond within the 10-calendar day reglementary period was excused because the High Court found it compelling to rule on the issue of whether the petitioners, who worked as masiador and sentenciador  in the cockpit of respondents, were employees of the latter. It thus declared that they were not employees but independent contractors since their relationship with respondents failed to pass muster the four-fold test of employment. The 2010 case of Intertranz Container Lines, Inc. v. Bautista,274 where relaxation of the rule was made because it is clear from the records that the petitioners never intended to evade the posting of an appeal bond. They exerted earnest efforts to abide by the law and the rules on appeal with a notice of appeal, appeal memorandum, and an appeal bond for P531,000.00. They also moved to reduce the appeal bond. The petitioners

might or might not have been aware that the accreditation of the bonding company expired on July 31, 2005 but when the bond was posted on July 11, 2005, the bonding company’s accreditation and the bond it issued were still valid. Although the petitioners failed to file a replacement bond within ten (10) days from receipt of the NLRC order requiring them to do so, again, it cannot be said that they intended to ignore the order.

In Your Bus Line v. NLRC,275 where the Labor Arbiter’s decision failed to state the exact total amount due which would be the basis of the computation of the bond, the failure of the petitioner to post the bond was excused because it was misled by the notice of the decision which did not mention that a bond must be filed. The lawyer for petitioner relied on such notice and considering this circumstance as an excusable mistake, the Supreme Court allowed petitioner to file the bond and appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter. In Erectors, Inc. v. NLRC,276 where the Labor Arbiter erroneously included moral and exemplary damages in the computation of the appeal bond.

VII-A. RULE ON REDUCTION OF APPEAL BOND 1. THE AMOUNT OF APPEAL BOND MAY BE REDUCED. The general rule is that the appeal bond that should be posted should be equivalent to the monetary award of the Labor Arbiter .277 Its reduction is neither provided for in the Labor Code nor in its implementing rules. In practice, however, the NLRC has allowed the reduction of the bond upon showing of meritorious grounds. And the validity of this practice ha s been given judicial imprimatur  in the case of Star Angel Handicraft v. NLRC. 278

2. REQUISITES. Under the latest 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, a motion to reduce bond may be allowed provided the following conditions are complied with: (1) The motion should be filed within the reglementary period; (2) The motion to reduce bond should be based on meritorious grounds; and (3) The motion should be accompanied by a partial bond, the amount of which should be reasonable in relation to the monetary awards.279 a. Guidelines to determine when case is meritorious.

The 2013 case of Maynilad Water Supervisors Association v. Maynilad Water Services, Inc. , 280 enunciates the following guidelines to determine existence of meritorious cases which include instances in which: (1) There was substantial compliance with the Rules;281 (2) Surrounding facts and circumstances constitute meritorious grounds to reduce the bond; (3) A liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the d esired objective of resolving controversies on the merits; or (4) The appellants, at the very least, exhibited their willingness and/or good faith by posting a partial bond during the reglementary period .282

3. SOME PRINCIPLES ON REDUCTION OF BOND. 

Bond may be reduced when decision failed to specify the exact amount of monetary award from which the amount of the appeal bond is to be based.283



Conversely, the reduction of the bond will not be warranted not only when no meritorious ground is shown to  justify the same but when the appellant absolutely failed to comply with the requirement of posting a bond, even if partial; or when circumstances show the employer’s unwillingness to ensure the satisfaction of its workers’ valid claims.284

 

Monetary award running into millions is not justification to reduce bond. 285 Financial difficulties or financial incapacity is not sufficient grounds to reduce bond. What appellant has to pay is a moderate and reasonable sum for the premium for such bond. 286





The full amount of the monetary award should still be posted within the reglementary period even if the appellant has filed a motion to reduce bond.287

 Alternative remedy is to pay partial appeal bond while motion to reduce bond is pending with the NL RC. Examples:



Rosewood Processing, Inc. v. NLRC.

(1)

- The petitioner was declared to have substantially complied with the rules by posting a partial  surety bond of P50,000.00 while its motion to reduce the appeal bond in the amount of P789,154.39 was pending before the NLRC.

(2)

Following Rosewood , the filing by petitioners of a motion to reduce appeal bond to P100,000, enclosing a  bond in that amount, from the total monetary award of P3,132,335.57 was given imprimatur in the 2010 case of Pasig Cylinder Mfg. , Corp. v. Rollo. 289

288

The partial bond must be posted during the reglementary period. The late filing of the bond divests the NLRC of its jurisdiction to entertain the appeal since the decision of the Labor Arbiter has already become final and executory with the lapse of the reglementary period. 290



Partial bond posted must not be inadequate. In Sapitan v. JB Line Bicol Express, Inc. ,291 the partial bond of P200,000 was found to be inadequate for the liability in the sum of P9,097,624.00.

------------oOo------------

E ndnotes:

1

Article 218(d) , as amended by R.A. No. 6715, March 21 , 1989; Section 1, Rule IX, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure; Section 1, Rule XXIII, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].

2

Article 219 of the Labor Code.

3

Under the 1990 New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, Labor Arbiters are expressly granted the power to issue injunction in ordinary cases. (See Section 1, Rule XI thereof) .

4

The said provision in the 1990 NLRC Rules is no longer found in its 2002, 2005 and 2011 versions. It is opined that this deletion is correct since Article 218 of the Labor Co de grants injunctive power only to the “Commission” which obviously refers to the NLRC’s various divisions and not to the Labor Arbiters. The reception of evidence in

injunction proceedings may, however, be delegated to the Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such places as he/she may determine to be accessible to the parties and their witnesses, and shall thereafter submit his/her report and recommendation to the Commission within fifteen (15) days from such delegation. (See Article 218(e) , Labor Code and Section 4 , Rule X, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure) . 5

As confirmed in Lahm III v. Mayor, A.C. No. 7430, Feb. 15, 2012.

