Upheaval in the Balkans: Venizelos and Politics, 1888-1920

Dimitris Michalopoulos

UPHEAVAL IN THE BALKANS: VENIZELOS AND POLITICS, 1888-1920

To my son

CONTENTS

NOTE ............................................................................................... 4 ABBREVIATIONS.............................................................................. 5 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................... 6 FOREWORD ..................................................................................... 7 CHAPTER ONE The Cretan Prelude...................................................................... 9 CHAPTER TWO The Maturation of the Wars ....................................................... 35 CHAPTER THREE The Balkan Wars ....................................................................... 65 CHAPTER FOUR The National Divide of the Greeks ............................................. 91 THE AFTERMATH ........................................................................ 125 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................ 129

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NOTE Greek words such as names, book and newspaper titles are transliterated into Roman letters according to the Library of Congress Romanization table. Regarding, nonetheless, Greek terms already existing in English, such as person names, toponyms etc.), there is observed the established form. Athens and not Athēna for instance, Crete and not Krētē, Salonika and not Thessalonikē. The result is somewhat complicated, yet it is the only reasonable one. Dates are given according to the Calendar in use in every country. It is noteworthy that the Julian one (Old Style) was used in Greece till 1923. The gap between the Julian Calendar and the Gregorian one (New Style) was twelve days in the nineteenth century and increases by one day every hundred years from then on. It noteworthy that “Sublime Porte”, “Ottoman Porte” or simply “Porte” means either the central government of the Ottoman Empire (the Sultan included) or the Ottoman Empire itself. The exact meaning depends on the sources used in this book.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AYE

Foreign Ministry Archives, Athens

EVP

Eleutherios Venizelos Papers, Athens

PKP

Panagiōtēs Kanellopoulos Papers, Athens

PA

Parliamentary Archives, London

And also: NS

New Style

OS

Old Style

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many grateful thanks are due to Prof. Michael Lumley, Dr Kerry R. Bolton, Thomas Theologis and John Phillipson. For they have proof-read my work in manuscript form and made exceedingly helpful suggestions. I am indebted to Alex Synodinos for many stimulating conversations. Needless to say that without my wife’s patience this book would not have come into being.

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FOREWORD Eleutherios Venizelos (1864-1936), an emblematic figure in the recent History of Greece, is considered to have been the champion of parliamentary democracy and of Greek irredentism. People in Crete still see in him the flower of their island; and throughout Europe an astute diplomat, a sharp mind and, above all, a great statesman. His memory is credited with the re-organization of the Greek Army and Navy at the beginning of the twentieth century and, subsequently, with the happy outcome for Greece of the Balkan and Great Wars. In stark contrast to these, the 1922 Greek Catastrophe in Asia Minor is ascribed to his political foes (shot on November 15, 1922). The 19281932 partial industrialization of Greece is considered to be one more of his great achievements; and his death in Paris the end of a “Hellene worthy of his Fatherland”. In short, to sort out the truth from the myth is a hard and perilous job. Little wonder at that; for whenever politics and History are intermixed, History suffers at the hands of politics and not vice versa. Unveiling the truth, therefore, means that the past should be reconsidered - and the future remodeled as well. Still, as a rule, very few people are prepared to put up with such intellectual and psychological matters. Needless to say, Venizelos was by no means what is generally termed a “common individual”. He was a remorseless lawyer, a consummate gambler and, consequently, a pitiless politician. Still, he was soft-mannered, obliging and always a good friend. The great giveaway was his eyes: bright, peering through gold-rimmed spectacles and making him look like an intellectual. Yet intellectual he was not. He was a rootless individual, with a wrecked family-life and, practically, no ties beyond the ones that eventually linked him with factors and powers capable of assuring him of his ascendancy. Nonetheless, it was thanks to these characteristics that he became the most noted Greek statesman of his time; and, of course, it is because of his uncommonness that his hagiography is skewed today. Evidence of his celebrity is provided by the opinions of him, published at the end of the present volume. It is quite unlikely, therefore, that the origins of the Great War in the Balkans can be fathomed without first understanding his personality and actions. These are the very tasks of this book.

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CHAPTER ONE The Cretan Prelude At the end of the 1821 Revolution -and the subsequent foundation of the Kingdom of Greece- Crete remained part of the Ottoman Empire. The key point of the “Cretan Issue” was the strategic importance of Suda Bay, whence almost the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean could be controlled. As a result the Great Powers tried to maintain the rule of the island, since Turkey was then the “Sick Man of Europe”. In 1897, a Greco-Turkish war started. The Greek Army suffered a quick – and somewhat ridiculous- defeat at the hands of the Ottomans. The Sublime Porte, nonetheless, was not allowed to annex Greek territories. On the contrary: thanks to secret discussions between George I, King of the Hellenes, and the Austro-Hungarian government, Crete was proclaimed autonomous. The island was administered as a collective protectorate of the Mediterranean Big Four, namely Great Britain, France, Italy - and Russia as well. It was then and there that Venizelos emerged.

I Eleutherios Venizelos is an enigmatic character in the Contemporary Greek Drama. Up to now nothing as far as his parents are concerned can be taken for granted. According to established scholarship, he was born in August 18641 to Kyriakos Venizelos and his wife, Stylianē.2 His birthplace was Mournies, a village near Canea (Chania in Greek), at that time the small capital of the island of Crete. The island was then Ottoman territory. The point is therefore, when and why Kyriakos Venizelos settled there. A certain Kyriakēs Venizelos reached Crete on May 20, 1834, at the age of 26.3 Eight years later, he was a poor pedlar, with no property on the island, unmarried - but with his mother and a sister depending upon him.4 He claimed that he was Cretan by descent, but he refused to mention either his father’s name, allegedly dead, or his mother’s one.5 Nevertheless, he was a Greek subject and stated to the Greek consular authority at Canea that he had the intention of going back to Greece within the year 1843.6 Most likely on the 11th of that month and year – according to the Old Style, i.e. the 24th in the Gregorian. See A. Lilly Macrakis, “Venizelos’ Early Life and Political Career in Crete” in Paschalis M. Kitromilidis (ed.), Eleftherios Venizelos. The Trials of Statemanship (Edinburgh University Press, 20082 ), p. 39. 2 There are people in Crete who still remember her as Maria. 3 AYE, 1843, 49/1, “Greek Subjects in Canea”; annex to the despatch No. 53 of Stylianos Peroglou, Greek consul at Canea, to Iakōvos Rhizos-Neroulos, Foreign Minister of Greece, Canea, 15/27 December, 1842. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 1

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If Kyriakēs Venizelos were indeed the father of Eleutherios, he was an individual more obscure than his son. It should be noted that Kyriakēs is a variant of the baptismal name Kyriakos, and quite popular as a name among the Diaspora Greek Orthodox people thoughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However that may be, Kyriakēs/Kyriakos Venizelos, albeit pretending to have Cretan ancestry, had his Greek passport under number 324, issued by the Prefecture of Nauplia.7 He was allegedly registered in the Syra municipality,8 Syros island, Cyclades, but was not able to produce any formal evidence.9 The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that almost everything Eleutherios Venizelos and his followers stated about Kyriakos Venizelos’ ancestry and achievements cannot be verified. In a letter that allegedly Eleutherios himself wrote in 1899 to his friend, Kōnstantinos Digenakēs, he told of his ancestry and father as follows: “The genealogical tree of Venizelos family is rooted in Mystras, near Sparta.10 For as early as the seventeenth century the Krevvatas family, one of the most distinguished in the Peloponnese, was established there. Panagiōtēs Krevvatas, a member of that family, renowned for wisdom and bravery, took part in the 1770 uprising against the Turks; [that uprising] was engineered by the Admiral Orlov, envoy of the Empress of Russia Catherine II. After the failure of the uprising, Turkish authorities kept watch on Panagiōtēs Krevvatas. As a result the latter, following the advice of an Ottoman friend, fled to the Ionian Islands, in order to avoid being put to death. Another member of the Krevvatas family was christened Benizelos, left his home as well and settled on Cythera (Cerigo Island). 11 It is there that he married and became a tradesman. After having spent some time on Cerigo [nonetheless], he moved to Canea, Crete, wherein he kept doing commerce. One of Benizelos Krevvatas’ siblings, Kyriakos, was the father of Eleutherios Venizelos. He was a tradesman as well, and highly regarded by everyone in Canea. He was educated by the standards of his time and also an ardent nationalist. When still very young he [Kyriakos] took part in the 1821 great [Revolutionary] Struggle : he was secretary to Koumēs, the [Cretan] chieftain from Selinon,12 at the siege of Monemvasia [in the Peloponnese]. He was awarded the bronze medal of the Uprising. Three of his brothers fell in Ibid. Syra is a municipality on Syros island, dwelled chiefly by autochthonous people of Roman Catholic faith. Hermoupolis, on the other hand, the capital of island, has a population of immigrants, originated from the islands of the eastern Aegean Sea, who are members of the Greek Orthodox Church. With regard to Hermoupolis (= the city of Hermes), see D. Michalopoulos, Vie politique en Grèce pendant les années 1862-1869 (University of Athens/Saripoleion, 1981), p. 32ff. passim. 9 AYE, 1843, 49/1, “Greek Subjects in Canea”; annex to the despatch No. 53 of S. Peroglou, Greek consul at Canea, to the Foreign Minister of Greece, Canea, 15/27 December 1842. 10 In the southern Peloponnese. 11 One of the Ionian Islands, offshore the southern Peloponnese. 12 Selinon is an area in south-western Crete. 7 8

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that “holy war” [as the Greeks of the time used call the uprising]; another [brother of him], Hadji-Nikolos Benizelos, was one of the three Cretans who were sent to confer with the Greek leaders [in the Peloponnese], when the Revolution broke out. Exiled in 1843 by the Turkish government, which confiscated his property and business assets, he remained an outlaw for a full 19 years”.13 Amazing is such a string of absurdities. First of all, and as aforementioned, it is dubious that Venizelos himself wrote this letter;14 for it is not a family’s account but a boasting of illustrious ancestry. The effort made by the author to connect Eleutherios’ father and his lineage with noted events in the History of Modern Greece is more than obvious. Eleutherios himself, due to his irritable and cynical nature, would have unlikely written such pompous lines. Secondly, with regard to famous Kyriakos’ connection with the Mystras Krevvatas family, harped on by several Eleutherios’ biographers,15 evidence was never produced;16 for it is an utter myth.17 Third, Monemvasia, in the southeastern Peloponnese, fell to the Greeks in 1821.18 It is highly improbable, therefore, that Kyriakos, then a child merely five years old, was secretary to a chieftain in war turmoil.19 Fourthly, if Kyriakos were member of such an illustrious family, with brothers actively involved and perished in the 1821-1829 Greek War of Independence, he would be known and honoured by the consular authorities of Greece in Crete. Not only was not professed such an esteem for him, but he systematically avoided to his death to mention 13 The letter was published in toto by Nik. V. Tōmadakēs, Ho Venizelos ephēvos (= The Puberty of Venizelos), Athens: Kydōnia, 1964, pp. 22 and partially by Lilē Makrakē, in Eleutherios Venizelos, 1864-1910. Hē diaplasē henos ethnikou hēgetē (=Eleutherios Venizelos, 1864-1910). The Forming of a National Leader), Athens: Educational Foundation of the National Bank of Greece, 1992, p. 100. A –partialEnglish translation is to be found in A. Lilly Macrakis, “Venizelos’ Early Life and Political Career in Crete…”, p. 37; and also in Andrew Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos. The Peace Conferences of 1919-1923 and their Aftermath (London: Haus Publishing, 2010), p. 4. 14 Lilē Makrakē, Eleutherios Venizelos, 1864-1910…, p. 101. 15 Some typical cases: C. Kerofilas, Eleftherios Venizelos. His Life and Work (London: John Murray, 1915), p. 4; N. V. Tōmadakēs, Ho Venizelos ephēvos, p. 27; Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados, 1828-1964 (= Political History of Modern Greece, 1828-1864), vol. II (Athens: Papyros, 1966), pp. 286-286; Constantin Iordan, Venizelos şi Românii (Bucharest: Omonia, 20102), p. 11; Charles Personnaz, Venizélos, le fondateur de la Grèce moderne (Paris: Bernard Giovangeli, 2008), p. 35. 16 A. Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos, p. 4; Steph. I. Stephanou, Eleutherios Venizelos, plastourgos Historias (= Eleutherios Venizelos, Maker of History), Athens, 19772, p. 5. 17 Lilē Makrakē, Eleftherios Venizelos, 1864-1910…, p. 101. 18 Kōnstantinos Paparrhēgopoulos, Historia tou Hellēnikou Ethnous (= A History of the Hellenic Nation), book XV (Athens: Galaxias, 1971 [first edition in 1860-1874]), p. 71. 19 No wonder that the “bronze medal” was never found. Only the wording of the diploma –allegedly- accompanying the medal was published in a pro-government Athens newspaper in 1912, i.e. when Eleutherios Venizelos was an all-powerful Prime Minister. (Lilē Makrakē, Eleftherios Venizelos, 1864-1910…, p. 106 [note 6].) Still, the mere wording of such a document cannot be regarded as “evidence”.

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the name of his parents, sister, and brothers. They are actually unknown up to our days. And last but not least, it is quite improbable that in 1843 Kyriakos “was exiled by the Turkish government, which confiscated his property and business assets”, and that “he remained an outlaw for a full 19 years”. For according to the Greek consul at Canea, in December, 1842, he had no property, and, if truth be told, he was not entitled to have. For Greeks subjects were granted the right to acquire property in Ottoman territory no sooner than the 1860s.20 Moreover, if he really left Crete in 1843, did so not as “exiled” by the Turks, but because, according to his statement to the Greek consular authority, “he wished to repatriate”. The point is, however, that in 1846 Kyriakos Venizelos was back in Crete – as poor as ever. He had but one precious piece of luggage with him, namely his Greek citizenship; and he was wise enough to keep it for life. For contrary to a widespread opinion, he did so not for patriotic reasons but rather for practical ones. Thanks to the Capitulations system,21 being a Greek citizen in an Ottoman province meant that the jurisdiction and, often, arbitrariness of the local Ottoman authorities and bureaucracy did not affect him22. As a matter of fact, he had neither to pay the famous harac,23 i.e. the head tax that the Sublime Porte collected from non-Moslems,24 nor to perform unpaid labour (corvée)25. He was a protégé of the relevant Greek consul, who was entitled to judge all civil and criminal cases arising between Greek subjects in Ottoman territory.26 20 AYE, 1843. 49/1, S. Peroglou to the Foreign Minister of Greece, No. 53, Canea, 15/27 December 1842; Sinan Kuneralp [ed.], Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on the Eastern Question. The Cretan Uprising, 1866-1869, Part 1 (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2010), doc. 383 Fuad Pasha, Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Ottoman representatives abroad, Constantinople, March 20, 1867, p. 335. 21 That means the network of privileges that citizens of Christian countries enjoyed in Turkey. Greece was involved in the Capitulations system. See S. Kuneralp (ed.), Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of World War One. The Turco-Italian War, 1911-1912 (Istanbul : The Isis Press, 2011), doc. 1593: Osman Nizami Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador in Berlin, to Assim Bey, Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, Berlin, June 17, 1912, p. 272. 22 According to Ottoman authorities, by 1866 40,000 Greek citizens were established in Ottoman territory. (S. Kuneralp, The Cretan Uprising, 1866-1869, 1, doc. 129: Photiades Bey, Ottoman minister at Athens, to Aali Pasha, Grand Vizier and Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, Athens, October 17 , 1866, p. 123.) 23 AYE, 1839, 49 (2-3), the Greek consul at Salonika to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, No. 91, Salonika, March 30, 1839; M. Soutsos, Greek consul in Epirus and Albania, to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 237, Preveza, September 20, 1839. 24 See Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. I (Oxford University Press, 1978 [reprinted]), p. 120. 25 AYE, 1865, 49/2b, the Secretary of the Greek Consulate at Canea to the Greek Legation at Constantinople, No. 290, Canea, May 20, 1965. 26 AYE, 1865, 98/5b, the Foreign Minister of Greece to P. Delēgiannēs, Greek minister at Constantinople, No. 2837, Athens, June 9, 1865. See also Sinan Kuneralp (ed.), Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on “the Eastern Question”. The Cretan Uprising, 1866-1869, Part 2 (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2010), doc. 1360: Safvet Pasha, acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Ottoman representatives abroad, Constantinople, January 5, 1869, p. 509.

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* * * So, Kyriakos Venizelos was a pedlar, as every “tradesman” in Crete with money-capital no larger than the equivalent of 20,000 Greek drachmae.27 His ambition was to be a “true merchant”, i.e to acquire fixed asset equivalent to 50-60,000 drachmae.28 During his wanderings, nonetheless, he met in Therison,29 a village about 15 km. southward from Canea, in the foothills of the White Mountains, the aforementioned Stylianē, then in her mid-twenties,30 and fell in love with her. Stylianē was member of the Ploumidakēs family; and Giannēs31 Ploumidakēs, i.e. the future Kyriakos’ father-in-law, used to pride himself on his relationship with the chieftain Vasileios Chalēs, a remarkable character of the 1821 Revolution in Crete. If truth be told, this relationship was only a very distant one.32 Yet the point is that Giannēs Ploumidakēs, head of a respectable Cretan family, did not wish his daughter to be married to a “social climber” such as Kyriakos was. The result was easy to foresee: a quarrel arose between the two men and a stormy period followed, embellished with nearly all the relevant spicy happenings of Cretan folklore. The conclusion was going to prove the astuteness of Kyriakos; for Ploumidakēs had managed to rally even the local Pasha’s interest in his family affairs. Mustafa Pasha, Governor-General of Crete, seized the opportunity and reduced Kyriakos to the following dilemma: If Kyriakos wanted to marry Stylianē, he had to settle permanently in Crete and consequently acquire Ottoman citizenship. Otherwise he would be expelled back to Greece. There is no doubt that the Ottoman Porte did not welcome people having foreign citizenship to her territory – especially if they had the Greek one. For, as aforesaid, such people were not, in practice, subject to the Ottoman law.33 Nevertheless, in all likelihood, Mustafa Pasha would not have paid attention to Kyriakos Venizelos, AYE, 1865, 49/2b, the Secretary of the Greek Consulate at Canea to the Greek Legation at Constantinople, No. 290, Canea, May 20, 1865. 28 Ibid. 29 It is not yet sure whether he met Stylianē in Therison or (according to a local tradition) in Mournies, a village on the edge of Canea. See A. Lilly Macrakis, “Venizelos’ Early Life and Political Career…”, p. 37. 30 Ibid., pp. 37-38. 31 Vernacular variant of the Christian name Ioannēs (= John). 32 A. Lilly Macrakis, “Venizelos’ Early Life and Political Career in Crete”, p. 38; Steph. I. Stephanou, Eleutherios Venizelos…, p. 8. 33 S. Kuneralp, The Cretan Uprising, 1866-1869, 2, doc. 1533: Hayder Effendi, Ottoman Ambassador in Vienna, to Aali Pasha, Vienna, March 25, 1869, p. 630. With regard to the Greek subjects in Crete: ibid., doc. 1377: Conemenos Bey, Ottoman chargé d’affaires at Saint Petersburg, to Safvet Pasha, acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saint Petersburg, 26 December/7 January 1869, p. 521. Especially as far as Greek subjects in Ottoman territory were concerned, see doc. 1360, Safvet Pasha to the Ottoman representatives abroad, Constantinople, January 5, 1869, p. 509, which, among others, reads as follows: Sont considérés de vrais sujets hellènes ceux qui sont issus de parents sujets hellènes ou ceux qui ont acquis cette nationalité en vertu du protocole de Londres. Pour les individus de cette [dernière] catégorie, le Gouvernement Impérial avisera à l’expulsion de ceux qu’il voudrait plus permettre le séjour dans l’Empire. 27

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unless prompted by Giannēs Ploumidakēs. In point of fact, such was the case.34 For the latter disliked very much his son-in-law in prospect. Kyriakos, on the other hand, could not abandon his Greek citizenship for the Ottoman one: being subject of King Otho of Greece in Sublime Porte’s territory was somewhat a shield against the Ottoman authorities. Therefore, straightaway he married Stylianē in early1846,35 placed her under the protection of the Greek consul at Canea and fled to Greece. There he awaited the fitting moment for going back to Crete. Yet, the hate of his father-in-law was so strong that he realized that only in the far future he would be able to join his wife.36 He opted therefore for a civil service career, and he became an employee of the Greek Ministry of Internal Affairs,37 namely secretary of the Missolonghi Sanitary Authority.38 He understood, however, that he could not become rich by merely working for the Greek Civil Service. As a result, he abandoned his post in 1858,39 and soon after, he returned to Crete. He could do so now, because the Reform Decree issued by the Porte in 185640 enabled him to have a marital life in Crete. But he never reconciled with his family-in-law.41 In any case, the path to prosperity was open to him from then on.

II Was not Kyriakos Venizelos Greek by birth? Abundant literature was produced with the intention of proving that he was. The point is that he never mentioned the names of his father and mother, viz. the name of Eleutherios’ grandfather and grandmother. As a result, his ancestry remains shrouded in mystery – and this very fact constitutes a strong indication that his parents were not Greek. Most likely he was an Armenian,42 who came to Southern Greece from Ayvalık, a seaside

Odyseas Dēmētrakopoulos, “Dyo Othomanika Engrapha gia ton Patera tou Venizelou” (= Two ottoman documents concerning Venizelos’ father”, Meletēmata gyrō apo ton Venizelo kai tēn epochē tou (= Essays on Venizelos and his Era). Edited by Thanos Veremēs and Odyseas Dēmētrakopoulos (Athens : Philippotēs, 1980), p. 705. 35 A. Lilly Macrakis, “Venizelos’ Early Life and Political Career in Crete”, p. 37. 36 O. Dēmētrakopoulos, “Dyo othōmanika engrapha gia ton patera tou Venizelou”, pp. 704, 706 37 EVP, Ι/2/1, Kyriakos Venizelos to Markos Rhenierēs, Canea, November 27th, 1877; Manousos Koundouros, Historikai kai diplōmatikai apokalypseis,1890-1923. (= Historical and Diplomatic Disclosures. Historical Events, 1890-1923). Edited by Charikleia G. Dēmakopoulou and Eleutherios Skiadas (Athens: ELIA, 19972), p. 329. 38 Ephēmeris tēs Kyvernēseos tou Vasileiou tēs Hellados (= Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Greece], No. 44 [September 24,1858), p. 288. 39 Ibid. 40 Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. II (Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 87ff. 41 Giannēs Manōlikakēs, Eleutherios Venizelos. Hē agnōstē zōē tou (= The Unknown Life of Eleutherios Venizelos), Athens: Gnōsē, 1985), p. 52. 42M. Koundouros, Historikai kai diplōmatikai apokalypseis. Historika gegonota…, pp. 329-330. 34

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town in Asia Minor, after the end of the 1821 Revolution and, as a Christian, became naturalized Greek.43 Thanks to his early wanderings throughout the Kingdom of Greece, Kyriakos gained not only a convenient citizenship but a surname as well. In fact, Venizelos is the scholarly variant of the name Benizelos,44 still existing in the Peloponnese. He added, nonetheless, this surname only after his ambition to be ‘someone’ had been satisfied. A respectable merchant might not be known even in an Ottoman province merely as “Kyriakos from Ayvalık”, as he used to be called during the early stages of his trade activity.45 Now, being someone and having a surname, he was ready to produce a prolific progeny. Eleutherios was his second son, i.e. the sixth surviving child of the couple. The birth of Eleutherios, in August, 1864, was a strange one; and the copious literature covering his early life obscures things. Nonetheless, there are some irrefutable details, such as: a) The delivery was by no means an ‘easy’ one; b) Kyriakos, providing evidence of his indifference to religious matters, invited not only the available Christian Orthodox priest but even a hoca and a rabbi to assist Stylianē spiritually;46 and c) after the baby was born, it was ‘abandoned’ by an olive tree, near the house. In doing so, Kyriakos and Stylianē47 were emphasizing their loyalty to a tradition common in Greek lands. For, if the life of a newborn child is judged to be in danger due to the family’s misfortune, the baby is –supposedly“dropped off”; and a passer-by (of course alerted by the family) “finds” the baby and “offers” it to its natural parents – as if the child were one of ‘unknown origin’. So it was with Eleutherios48 and, accordingly, his birthday was celebrated on August 24, 1864 (NS).49 But if one has this story in mind, there are some other facts in the future prime minister of Greece’s life to be taken into account. Eleutherios Venizelos was actually never ever dressed in the Cretan traditional dress.50 In this respect, he was in ‘flagrant’ contrast to his mother, a woman who was dressed all her life with in the typical clothes of the Cretan 43 The case of people coming into Greece and opting for Greek citizenship was foreseen by the Greek government as early as the 1st of January, 1822. (Prosōrinon Politeuma tēs Hellados [= Provisional Constitution of Greece], First Chapter, art. 5; in Archeia tēs Hellēnikēs Palingenesias [= The Archives of the Regeneration of Greece], vol. I [Athens: The Parliament of Greece, 1971], p. 26.) 44 Most likely from the words : Beni+Zelis (= Zelis’ son). See Lilē Makrakē, Eleutherios Venizelos, 1864-1910 (in Greek), Athens: Educational Foundation of the National Bank of Greece, 1992…, p. 101 (note 8). 45 M. Koundouros, Historikai kai diplōmatikai apokalypseis…, p. 330. 46 Memoirs of H.R.H. Prince Christopher of Greece (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1938 [ninth impression]), p. 104; cf. A. Lilly Macrakis, “Venizelos’ Early Life and Political Career…”, p. 39. 47 Dēmētrēs Pournaras, Eleutherios Venizelos (= Eleutherios Venizelos), Athens: Eleutheros (no date given), p. 17. 48 Steph. I. Stephanou, Eleutherios Venizelos…, p. 9. 49 Andrew Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos…, p. 5. 50 Lilē Makrakē, Eleutherios Venizelos, 1864-1910, p. 243.

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peasantry.51 But though she was of a strong character,52 she remained a shadowy figure in Eleutherios’ life. She had nothing of the well-known maternal influence on her illustrious son’s life. Nothing that could remotely smack of a Freudian case study, of an Oedipal nature. On the contrary, Kyriakos’ -i.e. his father’s- presence in his life was strong and vivid.53 These are in keeping with the fact that merely in the early 1920s the names of Eleutherios’ father and mother were established with some certainty.54 As a result, trustworthiness should be given to a curious statement that an Athens columnist made on March 20, 1936, i.e. a couple of days after Eleutherios had died: “We do not know yet who his mother and father were; we know nothing about his ancestry”.55 If the very fact that those male babies born to Stylianē, Kyriakos’ wife were moribund or seriously ill is taken into consideration,56 the above statement should be regarded as reliable. And it was a member of the Greek Royal House that shot a Parthian shaft to the reputation of Venizelos a couple of years after the latter’s death: “Venizelos was of mixed parentage, Turkish, Jewish and Armenian…He had [in fact] the characteristics of all three races: the ruthlessness of the Turk, the Armenian’s love of intrigue and the keen brain of the Jew.”57 In short, was Venizelos apparently “adopted” or actually adopted by Kyriakos and Stylianē? Up until now, nobody has been able to provide us with an answer to that crucial question.

III In 1866 an uprising of the Christian element of the Cretan population against the Porte’s sovereignty occurred. Kyriakos’ position was peculiar. He was a Greek citizen in Ottoman territory; and to be a Cretan-style “hero” was hardly the height of his ambition. He tried to appeal, therefore, to Greek public opinion for appeasement.58 It was in vain… and he left Crete for Syros, an island in the Cyclades group, in

A. Lilly Macrakis, “Venizelos’ Early Life and Political Career…”, p. 38. Lilē Makrakē , Eleutherios Venizelos, 1864-1910, p. 110. 53 Steph. I. Stephanou, Eleutherios Venizelos…, p. 12. 54 In 1920 his father’s name was “Geōrgios” and that of his mother “Despoina”. See Herbert Adams Gibbons, Venizelos (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1920), p. 1. 55 Daily paper Hē Kathēmerinē (= The Daily [Athens]), March 19, 1936. (In Ho thanatos tou Venizelou ston athēnaïko typo [= Venizelos’ Death in the newspapers of Athens]. Edited by Helenē Gardika-Katsiadakē (Canea: “Eleutherios Venizelos” National Foundation, 2004), p. 472. 56 G. Manōlikakēs, Eleutherios Venizelos..., pp. 54-55. 57 Memoirs of… Prince Christopher of Greece, p. 104; cf. Thomas Ath. Vaïdēs, Eleutherios Venizelos (in Greek), Athens: Patris, 1934, p. 60. 58 Andreas Th. Drakakēs, T’agnōsta chronia. Ho Eleutherios Venizelos stē Syro (= The Obscure Years. Eleutherios Venizelos on Syros Island), Athens, 1985, p. 15. 51 52

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the Aegean. He settled there with his family most likely in October, 1866; and he went back to Crete only in 1872.59 Strangely enough, although the Venizelos family were only refugees, they led a luxurious life. Kyriakos opened a general store in Hermoupolis, the Syros’ capital, and his business flourished so much that he had means to hire a villa for his family’s summer vacations.60 In early 1869, the uprising in Crete was over, but the Venizelos were uncertain of their repatriation. Life in Syros was easy going and the father had ample chance of making money. As a result, they returned to Canea in the summer of 1872.61 Kyriakos had by now a well-lined purse and, subsequently, was a prosperous tradesman. But he never forgot Syros, where he had become rich. He maintained all his life the profitable Hermoupolis connections.62 In fact, he was such a Syros enthusiast that, when the young Eleutherios had finished his elementary studies in Canea schools and begun his secondary ones in Athens, he suddenly made up his mind for his son to finish his schooling in Hermoupolis. And so was done. Eleutherios actually completed his secondary studies on Syros island on June 28, 1880. His grades were “very good” but his conduct left something to be desired.63 In the meantime the prosperous general store of his father was transferred –as aforementioned- from Syros island to Crete. As with nearly all traders, Kyriakos did not trust university studies; for he destined Eleutherios to become his successor in business. His opinion was justified by the very fact that Agathocles, his elder son, was a clinically certified idiot who was not able even to stand up.64 After Kyriakos’ death who would run his business? Eleutherios, of course, who was already serving his apprenticeship in his father’s shop, learning the trade. If truth be told, he made an excellent merchant, never letting clients go without a purchase, cheerful and affable as he was.65 Given nevertheless that Eleutherios was entitled by the Education Certificate obtained at Hermoupolis to pursue university studies, he managed to overcome paternal objections and enrolled in the Law School of the University of Athens on October 8, 1880.66 According to a legend cultivated later by Greek Liberals, it was thanks to the pressure exerted by the Greek Consulate at Canea that Kyriakos finally sent his son to Athens.67 Se non è vero, è ben trovato. Being a Greek citizen, Kyriakos needed the protection of Greek

Ibid., p. 9. Ibid., p. 41. 61 Ibid., p. 45. 62 Ibid. 63 EVP, I/3/1: His certificate from the Royal “Gymnasium” at Hermoupolis. 64 He died in 1896 on Melos island almost simultaneously with his mother. (Helenē Dalampira, Ho tafos tēs Stylianēs Venizelou stē Mēlo (= The grave of Stylianē Venizelos on Melos island), Athens 1992, pp. 12, 16. 65 A. Lilly Macrakis, “Venizelos’ Early Life and Political Career in Crete…”, p. 42. 66 EVP, I/3/ 2: Receipt of payment of his enrollment fees. 67 Steph. I. Stephanou, Eleutherios Venizelos…, p. 13. 59 60

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consular authority – and the latter was interested in the family affairs of its protégés in the Canea microcosm. However that may be, Eleutherios had the firm intention of studying Law most likely no later than in his last Syros days. He was clear-sighted enough to understand that the antagonism between the Great Powers over Crete led the way for ambitious young men able to grasp the opportunities offered. British interest for control over Crete was all but an open secret. The island was regarded by the Foreign Office as the “key of the Greek Archipelago”68 and “one of Egypt’s keys” (the other one being Cyprus) in the early 1860s.69 The United Kingdom’s main concern over the island’s fate, moreover, was obvious already in 1806. For the Foreign Secretary then made it clear that British occupation of Crete should take place in case Russia attempted annexation of Ottoman territory.70 The Suda Bay was of outstanding strategic importance, because it was the “best natural harbour in the Levant”.71 Of course, things were getting complicated by the fact that Crete had been administratively annexed to Egypt in 1830.72 The subsequent occupation of the island by troops of Muhammad Ali, then Viceroy in Cairo, was to finish only in 1840.73 The unrest provoked by the end of the island’s Egyptian administration fuelled hopes for Crete to be united with the Kingdom of Greece. At the same time, British consular authorities were actively –but unofficially- stirring up sentiment for Crete to be made a British protectorate.74 They failed in that, but not so much because the feelings in favour of the island’s union with Greece were so strong among the Christians of Crete. For, even though the latter were more numerous than the Moslems,75 a large number among them had blood ties with the autochthonous Moslems and, as such, were unwilling to remove the Sublime Porte’s

Archipelago= The Aegean Sea. Miranta Staurinou, Hē anglikē politikē kai to Krētiko zētēma, 1839-1841 (= British Policy and the Cretan Issue, 1839-1841), Athens: Domos, 1986, pp. 47-48. 70 And French occupation of Egypt. (Ibid., p. 47.) 71 Ibid., p. 49. 72 Athanase G. Politis, Les rapports de la Grèce et de l’Égypte pendant le règne de Mohamed Aly (1833-1849), Rome : Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato per la Reale Società di Geografia d’Egitto, 1935, p.XVff. 73 Thanks to the 1840 London Treaty (Ibid., p. XCI). 74 Athanase G. Politis, Le conflit turco-égyptien de 1838-1841 et les dernières années du règne de Mohamed Aly d’après les documents diplomatiques grecs (Cairo: Société royale de géographie d’Égypte, 1931), doc.83, S. Peroglou, Greek consul at Canea, to the Foreign Ministry, Athens, Canea, 6/18 April 1840, p. 100. 75 Ibid., doc. 13, S. Peroglou to C. Zographos, Foreign Minister, Canea, April 25/May 7, 1838, p. 16 ; cf. idem, Les rapports de la Grèce et de l’Égypte…, p. LXVI. During the 1866-1869 uprising in Crete, the Moslems numbered 90,000 according to the Sublime Porte but only 40,000 according to the Russian Chancellery. (S. Kuneralp, The Cretan Uprising, 1866-1869, 1, doc. 239: Aali Pasha to Musurus Bey, Ottoman Ambassador in London, Constantinople, January 16,1867, p. 201; doc. 258 : Conemenos Bey to Fuad Pasha, Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saint Petersburg, February 14, 1867 p. 254.) 68 69

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rule.76 The Ottoman administration, subsequently, was re-established. That was by common agreement of the Powers, namely the United Kingdom, Russia, Austria and Prussia – but the main Power to take advantage of such a development was Britain. Whilst an “English” protectorate over Crete was not feasible, direct Ottoman sovereignty over it was the best solution for the British. For if the island were annexed to Greece, the corollary would be the strengthening of Russia.77 As a matter of fact, Otho, the first King of Greece, was considered to be Russophile; while George I, whose Queen Consort, Olga, was née a Grand Duchess of Russia, was Anglophile (by necessity, not by sentiment).78 That was the background of Venizelos’ ascendancy. The crux, however, was the marriage of a sister of him, Katinkō,79 to Kōnstantinos Mētsotakēs (fifteen years her senior), a wealthy Canean lawyer and politician – and Greek subject as well.80 Mētsotakēs was an active anglophile and, since by the end of the 1866-1869 revolution had been created the framework for an embryonic political life in Crete, there were plenty of opportunities to be grasped by astute persons like him. If the story of the Greek Consulate at Canea having intervened on behalf of Eleutherios’ university studies is true, the authentic deus ex machina is to be found in the Mētsotakēs family. They had recognized the young man’s potential and had subsequently informed the Greek Consulate. Due to their wealth, high status and Greek citizenship they had been able to convince the Greek consul at Canea to talk with Eleutherios’ father.

