Zambales Chromite v. CA, 94 SCRA 261 Facts: Director Gozon issued an order dated October 5, 1960 wherein he dismissed the case filed by the petitioners Zambales Chromite Mining Co. In that case, they sought to be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of sixty-nine mining claims located in Santa Cruz, Zambales. On the basis of petitioners' evidence (the private respondents did not present any evidence and they filed a demurrer to the evidence or motion to dismiss the protest), Director Gozon found that the petitioners did not discover any mineral nor staked and located mining claims in accordance with law. The petitioners then appealed from that order to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. While the appeal was pending, Director Gozon was appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Instead of inhibiting himself, he decided the appealas it he was adjudicating the case for the first time. 'Thus, Secretary Gozon exercised appellate jurisdiction over a case which he had decided as Director of Mines. He acted as reviewing authority in the appeal from his own decision. Or, to use another analogy, he acted as trial judge and appellate judge in the same case. Issue: Whether petitioner’s right of due process is violated Held: Yes. Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due process, meaning fundamental fairness, when Secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director of Mines. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different viewor there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. A sense of proportion and consideration for the fitness of things should have deterred Secretary Gozon from reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines. He should have asked his undersecretary to undertake the review.
In Re: Complaint against Atty. Patricio A. Asoy Leonard Richards v. Atty. Patricio Asoy
A.C. No. 2655 9 July 1987 Facts Sometime in 1982, Leonard Richards retained Atty. Patricio Asoy as counsel in a civil case before the RTC of Pasay City. The terms of their contract provide that Richards was to pay an acceptance fee of fifteen thousand pesos and Php 300 for each court appearance. Thereafter, Richards and his family permanently left for Australia, with the understanding that Atty. Asoy would continue with the case. The civil case was dismissed by the trial court for lack of interest, as shown by the absence of their counsel despite notice. This decision was overturned and the case was reinstated following the reconsideration sought by Atty. Asoy. Two months after the reinstatement, the case was again dismissed for lack of interest and/or failure to prosecute. For alleged Malpractice for non-attendance at Court hearing, negligence, and lack of zeal in prosecuting a civil case for damages, resulting in its dismissal for lack of interest and/or failure to prosecute, Richards sued Atty. Asoy. Despite several attempts to serve him a copy of the show-cause Resolution, Atty. Asoy remained elusive. He had gone into hiding and was deliberately evading service of processes of the court, and so the Supreme Court issued a resolution suspending Atty. Asoy from the practice of law. Copies of the Resolution were circularized to all Courts nationwide with the directive that should Respondent appear before any lower Court, the latter shall serve upon him a copy of the show-cause Resolution and require him to appear within five days thereafter before the Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant. A little under a month after, Atty. Asoy filed a Manifestation submitting himself voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the Court. He denied all accusations and prayed that the order of suspension be lifted. He also asked that he be excused from appearing before the Bar Confidant by reason of financial constraints. The court denied the lifting but excused him from appearing. In his answer, Atty. Asoy reasoned that it was the failure of Richards to give him their new address in Australia that led to his inability to prosecute the case and also he was unable to shoulder the fees required for the services of expert witnesses besides the fact that his daughter was stricken with cerebral palsy. He also claimed that he had no intention to delay Richards for money, and that he was deprived of due process of law because he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was suspended. Issue: Whether Atty. Asoy may be held liable.
Held/Ratio: Yes As to the issue of due process, Atty. Asoy's side has been fully heard in the pleadings he has filed before this Court. A trial-type hearing is not needed. The requirement of due process has been duly satisfied. What due process abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. The facts disclosed require no further evidentiary hearing, and speak for themselves. Res ipsa loquitur. The Orders of the Trial Court dismissing the Civil Case are of record and Atty. Asoy's excuse that he can no longer recall them is feeble. Atty. Asoy is guilty of grave professional misconduct. He received from Richards, his client, compensation to handle his case in the Trial Court, but the same was dismissed for lack of interest and failure to prosecute. He had abandoned his client in violation of his contract ignoring the most elementary principles of professional ethics. That Atty. Asoy also ignored the processes of the Court and it was only after he was suspended from the practice of law that he surfaced, is highly indicative of his disregard of an attorney's duties to the Court. Mendoza v. NHA 111 SCRA 837 Santiago Mendoza, Carmen Urbano, Manuela Urbano, Renato De Guzman, Raquel De Guzman, Rosette De Guzman, And Romeo De Guzman (Mendoza et.al.), petitioners, are occupants of certain portions of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. They all claim ownership of their occupied lands: Santiago Mendoza: acquired from the DEUDORS, as evidenced by an AGREEMENT Carmen Urbano and Manuela Urbano : by virtue of a contract and denominated DEED OF TRANSFER OF RIGHTS TO, INTERESTS IN AND POSSESSION OF A RESIDENTIAL LOT Renato, Raquel, Rosette, and Romeo, all surnamed de Guzman: inherited from their father Serafin de Guzman On August 3, 1959, Republic Act No. 2616, took effect - authorized "the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate jointly owned by the J.M. Tuason and Company, Inc., Gregorio Araneta and Company, Inc., and Florencio Deudor, et al.," for subdivision into small lots and its resale al cost to the bona fide occupants thereof Land Tenure Administration (LTA) was directed to institute the proceeding for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate Before the complaint for eminent domain could be filed, the J.M. Tuason and Company, Inc., claiming to be the owner of the Tatalon Estate which was sought to be condemned, filed an action for prohibition with
preliminary injunction against the LTA, praying that Republic Act No. 2616 be declared unconstitutional: DENIED. On September 15, 1978, the trial court recognized the Compromise Agreement made by the Republic of the Philippines, now represented by the National Housing Authority, and the J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. On June 11, 1978, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 1472, authorizing the National Housing Authority (NHA) to summarily eject any and all squatters from government resettlement projects without the necessity of a judicial order. Thereafter, on May 8, 1980, the President of the Philippines declared the entire Metropolitan Manila Area as an Urban Land Reform Zone, issued Proclamation No. 1967, proclaiming 244 sites in Metropolitan Manila, including the Tatalon Estate, described as "Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones. On January 27, 1981, NHA wrote Manuela Urbano, informing her that her request for inclusion in the list of Tatalon Estate beneficiaries could not be favorably considered, for being an absentee structure owner, and demanding that she demolish her structure built on the Tatalon Estate and vacate the premises within 15 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, NHA would summarily demolish her structure after the expiration of the period without further notice. In a letter, dated June 5, 1981, NHA also informed Romeo de Guzman and Renato de Guzman that they cannot be granted a lot in the Tatalon Estate after development because they were absentee structure owners, as well. NHA, however, offered to buy their at a price to be determined by it in order to avoid economic waste, but that if the owner was not willing to sell the structure, he should demolish the same within 10 days from notice, otherwise NHA would summarily demolish the same without further notice. In a letter dated August 27, 1981, the National Housing Authority also ordered the petitioner Santiago Mendoza, "to demolish the illegal extension of (his) structure located at the Tatalon Estate which encroaches to the adjacent lot boundaries and pose obstruction/delay in the allocation process", within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise the NHA would summarily demolish the illegal construction after the expiration of the period without further notice. Due to the threat of demolition, Mendoza et.al. filed a petition for prohibition, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, to restrain the NHA from the threatened demolition of the petitioners' houses situated in Barangay Tatalon, Quezon City; and to declare Presidential Decree No. 1472 unconstitutional.
Petitioners (Mendoza et.al) They are rightful possessors of parcels of land within the Tatalon Estate. The enforcement of Presidential Decree No. 1472 against them is illegal and unconstitutional as it would deprive them of their property without due process of law. Respondents (NHA) Urbano and the De Guzmans, being absentee structure owners, are not entitled to lot allocations as they are bona fide occupants under P.D. 1261: “SECTION 3. Allocation of lots and/or housing units in the project area shall be made by the Authority according to the following priority: 1Present occupants who were listed in the 1958 Araneta Census List of Occupants; Present occupants as determined by the Authority in its 1976 Census Survey; and Squatter families in the Tatalon Estate after the 1976 Census Survey.” Mendoza created an illegal extension of his structure on the subject lot and, thus, must demolish the same. ISSUE/S: Whether or not Mendoza et.al. are entitled to a lot allocation in the Tatalon Estate RULING: No. They are not entitled to lot allocations. They falsely claim ownership over parcels of the Tatalon Estate. The subject land is a property of the state after the expropriation proceedings. They even admitted the State’s title when they applied for inclusion as beneficiaries. The petitioners, having actual knowledge of the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate,should have vindicated their claim of ownership to the land claimed by them in the expropriation proceedings, as intimated by the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration. Presidential Decree No. 1472 does not violate the constitutional due process clause since it requires proper notice of ejectment to the squatter or illegal occupant concerned either by personal service or by posting the same in the lot or door of the apartment as the case may be at least 10 days before his scheduled ejectment from the premises, which has been amply complied with in the case of the petitioners. Here, notices of ejectment were served upon the petitioners after it had been determined that they are not "Tatalon Estate beneficiaries" and, consequently, squatters on the land occupied by them.