6

Under Article 218(e) , Labor Code.

7

See paragraph [c], Article 217, Labor Code; Section 1, Rule V, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

8

As amended by R.A. No. 6715 [March 21, 1989].

9

As amended by R.A. No. 6727 [June 9, 1989], involving wage distortion cases in unorganized establishments.

10

As amended by R.A. No. 7730 [June 2, 1994], involving contested cases under the exception clause therein.

11

As incorporated by Section 26, R.A. No. 6715 [March 21, 1989].

12

Otherwise known as “The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.”

13

March 8, 2010.

14

The Wage Rationalization Act.

15

The last paragraph of Article 262- A of the Labor Code entitled “Procedures” provides: “Upon motion of any interested party, the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators or the Labor Arbiter in the region where the movant resides, in case of the absence or incapacity of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, for any reason, may issue a writ of execution requiring either the sheriff of the Commission or regular courts or any public official whom the parties may designate in the submission agreement to execute the final decision, order or award.”

16

Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, as amended by R.A. No. 10022.

17

See Section 1, Rule V, 2 011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

18

Under Article 248, Ibid.

19

Under Article 249, Ibid.

20

Article 247, Labor Code, as amended b y Section 19, Republic Act No. 6715.

21

Article 247, Ibid.

22

Under paragraph [a] (2) of Article 217.

23

Under Articles 261 and 262.

24

Under paragraph [g] of Article 263, he may take cognizance of termination disputes that are included or subsumed in the case/s over which he has assumed jurisdiction.

25

Id. ; Such certified cases may include or subsume the issue of termination of employment the legality of which the NLRC may validly decide upon.

26

C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc. v. CA, G.R. Nos. 155109, 155135 & 179220, Sept. 29, 2010.

27

Navarro III v. Damasco, G.R. No. 101875, July 14, 1995.

28

Maneja v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124013, June 5, 1998, 290 SCRA 603.

29

San San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 108001, March 15, 1996.

30

Atlas Farms, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 142244, Nov. 18, 2002.

31

Maneja v. NLRC, supra.

32

Landtex Industries v. CA, G.R. No. 150278, Aug. 9, 2007; San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, supra

33

Landtex Industries v. CA, supra.

34

Vivero v. CA, G.R. No. 138938, Oct. 24, 2000, 344 SCRA 268, 281.

35

Navarro III v. Damasco, supra.

36

Atlas Farms, Inc. v. NLRC, supra.

37

Maneja v. NLRC, supra; Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 95940, July 24, 1996.

38

G.R. No. 186557, Aug. 25, 2010.

39

G.R. No. 150278, Aug. 9, 2007.

40

G.R. No. 142244, Nov. 18, 2002.

41

G.R. No. 108001, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 133.

42

University of the Immaculate Conception v. NLRC and Teodora Axalan, G.R. No. 181146, Jan. 26, 2011.

43

Id.

44

Article 129, Labor Code; Briad Agro Development Corporation v. de la Serna, G.R. No. 82805, Nov. 9, 1989, 179 SCRA 269; Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Minister of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 74621, Feb. 7, 1990, 182 SCRA 5; Star Security and Detective Agency v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 82607, July 12, 1990, 187 SCRA 358.

45

San Jose v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121227, Aug. 17, 1998.

46

G.R. No. 158620, Oct. 11, 2006.

47

San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, 161 S CRA 719.

48

Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 112139, J an. 31, 2000.

49

Osias Academy v. DOLE, G.R. Nos. 83257-58, Dec. 21, 1990, 192 SCRA 612.

50

Apodaca v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80039, April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA 442.

51

Air Material Wing Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111870, June 30, 1994.

52

M. Ramirez Industries v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 89894, Jan. 3, 1997, 266 SCRA 111, 128; Ubay Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. v. Trajano, G.R. No. 106813, Nov. 25, 1993, 228 SCRA 189.

53

Article 217(a) ,(6) , Labor Code; South Motorists Enterprises v. Tosoc, G.R. No. 87449, Jan. 23, 1990, 181 SCRA 386.

54

55

G.R. Nos. L-75746-48, Dec. 14, 1987, 156 SCRA 498. Referring to the labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers who are tasked to inspect the establishments under Article 128 of the Labor Code. .

56

Emphasis supplied.

57

G.R. No. 152396, Nov. 20, 2007.

58

G.R. No. 179652, March 6, 2012. This Resolution modified its earlier May 8, 2009 decision found in 587 SCRA 724, 738.

59

Underscoring supplied.

60

The Supreme Court, in the 2007 case of Ex-Bataan Veterans Security Agency, Inc. v. The Secretary of Labor Laguesma, G.R. No. 152396, Nov. 20, 2007, reiterated the said three (3) elements to divest the Regional Director or his representatives of jurisdiction under the exception clause cited in the earlier cases of SSK Parts Corporation v. Camas, G.R. Nos. 85934-36, Jan. 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 675, 678, and Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. v. Sec. Dela Serna, G.R. No. 86963, Aug. 6, 1999, 370 Phil. 872. See also Bayhaven, Inc. v. Abuan, G.R. No. 160859, July 30, 2008 and Meteoro v. Creative Creatures, Inc. , G.R. No. 171275, July 13, 2009; Section 1 [b], Rule III of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices [September 16, 1987].

61

G.R. No. 152396, Nov. 20, 2007.

62

G.R. No. 171275, July 13, 2009.

63

G.R. No. 182018, Oct. 10, 2012.

64

G.R. No. L-72644, Dec. 14, 1987, 156 SCRA 435.