See Athanasios Th. Phōtopoulos (ed.), Theodōrou Rhigopoulou, grammateōs tōn Kolokotrōnaiōn, Apomnēmoneumata (= The Memoirs of Theodōros Rhigopoulos, Secretary of Kolokotrōnēs family), Athens, 1979, p. 196. It was a very peculiar situation, literally unique in the Balkans. The Cretan Orthodox Christians had invited the Turks to occupy Crete in 1645 and after the Ottoman occupation of the island was confirmed, they tolerated the famous “temporary marriages”. Ipso facto, Moslems were entitled to have sexual relations with Christian women for a determined period of time. Thereafter these Christian women were free to marry (permanently) their fellow Christians. Nonetheless, the children of those mixed, temporary connexions remained in the family of their Moslem father; and of course the offspring of the women’s second marriage were the uterine brothers and sisters of the siblings their mother had with her first –Moslem- husband. (V. Bérard, Krētikes Hypotheseis [=Cretan Affairs). Translated into Greek by G. Moraglēs [Athens: Trochalia, no date given] , pp. 79, 84.) 77 Miranta Staurinou, Hē anglikē politikē kai to Krētiko zētēma, 1839-1841…, p. 13 78 D. Michalopoulos, Vie politique en Grèce pendant les années 1862-1869 (Athens : Saripoleion/University of Athens), pp. 163-165, 197. 79 Variant of the Christian name Aikaterinē (=Catherine). 80 On the Mētsotakēs family: AYE, 1843, 49/1, “Greek Subjects in Canea” annex to the despatch No. 53 of S. Peroglou to I. Rhizos-Neroulos, Canea, 15/27 December, 1842. Also: G. Manōlikakēs, Eleutherios Venizelos…, p. 58; A. Lilly Macrakis, “Venizelos’ Early Life and Political Career in Crete…”, p. 49. 76

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IV Eleutherios’ university studies were finished only in 1887.81 But he was unlikely to have done otherwise. For his father had died in 1883 and Eleutherios was forced to look after his family affairs. He, therefore, liquidated Kyriakos’ general store at Canea and finally obtained his university degree, though studying for the most part at home. As a result, his grade was “Very Good” instead of “With Honours” which had hoped for. This fact had no practical importance. But it proved to be catalytic as far as his psyche was concerned; for it left him with a complex of “not-being-intellectual”, that tormented him for the rest of his life. And it is noteworthy that this complex grew because of the frustration he felt at not having the means to pursue further studies in Germany.82 In late 1887, however, he was appointed a Canean lawyer83 though he had been practicing as a “solicitor” from 1884 onwards.84 As aforementioned, Canea, where Moslems were the overwhelming majority, was then the capital of Crete. It was an “ugly, little town, with nothing attractive in it”.85 Thanks, nonetheless, to the special administrative régime (in actual fact an semi-autonomous one) that Crete enjoyed after the Ottomans were defeated by the Russians in 1878 and the subsequent conclusion of the Chalepa Convention, a large field of activity was already open to lawyers educated in “Europe”, viz. Greece. Still, Eleutherios’ professional beginnings were not promising,86 which was why he tried to make a career as a judge.87 But suddenly things changed for the better and he proved to be a very successful lawyer. Undoubtedly the deus ex machina was again K. Mētsotakēs, his brother-in-law. Not only was he a wealthy individual, but also the very founder and leader of the Liberal party of Crete,88 the editor of the weekly newspaper Leuka Orē,89 i.e. the Liberals’ mouthpiece - and a successful lawyer as well. But in 1888 K. Mētsotakēs retired from all his posts, appointing Eleutherios Venizelos his successor in everything.90 Thanks to K. Mētsotakēs, therefore, Venizelos came to be the leader of a strong political party (he literally inherited it from his brother-in-law), a member of the local Parliament, Steph. I. Stephanou, Eleutherios Venizelos…, op. cit., p. 14. In the meantime he met at Athens, in November 1886, the British liberal politician Joseph Chamberlain. It was in his capacity as a member of a Cretan students’ delegation. (See A. Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos…, pp. 9-11.) 82 G. Manōlikakēs, Eleutherios Venizelos…, p. 61. 83 Ibid., pp. 61-62. 84 EVP, I/4/1-9; I/5/1; I/6/1-2. 85 Panagiōtēs Danklēs, Anamnēseis-Engrapha-Allēlographia-To archeio tou (= Memoirs-Documents-Correspondence-his Archives). Edited by X. Leukoparidēs, vol. I (Athens: Vagiōnakēs, 1965), p. 217. 86 G. Manōlikakēs, Eleutherios Venizelos…, pp. 62-63. 87 Ibid., p. 62. 88 Lilē Makrakē, Eleutherios Venizelos, 1864-1910, pp.460-461. 89 Leuka Orē= White Mountains. 90 G. Manōlikakēs, Eleutherios Venizelos…, pp. 77-78; Lilē Makrakē, Eleutherios Venizelos, 1864-1910, pp. 194-195. 81

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the editor of an influential newspaper, and a successful lawyer.91 In practice he was the leader of the anglophile party in Crete.

*** This was made apparent as early as the following year, 1889. Thanks to K. Mētsotakēs’ retirement and financial aid,92 Venizelos was elected to the local Parliament, in the ranks of the Liberals. Liberals then held a majority in Parliament thanks to universal suffrage, for the first time exercised in Crete.93 On the other hand the Conservatives i.e. the other strong Cretan political party, judged the time ripe for Crete to be united with Greece. The Russian Consulate at Canea openly encouraged them to do so;94 but the Greek Government’s attitude was faltering.95 Anglophile Charilaos Trikoupēs was then in power in Athens and was setting in motion an economic development policy, which implied a pacifist one towards the Ottoman Empire. Venizelos, therefore, was against the “Conservative Uprising” that took place in Crete. And anxious not to be regarded as a “revolutionary” by the Ottoman authorities he voted against the union-with-Greece motion in the local Parliament. But he was almost alone in doing so;96 subsequently, he fled secretly to Athens in October 1889.97 He was not to return to Crete until mid-April 1890.98 It was then and in the Greek capital that Eleutherios Venizelos publicly emerged as the Cretan anglophile champion. First of all, it was the British Consul at Canea, Alfred Biliotti, his friend,99 who had arranged his flight to Athens;100 and it was in Athens that he became an adherent of Trikoupēs’ policy of internal development.101 Since, moreover, he had left behind, at Canea, Maria Katelouzou, i.e. his wife-to-be, he regarded the Russians as responsible for the turmoil in his life:102 he was separated from his fiancée and had lost of his seat in the Cretan Parliament. Needless to say, these ideas soon proved to be catalytic as far as the political and international life in SouthEastern Europe was concerned. Upon his coming back to Canea, therefore, his ideas were evident: no more unrest against the Porte. His father acted as a precedent; for as early as 1877 he had demanded that uprisings

As far as his post-1888 legal activities are concerned : EVP, I/8/1-16; I/9/1-17. Lilē Makrakē, Eleutherios Venizelos, 1864-1910, p. 229. 93 Eleutherios K. Venizelos, Hē Krētikē Epanastasē tou 1889 (= The 1889 Revolution in Crete). Edited by Giannēs G. Manōlikakēs, Athens, 1971, p. 50. 94 Lilē Makrakē, Eleutherios Venizelos, 1864-1910, p. 247. 95 Ibid., 246. 96 A. Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos…, p.13. 97 AYE, 1889, A/12, the Greek Consul General at Canea, to Stephanos Dragoumēs, Foreign Minister of Greece, Canea, October 9th, 1889. 98 G. Manōlikakēs, Eleutherios Venizelos…, p. 82ff. 99 Lilē Makrakē, Eleutherios Venizelos, 1864-1910, p. 175. 100 Ibid., p. 85. 101 E. Venizelos, Hē Krētikē Epanastasē tou 1889, p. 48. 102 Ibid., p. 58ff. 91 92

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against the Ottoman rule be stopped in Crete.103 In short, the Porte’s sovereignty was to be continued – at least for the moment. Venizelos, therefore, tried to prove again his loyalty to the Ottoman authorities; and he took a step that could have been fatal to his career. In December 1892 a Moslem, Tevfik Bedri Bey, was murdered in the Canea district, and four Christians were jailed as suspected of homicide. The four were taken to court and two of them, namely Geōrgios Papadakēs and Antōnios Larentzakēs, were sentenced to death and executed on January 8, 1894. Nonetheless, they were not guilty: the victim’s murder was the result of a family dispute. This was a widely-held opinion in the Canea social microcosm – and proved to be true.104 The consequence was that no lawyer had been willing to prosecute the alleged murderers other than Venizelos and his friends, who managed to send two innocent people to the gallows.105 The protests of the Canea Christians, actually the entire Cretan Christian community, were so vehement that Venizelos feared for his life.106 And he was going to live in constant fear of assassination till he died in Paris in 1936: he was actually assassinated, but not by Cretans. The 1893 trial, nevertheless, had been his cause célèbre,107 but it was a factitious one. In point of fact, it was fraudulently and cynically gained by him against innocent Christians -most likely for the considerable pecuniary advantage he derived from it.108

V He could not live in Crete anymore, unless constantly protected by the Ottoman authorities. So he kept his head down for a couple of years.109 It was not until 1895 that he tried to re-enter the political scene of his native island by editing another weekly newspaper, the Augē (= Dawn). But in 1895 a fresh Christian uprising took place in Crete. Unlike the 1889 one, it was incited not by Russians but by the British; and its aim was the island’s autonomy and by no means union with Greece. The main character in this new drama was Manousos Koundouros, a magistrate with an Athens University degree, like Venizelos, but a bellicose chieftain as well. The Koundouros uprising for autonomy was successful. For now it was the turn of the British to trip up the Russians. It was thanks to the 1878 Russian victory against the Porte that the Chalepa Convention was concluded in that same year; and it was thanks to the EVP, Ι/2/1, Kyriakos Venizelos to Markos Rhenierēs, Canea, November 27, 1877. G. Manōlikakēs, Eleutherios Venizelos…, p. 102. 105 Ibid., p. 103-105. 106 Cf. Ibid., pp. 121-123. 107 A. Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos…, p. 14, 108 Cf. A. Lilly Macrakis, “Venizelos’ Early Life and Political Career in Crete”, p. 79 (note 46). 109 Ibid.. 103 104

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Russian consular authorities’ activity that the 1889 uprising for union with Greece was launched. The British answer was most effective: they managed to have the semi-autonomy granted to the Christians of Crete by the Porte (thanks to the Russians) developed into a parliamentary system based on universal suffrage. As aforementioned, the 1895 insurrection had no “unionist” character. What is more, the Ottoman troops after the defeats they had suffered at the hands of the insurgents, abandoned the countryside and entrenched themselves in the island’s cities.110 The time was, therefore, ripe for essential changes in the political scene of Crete. In July, 1896, the Great Powers jointly decided to provide the populations of the island with the appropriate political régime. In other words, the Porte’s sovereignty over the island was to become shadowy.111 In the meanwhile, a Revolutionary Assembly was convened and a plan for Crete’s future drafted as an autonomous state: the island would be under the Porte’s suzerainty with a Christian governor, and a European police force.112 Venizelos had taken a seat in the Assembly. Nonetheless, his situation was tricky. He was regarded as an avowed pro-Turkish – and he was. The memory, moreover, of his 1894 innocent victims was still alive. As a result, he was very nearly murdered as soon as he first attended the Revolutionary Assembly. He escaped thanks only to Koundouros’ intervention, who had already been elected President of the Revolutionary Assembly.113 Koundouros was now the seeming star of Anglophilia in Crete. Venizelos’ political career was all but doomed; for the Cretan Christians merely put up with him. Koundouros, being confident of his success, rescued unhesitatingly Venizelos’ life. Yet in doing so he committed a fatal error. The British did not want so much to rely upon Koundouros, because he was married to the daughter of the Russian consular agent at Rethymnon.114 It made no difference whether Koundouros openly criticized Russia and the Russians. Venizelos was more trustworthy to the British; for his obscure ancestry, his ill reputation and, above all, his wretched family life made him a docile instrument in British hands. Stylianē, his mother, and Agathocles, his idiot brother, died almost to the day in 1896.115 Two years later K. Mētsotakēs, his brother-in-law and political mentor, passed away as well. But the most severe blow had been inflicted on him as early as 1894. His young and beautiful wife, Maria, whom he married in 1890, died while delivering Sophocles, their younger son. The cause of death is usually imputed to puerperal fever. But further investigation has now M. Koundouros, Historikai kai diplōmatikai apokalypseis…, pp. 63-65. Ibid., p. 91. 112 A. Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos…, p. 14. 113 M. Koundouros, Historikai kai diplōmatikai apokalypseis…, op. cit., pp. 94-95; cf. A. Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos…, p. 15. 114 Maria Tsirimonakē, En Rethymnō ( = In Rethymnon), Rethymnon, 19982 , σ. 32. 115 Helenē Dalampira, Ho tafos tēs Stylianēs Venizelou stē Mēlo, pp. 12, 16. 110 111

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established that Maria died of an infection attributed to squalor.116 As a sign of perpetual mourning, Venizelos was bearded for the rest of his life. As a consequence, he was bound to take on a quasi-maternal role to his siblings. There were two: Kyriakos and the aforementioned Sophocles, a future prime minister of Greece. The point is that in 1896 Venizelos was an afflicted widower in charge of two little boys. What is more, his compliant attitude towards the Ottoman authorities had alienated the Cretan Christians from him. Actually, the most important clients of his law office were Turks;117 for there was no sympathy for him among the Christians in Canea.

VI The British opened all doors to him. Cretan Moslems put obstacles in the way of the island’s autonomy. This is why Timoleon Vasos, colonel of the Greek Army and aide-de-camp to King George I of the Hellenes, landed on Cretan soil on the 3rd of February, 1897 and declared “he was occupying the island” in the name of his Sovereign.118 Christian irregulars hoisted the Greek flag on a hill close to Canea, and European men-of-war shelled them. An –unavoidableimbroglio ensued, and Venizelos appeared as the odd-job man: he hastened to the spot of the bombardment and thanks to his legal experience undertook the task of talking with the Powers’ representatives. His main contacts were with the British; and the fact that the latter acceded to his suggestions convinced the Christian Cretans that he was the persona grata of the new order being created in their island.119 For the moment he was not the target of his Christian compatriots’ hatred. But anxious about his questionable political past, he addressed a circular letter to his friends advocating instant “Union with Greece” as the “best remedy for the island’s pains”.120 That famous “Union with Greece” would be in the years to come the main political instrument in Venizelos’ hands. Now, having autonomy in their grasp, liberal politicians in Crete were going to use the unionist slogan as a cover for their own goals and ambitions. Such goals and ambitions were readily foreseeable; for “goals” meant the ‘duties’ assigned to them thanks to Great Britain, and “ambitions” signified Crete’s political arena about to be dominated by them. The role of the Conservatives, on the other hand, was apparently easier: they were constantly advocating “Union with Greece”. As a result, they were more trustworthy than the Liberals in the eyes of the local Christian population. They were backed, G. Manōlikakēs, Eleutherios Venizelos…, p. 106. EVP, I/12/1-55; I/14/3-18; I/15/1-31; I/16/1-4. 118 Édouard Driault and Michel Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours, vol. IV (Paris : Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1926), p. 345. 119 Dr. C. Kerofilas, Eleftherios Vénselos, pp. 18-19. 120 EVP, I/17/1. The letter (better: a declaration) was signed, on the 28th of January, 1897, by his new and old political friends as well. 116 117

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nonetheless, by Russia; and in the last analysis their success depended on whether the Tsar Nicholas II would effectively support them. For the time being, the game was being played in Athens. As already mentioned, Olga, Queen Consort of Greece, was of Russian stock: she was the daughter of the Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich, brother of the Tsar Alexander II. Her husband, King George I of the Hellenes,121 was the second son of King Christian IX of Denmark. According to the secret shared with the French minister at Athens, Joseph Arthur Count de Gobineau, in the autumn of 1864, he “was sold to England”. He knew nothing about Greece, and was not willing to know.122 But he was driven to accept the Greek Crown, after the fall of King Otho, by his father, because Lord John Russell, then Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, had promised the Danes British support in the Schleswig-Holstein issue.123 But the British policy towards his sibling in Athens was dishonest. According to secrets that he, George I, divulged to Gobineau with bated breath, the British, after “having dragged him to Greece”, deserted him and reappeared only in order to cause problems for him.124 It was natural, notwithstanding, for the young sovereign125 to be obedient to British dictates; for Britain had been the victorious Power in the Greek ‘battleground’ since King Otho’s removal in 1862.126 This was why, in 1875, King George I accepted the parliamentary system to be established in Greece. As a matter of fact, he was by no means persuaded to take such a step, and he had tried to rule his adoptive country in an authoritarian manner.127 But he failed. Therefore, he unwillingly agreed to have a fully-fledged Parliament functioning in Athens. Scholars discovered only in the 1980s the impact of the feelings of rancour he harboured against Britain throughout his life. Evidently, his frequent visits to the Viennese Court and his talks with the old Emperor of Austria and Apostolic King of Hungary, Franz Joseph, were no secret128. But very few realized that he had achieved a secret rapprochement with Austro-Hungary and regarded –secretly as wellthe old Emperor and King as his personal mentor;129 and strangely enough, he had the support of Ch. Trikoupēs, the well-known Statesman, whose obvious anglophilia had resulted in deep

King Otho was “King of Greece”. Cf. Prince Nicholas of Greece, Ta penēnta chronia tēs zōēs mou (= The fifty years of my life), Athens: Greca, 1926, p. 25. 123 D. Michalopoulos, Vie politique en Grèce…, p. 165. 124 Ibid., 125 He was merely 17 years old, when arrived in Athens, in October 1863. 126 D. Michalopoulos, Vie politique en Grèce…, p. 73ff. 127 Ibid., p. 166ff. 128 Prince Nicholas of Greece, Ta penēnta chronia tēs zōēs mou, pp. 96-98. 129 Paulos V. Petridēs, Xenikē exartēsē kai ethnikē politikē, 1910-1918 (= Greece’s dependence on foreign Powers and [her] national policy, 1910-1918), Salonika: Paratērētēs, 1981, p.286ff. passim. 121 122

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disappointment as well.130 The point of all this has been that in the last years of the nineteenth century Venizelos was, in British eyes, the only reliable person in Greek lands. King George was pro-Austrian, the Cretan Koundouros had pro-Russian family connections, and K. Mētsotakēs, the old, assured pro-British champion was dead. Under these circumstances, the Venizelos ascendancy was no laughing matter: either Venizelos in power or the British influence would be lost. And so a tragicomedy was played out, the main stages of which were the following: 1. T. Vasos’ landing in Crete -and his subsequent declaration that he was occupying the island in the name of King George I of the Hellenes- was an open provocation against the Sublime Porte. As a result, the beginning of a Greco-Turkish war was easily foreseeable. 2. Before the Vasos landing took place, Theodōros Delēgiannēs, then prime minister of Greece was asked by members of his cabinet whether the Greek Army was able to combat the Ottoman one. The only reasonable answer was that it was not. Nonetheless, T.Vasos arrived in Crete – and, of course, hostilities between the Ottoman Empire and Greece broke out in early April, 1897. 3. Within thirty days the Greek Army was defeated by the Ottomans, and put to flight. The Ottoman troops occupied the whole of Thessaly and their entry into Athens was prevented thanks to the European Powers’ mediation. 4. It was an ignominious defeat. But the island of Crete was declared autonomous under the Sultan’s suzerainty and the collective protection of four European Powers, namely Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia. (Germany and Austro-Hungary were with them only till April, 1898.131) Prince George of Greece, second son of the King George I, was accordingly appointed High Commissioner of the Powers in Crete. He arrived there in early December 1898 and was given a frenzied reception by the island’s Christian population. 5. The conclusion is that Greece was militarily humiliated in 1897 but diplomatically triumphant. For Crete was dynastically associated with the Kingdom of Greece, whilst the Ottoman rule there was in practice over. The key person in this very matter was King George I of the Hellenes. In actual fact, of fact, it was he who urged the Greek government into war against the Porte, though everybody knew that the Greek Army was not yet fit for warfare. He was sure, nevertheless, that the war’s outcome would be advantageous for his House. Why was he so sure? The mystery was disclosed only in 1910. Before the war began, King George was staying in Vienna and having secret talks with the Emperor and the latter’s Foreign Minister, Count Gołuchowski. They guaranteed that despite the defeat the Greek Army was to suffer at the hands of the Ottomans, Greece would not endure 130 131

Ibid., p. 286. Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, II, p. 351.

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territorial losses. On the contrary, Crete was to be put under the rule of the Greek Royal House.132

* * * Now all was light. Greece was defeated, but Crete was gained for the Royal Family of Greece. There emerged, nevertheless, a new problem: Prince George, the High Commissioner, was an open Russophile. Not only was he the cousin of Tsar Nicholas II, but he had saved the latter’s life in Japan in 1891, when both of them were on official visit to that country.133 His appointment, moreover, was the effect of Saint Petersburg’s cabinet manipulation and pressure.134 The point, however, is that Germany and Austria objected to him as High Commissioner; and though Emperor Wilhelm II had understood that the Cretan issue would be, in long run, of great benefit to Britain, he withdrew Germany from the Powers involved in Crete. Austro-Hungary copied Germany, but Italy did not. This was the first fissure within the Concert of Powers – and the Triple Alliance as well.135 Prince George, therefore, reached Canea on board a French man-of-war.136 Be that as it may, his popularity among the Christian peasantry of Crete was enormous;137 and he did his utmost for island’s overall development.138 At the same time, a constitution was drawn up by a committee, the most active member of which was Venizelos. The draft was submitted in March, 1899 to the Four Powers’ representatives139 and was promptly approved: it came into force in April of that same year.140 This very Constitution, almost entirely the personal achievement of Venizelos, proved to be a fatal trap set for Prince George. For it was pervaded by a blatantly authoritarian spirit.141 If the High Commissioner submitted to the dictates of the British policymakers, he would be given the freedom to govern as he desired; otherwise he would be removed. In other words, it was a duel between Venizelos and Prince George that was already underway: it was to finish in September 1906. For Venizelos was arguing for the independence of the island, whilst Prince George was advocating the latter’s union with Greece. 132 Daily paper Patris (= Fatherland), No. 6008 (September 15, 1910); cf. É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours, vol. V (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1926) , p. 332. 133 Prince Nicholas of Greece, Ta penēnta chronia tēs zōēs mou, pp. 123-125. 134 Geōrgios Aspreas, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados (= Political History of Modern Greece), vol. I, part II (Athens: Chrēsima Vivlia, no date given [second edition], pp. 243, 283; É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce…, IV, pp. 442-466. 135 É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce…, IV, pp. 450ff. 136 Ibid., p. 466. 137 Cf. P. Danklēs, Anamnēseis-Engrapha-Allēlographia-To archeio tou, I, p. 221. 138 A. Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos, p. 22. 139 Ibid., p. 21. 140 Episēmos Ephēmeris tēs Krētikēs Politeias (= Official Gazette of the State of Crete), First Year, I, No. 24 ( April 16, 1899), pp. 41-46. 141 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, II, p. 353.

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VII The High Commissioner began skirmishing with Venizelos by the time the latter was drafting the Constitution. A debate on Prince George’s title was opened - and Venizelos jumped at the chance to declare that “Crete was entitled to her own ideas about her future”. Prince George riposted that “foreign policy” either of Greece or of Crete “was not everyone’s business, but that of the King of the Hellenes and his government”.142 The gaps between the two men’s views were now obvious. The High Commissioner had of course the support of almost all the Cretan Christians; Venizelos, on the other hand, was backed by the British Consul and his allies at that time, namely the Italian and the French ones. Who was to gain the upper hand? The Prince acted with moderation. After the Constitution came into force, he appointed Venizelos his “Councillor”, i.e. Minister, of Justice143 - his Council (Cabinet) being five-strong. Koundouros, the ex-anglophile champion and Venizelos’ future bitter foe, was given the portfolio of Home Affairs. Things went well for a while. But in September 1900, the High Commissioner embarked on a tour of Europe. His purpose was to sound out the Powers’ intentions as far as Crete’s future was concerned. To his mind, the only good perspective was island’s union with Greece. If such a union were not feasible in the short run, only the strengthening of Crete’s ties with the Kingdom of Greece would assure the Christian population of the island that the future would be better for them than the past. Four out of his five Councillors concurred with his point of view; but Venizelos kept aloof. According to him Crete, already a “semi-independent” state, should aim to become a “really autonomous”, viz. an independent country.144 The crux was not only independence or union with Greece: the matter was also whether the “Head of the Executive” would be an elective one – in other words whether Crete would be a republic or not. For if the island became a “totally autonomous” statehood, i.e. an independent republic,145 Venizelos would most likely be her President. Backed by the British as he was, and identifying with republican/democratic ideas and ideals, he would have- sooner or later- the whole island in his grasp. The key was now the attitude of Tsar Nicholas II. The latter was the first to talk with the High Commissioner about the island’s future. They met each other in the Crimea, in the imperial residence. He was “very sympathetic” with the people who A. Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos…,p. 21. According to certain sources, nonetheless, this verbal conflict took place somewhat later, when the High Commissioner was about to start his tour to the Powers’ capitals. See Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, II, p. 29. 143 Episēmos Ephēmeris tēs Krētikēs Politeias, First Year, No. 28 (April 28, 1899), p. 48. The jurisdiction of this very portfolio encompassed foreign affairs as well. 144 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados, 1828-1964, vol. III (Athens: Papyros, 1966), p. 29ff. 145 Ibid., p. 38 (note 3). 142

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wished Crete to be united with Greece; yet he was not prepared to go ahead with this solution.146 Prince George and his Cretan subjects would have to wait. The Tsar, however, had miscalculated. Russia being one of Crete’s Protective Powers, Russian men-of-war had now obtained a long-wanted naval base of theirs in the “heart” of the Eastern Mediterranean. The upshot was that the Tsar was not inclined to give up this palpable, substantial gain for a beau geste in favour of the King of the Hellenes. Were Crete to be united with Greece, certain would be the loss of the Russian naval “facilities” in the island and questionable the attitude of King George in a major European crisis to ensue. All this was true; but there was another side to the “Cretan Question”, which was overlooked by the Tsar. And this side was the delicate position of the High Commissioner, the Tsar’s protégé. For Prince George’s insular throne was already tottering. The British were by no means disposed to tolerate a Russophile ruler in Crete, and their acolyte, Venizelos, had personal ambitions to gratify, if Prince George were removed. British diplomacy and Venizelos’ ruthlessness were fearsome weapons against the High Commissioner and mutatis mutandis against Russia. But Nicholas II did not grasp the situation.147 After the Crimea, Prince George visited England, where he talked with Edward, Prince of Wales, Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, foreign editor of the London Times and the Marquess of Salisbury, then prime minister of the United Kingdom. All of them turned down the idea of Crete’s annexation to Greece, but approved of the proposition that the ties between the former and the latter be reinforced.148 The same feelings were expressed to the High Commissioner in Paris, by the President of the French Republic Émile Loubet and the Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé; and Rome as well, by the King of Italy Victor Emmanuel III and Emilio ViscontiVenosta, his minister of Foreign Affairs.149 Critical confabulations took place subsequently. But while Prince George, after having talked with the rulers of Europe, hoped that Crete would be annexed at least de facto by Greece, a joint note of the Four Powers was issued on 23 February, 1901 (NS). According to the note, the Prince was “warmly invited” to stay on in his office as High Commissioner,150 but neither union with Greece nor the strengthening of the ties between Crete and the Kingdom of Greece would be tolerated. This response to the steps the Prince had taken, in order to meet the desire of him and his Christian subjects, provoked bewilderment on the part of Crete’s Christian population except for 146 147 148 149 150

Ibid., p. 29. É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce…, IV, pp. 494-495. Ibid., pp. 30-31. Ibid., p. 31. A. Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos…, p. 22.

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Venizelos. He likely expected such a Four Powers’ answer; and, what is more, he termed the regrettable outcome of Prince George’s tour of Europe as the intercession “of the finger of Destiny”.151 Why was the sad result of the High Commissioner’s steps regarded by his Councillor for Justice as Destiny’s intervention? Because the island’s union with of Greece, whether formal or de facto, would put the island under the rule of the King of the Hellenes; but, as aforementioned, he was an adherent of the Emperor Franz Joseph of Austro-Hungary. The British, therefore, were by no means ready to replace the Russophile ruler of Crete by his father, supporter of the Habsburgs. And the tool, of course, of such a policy against King George and his namesake son, Powers’ High Commissioner in Crete, would be “democracy”. Venizelos now undertook the task of saving from the “Russian styled” autocracy of the High Commissioner, “in whose veins the blood of Peter the Great run”, the parliamentary system in Crete.152 Little wonder, therefore, that similar arguments, namely the defense of democracy and the indictment of the Royal House of Greece being prone to authoritarian methods of rule, were to be used again by Venizelos during the First World War. The gap then between Prince George and his Justice Councillor was obvious and deep. And Venizelos gave publicity to his point of view by means of an interview with the influential Athens paper Acropolis.153 He did not mince his words: he wanted Crete to be a fully autonomous (i.e. independent) state because in that way the Head of the Executive would be elective.154 It was obvious that he was aspiring to a régime change in Crete.

VIII Venizelos, nevertheless, was then a member of the administration he wished to abolish. Prince George pretended at first to know nothing of his Councillor’s seditious activity. But finally, most likely on his father’s advice,155 he dismissed Venizelos on March 18, 1901.156 Immediately afterwards came the elections for the Cretan Assembly, in which Venizelos did badly. For he was now anathematized by nearly the whole of Crete’s Christian population as the only leading opponent of the island’s union with Greece. The High Commissioner, on the other hand, was justly regarded as the pro-Union champion. As a result, he was idolized by the populace and it was thanks to him that the unionist movement grew to such an extent as to jeopardize the authority of the Four Powers’ Consuls in Crete. Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 32. Ibid., p. 20. 153 To be found in toto in the book by I. Ēliakēs, Ho Eleutherios Venizelos ōs dēmosiographos (= Eleutherios Venizelos as journalist), Athens: Dēmētrakos, 1932, p. 18ff. 154 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 155 A. Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos…, p. 23. 156 EVP, I/21/1. 151 152

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In other words, because of Venizelos’ seditious activity the national sentiment of the island’s Christians was being strengthened more and more – and soon would be out of control. Venizelos was isolated, and trying to make his living once more as a lawyer.157 For the British to rescue his political career was now of vital importance. Accordingly a new British Consul-General, Esme Howard, arrived at Canea in July,1903. His instructions were clear: Prince George should be removed, but with honour; for he was the “beloved nephew” of the King of England Edward VII.158 Of course, these instructions were to be meticulously observed. The new Consul-General of the United Kingdom paved the way for Venizelos and his friends with the assistance of his French and Italian colleagues159. On the March 10, 1905, therefore, the leader of the “Cretan liberals” left the Italian Consulate at Canea160 for Therison, where his followers had gathered.161 The slogan of the rebellion was well calculated: “Union with Greece” – and, if it were not feasible, the abolition of the autocracy of Prince George.162 Of course, since union with the Greek Kingdom was for the time being ruled out by Crete’s Four Protective Powers, it was obvious that the rebels’ sole target was Prince George.163 The latter was again in a delicate position. The Cretan populace had no sympathy with the rebels;164 and Koundouros, protagonist of the 1895 revolution, threatened to take his followers into the mountains, in competition with Venizelos.165 But the latter was well financed166 and in constant contact with the Consuls of the Four Powers. The very presence of his armed bands near Canea, the island’s capital, was a challenge to High Commissioner’s prestige; for the problem was that Prince George had no means with which to face them. The Cretan Gendarmerie, modeled on the Italian Carabinieri, was still in embryo.167 What is more, Prince George was forbidden by EVP, I/22/1-195; I/23/1-95. Lord Howard of Penrith, Theatre of life: Life seen from the stalls, 1905-1936 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1936), p. 18. 159 With regard especially to the French and Italian Consuls see Sinan Kuneralp [ed.], Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of World War One.The Final Stage of the Cretan Question, 1899-1913 (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2009), doc. 289: Sadreddin Bey, Ottoman chargé d’affaires at Athens, to Tevfik Pasha, Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, Athens, July 12, 1906, p. 157. 160 A. Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos…, p. 26. 161 Steph. I. Stephanou, Eleutherios Venizelos…, p. 38. 162 Ibid., pp. 38-39. 163 Les chefs des insurgés ont répondu aux Consuls qu’ils se réservaient de leur faire connaître, dans le délai convenu, leur résolution tout en faisant comprendre que tant que le Prince Georges restera dans l’Île, les insurgés ne déposeront pas les armes. (S. Kuneralp, The Final Stage of the Cretan Question, 1899-1913, doc. 266: Sadreddin Bey to Tevfik Pasha, Athens, July 16, 1905, p. 143.) 164 Ibid., doc. 276: Sadreddin Bey to Tevfik Pasha, Athens, September 16, 1905, p. 148. 165 A. Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos…, p. 27. 166 Ibid., p. 26. 167 Episēmos Ephēmeris tēs Krētikēs Politeias , I, Eighth Year, No. 51 (16 September, 1906). 157 158

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the Powers’ Consuls at Canea to have a militia formed against the Therison rebels.168 As a result, only the British, Italian, French, and Russian troops camped out in the island could have scattered the rebellious Therison gathering. The High Commissioner asked, therefore, to “be lent a hand”, but when everything was ready for the Powers’ troops to crush the rebels, the British suddenly declared themselves unwilling to do so. For they did not want the 1900 Peking precedent to be repeated.169 In point of fact, the 1900 events in the Chinese capital, viz. the Boxer rebellion, had nothing in common with the 1905 liberals’ gathering at Therison. The argument, nonetheless, was so absurd that no reply could be given. As a result, only Russian troops, in the Rethymnon district, marched with success against the rebels, who were making raids into villages for food;170 but in other regions of the island, rural economic life was being gravely disturbed because of the impunity the rebels enjoyed.171 It was in that way that the summer of 1905 was spent on the island of Crete: the economic ruin of the island in practice was guaranteed. Yet in October, Venizelos, sensitive to cold weather, arranged to be granted an amnesty.172 For winter is harsh in the Cretan mountains. The Powers’ Consuls subsequently exerted pressure on the High Commissioner, and the latter nolens volens acquiesced. The amnesty was granted and the Therison camp was disbanded in November, 1905. The “comedy” 173 was over. Henceforth everything would happen contrary to what Prince George hoped. The Consuls grasped the opportunity to have the control over Crete shifted from him to themselves; and accordingly, the Four Protective Powers imposed over Crete an economic control

S. Kuneralp, The Final Stage of the Cretan Question, 1899-1913, doc. 278: Sadreddin Bey to Tevfik Pasha, Athens, October 14, 1905, p. 150. 169 Lord Howard of Penrith, Theatre of life: Life seen from the stalls, 1905-1936, pp. 24, 35. Cf. S. Kuneralp, The Final Stage of the Cretan Question, 1899-1913, doc. 226: Musurus Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador in London, to Tevfik Pasha, London, April 2, 1905, p. 126: … les troupes anglaises avaient reçu pour instructions d’assister la gendarmerie de l’Île au rétablissement de l’ordre, tout en s’abstenant d’attaquer les rebelles sur les hauteurs où ils se trouvaient. 170 S. Kuneralp, The final stage of the Cretan Question, 1899-1913, doc. 250: Rifaat Bey, Ottoman minister at Athens, to Tevfik Pasha, Athens, June 6, 1905, p. 135; doc. 269: Sadreddin Bey to Tevfik Pasha, Athens, August 9, 1905, p. 144; doc. 271: Sadreddin Bey to Tevfik Pasha, Athens, August 19,1905, p. 145. See also M. Koundouros, Historikai kai diplomatikai apokalypseis…, p. 190. 171 As far as the impunity is concerned, the Ottoman minister at Athens wrote to the Foreign Minister of the Sublime Porte as follows: Je crains que le retard mis par les troupes internationals à… étouffer [the Therison insurrection] lui donne une plus grande extension tout en créant des sympathies en Europe. (S. Kuneralp, The final stage of the Cretan Question, 1899-1913, doc. 250: Rifaat Bey to Tevfik Pasha, Athens, April 5, 1905, p. 128.) 172 Ibid., doc. 282: Sadreddin Bey to Tevfik Pasha, Athens, November 10, 1905, p. 152; Steph. I. Stephanou, Eleutherios Venizelos, p. 39. 173 S. Kuneralp, The final stage of the Cretan Question, 1899-1913, doc. 251: Rifaat Bey to Tevfik Pasha, Athens, June 20, 1905. 168

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régime.174 Within the framework of this régime the Consuls were entitled to contact the Councillors of the High Commissioner - thus circumventing him.175 It was the parliamentary system imposed on Crete; and only humiliations were in store for the Prince. Be that as it may, the 1906 elections gave Venizelos a minority in the Assembly of Crete. That meant the populace kept regarding him as the foe par excellence of the pro-Union movement and Prince George as its beloved leader. But the latter had had enough. Though the Therison rebellion had met neither military nor political success, Britain’s support which Venizelos enjoyed enabled him to present everything in a light most favourable to him. Prince George, moreover, was having a love affair with the French Princess Marie de Bonaparte, who disliked life in Crete.176 So, he resigned in September, 1906,177 and a year later he married Marie. He was to spend the rest of his life in France.178 As for Venizelos, he posed now as the parliamentary dictator of Crete.