Presidential Decree No. 1472 does not violate the constitutional due process clause since it requires proper notice of ejectment to the squatter or illegal occupant concerned either by personal service or by posting the same in the lot or door of the apartment as the case may be at least 10 days before his scheduled ejectment from the premises, which has been amply complied with in the case of the petitioners. Here, notices of ejectment were served upon the petitioners after it had been determined that they are not "Tatalon Estate beneficiaries" and, consequently, squatters on the land occupied by them. QUESTION: Why are the petitioners not entitled to lot allocations? ANSWER: They falsely claim ownership over parcels of the Tatalon Estate. The subject land is a property of the state after the expropriation proceedings. They even admitted the State’s title when they applied for inclusion as beneficiaries. The petitioners, having actual knowledge of the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate,should have vindicated their claim of ownership to the land claimed by them in the expropriation proceedings, as intimated by the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration. QUESTION: What are the remedies against public nuisance? ANSWER: Art. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are: (1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance: or (2) A civil action; or (3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings. Sumulong vs. Guerrero Facts: On 5 December 1977 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately 25 hectares, (in Antipolo Rizal) including the lots of Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters respectively. The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at P1.00 per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings. Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing the "total market value" of the subject 25 hectares of land, pursuant to
Presidential Decree 1224 which defines "the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation." On 17 January 1978, Judge Buenaventura Guerrero issued the order issuing a writ of possession in favor of NHA. Sumulong and Vidanes-Balaoing filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law. This was, however, denied. They filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether due process of law was observed in the expropriation process. Held: The exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to certain limitations imposed by the constitution (1973), i.e. that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" (Art. IV, sec. 9); and that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws" (Art. IV, sec. 1). The "public use" requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. The term "public use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. The 1973 Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services including housing [Art. II, sec. 7]. Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare. The public character of housing measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing for all who need it, all at once. "Socialized housing" falls within the confines of "public use". Provisions on economic opportunities inextricably linked with low-cost housing, or slum clearance, relocation and resettlement, or slum improvement emphasize the public purpose of the project. Herein, the use to which it is proposed to put the subject parcels of land meets the requisites of "public use". The lands in question are being expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project to provide housing facilities to lowsalaried government employees. The Supreme Court holds that
"socialized housing" defined in Presidential Decree 1224, as amended by Presidential Decrees 1259 and 1313, constitutes "public use" for purposes of expropriation. However, as previously held by the Supreme Court, the provisions of such decrees on just compensation are unconstitutional. Herein, the Court finds that the Orders issued pursuant to the corollary provisions of those decrees authorizing immediate taking without notice and hearing are violative of due process. Lumiqued vs. Exenea, 11/18/97 = GRACE Facts: Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of Lumiqueds death on May 19, 1994, his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order. The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first affidavit-complaint dated November 16, 1989,[1] charged Lumiqued with malversation through falsification of official documents. From May to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of falsification by padding gasoline receipts. In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22, 1989,[2] private respondent accused Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations, alleging that during the months of April, May, July, August, September and October, 1989, he made unliquidated cash advances in the total amount of P116,000.00. The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15, 1989,[3] charged Lumiqued with oppression and harassment. According to private respondent, her two previous complaints prompted Lumiqued to retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier without just cause.The were referred in due course to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for appropriate action. On May 20, 1992, Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro issued Department Order No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the complaints against Lumiqued. Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel
appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. Issue: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry? Ruling: No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, Lumiqued invoked the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime. The investigation conducted by the committee was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law. x x x. There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side. Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee was cured by Lumiqued’s appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property. Public office is a public trust. It is not a property guaranteed of due process. But when the dispute concerns one’s constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public office is deemed analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the right to due process could rightfully be invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute especially when it was proven, as in this case, that the public officer (Lumiqued) did not live up to the Constitutional precept i.e., that all public officers and employees must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
CSC vs Lucas Facts: Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant information officer at the Agricultural Information Division, Department of Agriculture (DA for brevity), filed with the office of the Secretary, DA, an affidavitcomplaint against respondent Jose J. Lucas, a photographer of the same agency, for misconduct. Raquel felt Mr. Lucas hand touching her thigh and running down his palm up to her ankle. She was shocked and suddenly faced Mr. Lucas and admonished him not to do it again or she will kick him. But Lucas touched her again and so she hit Mr. Lucas. Suddenly Mr. Lucas shouted at her saying lumabas ka na at huwag na huwag ka nang papasok dito kahit kailan A verbal exchange then ensued and respondent Lucas grabbed Raquel by the arm and shoved her towards the door causing her to stumble, her both hands protected her face from smashing upon the door.Board of Personnel Inquiry, DA, issued a summons requiring respondent to answer the complaint, not to file a motion to dismiss, within five (5) days from receipt. On June 17, 1992, respondent Lucas submitted a letter to Jose P. Nitullano, assistant head, BOPI, denying the charges. According to Lucas, he did not touch the thigh of complainant Linatok, that what transpired was that he accidentally brushed Linatoks leg when he reached for his shoes and that the same was merely accidental and he did not intend nor was there malice when his hand got in contact with Linatoks leg. Issue: (a) Whether respondent was denied Due process when CSC found him guilty of Grave Misconduct on a charge of simple misconduct (b) whether the act complained constitute grave mis conduct Ruling: CSC issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of grave misconduct and imposing on him the penalty of dismissal from the service.offenses fall under different categories. This is clear from a perusal of memorandum circular No. 49-89 (also known as the guidelines in the application of penalties in administrative cases) itself which classifies administrative offenses into three: grave, less grave and light offenses. The charge of grave misconduct falls under the classification of grave offenses while simple misconduct is classified as a less grave offense. The former is punishable by dismissal while the latter is punishable either by suspension (one month and one day to six months), if it is the first offense; or by dismissal, if it is the second. Thus, they should be treated as separate and distinct offenses. Grave misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest,which is obviously lacking in respondents case.
Villegas v Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho GR No L-29646, November 10, 1978 FACTS: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance programs of the government and another country, and members of religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayor’s permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila. Thus, a case was filed with CFI-Manila to stop enforcement of the ordinance. CFI-Manila declared the ordinance void. Thus, the present petition for certiorari. ISSUES: (1) Is the ordinance violative of the cardinal rule of uniformity of taxation? (2) Does it violate the principle against undue designation of legislative power? (3) Does it violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution? RULING: (1) Yes. The P50 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. The same amount of P50 is being collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. (2) Yes. It does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the action, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power, such ordinance is invalid. (3) Yes. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. Thus, the ordinance is invalid. VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG [86 SCRA 270; NO.L-29646; 10 NOV 1978] Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by Mayor
Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance. Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable aliens generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation. While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or disapproval of application is regulatory in character, the second part which requires the payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure. Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human right of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or denial of an alien employment permit fee. People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 = GRACE Facts: In 1934, Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a motion for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court of United States for review, which was also denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. ISSUE: 1. May the State question its own laws? 2. Is Act 4221 constitutional? HELD: 1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly authorized representative, from questioning the validity of a law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it had been using an invalid law. 2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional. Violation of the Equal Protection Clause The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on this note. There is violation of the equal protection clause. Under Act 4221, provinces were given the option to apply the law by simply providing for a probation officer. So if a province decides not to install a probation officer, then the accused within said province will be unduly deprived of the provisions of the Probation Law. Undue Delegation of Legislative Power There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221 provides that it shall only apply to provinces where the respective provincial boards have provided for a probation officer. But nowhere in the law did it state as to what standard (sufficient standard test) should provincial boards follow in determining whether or not to apply the probation law in their province. This only creates a roving commission which will act arbitrarily according to its whims. Encroachment of Executive Power Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court recognized the power of Congress to provide for probation. Probation does not encroach upon the President’s power to grant pardon. Probation is not pardon. Probation is within the power of Congress to fix penalties while pardon is a power of the president to commute penalties. PJA v. Prado G.R. No. 105371 Facts:
Philippine Postal Corporation implemented Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which provides the measures to withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced then questions the validity of Sec. 35 of RA. 7354 on the ground that it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary thus, violates of the equal protection clause. Issue: Whether or not RA 7354 denies the Judiciary of equal protection clause. Ruling: Yes. RA 7354 denies the Judiciary of equal protection clause. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more, specific guaranty against any form of undue favouritism or hostility from the government. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. In the case, the postal service office claims that the expense from judiciary with regards to frank mails amounts to P 73,574,864 as compared to P 90,424,175 total volume of frank mails. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be extended only to those who do not need it very much but not to those who need it badly (especially the courts of justice). Thus, RA 7354 denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege. This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct. [G.R. No. 130716. December 9, 1998] FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) and MAGTANGGOL GUNIGUNDO, (in his capacity as chairman of the PCGG), respondents. GLORIA A. JOPSON, CELNAN A. JOPSON, SCARLET A. JOPSON, and TERESA A. JOPSON, petitioners-in-intervention.
The Facts Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the countrys economy, alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports[2] bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets. Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information[3] and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest,[4] demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGGs task of recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of paramount public interest, since it has a debilitating effect on the countrys economy that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government. Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioners action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding. Respondents further aver that the Marcos heirs have submitted the subject Agreements to the Sandiganbayan for its approval in Civil Case No. 141, entitled Republic v. Heirs of Ferdinand E. Marcos, and that the Republic opposed such move on the principal grounds that (1) said Agreements have not been ratified by or even submitted to the President for approval, pursuant to Item No. 8 of the General Agreement; and (2) the Marcos heirs have failed to comply with their undertakings therein, particularly the collation and submission of an inventory of their assets. The Republic also cited an April 11, 1995 Resolution in Civil Case No. 0165, in which the Sandiganbayan dismissed a similar petition filed by the Marcoses attorney-in-fact.