65

Dai-ichi Electronics Manufacturing Corp. V. Villarama, Jr. , G.R. No. 112940, Nov. 21, 1994, 238 SCRA 267, 271 [1994]; San Miguel Corporation v. Etcuban, G.R. No. 127639, Dec. 3, 1999; Rodriguez, Jr. v. Aguilar, Sr. , G.R. No. 159482. Aug. 30, 2005.

66

Section 10, Republic Act No. 8042; Section 58, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.

67

No. 22, NCMB Primer on Strike, Picketing and Lockout, 2nd Edition, December 1995.

68

No. 26, Guidelines Governing Labor Relations.

69

In assumed cases.

70

In certified cases. ; See Article 263(g) , Labor Code; See also Section 3[b], Rule VIII, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

71

See 2  paragraph of Section 4 of Rule IV thereof. nd

72

Section 3[b], Rule VIII, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. This rule should likewise apply by analogy to assumed cases.

73

Section 3[c], Rule VIII, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

74

G.R. No. 183335, Dec. 23, 2009; See also Hotel Employees Union-NFL v. Waterfront Insular Hotel Davao, G.R. Nos. 174040-41, Sept. 22, 2010.

75

Otherwise known as t he “Wage Rationalization Act.”

76

Article 124, Labor Code, as amended by Section 3, Republic Act No. 6727; Section 7, Chapter II, Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 6727; Section 1, Rule VII, Rules of Procedure on Minimum Wage Fixing issued by the National Wages and Productivity Commission on 04 June 1990.

77

Id.

78

Section 6 [c], Rule V, NCMB Manual of Procedures for Conciliation and Preventive Mediation Cases.

79

Emphasis supplied.

80

See Section 1(h) of Rule V thereof.

81

Section 4, Rule XXII, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, [February 17, 2003].

82

Id.

83

Such as (1) the Sheriff of the Commission (NLRC) ; (2) a duly deputized officer; (3) a Special Sheriff; (4) the Sheriff of the regular courts; or (5) any public official whom the parties may designate in the submission agreement to execute the final decision, order or award.

84

The last paragraph of Article 262- A of the Labor Code entitled “Procedures” provides: “Upon motion of any interested party, the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators or the Labor Arbiter in the region where the movant resides, in case of the absence or incapacity of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, for any reason, may issue a writ of execution requiring either the sheriff of the Commission or regular courts or any public official whom the parties may designate in the submission agreement to execute the final decision, order or award.”

85

Entitled “An Act to Institute the Policies of Overseas Employment and Establish a Higher Standard of Protection

and Promotion of the Welfare of Migrant Workers, Their Families and Overseas Filipinos in Distress, and for Other Purposes. ” See Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, Otherwise known as the “Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos  Act of 1995” (Approved on June 7, 1995) , 86

See Section 7 of R.A. No. 10022 (Approved on March 8, 2010) .

87

G.R. No. 197309, Oct. 10, 2012.

88

G.R. No. 172642, June 13, 2012.

Section 1, Rule I, Part VI, 2002 POEA Rules for Land-Based Overseas Workers; Section 1, Rule II, Part V, 2003

89

POEA Rules for Seafarers; Section 28, Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 dated Feb. 29, 1996. 90

Ibid. ; Id. ; Id.

91

Zamboanga City Water District v. Buat, G.R. No. 104389, May 27, 19 94.

92

Reese, Choice of Law in Torts a nd Contracts, 16 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1, 21 [1977].

93

Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co. , Inc. , 151 F. Supp. 465, 467 [1957].

94

Scoles and Hayes, Conflict of Law, 644-647 [1982]; Asia International Builder Corporation v. Mondejar, G.R. No. 105029-32, Dec. 05, 1994. Omanfil International Manpower Development Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130339, Dec. 22, 1998, 300 SCRA

95

455. 96

G.R. No. 61594, Sept. 28, 1990.

97

G.R. No. 124382, Aug. 16, 1999.

98

G.R. No. 124382, Aug. 16, 1999.

99

Black’s Law Dictionary, 5  Ed. , [1979], p. 460. th

100

Id.

101

Otherwise known as “Domestic Workers Act” or “Batas Kasambahay” which was approved by President Benigno

S. Aquino III on January 18, 2013. 102

Section 4 [d], Article I, R.A. No. 10361.

103

Otherwise known as “The Cooperative Code of the Philippines.”

104

G.R. No. 121948, Oct. 8, 2001.

105

P.D. No. 175 [Law Strengthening the Cooperative Movement] was repealed by express provision of Article 127 of

R.A. No. 6938 [The Cooperative Code of the Philippines] which was then the law in force at the time the complaint in this case was filed with the DOLE. 106

G.R. No. 164257, July 5, 2010.

107

G.R. No. 128024, May 9, 2000, 331 SCRA 584.

108

See also Domondon v. NLRC. G.R. No. 154376, Sept. 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 559.

109

Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement [PRRM] v. Pulgar, G.R. No. 169227, July 5, 2010.

110

Dai-Chi Electronics Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Villarama, G.R. No. 112940. Nov. 21, 1994; Portillo v.

Rudolf Lietz, Inc. , G.R. No. 196539, Oct. 10, 2012.

111

San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC, 161 SCRA 719 (1988) .

112

Georg Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Hon. Isnani and Romana R. Lanchinebre, G.R. No. 109272, Aug. 10, 1994, 235

SCRA 216, 221. 113

Nestlé Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 85197, March 18, 1991, 195 SCRA 340; See also Locsin II v. Mekeni

Food Corporation, G.R. No. 192105, Dec. 09, 2013; Manese v. Jollibee Foods Corporation, G.R. No. 170454, Oct. 11, 2012; Jumuad v. Hi-Flyer Food, Inc. , G.R. No. 187887, Sept. 7, 2011. 114

Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Cor p. , Ltd. Staff Retirement Plan v. Spouses Broqueza, G.R. No. 178610, Nov.