*** The outcome of the 1901-1906 turmoil in Crete was a heavy diplomatic defeat that the Russians suffered at the hands of the British. The Russians preferred the short-term advantages given to them thanks to their position as one of the Four of Crete’s Protective Powers. As a result, they only half-heartedly supported Prince George, their tried friend, and finally let him be removed. The British, on the other hand, surmounted everything. They proved to be able to impose Venizelos, their acolyte, as Crete’s strongman – and managed to do so against the manifest feelings of the Christian population of Crete. After Prince George abdicated, they took a step further: they confirmed that the Powers’ High Commissioner in Crete would henceforth be appointed by the King of the Hellenes.179 Given the fact that King George’s throne had been jeopardized owing to the 1897 Greek defeat by the Ottomans, the British were now able to handle him effectively. For if he proved to be ‘loyal’ to them and prompt to disregard his friendship with the Emperor of Austro-Hungary, they would likely accept Crete’s annexation to Greece as “forthcoming”; if he would not, Cretan affairs would be in a stalemate once more. At the same time, Ibid., doc. 287: Naby Bey, Ottoman minister at Athens, to Tevfik Pasha, Paris, December 21, 1905, p. 156. 175 Episēmos Ephēmeris tēs Krētikēs Politeias, Eighth Year, I, No. 32 (July 12, 1906), pp. 201-203. 176 Μ. Koundouros, Historikai kai diplōmatikai apokalypseis…, p. 190. 177 Episēmos Ephēmeris tēs Krētikēs Politeias, Eighth Year, I, No. 45 (September 2, 1906). 178 He and his wife became intimate friends of Aristide Briand, who sold to them his house in country. (PA, LG/F/3/14/21.) 179 Episēmos Ephēmeris tēs Krētikēs Politeias, Eighth Year, I, No. 44 (September 2, 1906). 174

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they would be able to open the road for turning Crete into an exclusively British protectorate. The issue, nonetheless, was to be clouded by the 1909 military coup in Athens and, furthermore, by the beginning of the First Balkan War. Radical changes in the Balkans were in store.

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CHAPTER TWO The Maturation of the Wars An axiom of the British Naval leadership read as follows: “All war is a question of communications. The Power controlling communications holds in the hollow of his hand the Power to whom communications are denied”.180 It is noteworthy, moreover, that World War I was foreseeable as early as 1900; for the preamble of the German Navy Law, promulgated that very year, was regarded as a declaration of war against Great Britain.181 It was quite natural, therefore, that, in the framework of the Royal Navy’s planning, only oil-burning ships would be built from 1912 on;182 and the origin of the First Balkan War is to be found in Britain’s rush for oil. In 1911, when Winston S. Churchill was appointed to the office of First Lord of the Admiralty, the Royal Navy had already built or was in the process of building 56 destroyers dependent exclusively on oil and 74 submarines powered only by oil. What is more, a proportion of oil was used to spray the coal furnaces of almost all the other ships.183 Why so? Because immense were the advantages conferred by “liquid fuel” on ships: speed first of all, and capability of being easily re-fueled at sea as well.184 Oil, nevertheless, was not found in considerable quantities in the British Isles, even though the British had at their disposal the “best steam coil of the world”, safe in the substratum of their own country.185 In other words, if Britain kept building oilconsuming ships, her naval supremacy would depend on oil.186 Little wonder therefore that the very beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the commencement of Britain’s rush for petroleum; and the first steps aimed to control the relevant deposits of the Near East.187 Thus, on May 28, 1901, the British concluded an agreement with the Shah of Persia, Mozzafar-al-Din Shah Qajar.188 In point of fact, it was a concession encompassing the whole extent of the Persian Empire. As a result the “Anglo-Persian Oil Company” began to exploit the Iranian substratum. Afterwards, it was the turn of Mesopotamia’s petroleum wealth to be exploited. It is noteworthy that the first oil well was drilled there by the “Turkish Oil Company”: the drilling started as

PA, BL/53/4/3. “Since the preamble of the German Navy Law of 1900 gave… [to the British] deliberate notice of the intention of Germany to attack England with the object of destroying British Sea Power”. (Ibid.) 182 W. S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911-1918, vol. I (London: Odhams Press [no date given]), p. 102. 183 Ibid., p. 101. 184 Ibid., p. 100. 185 Ibid., p. 101. 186 Ibid. 187 Iraq and the Persian Gulf (B.R. 524. Naval Intelligence Division, September 1944), pp. 269-280, 493. 188 Alain Duret, Moyen-Orient. Crises et enjeux (Paris : Le Monde-Éditions, 1994), p. 192. 180 181

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early as 1902.189 The rich Caucasus deposits were exploited by famous oil-dynasties such as the Rothschild and the Nobel families.190 As a corollary, only the petroleum in Ottoman territory was ‘available’. Thus, in the first ten years of the twentieth century the Persian Gulf was actually under British control:191 the disintegration, therefore, of the Ottoman Empire was in sight, and in fact the main British desideratum with regard to the 1914-1918 fighting between Britain and Turkey was the “final recognition and consolidation of… [the British] position in the Persian Gulf”;192 that meant, first of all, “security…for oil production”.193 The decision, of course, of the Ottoman Empire’s dismemberment was taken after the end of the 1877-1878 war between Russia and the Porte; yet the definite resolution was not made until February 1897.194 The Great European Powers, namely Britain, France, Russia, Austro-Hungary, Germany, and Italy, were in perfect agreement on that.195 Italy’s share was Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, today’s Libya. Little wonder at that, since Italians were interested in exploiting Libya’s substratum,196 wherein, in Ancient Abdul-Mutalib Hasson Al-Marsoumi, “Petroleum Geology of Mesopotamia (general review)”. (Retrieved in http://www.geologyofmesopotamia.com/p57.htm on April 30, 2011.) 190 Simon Sebag Montefiore, Young Stalin (London: Phoenix, 2008), p. 92; Vanessa Martin and Morteza Nouraei, “Foreign Land Holdings in Iran 1828 to 1911”, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (April 2011), p.143. 191 Édouard Driault, La Question d’Orient depuis ses origines jusqu’à la paix de Sèvres (1920), Paris : Félix Alcan, 19218, p. 461. 192 PA, BL/63/2. 193 Ibid. Cf. Vanessa Martin and M. Nouraei, “Foreign Land Holdings in Iran 1828 to 1911”, p. 145. 194 É. Driault, La Question d’Orient…, p. 449ff. 195 Sinan Kuneralp (ed.), Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of World War One. The Turkish-Italian War, 1911-1912, Part 1 (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2011), doc. 115: Tevfik Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador in London, to Hakki Pasha, Grand Vizier and acting Foreign Minister, London, September 22, 1911, p. 112; doc. 119: Reshad Hikmet Bey, Ottoman chargé d’affaires at Vienna, to Hakki Pasha, Vienna, September 23, 1911, p. 114; doc. 211: Seifeddin Bey, Ottoman chargé d’affaires at Rome, to Hakki Pasha, Rome, September 29th, 1911, p. 156; doc. 493: Tevfik Pasha to Assim Bey, Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, London, October 27, 1911, p. 284. And also Part 2 (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2011), doc. 1467: Mavroyeni Bey, Ottoman Ambassador in Vienna, to Assim Bey, Vienna, May 2, 1912, p. 200; doc. 1599: the same to the same, June 22, 1912, p. 276; doc. 1632: Tevfik Pasha to Gabriel Effendi Noradounghian, Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, London, August 1, 1912, p. 302; doc. 837: Tevfik Pasha to Assim Bey, London, November 30, 1911, p. 428; and mainly the doc. 1835: Naby Bey, Ottoman Ambassador in Rome, to Gabriel Effendi Noradounghian, Rome, November 29, 1912, p. 415, where it was mentioned the following: Tout d’abord, il y a lieu de rappeler que la première idée de s’accaparer de nos deux provinces africaines [Tripolitania and Cyrenaica] fut suggérée à l’Italie dès 1882 par l’Angleterre… 196 Ibid., 1, doc. 266: Saïd Pasha, Grand Vizier and acting Foreign Minister, to Tevfik Pasha, Constantinople, October 2, 1911, p. 178: Affaires d’une mission minéralogique [italienne] envoyée Tripoli. Sur démarche Ambassade [italienne] Sublime Porte [a donné] à Vali ordre autoriser voyage mission qui, ayant déjà terminé ses études, est sur le point de rentrer à Benghazi. And also doc. 109 : Seifeddin Bey to Hakki Pasha, Rome, September 22, p. 108: Je crois inutile de répéter que cette 189

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Times, the existence of oil had been witnessed197. The 1911-1912 Italo-Turkish War, nevertheless, proved that Arabs were not impatient to have the Sultan’s rule replaced by one of a European Sovereign198. The Balkan Peninsula, therefore -Europe’s powder keg thanks to the irredentist dreams “breaking the hearts” of the Christian populationswas the likeliest place for a new conflict to break out.

I In the night of August 14/15, 1909, a military coup was triggered in Athens. It was a peculiar one; for, contrary to the ‘conventional’ way a putsch occurs, no ‘sensitive spots’ of the Greek capital were seized by troops. The garrison of Athens (and some naval officers as well) simply gathered in Goudi, a plain outside Athens,199 and demanded that reforms be instigated in the machinery of the State. The coup was organized by the Military League, founded on July 4, 1909.200 The League was doubtlessly inspired by the Young Turks revolution that took place in Salonika in 1908;201 yet no ideological affinity is to be found between the two revolts. The Young Turks, in fact, aimed at abolishing the Sultan’s autocracy and radically changing the ethos pervading the Ottoman Empire. The Greek Military League’s target, on the other hand, was the strengthening of the King’s authority; for the Crown’s indifference was regarded as being responsible for parliamentary inertia and apathy. Indeed the “Royal Republic”, viz. the parliamentary system established in Greece campagne est l’œuvre des journalistes et des politiciens encouragés par quelques institutions financières, le Banco di Roma en tête, et les brasseurs d’affaires. As a matter of fact, Italians had taken interest mainly in Libya’s phosphate deposits ; see doc. 5: Kiazim Bey, Ottoman Ambassador in Rome, to Rifaat Pasha, Ottoman Foreign Minister, Rome, February 17, 1911, p. 27; doc. 14: the same to the same, Rome, March 25, 1911, p. 37. 197 Herodotus IV, 195. Paradoxical as it may appear, Italians did not exploit Libya’s oil. See Angelo Iachino, Tramonto di una grande Marina (Milano: Mondadori, 19664), p. 41. 198 T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom. A Triumph (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co, 1936), p. 47; S. Kuneralp, The Turkish-Italian War, 1911-1912, 1, doc. 485: Fuad Simavi Bey, Ottoman acting chargé d’affaires at Vienna, to Assim Bey, Vienna, October 26, 1911, p. 280; Turkhan Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador in St Petersburg, to Assim Bey, St Petersburg, October 27, 1911, p. 285; doc. 498: Nihad Raif Bey, Ottoman Consul General at Malta, to Assim Bey, Malta, October 27, 1911. And also Part 2, doc. 1557: Rifaat Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador in Paris, to Assim Bey, Paris, June 6, 1912, p. 252; doc. 1599: Mavroyeni Bey to Assim Bey, Vienna, June 22, 1912, p. 276. 199 Today incorporated into the major Athens area. 200 Nikolaos Zormpas, Apomnēmoneumata. Hē epanastasē tou Goudi,1909 (= Memoirs. The Goudi Revolution, 1909), Athens: Metron, 20052, p. 19. Colonel N. Zormpas was the leader of the Military League. See also Pericles I. Argyropoulos, Anamnēseis. To zētēma tou Nautikou, hē exegersē sto Goudi, ho Dichasmos (= Memoirs. The question of the Greek Navy, the Goudi uprising, the [Greek National] Divide). Edited by Dēmētrēs Michalopoulos, Athens: Arsenidēs, 1996, p. 34. 201 Sir Basil Thomson, The Allied Secret Service in Greece. Translated into Greek by Kōstas Barbēs (Athens: Logothetēs [no date given]), p. 36.

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in 1875 had stripped the Crown of nearly all of its privileges in the domain of domestic politics. Little wonder, therefore, that the 1897 defeat of the Greek Army by the Ottomans was imputed to the incompetence of the ruling stratum of Greek society that cared solely about its privileges being upheld through the operating of the parliamentary government. The King had to intervene between Parliament, the Armed Forces and the populace, for a national consensus to be achieved. It was more than ever necessary for revenge to be taken on the Turks; or else there would be no room for Greek national self-respect. Such an indictment reflected but a biased view of Greek life whether political or social. It is true that power had been monopolized from the end of the 1821 Revolution onwards by a number of wealthy and influential families – the same more or less as those that ran the Christian populations of the Greek lands under Ottoman rule. They were collectively termed tzakia;202 and the populace often considered them to be oppressors every bit as cruel as Ottoman officialdom had been.203 The aftermath of the 1897 war, nonetheless, was something of an awakening. The Crown Prince, Constantine, was embarked on a systematic endeavour to re-organize the Army; and statesmen such as Geōrgios Theotokēs, prime minister from December 8, 1905 to July 7, 1909, backed wholeheartedly him.204 Still, the point was that Prince Constantine, in the context of his reforms, did show favouritism; for above all he encouraged and promoted chiefly commissioned officers such as Engineers and the Artillery ones. As a result, those in the Infantry and Cavalry felt scorned by him and considered revolt to be an effectual means for “justice to be done”.205 Yet Prince Constantine was right. For Engineers and Artillery officers needed a solid education in the Sciences in order to meet professional requirements, whilst this did not apply so much to those in the Infantry and Cavalry. What is more, the Greek Army was carrying out police duties throughout the nineteenth century;206 for brigands held sway in Greece (especially in her mountainous regions) from the 1830s on, and were not eradicated until the late 1920s. Such a task warranted undeniable and obvious social prestige; that is why Greek officers, NCOs and even privates got were in the habit of displaying a somewhat theatrical bellicosity based on handlebar moustaches, fiery countenances, well-tailored uniforms, clinging swords ready to be drawn in trivial disputes etc.207 Of course, this Plural of the word tzaki, meaning “fireplace”. An explication of this sentiment: Anastasia Kyrkinē-Koutoula, Hē othomanikē dioikēsē stēn Hellada. Hē periptōsē tēs Peloponnēsou,1715-1821 (Ottoman administration in Greece. The case of the Peloponnesus, 1715-1821), Athens: Arsenidēs, 1996, p. 142. 204 P. I. Argyropoulos, Anamnēseis…, pp. 33-38. 205 Ibid., p. 51. 206 See mainly a masterpiece of Modern Greek literature: [Anonymous], Hē stratiōtikē zōē en Helladi (= Military Life in Greece), Athens : Galaxias, 19702 (first edition in 1870), p. 147ff. 207 Ibid., pp. 74-78. 202 203

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army was not fit to carry out tactical warfare; and the 1886 Koutra fighting against Ottoman border troops,208 and especially the outcome of the 1897 Greco-Turkish war proved Greece to be essentially unprepared for a major armed conflict. Constantine’s reasoning, therefore, that the Army should be staffed by educated officers, was irrefutable; and, of course, those most likely to be educated were in the Engineers and Artillery. But as a rule Infantry and Cavalry officers -and NCOs alike- were scions of the aforementioned tzakia, i.e. the families who had monopolized wealth and political power.209 Hence the officers of this ilk relied on their family connections and not on professional skills. The Crown Prince, on the other hand, was the centre of attraction of Army officers who were well-educated yet without means, like Iōannēs Metaxas, the future Prime Minister of Greece (1936-1940). So, there arose a peculiar situation. The coup against the social stratum ruling Greece was engineered by the offspring of that very same social stratum. Those of the military involved in the revolt insisted on King George assuming essential political prerogatives. Seemingly, it occurred because they wished that politicians’ unresponsiveness be halted; yet in practice they aimed at carving out a career for themselves as well – without meeting the educational and competence requirements required by the Crown Prince of Army officering.210 The coup, however, did not strike deep roots in the populace.211 And to cap it all, the naval officers who joined the coup had been thoroughly radicalized: their target was not Prince Constantine but his father the King. For the latter had espoused a plan formulated in the mid-1900s by the French rear admiral François-Ernest Fournier. The Greek Navy was to be re-organized by the French officer, whereupon the British government would back him with money.212 The point was that in the context of such a “re-organization” the Greek Navy would be merely a ‘subsidiary’ of the French and British ones. As a matter of fact, only submarines and light destroyers were designated for Greece.213 Despite the secrecy surrounding the confabs, a couple of Greek naval officers smelled a rat and launched a press campaign against the King and the French admiral. The so-called “Fournier plan” was subsequently repudiated;214 and no doubt the coup-de-grace was Panagiōtēs Danklēs, Anamnēseis-Engrapha-Allēlographia-To archeio tou (= Memoirs-Documents-Correspondence-his Archives. Edited by X. Leukoparidēs, vol. I- (Athens: Vagiōnakēs, 1965), pp. 125-126. 209 Ibid., p.42 (a typical case). 210 It is noteworthy that the prologue to the Goudi coup was written by 300 Army NCOs manifesting against the government in the very centre of Athens in May, 1909. P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung (Athens: Zacharopoulos, 19922), p. 86. 211 N. Zormpas, Apomnēmoneumata..., p. 112. 212 Édouard Driault and Michel Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours, vol. IV (Paris : Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1926), pp. 565-566. 213 P. I. Argyropoulos, Anamnēseis…, pp. 42-45. 214 Ibid., pp. 43-44; É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique…, IV, p. 571. 208

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given to it by the Emperor of Germany Wilhelm II. He paid a visit to his Achilleion Palace, in Corfu215 in April 1908, and had an opportunity to discuss the affair with officers of the Greek Navy. He did not mince his words: Greece lacked heavy battleships.216 Greek officers found him to be right and, after the Goudi coup, they lobbied the government to buy an armoured cruiser, built in the Orlando shipyards, in Leghorn,217 Italy.218 The ship was named “Geōrgios Averoff”, and it was the only truly important man-of-war that Greece possessed to the outbreak of World War Two.

II Paradoxical as it may appear, after the Goudi coup prevailed, the troops who had revolted asked to be granted an amnesty by the King,219 which was done.220 The effect of the rebels asking for an amnesty made them appear somewhat ridiculous.221 The naval officers, therefore, were displeased; and their discontent fuelled fresh sedition, now an exclusively “naval” one. The crucial battle occurred in Salamis Bay in mid-October 1909, in the very waters where the famous battle had taken place nearly 2,500 years earlier.222 The ships of the rebels were defeated by the loyalists; the split, nonetheless, between the moderate Army officers and the radical naval ones now stood in stark. The naval officers of the League, however, had fallen into two of the fatal errors of would-be insurrectionists: they failed to conceal their plans from prying eyes;223 and were too late in taking action. The defeat they suffered engendered the reconciliation of the King with the “middle-of-the-road” commissioned officers who led the Military League and, by the same token, blacklisted the individuals who were in a position to bring about true betterment in the public life of Greece. Crown Prince Constantine, above all, was dismissed from his post as Commander-General of the Army and fled abroad merely a couple of weeks after the Goudi coup.224 Many Greek people, nevertheless, continued loving him, and did not wish him to leave his post.225 But he was adamant in his decision; for he realized that, had He had purchased it after the death of Elisabeth, Empress of Austro-Hungary. P. I. Argyropoulos, Anamnēseis…, pp. 44-45. 217 Livorno in Italian. 218 Commodore K. Païzēs-Paradelēs, Ta ploia tou Hellēnikou Polemikou Nautikou, 1830-1979 (= The ships of the Greek War Navy), Athens : General Staff of the Navy, 1979, pp. 1-4. 219 P. I. Argyropoulos, Anamnēseis…, pp. 62-63. 220 Ephēmeris tēs Kyvernēseōs tou Vasileiou tēs Hellados (= Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Greece), I, No. 182 (August 19, 1909). 221 Spyros Melas, Hē epanastasē tou 1909 (= The 1909 uprising), Athens: Birēs, 1957, pp. 294, 296-297. 222 Memoirs of H.R.H. Prince Christopher of Greece (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1938), p. 113. 223 S. Melas, Hē epanastasē tou 1909, p. 340. 224 Daily paper Kairoi (= The Times [Athens]), August 26, 1909, p. 3. 225 Ibid. 215 216

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he not left, the crown of his father would be jeopardized. By the same token, Dēmētrios Gounarēs, a right-wing statesman, was cast aside by the new political order prevailing in Greece.226 Gounarēs is the most tragic character in the Greek Nation’s recent History. He was born in Patras, in the Peloponnese, in 1867, to a self-made, wealthy merchant, of old native stock. He studied Law at the University of Athens and furthered his studies at Leipzig, Heidelberg, Munich, Göttingen, Paris, and London.227 It was soon after he gained a reputation as a barrister in his native city that he was elected a member of Parliament for the first time in 1902, aged 35. His was of an ascetic disposition.228 Unlike his parliamentary colleagues, he did not care about money but was an avid reader of classical and modern Literature. He was the political mentor of the Military League;229 yet he failed to seize power after the Goudi coup. For Constantine’s downfall had had a fatal effect on his political career. By means of a press smear campaign,230 he was falsely bracketed with the Crown Prince and so the bulk of the League officers turned their backs on him. Little wonder at it. For Gounarēs, in his capacity as an MP, had embarked, in the early 1900s, on a campaign against high finance; namely the twenty-year-monopoly of the Greek raisin by a British consortium. Such a monopoly failed; but Gounarēs was, of course, targeted by the capitalists and raisin-producers involved.231 Raisins were the main source of income of the peasantry in the Achaia region232 - the very constituency that Gounarēs represented. Not only did the raisin-producers see in him (at least for the moment) their enemy, but the Greek politicians that regarded the British monopoly as a lucrative business for themselves, feared him. To cap it all, Gounarēs did not attempt to conceal his intention of putting into Kairoi, August 29, 1909, p. 3. Dēmētrēs Michalopoulos, “Dēmētrios Gounarēs. Hē zōē kai to telos henos anthrōpou, 1867-1922” (=Dēmētrios Gounarēs. The Life and Death of a Man, 18671922], in Hē Dikē tōn Oktō kai hē ektelesē tōn Hexi (= The Trial of the Eight and the Execution of the Six), Athens: Historical Institute for Studies on Eleutherios Venizelos and his Era, 20102, p. 125. 228 PKP, I/58/209, Panagiōtēs Pan. Varnakiōtēs (civil servant, born in Patras) to Panagiōtēs Kanellopoulos, Athens (no date given). 229 Kairoi, August 8, 1909, p.1; newspaper Patris (= Fatherland [Athens]), August 20, 1909, p. 1. 230 Kairoi, August 27, 1909, p. 1; August 29, p. 3. 231 D. Michalopoulos, “Dēmētrios Gounaris…”, pp. 128-129. 232 Until 1912 the value of raisins sold abroad accounted for 45% of Greek exports. (Kostas Lourmpas, “Hē stafida tou Aigiou” [= The Aigion raisin], in Praktika tou ektaktou achaïkou pneumatikou symposiou, 2006 [= Proceedings of the extraordinary symposium on Achaia], Athens, 2009, p. 408. As far as the political impact of the raisin trade is concerned see D. Michalopoulos, Vie politique en Grèce pendant les années 1862-1869 (Athens: National University of Athens/Saripoleion, 1981), pp. 25-27. Raisins were the unique source of income for the Greek Revolutionary Army in the Peloponnese during the 1821-1829 Greek Revolution. See Theodōros K. Kolokotrōnēs, Aphēgēsis Symvantōn tēs Hellēnikēs Phylēs (= Account of Events Concerning the Greek Nation). Edited by Tasos Ath. Gritsopoulos (Athens, 1981), p. 177. 226 227

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effect radical changes in Greek society and statehood.233 He was emerging as the champion of the middle and lower social strata. As such he was good enough to be the adviser of a military conspiracy234but not an individual to be entrusted with real power. And so the way was paved for Eleutherios Venizelos to reach Athens and assume control of Greek politics.

*** The Military League had need of a mentor; for what was going on behind the political scene of Greece was not easily grasped even by the offspring of the Greek ruling social stratum. The Crown Prince, who could have effected the necessary reforms in Greek public life, was forced out of the country; and Gounarēs was brushed aside. Who was to assume the leadership of the radical and amnestied Army officers, who had gained the docility of the Sovereign and the deposition of the Crown Prince? What of the military that wished the Armed Forces to be reformed, but were themselves mired in outmoded patterns of warfare? It was more than an enigma: it was an imbroglio. And little wonder that from this imbroglio an individual like Venizelos came to the fore. To begin with, nobody among the leading members of the League saw in him the deliverer of Greece. It was no earlier than October 1909, i.e. roughly at the time of the radical-minded naval officers’ coup,235 that the proposal to summon Venizelos from Crete to Athens took place; yet this proposal was rejected out of hand. Such a rebuff was quite natural. The political ascendancy of the League was largely the product of the latent but effective toleration of King George; and the Sovereign had little –if any- sympathy for Venizelos. The latter had forced the High Commissioner of the Four Powers in Crete, i.e. a son of King George and cousin of Tsar Nicholas II, out of the island. The result was that the dynastic association of Crete with the Kingdom of Greece vanished for ever. In addition, the slap in the face of Tsardom was not easily to be forgotten. As foretold, Olga, Consort of the King of the Hellenes, was née Russian Grand Duchess; and King George had a good sense of balance. He was ostensibly a professed Anglophile yet tacitly pro-Austrian; the British, nonetheless, were, if the need arose, the so-to-speak supreme protectors of his family.236 The Crown Prince, married to Sophia, sister of the German Emperor Wilhelm II, was considered to be pro-German. And last but not least the King enjoyed holidays in France, where his son George, after having been driven out of Crete, lived in holy wedlock. Venizelos’ Aristos Kampanēs, Ho Dēmētrios Gounarēs kai hē hellēnikē krisis tōn etōn 19181922 (=Dēmētrios Gounarēs and the 1918-1922 crisis in Greece), Athens: Pyrsos, 1946, pp. 17-19; Heracles Malōsēs, Hē politikē Historia tou Dēmētriou P. Gounarē (= The Political Life of Dimitrios P. Gounaris), Athens: Nea Epochē, 1926), p. 35. 234 And trusted by the King as well. (P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung, p. 36.) 235 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados, 1828-1964 (= Political History of Modern Greece, 1828-1964), vol. III (Athens: Papyros, 1966), p. 95. 236 Cf. Memoirs of… Prince Christopher of Greece, p. 113. 233

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intrusion into Greek politics was to cloud the whole of the Greek politics; and this time the Crown of the Hellenes would be deliberately jeopardized. In point of fact, kingship had not struck deep roots in Greece. King Otho, the first Sovereign of Greece, was overthrown in 1862, after nearly thirty years on the throne. This ‘precedent’ haunted King George till his death in 1913. So, he told and retold his siblings that they must always bear in mind that they were foreigners in Greece; yet they must make Greeks forget it.237 Nonetheless, it was his very obsession of being an “adopted” King that would soon serve as an instrument for his siding totally with the British.

III Whatever the facts of the matter, public opinion, whether in Greece or in Crete, still saw in Venizelos an openly pro-Turkish politician. His 1893 cause célèbre, detrimental to innocent people who were sent to the gallows, had obscured his reputation; a large part of his political clientele in Crete was Moslem;238 and Greek nationalists resented his idea that the Ottoman Empire be transformed into a Greco-Turkish statehood.239 Of course he was now trying to become Crete’s parliamentary dictator; for the new High Commissioner, Alexandros Zaïmēs (appointed by King George240) was all but a shadowy figure in politics. Upon arrival at Canea, on September 18, 1906, he stated that his main concern was to “toe the line of the Four Protective Powers of the Island”.241 On February 8, 1907, moreover, the new Constitution of the State of Crete came into effect.242 The island was now proclaimed a “totally autonomous State”,243 under the joint protection of Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia.244 Though the Sultan’s suzerainty was preserved,245 the High Commissioner was to be nominated by the

Ibid., p. 29. Sinan Kuneralp [ed.], Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of World War One. The final Stage of the Cretan Question, 1899-1913 [Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2009], doc. 312: Rifaat Bey, Ottoman minister at Athens, to Tevfik Pasha, Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens, May 25, 1906, p. 171. 239 EVP, I/28/3, El. Venizelos to Stephanos Provatakēs, Canea, August 12, 1908. 240 A reward for having consented to Prince George’s ousting from the post of High Commissioner in Crete. (S. Kuneralp , The final Stage of the Cretan Question…, doc. 338: Sadreddin Bey to Tevfik Pasha, Athens, August 25, 1906, p.182.) 241 Episēmos Ephēmeris tēs Krētikēs Politeias (= Official Gazette of the State of Crete), I, Eighth Year, No. 53 (September 18, 1906). 242Episēmos Ephēmeris tēs Krētikēs Politeias, I, Ninth Year, No. 7 (February 8, 1907). 243 Art. 1. 244 Ibid. 245 Albeit the Porte insisted upon the sovereignty of the Sultan. Cf. S. Kuneralp, The final Stage of the Cretan Question…, doc. 1024: Hakky Pasha, Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Ghalib Kemaly Bey, Ottoman chargé d’affaires at Athens, Constantinople, September 24, 1911, p. 524. Regardless of what was implied, the “sovereignty” of the Sultan’s was a “platonic one”. (Ibid., doc. 477: 237 238

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King of the Hellenes. Nonetheless the prerogatives of both Sovereigns, Ottoman Emperor and King George, in the rule of Crete would be all but nominal. Last but not least, the new Constitution actually restricted the High Commissioner’s authority: it was a parliamentary system that was being imposed on Crete.246 No wonder that the standard-bearer of such a régime was Venizelos; for he was given the portfolio of Justice and Foreign Affairs on the Executive Committee appointed by the Assembly.247 But thanks to his previous policies his Cretan well was seemingly running dry.248 In terms of International Relations, furthermore, the Cretan issue was now a chaotic one.249 What did the Protective Powers have in store for Crete? The restoration of the Sultan’s rule? Was Greece going to annex the island? Or was Crete to be an independent Republic? To cap it all, on April 28, 1908, it was officially announced that the troops of the Four Protective Powers were to withdraw from the island.250 The evacuation was accomplished in July 1909;251 still Suda, near Canea, owing to its high strategic importance,252 remained occupied by the Powers’ troops with only the Ottoman flag flying.253 It was the last remnant of the rule of the Sultan. Accordingly, in autumn 1908, the Cretan Assembly renamed itself the “Parliament of Crete” and proclaimed that “the Island be indissolubly united with the Kingdom of Greece”.254 Hopes were actually raised thanks to the Young Turk Revolution, in July of that Pzenny Effendi, Ottoman Consul General at Corfu, to Rifaat Pasha, Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, Corfu, July 24, 1909 [annex], p. 262.) 246 Art. 33ff. 247 Lilē Makrakē, Eleutherios Venizelos, 1864-1910. Hē diaplasē henos ethnikou hēgetē (=Eleutherios Venizelos, 1864-1910. The Forming of a National Leader), Athens: Educational Foundation of the National Bank of Greece, 1992, p. 441; Andrew Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos (London: Haus Publishing, 2010), p. 31. 248 P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung, p. 124. 249 Cf. S. Kuneralp, The Final Stage of the Cretan Question…, doc. 521: Hakky Bey, Ottoman Ambassador in Rome, to Rifaat Pasha, Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, Rome, August 3, 1909, p. 282: D’ici là la Crète me paraît destinée à rester un pays unique en son genre : l’Europe maintiendra un « statu quo » mal défini, souveraineté ottomane pour nous, union avec la Grèce pour les Crétois et Dieu sait quel mélange d’espoirs et de désespoirs pour le Royaume [de Grèce]. 250 Episēmos Ephēmeris tēs Krētikēs Politeias, I, Tenth Year, No. 19 (April 28, 1908). 251 S. Kuneralp, The Final Stage of the Cretan Question…, doc. 433: Naoum Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador in Paris, to Rifaat Pasha, Paris, June 23, 1909, p. 238; doc. 458: Azarian Effendi, Under Secretary to the Ottoman Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to Rifaat Pasha, Malta, July 8, 1909, p. 251; Naby Bey, Ottoman minister at Athens, to Rifaat Pasha, Athens, July 27, 1909, p. 267. 252 With regard to Suda’s importance: ibid., doc. 477: Pzenny Effendi to Rifaat Pasha, Corfu, July 24, 1909 (annex), p. 262. 253 Ibid., doc. 1201: Saïd Halim Pasha, Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Tevfik Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador in London, Constantinople, February 16, 1913, p. 603; N. V. Tōmadakēs, entry “Krētē. Historia (= Crete. History) in Megalē Hellēnikē Enkyklopaideia (= The Great Hellenic Encyclopaedia), vol. XV (Athens: Pyrsos, 1931), p. 187. 254 Vasileion tēs Hellados. Parartēma tēs Ephēmeridos tēs Kyverniseōs en Krētē (= Cretan Annex of the Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Greece), I, No. 1 (September 24, 1908); No. 9 (October 2, 1908).