Furthermore, then President Fidel V. Ramos, in his May 4, 1998 Memorandum[5] to then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo, categorically stated: This is to reiterate my previous position embodied in the Palace Press Release of 6 April 1995 that I have not authorized you to approve the Compromise Agreements of December 28, 1993 or any agreement at all with the Marcoses, and would have disapproved them had they been submitted to me. The Full Powers of Attorney of March 1994 and July 4, 1994, did not authorize you to approve said Agreements, which I reserve for myself as President of the Republic of the Philippines. Issues The Oral Argument, held on March 16, 1998, focused on the following issues: (a) Procedural: (1) Whether or not the petitioner has the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition; and (2) Whether or not this Court is the proper court before which this action may be filed. (b) Substantive: (1) Whether or not this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses; and (2) Whether or not there exist any legal restraints against a compromise agreement between the Marcoses and the PCGG relative to the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth. The Courts Ruling The petition is imbued with merit. First Procedural Issue: Petitioners Standing Petitioner, on the one hand, explains that as a taxpayer and citizen, he has the legal personality to file the instant petition. He submits that since ill-gotten wealth belongs to the Filipino people and [is], in truth and in fact, part of the public treasury, any compromise in relation to it would constitute a diminution of the public funds, which can be enjoined by a taxpayer whose interest is for a full, if not substantial, recovery of such assets. Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an issue of transcendental importance to the public. He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of
paramount public interest; and if they immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people. Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,[14] such as in this case. He invokes several decisions[15] of this Court which have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case involved public interest. On the other hand, the solicitor general, on behalf of respondents, contends that petitioner has no standing to institute the present action, because no expenditure of public funds is involved and said petitioner has no actual interest in the alleged agreement. Respondents further insist that the instant petition is premature, since there is no showing that petitioner has requested PCGG to disclose any such negotiations and agreements; or that, if he has, the Commission has refused to do so. Indeed, the arguments cited by petitioner constitute the controlling decisional rule as regards his legal standing to institute the instant petition. Access to public documents and records is a public right, and the real parties in interest are the people themselves.[16] In Taada v. Tuvera,[17] the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the action.[18] In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution,[19] in connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners legal standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to be enforced is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,[20] while reiterating Taada, further declared that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.[21] Further, in Albano v. Reyes,[22] we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have been involved under the questioned contract for the development, the management and the operation of the Manila International Container Terminal, public interest [was]
definitely involved considering the important role [of the subject contract] x x x in the economic development of the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved. We concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for upholding the petitioners standing. Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to official records, documents and papers -- a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioners legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should be allowed. In any event, the question on the standing of Petitioner Chavez is rendered moot by the intervention of the Jopsons, who are among the legitimate claimants to the Marcos wealth. The standing of the Jopsons is not seriously contested by the solicitor general. Indeed, said petitioners-intervenors have a legal interest in the subject matter of the instant case, since a distribution or disposition of the Marcoses illgotten properties may adversely affect the satisfaction of their claims. Second Procedural Issue:The Courts Jurisdiction Petitioner asserts that because this petition is an original action for mandamus and one that is not intended to delay any proceeding in the Sandiganbayan, its having been filed before this Court was proper. He invokes Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition and mandamus. The solicitor general, on the other hand, argues that the petition has been erroneously brought before this Court, since there is neither a justiciable controversy nor a violation of petitioners rights by the PCGG. He alleges that the assailed agreements are already the very lis mota in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0141, which has yet to dispose of the issue; thus, this petition is premature. Furthermore, respondents themselves have opposed the Marcos heirs motion, filed in the graft court, for the approval of the subject Agreements. Such opposition belies petitioners claim that the government, through respondents, has concluded a settlement with the Marcoses as regards their alleged illgotten assets. In Taada and Legaspi, we upheld therein petitioners resort to a mandamus proceeding, seeking to enforce a public right as well as to compel performance of a public duty mandated by no less than the fundamental law.[23] Further, Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution,
expressly confers upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warrantoand habeas corpus. Respondents argue that petitioner should have properly sought relief before the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Civil Case No. 0141, in which the enforcement of the compromise Agreements is pending resolution. There may seem to be some merit in such argument, if petitioner is merely seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the compromise and/or to compel the PCGG to disclose to the public the terms contained in said Agreements. However, petitioner is here seeking the public disclosure of all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and documents related to or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs. In other words, this petition is not confined to the Agreements that have already been drawn, but likewise to any other ongoing or future undertaking towards any settlement on the alleged Marcos loot.Ineluctably, the core issue boils down to the precise interpretation, in terms of scope, of the twin constitutional provisions on public transactions. This broad and prospective relief sought by the instant petition brings it out of the realm of Civil Case No. 0141. First Substantive Issue: Public Disclosure of Terms of Any Agreement, Perfected or Not In seeking the public disclosure of negotiations and agreements pertaining to a compromise settlement with the Marcoses as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth, petitioner invokes the following provisions of the Constitution: Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. Respondents opposite view is that the above constitutional provisions refer to completed and operative official acts, not to those still being considered. As regards the assailed Agreements entered into by the PCGG with the Marcoses, there is yet no right of action that has accrued, because said Agreements have not been approved by the President, and the Marcos heirs have failed to fulfill their express
undertaking therein. Thus, the Agreements have not become effective. Respondents add that they are not aware of any ongoing negotiation for another compromise with the Marcoses regarding their alleged ill-gotten assets. The information and the transactions referred to in the subject provisions of the Constitution have as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged. However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information. Limitations to the Right: (1) National Security Matters At the very least, this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters.[24] But where there is no need to protect such state secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to withhold documents and other information,[25] provided that they are examined in strict confidence and given scrupulous protection. Likewise, information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.[26] (2) Trade Secrets and Banking Transactions The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code[27] and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act[28]) are also exempted from compulsory disclosure.[29] (3) Criminal Matters Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals,[30] which courts may not inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law enforcement would be seriously jeopardized by free public access to, for example, police information regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on covert criminal activities. (4) Other Confidential Information The Ethical Standards Act[31] further prohibits public officials and employees from using or divulging confidential or classified information
officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public.[32] Other acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.[33] Scope: Matters of Public Concern and Transactions Involving Public Interest In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.,[34] the Court emphasized that the information sought must be matters of public concern, access to which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy of full public disclosure extends only to transactions involving public interest and may also be subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. As to the meanings of the terms public interest and public concern, the Court, in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,[35] elucidated: In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. Public concern like public interest is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. Considered a public concern in the above-mentioned case was the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. So was the need to give the general public adequate notification of various laws that regulate and affect the actions and conduct of citizens, as held in Taada. Likewise did the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers (members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa) qualify the information sought in Valmonte as matters of public interest and concern. In Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato,[36] the Court also held that official acts of public officers done in pursuit of their official functions are public in character; hence, the records pertaining to such official acts and decisions are within the ambit of the constitutional right of access to public records. Under Republic Act No. 6713, public officials and employees are mandated to provide information on their policies and procedures in clear and understandable language, [and] ensure openness of information, public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate x
x x, except when otherwise provided by law or when required by the public interest. In particular, the law mandates free public access, at reasonable hours, to the annual performance reports of offices and agencies of government and government-owned or controlled corporations; and the statements of assets, liabilities and financial disclosures of all public officials and employees.[37] In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with their official functions must be accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of transparency of governmental affairs.This principle is aimed at affording the people an opportunity to determine whether those to whom they have entrusted the affairs of the government are honestly, faithfully and competently performing their functions as public servants.[38] Undeniably, the essence of democracy lies in the free flow of thought;[39] but thoughts and ideas must be well-informed so that the public would gain a better perspective of vital issues confronting them and, thus, be able to criticize as well as participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. Certainly, it is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by the people.[40] The Nature of the Marcoses Alleged Ill-Gotten Wealth We now come to the immediate matter under consideration. Upon the departure from the country of the Marcos family and their cronies in February 1986, the new government headed by President Corazon C. Aquino was specifically mandated to [r]ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and [to] protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts.[41] Thus, President Aquinos very first executive orders (which partook of the nature of legislative enactments) dealt with the recovery of these alleged illgotten properties. Executive Order No. 1, promulgated on February 28, 1986, only two (2) days after the Marcoses fled the country, created the PCGG which was primarily tasked to assist the President in the recovery of vast government resources allegedly amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates both here and abroad. Under Executive Order No. 2, issued twelve (12) days later, all persons and entities who had knowledge or possession of ill-gotten assets and properties were warned and, under pain of penalties prescribed by law, prohibited from concealing, transferring or dissipating them or from
otherwise frustrating or obstructing the recovery efforts of the government. On May 7, 1986, another directive (EO No. 14) was issued giving additional powers to the PCGG which, taking into account the overriding considerations of national interest and national survival, required it to achieve expeditiously and effectively its vital task of recovering ill-gotten wealth. With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority emanates from the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest.[42] We may also add that ill-gotten wealth, by its very nature, assumes a public character. Based on the aforementioned Executive Orders, ill-gotten wealth refers to assets and properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates through or as a result of their improper or illegal use of government funds or properties; or their having taken undue advantage of their public office; or their use of powers, influences or relationships, resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As such, upon reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts. Another declared overriding consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is that it may be used for national economic recovery. We believe the foregoing disquisition settles the question of whether petitioner has a right to respondents disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at concerning the Marcoses purported ill-gotten wealth. Access to Information on Negotiating Terms But does the constitutional provision likewise guarantee access to information regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the final agreement? This same clarification was sought and clearly addressed by the constitutional commissioners during their deliberations, which we quote hereunder:[43] MR. SUAREZ. And when we say transactions which should be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?
MR. OPLE. The transactions used here, I suppose, is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction? MR. OPLE. Yes, subject to reasonable safeguards on the national interest. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications[44] during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier -- such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information. Second Substantive Issue: Legal Restraints on a Marcos-PCGG Compromise Petitioner lastly contends that any compromise agreement between the government and the Marcoses will be a virtual condonation of all the alleged wrongs done by them, as well as an unwarranted permission to commit graft and corruption. Respondents, for their part, assert that there is no legal restraint on entering into a compromise with the Marcos heirs, provided the agreement does not violate any law. Prohibited Compromises In general, the law encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard to the following matters: (1) the civil status of persons, (2) the validity of a marriage or a legal separation, (3) any ground for legal separation, (4) future support, (5) the jurisdiction of courts, and (6) future legitime.[45] And like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order.[46] A compromise is binding and has the force of law between the parties,[47] unless the consent of a party is vitiated -- such as by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence -- or when there is forgery, or if the terms of the settlement are so palpably unconscionable. In the latter instances, the agreement may be invalidated by the courts.[48]
Effect of Compromise on Civil Actions One of the consequences of a compromise, and usually its primary object, is to avoid or to end a litigation.[49] In fact, the law urges courts to persuade the parties in a civil case to agree to a fair settlement.[50] As an incentive, a court may mitigate damages to be paid by a losing party who shows a sincere desire to compromise.[51] In Republic & Campos Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[52] which affirmed the grant by the PCGG of civil and criminal immunity to Jose Y. Campos and family, the Court held that in the absence of an express prohibition, the rule on compromises in civil actions under the Civil Code is applicable to PCGG cases. Such principle is pursuant to the objectives of EO No. 14, particularly the just and expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth, so that it may be used to hasten economic recovery. The same principle was upheld in Benedicto v. Board of Administrators of Television Stations RPN, BBC and IBC[53] and Republic v. Benedicto, [54] which ruled in favor of the validity of the PCGG compromise agreement with Roberto S. Benedicto. Immunity from Criminal Prosecution However, any compromise relating to the civil liability arising from an offense does not automatically terminate the criminal proceeding against or extinguish the criminal liability of the malefactor.[55] While a compromise in civil suits is expressly authorized by law, there is no similar general sanction as regards criminal liability. The authority must be specifically conferred. In the present case, the power to grant criminal immunity was conferred on PCGG by Section 5 of EO No. 14, as amended by EO No. 14-A, which provides: SECTION 5. The Presidential Commission on Good Government is authorized to grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who provides information or testifies in any investigation conducted by such Commission to establish the unlawful manner in which any respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question in any case where such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the latters guilt or his civil liability. The immunity thereby granted shall be continued to protect the witness who repeats such testimony before the Sandiganbayan when required to do so by the latter or by the Commission. The above provision specifies that the PCGG may exercise such authority under these conditions: (1) the person to whom criminal immunity is granted provides information or testifies in an investigation conducted by the Commission; (2) the information or testimony pertains to the unlawful manner in which the respondent,