17, 2010. 115

Ibid.

116

Under Section 5 [5.2. ] of R.A. No. 8799 the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over

all cases enumerated under P.D. No. 902-A, has been transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC) . 117

Enunciated in the 2010 case of Matling Industrial and Commercial Corp. v. Ricardo R. Coros, G.R. No. 157802,

Oct. 13, 2010. This case is an appeal via petition for review on certiorari. The petitioners challenge the decision of the CA which sustained the ruling of the NLRC to the effect that the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction because the respondent, its Vice President for Finance and Administration, was not a c orporate officer of petitioner Matling. 118

P.D. No, 902-A; Barba v. Liceo de Cagayan University, G.R. No. 193857, Nov. 28, 2012; Gomez v. PNOC

Development and Management Corporation (PDMC) , G.R. No. 174044, Nov. 27, 2009, 606 S CRA 187, 194, 119

See Section 25, Batas Pambansa Blg. 69, otherwise known a s the “Corporation Code of the Philippines.”

120

Purificacion G. Tabang v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121143, Jan. 21, 1997, 266 SCRA 462, 468. For a long time, the ruling

in this case has been the controlling doctrine. It was enunciated therein that “(a) corporate officer’s dismissal is

always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate controversy, and the nature is not altered by the reason or wisdom with which the Board of Directors may have in taking such action. Also, an intra -corporate controversy is one which arises between a stockholder and the corporation. There is no distinction, qualification, nor any exemption whatsoever. The provision is broad and covers all kinds of controversies between stockholders and corporations. ” In this case, the petitioner’s dual positions at the time of her dismissal, that of Medical Director and Hospital

Administrator of private respondent Pamana Golden Care Medical Center in Calamba, Laguna, are expressly provided under the By-Laws. 121

Nacpil v. Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation, G.R. No. 144767, March 21, 2002. In this case, petitioner was

declared a corporate officer despite the fact that the By-Laws of respondent IBC did not mention his position of Comptroller and Assistant Manager. The reason cited is that even assuming that he was in fact appointed by the General Manager, such appointment was subsequently approved by the Board of Directors of respondent IBC. That the position of Comptroller is not expressly mentioned among the officers of IBC in its By-Laws is of no moment because the IBC’s Board of Directors is empowered under Section 25 of the Corporation Code and under

the corporation’s by-laws to appoint such other officers as it may deem necessary. Consequently, since petitioner’s appointment as comptroller required the approval and formal action of respondent IBC’s Board of Directors to

become valid, it is clear therefore that petitioner is a corporate officer whose dismissal is in the nature of an intracorporate controversy. 122

The following is the sequence of respondent Coros’s   rising from the ranks: 1966 –  Bookkeeper; 1968 –Senior

Accountant; 1969  –Chief Accountant; 1972 –Office Supervisor; 1973 –Assistant Treasurer; 1978 –Special Assistant for Finance; 1980 –Assistant Comptroller; 1983 –Finance and Administrative Manager; 1985 –Asst. Vice President for Finance and Administration; 1987 to April 17, 2000 –Vice President for Finance and Administration. 123

See also Prudential Bank and Trust Company v. Reyes, G.R. No. 141093, Feb. 20, 2001, 352 SCRA 316, 327.

This case also involves an employee who rose from the ranks until she reached the position of Assistant VicePresident at the time of her termination. 124

G.R. No. 201298, Feb. 5, 2014.

125

Petitioner Raul C. Cosare, although a salesman employee of private respondent Dante Arevalo, was named an

incorporator of Arevalo’s Broadcom, having been assigned 100 shares of stock with par value of P1.00 per share. 126

G.R. No. 193857, Nov. 28, 2012.

127

G.R. No. 171993, Dec. 12, 2011, 662 SCRA 35. Petitioner Marc II Marketing, Inc. (petitioner corporation) , is a

corporation primarily engaged in buying, marketing, selling and distributing in retail or wholesale for export or import household appliances and products and other items. It took over the business operations of Marc Marketing, Inc. which was made non-operational following its incorporation and registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) . Petitioner Lucila V. Joson (Lucila) is the President and majority stockholder of petitioner corporation. She was also the former President and majority stockholder of the defunct Marc Marketing, Inc. Respondent Alfredo M. Joson (Alfredo) , on the other hand, was the General Manager, incorporator, director and stockholder of petitioner corporation. 128

G.R. No. 168757, Jan. 19, 2011, 640 SCRA 67.

129

On December 15, 2000, the Supreme Court, in A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, adopted the Interim Rules of Procedure on

Corporate Rehabilitation and directed the transfer from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to the Regional Trial Courts of all petitions for rehabilitation filed by corporations, partnerships, and associations under P.D. No. 902-A in accordance with the amendatory provisions of R.A. No. 8799, otherwise known as the “Securities Regulation Code.” 130

The Manila Banking Corporation, v. NLRC, G.R. No. 107487, Sept. 29, 1997, 279 S CRA 602.

131

De Castro v. Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. , G.R. No. 165153, Aug 25, 2010; Negros Navigation Co. , Inc. v.

CA, G.R. No. 163156, Dec. 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 434, 455. 132

Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Heirs of Zamora, G.R. No. 164267, Nov. 23, 2007, citing Philippine Airlines, Inc. v.

Zamora, supra; Rubberworld [Phils. ], Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 126773, April 14, 1999, 305 SCRA 721, 729. 133

134

Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 123238, July 11, 2005 [Resolution].