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same year, and during the subsequent flare-up of the Eastern Question, that Crete could be annexed to Greece. Yet the Protective Powers were adamant: no annexation unless the Sublime Porte consented.255 The Porte, on the other hand, was resolute: Ottoman “sovereignty” over Crete was non-negotiable.256 Should, therefore, Greece annex the island, a fresh Greco-Turkish war might be ignited.257 Zaïmēs grew tired of this imbroglio and in September 1908, abandoned his post and went back to Athens; yet he had not tended his formal resignation.258 Was now the appropriate time for Venizelos to act. He actually intended Crete to be an independent statehood; and by the same token he was sure of Britain being the dominant Power as far as the Cretan issue was concerned.259 As foretold, the British –overtly or covertly- disapproved of the island’s annexation to Greece. They wished Crete to be a protectorate of theirs: independence, therefore, would be a good step towards such a hope being attained.260 The point now was to keep the issue open until the right moment - and, if the case arose, to play off the Ottomans against the Greeks. The Greek government was aware of the British goal;261 yet it was to do very little to counter such tactics. As a matter of fact, Greece was a powerless country and, after King Otho was overthrown, Britain had the upper hand in Greek politics. In short, by 1909 Crete had become a quasi-independent State. So, Venizelos was in a position to be summoned to Athens to have the King, the Military League and the politicians thoroughly siding with the British. Crete was left in a happy chaos. Nearly two thirds of the population were Christians,262 whereas in the early nineteenth century half the population had been Moslems.263 Ottoman officials

Vasileion tēs Hellados. Parartēma tēs Ephēmeridos tēs Kyverniseōs en Krētē, I, No. 14 (October 15, 1908). 256 S. Kuneralp , The Final Stage of the Cretan Question…, doc. 412: Rifaat Pasha, to the Ottoman Ambassadors abroad, Constantinople, June 9, 1909, p. 228. 257 Ibid., doc. 521: Hakky Bey, Ottoman Ambassador in Rome, to Rifaat Pasha, Rome, August 3, 1909, p. 282 ; doc. 536 : Turkhan Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador in Saint Petersburg, to Rifaat Pasha, Saint Petersburg, August 7, 1909, p. 288; doc. 540: Reshid Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador in Vienna, to Rifaat Pasha, Vienna, August 9, 1909, p. 289; doc. 547: the same to the same, August 11, 1909, p. 292; doc. 550: Hakky Bey to Rifaat Pasha, Rome, August 12, 1909, p. 293. 258 Thomas Ath. Vaïdēs, Eleutherios Venizelos (in Greek), Athens: Patris, 1934, p. 63. 259 I. Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio (= I. Metaxas’ diary), vol. II. Edited by Chr. Christidēs (Athens: Govostēs [no date given]), p. 39 (entry of October 29, 1910). 260 Lilē Makrakē, Eleutherios Venizelos…, pp. 253, 257-258. 261 AYE, 1890, AAK, the Foreign Minister of Greece to the Greek Consuls in Crete, April 1890. 262 S. Kuneralp, The Final Stage of the Cretan Question…, doc. 477: Pzenny Effendi to Rifaat Pasha, Corfu, July 24, 1909 (annex), p. 261; cf. Lilly Macraki, Eleutherios Venizelos, 1864-1910, p. 258. 263 S. Kuneralp, The Final Stage of the Cretan Question…, doc. 467: Hakky Bey to Rifaat Pasha, Rome, July 12, 1909, p. 255. 255

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began considering the partition of the island as a fair solution.264 The outcome of the First Balkan War, nonetheless, brought about annexation to Greece. The point is: Why did not Crete become a British protectorate? Although historical scholarship has not provided a definite answer so far, French hostility to such a prospect is a plausible likelihood.265

IV The Military League was being blackmailed: by means of the British and French press it would be associated with the Young Turks, unless it agreed to be led by an upright politician.’266 Who was he to be? Venizelos, of course. Emile Joseph Dillon, a noted British publicist and Venizelos’ acquaintance, paid a visit to Athens and harped on about his talents.267 No sooner did he point to the “Cretan Statesman” as Greece’s “Saviour” than influential Athens newspapers showered Venizelos with praise.268 The bulk, nonetheless, of the radical-minded military stubbornly refused to hand over to him the League’s political leadership. The proposal was submitted to the directory of the League again and again – but every time it was turned down.269 At length, the proposal was adopted thanks mainly to Epameinōndas Zymbrakakēs (nicknamed: Pamikos), a hot-tempered military officer of Cretan descent. He was a character typical of the people who had engineered the 1909 Goudi coup. He had volunteered as a private in the Greek Army; soon after that, he became an NCO and in the end he was commissioned in the Cavalry. He lacked education but gained promotion thanks to his political connections. Still, he used to fight duels with anybody he disliked and, amazingly enough, he survived. He was notorious, moreover, for this love affairs and his contacts with the Royal House.270 As a result, his prestige among junior officers was enormous. He was the virtual leader of the Ibid., doc. 477: Pzenny Effendi to Rifaat Pasha, Corfu, July 24, 1909 (annex), p. 262. 265 Ibid., doc.1187: Tevfik Pasha to Gabriel Efendi Noradounghian, Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, London, October 1912, pp. 598-599. 266N. Zormpas, Apomnēmoneumata , pp. 62-64. 267 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Poilitikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 95; Iōannēs Ēliakēs, Ho Venizelos kai hē politikē (= Venizelos and politics), Athens: Kalergēs [no date given], pp. 52-53; Dēmētrēs Pournaras, Eleutherios Venizelos, Athens: “Eleutheros” (no date given), p. 179. 268 Giannēs Manōlikakēs, Eleutherios Venizelos. Hē agnōstē zōē tou (= The Unknown Life of Eleutherios Venizelos), Athens: Gnōsē, 1985, p. 250; Helen GardikasKatsiadakis, “Venizelos’ Advent in Greek Politics, 1909-1912” in Paschalis Kitromilidis (ed.), Eleftherios Venizelos. The trials of Statesmanship (Edinburgh University Press, 20082, p. 89. Cf. Steph. I. Stephanou, Eleutherios Venizelos, plastourgos Historias (= Eleutherios Venizelos, a History Maker), Athens, 19772 , p. 44. 269 G. Aspreas, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados (= Political History of Modern Greece), vol. II Athens: Chrēsima Vivlia (no date given; second edition), pp. 125-126; D. Pournaras, Eleutherios Venizelos, p. 185. 270 P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung, p. 108. 264

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Military League and by no means the mild-mannered Artillery colonel Nikolaos Zormpas, who was given the conventional command of the 1909 coup by the bulk of the seditious officers. For N. Zormpas had been accused of cowardice in the 1897 Greco-Turkish war and, albeit found innocent271 he was besmirched and saw his promotion delayed.272 No wonder, therefore, that Zormpas wanted Crown Prince Constantine ousted from the Army; for he saw in him the very person who had his advancement put on hold.273 By the same token, he wished King George to assume real power in Greek politics – and in military affairs as well.274 Zymbrakakēs, on the other hand (thanks to his connections with the Royal Court), did not disapprove of the measures taken by Constantine,275 though he was –as aforementioned- a carbon copy of the radical military type. In any case he, the bellicose Pamikos was now the pivotal figure within the League. He was informed of Venizelos’ policy in Crete - and he disliked both him and it.276 After Dillon’s campaign, however, he changed his mind and persuaded his colleagues to summon Venizelos to Athens.277 The point however is that the League still did not trust Venizelos. That is why the leading officers composed and signed a letter to him, setting out the conditions of his being summoned and the task to be fulfilled by him in Athens.278 Most likely he was invited merely for a meeting in the context of which he was to ‘give advice’; in other words, he was to serve, for a while, merely as the mentor of the League. Nonetheless, this document disappeared and nobody has as yet been able to discover a copy of it.279 As a result, whereas the “Cretan Statesman” was called to Athens merely for co-operation with the League, thanks to the lack of this very document, his coming has largely been seen as the “Beginning of a New Era”.280

V Venizelos reached Athens on December 26, 1909. He wore “cracked boots” and “frayed trousers”.281 Yet his programme was quite clear: Greece should prepare for war.282 In the framework of her preparation an entente should be accomplished between Greece and the other Christian Powers in the Balkans, namely Bulgaria and Serbia.283 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283

Ibid., p. 108. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. D. Pournaras, Eleutherios Venizelos, p. 176. Sp. V. Markezinēs, Poilitikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 95. Steph. I. Stephanou, Eleutherios Vénselos…, p. 44. Giannēs Manōlikakēs, Eleutherios Venizelos. Hē agnōstē zōē tou, p. 251. Steph. I. Stephanou, Eleutherios Vénselos…, p. 46. Memoirs of… Prince Christopher of Greece, p. 113. EVP, I/30/4, El. Venizelos to Vladimēros Bensēs, Halepa, June 7, 1910. Ibid.

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Such an entente was an old dream. As early as 1867, thanks to Charilaos Trikoupēs, then Foreign Minister of Greece, a Greek-Serbian treaty had been concluded and signed at Bad Voeslau, in the environs of Vienna. The treaty stipulated the alliance of the two countries against the Ottoman Empire. Greece and Serbia, accordingly, were to provide an Army 30,000 strong on the Greek side and 60,000 by the Serbs by March 1868 (art.2). The intention of the alliance was to “wholly free the Christian populations of Turkey’s European lands and of the Archipelago islands as well” (art. 4). If such a grandiose goal could not be achieved, Serbia would annex only Bosnia and Herzegovina, whilst Greece would annex Epirus and Thessaly.284 Nonetheless, a war of Serbia and Greece against the Ottoman Empire did not take place. Yet it was thanks to the outcome of the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish war and the subsequent Congress of Berlin that Greece annexed Thessaly and, in Epirus, the Arta district.285 In 1897, the long-awaited war between the Ottoman Empire and Greece flared up thanks to the Cretan issue. Greek public opinion hoped that the capture of Constantinople and, generally speaking, the Megaloidea, i.e. the “resurrection” of the Byzantine Empire, were at hand; instead of which the occupation of Thessaly by Ottoman troops occurred. If truth be told, even Crown Prince Constantine, Generalissimo of the Greek Army, was astonished at seeing his troops disbanded almost without a fight. Accordingly, he did not mince his words: the Greek Army was “undisciplined” and “unable to carry on a war”; an army of “cowards, constantly running away from the battlefield”.286 As foretold, the 1897 war was all but a farce. For King George I of the Hellenes, before the hostilities began, had ventured in Vienna the outcome and aftermath: Greece would be militarily defeated but diplomatically triumphant. And so it was: Crete was declared an autonomous statehood, dynastically associated with Greece. Yet Crown Prince Constantine had no feelings of triumph. Regardless of his father’s surreptitious arrangements, he considered himself to be responsible for the defeat and, accordingly undertook to reorganize the Greek Army from top to bottom.

*** Constantine was born on July 21, 1868. He was educated within the Royal Palace. He had a good knowledge of History, both Greek and European, and Geography. Moreover, he was fluent in English, German, French - and Classical Greek as well. He had received a

Édouard Driault and Michel Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours, vol. III (Paris : Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1925), p. 129. 285 The relevant documents were published by the Foreign Ministry of Greece. (Hypourgeion Exōterikōn, Diplōmatika engrapha aphorōnta eis to methoriakon zētēma [= Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Documents concerning the Border Question], Athens, S. K. Vlastos, 1882. 286 N. Zormpas, Apomnēmoneumata, p. 143. 284

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tough military training and joined the Army as a sub-lieutenant. Soldiering soon proved to be his passion.287 He furthered his studies at the universities of Leipzig and Heidelberg, Germany, where he followed courses in History, Law, and Archaeology. He attended the German War Academy and served as an officer of the 2nd Regiment of the Imperial Guard. In 1889, he married Sophia, sister of the Emperor of Germany Wilhelm II.288 In 1890 Sophia adopted the Greek Orthodox faith; as a result, thanks also to her mild character and organizing talents, she became popular in Greece. The couple had six children and led a happy life. Still, the 1897 debacle was a severe blow to Constantine’s prestige and selfesteem. He asked, therefore, the advice of Kaiser Wilhelm II, his brother-in-law; and the latter agreed to have talented, young Greek officers educated in Germany.289 One of them was I. Metaxas, Constantine’s ardent follower during the First World War.

VI Meantime, a new foe was emerging for Greece, namely Bulgaria. In 1870, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was given the right by the Porte to secede from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. The Bulgarians, still under Ottoman rule, wanted their very own ‘national’ Church to be established, on the grounds that the Ecumenical See in Constantinople was run by Greeks. A precedent did exist: in 1833,290 the Church of the Kingdom of Greece had declared itself to be autocephalous,291 i.e. independent of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Since the Greek Orthodox Church had split into two in the first half of the nineteenth century, why were the Bulgarians still required to submit to the spiritual jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople?292 The Porte agreed to the splitting away but the Ecumenical Patriarchate did not; and the latter, furthermore, proved to be prompt to react. For when the Bulgarians’ ecclesiastical independence was officially celebrated in May, 1872, a Synod293 summoned by the Patriarch Anthimus VI judged the Bulgarian Church “schismatic”, and condemned it.294 287 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados, 1828-1964, vol. II (Athens : Papyros, 1966), p.183ff. passim; Th. Vellianitēs, entry “Kōnstantinos, Vasileus tōn Hellēnōn” (= Constantine, King of the Hellenes) in Megalē Hellēnikē Enkyklopaideia, vol. XV (Athens: Pyrsos, 1931), pp. 577-579. 288 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, II, p. 196ff. 289 I. Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio vol. I. Edited by Chr. Christidēs (Athens: Govostēs [no date given]), p. 377 (year 1898), p. 461ff. 290 The independence, nonetheless, of the Church of the Kingdom of Greece was not recognized by the Patriarchate of Constantinople until 1850. 291 Autocephalous= Self Headed (
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Truth to tell, the Exarchate,295 as the Bulgarian independent Church used to be called, enjoyed less self-rule than the Greek Autocephalous one. Yet the issue had a pronounced political bent; for according to the 1870 arrangement made by the Porte, provinces where two thirds of the Christian Orthodox population formally wished to join the Exarchate, could go over to the latter’s spiritual jurisdiction. As far as Bulgaria proper was concerned, no problem existed seeing that it was natural for her people to want to shake off the spiritual yoke of the Greeks. The nub now was Macedonia, i.e. the very heartland of Ottoman dominions in Europe. An exhaustive study of the Macedonian Issue would be beyond the scope of this book. Still attention should be paid to the fact that the church feud spilt over rapidly into a political and national one. For those inclining toward the Exarchate were considered to be Bulgarians; whilst those who opted for the Patriarch of Constantinople were regarded as being Greeks.296 Both Exarchists and Patriarchists, nonetheless, were of Macedonia the autochthonous people; and this people, namely the Slav-Macedonians, spoke a tongue little different from Bulgarian. There is no doubt that Slavs had overrun Macedonia during the early Middle Ages.297 Yet these “Southern Slavs” were granted statehood by the Bulgarians298; hence Bulgari, qui Sclavi appelantur, viz. the “Bulgarian Slavs”299 were to be a commonplace in Macedonia’s History not only in the Middle Ages but in Modern Times as well. For “Bulgarian”300 was now the common ‘currency’ of Macedonian Slavs.301 It is with just reason that the foundation of the Exarchist Church is regarded as the spiritual and cultural emancipation of the Bulgarians. 302 Still the struggle was to continue at the political level; and the apple of discord of course was Macedonia. For, as aforementioned, if the autochthonous Slav populations declared Exarchate
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themselves to be Exarchists, Macedonia would be annexed to Bulgaria some day. But in the late 1890s the so-called “Exarchist movement” in Macedonia split in two, namely the pro-Bulgarian Verhovists and the Centralists. The latter uttered the slogan “Macedonia for the Macedonians”, whilst the former proclaimed “Two nations [Macedonians and Bulgarians, but] one People”.303 Be that as it may, on July 20, 1903, an uprising against Ottoman rule -organized by the Centralists- broke out in Macedonia,304 but it failed; and terrible were the reprisals of the Sublime Porte.305 Since, furthermore, a pronounced social character was given to the Centralist movement (landless peasantry against propertied people), Greece had to counter this; for, as a rule, wealthy people were either Moslems or Greekspeaking. Had the Slavic-speaking peasants, thanks to the Centralists’ organization and guidance, gained the upper hand, Macedonia would have been lost to Greece. Such a loss was not a point to be sanctioned in the late nineteenth century. The Greek political leadership wavered with regard to Greece’s future enlargement. Should the Kingdom expand northward into Epirus wherein compact Greek populations lived? Or eastward into Macedonia? The true interest of Greece, however, as regards the “Macedonian Affairs” became evident only in the 1890s306. And this ‘oscillation’ was to assume a violent character in the second decade of the twentieth century; for it was to culminate in the 1916-1917 National Divide of the Greeks. Whatever the facts of the matter, in the early 1900s Greek leadership was unanimous in stating that Macedonia was the overriding national priority: proselytism of the Macedonian peasantry to the Exarchist Church must be halted. True, such a proselytism was fuelled by the work of the “Bulgarian”, i.e. Exarchist armed bands. As a result, gangs of Patriarchist irregulars –staffed nonetheless by officers and NCOs of the Greek Army- were dispatched to and throughout Macedonia in order to fight Exarchists (whether Verhovists or Centralists).307 Greek gangs enjoyed the silent quasi-toleration of the Ottoman authorities, and fought effectively against the “Bulgarians”. A bloody imbroglio ensued brought to an end only by the 1908 Young Turkish revolt. The point, nonetheless, is that for the first time Greek Army officers were taking part in real – and furthermore irregular warfare, with more or less effective results.

K. Misirkov, On Macedonian Matters, pp. xv-xx. The Ilinden Uprising. 305 Albert Londres, Comitadjis ou le terrorisme dans les Balkans. Translated into Greek by Dēmētrēs Michalopoulos (Athens: Petsivas, 2008), pp.28-30. 306 Spyros Brekēs, Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados. Dekatos enatos aiōnas (= A History of Modern Greece [Nineteenth Century]), Athens, 20014, p. 293ff. passim.(mainly p. 348). 307 See mainly Geōrgios Tsontos-Vardas, Ho Makedonikos Agōn (= The Macedonian Struggle). Edited by Giōrgos Petsivas, vols. I-III, Athens: Petsivas, 2003; Iōannēs Karavitēs, Ho Makedonikos Agōn. Apomnēmoneumata (= The Macedonian Struggle. Memoirs). Edited by Giōrgos Petsivas, vols I-II, Athens: Petsivas, 1994 303 304

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VII In late December 1909, Venizelos had got to Athens and met the leadership of the Military League. He was invited only to “give advice”; nevertheless he already felt strong enough to dictate the main points of his policy. The first goal to be achieved was that the King’s interference in foreign policy be halted. If the Sovereign did not consent, he would be dethroned and replaced by a “young member” of his family. The succeeding King should be supervised by a “committee” of experienced statesmen”- if the “wrong” steps that King George I had taken were to be avoided in the future.308 King George’s “wrong steps” were his contacts with the Austrian Emperor. And such a friendship made a serious impact on domestic policy as well. In point of fact, no sooner had Venizelos reached Athens than he pointed out again the top priority of Greece, viz. Macedonia. Crete, accordingly, was to be brushed aside for the moment.309 It was clear, in other words, that a war against the Porte was already in sight. But who was to undertake the re-organization of the Greek Army? It was a crucial matter dealing not only with warfare but with foreign policy as well. Colonel N. Zormpas, nominal head of the Military League, preferred a French military mission. Yet the point was that there had been such a mission in Greece during the years 1884-1887.310 The results of its work had been all but deplorable. The 1897 GrecoTurkish war stood as proof. As a result, Crown Prince Constantine wished German officers to come to Greece to instruct and train their Greek colleagues. King George agreed and talked accordingly to the Kaiser Wilhelm II.311 Still, Zormpas was steadfast in his opinion; for if German officers were invited into Greece, Constantine’s prestige would be restored and enhanced. He, therefore, took advantage of Constantine having fled abroad after the Goudi coup and, without informing the King, he carried the discussions with the French through to a successful conclusion.312 On the other hand, upon his arrival in Greece Venizelos had reached a decision: Either the French or the Italians were to organize the Greek Army, and either the Americans or the British the Greek Navy.313 In any case, neither German nor Austrian officers were to be permitted to come to Greece. But in order to have Greece’s Armed Forces trained by oversight of the Entente Powers, he needed to get a handle on Greek politics. It was the King who paved the way. Little wonder at that, since the British minister at Athens, Sir Francis Elliot, was manipulating N. Zormpas, Apomnēmoneumata..., pp. 84-85; cf. P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung, p. 131. 309 I. Ēliakēs, Ho Venizelos kai hē politikē, p. 59. 310 EVP, Ι/30/18 : Emoluments of the first French Military Mission in Greece. 311 Ν. Zormpas, Apomnēmoneumata., p. 139. 312 Ibid., pp. 139-140. 313 I. Metaxas, To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio, II, p. 32 (entry of October 22, 1910). 308

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George I for Venizelos’ sake.314 Sir Francis had by then more power in Athens than the Greek Prime Minister himself.315 The King, therefore, was afraid of losing his throne following a general unrest, if Venizelos turned the Military League against him and the British discontinued the protection of his House.316 In short, both the Crown and the League were coerced into bending to Venizelos’ personality and programme.

*** Since the King was prompted to grant Venizelos the leadership of Greek politics, a sense of urgency prevailed. At the outset, the League was persuaded by Venizelos himself that a radical amendment -in a most liberal way- to the current Greek Constitution (in force since1864) should be its crowning achievement.317 The corollary was that not just a “conventional Parliament” should be summoned but a Revisionist one instead (with twice the number of deputies)318. Such a Parliament, nonetheless, would be only a Revisionist one, a Boule, and by no means a Constituent Assembly. In other words, the abolition of the kingship would be out of the question;319 George I was assured of his throne; and the way back to “normality” was paved by the selfdissolution of the Military League in mid-March 1910.320 Such a gracious act should be reciprocated by the King. And so it was. On August 8, 1910, a general election took place throughout Greece. Venizelos was entered as an independent candidate and absentee; yet he gained a seat in the Revisionist Parliament. The “Old Political Parties”, nonetheless, i.e. the ones that were the adversaries of the Military League and of himself, won the day.321 Thus it was that Kōnstantinos Esslin322 was elected, on September 27, President (= Speaker) of the Parliament. Esslin thought that the root problem of Greece was the “liberal spirit running through the 1864 constitution”.323 He distrusted, therefore, Venizelos and, of course, was opposed to the radical changes scheduled by him and his obsequious military followers. In doing so, he signed his own death Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados, III, pp. 86, 110. According to the chargé d’affaires of Austro-Hungary at Athens. (P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung, p. 230.) 316 I. Ēliakēs, Ho Venizelos kai hē politikē, p. 84; Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Venizelos’ Advent in Greek Politics, 1909-1912”, p.93; P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung, p. 127. 317 Andrew Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos, pp. 35-36. 318 Ibid., p. 36. 319 Ibid. 320 Kairoi , March 18, 1910, p. 3. 321 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados, III, p. 106. 322 Of Bavarian stock. His German name was Konstantin von Hoesslin 323 N. Zormpas, Apomnēmoneumata…, p. 66 (note 45). As for the Constitution of 1864 see mainly Ch. Seignobos, Histoire politique de l’Europe contemporaine. Évolution des partis et des formes politiques, 1844-1896 (Paris : Armand Colin, 1903), p. 624 : La constitution de 1864 établit la liberté de la presse et abolit le Sénat. Tout le pouvoir parlementaire fut concentré dans la Boulé [= Parlement] élue au suffrage universel, portée à 192 membres et quatre ans de durée. 314 315

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warrant. For Venizelos never forgave him: Esslin was to die in jail in January 1920.324 Be that as it may, a political deadlock had been reached – and the King’s personal intervention then was more necessary than ever. George I had been taught his lesson – and acted accordingly. In line with the Greek political practices –especially with the Dedēlōmenē principle, in force since 1875325- he was required to entrust the leader of the strongest party with the premiership. Still, the Sovereign, on the grounds that no “group” in the Parliament had achieved a clear majority,326 opened talks with every available political leader in the country, and quite unexpectedly stated, on October 2, that the only politician fit to be charged with the formation of a government was Venizelos.327 It was actually represented to him that Venizelos was “the one person in Greece capable of forming a cabinet without fomenting a civil war”.328 It was clear, however, that the Sovereign only pretended to be convinced by such arguments.329 Yet he could not do otherwise: he was browbeaten into trusting Venizelos “to the bitter end”.330 But Venizelos was not yet the leader of a political party, and it was more than questionable whether he was qualified to be the Prime Minister of Greece. In point of fact, when elected to the Revisionist Parliament he was still in office in Crete, viz. Ottoman territory. His being summoned to Athens by the Military League had led to his popularity in Crete reaching “its modest peak”.331 For he had gained a small and unstable majority in the Cretan Assembly332 and, subsequently, became, on May 4, 1910, the Chairman of the Executive Committee, i.e. the quasi-Prime Minister of Crete.333 This office had hitherto been held by Manousos Koundouros, his chief antagonist.334 Of course Venizelos, after he had informed of his election in Greece, rushed to Canea, on August 30, to resign; and with Theodōros Vellianitēs, entry “Kōnstantinos Eslin” in Megalē Hellēnikē Enkyklopaideia (= The Great Greek Encyclopaedia), vol. XI (Athens: Pyrsos, 1929), p. 637. 325 Alexandros Svōlos, Hē syntagmatikē Historia tēs Hellados. Ta hellēnika syntagmata, 1822-1955 (= The Constitutional History of Greece. The Constitutions of Greece, 1822-1955), Athens: Stochastēs, 1972, pp. 43-44. 326 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 108. 327 Ibid. 328 Memoirs of … Prince Christopher of Greece, p. 113. 329 I. Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio, II, pp. 30-31 (entry of October 21, 1910); cf. Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados, III, p. 110. 330 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 114. 331 A. Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos, p. 39. 332 Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Venizelos’ Advent in Greek Politics, 1909-1912”, p. 95. 333 Ibid.; Lilē Makrakē, Eleutherios Venizelos…, p. 441; S. I. Stephanou (ed.), Eleutheriou Venizelou ta Keimena (= Eleutherios Venizelos’ Texts), vol. I (Athens, 1981), p. 170. 334 Manousos Koundouros, Historikai kai diplōmatikai apokalypseis. Historika gegonota, 1890-1923. (= Historical and Diplomatic Disclosures. Historical Events). Edited by Charikleia G. Dēmakopoulou and Eleutherios Skiadas (Athens: ELIA, 19972)), pp. 198-199. 324

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exceeding dexterity, he avoided the danger of making statements on his further political views. Upon boarding a ship back to Greece, he talked excitedly, and accordingly cried his eyes out.335 It was obvious that he had adopted a strategy of complete –yet tearful- silence. Still how might he be regarded as a subject of the King of the Hellenes, since he was involved so deeply in Cretan politics? For involvement in Cretan politics implied Ottoman citizenship. It is noteworthy that five other Cretans, i.e. Sultan’s subjects, namely M. Koundouros, Antōnios Michelidakēs, Geōrgios Papamastorakēs, Antōnios Katzourakēs and Charalampos Pōlogiōrgēs, had put themselves up for candidacy in Greek constituencies; and were elected as well to the Revisionist Parliament.336 The latter, nonetheless, had their election invalidated.337 Such an annulment was presented to Venizelos as it were on a plate; because almost all of them were his political antagonists in Crete.338 On the other hand, the Body stood by the legality of Venizelos’ election in absentia.339 Thus, it was a complex situation that emerged. Paradoxical as it may appear, the Ottoman Porte was not disposed to raise objections at the election of Cretans in the Parliament of Greece. Nonetheless, given that the Porte considered “Cretan” citizenship to be identical with Ottoman citizenship,340 only two –wholly logical- conditions were laid down: Cretans elected to Greek constituencies had to break off all political ties with their native island and never go back to it.341 Venizelos fulfilled both conditions promptly. As a result, his premiership was regarded by the Porte as a “domestic affair of Greece”;342 hence there was no room for Ottoman interference especially in it.343 Had not the Parliament, on the other hand, annulled the election of the five, a diplomatic incident would likely have been produced and, as a result, the election of all six Cretans (including Venizelos) would have been cancelled. Effectively, it was the leaders of the “Old Political Parties”, namely G. Theotokēs and Dēmētrios Rallēs, who had pushed Venizelos’ foes in Crete to submit their candidacy to Greek constituencies in 1910. They hoped that international complications Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados, III, p. 107. S. Kuneralp, The Final Stage of the Cretan Question…, doc. 830: Halil Bey to Rifaat Pasha, Athens, August 6, p. 429. 337 Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Venizelos’ Advent in Greek Politics, 1909-1912”, p. 97. 338 S. Kuneralp, The Final Stage of the Cretan Question…, doc. 830: Halil Bey to Rifaat Pasha, Athens, August 6, p. 430. 339 Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Venizelos’ Advent in Greek Politics…”, p. 97. 340 S. Kuneralp, The Final Stage of the Cretan Question…, doc. 979: Rifaat Pasha to Halil Bey, Constantinople, June 14, 1911, p. 499. 341 Ibid., doc. 430 : Rifaat Pasha to the Ottoman Embassies in Paris, London, Saint Petersburg, Rome, Vienna and Berlin, Constantinople, March 15, p. 477. 342 In all probability, the Porte’s attitude with regard to Venizelos’ Greek premiership was dictated by the Protective Powers of Crete, i.e. the Entente Powers. (P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung, p. 167.) 343 S. Kuneralp, The Final Stage of the Cretan Question…, doc. 851: Rifaat Pasha to the Ottoman Imperial Embassies, Constantinople, October 19, 1911, p. 442. 335 336

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would arise because of their Ottoman nationality and so Venizelos’ rush for power would be halted.344 Strangely enough, it was the contrary that was occurred: though Theotokēs and Rallēs controlled the Parliament, the election of Venizelos was validated, whilst those of the five other “Cretans” were annulled. Was Venizelos a Greek citizen in 1910? True, his father was; and thanks to the Greek law No. 391 of 1856345 the son of a Greek citizen was considered to be a Greek citizen, too. Nonetheless, every Greek citizen had to register with his home Town Council, actually reside there and only after two years346 had passed without the committing of criminal act, could he take the oath of “the Greek Citizenship” before the relevant administrative authority (the prefect as a rule).347 Venizelos was born to a Greek citizen, but he had not been registered with a town council in Greece. As a result, the Ottoman authorities in Crete did not regard him as Greek – and they were right. Had he not been backed overtly by the King and covertly by the British, he would not have been elected a member of the Greek Parliament and become the Greek Prime Minister.

VIII Venizelos was sworn into office on October 6, 1910, and on the same day he appointed his cabinet. He further took a wise step, when he earmarked the Army and Navy ministries for himself. For in that way was he able to keep under control the leadership of the Military League and its radical-minded members as well. The King, on the other hand, managed to have the portfolio of Foreign Affairs given to Iōannēs Gryparēs, a career diplomat.348 The Sovereign trusted Gryparēs, and hoped that that diplomat would frustrate any Venizelos’ attempt at wholly encroaching on foreign policy. Venizelos reciprocated by appointing Emmanouēl Repoulēs as Minister of Internal Affairs. The latter was a publicist of Albanian descent, associated with the influential daily paper Hestia; he was ruthless by nature, “fluent in all languages except foreign ones” and blindly devoted to Venizelos.349 Whenever Venizelos was in power, Repoulēs ruled Greece’s domestic affairs with a rod of iron up to his death in 1924. Lampros Koromēlas’ nomination to the ministry of Finance was Ibid., doc. 830: Halil Bey to Rifaat Pasha, Athens, August 6, p. 430. Art. 14. (Ephēmeris tēs Kyvernēseōs tou Vasileiou tēs Hellados, I, No. 75 [November 15, 1856], p. 400.) 346 For Greeks who had foreign citizenship – as Venizelos had. 347 Art. 15. (Ephēmeris tēs Kyvernēseōs tou Vasileiou tēs Hellados, I, No. 75 [November 15, 1856], p. 400.) The observance of this formality was compulsory. (AYE, 1898, A/11/1, Athōs Rōmanos, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, to G. A. Argyropoulos, Greek minister at Bucharest, No. 11831, Athens, December 7, 1899.) 348 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 111. 349 P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung, p. 173; Demetra Vaka, In the Heart of German Intrigue (Boston-New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1918), p. 273. 344 345

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due to his American connections. He had been the Greek minister at Washington, D. C., since 1908 and had strong ties with rich Americans of Greek origin.350 In 1911 he was to marry Anna Ewing Cockrell, a member of a powerful Missouri family,351 and in 1912 he was appointed by Venizelos Minister of Foreign Affairs. An avowed enemy of the Slavic peoples, he was to play a crucial role in the outbreak of the Second Balkan War. It was the Minister of Justice, Nikolaos Dēmētrakopoulos, who was the only one among these ‘rising stars’ of Greek politics who did not depend upon Venizelos or the King or a foreign Power. He was justly regarded as a brilliant jurisconsult, and Venizelos urged him to reform the Greek law system.352 Yet he soon fell out with the Prime Minister - and was to pass away unexpectedly in 1921.353 On October 7, Venizelos delivered a speech to the Parliament – the first one in his capacity as Prime Minister. He declared that the work of Greece’s reconstruction on which he was going to embark “could not take place from one day to the next”; for the fulfillment of such a task would require a long period of domestic and international tranquility. As a result, Greece would be “an element of peace in the [Near] East”.354 It was an obvious attempt to veil his intentions. Few, if any, believed him. Thus the Parliament became unmanageable and, accordingly, Venizelos dissolved it on October 12.355 No objection was raised on the side of the King;356 for most likely Venizelos had been given carte blanche. The Sovereign, in other words, had agreed in advance to have the Parliament dissolved, if Venizelos so wished.357 The elections for a new Revisionist Parliament, the second to date, were held on November 28, 1910. Both G. Theotokēs and D. Rallēs suspected the compliance of the King with Venizelos, denounced the “chicanery” and refused, accordingly, to stand in the elections.358 In doing this they presented their enemy with an unassailable weapon. Theodōros Vellianitēs, entry “Lampros Koromēlas” in Megalē Hellēnikē Enkyklopaideia, vol. XIV (Athens: Pyrsos, 1930), p. 916. 351 F. R. Bridge, Austro-Hungarian Documents relating to the Macedonian Struggle (Salonika: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976), doc. 446, Athens, May 18, 1912 (No. 196), pp. 480-481; Percy F. Martin, Greece of the Twentieth Century (London-Leipzig: T. Fisher Unwin, 1913), p. 54. 352 Geōrgios Ventērēs, Hē Hellas tou 1910-1920, vol. I (Athens: Pyrsos, 1931), p. 77; cf. P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung, p. 173. 353Geōrgios D. Dēmakopoulos, “Tina peri tou N. P. Dēmētrakopoulou kai tou nomothetikou tou ergou” (= On the Life and Legislative Work of N. P. Dēmētrakopoulos), Anakoinōseis hēmeridos (17 Martiou 2008) gia tēn epeteio tou thanatou tou Eleutheriou Venizelou (= Proceedings of the Congress [March 17, 2008] on the Anniversary of Eleutherios Venizelos’ Death), Athens: Historical Institute for Studies on Eleutherios Venizelos and his Era, 2008, pp. 43-64. 354 S. I. Stephanou, Eleutheriou Venizelou ta Keimena, I, p. 189. 355 Ibid., p. 201. 356 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 114. 357 É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce…, IV, p. 50; A. Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos, p. 43. 358 A. Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos, p. 43. 350

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For now he had a solid political party at his disposal, namely the Liberal one, christened by the publicist Geōrgios Pōp,359 owner and editor of the paper Athēnai - “the only person [in Greece] entitled to interpret his [= Venizelos’] ideas”.360 Though “liberal”, the Venizelist party was a monolithic one. “It often denied freedom to its opponents and always to its adherents”as a prominent founding member of it stated.361 The term “party discipline” became, in fact, the slogan of Venizelos and his followers in the November elections.362 The Liberal Party’s local branches were soon being set up throughout Greece.363 And last but not least, Venizelos had not resigned from office: the elections were to take place with him controlling the state machinery.364 Under such conditions, the non-participation in the elections of Rallēs and Theotokēs, i.e. the leaders who were in a position to organize political groups effectively, doomed to failure any candidate who did not belong to Venizelos’ Liberals. Significantly enough, the Prime Minister’s first electoral speech was delivered in Larissa, Thessaly – a border city by then. Though he heralded urbi et orbi the peaceful purposes of his administration, he declared that the Greek Armed Forces were to be rapidly re-organized under the supervision of foreign experts.365 So it was done, after he had won the elections. He amended the current Constitution, by which foreigners had been forbidden to become either civil servants or Army or Naval officers in Greece,366 and stated that by means of “ad hoc laws” foreign specialists would be summoned to the aid of the country.367 What is more, he added an eighth ministry, that of Agriculture, Trade and Industry,368 the portfolio of which was given to Emmanouēl Benakēs, his sponsor.

***

E. Benakēs was a key-figure in Venizelos’ ascendancy. He had no business interests in Greece. Still, he was a fabulously wealthy S. I. Stephanou, Eleutheriou Venizelou ta Keimena, I, p. 203. Kuneralp, The final Stage of the Cretan Question…, doc. 879: Halil Bey to Rifaat Pasha, Athens, December 31, 1910, p. 453. 361 Kōnstantinos G. Zavitzianos, Hai anamnēseis tou ek tēs historikēs diafōnias Vasileōs Kōnstantinou kai Eleutheriou Venizelou opōs tēn ezēse, 1914-1922 (=Kōnstantinos Zavitzianos’ Memoirs from the Historical Disagreement between King Constantine and Eleutherios Venizelos as he witnessed it, 1914-1922), vol. I, Athens, 1946, p. 74. 362 Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Venizelos’ Advent in Greek Politics, 1909-1912”, p. 99. 363 S. I. Stephanou, Eleutheriou Venizelou ta Keimena, I, p. 225ff.; A. Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos, p. 43. 364 S. I. Stephanou, Eleutheriou Venizelou ta Keimena, I, p. 171. 365 Ibid., p. 208. 366 Art. 3 of the 1864 Constitution. 367S. I. Stephanou, Eleutheriou Venizelou ta Keimena, I, p. 276. 368 Renamed as the “Ministry of National Economy” in July 1911. (Christine Agriantoni, “Venizelos and Economic Policy”, in Paschalis Kitromilidis, Eleftherios Venizelos. The trials of Statesmanship… , p. 288. 359

360S.