defendant or accused acquired or accumulated ill-gotten property; and (3) such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove guilt or civil liability of such individual. From the wording of the law, it can be easily deduced that the person referred to is a witness in the proceeding, not the principal respondent, defendant or accused. Thus, in the case of Jose Y. Campos, the grant of both civil and criminal immunity to him and his family was [i]n consideration of the full cooperation of Mr. Jose Y. Campos [with] this Commission, his voluntary surrender of the properties and assets [--] disclosed and declared by him to belong to deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos [--] to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines[;] his full, complete and truthful disclosures[;] and his commitment to pay a sum of money as determined by the Philippine Government.[56] Moreover, the grant of criminal immunity to the Camposes and the Benedictos was limited to acts and omissions prior to February 25, 1996. At the time such immunity was granted, no criminal cases have yet been filed against them before the competent courts. Validity of the PCGG-Marcos Compromise Agreements Going now to the subject General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs, a cursory perusal thereof reveals serious legal flaws. First, the Agreements do not conform to the above requirements of EO Nos. 14 and 14-A. We believe that criminal immunity under Section 5 cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal defendants in the spate of ill-gotten wealth cases now pending before the Sandiganbayan. As stated earlier, the provision is applicable mainly to witnesses who provide information or testify against a respondent, defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth case. While the General Agreement states that the Marcoses shall provide the [government] assistance by way of testimony or deposition on any information [they] may have that could shed light on the cases being pursued by the [government] against other parties,[57] the clause does not fully comply with the law. Its inclusion in the Agreement may have been only an afterthought, conceived in pro formacompliance with Section 5 of EO No. 14, as amended. There is no indication whatsoever that any of the Marcos heirs has indeed provided vital information against any respondent or defendant as to the manner in which the latter may have unlawfully acquired public property. Second, under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the Constitution.The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in
the Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. [58] Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution, specifically provides: No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases. Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses from paying taxes on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal protection clause under the Bill of Rights.Any special grant of tax exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that taxation shall be uniform and equitable.[59] Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the commissioner of internal revenue to compromise taxes. Such authority may be exercised only when (1) there is reasonable doubt asto the validity of the claim against the taxpayer, and (2) the taxpayers financial position demonstrates a clear inability to pay.[60] Definitely, neither requisite is present in the case of the Marcoses, because under the Agreement they are effectively conceding the validity of the claims against their properties, part of which they will be allowed to retain. Nor can the PCGG grant of tax exemption fall within the power of the commissioner to abate or cancel a tax liability. This power can be exercised only when (1) the tax appears to be unjustly or excessively assessed, or (2) the administration and collection costs involved do not justify the collection of the tax due.[61] In this instance, the cancellation of tax liability is done even before the determination of the amount due. In any event, criminal violations of the Tax Code, for which legal actions have been filed in court or in which fraud is involved, cannot be compromised.[62] Third, the government binds itself to cause the dismissal of all cases against the Marcos heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts.[63] This is a direct encroachment on judicial powers, particularly in regard to criminal jurisdiction. Well-settled is the doctrine that once a case has been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction, the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion and control of the judge. In a criminal case, the manner in which the prosecution is handled, including the matter of whom to present as witnesses, may lie within the sound discretion of the government prosecutor;[64] but the court decides, based on the evidence proffered, in what manner it will dispose of the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution, even by the justice secretary, to withdraw the information
or to dismiss the complaint.[65] The prosecutions motion to withdraw or to dismiss is not the least binding upon the court. On the contrary, decisional rules require the trial court to make its own evaluation of the merits of the case, because granting such motion is equivalent to effecting a disposition of the case itself.[66] Thus, the PCGG, as the government prosecutor of ill-gotten wealth cases, cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases against the Marcoses pending in the courts, for said dismissal is not within its sole power and discretion. Fourth, the government also waives all claims and counterclaims, whether past, present, or future, matured or inchoate, against the Marcoses.[67] Again, this all-encompassing stipulation is contrary to law. Under the Civil Code, an action for future fraud may not be waived.[68] The stipulation in the Agreement does not specify the exact scope of future claims against the Marcoses that the government thereby relinquishes. Such vague and broad statement may well be interpreted to include all future illegal acts of any of the Marcos heirs, practically giving them a license to perpetrate fraud against the government without any liability at all. This is a palpable violation of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. It effectively ensconces the Marcoses beyond the reach of the law. It also sets a dangerous precedent for public accountability. It is a virtual warrant for public officials to amass public funds illegally, since there is an open option to compromise their liability in exchange for only a portion of their ill-gotten wealth. Fifth, the Agreements do not provide for a definite or determinable period within which the parties shall fulfill their respective prestations. It may take a lifetime before the Marcoses submit an inventory of their total assets. Sixth, the Agreements do not state with specificity the standards for determining which assets shall be forfeited by the government and which shall be retained by the Marcoses. While the Supplemental Agreement provides that the Marcoses shall be entitled to 25 per cent of the $356 million Swiss deposits (less government recovery expenses), such sharing arrangement pertains only to the said deposits. No similar splitting scheme is defined with respect to the other properties. Neither is there, anywhere in the Agreements, a statement of the basis for the 25-75 percent sharing ratio. Public officers entering into an arrangement appearing to be manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, in violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act,[69] invite their indictment for corruption under the said law.
Finally, the absence of then President Ramos approval of the principal Agreement, an express condition therein, renders the compromise incomplete and unenforceable. Nevertheless, as detailed above, even if such approval were obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid. From the foregoing disquisition, it is crystal clear to the Court that the General and Supplemental Agreements, both dated December 28, 1993, which the PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs, are violative of the Constitution and the laws aforementioned. LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x G.R. No. 193036 REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR. vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010. PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their coprincipals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that: (a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.” (c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987. (d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable. Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that: 1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies. 2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress. 3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction. 4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes. ISSUES: 1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1; 2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions; 3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ; 4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause. RULING: The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators. With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1. Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer. The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionallymandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. 2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding. 3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. 4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities. There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional. WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. People of the Philippines vs Cayat 68 Phil. 12 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Equal Protection – Requisites of a Valid Classification – Bar from Drinking Gin In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an
A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or “mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled” will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians. ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause. HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are; (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon “accident of birth or parentage.” The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as “an inferior or less capable race.” On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. Antero Sison Jr. vs Acting BIR Commissioner Ruben Ancheta et al “Equal Protection” Sison assails the validity of BP 135 w/c further amended Sec 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977. The law provides that there’d be a higher tax impost against income derived from professional income as opposed to regular income earners. Sison, as a professional businessman, and as taxpayer alleges that by virtue thereof, “he would be unduly discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis
those which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers.” He characterizes the above section as arbitrary amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character. There is a transgression of both the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring uniformity in taxation. ISSUE: Whether the imposition of a higher tax rate on taxable net income derived from business or profession than on compensation is constitutionally infirm. HELD: The SC ruled against Sison. The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to assure the performance of vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of public funds. Taxes, being the lifeblood of the government, their prompt and certain availability is of the essence. According to the Constitution: “The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.” However, the rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because this is hardly attainable. Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. Where “the differentiation” complained of “conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity” it “is not discriminatory within the meaning of this clause and is therefore uniform.” There is quite a similarity then to the standard of equal protection for all that is required is that the tax “applies equally to all persons, firms and corporations placed in similar situation. What misled Sison is his failure to take into consideration the distinction between a tax rate and a tax base. There is no legal objection to a broader tax base or taxable income by eliminating all deductible items and at the same time reducing the applicable tax rate. Taxpayers may be classified into different categories. In the case of the gross income taxation embodied in BP 135, the discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the income to the application of generalized rules removing all deductible items for all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to be applied to all of them. Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set apart as a class. As there is practically no overhead expense, these taxpayers are not entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes because they are in the same situation more or less. On the other hand, in the case of professionals in the practice of their calling and businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or expenses necessary to produce their income. It would not be just then to disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and indiscriminately
impose on all alike the same tax rates on the basis of gross income. There is ample justification then for the Batasang Pambansa to adopt the gross system of income taxation to compensation income, while continuing the system of net income taxation as regards professional and business income. Patricio Dumlao vs Commission on Elections 95 SCRA 392 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – “Equal Protection” – Eligibility to Office after Being 65 Judicial Review; Requisites thereof Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides, among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law. His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office. ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action. HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case should have never been merged. Dumlao’s issue is different from Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints
against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void. The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. Rufino Nuñez vs Sandiganbayan & the People of the Philippines “Equal Protection” – Creation of the Sandiganbayan Nuñez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuñez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuñez’s right to equal protection, because – appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; – appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions
of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be concerned. HELD: The SC ruled against Nuñez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it “must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.” Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices – a showing that decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts. Justice Makasiar (concurring & dissenting) Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to two appellate courts – first, to the CA, and thereafter to the SC. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft and corruption committed by public officers, who, under the decree creating the Sandiganbayan, are only allowed one appeal – to the SC (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination. Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to the people.
Then again, par 3 of Sec 7 of PD 1606, by providing that the decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the SC through certiorari, likewise limits the reviewing power of the SC only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law are reviewed, first by the CA, and then by the SC. To repeat, there is greater guarantee of justice in criminal cases when the trial court’s judgment is subject to review by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality unaffected as they are by views and prejudices that may be engendered during the trial. Limiting the power of review by the SC of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused, which presumption can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila Inc vs The Board of Transportation et al “Equal Protection” – Phasing Out of Old Taxis in MM but not Elsewhere On 10 Oct 1977, BOT issued Circ 77-42 which has for its purpose the phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis which are 6 years older. The law is set to be immediately implemented in Metro Manila first before it would be implemented elsewhere. Pursuant to this, the Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation issued Circ 52 which is the IRR of the law in the NCR. TOMMI assailed the constitutionality of the law. It avers, among other things, that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection clause by the implementation of the said circular. HELD: The SC held that Circ 77-42 is valid. BOT’s reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. Thus is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.
In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.
