Wittgenstein on the Nature of the Self and Solipsism from his Tractatus Rev. Randolph Thompson Dible II, U. L. . !"# $%# $& Wittgenstein 'as heavil( influenced b( a number of )erman thin*ers from ph ilosoph( and the arts from the generations +ust before his era, and of them a huge influence influence, as 'ell as a direct influence on Wittgenstein, is rthur rthur Schopenhauer, 'hose thesis is states as the title of his opus -The World World as Will Will and Representation. In /oo* ! of 0olume 0olume ! of that 'or*, he starts the 'or* 'ith the follo'ing proposition1 proposition1 -The 'orld is m( representation 2vorstellung3. 2vorstellung3. nd that chapter he concludes 'ith the proposition -nd the 'orld is m( Will. There is an obvious influent in Wittgenstein4s Wittgenstein4s Tractatus4s Tractatus4s proposition 5.%"% -The 'orld is independent of m( 'ill. 6et, at first glance, it seems that Wittgenstein Wittgenstein is antithetical to Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer. /oth thin*ers clarif( 'hat the( mean b( these propositions in their discussions of the substitutabilit( substitutabilit( of the notions of 'ill and sub+ect. In Schopenhauer 'e find a discussion discussion of the -pure sub+ect of *no'ing in the chapter of 0olume 0olume !, of that title. 7ere, as else'here throughout that 'or* 'e find a careful distinction bet'een the sub+ect as the thing8in8itself and the sub+ect as the ps(chological phenomenon 'hich is thereb( ob+ectified or represented. This echoes the trouble some readers of Schopenhauer have 'ith the idea of the self as the origin and limit 2source and telos3 of the 'orld as representation. representation. This confusion is resolved resolved b( once again reminding such readers that the self referred to is none other than the transcendental base of reference, the pure self8reference of the self itself, not the sub+ective forms 2Whitehead4s 'ord as 'ell as Schopen hauer4s 2from the aforementioned chapter33 or individual self 2the +iva or +ivatman distinct from the true self or atman in the 7indu 'or*s Schopenhauer reads before going to bed.3 Such a distinction is necessar( necessar( to *eep in mind to understand m(stical 'or*. Such a distinction *eeps the limit limit of the finitude of the 'ord clear, clear, and thus the 'orld and all its constituents in chec*. 9no'ing the limit is *no'ing the true nature of the self, and is the m(stical *e( to placing non8 ultimate realit( in the conte:t of ultimate realit(. realit(. The similar sounding propositions of Schopenhauer and Wittgensetin4s Wittgensetin4s 5.%"% resound of antipodal antipoda l nodes in a harmonium, of m(stical tal* about the self, but in fact there is no such sphere of an( dimensions, it is rather a metaphor of the dimensionless point Wittgenstein Wittgenstein describes in ;roposition <.5=1 -7ere 'e see that solipsism solipsism strictl( carried carried out coincides 'ith pure realism. realism. The I is solipsism shrin*s to an e:tensionless point and there remains the realit( coordinated 'ith it. <.5=!1 There is therefore therefore reall( a sense in 'hich in in philosoph( 'e can tal* of a non8ps(chological I. The I occurs in philosoph( through the fact that the -'orld -'orld is m( 'orld. The I is not the man, man, not the human bod( or the human soul of 'hich ps(cholog( treats, but the metaph(sical sub+ect, the limit > not a part of the 'orld. ertainl( Schopenhauer4 Schopenhauer 4s t'o statements do not conflict 'ith on another, so 'e must understand the sense in 'hich he emplo(s these motions of self, 'ill and 'orld. With that sense, 'e can ma*e sense of Schopenhauer and his critics, and it is helpful to empirical scientistic critics of m(sticism, such as the logical positivists of the 0ienna ircle 'ho 'ere so attracted to 'hat Wittgenstein did sa( sa( in his opus, to the form of his brilliant 'or* 2formosus means beautiful.3 /ut of course, the m(stical side of things is
not the side 'e are presented 'ith, but the side 'hich is ever8present, the in8side. Ta*e these t'o propositions for Wittgenstein to illustrate the point1 5.=!1 -The sense of the 'orld must lie outside the 'orld. In the 'orld ever(thing is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value88 and if there 'ere, it 'ould be of no value. If there is a value 'hich is of value, it must lie outside all happening and being8so. ?or all happening and being so is accidental. It must lie outside the 'orld. 5.5.<@@ -There is indeed the ine:pressible. This sho's itselfA it is the m(stical. The sub+ect cannot be seen na*ed, the self8a'are self is a'are of no ob+ectification of the self, rather, but the self in an( 'a( is n ever absent, rather, it is ever8 present, for it is the ver( presence 'hich sees 'hat is sho'n and *no'n. So again, although it is invisible and cannot be sensed, there is nothing more necessar(. The 'orld as Wittgenstein understands it is the logical construct, the ver( structure that is the case, 'hich is li*e Sc hopenhauer4s characteriBation of the 'orld as representation. Wittgenstein4s logicism goes further than Schopenhauer on this point in describing the 'orld as logicall( complete, precisel( defined b( the scaffold of the logical hierarch( 'hich runs from the parallel structures of ob+ects and atomic facts named through situations or states of affairs to the 'orld 'hich is the case. /ut this hierarch( is simpl( 'hat can be stated, not ultimate realit(. Can( propositions in the propositions < and the propositions 5 clarif( the more m(stical points Wittgenstein has about the self, the sub+ect and the place of solipsism in his understanding. Statements such as <.5@4s -the limits of m( language mean the limits of m( 'orld are clarifications of such states as <.54 s state of the same 2-The limits of m( language are the limits of m( 'orld3 and <.5@! -The 'orld and life are one and <.5% -I am m( 'orld. 2The microcosm.3. <.5%! clarifies the nature of the aforementioned distinction bet'een the true self and the non8self sub+ective form, starting 'ith -The thin*ing, presenting sub+ectA there is no such thing.. nd the follo'ing propositions in this area continue 'ith the sub+ect. In <.5=! he clarifies the terminolog( using -the philosophical sub+ect and -the metaph(sical sub+ect, predicates necessar( onl( because of the normal usage of our colloEuial language 'hich has different senses. The non8ps(chological I and the e:tensionless point are other names he gives the self, the limit. The 'orld felt as limited 'hole, indeed, is the picture painted b( Wittgenstein4s Tractatus.