 Alemar’s Sibal & Sons, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 114761, Jan. 19, 2000.

135

Lingkod Manggagawa sa Rubberworld, Adidas-Anglo v. Rubberworld [Phils. ], Inc. , G.R. No. 153882, Jan. 29,

2007. 136

See Section 11, in relation to Section 27, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation; De

Castro v. Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. , G.R. No. 165153, Aug 25, 2010; Rubberworld (Phils. ) Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 126773, April 14, 1999, 365 Phil. 273. 137

Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 148372, June 27, 2005.

138

Section 2, Article II, 1987 Constitution.

139

Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center v. Acosta, G.R. Nos. 97468 -70, Sept. 2, 1993, 226 SCRA 49.

140

G.R. No. 113191, Sept. 18, 1996, 262 SCRA 39, 43-44.

141

G.R. Nos. 109095-109107, Feb. 23, 1995.

142

See also World Health Organization v. Aquino, G.R. No. L -35131, Nov. 29, 1972, 48 SCRA 242.

143

G.R. No. 108813, Dec. 15, 1994.

144

G.R. No. 92432, Feb. 23, 1995.

145

G.R. No. 79470, Feb. 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 644, 660.

146

Ebro III v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110187, Sept. 4, 1996, 261 SCRA 399.

147

According to Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America International, Ltd. v. CA, G.R. No. 120135, March 31,

2003, 448 Phil. 181, 196, and Communication Materials and Design, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 102223, Aug. 22, 1996, 260 SCRA 673, 695. 148

G.R. No. 166920, Feb. 19, 2007.

149

See PHILSEC Investment Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 103493, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 102.

150

G.R. No. 120077, Oct. 13, 2000.

151

Id.

152

G.R. No. 149578, April 10, 2003.

153

Entitled “Penalties.”

154

As amended, by Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, and further amended by Department Order No. 40-

G-03, Series of 2010 [March 29, 2010], 155

156

Now Department of Justice. Section 19 [formerly Section 15], Rule XXII, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by

Department Order No. 40-G-03, Series of 2010, [March 19, 2010], previously amended by Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].

157

Now Regional Trial Courts.

158

G.R. No. 172013, Oct. 2, 2009.

159

Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118651, Oct. 16, 1997, 280 SCRA 806.

160

 Article 223 provides in part: “In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated

employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein. ” 161

3rd paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, [March 21, 1989].

162

See Section 3 of Rule XI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

163

Such as the cases of Maranaw Hotel Resort Corporation (Century Park Sheraton Manila) v. NLRC, G.R. No.

110027, November 16, 1994, 238 SCRA 190, as reiterated in Archilles Manufacturing Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 107225, June 2, 1995, 244 SCRA 750. 164

International Container Terminal Services, Inc. [ICTSI] v. NLRC, supra.

165

By virtue of Rule 65 certiorari petition.

166

By reason of Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari.

167

Mt. Carmel College v. Resuena, G.R. No. 173076, Oct. 10, 2007; See also Panuncillo v. CAP Philippines, Inc. ,

G.R. No. 161305, Feb. 9, 2007. 168

Article 223, Labor Code; Zamboanga City Water District v. Buat, G.R. No. 104389, May 27, 1994, 232 SCRA 587.

169

See Section 19 [Contents of Decisions] of Rule V [Proceedings Before Labor Arbiters] of the 2011 NLRC Rules of

Procedure. It must be noted that this Section 19 was previously numbered Section 18 of the original version of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. It was renumbered by NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 11-12, Series of 2012 [November 16, 2012], effective January 11, 2013. 170

2  paragraph, Section 19, Rule V thereof, as renumbered by NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 11-12, Series of 2012 nd

[November 16, 2012], effective January 11, 2013. 171

Garcia and Dumago v. Philippine A irlines, Inc. , G.R. No. 164856, Jan. 20, 2009 [En Banc].

172

See 1  paragraph of Section 12 (formerly Section 9) , Rule XI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as renumbered by st

NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 11-12, Series of 2012 [November 16, 2012], effective January 11, 2013. 173

Ibid.

174

The contempt proceeding shall be in accordance with Rule IX [Contempt] of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

See 3  paragraph of Section 12 (formerly Section 9) , Rule XI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as renumbered by rd

NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 11-12, Series of 2012 [November 16, 2012], effective January 11, 2013.

175

See also Christian Literature Crusade v. NLRC, G.R. No. 79106, April 10, 1989, 171 SCRA 712; Ocampo v. Hon.

Carale, G.R. No. 110687, Dec. 15, 1993; Industrial and Transport Equipment, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113592, Jan. 15, 1998. 176

See 3  paragraph of Section 12 (formerly Section 9) , Rule XI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as renumbered by rd

NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 11-12, Series of 2012 [November 16, 2012], effective January 11, 2013. 177

Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118651, Oct. 16, 1997, 280 SCRA 806.

178

Roquero v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc. , G.R. No. 152329, April 22, 2003.

179

MAI Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 73662, June 18, 1987.

180

See Section 12 [Execution of Reinstatement Pending Appeal], Rule XI [Execution Proceedings] of the 2011 NLRC

Rules of Procedure. It must be noted that this Section 12 was p reviously numbered Section 9 of the original version of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. It was renumbered by NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 11 -12, Series of 2012 [November 16, 2012], effective January 11, 2013. 181

This directive is provided under the 2  paragraph of Section 19 (formerly Section 18) of Rule V, 2011 NLRC Rules nd

of Procedure, as renumbered by NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 11-12, Series of 2012 [November 16, 2012], effective January 11, 2013. 182

See 2   paragraph of Section 12 (formerly Section 9) , Rule XI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as nd

renumbered by NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 11-12, Series of 2012 [November 16, 2012], effective January 11, 2013. 183

Article 223, Labor Code; Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. NLRC, supra.