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member of the Greek colony in Alexandria, Egypt, and had supported Venizelos financially even before he became Prime Minister.369 During the 1910s, moreover, Benakēs became the cardinal figure in Venizelos’ taking charge of Greece. For not only did he give, throughout the decade, generous financial support to the Venizelists, but his sumptuous house, in the centre of Athens, near Syntagma Square, was rapidly transformed into the focus of the alliance between merchants and Venizelos’ associates.370 Benakēs furthermore was intimate with the Kyrou family, the owners of the daily paper Hestia. This newspaper was regarded as the mouthpiece of the Royal Court;371 it had, moreover, played an important role in Venizelos’ rise to power in the early 1910s;372 and it was to play a key part in Greece’s National Divide set up in 1914373 - and in Venizelos’ fall from power as well in the early 1930s.374 E. Benakēs was a case in point of the “golden cockroaches”,375 that socially dominated the Greek colonies in countries under British rule. Those “golden cockroaches” felt ashamed of being associated with “such a miserable country” as Greece; as a result they had adopted a way of life modelled on those of the British and French.376 To cap it all, they were the main sponsors and promoters of the struggle against the Exarchists in Macedonia.377 As Benakē’s story in the World War One years was to prove, he was capable of being disliked even by his friends and relatives;378 albeit Venizelos proved to be an exception to the rule.379 His appointment to the newborn Ministry of Agriculture, Trade and Industry meant that the economic life of Greece was being subjugated to foreign control. In retrospect, Venizelos’ victory in the general elections of November 28, 1910, is rightly identified as the victory of Diaspora businessmen over Greece’s native Civil and Army bureaucracy.380 Venizelos’ supremacy was now unchallenged.381

A. Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos, p. 39. Ibid., p. 42. 371 S. Kuneralp, The final Stage of the Cretan Question…, doc. 879: Halil Bey to Rifaat Pasha, Athens, December 31, 1910, p. 453. 372 Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Venizelos’ Advent in Greek Politics, 1909-1912”, pp. 95-96. 373 Demetra Vaka, In the Heart of German Intrigue, pp. 77-80. 374 EVP, I/50/101: Achilleus Kyrou, manager of the newspaper Hestia, to Venizelos, Athens, December 10, 1930. 375 Chrysokantharoi in Greek. 376 Hē Penēlopē Delta kai ho kosmos tēs (= Penelope Delta and her World), Athens: Benaki Museum, 2006, pp. 12-13. 377 F. R. Bridge, Austro-Hungarian Documents relating to the Macedonian Struggle, doc. 17, Monastir, No. 5/pol., February 15, 1897, p. 55; doc. 24, Athen, No. 91B, December 23, 1897, p. 65. 378 EVP, Ι/31/4, letter of Zoē Stephanou-Dragoumē to Angelikē Phikiōrē, Alexandria April 14/27, 1911; Hē Penēlopē Delta kai ho kosmos tēs, p. 10. (Penelope Delta was the daughter of E. Benakēs.) 379 Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Venizelos’ Advent in Greek Politics…”, p. 100. 380 A. Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos, p. 44. 369 370

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IX The reform of the Constitution was completed on June 1, 1911;382 a remarkable output of legislative work was produced as well.383 Still both the constitutional amendment and legislative reforms largely benefited from steps taken by previous administrations.384 Some of Venizelos’ reforms, moreover, were never put into effect.385 However, the point is that he did not decide upon Greece’s crucial problems, namely her language and her rural issues. Kathareuousa, i.e. the artificially classicizing variety of Modern Greek, was to remain the official language up to the mid-1970s; whilst the land reform, required especially in Thessaly, was implemented no earlier than the early 1920s.386 His only actual reform was that applying to Paris and London for Army and Naval officers to be dispatched in order to reform the Greek Armed Forces. It was in January 1911, that the French mission arrived; it was under the command of General Joseph-Paul Eydoux. The British, who were to supervise the Navy, reached Athens later – in May of the same year; they were led by Rear-Admiral Lionel Grand Tufnell.387 Eydoux and his associates had not much to do; for the foundations of the Army re-organization had already been laid by Crown Prince Constantine – backed as he was by G. Theotokēs.388 The crux of the matter was the Navy: Tufnell was a “retired and undistinguished” officer.389 What was he supposed to do in Greece? As a matter of fact, the armoured cruiser “Geōrgios Averoff” had been purchased in Italy by the Greek government as early as 1909 and reached Greek waters in May, 1911.390 It was thanks to this man-ofwar that the Ottoman Fleet had been defeated in the Balkan War; yet Tufnell had not been involved in the purchase of the “Averoff”. What was he, therefore, supposed to do in Greece? The answer to such a question is simple: the French and British missions were summoned to Greece for political reasons and not for those of warfare.391 For Greece had to side with the Entente Powers, Britain, France, and Russia.392 As aforementioned, thanks to the amendment of art. 3 of the 1864 Constitution, French and British 381 Thanos Veremis and Helen Gardikas Katsiadakis, “ Protagonist in Politics, 19121920” in Paschalis Kitromilidis, Eleftherios Venizelos. The trials of Statesmanship… , p. 115. 382 S. I. Stephanou, Eleutheriou Venizelou ta Keimena, I, p. 276. 383 EVP, I/31/7-22: Venizelos’ notes on the reforms to be put into effect. 384 Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Venizelos’ Advent in Greek Politics…”, p. 104. 385 A. Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos, p. 45. 386 Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Venizelos’ Advent in Greek Politics…”, p. 107. 387 Zisis Fotakis, Greek Naval Strategy and Policy, 1910-1919 (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 28. 388 G. Ventērēs, Hē Hellas tou 1910-1920, I, p. 79. 389A. Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos, p. 45. 390 Commodore K. Païzēs-Paradelēs, Ta ploia tou Hellēnikou Polemikou Nautikou…, p. 1. 391 I. Metaxas, To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio, II, p. 32 (entry of October 22, 1910). 392 Ibid., p. 39 (entry of October 29, 1910).

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officers now had posts of responsibility in the apparatus of the Greek State393. Tufnell, first of all, was promoted to the rank of Vice-Admiral in command of the Naval Forces and Establishments of Greece394 in the beginning; and Inspector-General of the Greek Navy later.395 The French, on the other hand, had to wait a little longer, because Prince Constantine and his party, regardless of the Goudi coup and its aftermath, had always hold of the rank-and-file of the Army. As a result, French officers did not take actual command of Greek troops until the end of the Balkan Wars.396 Tufnell, fortunately, was mild-tempered; so Greek seamen liked him and tried to even emulate him. For they saw in Tufnell a typical officer of the prestigious [British] Royal Navy.397 Under such conditions, Tufnell’s major achievement was the disciplining of the Greek crews. Discipline, in fact, was somewhat lax among them after the 1909 Salamis battle.398 King George I, moreover, did not want the “Averoff”, by far the most important ship of the Greek Navy, to be commanded by Iōannēs Damianos, an officer associated with the Military League and considered to be inimical to his authority.399 Thus Tufnell took advantage of an accident suffered by the “G. Averoff” in June 1911 to have Damianos placed en disponibilité and replaced by Captain Sophocles Dousmanēs.400 By the same token, King George openly favoured Paulos Kountouriōtēs, another Captain of the Greek Navy whom the sovereign considered to be loyal to his Crown; and his favour was upheld when he recommended him to Venizelos as Chief of the General Staff of the Navy.401 Venizelos acquiesced, and Kountouriōtēs from then on was to play a key role in the Balkan War -and Greek politics as well.

*** In truth, the British had no illusions as to whether their aid in reorganizing the Greek Navy would contribute to a Greco-Turkish war in the future.402 Still, Russia’s willingness to help the Greek Navy to 393 Law No. 3775, Ephēmeris tēs Kyvernēseōs tou Vasileiou tēs Hellados, I, No. 101 (May 3rd, 1911), pp. 399-400. 394 Z. Fotakis, Greek Naval Strategy and Policy…, p. 29. 395 Admiral S. I. Dousmanēs, To hēmerologion tou kyvernētou tou “G. Averoff” kata tous polemous 1912-1913 (= The Diary of the Captain of the “G.Averoff” during the Wars of [the Years] 1912-1913), Athens: Pyrsos, 1940, p. 15. 396 Ephēmeris tēs Kyvernēseōs tou Vasileiou tēs Hellados, I, No. 186 (June 9, 1914), p. 986: Royal Decree regarding the Cavalry Officer Descoins. 397 Rear Admiral Epameinōndas P. Kavvadias, Ho Nautikos Polemos tou 1940 opōs ton ezēsa. Anamnēseis, 2 Martiou 1935-25 Martiou 1943 (= The Naval War of 1940 as I witnessed it. Memoirs, March 2, 1935-March 25, 1943), Athens: Pyrsos, 1950, pp. 19-20. 398 Z. Fotakis, Greek Naval Strategy and Policy…, p. 34. 399 Though he did not take part in the Goudi coup. (P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung, p. 106.) 400 Z. Fotakis, Greek Naval Strategy and Policy…, pp. 33-34. 401 EVP, I/32/5, King George I to Eleutherios Venizelos (letter), Corfu, April 8, 1912. 402 Z. Fotakis, Greek Naval Strategy and Policy…, p. 28.

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redress the balance of the Ottoman navy (if the British did not do so) worked in favour of Tufnell’s team coming to Greece.403 And last but not least, Greece was subsidized with French money in order to accomplish her re-armament.404 Of course Venizelos was aware of the political motives of the decision to summon French and British officers. As for the Navy, in late 1910 the Greek government was given clear warning by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov, not to rely for the Navy’s re-organization on expertise from Germany.405 Not surprisingly, since 1898-1901 Russia’s repeated attempts to persuade Germany to sign a secret agreement on spheres of influence in the Ottoman Empire, recognizing Russian ambitions in the Bosporus, were silently turned down by the Germans.406 Still Sazonov’s warning had no effect on the Army. Accordingly, Venizelos recalled Crown Prince Constantine and entrusted the Army to him and his Germantrained associates (such as I. Metaxas).407 He was dexterous enough to display this act as a vital step for the sake of Greek national unity.408 Be that as it may, it was Constantine’ and his military ‘wing’ that waged the Balkan War on the Ottomans.

*** The work of the Second Revisionist Parliament was over in December 1911, and accordingly general elections took place on March 11, 1912. The result was a fresh triumph for Venizelos: he was to dominate Greek politics unchallenged up to 1915.409 In the meantime, the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was put into effect. As foretold, Italy declared war on the Porte in 1911 and in 1912 Italian troops captured Rhodes, a major island of the Dodecanese group, hitherto under Turkish rule. Venizelos knew that war was imminent. A couple of weeks after the 1912 elections he met on Mt. Pelion, Thessaly, James D. Bourchier, the Balkan correspondent of the London Times. Bourchier was acting as an intermediary between the Sofia and Athens governments, for the attainment of a rapprochement. The Pelion talks were the last stage of Bourchier’s endeavours. In point of fact, the Greco-Bulgarian understanding had been canvassed since early 1910,410 and Venizelos had harped on about the benefits of this very entente long before he became Prime Minister of Greece. Bulgaria was regarded as the pivotal Power in the Ibid., p. 27. Ibid. ; Michel Garin, Les Grecs de Paris pendant la Première Guerre mondiale (Istanbul : The Isis Press, 2010), pp. 8-9. 405 Z. Fotakis, Greek Naval Strategy and Policy…, p. 27. 406 Christopher Andrew and Oleg Cordievsky, KGB. The Inside Story (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), p. 29 407 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, pp. 132-133. 408S. I. Stephanou , Eleutheriou Venizelou ta Keimena, I, p. 283ff. 409 Ibid., p. 337. 410 Th. Veremis and Helen Gardikas Katsiadakis, “ Protagonist in Politics, 19121920”, p. 143. 403 404

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Balkan alliance against the Porte; but due to the 1904-1908 bloody antagonism in Macedonia, the former was not prompt to conclude an alliance with Greece. Still, a Greco-Bulgarian formal alliance was concluded on May 16, 1912; any commitment on how the spoils of a successful outcome of a future war would be shared was avoided therein.411 This alliance was heralded as the “first diplomatic triumph” of Venizelos.412 In fact, it was the product of semi-official British pressure on the Bulgarian government. Whatever the facts of the matter, the war was now ante portas.

The text of the Alliance: Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn. Genikon Epiteleion Stratou. Polemikē Ekthesis (= Ministry of War. General Staff of the Army. Account of the War), Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous tou 1912-1913 (= The Greek Army in the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars), vol. I. Annex (Athens: National Printing House, 1932), doc. 2, pp. 3-4. 412 Steph. I. Stephanou, Eleutherios Vénselos…, pp. 53-55. 411

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CHAPTER THREE The Balkan Wars An indirect consequence of the 1912 elections was that the Christians of Crete considered that the time was ripe for the union413 of their island with Greece. As aforementioned, they saw in Venizelos a supporter of Ottoman rule over Crete. Now they discovered in him an all-powerful Prime Minister of Greece. They knew him to be the irreconcilable foe of Prince George and, further, of the Greek Royal House. They now saw King George I backing Venizelos’ “chicaneries”. Of course they were not able to grasp the enormity of the diplomatic manoeuvres that produced Venizelos’ seizing the reins of Greek politics. They perceived, nonetheless, that the socio-political climber, who claimed Cretan ancestry, was now the strongman of Greece. If so, why should the formal accomplishment of enosis be delayed? After all, Venizelos, before he left Crete for good, proclaimed the island to be nothing more than an “annex of Greece”.414 Shortly after the general elections of March 11, 1912, therefore, the Cretan Assembly required of Iōannēs Tsirimōkos, the new Speaker of the Greek Parliament, that Christian Cretans -elected according to “Cretan custom”- be accepted as regular members of the Chamber of Deputies.415 Venizelos refused point-blank.416 He argued that the Cretan deputies’ taking part in the working of the Greek Parliament would be a rebellion against the “established order”, both international and domestic; and explained accordingly that such an act would be met violently, viz. “by guns”417. In retrospect, such an attitude is justified by Venizelos’ alleged fear of diplomatic complications; for the Porte was said to be ready to declare war on Greece if this occurred. But this is not true. Of course the Ottoman Government did not wish the Cretan deputies to be recognized as members of the Greek Parliament.418 Still the possibility of war was far off; for nothing in the Ottoman documents has revealed, so far, the Porte rushing to a foreseeable and catastrophic combat. It is clear, on the other hand, that Britain was against the formal accomplishment of Cretan annexation by Greece.419 This is Enosis in Greek. Vasileion tēs Hellados. Parartēma tēs Ephēmeridos tēs Kyvernēseōs en Krētē (= Kingdom of Greece. Cretan Annex of the Official Gazette), I, No. 30 (May 31, 1910), pp. 121-127. 415 Sinan Kuneralp [ed.], Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of World War One. The Final Stage of the Cretan Question, 1899-1913 [Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2009], doc. 1140: Ghalib Kemaly Bey, Ottoman chargé d’affaires at Athens, to Assim Bey, Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 16, 1912, p. 575; doc. 1146: the same to the same, Athens, March 23, 1912, p. 578. 416 Ephēmeris tōn Syzētēseōn tēs Voulēs (= Official Hansard of the Greek Parliament), sitting of May 19, 1912, p. 6. 417 Ibid. 418S. Kuneralp, The Final Stage of the Cretan Question…, doc. 1148: Mavroyeni Bey, Ottoman Ambassador in Vienna, to Assim Bey, Vienna, March 26, 1912, p. 579. 419 Daily paper Kairoi (= Times [Athens]), January 24, 1912, p. 3. 413 414

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why British men-of-war blockaded the island and arrested several deputies trying to reach Athens.420 By the same token, Venizelos did not want his ‘fellow-patriots’ in the Greek Parliament. They were sixty nine,421 “too many” in his mind, and chiefly “manipulated” by Antōnios Michelidakēs, one of his political opponents in Crete;422 they could, therefore, wipe out the Venizelists’ parliamentary majority. (For the Liberals, viz. the Venizelists had won, in the 1912 elections, 150 seats out of the Greek Parliament’s 181.423) That was why on May 19, when the Cretan deputies, who had managed to arrive in Athens, tried to enter the Parliament on Stadiou Street,424 Venizelos drew up the whole garrison of the capital, i.e. 2,000 troops “with fixed bayonets”.425 The result was that a string of skirmishes broke out in downtown Athens. Cavalry units charged the Cretan deputies. The populace supported the latter; and the Athens Gendarmerie threatened to “decapitate” anyone trying to interfere with the working of Parliament “without the right to do so” and so on.426 It was Venizelos who put an end to these colourful scenes. Realizing that such a confrontations were hazardous to him and his Liberal party, he declared that he could not make stand in such a delicate matter. Upon the advice, therefore, of Nikolaos Dēmētrakopoulos, his minister of Justice, he suggested that the opening of the Legislature should be postponed until October, 1912. So it was; and the episode was over.427 Venizelos, nonetheless, grasped the opportunity to get rid of his Justice minister. He accused him, by means of the pro-government newspapers, of having given advice contrary to the Greek Constitution.428 Bewilderedly Dēmētrakopoulos saw no option but to resign, as he saw the Prime Minister adopting his idea yet, almost simultaneously, accusing him of not being in conformity with the Constitution.429 He was immediately Daily paper Patris (= Fatherland [Athens]), April 16, p. 5. S. Kuneralp, The final Stage of the Cretan Question…, doc. 1148: Ghalib Kemaly Bey to Assim Bey, Athens, March 23, 1912, p. 578. 422 Patris, February 8, 1912, p. 5; with regard to A. Michelidakēs, eloquent is Venizelos’ letter to a friend of his, dated on June 4, 1907 (AEV, I/27/2). 423 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados, 1828-1964 (= Political History of Modern Greece, 1828-1964), vol. III (Athens: Papyros, 1966), p. 140. 424 Today the Museum of the Historical and Ethnological Society of Greece. 425 S. Kuneralp, The final Stage of the Cretan Question…, doc. 1155: Moukhtar Bey, Ottoman minister at Athens, to Assim Bey, Athens, June 1, 1912, p. 582. 426 Patris, May 18, p. 5 and May 19, p. 1; Kairoi, May 19, pp. 1, 3. 427 Ephēmeris tōn Syzētēseōn tēs Voulēs, sitting of May 19, 1912, p. 6; Patris, May 20, p. 4. 428 Patris, May 19, 1912, p. 1; Kairoi, May 19, pp. 1, 3. 429 EVP, Ι/32/9, Venizelos to Dēmētrakopoulos (letter), Athens, May 18, 1912; Geōrgios D. Dēmakopoulos, “Tina peri tou N. P. Dēmētrakopoulou kai tou nomothetikou tou ergou” (= On the Life and Legislative Work of N. P. Dēmētrakopoulos), Anakoinōseis hēmeridos (17 Martiou 2008) gia tēn epeteio tou thanatou tou Eleutheriou Venizelou (= Proceedings of the Congress [March 17, 2008] on the anniversary of Eleutherios Venizelos’ Death), Athens: Historical Institute for Studies on Eleutherios Venizelos and his Era, 2008, p. 58; Geōrgios Ventērēs, Hē Hellas tou 1910-1920 (Greece of [the years] 1910-1920), vol. I (Athens: Pyrsos, 1931), p. 95. 420 421

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replaced by Kōnstantinos Raktivan. The latter was born in Manchester to Demetrius Ractivand, a wealthy merchant of Greek origin,430 and he had strong ties with the opulent Greek merchants abroad. After the Balkan Wars, he was to emerge as an expert in Macedonia’s colonization and administration by Greece.

*** Not only was Venizelos now the strongman of Greece but moreover her parliamentary dictator. The functioning of Parliament was discontinued; the King was docile and Dēmētrakopoulos ousted. There was only one more step to be taken: to have an individual of his choice as head of the Navy. In fact, the Crown Prince was appointed Inspector-General of the Greek Army, i.e. Generalissimo. The Greek troops, nonetheless, were discredited because of the 1897 débâcle. Unlike the Army, the Greek Navy enjoyed a great deal of prestige. But who was to command the Greek men-of-war against those of the Ottoman Porte? The quasi ‘natural’ head of the Greek Navy was Prince George, who had ruled Crete in his capacity as the Powers’ High Commissioner. He was an excellent seaman, a rear-admiral, and before being appointed to Crete he had laid the foundations of a successful re-organization of the Greek Navy. But Venizelos vetoed his appointment, because he had feuded bitterly with Prince George in Crete. Thus the choice fell upon Captain Paulos Kountouriōtēs, the Chief of the Navy’s General Staff.431 He was to be the Head of the Greek Fleet in the coming war – his flagship being the “Averoff”. The King did not object; for he considered Kountouriōtēs to be loyal to the Royal House. Thinking so and acting accordingly, George I was mistaken; but it was Constantine, his son and successor, who paid dearly for Kountouriōtēs’ rise.

I It was the Russians that in February, 1912 fomented the Macedonia problem: As for the European part of the Ottoman Empire, what lessons were the Great Powers to draw from the Italo-Turkish war?432 Undoubtedly there was ‘something’ going on in the Balkans. And this ‘something’ came into being merely a couple of weeks after the “Macedonian issue” had been stirred up by the government of St. Petersburg. For on February 29th the Bulgaro-Serbian Alliance Treaty

[Anonymous] entry “Raktivan, Kōnstantinos” in Megalē Hellēnikē Enkyklopaideia (= The Great Greek Encyclopedia), vol. XXI (Athens: Pyrsos, 1933), p. 38. 431 Admiral S. I. Dousmanēs, To hēmerologion tou kyvernētou tou “G. Averoff” kata tous polemous 1912-1913 (= The Diary of the Captain of the “G.Averoff” during the Wars of [the Years] 1912-1913), Athens: Pyrsos, 1940, p. 33. 432 Édouard Driault and Michel Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours, tome V (Paris : Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1926), pp. 68-69. 430

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was signed.433 It was a bilateral act, thanks to which the partition of Macedonia between the two Slavic nations of the Balkans was assured. Given, nevertheless, that Macedonia was already the inchoate apple of discord between them, the Emperor of Russia, Nicholas II, was proclaimed, in a secret protocol annexed to the Treaty, arbiter summus.434 It was clear, therefore, that Slavs, headed by the Russian Tsar, were to overrun Macedonia and reach the Mediterranean seashore.435 Therefore, the British (namely James Bourchier) obliged the Bulgarians to accept Greece, too, in the Alliance. The Sofia government agreed halfheartedly: not only was the Greek Army discredited (unlike that of Bulgaria) but, as aforementioned, memories of the 1904-1908 conflict between Patriarchists and Exarchists were still alive. There was only one trump card in favour of Greece: her fleet – and chiefly the Italian-built, armoured cruiser “G. Averoff”. For, in the framework of the Ottoman mobilization plan, the garrisons in Europe (in Macedonia, Epirus and Albania) were to be reinforced by troops from Asia Minor; and transport ships were supposed to carry these troops.436 It was a “perfect plan”437 but only on paper:438 the rule of the Ottoman men-ofwar on the Aegean Sea was presupposed for such a plan to be put into effect. If, on the other hand, the Greek Navy interrupted the Ottoman sea communications, a major step towards the Christian Allies’ victory would be taken. Not only was Bulgaria the pivotal nation in the Balkan Alliance (or League, as it was termed in retrospect) vis-à-vis the Porte but she was now emerging as the Great peripheral Power. Her population had been constantly increasing during the last decades of the nineteenth century – and her prosperity alike.439 She had concluded bilateral alliance treaties with Serbia and with Greece – plus an “oral” one with Montenegro.440 A formal joint Treaty of the four Christian Balkan nations was never concluded; for it was needless: so huge was the prestige of the Bulgarian Army, thanks to its victory in Slivnitsa over the Serbs in 1885. As aforesaid, the Greek Army was discredited, the Serbian army also (on account of the Slivnitsa battle) – and Montenegro’s army was simply too small. The corollary is that the Bulgarian Army was ranked among the best of Europe; and Bulgaria, The text: ibid., pp. 69-70. Ibid., p. 70. 435 Ibid., p. 73. 436 N. Th. Kladas, entry “Prōtos Valkanikos Polemos” (= The First Balkan War) in Megalē Hellēnikē Enkyklopaideia , vol. VI (Athens: Pyrsos, 1928), p. 549. 437 Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn. Genikon Epiteleion Stratou. Polemikē Ekthesis (= Ministry of War. General Staff of the Army. Account of the War), Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous tou 1912-1913 (= The Greek Army in the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars), vol. I. Parartēma (=Annex), Athens: National Printing House, 1932, doc. 3: Dēmētrios Panas, Greek minister at Sofia, to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, Sofia, August 14, 1912, p.4. 438 Ibid. 439 H. Charles Wood, The Danger Zone of Europe. Changes and Problems in the Near East (London and Leipzig: T. Fisher Unwin, 1911), p. 284. 440 N. Th. Kladas, “Prōtos Valkanikos Polemos”, p. 547. 433 434

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when independence was declared in 1908, ipso facto occupied the most powerful position in South-Eastern Europe.

*** On September 22, 1912, a military convention between Greece and Bulgaria was concluded in Sofia.441 During that same month the Greek Army was mobilized.442 The Porte, nonetheless, up till the last moment hoped that a new Greco-Turkish war was by no means unavoidable and, subsequently, tried to lure Greece away from the Balkan League.443 If truth be told, neither King George nor the Crown Prince were delighted at the prospect of a war against Turkey. Still Venizelos was adamant and briefed the Sovereign as follows: “Your Majesty! The war or your crown!”444 As might be imagined, King George preferred his throne and on th the 5 of October Greece declared war on the Ottoman Empire. She was the last to do so; for Montenegro had declared war as early as September 25445 and Bulgaria and Serbia on October 4.446 The Bulgarian Army was exceedingly strong: it numbered 300,000.447 The Serbians had 220,000 in arms448, Montenegro only 35,000,449 whereas Greece numbered 89,300 in Thessaly450 and 10,500 in Epirus.451 It is noteworthy, however, that the Greek Army swelled to 100, 000 as soon as hostilities began452 and doubled in number shortly after that, thanks to Greek-Americans who rushed to her aid as volunteers.453 Crown Prince Constantine was appointed Generalissimo of the Greek Thessaly Army, i.e. the one that was to confront Ottoman forces in Southern Macedonia. He was assisted by a team of brilliant officers namely: lieutenant colonel Victor Dousmanēs and captains Xenophon Stratēgos, Iōannēs Metaxas, and Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, Parartēma, doc. 11, pp. 11-12. 442 Ibid., doc. 42, pp. 23-24; doc. 43, pp. 24-25. 443 Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou (= General Staff of the Army. Department of Military History), Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous tou 1912-1913 (= The Greek Army in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913), vol. I (Athens: History Department of the Army, 1988), p. 32. 444 É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours…, V, p. 76. 445 Viz. on October 8, 1912 (NS). Ibid. p. 76. 446 Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, I, pp. 32-34. 447 Ibid., p. 26. 448 Ibid, p. 27. 449 Ibid. 450 Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, Parartēma, doc. 211a: Colonel Napoleōn Sotilēs to the Ministry of War, Larissa, October 6, 1912, p. 98. 451 Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, I, p. 25. 452 Ibid.; Sir Basil Thomson, The Allied Secret Service in Greece. Translated into Greek by Kōstas Barbēs (Athens: Logothetēs [no date given]), p. 39. 453 X. Stratēgos, Ho hellēnotourkikos polemos tou 1912 (= The 1912 Greco-Turkish War), Athens: “Hellēnikē”, 1932, pp. 45, 48. 441

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Kōnstantinos Pallēs. They formed the General Staff of the Greek Army and together planned the to be successful campaign. The three captains had been trained in Germany454 (typical 455 Kriegsakademiker ). On the other hand, the nominal Chief of Staff, Major-General Panagiotēs Danklēs, of remote Albanian stock,456 was an associate of Venizelos457 and the favourite with the French Military Mission, as well.458 As a matter of fact, it was general Eydoux himself who insisted on his appointment;459 for he had voted down the Krupp gun over the Schneider.460 Danklēs’ contribution to the operations was nil;461 but under the aegis of King George I,462 he was forever trying to “detect” what was going on among the “Germans” of Constantine’s entourage. Notwithstanding, 300,000 Ottomans were expected to fight in the case of war in the Balkans.463 The bulk of them were to confront the Bulgarians in Thrace and about 25,000 of them the Greek Thessaly Army.464 Yet at the beginning of the hostilities only 15,000 Ottoman troops were ranged along the Greco-Turkish frontier in Macedonia.465 The Greek General Staff, moreover, had organized a good espionage network in Ottoman territory,466 and most of the Christian privates of the Ottoman Army were expected to desert after 454 As far as the officers of the General Staff of the Greek Army, their ideology and their connection with Crown Prince Constantine are concerned, see mainly Gnōmateusis tou eisēgētou tou A´ Diarkous Stratodikeiou Styl. A. Kolokytha kata tou teōs Genikou Hellēnikou Epiteleiou Dousmanē V., Metaxa Iōan., Stratēgou X. kai Hexadaktylou Athanasiou (= Report of Stylianos Kolokythas, reporter of the First Permanent Court Martial, against the former Greek General Staff [namely] V. Dousmanēs, I. Metaxas, X. Stratēgos and Athanasius Hexadaktylos), Athens: National Printing House, 1919, pp. 3-5. 455 Iasōn A. Dēmētriadēs, Ho heligmos tou Sarantaporou kai hē strophē pros Thessalonikēn (= The Sarantaporon maneuver and the move to Salonika), Athens, 1948, p. 44. 456Panagiōtēs Danklēs, Anamnēseis-Engrapha-Allēlographia-To archeio tou (= Memoirs-Documents-Correspondence-his Archives). Edited by X. Leukoparidēs, vol. I (Athens: Vagiōnakēs, 1965), pp. 1-2; cf. vol. II (Athens: Vagiōnakēs, 1965), p. 15. 457Victor Dousmanēs, Apomnēmoneumata. Historikai selides tas hopoias ezēsa (= Memoirs. Pages of History that I have witnessed), Athens: Petros Dēmētrakos, 1946, p. 93; Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 153. 458 I. A. Dēmētriadēs, Ho heligmos tou Sarantaporou…, p. 41. 459P. Danklēs, Anamnēseis-Engrapha-Allēlographia-To archeio tou, II, pp. 1-2. 460 Ibid., vol. I, pp. 290-292. 461 I. Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio (= I. Metaxas’ diary), vol. II. Edited by Chr. Christidēs (Athens: Govostēs [no date given]), pp. 132 (entry of October 12, 1912) and 174 (entry of October 23, 1912); V. Dousmanēs, Apomnēmoneumata…, pp. 88-91. 462 V. Dousmanēs, Apomnēmoneumata…, p. 53. 463 Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, Parartēma, doc. 5: D. Panas to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, Sofia, August 14, 1912, p. 5. 464 Ibid., doc. 203: Information Bulletin signed by Captain Athanasios Hexadaktylos, p. 92. 465 Stylianos Gonatas, Apomnēmoneumata, 1897-1957 (=Memoirs, 1897-1957), Athens, 1958, p. 39. 466 I. A. Dēmētriadēs, Ho heligmos tou Sarantaporou…, p. 58.

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war had been declared.467 The apostasy of those Christians would actually prove to be crucial for the defeat of the Ottoman troops – but only in Epirus and in 1913. With reference to 1912 Macedonia, the key person was an Ottoman general of Albanian descent, namely Hasan Tahsin Pasha.

II When hostilities began, the objective of the Greek General Staff was to destroy the enemy troops covering the frontier in Macedonia, and move northward along the valley of the Vardar (Axios) river to strike the Ottomans fighting the Serbs. The point, in other words, was to capture Monastir (Bitola) advancing from the South.468 Nonetheless, the Sarantaporon and Demir Kapı (Iron Gate) gorges, in the very region bordering on Greece, were heavily fortified. Would the Greek Army be able to pass through these gorges? Big surprises were in store; for on the night of October 9/10, after the initial engagements, the Ottoman troops abandoned their positions in Sarantaporon and subsequently Demir Kapı.469 A couple of days later a bridge over the Bistritsa (Aliakmon) River was found intact.470 As a result, a unit of Greek Cavalry crossed the river and reached Kozanē. It was a well fortified city, commanding important communication routes. The Greek cavalrymen, nonetheless, seized it on October 11th without meeting any opposition.471 Now the Greek Army was able to advance northward, namely to Monastir. Still Hasan Tahsin Pasha lured –by means of his troops’ retreat- the Greeks towards Salonika. And when the Crown Prince Constantine was unsure whether he should try to capture Monastir or Salonika, Venizelos himself, in his capacity as War Minister, ordered him that he march against Salonika.472 The point is that when hostilities began Ali Riza Pasha and not Hasan Tahsin was the Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman troops deployed against the Greeks on the Macedonian front.473 He was

467 Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, Parartēma, doc. 195a: General Order (signed by Crown Prince Constantine, Larissa, October 3, 1912), pp. 88-89. 468 Ibid., doc. 21: Constantine to the Ministry of War (cable), Berea, October 18, 1912, p. 14. 469 Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, I, pp. 44-59. 470 X. Stratēgos, Ho hellēnotourkikos polemos tou 1912, p. 60; Spyros Melas, Hoi polemoi tou 1912-1913 (= The 1912-1913 Wars), Athens: Birēs, 1958, p. 117. 471 X. Stratēgos, Ho hellēnotourkikos polemos tou 1912, p. 62. 472 Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, Parartēma, doc. 415: Venizelos to Constantine (cable), Athens, October 12, 1912, p. 169. 473 Ibid., doc. 210: Information Bulletin, Larissa, October 4th, 1912, p. 97.

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renowned for his bellicosity and expertise in warfare.474 Yet he was replaced when the hostilities began by Hasan Tahsin Pasha.475 The latter had begun his career as a guard in the provinces. Afterwards he was commissioned in the Ottoman Army and promoted to the rank of general. His rapid promotion, nonetheless, was due mainly to his political connections.476 At the beginning of the First Balkan War, he was the Commander of the VIII Army Corps, with its headquarters in Damascus, Syria. But given that this very Army Corps came under the military authority of Salonika, Hasan Tahsin Pasha was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman troops at the Bistritsa River. At last an “extraordinary” VIII Army Corps was created there, having headquarters in Kozanē and, literally, by means of legerdemain, he assumed the command.477 Without any doubt, such a conjuring trick was performed through political chicanery; and Mehmet Kâmil Pasha, appointed Grand Vizier on October 16, 1912478 and noted for his British connections,479 most likely had something to do with it.480 Whatever the facts of the matter, Hasan Tahsin Pasha was an “old and experienced Army officer”.481 Yet, after the first engagements with the Greek troops, he “lost every hope of gaining the war”482 and hastened to retreat to Salonika. A plausible explanation of such a stance is that he was bribed,483 but this is only an assumption. Other factors that probably determined his attitude were his Greek wife and his admiration of Greek learning.484 The crux, nevertheless, was that he had a large property on the outskirts of Salonika485 and dreaded that city being Ibid., doc. 209: Information Bulletin, Kazaklar, October 4, 1912, p. 95. Ali Riza Pasha, in fact, fought only against the Serbs. 476 Vasileios Nikoltsios and Vasilēs Gounarēs, Apo to Sarantaporo stē Thessalonikē. Hē hellēnotourkikē anametrēsē tou 1912 mesa apo tis anamnēseis tou Stratēgou Hasan Tahsin Pasa (= From Sarantaporon to Salonika. The 1912 Greco-Turkish Conflict through the Memoirs of General Hasan Tahsin Pasha), Salonika, 2002, p. 10. 477 Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, I, p. 28. 478 Ibid., p. 439. 479 Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. II: Reform, Revolution and Republic. The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 (Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 294. 480 V. Nikoltsios and V. Gounarēs, Apo to Sarantaporo stē Thessalonikē, pp. 19-20. It is noteworthy that Mehmet Kâmil Pasha was forced to resign at gunpoint on January 23, 1913. (S. J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire…, II, p. 295.) 481 X. Stratēgos, Ho hellēnotourkikos polemos tou 1912, p. 13. 482 Ibid. 483 Herbert Adam Gibbons, Venizelos (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1920), p. 118. 484 Christos K. Christodoulou, “Hoi treis taphes tou Hasan Tahsin Pasa” (= The Three Burials of Hasan Tahsin Pasha), daily Makedonia (= Macedonia [Salonika]), October 27, 2007. (http://www.makthes.gr/news/arts/8072/ [retrieved on July 15, 2011].) 485 V. Nikoltsios and V. Gounarēs, Apo to Sarantaporo stē Thessalonikē, p. 10. 474 475

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captured by the Bulgarians.486 For the members and followers of the Internal Macedonian Organization (IMRO), usually identified with the Centralists, headed by Yane Sandanski,487 were fighting as irregulars of the Bulgarian Army in 1912.488 Those irregulars had put forward anti-plutocratic slogans – and Hasan Tahsin Pasha was terrified. For the prelude to the 1903 Ilinden Uprising was the bomb attacks which took place in Salonika in the spring of that same year. These attacks were performed by the “Boatmen”, i.e. the IMRO’s anarchist branch, and aimed at provoking the intervention of the Great Powers in favour of the autochthonous Slavic populations of Macedonia.489 This goal was somehow achieved thanks to the 1903 Mürzsteg agreement between the two Emperors, namely Franz-Joseph of Austro-Hungary and Nicholas II of Russia. Most of the 1903 bomb attacks’ protagonists, nevertheless, met a cruel end.490 But in the long term more important was the fact that the “Boatmen” were considered to be Bulgarians;491 and the large majority of Salonika’s population in the early twentieth century, i.e. Jews and Moslems, were panicked by those “Bulgarians”. In fact, Salonika was by then an “international city”.492 According to the estimations of Salonika’s first Greek prefect, Pericles Argyropoulos,493 in October 1912 there dwelled merely 19,000 Greeks494. The great majority of the population were Jews (90,000 out of 160,000),495 with the Moslems as the second largest religious group (about 44,000).496 That is why that though Sandanski’s irregulars were the first to enter Salonika before the Bulgarian and the Greek armies, 497 Hasan Tahsin Pasha managed to have the city surrendered to the Greeks.498 For the latter had the reputation of being lenient towards the non-Christians.499 Ibid., p. 57. Hermenegild Wagner, With the victorious Bulgarians (London: Constable and Co., 1913), p. 250. 488 Ibid.,, pp. 251, 254-255. 489 Giannēs Megas, Hoi Varkarēdes tēs Thesalonikēs. Hē anarchikē voulgarikē homada kai hoi vomvistikes energeies tou 1903 [= The Salonika Boatmen. The Bulgarian Anarchist Group and the 1903 Bomb Attacks], Athens: Trochalia, 1994, p. 47ff. 490 Ibid, p. 159ff. 491 Ibid., p. 172ff. passim. 492 Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, Parartēma, doc. 554: Constantine to the War Ministry (cable), Berea, October 18, 1912, p. 209. 493Pericles A. Argyropoulos, Apomnēmoneumata (= Memoirs), Athens, 1970, p. 100. 494 Ibid., 107. 495 Ibid. 496 Ibid. 497 Ibid., pp. 103-104. 498 The protocol of surrender: Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, Parartēma, doc. 765, p. 168. 499 Pierre Loti, Turquie agonisante (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1913), p. 70; cf. Réna Molho, «Thessalonique après 1912. Propagandes étrangères et communauté juive », La France et la Grèce dans la Grande Guerre. Actes ducolloque tenu en novembre 1989 à Thessalonique (Θεσσαλονίκη, 1992), p. 54 486 487

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What is more, the Pasha made the advance of the Greek Army easier. For after the Ottomans failed to halt the Greeks in Yenice-i Vardar on October 19-20th ,500 the Moslems’ sacred city in Macedonia,501 Hasan Tahsin Pasha abandoned the defence line on the Vardar (Axios) River,502 and actually disbanded his troops on the very outskirts of Salonika.503 Thus, although the capital of Macedonia was heavily fortified by the Porte, it was surrendered to the Greeks without opposition.504 It is noteworthy, moreover, that the agreement on Salonika’s surrender, albeit concluded and signed on October 27,505 it was dated on October 26.506 In this way the Greeks were given an unassailable argument against the Bulgarians;507 for units of the Bulgarian regular Army had reached Salonika almost simultaneously with the Greek ones.508 So the move of the Greek troops to Monastir did not take place; and it was Salonika, a non-Greek city in 1912, that fell to the Greeks instead. Of course, to assume that Hasan Tahsin Pasha, bribed or not, hatched by himself the entire ‘plot’ that culminated in Salonika being captured by the Greeks, is all but an absurdity. It is well-known that many individuals were involved in Salonika’s capture by the Greek Army and not by the Bulgarians. The first among them was L. Koromēlas, to whom Venizelos had given the Foreign Affairs portfolio in August, 1912.509 As previously stated, Venizelos’ new Foreign Minister had moneyed connections abroad. The result was that he had been the first to bring to Crown Prince Constantine’s attention the shift that it was necessary to make with regard to the Greek Army’s move. On October 12, in fact, at exactly 03.35´ p.m., he cabled to Constantine that he (i.e. Constantine) had to enter Salonika “at the soonest possible”.510 A couple of hours later it was Venizelos himself who actually ordered the Generalissimo to have Salonika seized, for “outstanding political reasons”.511 The interference of the Foreign S. Gonatas, Apomnēmoneumata…, pp. 40-41; Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, I, p.82ff. 501 S. Melas, Hoi polemoi tou 1912-1913, p. 215. 502 S. Gonatas, Apomnēmoneumata…, p. 41; S. Melas, Hoi polemoi tou 1912-1913, p. 251. Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, Parartēma, doc. 681: Hasan Tahsin Pasha to the Ottoman Headquarters in Salonika Topsin, October 21st, 1912, p. 244 (intercepted cable); doc. 693: Constantine to the IV Division, Kircalar, October 23, 1912, p. 248. 503 Ibid., doc. 702: Koromēlas to Constantine (cable), Athens, October 23, 1912, p. 250. 504S. Gonatas, Apomnēmoneumata…, p. 42; V. Dousmanēs, Apomnēmoneumata…, pp. 59-60. 505 P. Argyropoulos, Apomnēmoneumata, p. 96; V. Nikoltsios and V. Gounarēs, Apo to Sarantaporo stē Thessalonikē…, p. 39. 506 V. Dousmanēs, Apomnēmoneumata…, p. 57. 507 Cf. P. Argyropoulos, Apomnēmoneumata, p. 100. 508 Ibid., pp. 97-98. 509 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 129. 510 Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, Parartēma, doc. 416, p. 170. 511 Ibid., doc. 415, p. 169. 500

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Minister in military matters was quite unorthodox;512 still not only did Venizelos not dissuade his Foreign Minister from doing so, but he took his lead. Three days later, on October 15, Koromēlas suddenly changed his tune, and urged the Generalissimo to hasten his troops’ advance to Monastir. For it was crucial for that city to fall to the Greeks and not to the Serbs or the Bulgarians.513 A week and a half later, nonetheless, a further change of heart occurred; for he sent Constantine the following message: “… The Ambassador [of a Great Power in Berlin] implores you to enter Salonika the sooner the better. That way most likely the Great Powers will agree to Salonika being annexed by Greece”.514 The Ambassador in question was France’s Jules Cambon.515 It was clear that L. Koromēlas was pirouetting to music other than his own, i.e. from abroad; and Venizelos to the music being played by his Foreign Minister.