PASEI vs DRILON163 SCRA 380 Facts:Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers. Issue:Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1. Decision:SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that: 1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions 2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law 3. They are not confined to existing conditions 4. They apply equally to al members of the same class In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions. Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of “public safety” as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers. Mary Concepcion Bautista et al vs Alfredo Juinio et al “Equal Protection” – Distinction Between Heavy and Extra Heavy Cars and Others Bautista is assailing the constitutionality of LOI 869 issued in 1979 which classified vehicles into Heavy and Extra Heavy. The LOI further banned these vehicles during weekends and holidays that is from 5am Saturday until 5am Monday. Purpose of this law is to curb down petroleum consumption as bigger cars consume more oil. Bautista claimed the LOI to be discriminatory as it made an assumption that H and EH cars are heavy on petroleum consumption when in fact there are smaller cars which are also big on oil consumption. Further, the law restricts their freedom to enjoy their car while others who have smaller cars may enjoy theirs. Bautista avers that there is no rational justification for the ban being imposed on vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for precisely those owned by them fall within such category. ISSUE: Whether or not the LOI violates equal protection. HELD: The SC held that Bautista was not able to make merit out of her contention. The classification on cars on its face cannot be characterized as an affront to reason. The ideal situation is for the law’s benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the
sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law. The actual, given things as they are and likely to continue to be, cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. . . . To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. Ishmael Himagan vs People of the Philippines 237 SCRA 538 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection – Suspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave Felonies Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and for the attempted murder of Benjamin’s younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that: Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree provides that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days only. He claims that an imposition of
preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws . ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution. HELD: No. The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be finished. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word “shall” before the phrase “be terminated within ninety (90) days”, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the
accused can compel its dismissal bycertiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus. Tiu v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 278 (1999) Nature of the case: A petition for review to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which upheld the constitutionality and validity of the E.O. 97-A. Facts of the case: The petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said Order claiming that they are excluded from the benefits provided by RA 7227 without any reasonable standards and thus violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals upheld the validity and constitutionality and denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition was filed. Issue: WON E.O. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution Arguments: Petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base. However, EO 97-A, according to them, narrowed down the area within which the special privileges granted to the entire zone would apply to the present “fenced-in former Subic Naval Base” only. It has thereby excluded the residents of the first two components of the zone from enjoying the benefits granted by the law. It has effectively discriminated against them, without reasonable or valid standards, in contravention of the equal protection guarantee. The solicitor general defends the validity of EO 97-A, arguing that Section 12 of RA 7227 clearly vests in the President the authority to delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. He adds that the issuance fully complies with the requirements of a valid classification. Decision: Panganiban J., The Court held that the classification was based on valid and reasonable standards and does not violate the equal protection clause. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
Ruling: Petition denied. The challenge decision and resolution were affirmed. RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO, FLORENCIO L. VARGAS, ROMEO I. CALUBAQUIB, AMADO T. GONZALES, SILVERIO C. SALVANERA, ALBERTA O. QUINTO, and AURORA V. ESTABILLO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents. SYNOPSIS Through a petition for prohibition, petitioners sought to prevent the COMELEC from enforcing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code on the ground that it was violative of the Constitution in that if effective shortens the terms of office of elected officials. Sec. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Sec. 67. Candidates holding elective office Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso-facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. The Court ruled that Section 67 does not unduly cut short the term of office of local officials. The situation that results with the application of Section 67 is covered by the term voluntary renunciation. Rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. Moreover, the act sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished with the holding of the 1998 elections. Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli. SYLLABUS 1. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE; SECTION 67 THEREOF PROVIDING THAT ELECTIVE OFFICIALS ARE CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO RESIGNED FROM OFFICE UPON FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY, NOT VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.- The COMELEC asserts that the classification embodied in Section 67 is reasonable and based on substantial distinction. It points out that incumbents running for the same position are not considered resigned because the intention of the law is to allow them to continue serving their constituents and avoid a disruption in the delivery of essential services. Those running for different positions are considered resigned because they are considered to have abandoned their present position by their act of running for other posts. For his part, the Solicitor
General points our that the issue regarding Section 67 had already been passed upon by the Court in the case of Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr. Indeed, we have dealt squarely with the issue of the validity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr. Section 67 was crafted with the intention of giving flesh to the constitutional pronouncement that public service is a public trust. Section 67 is not violative of the Constitution as it does not unduly cut short the term of office of local officials. The situation that results with the application of Section 67 is covered by the term voluntary renunciation. Our foregoing ruling in Dimaporo is still applicable in this case. 2. REMEDIAL LAW, SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; PROHIBITION; DOES NOT LIE TO RESTRAIN ACTS ALREADY A FAIT ACCOMPLI.- It must be pointed out that this present petition is one for prohibition which is a preventive remedy. The act sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished with the holding of the 1998 elections. Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli. TELEBAP vs COMELEC G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998 Facts: Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881. on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election. Issue: Whether is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election. Held: No. The petition is dismissed. With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space are about the only means through which candidates can advertise their qualifications and programs of government. More than merely depriving candidates of time for their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the government would clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Art. III, §7 of the Constitution provides that “the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized,” while Art. XII, §6 states that “the use of property bears a social function [and] the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises [is] subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.”
To affirm the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an election is maintained. For while broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities with free speech rights, they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people have access to the diversity of views on political issues. This right of the people is paramount to the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of §92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the people’s right to information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state’s duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good. Rodolfo Fariñas vs Executive Secretary 417 SCRA 503 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative Department – How a Bill Becomes a Law – Bicameral Conference Committee – Enrolled Bill Doctrine Equal Protection Clause – Valid Classification Election Law – Appointive Officials vs Elective Officials In 2001, Republic Act No. 9006 or the Fair Election Act was signed into law. Section 14 thereof repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code which states that an elective official, except the President and the Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Hence, under RA 9006, an elective official shall no longer be deemed resigned if he files his certificate of candidacy for an elective office while he is still in office. Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that an appointive official hall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy, was however retained by the Fair Election Act. Rodolfo Fariñas, then a Congressman belonging to the minority group, questioned the constitutionality of Section 14 on the ground that it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. He averred that the repeal of Section 67 gave elective officials undue advantage over appointive officials (discrimination). The Fariñas group also questioned the validity of RA 9006 in its entirety. They contend that irregularities attended to the creation of the said law. Fariñas explained that RA 9006 originated as House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1741; that there were contrasting
provisions between the two bills hence a Bicameral Conference Committee was created; that in fact two subsequent BCCs were convened which is irregular already in itself; that only the 1st BCC had its record and the compromise bill from said 1st BCC was never subjected to a conference with the lower house; that in the 2nd BCC, it appeared that another compromised bill was agreed upon even though there was no meeting at all and that the Report as to how said compromise bill was reached was instantly made and made to be passed around for signing – all these irregularities made the law unconstitutional for being procedurally infirm. ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9006 is constitutional. HELD: Yes, RA 9006 is constitutional. On Equal Protection The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. In this case, substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Further, appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote; while elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities. On the Enrolled Bill Doctrine The contention that irregularities attended the creation of RA 9006 is overridden by the enrolled bill doctrine. Under this doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. The Supreme Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern. Whatever irregularities there may have been in the Bicameral Conference
Committee involve internal rules which cannot be inquired into by the Court. QUINTO vs. COMELEC, 1 DECEMBER 2009 Congress enacted RA 8436 on December 22, 1997. On January 23, 2007. it enacted RA 9369, amending the previous act. Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678,4 the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide: SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position. SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.- The certificate of candidacy shall be filed on regular days, from November 20 to 30, 2009, during office hours, except on the last day, which shall be until midnight. Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections,5 filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. ISSUES: 1. Do petitioners have locus standi? 2. Do the second proviso in paragraph 3, Section 13 of RA 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and Section 4(a) of RA 8678 violate the equal protection clause? HELD: 1. The transcendental nature and paramount importance of the issues raised and the compelling state interest involved in their early resolution the period for the filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections has already started and hundreds of civil servants intending to run for elective offices are to lose their employment, thereby causing
imminent and irreparable damage to their means of livelihood and, at the same time, crippling the government's manpowerfurther dictate that the Court must, for propriety, if only from a sense of obligation, entertain the petition so as to expedite the adjudication of all, especially the constitutional, issues. The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the standing to raise the constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged measure herein, affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials. The Court, in this case, finds that an actual case or controversy exists between the petitioners and the COMELEC, the body charged with the enforcement and administration of all election laws. Petitioners have alleged in a precise manner that they would engage in the very acts that would trigger the enforcement of the provisionthey would file their CoCs and run in the 2010 elections. Given that the assailed provision provides for ipso facto resignation upon the filing of the CoC, it cannot be said that it presents only a speculative or hypothetical obstacle to petitioners' candidacy. 2. It is noteworthy to point out that the right to run for public office touches on two fundamental freedoms, those of expression and of association. Here, petitioners' interest in running for public office, an interest protected by Sections 4 and 8 of Article III of the Constitution, is breached by the proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment. In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be invalid if it is not germane to the purpose of the law. Applying the four
requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad. First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Quinto Vs COMELEC 22 Feb. 2010 This is a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Supreme Court in Quinto vs. COMELEC, 1 December 2009. ISSUES: 1. Do the assailed provisions violate the equal protection clause? 2. Do the assailed provisions suffer from overbreadth? HELD: 1. No. The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities is too plain to be mistaken. The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-à-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned. The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. 2. No. The view that the assailed provisions are overly broad because they apply indiscriminately to all appointive civil servants regardless of position obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the government posed by the partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a "powerful political machine" that has amassed "the scattered powers of government workers" so as to give itself and its incumbent workers an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power." [T]he avoidance of such a "politically active public work force" which could give an emerging political machine an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power" is reason enough to impose a restriction on the candidacies of all appointive public officials without further distinction as to the type of positions being held by such employees or the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto. Obviously, these rules and guidelines, including the restriction in Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, were issued specifically for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections, which, it must be noted, are decidedly partisan in character. Thus, it is clear that the restriction in Section 4(a) of RA 8678 applies only to the candidacies of appointive officials vying for partisan elective posts in the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Central Bank Employees Association vs BSP GR 148208 15 December 2004 Facts: The New Central Bank Act abolished the old Central Bank and created the new BSP on 1993 through RA No 7653. Central Bank Employees Association assailed the provision of RA No 7653, Art II Sec
15(c). They contend that it makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers as exempt class of Salary Standardization Law (RA 6758) and (2) the rank-and-file non-exempt class. BSP contends that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-andfile. Issue: Whether or not Section 15(c) violates equal protection right of the BSP r&f employees? Decision: Sec 15(c) unconstitutional. Judicial notice that other Govt Financial Institution undertook amendment of their charters from 1995 to 2004 – a blanket provision for all employees to be covered by SSL. The said subsequent enactments constitute significant changes in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c). Legal history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as comprising one distinct class, separate from other governmental entities. There is no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is equally binding on the rest. It is clear that the enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared as an outlaw. IMBONG VS OCHOA Facts: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. The RH Law violates the right to free speech. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution A. On the constitutionality of RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law 1. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the right to life: NO. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter. Ponente’s view (Justice Mendoza): Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of “conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization. The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible. The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it. However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down. 2. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the right to health NO. Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills. Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: thecontraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.
3. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the freedom of religion and right to free speech The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it mandates the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners NO. The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners. b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling medical health practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other institutions despite their conscientious objections YES. Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service providers to refer patients to other providers and penalizing them if they fail to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well as compelling them to disseminate information and perform RH procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of religion. While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance to it, a constitutionally-protected right must prevail over the effective implementation of the law.
Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR) also violates the equal protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction between public health officers and their private counterparts. In addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protection of this freedom remains even if he/she is employed in the government. Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit the free exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In addition, the limits do not pertain to life-threatening cases. The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least intrusive means to achieve a legitimate state objective. The Legislature has already taken other secular steps to ensure that the right to health is protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The Population Act of the Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women). c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition NO. Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The law does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to accept or reject information they receive and they retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State. 4. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy) YES. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content),intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe
upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family. The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-ofkin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.” However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures. 5. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the freedom of expression and academic freedom NO. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it. Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on ageappropriate reproductive health education. Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State. The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children. By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH
program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. 6. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the due process clause NO. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague. The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.” The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures. The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. 7. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause NO. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers. The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor. The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions
especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education. 8. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the prohibition against involuntary servitude NO. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and nongovernment health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and nongovernment RH service providers to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise. However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b of this digest.) B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to determine WON a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid NO. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not only has the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods (under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of 2009). C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local Governments and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) NO. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments. Paragraph (c) of Section 17 provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provision of these services are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.
Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely delineates the powers that may be exercised by the regional government. These provisions cannot be seen as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. vs Ormoc City et al “Equal Protection” In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: “There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries.” Though referred to as a “production tax”, the imposition actually amounts to a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: “It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void.” And that the ordinance is violative to equal protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is found in the city. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection. HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of the RAC had already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized LGUs to tax goods and merchandise carried in and out of their turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal protection. The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance’s enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the
ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon. [G.R. No. 126594. September 5, 1997] IMELDA MARCOS, petitioner, vs., The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS; Honorable Judge GUILLERMO L. LOJA, SR., the Presiding Judge of Branch 26 of the RTC at Manila; and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. RESOLUTION REGALADO, J.: In a petition for review on certiorari filed on November 5, 1996, petitioner Imelda R. Marcos prays this Court to set aside the decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No. 35719 on May 23, 1996, as well as its resolution of September 27, 1996 denying her motion for the reconsideration of the judgment in said case.[1] Preliminary, her motion for extension of time to file this petition was denied for non-compliance with Revised Circular No. 1-88 and Circular No. 19-91 because the affidavit of service, although otherwise sufficient in form and substance, was not signed by the affiant, and the registry receipt proving service of a copy of said motion to the Solicitor General was not attached thereto. Hence, the petition subsequently filed by her was dismissed for having been filed out of time in this Courts resolution of November 27, 1996.[2] Petitioner then moved for reconsideration, explaining the cause for the procedural lapses and contending that, on the merits, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged; that no offenses actually charged or that the facts alleged do not constitute the imputed offenses; and, consequently, that the court a quo gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion to quash. Considering the number of criminal cases filed against petitioner, relief from which is sought in the petition at bar and the issues wherein may possibly be raised again in other cases of a similar nature, the Court resolved on February 24, 1997 to require the Solicitor General to comment thereon, in order that the adjudication of petitioners plaints may not go off only on procedural points. In due time, such comment was filed, albeit in abbreviated form, the Solicitor General correctly pointing out that all the substantive issues now being raised before us had also been extensively argued in and resolved by respondent appellate court. Indeed, an overall review of the allegations in the present petition reveals that the same are merely a rehash of those already submitted
to respondent court and that this petition is apparently a reprise of the certiorari petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 35719 filed in the Court of Appeals. For facility of presentation, therefore, we need merely to reproduce herein the findings in the assailed decision of respondent appellate court, which are fully sustained by the records, excluding therefrom those cases pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 (except when involved in the narration of the antecedents of this case) which was jointly resolved by it but from which no appeals or other recourse was taken by the petitioners therein. We accordingly give credit to respondent court and adopt its recital of the antecedents of the instant petition, to wit: In CA-G.R. SP No. 35719, petitioner Marcos assails the Order dated June 9, 1994 which denied her Motion to Quash the eight (8) informations filed against her in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 91-101732 to 91-101739 and the other fourteen (14) informations filed against her, Benedicto and Rivera in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 91101879 to 91-101892, and Order dated August 30, 1994 which denied her Motion for Reconsideration. xxx On October 21, 1983, pursuant to Monetary Board Resolution Nos. 1632 and 1718 dated September 30, 1983 and October 21, 1983, respectively, the Central Bank (CB) of the Philippines (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) issued Circular No. 960. The circular, which consolidated the various rules and regulations promulgated by the CB concerning foreign exchange non-trade transactions including those on gold and silver, prohibits in its Section 4 residents, firms, association, or corporations from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without prior authorization from the CB or without being permitted by CB regulations; and requires in Section 10 thereof all residents who habitually earn or receive foreign exchange from invisibles locally or from abroad to submit reports of such earnings or receipts in prescribed form with the proper CB department and to register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the CB within 90 days from October 21, 1983. Violation of the provisions of the circular is punishable as a criminal offense under Section 34 of R.A. No.265, as amended (the Central Bank Act). On December 20, 1991 or nearly six years after the 1986 EDSA Revolution which toppled the Marcos regime, Marcos was, for allegedly opening and maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad on various dates from 1968 to 1991 without prior authorization from the CB or otherwise allowed by CB regulations, charged with violating Section 4 of CB Circular 960 before the RTC of Manila in eight (8) essentially
identically worded informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91101732 to 101739, one of which reads as follows: That from 1968 to June 6, 1991, both dates inclusive, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with her late husband, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while both residing in Malacaang Palace in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously open and maintain foreign exchange accounts abroad, particularly in Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC) in Geneva, Switzerland, in the name of Maler Establishment, later transformed into Maler Foundation, which was organized by their dummies, nominees, fronts, agents or duly appointed administrators among them Jean Louis Sunier who received instructions from the accused and her husband who signed with their alias JOHN LEWIS in order to maintain two accounts, one of which is Account No. 98929 NY under Maler II with a balance of SF 16,195,258.00, without prior permission from the Central Bank of the Philippines, and such act of maintaining foreign account abroad was not permitted under Central Bank regulations. - (Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No.35719, pp. 45-46) The wordings of the other seven (7) informations differed only in the dates of commission of the offense charged, the name/s of the dummy/dummies, the balance of the foreign exchange accounts maintained abroad and the name/s of the foreign bank/s where such accounts were maintained. Likewise, for allegedly failing to submit a report of their foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or to register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the CB within the period mandated by Section 10 of CB Circular No. 960, Marcos, Benedicto and Rivera were similarly indicted on December 27, 1991 for violation of Section 10, CB Circular No. 960 in relation to Section 34 of the Central Bank Act in five (5) informations filed with the RTC of Manila which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-101879 91-101883. On the same date, nine (9) more informations essentially charging the same offense were filed with the RTC of Manila, but this time only against Marcos and Benedicto, which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-101884 to 91-101892. One of the informations reads: That from September 21, 1983 up to December 26, 1985, both dates inclusive, and for sometime thereafter, all accused, conspiring and confederating with one another and with the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos, all residing and/or doing business in Manila, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and assisted by their foreign agent or attorney-in-fact Stephen G. Cattaui, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to submit reports in the prescribed form and/or register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within 90 days from October 21, 1983 as required of them being residents habitually/customarily earning, acquiring/receiving foreign exchange from whatever source or from invisibles locally or from abroad, despite the fact that they actually earned interests regularly for their investment of FIFTEEN MILLION ($15-million) DOLLARS, U.S. Currency, in Philippine-issued dollardenominated treasury notes with floating rates and in bearer form, in the name of Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas (also known as Banque Paribas) in Geneva, Switzerland but which was transferred on May 17, 1984 to Lombard, Odier et Cie, a bank also in Geneva, for the account of COGES 00777 being managed by Mr. Stephane Cattaui for the marcoses who also arranged the said investment of $15-million through respondents Roberto S. Benedicto and Hector T. Rivera by using the Royal Traders Bank in Manila as the custodian of the said dollar-denominated treasury notes, which earned, acquired or received for the accused Imelda Romualdez Marcos and her late husband an interest of $13,229.16 for delay (December 16-19, 1995) plus redemption of $15-million which was remitted to Lombard, Odier et Cie through Chicago International Banking Corporation in New York, United States of America, for the credit of said Account COGES 00777 of the Marcoses for further investment outside the Philippines without first complying with the reporting/registering requirements of the Central Bank. - (Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 35928, pp. 45-46) On January 3, 1992, eleven (11) more informations for alleged violation of the aforesaid Section 10, CB Circular 960 were filed against Marcos and Benedicto with the same court which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969. xxx All these thirty-three (33) cases were consolidated before Branch 26 of the RTC of Manila presided by herein public respondent Judge Loja, Sr. Marcos was arraigned on February 12, 1992 while Benedicto and Rivera were arraigned on February 28, 1994. During the pendency of these cases, CB Circular No. 1318 (Revised Manual of Rules and Regulations Governing Non-Trade Foreign Exchange Transactions) dated January 3, 1992 and CB Circular No. 1353 (Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulations) dated August 24, 1992 were issued by the CB. CB Circular No. 1318 repeals insofar as inconsistent therewith all existing provisions of CB Circular No. 960, among other circulars, while CB Circular No. 1353 repeals all the
provisions of Chapter X of CB Circular No. 1318 only insofar as they are inconsistent therewith. Both circulars, however, contain a saving clause excepting from the circular pending criminal actions involving violations of CB Circular No. 960 and CB Circular No. 1318. (Italics supplied) Invoking the abovementioned repeal as one of her grounds, Marcos filed a Motion to Quash on May 23, 1994 seeking the dismissal of the cases or the quashal of the informations filed against her in Criminal Case Nos. 91-101732 to 91-101739 and 91-101879 to 91101892. Respondent People of the Philippines opposed the same on June 2, 1994. [3] Petitioners Marcos aforesaid motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated June 9, 1994 and her motion for reconsideration was likewise repudiated in an order of August 30, 1994. She then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with respondent Court of Appeals ascribing abuse of discretion on the part of respondent trial judge. What transpired there is best taken from the account thereof in the following portion of the impugned decision of respondent appellate court. In CA-G.R. SP No. 35719, Marcos relied on two grounds in taking respondent court to task, to wit: (1) respondent court has no jurisdiction over the offenses charged; and (2) respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying her Motion to Quash. Anent the first ground, Marcos argues that respondent court has no jurisdiction over the cases as the informations clearly allege that the acts complained of were committed outside Philippine territory, and that her constitutional right to equal protection of the laws was violated, the saving clause contained in CB Circular No. 1318 which repealed CB Circular No. 960 being patently discriminatory as it was purposedly designed to preserve the criminal cases lodged against her and her co-accused. As to the second ground, Marcos argues that the facts alleged in the informations, even if true, do not constitute offenses and that in any event the offenses charged have disappeared due to repeal. Marcos asseverates that the saving clause (Section 111, Chapter X) of CB Circular No. 1318 is invalid since the Monetary Board has no authority to except therefrom pending criminal prosecutions, the power being purely legislative and is not expressly granted in its charter; that even assuming ad arguendo that the Monetary Board has the power, the same is still invalid for being an encroachment and an invalid delegation thereof, the power to declare what constitutes a crime and