184

C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc. v. CA, G.R. Nos. 155109, 155135 & 179220, Sept. 29, 2010 .

185

Lansangan v. Amkor Technology Philippines, Inc. , G.R. No. 177026, Jan. 30, 2009.

186

Buenviaje v. CA, G.R. No. 147806, Nov. 12, 2002; See also Pfizer, Inc. v. Velasco, G.R. No. 177467, March 9,

2011. 187

Medina v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS)  –  DZWX, G.R. Nos. 99054-56, May 28, 1993, 222 SCRA

707. 188

Panuncillo v. CAP Philippines, Inc. , G.R. No. 161305, Feb. 9, 2007.

189

G.R. No. 108878, Sept. 20, 1994.

190

Triad Security & Allied Services, Inc. v. Ortega, G.R. No. 160871, Feb. 6, 2006.

191

G.R. No. 180972, Jan. 20, 2014.

192

Issued by the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code.

193

Zamboanga City Water District v. Buat. G.R. No. 104389, May 27, 1994.

194

Section 1 [b], Rule I, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 40-03,

Series of 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]. 195

Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 152568, Feb. 16, 2004; United Field Sea Watchman and

Checkers Agency v. Requillo, G.R. No. 143527, Dec. 6, 200 6. 196

P.D. No. 1367, approved on May 1, 1978, entitled “Further Amending Certain Provisions of Book V of P.D. No.

442, Otherwise Known as the Labor Code o f the Philippines, As Amended”, eliminated appeals to the President, but gave the President the power to assume jurisdiction over any case which he considers of national interest. Moreover, P.D. No. 1391, approved on May 29, 1978, entitled “Amending Book V of the Labor Code of the Philippines to Insure Speedy Labor Justice and Further Stabilize Industrial Peace”, further eliminated appeals from

the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor and Employment but the President still continues to exercise his power to assume jurisdiction over any cases which he considers affecting national interest. 197

Philux, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 151854, Sept. 3, 2008.

198

Millennium Erectors Corporation v. Magallanes, G.R. No. 184362, November 15, 2010; Reyes v. Maxim’s Tea

House, G.R. No. 140853, Feb. 27, 2003; Cayena v. NLRC, G.R. No. 7 6137, Feb. 18, 1991. 199

New Pacific Timber & Supply Co. , Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124224, March 17, 2000.

200

Radiowealth Finance Company v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 138739, July 6, 2000, 335 SCRA 288; See alsoCañedo

v. Kampilan Security and Detective Agency, Inc. , G.R. No. 179326, July 31, 2013; Daabay v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. , Inc. , G.R. No. 199890, Aug. 19, 2013; Universal Staffing Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 177576, July 21, 2008; Solgus Corp. v. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 157488, Feb. 6, 2007; Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. , Inc. v. Daniel, G.R. No. 156893, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 494, 506. 201

Articles 129 and 223, Labor Code; Section 2, Rule VI, 2011 NLRC Rules of P rocedure.

202

G.R. No. 160871, Feb. 6, 2006.

203

See also Metro Drug Distribution, Inc. v. Metro Drug Corporation Employees Association-FFW, G.R. No. 142666, Sept.

26, 2005. 204

G.R. No. 175481, Nov. 21, 2012.

205

Section 3, Rule XI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

206

Opinaldo v. Ravina, G.R. No. 196573, Oct. 16, 2013; Bunagan v. Sentinel Watchman & Protective Agency, Inc. ,

G.R. No. 144376, Sept. 13, 2006, 533 Phil. 283, 290-291; Kathy-O Enterprises v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117610, March 2, 1998, 286 SCRA 729. 207

Section 1, Rule VI, Ibid. ; See also Bristol Myers Squibb [Phils. ], Inc. v. Viloria, G.R. No. 148156, Sept. 27, 2004.

208

RJL Martinez Fishing Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. L -63550-51, Jan. 31, 1984.

209

Judy Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111934, April 29, 1998, 289 SCRA 755; 352 Phil. 593; SM Agri and

General Machineries v. NLRC, G.R. No. 74806, Jan. 9, 1989.

210

Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120506, Oct. 28, 1996, 263 SCRA 638; Chong Guan Trading v. NLRC,

G.R. No. 81471, April 26, 1989, 172 SCRA 831. 211

Chronicle Securities Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 157907, Nov. 25, 2004; Equitable PCI Bank v. Rosita Ku,

G.R. No. 142950, 26 March 2001. 212

Tiger Construction and Development Corporation v. Abay, G.R. No. 164141, Feb. 26, 2010; Iligan Cement Corp. v.

ILIASCOR Employees and Workers Union  –  Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (IEWU-SPFL) , G.R. No. 158956, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 449, 461; Ruiz v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 166386, Jan. 27, 2009, 577 SCRA 29, 48/  213

Judy Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111934, April 29, 1998, 289 SCRA 7 55; 352 Phil. 593.

214

Philippine Geothermal, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 106370, Sept. 8, 1994.

215

Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the P hilippines v. Lariosa, G.R. No. L-70479, Feb. 27, 1987.

216

Article 218(d) , as amended by R.A. No. 6715, March 21, 1989; Section 1, Rule IX, 2011 NLRC Rules of

Procedure. 217

Under the current 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, the decision of the Labor Arbiter on a third party claim is not

appealable but may be elevated to the Commission and resolved in accordance with Rule XII [Extraordinary Remedies] of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. (Section 11 [d], Rule XI thereof) . Consequently, such elevation to the Commission may only be initiated by way of filing of a petition for extraordinary r emedy not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the order or resolution of the Labor Arbiter, furnishing a copy thereof to the adverse party. ( Section 3, Rule XII, Ibid. ) . 218

New Pacific Timber & Supply Co. , Inc. v. NLRC, G. R. No. 124224, March 17, 2000, 328 SCRA 404.