*** One should be reminded of the fact that Constantine was ‘lured’ to Salonika by Hasan Tahsin Pasha. Kozanē had fallen to the Greeks on October 11; and the Greek Generalissimo knew well that Southern Macedonia’s Ottoman troops were being marshalled in Berea, the famous age-old town about 75 kilometres westward from Salonika.516 The mind of Constantine was clear-cut: he would advance to Berea in order “to combat the enemy”517 – and try, by the same token, to destroy the Ottoman troops that would eventually retreat to Monastir.518 That was his operational plan on October 15. Still new –happy- surprises were in store for the Greek Army. On the morning of October 16, the Crown Prince was informed that Hasan Tahsin Pasha’s troops had evacuated Berea and were retreating eastward, viz. to Salonika.519 Constantine and his Staff entered Berea that same day.520 In the meantime, Greek troops captured other important towns in south-western Macedonia without meeting any resistance;521 but a Greek Division that attempted to advance

S. Melas, Hoi polemoi tou 1912-1913, p. 136. Ibid., p. 194. 514 Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, Parartēma, doc. 728, p. 257. 515 P. Argyropoulos, Apomnēmoneumata, p. 101. 516 Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, Parartēma, doc. 474: Constantine to the V Division, Kozanē October 14, 1912, p. 187. 517 Ibid., doc. 480: Operational Order, October 15, 1912, p. 189. 518 Ibid. 519 Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, I, p. 75. 520 Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, Parartēma, doc. 519: Constantine to the Ministry of War, Berea, October 16, 1912, p. 198. 521 Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, I, p. 75. 512 513

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northward -actually to Monastir-522 halted abruptly and “without explication” on October 20523 - though it had beaten the Ottoman troops that it had met.524 A couple of days later having interrupted its push to Monastir,525 this Division suffered a severe defeat.526 It was clear that whilst the way to Salonika was open, the one to Monastir was closed. Yet Constantine was oscillating. As early as the 16th of October, he had stated that the Greek Army was to move eastward, i.e. to Salonika.527 But the day after, at 3.00´ p.m., the “whole of the…Army” was sent northward from Berea:528 that meant Constantine was likely to march to Monastir. In point of fact, a couple of hours later Constantine entered Niaousa,529 another town located to the north of Berea. The Ottomans had evacuated Niaousa during the night of October 16/17;530 Constantine and his Staff encamped in the railway station.531 The distance between Berea/Niaousa and Salonika or Monastir being almost the same, Venizelos was unsure of the Generalissimo’s intentions. He feared that the Greek Army might advance to Monastir; this is why on October 17, he sent Constantine a telegram which read as follows: “According to intelligence furnished by foreign diplomats, it is likely that agitation and massacres will soon take place in Salonika... I have assured [the foreign diplomats] that our Army will reach [Salonika] in time, in order to avert agitation and massacres”.532 It was the IMRO ‘peril’ that was termed “agitation” and “massacres” by “foreign diplomats”. Both Moslems and Jews were terribly scared; for not only were Sandaski’s komitadjis approaching Salonika, but some of them had bypassed it and had already reached the Berea and Niaousa region.533 Constantine was at last convinced and, accordingly, on October 18 announced to Venizelos his decision to capture Salonika during “the next three or four days”.534 The political pressure exerted on him was unbearable.535 As aforementioned, Salonika fell to Constantine on October 27. It is discernible that without Hasan Tahsin Pasha’s

Ibid., p. 104. Ibid. 524 Ibid., pp. 76-79. 525 S. Melas, Hoi polemoi tou 1912-1913, p. 275. 526 Ibid., p. 143ff. 527 Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, Parartēma, doc. 524, p. 200. 528 Ibid., doc. 543: Constantine to the VII Division, Berea, October 17, 1912, p. 205. 529 Today Naousa. 530 S. Melas, Hoi polemoi tou 1912-1913, p. 149. 531 Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, I, p. 81. 532 Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, Parartēma, doc. 553, p. 209. 533 S. Melas, Hoi polemoi tou 1912-1913, pp. 154-155. 534 Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn..., Polemikē Ekthesis, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, Parartēma, doc. 554, p. 209. 535 Cf. S. Gonatas, Apomnēmoneumata…, p. 40. 522 523

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‘conscious passivity’ Salonika would be seized by the Greeks much later – or never. The Pasha could not live in Macedonia any longer; for Turks, Macedonians and Bulgarians alike saw in him a hated foe. As a matter of fact, the opinion was widespread that Macedonia had been “sold out” by Ottoman officialdom.536 So he fled to Paris in 1913 and afterward to Lausanne, Switzerland, where he passed away, aged 73, in 1918.537 His son, Kenan Mesare (1889-1965), became a naturalized Greek and spent his life in Greece. What is more, he became the semiofficial painter of the Greek Army.538

III As foreseen, the march of the Greek Army to Monastir never took place, though it was not until November 5 that the Serbs seized it.539 Janina, nonetheless, i.e. Epirus’ capital, remained a very important Ottoman stronghold in Europe – and it was there that the Ottomans held out against the Greeks.540 In fact, the Greek troops in Epirus, only 10,500 strong, were unable even to menace Janina.541 On January 17, 1913, nonetheless, after reinforcements had arrived from Macedonia,542 the Janina fortress was besieged; but the assault made four days later failed.543 On January 10, 1913, Crown Prince, Constantine arrived in Epirus,544 and assumed the direct leadership of the Greek Army therein.545 On February 20, Janina was attacked anew.546 Greek arms were now crowned with success; for a Christian officer of the Ottoman Army, namely Nikolaki Effendi, a captain of Engineers, following the intervention of the local Metropolitan, Gervasius, delivered sketches of the fortifications to the Greek General

S. Melas, Hoi polemoi tou 1912-1913, p. 204. Chr. K. Christodoulou, “Hoi Treis Taphes tou Hasan Tahsin Pasa”. 538 Paraskeuē Katimertzē, “Kenan Mesare”, daily Ta Nea (= The News [Athens]), February 14, 2003. (http://www.greeklanguage.gr/greekLang/modern_greek/tools/corpora/nea/conten t.html?t=2,1471. [Retrieved on July 15, 2011].) 539 N. Th. Kladas, “Prōtos Valkanikos Polemos”, p. 559. 540 EVP, I/32/108, Crown Prince Constantine to the Ministry of War, Flōrina (Lerin), November 24, 1912 (cable); Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous, I, pp. 207, 211. 541 Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous polemous tou 1912-1913, vol. II, Athens: Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, 1991, pp. 65-69, 91-103. 542 Ibid., p.126. 543 Ibid., p.142. 544 Ibid., p.146. 545 Ibid., p.148. 546 Ibid., p. 203ff. 536 537

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Staff.547 As a result, the Ottoman troops in Janina surrendered on February 21, 1913.548 The fall of Janina to Constantine had an enormous impact on Greece. Epirus is justly considered to be “the cradle of the Hellenes”, and Janina meant a lot to the entire Greek People.549 The operations were pressed forward, therefore: on March 3, Argyrokastron (Gjirokastër) was captured by the Greek Army550 and two days later Tepelenë.551 (Korytsa [Korçë] had fallen as early as December 7, 1912, to Greek troops advancing from Western Macedonia.552) The Greek Army was all set to enter Valona (Vlorë); yet Venizelos, on March 2nd, had ordered (again in his capacity as Minister of War, but unlike his previous orders with reference to Salonika) the march to Valona to be halted.553 It was Dēmētrios Gounarēs who was the only one that dared to ask him, in May 1914, in Parliament, the reason for his having hastened the Greek Army to Salonika yet halted its march to Valona.554 Gounarēs was to be shot, in November 1922, by Venizelists with the connivance of Venizelos himself.555 The latter, nonetheless, had no option in 1914 but to answer however indirectly, but still clearly enough: it was Britain that was to blame.556 In this Venizelos was right. Not only had the British kept a watchful eye on the situation in Epirus and Albania, but at the beginning of May 1913, Herbert Henry Asquith, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Winston S. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, and a “British Admiral” arrived in Athens, after “having visited” the “Channel and the island of Corfu”.557 Asquith and Churchill claimed that their stay in the Greek capital did not have a “political flavour”; for they were in Greece “only on holiday”, they explained. Of course, nobody believed them.558 As a matter of fact, they were in Greece in

Athan. D. Tsekouras, Apo tou 98ou hypsōmatos (= From the 98th Hill), Athens: The Epirotic Society, 1979, pp. 201-221. 548Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous polemous…, II, p. 224. 549 É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce…, V, p. 91 : Car l’Épire est comme le berceau de l’Hellénisme… Elle tient plus que Constantinople même au cœur de tous les Grecs. 550 Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous polemous…, II, p. 249. 551 Ibid., p. 253. 552 Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous polemous…, I, p. 187. 553 V. Dousmanēs, Apomnēmoneumata…, p. 115; Dēmētrēs Michalopoulos, Ho Eleutherios Venizelos kai to Voreioēpeirōtiko zētēma (= Eleutherios Venizelos and the Question of Northern Epirus), Athens: Liberal Club, 1992, pp. 18-19. 554 Ephēmeris tōn Syzētēseōn tēs Voulēs, sitting of May 12, 1914, p. 1585. 555 PKP, I/1/1, Venizelos to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, Paris, November 3/16, 1922 (cable, top secret). 556 Ephēmeris tōn Syzētēseōn tēs Voulēs, p. 1592ff. 557 Kairoi, May 6, 1913, p. 1. 558 Grēgorios Xenopoulos, “Askouith kai Sia” (=Asquith and Co), Kairoi, May 7, 1913, p.1. 547

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order to have talks with the “Greek leaders”, chiefly Venizelos,559 on the matter of Epirus and Southern Albania. Before the British leaders visited Corfu and Athens, King George I was assassinated in Salonika. Constantine was now the new King and his son George,560 the new Crown Prince. After Venizelos halted the march of the Greek troops to Valona, Crown Prince George, commanded by his father, did a “round of inspection” in the Northern part of Epirus and in southern Albania.561 The new King was anxious to have the Argyrokastron and Korytsa districts, where the majority of the population was Christian Orthodox, annexed to Greece. Still Venizelos was adamant in his refusal. On May 17, moreover, the Peace Treaty between the Balkan League, namely Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro, and the Ottoman Empire was signed in London. According to article 3 of this Treaty, the Sultan entrusted the Emperors of Austro-Hungary, Germany and Russia, the Kings of Britain and Italy and the President of the French Republic with the task of “organizing” and “delimiting” an autonomous (actually independent) Albania. Had not the Greek government, i.e. Venizelos, agreed, Greece would no longer be supported by the British, the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey explained to Iōannēs Gennadios, Greek minister at London.562 By “British support” it was inferred that Greece would be backed by Britain as far as the issue of the islands of the Eastern Aegean Sea was concerned. For article 5 of the London Treaty made provision for “the care” of these islands to be entrusted to the six Great Power (as was done with regard to Albania).563 Nonetheless, the northern ones of these islands had already been seized by the Greek Fleet under P. Kountouriōtēs (who was promoted to the rank of RearAdmiral at the outbreak of the war564). It was clear, therefore, that Venizelos had opted for Greece to expand eastward. He therefore abandoned the southern slice of Albania. Still his decision was pregnant with consequence; for it contained in embryo the 1919-1922 Greek campaign in Asia Minor. Thus Venizelos completed the change of direction of Greek irredentism – fuelled, moreover, by himself. Salonika instead of Monastir was to be annexed to Greece; and the islands of the Eastern Aegean Sea instead of the Argyrokastron and Korytsa districts. Constantine, the new King, and his political allies such as D. Gounarēs, did not agree.565 But Venizelos, eager to have British Kairoi, May 6, 1913, p. 1. The future King George II of the Hellenes. 561 Kairoi, May 11, 1913, p. 1. 562 Gennadios’ dispatch to the Foreign Ministry, London, May 17, 1913 in: Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous polemous…, vol. III (Athens: History Department of the Army, 1992), p. 347. 563 Ibid. 564 S. I. Dousmanēs, To hēmerologion tou kyvernētou tou “G. Averoff”…, p. 47. 565 P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung (Athens: Zacharopoulos, 19922 ), pp. 271274; Sinan Kuneralp [ed.], Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of World 559 560

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support, gave up the island of Saseno to newborn Albania.566 Saseno is located at the mouth of the Valona gulf and was nominally annexed to Greece in 1864: for this little but highly strategic island567 was regarded as part of the Ionian Islands. True, Saseno was never occupied by Greek troops or ruled by Greek authorities. Yet its being given up to Albania engendered a bitter conflict between Venizelos and Gounarēs that culminated in the National Divide of the Greeks - and Gounarēs’ execution in 1922 as well.

IV As aforementioned, on March 5, 1913, King George I of the Hellenes was assassinated in Salonika. The sovereign had settled there on October 29, 1912, i.e. shortly after the city had fallen to his son, Constantine; for he wished to make sure that it would be annexed to Greece. As foretold, the Macedonian irregulars of the Bulgarian Army had entered Salonika before the Greek troops did; and units of the Bulgarian –regular- Army had reached Salonika simultaneously with the Greeks. From late October on, nevertheless, the city was ruled by Greek military authorities; yet the Bulgarians had their own and, in practice, did not recognize Greek rule.568 On December 5, 1912, the Tsar of the Bulgarians, Ferdinand, paid a visit to Salonika. He wished a Greek-Bulgarian condominium to be established. King George “welcomed” him, but made it clear that such a joint rule was out of question.569 About three months later King George was murdered. The assassin was Alexandros Schoinas (or Schinas), a 52 year old Greek, a former schoolteacher, and a native of Macedonia.570 He was said to be anarchist or insane; but he was neither. 571 He was merely the “armed hand” of a vast plot against the King – a plot wherein even the Greek Salonika authorities were involved.572 After this criminal act, Schoinas was arrested by the Greek police and tortured. He declared at length that he was willing to unveil the War One. The Aegean Islands Issue, 1912-1914 [Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2011], doc. 514: Djevad Bey, Ottoman minister at Belgrade, to Saïd Halim Pasha, Grand Vizier and Foreign Minister, Nish, September 10, 1914, p. 306. 566 Law No. 271, Ephēmeris tēs Kyvernēseōs tou Vasileiou tēs Hellados (= Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Greece), I, No. 151 (June 7, 1914), p. 801. 567 Valona (actually its gulf) was considered to be “the key of the Adriatic Sea”. (S. Kuneralp, The Aegean Islands Issue…, doc. 22: Naby Bey, Ottoman Ambassador in Rome, to Gabriel Effendi Noradounghian, Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rome, December 8, 1912, p. 42. ) 568 EVP, I/32/108, Prince Nicholas of Greece, Military Commander of Salonika, to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, Salonika, November 27, 1912 (cable). 569 Iōan. E. Iōannidēs, Kōnstantinos IB´ (= Constantine XII), Athens: Govostēs [no date given], pp. 284-285. 570 P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung, p. 237. 571 P. A. Argyropoulos, Apomnēmoneumata, p. 120. 572 Ibid., p. 115.

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“mystery of the King’s death” to the latter’s Consort Olga. Thus Olga paid him a visit and heard his confession. She was accordingly terrified and conveyed the secret only to their son Nicholas, by then, military commander of Salonika.573 Schoinas, after he had talked to Olga, was murdered by being defenestrated by his guards.574 Last but not least, the dossier on the King’s death was destroyed by fire in 1915.575 There were members of the Royal House who suspected Venizelos of being the éminence grise behind the plot that culminated in the killing of the Sovereign576. Still nothing has been proven so far.

*** The death of King George I was ill omened; for it acted like a catalyst – as the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, in 1914 would do but on a larger scale. The problem now was Serbia’s relationship with Albania. Serbia coveted the Albanian littoral; but Albanian independence was proclaimed in Valona as early as November, 1912. If the Great Powers were to recognize Albanian independence (which was most likely), Serbia would not have outlet to the sea. Anxious to have such an exit, the Serbian government concluded a secret agreement with the Greeks: Albania would be shared between the two Parties by means of “influence zones”.577 Yet this agreement was never put into practice. Macedonians, on the other hand, obviously the IMRO associates, dispatched a memorandum to the Six Great Powers, calling for an autonomous (in fact independent) Macedonian State.578 But this demand (fashioned on the Albanian precedent) also went unheeded . In short, Serbia was now denying Macedonia proper, i.e. the Üsküp (Skopje) and Monastir regions, the right to be Bulgarian – as had been tacitly agreed before the outbreak of the war against the Porte.579 The Bulgarian government accepted, therefore, that the dispute should be submitted to the Russian Emperor.580 But by then the main characters of the drama had changed their minds. First of all, James Bourchier, the famous correspondent of the London Times in the Balkans, argued against the arbitration of Nicholas II.581 Tsar Ferdinand of the Bulgarians subsequently, reminiscent of his Habsburg connections (for he was of Hungarian stock) strongly opposed Russian intervention in the “Macedonian issue”;582 for the Ibid., p. 119. Ibid. 575 Ibid., p. 120. 576 Memoirs of H.R.H. Prince Christopher of Greece (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1938), p. 118. 577 É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce…, V, p. 70. 578 Ibid., p. 108. 579 Ibid., pp. 70, 122. 580 Ibid., p. 122; : Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous polemous…, III, p. 81. 581 Daily Nea Hēmera Tergestēs (= The Trieste New Day [published nevertheless in Athens]), May 31, 1913, p. 1. 582 Nea Hēmera Tergestēs, June 2, 1913, p. 7. 573 574

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Vienna cabinet disapproved of such a ‘conciliatory’ intervention of the Russian Tsar.583 What is more, Ferdinand overtly approved of the Bulgarian military leadership’s stance; for he had established a “political party of the Crown” reliant on Bulgarized Macedonians.584 So he supported the upper echelons of the Bulgarian Army, the bulk of whom was of Macedonian descent, and allowed them to prepare for a general onslaught on the Serbs and the Greeks.585 For the revival of the Serbo-Bulgarian feud implied also a Greco-Bulgarian one, since the Sofia government was now almost bound to dispute Greek rule over Salonika. Paradoxical as it may appear, Venizelos was the main champion of Russian arbitration in the Balkan mess that spring of 1913. In fact, when Prince Nicholas of Greece paid a visit to St Petersburg in order to explain to the Tsar the Greek views on the Macedonian issue,586 it was released to the Greek Press that the Russian Emperor had authorized Venizelos to “inform the Balkans of his own [imperial] wishes”.587 Though such news was somewhat exaggerated, it did contain a kernel of truth. For, according to what had been announced by then, Nicholas II was backed up by the German Emperor;588 and King Constantine of the Hellenes, who was related to the Kaiser through family ties, had wholeheartedly endorsed the prospect of Russian arbitration in the Balkans. Venizelos, on the other hand, was at that time all out to curry favour with King Constantine: thus no disagreement was in sight between them.589 By the same token Venizelos aspired to have the Kaiser’s sympathy as well.590 The British perceived early on Venizelos’ shifting his ground and managed to have a Greco-Serbian Protocol signed in Athens in April 1913.591 It stipulated that Greece and Serbia would have a “common frontier”. The “common frontier” implied Monastir’s annexation by Serbia and Salonika’s by Greece. The éminence grise behind the new, anti-Bulgarian constellation, was Crawfurd Price, the deputy Balkan correspondent of the London Times. He convinced Prince Nicholas, commander, as aforementioned, of the Salonika defences, to engineer a surreptitious anti-Bulgarian policy;592 and such a policy was fuelled

Kairoi, June 6, 1913, p. 3 and June 8, 1913, p. 1. Victor Kuhne, Les Bulgares peints par eux-mêmes (Paris-Lausanne : Payot, 1917), pp. 247, 251-252. 585 Ernest Daudet, Ferdinand Ier, tsar de Bulgarie (Paris-Neuchatel : Attinger frères [no date given]), p. 209 ; É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce…, V, p. 123. 586 Kairoi, June 7, 1913, p. 1. 587 Kairoi, June 6, 1913, p. 3. 588 Kairoi, June 10, 1913, p. 3; Nea Hēmera Tergestēs, June 17, 1913, p. 7. 589 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 309; cf. V Dousmanēs, Apomnēmoneumata…, p. 118. 590 Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce…, V, p. 111. 591 Hypourgeion epi tōn Exōterikōn (=Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Diplōmatika engrapha, 1913-1917 (= Diplomatic Papers, 1913-1917), Athens: National Publishing House, 19202 , pp. 37-39. 592 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, pp. 208-209. 583 584

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by the April Protocol signed by Koromēlas himself. The Alliance Treaty proper was to be concluded on May 19.593 Of course Venizelos, making use of a smokescreen, implored the British government to act as an “independent arbitrator” as far as the Tsar’s intervention in the Balkan turmoil was concerned.594 But the reaction to his demand was foreseeable: the British minister at Athens, Sir Francis Elliot, explained to him that Britain was not disposed to “act” in the Balkans alongside Russia.595 Venizelos then made it clear that he was to pay a visit to St Petersburg – at the Tsar’s invitation.596

V Venizelos was thus speaking the truth. For at the eleventh hour, a compromise was reached between the members of the –victorious yet moribund- Balkan League.597 The Prime Ministers of Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece agreed to be in the Russian capital on June 25, 1913, and have their disagreement submitted to Emperor Nicholas II.598 What is more, the Tsar was not to be the only arbiter. In fact, he would act in the name of the German Emperor as well – and both Monarchs would “represent the whole of Europe”.599 And last but not least, the Bulgarians had finally agreed for Salonika being annexed to 600 Greece. In short, the war had seemingly been averted. In those self same days, however, a Greek verbal note was published in some Athens newspapers: it was slanted so insultingly against the Bulgarians that war was now a certainty.601 Nonetheless, it was a “phoney” one, because Venizelos knew nothing about it. He blamed, therefore, L. Koromēlas, his Foreign Minister, and asked the King to dismiss him.602 Yet nothing happened. Not only did Koromēlas keep the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, but he was promoted to acting Prime Minister on August 8.603 True, he resigned ten days later604 - only

Hypourgeion epi tōn Exōterikōn, Diplōmatika engrapha, 1913-1917, pp. 37-39. Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 213. 595 Ibid. 596 Ibid. 597 I. Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio, II, pp. 219 (entry of June 5, 1913) and 231 (entry of June 14, 1913). 598 Nea Hēmera Tergestēs, June 3, 1913, p. 7 and June 19, 1913, p. 1; Kairoi, June 12, 1913, p. 3; É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce…, V, p. 122. 599 Nea Hēmera Tergestēs, June 18, 1913, p. 9. 600 Nea Hēmera Tergestēs, May 16, 1913, p. 1; Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 210. 601 Nea Hēmera Tergestēs, June 19, 1913, pp. 3, 4; June 20, p. 7. 602 EVP, I/33/85, Venizelos to King Constantine (cable), Athens [June 1913]. 603 Alcibiades Provatas, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados apo 1821 mechri 1980. Nomothetika kai ektelestika Sōmata (= Political History of Modern Greece from 1821 to 1980. Legislative and Executive Bodies), Athens, 1980, p. 393. 604 Ibid. 593 594

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because he had been offered the opportunity of becoming the Greek minister at Rome.605 In mid-June 1913, however, it was too late for any kind of reaction: furious with the Greeks thanks to the “phoney” verbal note, the Bulgarian military leadership ordered a general and immediate offensive against the Greeks first, and the Serbs afterwards, in Macedonia. The sporadic hostilities broke out during the night of 16 /17 June;606 still the outbreak of the war proper did not occur until the 19,607 whilst the King and Venizelos announced it only on June 21; 608 for they had hoped that it would be avoided.

***

This war (usually yet wrongly termed the Second Balkan War609) was too short to be termed as a war. The Bulgarian Army was ravaged by cholera610 for –unlike the Greeks611- it lacked an efficient medical corps.612 The Greek Army, on the other hand, was galvanized by the victories of the war against the Ottomans and the stance and tactics of its Generalissimo – who was now a most popular King: the German Aufmarsch principle613 was carried into effect with spectacular success. The Bulgarians, moreover, had to fight simultaneously the Serbs, the Ottomans and the Romanians as well. For them it was a war on several fronts; so the armistice was concluded –to their detriment- on July 18.614 Still, unlike in the war against the Ottomans, the Greek Army suffered many casualties.615 Iōannēs Metaxas, who jointly with Victor Dousmanēs, the new Chief of the Army General Staff,616 had planned the whole campaign with regard to the Greek side,617 was instilled by a something approaching fear of Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 110. Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, III, p. 73ff. 607 I . Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio, II, p. 222 (entry of June 18, 1913). 608 Ephēmeris tēs Kyvernēseos tou Vasileiou tēs Hellados, I, No. 121 (June 21, 1913), p. 395. 609 In fact, it was the “Second Stage” of the Balkan War. (S. Kuneralp, The Aegean Islands Issue…, doc. 210: Tevfik Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador in London, to Saïd Halim Pasha, Ottoman Prime Minister, London, November 5, 1913, p. 146. 610 Kairoi, June 4, 1913, p. 1 and June 14. 611 I. Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio, II, pp. 219 (entry of June 7, 1913), 223 (entries of July 7 and 11, 1913). 612 Nea Hēmera Tergestēs, June 8, 1913, p. 7. 613 I. A. Dēmētriadēs, Ho heligmos tou Sarantaporou…, p. 51. 614 Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, III, p. 283ff. 615 15, 054 in the First Balkan War and 21, 894 in the Second one. See Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, I, p. 289; II, p. 355; III, p. 462. And also I. Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio, II, p. 222 (entry of June 22nd, 1913). 616 V. Dousmanēs, Apomnēmoneumata…., p. 116; Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 215; P. Danklēs, Anamnēseis-Engrapha-AllēlographiaTo archeio tou, vol. II pp. 51-52. 617 V. Dousmanēs, Apomnēmoneumata …, p. 117; Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 215; I. Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio, 605 606

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Bulgarian dexterity in warfare.618 Thus he was to stand in dread of conducting a renewal of war against them – and this feeling cast long shadow over the History of the Balkan Peninsula in general and Greece in particular. It was the Russian government that intervened to stop the hostilities and summoned again the political leadership of the belligerents to St. Petersburg. For Russia was “equally benevolent towards everyone of them”.619 Upon the advice of Koromēlas, nonetheless, King Constantine turned down the Russian démarche,620 and a conference was called in Bucharest instead. It was there that the Peace Treaty was signed on July 28, 1913. The borderline between Romania and Bulgaria was adjusted in favour of the former, Serbia annexed the Macedonian regions of Üsküp and Monastir, whilst the Greco-Bulgarian frontier was fixed along the Mesta (Nestos) River in Macedonia.621 Bulgaria lost Eastern Thrace to the Porte, but held on to the Western part of it with the port of Dedeağaç (today Alexandroupolis). True, the Bulgarian government wanted Kavalla, too; for Kavalla was as an outlet to the sea far more important than Dedeağaç. But Venizelos was adamant: he had taught a lesson by Koromēlas, whose dismissal, though vociferously sought, was still pending. Venizelos, therefore, was by no means prepared to be accused of being pro-Bulgarian. Therefore, he was laconic: To Bulgaria should be ceded either Dedeağaç or nothing.622 Greece was at last awarded Kavalla, thanks to the intervention of the Kaiser.623 So, Bulgaria lost most of Macedonia to Serbia and Greece, whilst Serbia had no sea outlet. Here is to be found the embryo of World War One – and its aftermath as well.

VI The task of the Generalissimo Constantine and his General Staff in carrying on the war against the Ottomans and the Bulgarians was crucial. Regardless of the role played by Hasan Tahsin Pasha in Salonika and Nikolaki Effendi in Janina, this was the first time after the independence of Greece that the (regular) Greek Army proved able to conquer dreaded foes such as the Ottomans and the Bulgarians. The crux of the matter, however, was that King Constantine and his Staff had been trained in Germany. On the contrary, the work II, pp. 222 (entry of June 28, 1913), 223 (entry of June 30, 1913) and 224 (entry of July 21, 1913) 618 I . Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio, II, p. 224 (entry of July 21, 1913). 619 …La Russie également bienveillante pour tous. (É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce…, V, p. 125.) 620 Ibid., pp. 125-128. 621 The text of the Treaty: Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou, Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous…, III, pp. 426-431. 622 Dimitris Michalopoulos, Attitudes parallèles: Éleuthérios Vénisélos et Take Ionescu dans la Grande Guerre (Athens : Institut de recherches sur Éleuthérios Vénisélos et son époque, 20083), p. 18. 623 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 224.

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accomplished by the French Military Mission under General Eydoux was said to lack organizational effectiveness.624 Be that as it may, Constantine after the Bucharest Treaty was signed paid a visit to Berlin and Paris. In the capital of Germany he was invested, on August 26, the insignia of a German Army Field Marshal.625 It was an honorific act: King Edward VII of Britain, for instance, was a German Field Marshal as well, whilst the Emperor Franz Joseph of AustroHungary was a British one.626 Constantine thanked the German Emperor and explained that the Greek victories in the Balkan Wars were due to the “vigour” of the Greek troops and also to the “warfare principles” that “he and his officers” had been taught in Berlin.627 He was right – and, furthermore, it was an all but private conversation between the two Sovereigns.628 Constantine’s “statement”, however, was echoed in the international Press; and accordingly a wave of protests swept Paris. The King of the Hellenes failed to grasp the reason for such indignation. He hastened to the French capital and thanked Raymond Poincaré, the President of the French Republic, for the assistance that Greece had been given by France “from her Independence [i.e. the 1821-1829 Revolution] to the glorious victories of the Balkan Wars”.629 Nevertheless, the tumult continued; and now Constantine was dubbed “the brother-in-law of the Kaiser”.630 Venizelos, on the other hand, got the message at once and grasped his chance: Greece must side with the Entente Cordiale Powers, namely France and Britain. He therefore explained to the King that Greece was actually in desperate need of French aid and support and, as a result, the “misunderstanding” should be “cleared up”.631 So it was done: from late 1913 onwards, the French seized control of the Greek Army.632No Greek officers were to be German-trained any longer. Venizelos, already awarded the cordon de la Légion d’Honneur,633 was the “man of France” in Greece634 – actually of the Entente Cordiale.

***

624 V. Dousmanēs, Apomnēmoneumata…., p. 43; I . Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio, II, p. 173 (entry of October 12, 1912). 625 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 232. 626 The Sunday Morning Herald (Sydney), October 17, 1903, p. 1. 627 É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce…, V, p. 138. 628 Ibid. 629 Ibid., p. 140. 630 Ibid. 631 EVP, I/33/103, Venizelos to the King (report [no date given]). 632 N. Th. Kladas, entry “[Hellēnikos] Stratos” (= [ The Greek] Army] in Megalē Hellēnikē Enkyklopaideia (= The Great Greek Encyclopaedia) , vol. X (Athens: Pyrsos, 1934), p. 280. 633 EVP, I/33/30-51: Congratulatory telegrams to Venizelos. 634 On comptait sur Venizelos. (É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce…, V, p. 140.)