how it should be punished being vested solely and exclusively in the legislature; that even further assuming that there is no invalid delegation of power to incorporate the saving clause, it is still invalid for being ultra vires as it is not germane to the object and purpose of the Central Bank Act which is to stabilize the monetary system; and in any event, even if the power is unquestioned, the clause is still invalid for being violative of the equal protection of (t)he law clause of the constitution, it having been designed solely for the purpose of preserving the criminal cases against her and her co-accused. As regards the assertion that the facts alleged in the informations do not constitute an offense, Marcos contends that since the allegations unequivocally state that foreign foundations or trust, not the Marcoses, opened and maintained the subject Swiss accounts and earned and received the interest therefrom, she has no duty to report any earnings and if at all, she was a mere beneficiary of the foreign foundations or trusts; and that the acts having been committed abroad, they are beyond the jurisdiction of respondent court. xxx Petitioners do not dispute the validity of CB Circular No. 960, the law under which they are being prosecuted, and of CB Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 which they allege repealed CB Circular No. 960, nor do they challenge the authority of the Monetary Board to issue them. Petitioners likewise do not dispute that violation of Section 4 of CB Circular No. 960, as amended, which provides: SEC. 4. Foreign exchange retention abroad. No person shall promote, finance, enter into or participate in any foreign exchange transactions where the foreign exchange involved is paid, retained, delivered or transferred abroad while the corresponding pesos are paid for or are received in the Philippines, except when specifically authorized by the Central Bank or otherwise allowed under Central Bank regulations. Residents, firms, associations, or corporations unless otherwise permitted under CB regulations are prohibited from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad. Or of section 10 thereof, the pertinent portions of which provide: SEC. 10. Reports of foreign exchange earners. All resident persons who habitually/customarily earn, acquire, or receive foreign exchange from invisibles locally or from abroad, shall submit reports in the prescribed form of such earnings, acquisition or receipts with the appropriate CB department. Those required to submit reports under this section shall include, but need not necessarily be limited to the following: xxx xxx xxx
Residents, firms or establishments habitually/customarily earning, acquiring or receiving foreign exchange from sales of merchandise, services or from whatever source shall register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within ninety (90) days from the date of this Circular. is punishable as a criminal offense under Section 34 of the Central Bank Act the pertinent portion of which provides: SEC. 34 Proceedings upon violation of laws and regulations. -Whenever any person or entity wilfully violates this Act or any order, instruction, rule or regulation issued by the Monetary Board, the person or persons responsible for such violation shall be punished by a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos and by imprisonment of not more than five years.[4] In respondent Court of Appeals, however, it was petitioners insistent position that violations of CB Circular No. 960, specifically Sections 4 and 10 thereof, ceased to be punishable upon the issuance in 1992 of CB Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353, on the theory that the latter circulars completely repealed the former, and that the reservations made in each of the repealing clauses of the latter circulars are invalid. She now reiterates the same contentions before us. Respondent appellate court rejected her thesis on this score; we are sufficiently persuaded to do likewise. The saving clause in CB Circular No. 1318, which petitioner questions, provides: SEC. 111. Repealing Clause. All existing provisions of Circulars 363, 960 and 1028, including amendments thereto, with the exception of the second paragraph of Section 68 of Circular 1028, as well as all other existing Central Bank rules and regulations or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this Circular, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly:Provided, however, that regulations, violations of which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern (Italics ours). The assailed saving clause in CB Circular No. 1353 is as follows: SEC. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318. All the provisions in Chapter X of CB Circular No. 1318 insofar as they are not inconsistent with, or contrary to the provisions of this circular, shall remain in full force and effect: Provided, however, that any regulation on non-trade foreign exchange transactions which has been repealed, amended or
modified by this Circular, violations of which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the time of the cause of action accrued shall govern (Italics also supplied). We agree with respondent appellate court that such amendments and saving clauses are valid and were authorized enactments under a delegated power of the Monetary Board.Section 14 of the Central Bank Act expressly grants the Monetary Board the power to prepare and issue rules and regulations necessary for the effective discharge of the responsibilities and exercise of the powers assigned to the Monetary Board and to the Central Bank under this Act, and to report the same thereafter to the President and Congress. In fact, this power of subordinate legislation and its validity was admitted by petitioner in the respondent appellate court.[5] It cannot be plausibly claimed that there was undue delegation of legislative power in this particular instance since it was the Central Bank itself which defined the offense and provided the penalty therefor. As respondent Court of Appeals points out, administrative bodies have the authority to issue administrative regulations which are penal in nature where the law itself makes the violation of the administrative regulation punishable and provides for its penalty. [6] This is still the rule on the matter and, in the instant case, the Central Bank Act defined the offense and its penalty while the questioned circular merely spelled out the details of the offense. Ironically, petitioner concedes the greater power of the Board to repeal CB Circular No. 960 through CB Circular No. 1318, yet she inexplicably questions the lesser and incidental power to provide for saving clauses therein. Petitioners argument that the saving clauses are not germane to the purposes of the Central Bank Act, and consequently ultra vires, has been roundly confuted by respondent Court of Appeals. If, as she claims, one of the objectives of that law is to stabilize the monetary system, that is precisely why Congress punished as criminal offenses the violations of the issuance of the Monetary Board necessary for the effective discharged of its responsibilities, and to carry out which the Board deemed it necessary to provide for the challenged saving clauses.Obviously, these saving clauses were dictated by the need to continue the prosecution of those who had already committed acts of monetary destabilization. The opposite view posited by petitioner would result in an absurdity.
Her lamentations that the aforementioned provisions are discriminatory because they are aimed at her and her co-accused do not assume the dignity of a legal argument since they are unwarranted conjectures belied by even the text of the circulars alone. Hence, as respondent appellate court correctly concludes, the foregoing facts clearly disprove petitioners claim that her constitutional right to equal protection of the law was violated. Should she nonetheless desire to pursue such objection, she may always adduce additional evidence at the trial of these cases since that is the proper stage therefor, and not at their present posture. Lastly, there is no need for us to tarry on petitioners hypothesis that the acts charged in the questioned informations were committed by foreign agents or juridical persons outside Philippine territory and that, she being supposedly a mere beneficiary, this scenario divests the trial court of jurisdiction over her insofar as the violations resulting from such acts abroad are concerned. This is too simplistic an argument because it would have the Court assume that she only had a passive participation thereon or, if she is to be believed, none at all. That is why respondent Court of Appeals decided to just graciously quote, in refutation of such imposition on judicial credulity, the perceptively succinct observation of respondent trial judge, to wit: x x x In no uncertain terms, the corresponding informations clearly state that the accused, in conspiracy with the late president x x x opened and maintained foreign accounts abroad in the name of foundations organized by their dummies. The same observation holds true in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879-92 where the accused and her co-accused are charged (with) violation of section 10, CB Circular 960. As easily gleaned therefrom, (the) criminal informations are not only sufficient but clear in alleging that the accused earned foreign exchange without proper reporting therof although camouflaged in the name of foundations. xxx x x x accuseds contention that the acts charged were committed by persons or agents who managed said foundation outside the country and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this court is misplaced argument. As already stated and discussed, it is the accused who (was alleged to have) maintained foreign accounts and earned foreign exchange abroad camouflaged in the name of foreign agents and/or foundations but neither obtained authority to do so nor reported the earnings to the Central Bank.[7] (Words in parenthesis supplied). All the way from the trial court, through the Court of Appeals, and now before this court, petitioner has insistently repeated the selfsame
issues and arguments for the quashal of the charges against her, with the result that the same have been deep-frozen since 1991. Inevitably, the three-tiered adjudicature to which they have been subjected has merely resulted in reiterations by the parties of their set issues, congealed arguments and invariable conclusions. It is time then to thaw those cases from the frigidity of their present status so that petitioner may have the opportunity to prove her defenses on the merits, instead of having those cases indefinitely sidelined by legal strategy contingent on expectancies. For, in the present posture thereof, it does not appear that respondent Court of Appeals has committed any abuse of discretion, much less of a grave or arbitrary nature, as would call for the extraordinary writ of certiorari. We accordingly uphold the denial of petitioners motion to quash so that the interlocutory proceedings may now move on to trial wherein she can present such evidence as may possibly place her protestations in another light as she claims. WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the challenged judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Nolasco v COMELEC FACTS A disqualification case was filed against Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayorelect Florentino Blanco for alleged performing acts which are grounds for disqualification under the Omnibus Election Code – giving money to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing election functions: for committing acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy, and for spending an amount for his campaign in excess of what is allowed by the law. The COMELEC First Division required both parties to submit their position papers. The case was decided against Blanco. A reconsideration was moved by Blanco in the COMELEC En Banc. Nolasco, the vice-mayor-elect took part as intervenor, urging that should Blanco be finally disqualified, the mayoralty position be turned over to him. The parties were allowed to file their memoranda. En Banc denied Blanco and Nolasco’s motions thus this petition for certiorari. Issues: 1. WON Blanco was denied due process and equal protection of laws 2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Alarilla as the duly elected mayor
Held: 1. Blanco was not denied due process and equal protection of the laws. He was given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence on his disqualification was not strong. Blanco’s contention that the minimum quantum of evidence was not met is untenable. What RA 6646 and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require is a mere evidence of guilt that should be strong to justify the COMELEC in suspending a winning candidate’s proclamation. 2. Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the Mayor of Meycauayan. It is already a settled principle in the case of Reyes v COMELEC that the candidate with the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate be disqualified. There cannot be an assumption that the second placer would have received the other votes otherwise it is a judgment substituting the mind of a voter. It cannot be assumed that the second placer would have won the elections because in the situation where the disqualified candidate is excluded, the condition would have substantially changed. Regala v. Sandiganbayan Ponente: Kapunan Facts PCGG field a case against Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. for the recovery of illgotten wealth. Among the defendants were the ACCRA Law Firm and Raul Roco, also a part of ACCRA. Case alleged that Cojuangco and defendants conspired in setting up through the use of coco levy funds numerous banks; that ACCRA acted as dummies. ACCRA performed legal services for clients, with the incidental services where its members acted as stockholders. In the process, members of ACCRA acquired information relative to assets of clients and their personal and business circumstances. PCGG excluded Raul Roco from the complaint as party-defendant because of his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principals for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder in the companies involved. Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution denying the exclusion of ACCRA members in the complaint as party-defendants. MR denied. PETs contend: that the exclusion of Roco as party-defendant grants him a favourable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of his client, giving him an advantage over ACCRA members; that lawyers are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal. Issue
W/N privileged communication between atty and client may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of ACCRA’s clients? Yes. Held PET’s inclusion as co-defendants is merely being used as leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable PCGG to nail these clients -> thus PCGG has no valid cause of action against PETs and should exclude them from the complaint. An atty is more than a mere agent or servant because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self-incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed, thereby rendering the right to counsel practically nugatory. An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information. General rule: a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. Exception: 1. client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate that client in the very activity which he sought the lawyer’s advice. 2. the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance. 3. where the nature of the atty-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be privileged The instant case falls under exceptions: disclosure of client’s name would lead to establish said client’s connection with the very fact in issue of the case. Link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice/service sought duly established: clients consulted the PETs regarding structure, framework and set-up of corporations. In turn, PETs gave professional advice in the form of, among others, deeds of assignment covering client’s shareholdings. Preparation of documents part of PET’s legal service to clients. Thus PETs have legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought. Revelation of client’s name would provide necessary link for the prosecution to build its case.