219

New Pacific Timber & Supply Co. , Inc. v. NLRC, supra; City Fair Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 95711, April 21,

1995, 243 SCRA 572. 220

Surima v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121147, June 26, 1998; Valderrama v. NLRC, G.R. No. 98239, April 25, 1996; Ruga v.

NLRC, G.R. Nos. 72654-61, Jan. 22, 1990, 181 SCRA 266. 221

Calipay v. NLRC, G.R. No. 166411, Aug. 3, 2010, citing Moneytrend Lending Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 165580,

Feb. 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 705, 714-715; Cuevas v. Bais Steel Corporation, supra. 222

Volkschel Labor Union v. NLRC, Ibid. ; See also Chronicle Securities Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 157907, Nov.

25, 2004; United Field Sea Watchman and Checkers Agency v. Requillo, G.R. No. 143527, Dec. 6, 2006; Andaya v. NLRC, G.R. No. 157371, July 15, 2005. 223

Building Care Corporation/Leopard Security & Investigation Agency v. Myrna Macaraeg, G.R. No. 198357, Dec.

10, 2012; Henry Clyde Abbott v. NLRC, G.R. No. L -65173, Oct. 27, 1986, 145 SCRA 206. 224

Section 4 [b], Rule III, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure; Flexo Mfg. Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-55971, Feb. 28,

1985, 135 SCRA 145; Lynx Industries Contractor, Inc. v. Tala, G.R. No. 164333, Aug. 24, 2007.

225

Volkschel Labor Union v. NLRC, G. R. No. L-39686, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 314.

226

Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 125602, April 29, 1999, 306 SCRA 380.

227

Section 1, Rule VI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

228

Bristol Myers Squibb [Phils. ], Inc. v. Viloria, G.R. No. 148156, Sept. 27, 2004.

229

Bunagan v. Sentinel Watchman & Protective Agency, Inc. , G.R. No. 144376, Sept. 13, 2006.

230

Lamzon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113600, May 28, 1999, 307 SCRA 665; 367 Phil. 169, 177.

231

Saint Louis University, Inc. v. Cobarrubias, G.R. No. 187104, Aug. 3, 2010.

232

Workers of Antique Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120062, June 8, 2000.

233

Acda v. Minister of Labor, G.R. No. L -51607, Dec. 15, 1982, 119 SCRA 326.

234

Luna v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116404, March 20, 1997, 270 SCRA 227, 231.

235

Saint Louis University, Inc. v. Cobarrubias, G.R. No. 187104, Aug. 3, 2010, citing Lim v. Delos Santos, G.R. No.

172574, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 607, 616-617; Villena v. Rupisan, G.R. No. 167620, April 3, 2007, 520 SCRA 346, 358-359. 236

Philamlife Insurance Co. v. Edna Bo nto-Perez, G.R. No. 83699, Feb. 21, 1989; C. W . Tan Mfg. v. NLRC, G. R. No.

79596, Feb. 10, 1989. 237

See Section 4, Rule 7 thereof.

238

Section 4 [a], Rule VI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure; Bristol Myers Squibb [Phils. ], Inc. v. Viloria, G.R. No.

148156, Sept. 27, 2004. 239

Del Mar Domestic Enterprises v. NLRC, G.R. No. 108731, Dec. 10, 1997.

240

G.R. No. 116464, March 1, 2000.

241

Section 4 [b], Rule VI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure; Bristol Myers Squibb [Phils. ], Inc. v. Viloria, G.R. No.

148156, Sept. 27, 2004. 242

Lamsan Trading, Inc. v. Leogardo, G.R. No. 73245, Sept. 30, 1986.

243

Millennium Erectors Corporation v. Magallanes G.R. No. 184362, Nov. 15, 2010; Gaerlan v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-

66526, Sept. 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 402; Del Ros ario & Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-64204, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 669. 244

Loon v. Power Master, Inc. , G.R. No. 189404, Dec. 11, 2013.

245

Section 3, Rule 1 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, in relation to Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.

246

Citing Roy Pasos v. Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 192394, July 3, 2013; and Millennium

Erectors Corporation v. Magallanes, G.R. No. 184362, Nov. 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 708, 713-714, citing Pacquing v. Coca-Cola Philippines, Inc. , G.R. No. 157966, Jan. 31, 2008, 543 SCRA 344, 356-357. 247

See No. 4, Administrative Order No. 11-09, Series of 2012 [November 16, 2012], issued by Hon. Gerardo C.

Nograles, NLRC Chairman. 248

Solgus Corp. v. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 157488, Feb. 6, 2007.

249

See Section 1, Rule III thereof.

250

Required under Article 223, Labor Code; Section 4 [a], (5) (iii) , Rule VI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

251

PNCC v. NLRC, G.R. No. 103670, July 10, 1998, 292 SCRA 266; C. W. Tan Mfg. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 79596, Feb.