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Meantime, the war against the Ottoman Empire was continuing (at least in theory). True, the Peace Treaty was signed in London on May 17, 1913, but though termed “definitive”635 it was only a preliminary one: for Macedonia and the island of Crete were handed over to the four Christian Balkan Sovereigns, whilst Albania and the islands of the Aegean Sea were “entrusted”, as previously stated, to the Six Great Powers.636 The Six were to deliberate upon the Islands of the Eastern Aegean Sea,637 of which the southern portion, namely the Dodecanese, had been seized by the Italians and the northern group captured, as aforementioned, by the Greeks. The Greek men-of-war, in fact, had managed to bottle up the Ottoman Fleet in the Dardanelles throughout 1912 and 1913: Not only were the Ottoman garrisons in Europe not reinforced, but large islands of the Eastern Aegean Sea, such as Lemnos, Mitylene and Chios, were occupied by Greek naval troops as well. The British had guaranteed that these islands would be annexed to Greece and so the Greek Army evacuated the Argyrokastron and Korytsa districts. Still, the Porte objected to Greek rule over these islands on the grounds that it was the Great Powers, chiefly Britain,638 that wished them to be annexed to Greece; such a “wish” nonetheless did not chime in with the thinking of the Ottoman Government.639 In point of fact, the islands of the Eastern Aegean Sea “besiege” Asia Minor.640 The Porte, therefore, was not ready to give them up.641 Still, on November 1, 1913, the Peace Treaty between the Ottoman Porte and Greece was signed in Athens. The war was formally over, diplomatic relations resumed; but the question of the islands of the Eastern Aegean Sea remained unresolved. The Porte was now threatening Greece with a fresh war. Venizelos, moreover, was blamed: because of his diplomatic and political “inepteness”, Greece was left alone face to face with a dreaded foe. Constantine, who was triumphantly touring the European capitals, hastily returned to Athens. But it was now clear that if Greece lost her naval supremacy in the Aegean, hitherto assured by the cruiser “G. Averoff”, her rule over the islands would be over. Yet Venizelos did not want the Greek Fleet to be reinforced by heavy warships (dreadnoughts); for as he frankly explained, the British government was against such a step being taken by the Greeks.642 Of course he was overtly backed by Ibid., p. 113. Ibid. 637 Ibid. 638 S.Kuneralp, The Aegean Islands Issue…, doc.256: Naby Bey to Saïd Halim Pasha, Rome, January 14, 1914, p. 200; the same to the same, Rome, February 10, 1914, pp. 232-233; Moukhtar Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador in Vienna, to Saïd Halim Pasha, Berlin, January 11, 1914, p. 236 639 S. Kuneralp, The Aegean Islands Issue…,doc. 256: Munif Bey, Ottoman chargé d’affaires at St Petersburg, to Saïd Halim Pasha, St Petersburg, December 31, 1913, pp. 178-179. 640 Ibid., p.143. 641 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 228. 642 Ibid., p. 236; I . Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio, II, p. 229ff. 635 636

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Admiral Lionel Grand Tufnell, head of the British Naval Mission in Greece.643 Therefore, upon the advice of his old friend, Emile Joseph Dillon, the noted British publicist, and due mediation, he decided to submit to the Porte the suggestion that Ottoman suzerainty over the islands in question, namely Lemnos, Mitylene and Chios,644 be preserved. In the framework of a regime analogous to that of Crete’s from 1899 to 1912, the Turkish flag would fly “somewhere, with a small garrison” to defend it. Dillon offered to inform the Ottoman government of Venizelos’ proposal.645 The suggestion, on the other hand, that Greece’s problems with Turkey be resolved following a Russian military intervention in the Balkans, was flatly turned down by Venizelos.646 The memories of the 1913 Koromēlas affair were still vivid in his mind. In May 1914, however, a fresh war between Greece and the Ottoman Empire was ante portas.647 But Greece was now in a position far worse than the one she had been in 1912. The Porte would now have to combat only Greece; and her Navy was to be strengthened by two dreadnoughts that she had ordered from British shipyards.648 These dreadnoughts were due for completion in the summer of 1914.649 The Ottoman Navy moreover was now being reorganized by a British Mission led by Rear Admiral Sir Arthur H. Limpus.650 Greece hastily purchased two American warships built in 1907, namely the “Idaho” and “Mississippi”.651 It was clear, nonetheless, that should a new Greco-Turkish war break out, the Greek Navy would be inferior to that of Turkey.652 Thus Venizelos decided to take a huge risk: he agreed to meet the Grand Vizier, Saïd Halim Pasha, in Brussels, in late August, 1914.653 He was to have “conciliatory talks” with him. It was a foregone conclusion that the Ottoman suzerainty on Lemnos, Mitylene and Chios would be accepted by the Greek government.654 Venizelos was in Trieste when the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, took place in Sarajevo.655 He was I . Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio, II, pp. 229, 231. Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, pp. 237-238. 645 I. Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio, II, pp. 235-236; S. Kuneralp, The Aegean Islands Issue…, doc. 471: Ghalib Bey to Saïd Halim Pasha, Athens, July 13, 1914, p. 288; the same to the same, Athens, July 14, 1914, p. 289. 646 Ibid., p. 237. 647 É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce…, V, p. 157. 648 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911-1918, vol. II (London: Odhams Press [no date given]), p. 436. 649 Ibid. 650 S. J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire…, II, p. 308. 651 Rear Admiral Epameinōndas P. Kavvadias, Ho Nautikos Polemos tou 1940 opōs ton ezēsa. Anamnēseis, 2 Martiou 1935-25 Martiou 1943 (= The Naval War of 1940 as I witnessed it. Memoirs, March 2, 1935-March 25, 1943), Athens: Pyrsos, 1950, p. 24. 652 Ibid. 653 S. Kuneralp, The Aegean Islands Issue…, doc. 473: Ghalib Bey to Saïd Halim Pasha, Athens, July 14, 1914, p. 289; the same to the same, Athens, July 20, 1914, p. 291. 654 M. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce…, V, p. 158. 655 Ibid., p. 159. 643 644

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astute enough to grasp that the issue was clouded. He therefore cancelled the meeting with the Grand Vizier and returned to Greece, via Brindisi.656 Thanks to the mediation of the Romanian Government, one more attempt of Greco-Turkish entente in the matter of the islands of the Aegean Sea took place in Bucharest in August. But nothing was achieved.657 For World War One had already broken out.

Ibid.; Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p.226; S. Kuneralp, The Aegean Islands Issue…, doc. 486: Ghalib Bey to Saïd Halim Pasha, Athens, July 29, 1914, p. 486. 657 Constantin Iordan, Venizelos şi Românii (Bucharest: Omonia, 20102), p. 115ff. 656

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CHAPTER FOUR The National Divide of the Greeks At the outbreak of the Great War, in August, 1914, widespread was the desire for peace among the Greek people. Though King Constantine made some bellicose statements,658 Greeks were aware of having gained enough in the Balkan wars. The point at issue, therefore, was not in annexing more territories but in ‘absorbing’ the ones incorporated and assimilating their populations.659 On the other hand, there was the Greco-Serbian Alliance Treaty concluded in May, 1913. It was regarded as a main ‘tool’ of the victory over the Bulgarians and it was still valid. The Austro-Serbian feud made the sparks fly. But what was Greece going to do? Side with her ally or remain neutral? Generally speaking, the populace had faith in both King Constantine and Eleutherios Venizelos, the Prime Minister. For they were the “tandem riders” of Greece and they had already proved to be good riders. Unaware of what had gone on behind the scenes during the years 1912-1913, Greek public opinion credited exclusively the Sovereign and “his” Prime Minister with the great success in the Balkan Wars. Peace was now a somewhat ‘universal’ passion in the country; but if the King and Venizelos ordered war, the people would follow them unconditionally. The point, in fact, being what the leading ‘tandem’ –and by no means the populace- wished to do. The King was supposed to agree with the Prime Minister as far as the foreign policy of Greece was concerned. But would this ‘harmony of opinion’ be proved in practice? *** As aforementioned, when World War I broke out Venizelos was abroad; for he was to have “conciliatory talks” with the Grand Vizier of the Porte, Saïd Halim Pasha, on the north-eastern islands of the Aegean Sea. Meantime, the acting Prime Minister was Emmanouēl Repoulēs, his minister of Internal Affairs, who was fluent only in Greek660 and Albanian, his native tongue. He was a well-known publicist; he therefore took advantage of his relations with the Press and anonymously published a couple of articles in the newspaper Hestia, viz. the official organ of the Liberal party: He advocated that Greece should abandon neutrality and side with Serbia.661

Édouard Driault and Michel Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours, vol. V (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1926), pp. 127-134. 659 Victor Dousmanēs, Apomnēmoneumata. Historikai selides tas hopoias ezēsa (= Memoirs. Pages of History that I have witnessed), Athens: Petros Dēmētrakos, 1946, p.43. 660 Demetra Vaka, Constantine: King and Traitor (London-New York: John Lane, 1918) p. 218. 661 Ibid., pp. 64-65. 658

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Now the point was not the interference of newspapers in delicate foreign policy matters but something more ‘sensitive’; namely the feelings of Greeks who were of German descent. In point of fact, many Bavarians had settled in Greece when Otho, prince of Bavaria, was elected the first King of Greece. And most important among them was Geōrgios Streit, a professor at the Law School of the University of Athens, Foreign Minister (from late 1913 on), and, further, King Constantine’s intimate friend.662 His presence among the chief members of Venizelos’ cabinet was a symbol of Greek national unity at a critical moment of World History. Yet it was this very unity that Repoulēs aimed to destroy; for it was beyond any doubt that Streit – and, in practice, every Greek of German stock- would look unfavourably on a conflict between Germany and their adoptive homeland. Repoulēs’ efforts, nonetheless, were successful. Streit realized at once who was to blame, walked into Repoulēs’ office and complained. The latter not only admitted that he himself was the author of the articles in question, but he promised that he was going to write and publish, on the same subject, even more virulent “essays”.663 Within the next few days, Venizelos was back in Greece. The Crown Council was summoned on July 20. It was made up of the current and former Prime Ministers under the Sovereign’s presidency: all of them agreed that Greece should remain neutral “for the time being”.664 It was clear, nonetheless, that something had fractured. Evidence of such a ‘fracture’ became apparent a couple of days after the Crown Council was summoned. On August 1, Streit met with Venizelos and protested against the campaign hostile to the Central Powers launched by the government press. At first, Venizelos pretended not to understand. Still, under pressure from Streit, he revealed that he saw in the war a struggle between “civilization and barbarism”; and when the Foreign Minister asked him to clarify this, he explained that “England was at war for the sake of little countries’ freedom”. Streit protested, Venizelos grew angry - and the schism between the two statesmen became apparent.665 The Rubicon, in short, had been crossed by both friend and foe of the Entente alike.

Geōrgios Ventērēs, Hē Hellas tou 1910-1920 (Greece during the Years 19101920), vol. I (Athens: Pyrsos, 1931), p. 194. 663 Ibid. 664 Geōrgios Streit, Hēmerologion-Archeion (= Diaries and Archives), vol. I (Athens, 1964), p. 3 (note 1); Alessandro de Bosdari, Delle guerre balcaniche, della Grande Guerra e di alcuni fatti precedenti ad esse: appunti diplomatici (Milano: A. Mondadori, 1928), p. 106. 665 G. Streit, Hēmerologion-Archeion, I, pp. 2-3 (entry of August 1). 662

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I Notwithstanding the pro-Entente feelings of Venizelos and his followers, at the outset of hostilities Greece was not asked to enter the war by either the London or Paris governments. Unlike Britain and France, however, the German Emperor urged King Constantine to side with the Central Powers as early as July 20/August 2, 1914. The King replied to his brother-in-law that Greece was not likely to enter “a war against Serbia”; and when the Kaiser pressed him once more on July 22/August 4, Constantine did not mince his words: Greece was at the mercy of the British –and French- Navy.666 So Greece was not in a position to march into battle against the Entente.667 Streit hastened to corroborate the views of the King.668 Serbia, on the other hand, was in a critical situation. As a result, the Serbian government repeatedly asked Venizelos to fulfill the clauses of the 1913 Alliance treaty. Literally speaking, Greece should help her ally. Venizelos, therefore, wished to have the opinion of lieutenant colonel Iōannēs Metaxas, widely recognized as a genius in warfare and chief of operations of the Greek Army’s General Staff as well. Metaxas’ report was submitted to Venizelos late on November 21, 1914. The lieutenant colonel was explicit: Greece should not assist Serbia.669 In point of fact, five Corps composed the Greek Army at that time. Their mobilization and advance into Serbia were to last 50 days. Meantime, the Bulgarian Army (20 divisions strong) was able to attack synchronically in both Serbia and Greece; and since all of the Greek troops would be fighting in Serbia, the rear would by no means be protected. As such, Greek defeat was a virtual certainty.670 Venizelos acquiesced; the Serbs were not helped by the Greeks – and the ‘famous’ 1913 Alliance Treaty was overtly broken by the Greek government.671 The main thrust of Metaxas’ argument, i.e. that a “catastrophe” was impending for Greece following Bulgarian aggression against the Greek part of Macedonia, was tormenting the mind of Greece’s military leadership from the conclusion of the Bucharest Treaty (1913) on. As aforementioned, autochthonous Macedonians were of Slavic stock and regarded themselves more or less as Bulgarians. The outcome of the Balkan Wars surrendered Macedonia to Serbia and Ibid., p. 4 (note 1); É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce…, V , pp. 162-164; Édouard Driault, Le roi Constantin (Versailles, 1930), pp. 94-95 ; A. de Bosdari, Delle guerre balcaniche, della Grande Guerra e di alcuni fatti..., p. 106. 667 S. Cosmin, Diplomatie et Presse dans l’Affaire Grecque (Paris : Société mutuelle d’édition, 1921), pp. 17-19. 668 Dispatch of Streit to the Greek legation at Berlin, No. 25108, Athens, July 26/August 8, 1914. (Published in G. Streit, Hēmerologion-Archeion, vol. I, pp. 67-69.) 669 EVP, I/34/54. 670 Ibid. 671 I. Metaxas, Hē Historia tou Ethnikou Dichasmou (= The Story of the National Divide), Athens: Kathēmerinē, 1935, p. 7. 666

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Greece. Thus Bulgarian revenge was to be expected; and Metaxas – and the whole of the Greek General Staff alike- was afraid of such an ensuing war.672 Venizelos concurred and endorsed Metaxas’ arguments673 though he confided to Streit that la neutralité n’est pas une politique.674 Such was the way things stood, when a fresh episode bemused public opinion and embarrassed the government. Two dreadnoughts, which had been ordered by the Porte from Britain, were requisitioned by the British Government for the Royal Navy on July 28, 1914 (NS).675 Such a step was not unexpected; for it was merely a day before that a secret alliance between Germany and Turkey against Russia had been proposed by the Porte. It was accepted by Germany and signed five days later.676 The “rage and disappointment” provoked by the warships’ requisition was enormous throughout the Ottoman Empire. The point, however, was that the policy of Young Turks, in almost every sphere of Ottoman life, was embodied in a “definite war plan”. In the framework of this plan, the Young Turks intended to conquer the Caucasus; for they wanted to ‘liberate’ the “Moslem areas of Caucasia”,677 and a prerequisite of such a campaign was the control of the Black Sea.678 That is why the Porte was in need of a strong Navy, and the hearts of the Ottoman admirals sank on account of the loss of the two dreadnaughts. Churchill tried to sugar the pill;679 still solace was to appear speedily from quite an unexpected quarter. This played out at Pola, the Austro-Hungarian naval base on the Adriatic Sea. Two German warships, the cruisers “Goeben” and “Breslau”, were anchored there in late July, 1914 (NS): they constituted the Mediterranean Squadron of the German Fleet. The “Goeben” was the flagship of Rear Admiral Wilhelm Souchon. Both cruisers were moored in the port of Messina, Italy, for coaling purposes, when the war broke out. The point, therefore, was where they should head for. If they returned to Pola, they would be ‘trapped’ in the Mediterranean – a sea under the control of the Entente Cordiale. Their escape to a German port, on the other hand, via the Gibraltar Strait was not feasible for them. The only solution, therefore,

G. Streit, Hēmerologion-Archeion, I, p. 5 (entry of August 2). E. Venizelos to the Greek ministers at London, Paris (Bordeaux) and Petrograd, No. 42965, Athens, November 24, 1914. (Published in G. Streit, HēmerologionArcheion, I, pp. 57-58.) 674 “Neutrality is not a policy”. (É. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce…, V , p. 164.) 675 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911-1918, II (London: Odhams Press [no date given]), p. 437. 676 Ibid., p. 436. 677 Ibid., p. 435. 678 Ibid., p. 436. 679 Ibid., p. 437. 672 673

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was to ‘take refuge’ in a secure Ottoman port such as Constantinople.680 Early on the morning of July 22/August 4, the “Goeben” bombarded the port of Philippeville, Algeria,681 and the “Breslau” the port at Bône, also Algeria.682 The hostilities, moreover, between the United Kingdom and Germany began that very day. Now the sea route to Constantinople was cut off for the German squadron by the 683 British men-of-war patrolling in the Mediterranean Sea. Still, Souchon coaled his ships anew at Messina, and afterwards headed for Greek waters, namely the Aegean Sea. During the trip, the German cruisers passed close to numerous heavy British warships, seeking to “catch” and destroy them.684 Strangely enough, this did not happen.685 So “Goeben” and “Breslau” reached the Aegean Sea unscathed on July 27/August 9.686 Rumour had it that the two German ships were “lucky”.687 Yet what happened in Greek waters proved that their escape through the British ‘blockade’ had not merely been a stroke of luck. For it was off the island of Naxos that they were coaled; and the order for them to be coaled there was given by Venizelos himself;688 moreover, such an order was given “under the aegis of the British government”,689 viz. in the teeth of the entreaties of Sir Francis Elliot, the British minister at Athens .690 The result was that the two German cruisers sailed up the Dardanelles on July 28/August 10 and anchored in the Marmora Sea.691 Nearly a week later both vessels were “sold” to the Porte and so the “command of the Black Sea” rested on balance with the Ottomans.692 On October 18/31, furthermore, the “Goeben” was renamed “Sultan Yavuz Selim”, the “Breslau” “Midilli”, and jointly with “Hamidiye” (a genuinely Ottoman war vessel) they bombarded the Sebastopol fortress, nearly destroyed Novorossiysk and heavily damaged Odessa.693 The next day, October 19/November 1, war

Spyridōn Skontras, Historia tou Prōtou Pankosmiou Polemou, 1914-1918 (= History of the First World War, 1914-1918), II (Athens: Kekrops, 1969), p.77. 681 Today : Skikda. 682 Today: Annaba. 683 S. Skontras, Historia tou Prōtou Pankosmiou Polemou…, II, p. 77. 684 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis…, II, p. 437. 685 Alexandra Stephanopoulou, Hē politikē tēs Rōsias dia tēn Kōnstantinoupolin kai ta Stena kata ton A’ Pankosmion Polemon (= Russian policy with regard to Constantinople and the Straits during WWI), Athens, 1975, p. 25. 686 S. Skontras, Historia tou Prōtou Pankosmiou Polemou…, II, p. 78. 687 Michel Farnaise, L’aventure de Goeben (Paris : La Renaissance du Livre [no date given]), p. 243. 688 Letter from the Admiral Mark Kerr, head of the British Naval Mission to Greece during World War I, to Sir Basil Thomson, April 7, 1931. (Published in: G. Streit, Hēmerologion-Archeion, vol. I, pp. 76-79.) 689 G. Ventērēs, Hē Hellas tou 1910-1920, I, pp. 240-241. 690 Ibid. 691 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis…, II, p. 438. 692 Ibid., p. 439. 693 S. Skontras, Historia tou Prōtou Pankosmiou Polemou…, II, p. 78. 680

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was officially declared by Russia on the Ottoman Porte, the latter siding officially with the Central Powers. It is beyond any doubt that “the British Government” approved of the sale of the “Goeben” and “Breslau” to the Sublime Porte. “In all the circumstances, the Admiralty agree that the sale or transfer of these two vessels to the Turkish flag should be allowed, provided that the transference is bona fide and permanent”, Churchill wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, on August 12.694 It was the aforementioned ‘consolation’, destined to “allay” the lament of the “Turkish Ministry of Marine”, whose heart had sunk following the previous requisition of the two Ottoman dreadnoughts by the Admiralty. However, merely five days later, i.e. on the very eve of the commencement of hostilities’ between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, Churchill was singing another tune: “The situation about Goeben and Breslau is extremely unsatisfactory”, he wrote again to Sir Edward Grey. And he went on: “Their sale to Turkey is probably itself a breach of neutrality. The vital condition of the repatriation of the German complements down to the last man has not taken place; [for] it is admitted that ‘experts are to be retained’. Meanwhile, the British Naval Mission has been banished from the Turkish ships committed to their charge, and forbidden to go on board the two ex-Germans”. And Churchill concluded: “As long as the Goeben and Breslau remain in this condition, and until we know that the whole of the German crews are definitely repatriated, we have to keep two British [battle] cruisers, which are urgently needed elsewhere, waiting with other vessels outside the Dardanelles. This is a situation which cannot continue indefinitely”.695 It was somewhat naïve -especially for a man as intellectually calibrated as Churchill - to expect that German crews would be repatriated after the Porte purchased the two German vessels. Of course, quite the contrary happened. W. Souchon wore the fez and was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman Fleet.696 On December 10, the ex-“Goeben” again entered the Black Sea and bombarded Batum. A couple of weeks later, the vessel ran onto a sea mine and was damaged. Still, it was capable of repair and continued being a menace to the naval forces of the Entente.697 That is why the affair of the two German cruisers is of an importance that goes beyond the framework of the Great War. Was their success in escaping the British flotillas in the Mediterranean and coaling in the Aegean Sea casual or was it the result of a carefully –and tacitly- elaborated plan? Because it was clear that the arrival of the two German warships at the Marmora Sea played a pivotal rôle on the Ottoman Empire’s stance with regard to belligerents. Had not “Goeben” and “Breslau” reached the Dardanelles safely, it is doubtful whether the Porte would have abandoned neutrality and sided with Germany in 694 695 696 697

Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis…, II, p. 438. Ibid., pp. 438-439. S. Skontras, Historia tou Prōtou Pankosmiou Polemou…, II, p. 78. Ibid., pp. 78-79.

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the Great War.698 So great was the fear of Russia “in the Turkish mind”.699

***

No later than August, 1914 did the divide among the Greeks grow stark. Lieutenant Colonel Metaxas, the linchpin person of the Greek General Staff, wrote a memorandum on July 31/August 13 submitting it to the higher-ups of the military bureaucracy as well as to the Foreign Minister : the safety of Greece could be guaranteed, only if Germany won the war.700 Venizelos, on the other hand, convinced that the interests of Greece were “indissolubly bound” to those of Great Britain, “placed at the disposal of the Entente”, on August 6/19, “all the naval and military resources of Greece”.701 Sir Edward Grey, however, “after very anxious consideration”, moved the Cabinet to decline Venizelos’ proposal, on the grounds that an alliance with Greece “meant immediate war with Turkey and possibly Bulgaria”.702 Both Venizelos and Metaxas were to be the protagonists of the Greek Drama, the curtain of which was rising. Venizelos, however, remained adamant in his choice; and on August 10/23 he declared urbi et orbi that “the sympathies of Greece were with the Entente Powers”.703 It is noteworthy that this statement was made first the battle of the Marne was won by the French.704 In other words, he was sure of the final outcome of the Great War – regardless of the vicissitudes of the moment. Moreover, he had clarified unofficially his pro-Entente attitude to the members of his cabinet as early as July 24/August 6.705 Given his attitude of mind, therefore, it was quite natural for him to act, in the “Goeben” and “Breslau” affair, in line with the British ‘instructions’. The point, consequently, is the British bias towards the two German cruisers. It was Ottoman officialdom that grasped the essence of the matter at once. The British had already agreed that Constantinople and the Straits ‘be given’ to Russia after the –happy- conclusion of the war; yet they were undermining this very perspective.706 Paradoxical as it may appear, the British wished that the Ottoman fleet of the Black Sea be strengthened to the detriment of their allies, namely the Russians. 698 S. Skontras, Historia tou Prōtou Pankosmiou Polemou…, II, p. 170; cf. Lynn H. Curtright, Muddle, Indecision and Setback. British Policy and the Balkan States, August 1914 to the Inception of the Dardanelles Campaign (Salonika: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1986), p. 17 699 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis…, II, p. 433. 700 I. Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio (= I. Metaxas’ diary), vol. II. Edited by Chr. Christidēs (Athens: Govostēs [n. d.]), p. 340 (entry of August 13, 1914). 701 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis…, II, pp. 440-441. 702 Ibid., p. 441. 703 Steph. I. Stephanou, Eleutherios Venizelos, plastourgos Historias (= Eleutherios Venizelos, a History Maker), Athens, 19772 , p. 44. 704 Ibid. 705 G. Ventērēs, Hē Hellas tou 1910-1920, I, p. 222. 706 Alexandra Stephanopoulou, Hē politikē tēs Rōsias dia tēn Kōnstantinoupolin kai ta Stena…, p. 25.

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As a matter of fact, Russia had coveted Constantinople long before the Great War broke out; and it was Fyodor Dostoyevsky who had crystallized the relevant feelings and views eloquently as early as the 1870s: “Nowadays Byzantium should be ours [=Russian], but not as a [new] capital either of Russia or of the Pan-Slavs… Constantinople by no means should be bequeathed to the Greeks. For they are not capable of ensuring their sovereignty over such an important point [of the globe]. But on what grounds might Russia covet Constantinople? On the following [ones]: [Russia is] the Power [that] has taken the lead of Orthodox Christendom since the time of Ivan III...”. And Dostoyevsky concluded: “Sooner or later, Constantinople must be ours”.707 Late in 1914, Tsar Nicholas II and nearly the whole of the Russian officialdom agreed that Russia was at war mainly for Constantinople and the Straits.708 They did not avow, of course, such an ambition to the French and the British.709 Russian views on Constantinople, nonetheless, were all but a Pulcinella secret; for the Tsar himself laid bare Russia’s supreme goal upon declaring war on the Porte. “Myself and the whole of the Russian People firmly believe that insane Turkey’s entrance into the war… will have as a result only to accelerate the development of the events. [And these events] will be fateful for Turkey, because they will pave the way for Russia to bring to fulfillment on the [other] end of the Black Sea the historic work passed on by… [our] ancestors”.710 Such was the juncture that furnished Russian public opinion with the evidence of the Tsar’s transparency: The closing of the Straits, announced by the Porte already on September 15/28, 1914, i.e. four weeks before the start of hostilities, was an enormous damage to the Russian grain trade.711 What is more, the communication lines between Russia and her allies in the West were abruptly cut off. In the mind of the Russian leadership the conquest of the Straits and Constantinople was now more necessary than ever; and for Great Britain and France, the necessity of opening a sea route to Russia through the Straits became obvious. The Gallipoli campaign was already in sight – as well as a definite breach between the Greeks.

Fyodor Dostoyevski, Journal d’un écrivain. Translated [into French] by Jean Chuzeville (Paris: Gallimard, 1951), pp. 341, 486. 708 Alexandra Stephanopoulou, Hē politikē tēs Rōsias dia tēn Kōnstantinoupolin kai ta Stena…, pp. 30-35. 709 Ibid., p. 35. 710 Ibid., p. 26; PA, BL/62/3. 711 S. Skontras, Historia tou Prōtou Pankosmiou Polemou…, II, p. 170. 707

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II On December 18/19, 1912 (OS), the Greek destroyer “Aspis” (=Shield) undertook a reconnaissance mission of the Gallipoli peninsula. Bulgarian troops were then trying to break the Chatalja line and, due to the fierce resistance put up by the Ottoman Army, the Greek Navy was called to their assistance.712 Crown Prince Constantine suggested the landing of Greek troops on Gallipoli’s western beach;713 that is why the destroyer “Aspis” was sent to reconnoitre.714 The reconnaissance mission was carried out successfully; yet the conclusion was wholly negative: no landing was feasible at Gallipoli, because the peninsula was already a “heavily fortified spot”.715 So the landing never took place. Early in 1914, I. Metaxas worked out a “plan of operations” against the Ottoman Armed Forces – in case of a fresh war between Greece and the Porte, because of the Aegean Islands issue. He was categorical: the Greek Navy was not in position to land troops on Gallipoli.716 A couple of months later he wrote a paper concentrating on the possibility of the Greek Forces seizing Gallipoli : he handed it to Major General Victor Dousmanēs, Chief of the General Staff, on July 6, 1914. Now, his mind was somewhat changed: Greek troops should able to land there, provided that the Ottoman Fleet was totally destroyed.717 Such were the issues at the start of the Great War. In December, 1914, nonetheless, “disheartenment” set in the minds of British statesmen: deadlock had been reached on the Western front. As a result, the position of the Entente was “unsatisfactory” and, with special regard to Russia, “she [Russia] [should] be saved [urgently]… from the peril of exhausted caissons”.718 It was in London, therefore, that the idea of an “alternative campaign” took shape. The relevant schemes of action were fathered by Winston S. Churchill, David Lloyd George and Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence.719 In Churchill’s, Great Britain was “to seize the German island of Borkum, invade Schleswig-Holstein, take the Kiel Canal, win over neutral Denmark, and open the Baltic to allow Russian troops to

Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn. Genikon Epiteleion Stratou. Polemikē Ekthesis (= Ministry of War. General Staff of the Army. Account of the War), Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous tou 1912-1913 (= The Greek Army in the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars), vol. I. Parartēma (=Annex), Athens: National Printing House, 1932, doc. 1434: Constantine to the War Ministry , Salonika, December 14, 1912, p. 490. 713 Ibid. 714 Ibid., doc. 1435: Constantine to rear-admiral P. Kountouriōtēs (n.d.), p. 490; doc. 1436: P. Kountouriōtēs to Constantine, Lemnos, December 15, 1912, p. 491. 715 Ibid., doc. 1437: Report of the reconnaissance, pp. 491-492. 716 I. Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio, II, pp. 255-258. 717 Ibid., pp. 294-309. 718 L. H. Curtright, Muddle, Indecision and Setback…, pp. 68-69. 719 Ibid., p. 69. 712

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be transported from Russia and landed ninety miles from Berlin”.720 It was a grandiose plan worthy of a twentieth century Alcibiades. Lloyd George, on the other hand, had studied the situation in the Balkans and had closely followed Venizelos’ political career (because the Prime Minister of Greece was a family acquaintance of Sir Arthur Crossfield, a friend of Lloyd George). He chose Salonika, therefore, as the pivotal point of an alternative campaign in the east.721 In such a scheme, the supreme goal would not be Germany, of course, but Austria.722 Still, the most eloquent plan was Hankey’s: “Germany can… be struck most effectively and with the most lasting results through her allies, and particularly through Turkey”, he wrote in his memorandum.723 The three plans were examined by the War Council on January 7 and 8. The scheme submitted by Churchill was endorsed in principle; and preference was given to Hankey’s proposal over Lloyd George’s.724 On January 13, nonetheless, Churchill gave the proposals an unexpected spin. He explained to the War Council that, according to what he had been told by Vice Admiral Suckville Carden, commander of the French and British squadrons in the Mediterranean, the Navy could seize Constantinople without the aid of troops.725 The conditio sine qua non of such an achievement was the systematic destruction of the Dardanelles fortifications. The imagination of the War Council’s members was literally stirred by this prospect and it was decided that the Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February [1915] to take the Gallipoli peninsula, with Constantinople as its objective. Strange to say, it never crossed anyone’s mind that “ships cannot fight forts”.726 Meanwhile events were coming to a head in the Balkans. For early in January, 1915, it was announced to the British government that “cooperation” between Romania, Bulgaria and Greece was to be concluded – in favour of the Entente.727 Sir Francis Elliot sounded out Venizelos at Athens. The latter grew excited.728 If only he could lure the King and the General Staff by means of a “magnificent compensation” to be given! Such compensation might be Smyrna and a strip of the Asia Minor coast with the immediate hinterland.729 Yet Greece should surrender Kavalla to Bulgaria. The story of Kavalla was an old one. Bulgarians regarded it as a good outlet to the Aegean. That is why, even with the disastrous for Ibid., p. 70; cf. Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911-1918, II, pp. 484485. 721 L. H. Curtright, Muddle, Indecision and Setback…, p. 71. 722 Ibid., p. 87. 723 Ibid., p. 70. 724 Ibid., pp. 87, 88. 725 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911-1918, II, pp. 534-536. 726 Ibid., p. 536. 727 L. H. Curtright, Muddle, Indecision and Setback…, p. 90. 728 Telegram of Venizelos circulated to the Greek ministers at Petrograd, London and Paris (in French). Published in : G. Streit, Hēmerologion-Archeion, vol. I, pp. 61-62. 729 Ibid., p. 96. 720

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Bulgaria outcome of the 1913 conflict, Kavalla was awarded to Greece only after the personal intervention of the German Emperor. Now the Entente was in need of Bulgaria entering the war and siding with Serbia. Since, therefore, Kavalla was a “gift” of the Kaiser to the King of the Hellenes, his brother-in-law, why would Greece not give it up? The issue was discussed unofficially as early as August 1914. Late in that year, Take Ionescu, the Romanian statesman and a personal friend of Venizelos’,730 raised the matter with the Greek Prime Minister.731 The latter’s response was emphatic: Kavalla’s surrender was out of the question. Unlike Bulgaria and Romania, moreover, Greece most certainly needed lebensraum. For the Greeks who were settled in Ottoman territory “were scattered all over Asia Minor”. As such, Greece was not in a position to covet slices of Anatolia and/or the Eastern Aegean seaboard: the Greek populations of Asia Minor were ‘condemned’ to return some day to Greece.732 After he had met with Sir Francis Elliot, Venizelos nonetheless changed his mind and tried to convince the King of the “necessity” that Kavalla be given up to Bulgaria. He handed him two memoranda in which he underlined the “new perspectives” of a “Greater Greece” to be recreated. Such a Greece would have sway over the whole of the Aegean Sea and the “most fertile territories” of the Near East as well.733 Constantine was disinclined to adopt this plan, whilst the General Staff were quite indifferent to it.734 It was by this way that the two rival constellations of forces fully fledged on the Greek political scene.