Where a client thinks he might have previously committed something illegal and consults atty about it -> falls within the exception. But where client seeks services of an atty for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law to commit illegal activities -> not covered by privilege. Purpose of privilege: to avoid fishing expedition by the prosecution. There are alternative sources of information available to prosecutor w/c do not depend on utilizing defendant’s counsel as source. Duration of privilege: exists not only during relationship but extends even after termination. PCGG failed to show that Roco actually revealed identity of clients. PCGG failed to show that Roco was treated as a species apart from the rest of ACCRA lawyers -> no substantial distinctions between him and ACCRA; violates equal protection clause. In response to petitioners' last assignment of error, respondents allege that the private respondent was dropped as party defendant not only because of his admission that he acted merely as a nominee but also because of his undertaking to testify to such facts and circumstances "as the interest of truth may require, which includes... the identity of the principal."[59] First, as to the bare statement that private respondent merely acted as a lawyer and nominee, a statement made in his out-of-court settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient to state that petitioners have likewise made the same claim not merely out-of- court but also in their Answer to plaintiff's Expanded Amended Complaint, signed by counsel, claiming that their acts were made in furtherance of "legitimate lawyering.[60] Being "similarly situated" in this regard, public respondents must show that there exist other conditions and circumstances which would warrant their treating the private respondent differently from petitioners in the case at bench in order to evade a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. To this end, public respondents contend that the primary consideration behind their decision to sustain the PCGG's dropping of private respondent as a defendant was his promise to disclose the identities of the clients in question. However, respondents failed to show - and absolutely nothing exists in the records of the case at bar - that private respondent actually revealed the identity of his client(s) to the PCGG. Since the undertaking happens to be the leitmotif of the entire arrangement between Mr. Roco and the PCGG, an undertaking which is so material as to have justified PCGG's special treatment exempting the private respondent from prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan should have required proof of the undertaking more substantial than a
"bare assertion" that private respondent did indeed comply with the undertaking. Instead, as manifested by the PCGG, only three documents were submitted for the purpose, two of which were mere requests for re-investigation and one simply disclosed certain clients which petitioners (ACCRA lawyers) were themselves willing to reveal. These were clients to whom both petitioners and private respondent rendered legal services while all of them were partners at ACCRA, and were not the clients which the PCGG wanted disclosed for the alleged questioned transactions.[61] To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case or the filing of the suit in the respondent court without him, therefore, the PCGG should conclusively show that Mr. Roco was treated as a species apart from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a classification which made substantial distinctions based on real differences. No such substantial distinctions exist from the records of the case at bench, in violation of the equal protection clause. The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven application of statutes and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against uneven application of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment.[62] Those who fall within a particular class ought to be treated alike not only as to privileges granted but also as to the liabilities imposed. x x x. What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision: Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding the rest.[63] We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. The condition also constitutes a transgression by respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.[64] It is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from prosecution without allowing the same exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGGs demand not only touches upon the question of the identity of their clients but also on documents related
to the suspected transactions, not only in violation of the attorneyclient privilege but also of the constitutional right against selfincrimination.Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the expense of such rights. An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that they should wait until they are called to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters learned in confidence before they can raise their objections. But petitioners are not mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have made their position clear from the very beginning that they are not willing to testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their constitutional right against selfincrimination and of their fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality. It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to take its full course in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of further litigation when it is obvious that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a privileged attorneyclient relationship and as a means of coercing them to disclose the identities of their clients.To allow the case to continue with respect to them when this Court could nip the problem in the bud at this early opportunity would be to sanction an unjust situation which we should not here countenance. The case hangs as a real and palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should not be allowed to continue a day longer. While we are aware of respondent PCGGs legal mandate to recover illgotten wealth, we will not sanction acts which violate the equal protection guarantee and the right against self-incrimination and subvert the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. Olivarez vs Sandiganbayan GR 118533 04 October 1995 Facts: Paranaque Sanguaniang Bayan Resolution 744, approved by Mayor Olivarez 6 Oct 1922, authorized Baclaran Credit Cooperative Inc (BCCI) to set up a manfacturer’s night (Christmas Agro-Industrial Fair sa Baclaran) during the Christmas fiesta celebration, at Baclaran for 60 days, (11 Nov 92 to 15 Feb 93) for which they will use a portion of the service road of Roxas Boulevard. Allegedly, BCCI exerted all possible efforts to secure the necessary permit but Olivarez simply refused to issue the permit unless BCCI gives money to the latter.
On 15 Dec 1992, BCCI charged Olivarez with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for unreasonably refusing to issue a mayor’s permit deapite request and follow ups to implement SB Resolution 744. After preliminary investigations and pleadings before the Sandiganbayan, the case was remanded to the Office of the Ombudsman. Consequently, the Ombudsman found Olivarez liable by giving unwarranted benefit though manifest impartiality to another group on the flimsy reason that complainant failed to apply for a business permit. Olivarez filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition. Issue: Whether Parañaque Mayor Olivarez’ refusal to issue a mayor's permit and refusal to act favorably on the application of the Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI) was a violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Petitioner: Petitioner's main defense is that BCCI was not issued a mayor's permit by reason of its failure to apply therefor and to comply with the conditions set forth in Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 744. Held: Yes, there is enough evidence to warrant the filing of a formal charge in court against petitioner for a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Ratio: First. Initially, petitioner claims he could not grant a permit to BCCI, which was allegedly demanding an exclusive authority to operate, on the pretext that he can be held liable for a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 for giving unwarranted benefits to BCCI to the detriment of other associations. Then, petitioner justifies the subsequent issuance of an executive order granting a permit to another Baclaran-based vendors' associations, by claiming it did not cause injury to BCCI since the latter’s authority to operate is not exclusive. Petitioner had taken it upon himself to categorize the exclusivity or non-exclusivity of the authority to operate granted to BCCI, depending on whether or not it would suit his preference. The inconsistent stand taken by petitioner with regard to the character of BCCI's authority to operate is inexplicable and casts sufficient doubt on the real motive behind the non-issuance of the required permit. Second. Petitioner asserted that the executive order granting a permit to the other Baclaran-based vendors' associations was issued supposedly in the best interest of the municipality as evidenced by its 13M earnings from the night fair. While the declared purpose may be noble, it pales in contrast to what appears to be manifest partiality on the part of petitioner in refusing to grant a permit to BCCI. Petitioner could not demonstrate how the issuance of a permit to BCCI would so adversely affect public interest as to warrant its denial.
On the contrary, the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque had passed a resolution, which was even approved by herein petitioner, expressly allowing BCCI to hold the night fair. This is concrete proof that the grant of authority to operate in favor of BCCI was not contrary to law, public policy, nor prejudicial to public interest as alleged by the petitioner. Petitioner's partiality may be gleaned from the fact that he issued a permit in favor of the other Baclaran-based vendors' associations by the mere executive order, whereas many requirements were imposed on BCCI before it could be granted the same permit. Worse, petitioner failed to show, in violation of BCCI's right to equal protection, that BCCI and the other Baclaran-based vendors' associations were not similarly situated as to give at least a semblance of legality to the apparent haste with which said executive order was issued. The only interest served by such executive order was that of the petitioner. Lastly, Petitioner submits that no permit could be issued because BCCI never filed an application with the proper office, the Business Permit and Licensing Office. This is specious. It was shown that on November 13, 1992, BCCI, through its general manager, wrote petitioner requesting for a permit to operate, but this was rejected by him on the theory that the application should be made with the proper municipal official. The indifference shown by petitioner to BCCI's application taints his actuations with suspicion. As the mayor of the municipality, the officials he referred to were definitely under his authority and he was not without recourse to take appropriate action on the letter-application of BCCI (although the same was not strictly in accordance with normal procedure.) There was nothing to prevent him from referring said letter-application to the licensing department, but which paradoxically he refused to do. Petitioner, as a municipal mayor, is expressly authorized and has the power to issue permits and licenses for the holding of activities for any charitable or welfare purpose, pursuant to Section 444 (b) (3) (iv and v) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160). Hence, he cannot feign total lack of authority to act on the letter-application of BCCI. SORIANO VS CA SYNOPSIS Petitioner Ronald Soriano was convicted of the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property. His application for probation was granted with its corresponding terms and conditions. In less than a year, Assistant
Prosecutor Benjamin A. Fadera filed a motion to cancel petitioners probation due to his failure to satisfy his civil liability to the heirs of the victim and a supplemental motion alleging petitioners commission of another crime for which at that time he was awaiting arraignment. The Parole and Probation Office, however, recommended the continuance of petitioners probation and he be required to submit a program of payment of his civil liability. The trial court denied the prosecutors motion and directed petitioner to submit a program of payment of the civil liability imposed upon him. The latter failed to comply with the said order. The trial court issued an order declaring petitioner in contempt of court for his failure to comply with its orders. The court likewise revoked the grant of probation to petitioner and ordered that he be arrested to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. Petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, holding that petitioners stubborn unwillingness to comply with the orders of the trial court shows his refusal to reform himself and to correct a wrong. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the Court of appeals. Hence, this petition for review. The only issue to be resolved by the Supreme Court in this case is whether or not the revocation of petitioners probation is lawful and proper. There was no justifiable reason given by the petitioner for ignoring the two orders of the court. The trial could not be faulted for citing him in contempt for his failure to comply with its orders. Petitioners continued refusal to submit a program of payment, along with his prayer for the deletion of the requirement of payment of civil liability from his probation order, creates the impression that he wanted to completely avoid paying his civil liability, with or without a program of payment. Having admittedly violated the terms and conditions of his probation, petitioner cannot now assail the revocation of his probation. The petition was denied by the Supreme Court. SYLLABUS 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; NOT VIOLATED WHEN THE PAYMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY IS NOT MADE A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO PROBATION; INSTANT CASE. Contrary to his assertion, payment of civil liability is not violative of equal protection clause of the Constitution. Note that the payment of civil liability is not made a condition precedent to probation. If it were, then perhaps there might be some basis to petitioners assertion that only moneyed convicts may avail of the benefits of probation. In this case, however, petitioners application for probation had already been granted. Satisfaction of his civil liability was not made a
requirement before he could avail of probation, but was a condition for his continued enjoyment of the same. The trial court not have done away with imposing payment of civil liability as a condition for probation, as petitioner suggests. This is not an arbitrary imposition but one required by law. It is a consequence of petitioners having been convicted of a crime, and petitioner is bound to satisfy this obligation regardless of whether or not he is placed under probation 2. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; NOTICE TO COUNSEL IS NOTICE TO CLIENT; EXCEPTION NOT APPLICABLE IN PRESENT CASE. Petitioner wants to take exception to the rule that notice to counsel is notice to client. The Court finds no reason to make an exception in this case. Petitioners counsel has not been shown to be grossly irresponsible as to cause prejudice to petitioners rights. 3. ID.; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT BY THE TRIAL COURT; ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT MORE SO WHEN THEY ARE AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS; PRESENT CASE. The question of whether or not petitioner has, indeed, violated the terms and conditions of his probation is evidently a factual one which had already been passed upon by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Settled is the rule in the jurisdiction that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight, more so when they are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this case. 4. CRIMINAL LAW; PROBATION LAW; CONDITIONS THEREOF; RATIONALE. Section 10 of the Probation Law states: SEC. 10 Conditions of Probation -- xxx The court may also require the probationer to: (a) Cooperate with a program of supervision; (b) Meet his family responsibilities; (c) Devote himself to a specific employment and not to change said employment without the prior written approval of the probation officer. xxx (e) Pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational; training; xxx Clearly, these conditions are not whims of the trial court but are requirements laid down by statute. They are among the conditions that the trial court is empowered to impose and the petitioner, as probationer, is required to follow. Only by satisfying these conditions may the purposes of probation be fulfilled. These include promoting the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized treatment, and providing an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence. Failure to comply will result in the revocation of the order granting probation pursuant to the Probation Law. 5. ID.; ID.; PROBATION CONSTRUED. Probation is not an absolute right. It is a mere privilege whose grant rests upon the discretion of the trial
court. Its grant is subject to certain terms and conditions that may be imposed by the trial court. Having the power to grant probation, it
follows that the trial court also has the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.