10, 1989. 252

Sunrise Manning Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 146703, Nov. 18, 2004; Pagdonsalan v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-

63701, Jan. 31, 1980, 127 SCRA 463. 253

Millennium Erectors Corporation v. Magallanes, G.R. No. 184362, Nov. 15, 2010; Remerco Garments

Manufacturing v. Minister of Labor and Employment, G.R. Nos. L-56176-77, Feb. 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 167. 254

 Although Article 223 expressly requires the posting “only” of a “cash or surety bond” in order to p erfect the appeal,

in UERM-Memorial Medical Center v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110419, March 3, 1997, 269 SCRA 70, the posting of real property bond in lieu of cash or surety bond was held sufficient protection for the interests of the employees should they finally prevail. 255

Section 6, Rule VI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure; Roos Industrial Construction, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 172409,

Feb. 4, 2008; Borja Estate v. Ballad,

G.R. No. 152550, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 657;

Ong v. CA, G.R. No. 152494, Sept. 22, 2004;

Lamzon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113600, May 28, 1999, 307 SCRA 665; 367 Phil. 169, 177. 256

Quiambao v. NLRC, G.R. No. 91935, March 4, 1996, 324 Phil. 455; Aquino v. NLRC, G.R. No. 98108, Sept. 3,

1993, 226 SCRA 76. 257

Gaudia v. NLRC, G.R. No. 109371, Nov. 18, 1999; Lamzon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113600, May 28, 1999, 307 SCRA

665; 367 Phil. 169, 177. 258

Santos v. Velarde, G.R. No. 140753, April 30, 2003; Borja Estate v. Spouses Ballad G.R. No. 152550, June 8,

2005, 459 SCRA 657, 667. 259

Diaz v. Nora, G.R. No. 89324, Oct. 11, 1990.

260

Article 223, Labor Code; Section 6, Rule V I, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

261

Section 6, Rule VI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

262

Biogenerics Marketing and Research Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122725, Sept. 8, 1999, 313 SCRA 748.

263

Balagtas Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 159268, Oct. 27, 2006.

264

Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation v. Pacana, G.R. No. 171673, May 30, 2011.

265

Cadalin v. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 168923, Nov. 28, 2008.

266

See Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, Series of 1999, Rule VI, Section 6, in relation to Rule VII, Section 14

[Section 15 in the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure] thereof. 267

Sang-an v. Equator Knights Detective and Security Agency, Inc. , G.R. No. 173189, Feb. 13, 2013.

268

Aba v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122627, July 28, 1999.

269

Orozco v. The Fifth Division of the Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155207, April 29, 2005; Taberrah v.

NLRC, G.R. No. 117742, July 29, 1997, 276 SCRA 431; 342 Phil. 394, 402-403; Vergara v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117196, Dec. 5, 1997, 282 SCRA 486. 270

Mendoza, Jr. v. San Miguel Foods, Inc. , G.R. No. 158684, May 16, 2005.

271

Semblante v. CA, Gallera de Mandaue, et al. , G.R. No. 196426, Aug. 15, 2011, citing Orozco v. CA, Fifth Division,

G.R. No. 155207, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 700, 706-710; Olacao v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81390, Aug. 29, 1989, 177 SCRA 38, 49; Taberrah v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117742, July 29, 1997, 276 SCRA 431, 342 Phil. 394; Star Angel Handicraft v. NLRC, G.R. No. 108914, Sept. 20, 1994, 236 SCRA 580, 584. 272

Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120506, Oct. 28, 1996, 263 SCRA 638, 658; Manaban v. Sarphil

Corporation, G.R. No. 150915, April 11, 2005, 455 SCRA 240, citing Jaro v. CA, G.R. No. 127536, Feb. 19, 2002, 377 SCRA 282; Rosewood Processing, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 116476-84, May 21, 1998, 290 SCRA 408; 352 Phil. 1013. 273

G.R. No. 196426, Aug. 15, 2011.

274

G.R. No. 187693, July 13, 2010.

275

G.R. No. 93381, Sept. 28, 1990, 190 SCRA 160.

276

G.R. No. 93690, Oct. 10, 1991, 202 SCRA 597.

277

Ramirez v. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 182626, Dec. 4, 2009.

278

G.R. No. 108914, Sept. 20, 1994.

279

Section 6, Rule VI, 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure .

280

G.R. No. 198935, Nov. 27, 2013, citing University Plans v. Solano, G. R. No. 170416, June 22, 2011, 652 SCRA

492, 504-505, citing Nicol v. FootjJoy Industrial Corporation, July 27, 2007, 528 SCRA 300, 312 -313. 281

Should refer now to the prevailing 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.

282

See also Cervantes v. PAL Maritime Corporation, G.R. No. 175209, Jan. 16, 2013; University Plans Inc. v. Solano,

G.R. No. 170416, June 22, 2011, 652 SCRA 492; Forever Security & General Services v. Flores, G.R. No. 147961, Sept. 7, 2007; Ciudad Fernandina v. CA, G.R. No. 166594, July 20, 2006, 495 SCRA 807; Quiambao v. NLRC, G.R. No. 91935, March 4, 1996, 324 Ph il. 455.

283

Maynilad Water Supervisors Association v. Maynilad Water Services, Inc. , supra.

284

Id.

285

Calabash Garments, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110827, Aug 8, 1996, 260 SCRA 441; 329 Phil. 226, 235.

286

Times Transportation Company, Inc. v. Sotelo, supra citing Biogenerics Marketing and Research Corporation v.

NLRC, G.R. No. 122725, Sept. 8, 1999, 372 Phil. 653, 661; See also Accessories Specialist, Inc. v. Alabanza, G.R. No. 168985, July 23, 2008. 287

Ramirez v. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 182626, Dec. 4, 2009; Colby Construction and Management Corp. v. NLRC, G.R.

No. 170099, Nov. 28, 2007. 288

G.R. Nos. 116476-84, May 21, 1998, 290 SCRA 408; 352 Phil. 1013.

289

G.R. No. 173631, Sept. 8, 2010.

290

Filipinas [Pre-fabricated Bldg. ] Sys tems ‘Filsystems, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 153859, Dec. 11, 2003.

291

G.R. No. 163775, Oct. 19, 2007.

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