*** Some summing up is surely needed here. In late 1914, there were four persons leading Greece. Of course, King Constantine and E. Venizelos, the Prime Minister, were of the four. There were, nonetheless, the General Staff, whose chief was major general V. Dousmanēs, as was also - in ‘spirit’ - lieutenant colonel I. Metaxas to make up the four. The King, Dousmanēs and Metaxas were in favour of Greece’s neutrality. Some differences, however, could be discerned between them. Metaxas was a Germanophile par excellence. Not only did he believe in the military and industrial superiority of the Second Reich, but –as foretold- he saw in German victory, moreover, the ideal solution of Greece’s problems. The assertion that “German Civilization” was the “hope of Humankind” may be regarded as typical of his cast of mind.735 Dousmanēs, on the other hand, was far less Take Jonesco, Souvenirs (Paris: Payot, 1919), p. 187. Dimitris Michalopoulos, Attitudes parallèles : Éleuthérios Vénizélos et Take Ionescu dans la Grande Guerre (Athens : Institut de recherches sur Éleuthérios Vénizélos et son époque, 20083), p. 23. 732 EVP, I/35/1. (Published in D. Michalopoulos, Attitudes parallèles…, pp. 35-36. (The French translation: pp. 23-27. 733 É.Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce…, V, pp. 176-178. 734 Ibid., p. 178. 735 I. Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio, II, p. 361 (entry of September 2, 1914). 730 731

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pro-German than Metaxas was. Moreover, neither had studied in Germany nor could speak German.736 Dousmanēs’ main concern was not the future of humankind but that of Greece: he wanted her to be a “military power”.737 Yet he was an Army officer and not a politician. Thinking militarily solely, therefore, he was not in a position to gauge whether the war would be won by the Entente or by the Central Powers. That is why he advocated a strict neutrality.738 The King’s position was peculiar. Metaxas was closely associated with him and undoubtedly was able to influence him. His main concern, nonetheless, was the preservation of the territorial gains that Greece had made in the Balkan Wars, the safety of his House, and the retention of the prestige and the appreciation he enjoyed for having defeated “Turks and Bulgarians, hereditary foes of Greece”. Assuredly, he had no sympathy for the “bourgeois democracies” of the Entente Cordiale Powers. He was inclined towards authoritarian systems of government; that is why he had “links of affection” with both the Kaiser and Tsar Nicholas II.739 Yet he was often motivated by Sophia, his Queen Consort, and George, the Crown Prince.740 The former sided with her brother sentimentally and, of course, the Second Reich; the latter, instigated by his mother, was clearly proGerman. So the King, though a convinced ‘neutralist’,741 looked proGerman. What is more since August 30/September 12, 1914 he had not been assisted by Streit, because the latter had resigned that very day.742 In point of fact, Streit could no longer tolerate Venizelos’ pro-Entente stance; and Venizelos, on the other hand, wished the Foreign portfolio be given to someone more ‘obedient’ to his instructions.743 Still, the point is that he trusted nobody; thus he made himself Minister of Foreign Affairs.744 Following Streit’s virtual dismissal, the King was deprived of a friend who was a sincere neutralist in spite of his German descent.745 For Streit, whose wife was the sister of an eminent Venizelist,746 was Demetra Vaka, Constantine: King and Traitor, p. 111. Ibid., p. 116. 738 V. Dousmanēs, Apomnēmoneumata…, p. 149ff. 739 Demetra Vaka, Constantine: King and Traitor, p.47. 740 Dēmētrēs Michalopoulos, “Hē kata ton A’ Pankosmio polemo allēlographia tou hellēnikou vasilikou zeugous me ton autokratora tēs Germanias” (The correspondence between the Royal Couple of Greece and the Emperor of Germany during World War I). Anakoinōseis hēmeridos (16 Martiou 2006) gia tēn epeteio tou thanatou tou Eleutheriou Venizelou (= Proceedings of the Congress [March 16, 2006] on the Anniversary of Venizelos’ Death), Athens: Historical Institute for Studies on Eleutherios Venizelos and his Era, 2007, p. 79ff. 741 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados, 1828-1964 (= Political History of Modern Greece, 1828-1964), vol. III (Athens: Papyros, 1966), p. 272; A. de Bosdari, Delle guerre balcaniche, della Grande Guerra e di alcuni fatti..., p. 111. 742 G. Streit, Hēmerologion-Archeion, I, pp. 45-46. 743 Ibid., p. 45 (entry of August 30/September 12, 1914). 744 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 290. 745G. Streit, Hēmerologion-Archeion, vol. I, pp. 24-25 (entry of August 12/24, 1914). 746 Cf. Pēnelopē S., Delta, Eleutherios K. Venizelos. Hēmerologio-AnamnēseisMartyries-Allēlographia (=Eleutherios K. Venizelos. Diary-Memoirs-Eyewitness 736 737

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never again to be involved in politics. Early in 1915 neutralism in Greece suffered a further blow. V. Dousmanēs, chief of the General Staff, wrote a letter to a friend of his, in which he expressed his preference for authoritarianism to the detriment of resting-onmajorities democracy. Autocracy, in fact, was the key-concept to his way of thinking.747 The letter came to Venizelos’ attention: he grew furious and, on January 28/February 10, 1915, he requested the King to relegate Dousmanēs to reserve duties. Constantine was hesitant for a while; yet ultimately he gave in and signed the relevant order.748 Venizelos, nevertheless, though having the upper hand, discovered that his victory was a Pyrrhic one; for Metaxas became the acting chief of the General Staff, and, as aforesaid, he was not a neutralist but an ardent Germanophile. Now the King had no-one on whom to uphold his non-interference policy. To cap it all, a fresh character was to emerge on the stage of Modern Greece’s drama in 1915: Nikolaos Theotokēs, Minister at Berlin from the outbreak of the Great War on. He was a genuine aristocrat from Corfu and clearly pro-German. His contribution to the formation of a Germanophile bias among Greek politicians and people was of great importance. For he was to depict, through his dispatches to Athens, the image of a German Reich actually indestructible and safe from either military or economic attack. It was thanks to him, moreover, that the military and the bureaucrats, passed by in 1910 because of Venizelos’ “chicanery”, considered the pro-German attitude to be the means of their returning to power and taking revenge for the humiliation they had suffered. In the beginning, Venizelos had the one advantage of having clearcut ideas. Unlike his adversaries, either neutralists or Germanophiles, he was convinced of just one thing: The defeat of the Entente Cordiale would encompass his own ruin. The military leadership disliked him as did the King’s entourage. In the framework of an authoritarian system, as advocated by Dousmanēs, there would be no room for an ambitious and energetic person such as he was. He would have preferred to be born a sovereign; and this not being the case, he used to taunt the ingratitude of Kings bitterly.749 In short, with regard to the struggle of the Entente Cordiale against the Central Empires, his slogan was “Victory or Death”. In other words, he would rather perish, should Great Britain and France be conquered by Germany.750 His predilection for the Entente Cordiale, nonetheless, rested on other reasons, too. He firmly believed that it was impossible for Great

Accounts- Correspondence). Edited by P. A. Zannas, Athens: Hermes, 1979, p. 27 (note 34). 747 Demetra Vaka, Constantine: King and Traitor, p. 112. 748Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, pp. 307-308. 749 750

D. Michalopoulos, Attitudes parallèles…, p. 31. G. Streit, Hēmerologion-Archeion, I, p. 21 (entry of August 8/21, 1914).

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Britain to lose the war.751 (As for France he was somewhat skeptical.752) His policy, therefore, was crystal-clear: Greece must join the Entente Cordiale Powers as soon as possible. Yet it is needful to consider who was backing Venizelos. The rich Greek Diaspora, mainly within Egypt, supported him wholeheartedly. The war, in fact, was having a disastrous impact on their businesses, and they saw in Germany the unique culprit for the world conflict.753 Yet, unlike these fabulously wealthy merchants, the Greek people, especially in the Peloponnese and Attica, i.e. Greece’s heartland, were moving in the opposite direction. Whilst at the beginning of the war they approved of the neutralist policy of the tandem King Constantine/Venizelos,754 as soon as the breach between them became apparent, they opted for the King. It is noteworthy that in the summer of 1916 mass gatherings took place in downtown Athens: the populace was living in the hope of seeing August von Mackensen’s troops in Greece.755 It was due to the lack of people support that Venizelos was obliged to resort to French and British troops later on. What is more, the followers of the King, either neutralists or Germanophiles, disputed Greece’s expansion eastward. Although they did not admit openly it, they wished Greece had annexed not Salonika –by no means a Greek city in 1912- but Monastir in Serbia and the Gjirokastër and Korçë districts in Albania.756 Since Monastir had been annexed by a friendly country, namely Serbia, Gjirokastër and Korçë, in Albania, would become emblematic place names of the right-wing Greek irredentism. Those were the days that witnessed the start of the Dardanelles campaign. It was on February 19, 1915 (NS), that the bombardment of the Straits’ forts commenced. To give an account of the events of course would be beyond the scope of this book. Still, it is noteworthy that Hankey and Lloyd George’s options for an alternative campaign (namely in the Dardanelles and Salonika) were somewhat interchangeable in the beginning until finally becoming closely interconnected .757 This was to take its toll on Greek politics.

Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 312. G. Streit, Hēmerologion-Archeion, vol. I, p. 21 (entry of August 8/21, 1914). 753 I. Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio, II, p. 367 (entry of September 9, 1914); Hē Pēnelopē Delta kai ho kosmos tēs (= Penelope Delta and her World), Athens: Benaki Museum, 2006, pp. 12-13. 754 Cf. Pēnelopē S., Delta, Eleutherios K. Venizelos…, p. 11. 755 Aus den Geheimarchiven der Entente, vol. 5: Die europäischen Mächte und Griechenland während des Weltkrieges (Dresden: Carl Reissner, 1932), doc. 188, the Russian minister at Athens to B. Stürmer, Athens, August 15/28, 1916, p. 16. 756 G. Streit, Hēmerologion-Archeion, I, pp. 72-73. 757 L. H. Curtright, Muddle, Indecision and Setback…, p. 123ff. passim. 751 752

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III Upon hearing of the Dardanelles operation news, Venizelos seized the chance to get Greece involved in the war. The revival of the Megaloidea -viz. the “Great Idea” of the Byzantine Empire being restored with Constantinople as the capital city- looked to him as being the fitting means of taking definite hold of Greek politics. If only he could ‘urge’ Constantine to enter Constantinople in triumph! His name with that of the King would be ‘hallowed’ in the memory of the Greeks. His obscure past and his unscrupulous means of seizing power would sink into oblivion forever.758 In short, he was “blinded by the Byzantine vision”.759 Nonetheless, there was a serious drawback to the participation of Greek troops in the Dardanelles affair. As early as November 1914 Sir George Buchanan, British ambassador to Russia, stated to Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov, Foreign Minister of Russia, that “His Majesty’s Government was led to recognize that the Straits and Constantinople issue should be resolved according to Russia’s desires”. Sir George added that he was happy “about making such a statement”.760 Sazonov, of course, was on the verge of tears of joy;761 and Maurice Paléologue, the French ambassador, who was present, could not but pretend to share the general happiness.762 Unlike the British government, however, the French were clearly reluctant to support such a ‘scheme’.763 Deeply troubled the Tsar tried to soften the French position by means of a tête-à-tête with M. Paléologue in Tsarskoye Selo; he explained to him accordingly that Russia was not aiming at annexing Constantinople but making of it an “international city”. Yet the French remained icy.764 There was no doubt that the “final solution” of the Straits/Constantinople issue would come about only after the end of the war.765 Greek involvement, nonetheless, would sign away Russia’s dream. Still, Venizelos did not care about Russian rancour. The point in his eyes was that the Franco-British campaign was to be carried out without actual land troops.766 Venizelos, therefore, would ask the King whether the “ancestral war against the Turks” was to be continued. If it was, then Greek troops would be going to fight against the Ottomans at Gallipoli. He met with the King on February 15 and 17, 1915 (OS). Constantine was at last persuaded: he approved of Venizelos’ plan, P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung. Aus den Gemeinarchiven in Wien, Berlin und Bern, 1908-1918 (Athens: Zacharopoulos, 19922), pp. 350. 759 Ibid., p. 351. 760 Alexandra Stephanopoulou, Hē politikē tēs Rōsias dia tēn Kōnstantinoupolin kai ta Stena…, p. 38. 761 Ibid. 762 Ibid. 763 Ibid. 764 Ibid., pp. 41-42. 765 Ibid., p. 38. 766L. H. Curtright, Muddle, Indecision and Setback…, p. 113. 758

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eulogized the Prime Minister and “called upon God”.767 Yet Venizelos had not taken into account the mind of Metaxas, now acting as Chief of the General Staff. Thus, whilst the Sovereign was complimenting Venizelos with a “tremulous voice”, “the bomb exploded”; Metaxas had resigned from the Army, on the grounds of his “disagreement with the Government”.768 If truth be told, Venizelos had asked Metaxas’ opinion no later than mid-February (OS).769 The lieutenant colonel was categorical: The Franco-British Dardanelles campaign was doomed from the start. A “sea campaign”, moreover, was unlikely to be successful in winter time; thus, the participation of Greek troops would be nonsensical. Greece, for her part, would thus be exposed to Bulgarian aggression.770 Venizelos did not expect Metaxas to react so bluntly. He was sure, in addition, that the King would not back the acting Chief of the General Staff. Yet he was mistaken; for Constantine had had enough. As a matter of fact, it was thanks to Venizelos’ acrimony that Streit and Dousmanēs were ‘fired’. What is more, even the German minister at Athens, Alfred von Quadt zu Wykradt und Isny, though always tactful,771 was compelled to resign, because Venizelos disgusted him.772 True, Venizelos’ antipathy towards von Quadt was ‘disguised’ as an “incident” between the German minister and the King of the Hellenes.773 Constantine, nonetheless, had modelled his conduct once more on his Prime Minister’s “advices”. Were now Metaxas to be ‘fired’ as well, the Sovereign would be utterly and definitively under the thumb of Venizelos – a virtual dictator.774 For the Sovereign was to have no more friends in key positions of the State machinery. So, he summoned the Prime Minister on February 21/March 6, 1915 and declared to him in no uncertain terms that Greece was not to take part in the Dardanelles campaign.775 In doing so, Constantine approved of the opinion of Metaxas, whilst almost all the Greek politicians were biased towards Venizelos.776 In brief, the Sovereign concurred with the opinion

767 Kōnstantinos G. Zavitzianos, Hai anamnēseis tou ek tēs historikēs diafōnias Vasileōs Kōnstantinou kai Eleutheriou Venizelou opōs tēn ezēse, 1914-1922 (=Kōnstantinos Zavitzianos’ Memoirs from the Historical Disagreement between King Constantine and Eleutherios Venizelos as he witnessed it, 1914-1922), vol. I, Athens, 1946, p. 44. 768 Ibid. 769 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 319. 770 I. Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio, II, pp. 406-413 (entry of February 17, 1915). 771 George M. Melas, Ex-King Constantine and the War (London: Hutchinson, [n.d. ]), p. 142. 772 P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung…, pp. 356-359. 773 Ibid. 774 Ibid., p. 352. 775 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, III, p. 326. 776 Ibid., p. 325.

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Gounarēs and the military had 777– because Metaxas was of course backed by Dousmanēs and his colleagues on the General Staff.778 Yet the Greek people were by then supporting sentimentally a Greek attack on the Ottoman Empire:779 the “Byzantine Vision” was still ‘blinding’ all Greeks. In other words, Constantine was behaving in sharp contrast to the public opinion in Greece.780 So the question is more pressing than ever: Why did he turn down the suggestion made by the Entente Cordiale and Venizelos? Why did he dismiss Venizelos? The King was said to be influenced by his wife, the Queen Consort Sophia.781 The latter is said to have cabled to her brother, the Kaiser, asking him to “make overtures” to Greece;782 and Wilhelm II consented. Whatever the facts of the matter, the German Emperor did assure his brother-in-law of the following; that: 1. Greece would be able to raise a loan from Germany; 2. Greek sovereignty of the islands of the north-eastern Aegean Sea, namely Lemnos, Mitylene and Chios, would be “unconditionally recognized” by the Sublime Porte; 3. Greek populations in the Ottoman Empire would in future live “freely and be “absolutely protected”; 4. At the end of the War, Greece was to annex territories in Macedonia and Albania. Merely one condition was necessary and sufficient for all of these terms to be fulfilled: Greece should remain neutral until the end of the World conflict.783 True, these offers were made “orally” – by the Emperor to the King of the Hellenes:784 they were, nonetheless, under the guarantee of the Second Reich. For they were communicated to Constantine by the newly–appointed German minister at Athens, Wilhelm Graff von Mirbach-Harff (who was to be murdered in Moscow in 1918785) and Venizelos as well, 786 and were to be repeated officially and in writing in September, 1915.787 These “overtures” proved to be fatal for Venizelos; for war on the side of the Entente Cordiale was no longer of interest to the King. If the King were sure of Greek sovereignty over the disputed islands of the Aegean and of Albanian and the annexation of Serbian and Albanian territories to Greece, why should he tolerate the virtual dictatorship of Venizelos any longer? The

777 S. Cosmin, L’Entente et la Grèce pendant la Grande Guerre (1914-1915), tome I (Paris : Société mutuelle d’édition, 1926), p. 42. 778 Ibid., p. 320. 779 P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung…, pp. 337. 780 K. G. Zavitzianos, Hai anamnēseis tou…, I, p. 49. 781 P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung…, pp. 339-343. 782 Ibid., p. 341. 783 I. Metaxas, Hē Historia tou Ethnikou Dichasmou, p. 11. 784 P. K. Enepekides, Gloria uns Spaltung…, pp. 314. 785 By the Socialist-Revolutionaries. See Robert Service, Lenin. A biography (London: Pan Books, 2003), p. 360. 786 P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung…, pp. 313. 787 I. Metaxas, Hē Historia tou Ethnikou Dichasmou, p. 11.

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people, moreover, had their conscience eased, because further annexations were in store for Greece without bloodshed!788 Here lies the defining moment in the story of the National Divide of modern Greeks. From then on the Greek people deserted Venizelos and went over to the side of the King. Were the German “overtures” a Queen Consort’s masterly stroke? Maybe; still, the point is that they were a masterly stroke indeed. Venizelos himself was fully aware of the impact that the German “guarantees” had on Greek politics. That is why following his return to power in 1917 the relevant documents literally disappeared,789 and Venizelos accordingly pretended to know nothing about them.790 The relevant documents, nonetheless, do exist both in the German archives791 and the Austrian ones.792

*** Following his disagreement with the Sovereign, Venizelos resigned from office on February 21, 1915 (OS);793 and it was Alexandros Zaïmēs who succeeded him at the presidency of the Greek cabinet.794 As aforementioned, he was a well-known still shadowy politician,795 who grasped the chance to provide everybody evidence of his ideological colourlessness. He stated, in fact, that Greece was to pursue a neutralist policy; still, this policy would be benevolent vis-àvis the Entente Powers.796 But the King and his military entourage were by no means ready to endorse such a colourless attitude in such critical years. Thus a new cabinet, under Dēmētrios Gounarēs, was sworn into office on February 25/March 10, 1915;797 the Prime Minister took upon himself the War portfolio as well. He was the noblest and most virtuous character in Greek politics.798 He was cultured, well-mannered and had deep knowledge of almost every aspect of national life;799 for he used to spend his leisure time studying.800 Venizelos himself held him in high esteem.801 That a P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung…, pp. 348. I. Metaxas, Hē Historia tou Ethnikou Dichasmou, p. 11. 790 P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung…, pp. 312, 321-322. 791 Auswärtiges Amt (signed: Dr. Pretsch) to Dr. Ing. D. Gyalistras, No. 117-251.09, Bonn, February 6, 1979. (Dr. Gyalistras had asked the German authorities whether the relevant documents existed. The author of these lines was given a copy of the answer that Dr. Gyalistras received.) 792 P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung…, pp. 313. 793 Daily paper Empros (= Forward [Athens]), February 22, 1915, p. 1. 794 Ibid. 795 See Chapter Two. 796 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, IV (Athens: Papyros, 1968), p. 18. 797 Ibid. 798 K. G. Zavitzianos, Hai anamnēseis tou…, I, p. 56. 799 Sir Basil Thomson, The Allied Secret Service in Greece. Translated into Greek by Kōstas Barbēs (Athens: Logothetēs [n.d.]), p.79. 800 Dēmētrēs Michalopoulos, “Dēmētrios Gounarēs. Hē zōē kai to telos henos anthrōpou, 1867-1922” (=Dēmētrios Gounarēs. The Life and Death of a Man, 18671922], in Hē Dikē tōn Oktō kai hē ektelesē tōn Hexi (= The Trial of the Eight and the Execution of the Six), Athens: Historical Institute for Studies on Eleutherios Venizelos and his Era, 20102, p. 125ff. passim. 788 789

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bitter enmity was to develop speedily between them resulting in Gounarēs’ execution in 1922 is all but a tragic irony. Be that as it may, according to Baron Julius von Szilassy, the Austro-Hungarian minister at Athens, Gounarēs was a pronounced Germanophile – and, of course, a royalist.802 Petros Prōtopapadakēs, the Finance Minister, was Gounarēs’ close friend. He was true to his ideals and had a very good name in Athens and Naxos, his native island.803 The other members of the new government were more or less cast in the same mould as Gounarēs and Prōtopapadakēs. At first Venizelos did not enter into division with the new administration, though his party had the majority in the Parliament. He was to change his mind very soon. Most likely this ‘volte-face’ was due to Repoulēs, his ‘evil spirit’; for the latter, for personal reasons, was on very bad terms with the King.804 Venizelos, therefore, addressed a missive to the Sovereign, accusing him of “putting into practice a pro-dynasty policy” that was fatal for the country; for such a policy was actually contrary to the Entente in general “and England in particular”.805 Gounarēs replied on behalf of King Constantine accusing Venizelos of what amounted to ‘treason’ his wish that Kavalla be surrendered to the Bulgarians.806 Of course, tension escalated; the King henceforth sided overtly with Gounarēs,807 backed by his Queen Consort who saw in Gounarēs a “calm nature and wise mind”.808 Venizelos, therefore, since he had been checkmated, stated that he was resigning from politics809 and fled to Alexandria, Egypt. The fabulously rich Greek colony there made him feel most welcome –as did the British authorities, too.810 Whereupon Venizelos changed his mind: thanks to his Alexandria friends and the British he was ready to enter the political arena again. Meanwhile, Gounarēs’ minority government was feeling uneasy. On the Prime Minister’s advice, therefore, the King proclaimed that parliamentary elections be held on May 31/June 13, 1915. The hope was that the “verdict of the People” would offer a solution to Greece’s political dilemmas. As a matter of fact, there were two points that needed clarifying by the electorate: 1) What foreign policy was most fitting in the interests of the Kingdom? In other words, should Greece side with the Entente Cordiale, in the hope of post-war “rich dividends” in Asia Minor. And 2) whether the people approved of the

801Sp.

V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, IV, p. 19; P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung…, pp. 366. 802 P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung…, p. 366; cf. Empros, September 29, 1920, p. 1. 803 P. K. Enepekides, Gloria und Spaltung…, p. 366. 804 K. G. Zavitzianos, Hai anamnēseis tou…, I, p. 51. 805 The text: ibid., p. 52. 806 Ibid., p. 57. 807 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, IV, p. 20. 808 Ibid. 809 K. G. Zavitzianos, Hai anamnēseis tou…, I, p. 59. 810 Pēnelopē S. Dellta, Eleutherios K. Vénselos…, p. 11.

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King’s attitude and conduct, who was already openly in contention with Venizelos. The elections actually took place on the fixed date: Venizelos’ Liberals were the winners.811 His majority in the new Parliament, nonetheless, was due mainly to the provinces annexed to Greece in 1913.812 But the populations of these “new provinces”, either Turks (viz. Moslems) or Slavs, had not been assimilated yet. As a result, the voters of the Kingdom’s southern regions considered the result of the elections to be null and void: In short, fresh strife was in store for Greece and the Greeks.

IV The new Venizelos cabinet was sworn into office on August 10/23, 1915. Kōnstantinos Raktivan was given the portfolio of Justice, and Emmanouēl Repoulēs that of Finance.813 Notwithstanding the fresh Venizelos’ rise to power, King Constantine was determined to follow his neutralist policy as far as the world conflict was concerned. On August 19 (OS) Kōnstantinos Zavitzianos, the new Speaker of the Parliament, paid a visit to the Sovereign at his country residence, Tatoi, near Athens. It was then and there that Constantine declared once more that the “war was virtually over” – of course in favour of Germany and her allies. His conviction relied on II Reich’s military and scientific superiority. The United States were still an “unpredictable factor”, but even if they joined the Entente Powers at last, they would not be able to display their “wealth and power” unless a “considerable space of time would have passed”. During that time, Germany would be most likely to “win the war”.814 If truth be told, the King was right. Following the French crushing defeat early in the 1870s, a somewhat “blind belief” to the “limitless power of the Science” had grown up throughout Europe.815 His idea, furthermore, that the Entente Cordiale would be late in taking advantage of the American industrial and financial superiority was not wrong as well. Yet he was not able to perceive the “subterraneous currents” that “run invisibly” the events and determine occasionally the outcome of the great conflicts. As a matter of fact, such currents were to determine the issue of the First World War. To cap it all, the Greek Government was constantly alerted by Nikolaos Theotokēs, Minister at Berlin, to Germany’s inexhaustibility as far as foodstuff, industrial production, and financial capacity were concerned. To Theotokēs the Entente blockade had no impact upon Andrew Dalby, Eleftherios Venizelos (London: Haus Publishing, 2010), p. 61. Yannis G. Mourélos, L’intervention de la Grèce dans la Grande Guerre (19161917), Athens : Institut français d’Athènes, 1983, p. 21. 813 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, IV, p. 36. 814 K. G. Zavitzianos, Hai anamnēseis tou…, I, pp. 82-84. 815 Cf. the famous work of Ernest Renan, The Future of Science. Translated into English by Albert D. Vandam and C. B. Pitman, London: Chapman and Hall, 1891. 811 812

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the Reich; for it was able to feed not only the 67,000,000 Germans but the 1,500,000 POWs, too. Germany had still a bovine livestock 20 million strong and a swine one 21 million strong.816 The potato production was fairly meeting population’s nutrition needs,817 industry was unharmed by the war,818 and Germany was by no means hit by financial crisis.819 To be sure, the Reich had spent 20 billion marks for war purposes from August, 1914 to August, 1915,820 whereas the total property of Germany, either public and private, was estimated to 300 billion marks.821 But the 33.7% of the value of banknotes issued in 1915 by the Reichsbank consisted of gold cover, whilst only 28.3% and 25.3% of the notes issued respectively by the Banque de France and the Bank of England consisted of precious metal cover.822 It was well known on the other hand that the United States were constantly and heavily furnishing the Entente with war material.823 That is why the war was not over yet.824 Still, the Reich was unlikely to lose the war, because the organization skills and discipline of the German Folk “were unparalleled”.825 Be that as it may, the King and the Premier were resolute to avoid evidence of ill will among them. Constantine explained to Venizelos that their “common line” consisted in maintaining neutrality and turning down “any offer of joining either camp of the belligerents, even following promises of Greece’s territorial expansion”.826 Yet the period of lull was to end soon… …For on September 8/21 Bulgaria’s entrance into the war at the side of Germany grew more likely than ever.827 In such a case, Serbia would certainly succumb – unless assisted by Greece. King Constantine and the General Staff, nonetheless, were by no means willing to help the Serbian Army with Greek troops; so another solution should be found. And then Venizelos had a ‘masterly’ idea: What about the French and British Gallipoli troops coming into Greece to have a hand lent to the Serbs? Still, the Greek Constitution was categorical on that point; for the article 99 read as follows: “Without a [special] legislation foreign troops cannot either pass through the Greek territory or serve in Greece”;828 but Venizelos was resolute to circumvent the Parliament AYE, 1915, N. Theotokēs to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, dispatch No. 3043, Berlin, August 22/September 4, 1915. 817 Ibid. 818 Ibid. 819 Ibid. 820 AYE, 1915, N. Theotokēs to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, dispatch No. 2911, Berlin, August 8/21August, 1915. 821 Ibid. 822 Ibid. 823 Ibid. 824 Ibid. 825 Ibid. 826 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, IV, p. 38. 827 S. Skontras, Historia tou Prōtou Pankosmiou Polemou…, II, p. 358. 828 Ephēmeris tēs Kyvernēseōs tou Vasileiou tēs Hellados (= Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Greece), I, No. 127 (June 1st, 1911), p. 531, 816

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and the relevant embarrassing debates. He sounded out the King therefore – of course secretly. Constantine tried to escape the dilemma: “In principle, yes”, he told the Premier; “but I should know the strength of the Entente troops to be dispatched”.829 Venizelos, nevertheless, interpreted King’s “in principle” agreement as a definite one; and without spending more time, he summoned French and British troops to land in Salonika.830 It was a coup d’État; yet it was carried out not by military against the government but by the head of the government against the Sovereign and the military establishment. Constantine, therefore, made haste to react; and on September 24/October 7, 1915, Venizelos once more resigned from office due to his “discord with the Crown”.831 On that very day a new cabinet was formed headed by the “colourless” A. Zaïmēs, the statesman who was said to “able to deal with all situations”. But this situation proved to be beyond his control. Thus he resigned on October 25/November 7, 1915, and Stephanos Skouloudēs, a fabulously wealthy banker, native of Chios island and aged 77, was appointed Prime Minister by the King.832 Skouloudēs is one more part of the Greek Enigma during the First World War. His interests laid not in Greece but in Britain instead. Still, he posed as an avowed enemy of the Entente Cordiale and, to cap it, he was the close friend of Basil Zaharoff, i.e. the dubious gun merchant. As a matter of fact, it was his ‘decisive support’ that Zaharoff had in some critical moments of his stormy life;833 and Skouloudēs did not hesitate to declare urbi et orbi that he was “honoured” by Zaharoff’s friendship.834 His appointment to the premiership was all but a King’s effort to veil his neutralist policy under a personality friendly to the British. He failed, nonetheless, and new legislative elections were proclaimed for December 6/19, 1915.835 Venizelos grew wrathful and he declared that his Liberals would abstain from voting.836 And so was done. Rubicon was crossed. Not only did the Liberals abstain but they declared by the mouth of their leader that the elections “were not valid”.837 Whatever the facts of the matter, the point is that Venizelos did not want him and his party to undertake the risk of a new electoral combat. For now, his disagreement with the K. G. Zavitzianos, Hai anamnēseis tou…, I, p. 90. EVP, I/35/334, Venizelos’ circular dispatch to the Greek Legations at Paris, Rome, Petrograd, London and Niš (Serbia), Athens, September 8/21, 1915 (in French). 831 Alcibiades Provatas, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados apo 1821 mechri 1980. Nomothetika kai ektelestika Sōmata (= Political History of Modern Greece from 1821 to 1980. Legislative and Executive Bodies), Athens, 1980, p. 400. 829 830

832 833 834 835 836 837

Ibid., p. 401. Richard Lewinson, Zaharoff. L’européen mystérieux (Paris : Payot, 1930), p. 32ff. Ibid., p. 8. Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, IV, p. 75. A. Provatas, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, p. 399. Ibid.

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King being obvious, the populace was most likely in favour of the Crown. So he opted not to rely on the polls and began preparing his second coup d’État instead. Constantine, on the other hand, kept considering Skouloudēs to be able enough to pursue a neutralist policy being simultaneously in good terms with the Entente. So the Prime Minister was given also the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, whilst D. Gounarēs, mastermind and éminence grise of the anti-Venizelist social and political constellation, was merely the minister of Internal Affairs. But now it was the Germans who drew a red herring across the trail. For French and British troops effectively landed in Salonika late in September, 1915 (OS) Yet they were few, proved not to be able to effectively support the Serbs and imposed on Macedonia’s megalopolis a harsh regime of military occupation instead. Venizelos protested on the grounds that his “invitation” to the Gallipoli troops of the Entente was misinterpreted by the Allies,838 but Salonika’s occupation was a fait accompli in late 1915. So Venizelos changed his mind, grasped the advantages of the situation created in Northern Greece and decided to act accordingly. Paradoxical as it may appear, it was the Germans that paved him the way. From October, 1915 on Bulgaria was belligerent and her government was by no means disposed to tolerate Salonika, important harbour of neutral Greece, to be occupied by Entente troops.839 As a result, a Bulgarian Army’s column, led by German officers, advanced to the Rupel fortress, Macedonia, in May 1916, and asked the Greek garrison to evacuate it. Upon instructions from Athens, the commandant opposed no difficulties and the fortress was captured by Bulgarians and Germans. Bulgaria’s minister at Athens explained that Rupel’s seizure was only a “defensive measure” aiming at “counterbalancing” Salonika’s occupation by Entente.840 Still, the Greek public opinion was upset. As for the Germans there was no problem… but the Bulgarians were a quite different affair; for they had been bitter foes of the Grecophile populations in Macedonia from the beginning of the twentieth century on. If truth be told, the populations in Southern Greece, especially the Peloponnese, did not care too much. But in other regions of the country, the ones annexed to Greece following the end of the Balkan War, people’s sentiment leaned now towards Venizelos and his followers. The National Divide of the Greeks was now a fact.

EVP, I/35/376, circular dispatch of Venizelos to the Greek Legations at Greek Legations at Paris, Rome, Petrograd, and London, Athens, September 18/October 1st, 1915. 839 D. Michalopoulos, “Hē kata ton A’ Pankosmio polemo allēlographia tou hellēnikou vasilikou zeugous… », doc. 12, King Constantine to N. Theotokēs, Greek minister at Berlin, Athens, March 10, 1916 (OS), p. 100. 840 Hypourgeion epi tōn Exōterikōn (=Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Diplōmatika engrapha, 1913-1917 (= Diplomatic Papers, 1913-1917), Athens: National Publishing House, 19202, No. 118, p. 169. 838

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V On August 16/29, 1916, a putsch started in Salonika, aiming at the removal of the Athens “royalist government”.841 The protagonists were Gendarmerie and Army officers originating from the island of Crete. The putsch was nearly aborted, but the support of the Entente troops proved to be a key factor. For the general Maurice Sarrail, Commander-in-Chief of the Orient Army, declared the Greek officials who did not sympathize with the sedition to be “under arrest” and imposed Salonika’s secession from the Kingdom of Greece. There is no wonder that Sarrail acted in favour of the putsch. A fervent republican by conviction and married to a Protestant lady,842 he saw in King Constantine a foe of the Secular Statehood in general and the Entente Cordiale in particular; and further he wanted Salonika, with her internationally connected big Jewry, to be an autonomous, nay! an independent city. Venizelos grasped the point at once. The megalopolis of Macedonia, with her medley of population and under the joint control of his Greek followers and the French of Sarrail, constituted a unique place wherein he could found his own pro-Entente Republic. So he left Athens and under the protection of the French but the guidance of the British,843 he reached Salonika on September 26/October 9 and assumed the political leadership of the seditious military. His government, known henceforth as the “Salonika one”, was recognized by the Entente Powers only de facto. The reason for such an attitude was that the British government wanted to have King Constantine not dethroned but acting in accordance with its dictates. The King of the Hellenes, in fact, was the cousin of King George V of England; 844 and what is more, the removal of the Kingship in Greece would enhance the French influence in the Southern Balkans to the detriment of the British one.845 Still, Venizelos had the “official sympathy” of the British Government;846 the “official support”, therefore, would not be late to come. Still, the virtual assistance actually was enough. For credits were granted to the Salonika government, whilst the Greek “Salonika Army”, a conscript one formed out by Venizelists from Crete and the Eastern Aegean islands, was abundantly supplied by the Entente Cordiale with arms, war materials and munitions. Army officers, furthermore, civil servants and NCOs who preferred to desert the Athens “Royalists” and join the “Salonika Army and Government” were

Général Sarrail, Mon commandement en Orient (1916-1918), Paris : Ernest Flammarion, 1920, p. 152. 842 Compton Mackenzie, First Athenian Memories (London: Cassell, 1931), p. 309. 843 PA, E/3/15/2. 844 On the political impact of such a kinship, see Général Sarrail, Mon commandement en Orient…, p. 153. 845 PA, E/3/15/1. 846 Ibid. 841

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given the guarantee that were not to suffer loss of promotion or pension rights.847 The “Greece of Athens”, on the other hand, was systematically harassed by a sea blockade more and more strict which brought about the starvation of the nearly the whole population of Athens, Piraeus, the Peloponnese and the Cyclades islands. The mastermind of the blockade was a British academician, namely Ronald Burrows, professor at the King’s College, London.848 If truth be told, the King was –seemingly- neutralist; still the populace was growing more and more pro-German.849 That is why the treatment of Southern Greece’s populations as if were hostile to the Entente may be not regarded as ‘unforeseen’. Be that as it may, the Athens government tried to purchase foodstuffs in the U.S.A., still a neutral country; but from November, 1916 on, the ships carrying food cargoes from America to Greece were stopped by French and British men-of-war, and the load seized.850 In spring, 1917, the impact of the famine was awful throughout the “Old/Athens Greece”,851 i.e. the part of the country that remained loyal to King Constantine. According to the findings of the Athens Medical Society the starvation brought by the Entente Cordiale blockade was critically undermining the public health. It was the workers that suffered the most because of malnourishment; the administration of medicines was useless; and, to cap it all, tuberculosis was ravaging across the major cities of Southern Greece.852 Needless to say that in the countryside the situation was not essentially better. Malaria, first of all, reappeared. It was an old bane of the Greek lands, yet it was almost extinguished at the beginning of the twentieth century thanks to the quinine. But now there was no quinine in Southern Greece – thanks to the blockade.853 Traditional aquacultures, such as the one at Missolonghi, were being nearly AYE, Archeion Thessalonikēs (= Archives of the Salonika Government), 1916, Jean Guillemin, French minister at Athens, to Michel Graillet, French Consul at Salonika, cable, Athens, October 31, 1916; the same to the same, cable, Athens, November 5, 1916. 848 PA, F/55/1/1. 849 See: Aus den Geheimearchiven der Entente, vol. 5: Die europäischen Mächte und Griechenland während des Weltkrieges (Dresden: Carl Reissner, 1932), doc. 188: the Russian minister at Athens to B. Stürmer, Foreign Minister of Russia, cable No. 479, Athens, August 15/28, p. 126. 850 AYE, 1916, A/7, A. Chrēstakē Zōgraphos, Governor of the National Bank of Greece, to Spyridōn Lampros, Prime Minister of Greece, Athens, March 14, 1917 (OS). 851 AVP, I/37/15, Memorandum signed in Athens, on May 17, 1917, by Édouard Helsey (correspondent of the newspaper Journal), Albert Londres (correspondent of the Petit Journal), J. M. M. Jeffries (correspondent of the Daily Mail), and G. J. Stevens (correspondent of the Daily Telegraph) and addressed to the French and British governments. 852 AYE, 1916, A/7, The Athens Medical Society (Public Statement), No. 20, Athens, April 10, 1917 (OS) 853 Ibid. 847

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destroyed due to the lack of aliments for the fish;854 and agriculture was damaged because of the scarcity of fertilizers.855 What is more, cereals essential for the nutrition of the humans and livestock as well, such as the wheat and the barley, were desperately missing in the “Royalist Greece” already from January, 1917.856 The “black market” was consequently flourishing.857 Yet the populace was not disposed to desert King Constantine and his neutralist policy. He was considered to be the bellator Rex par excellence and workmen and peasants saw in his “impartial” policy a veiled pro-German one. When, in fact, the British offered to raise of the blockade if only the people recognized the Venizelist government of Salonika, the usual answer was the following: “We do not need bread! Long live our King!”858 Meantime, an Entente task force, under the command of the French admiral Louis Dartige du Fournet tried to occupy Athens in November, 1916 (OS) The Greek Army, assisted by the Reservists, masterly organized by I. Metaxas, repulsed the attack.859 Overjoyed Sophia, the Queen Consort, cabled to Kaiser, his brother: “The page is turned over. It is a great victory against four Great Powers…”. 860 And so it was. The Kaiser, nonetheless, waited for King Constantine, his brother-in-law, to declare war on Great Britain and France. If so, the Entente troops in Salonika would be caught “in a pincer movement”, since Bucharest had already fallen to August von Mackensen.861 Still Constantine was hesitant; and though he was assured by Erich Ludendorff, Quartermaster general of the Imperial Army, that Germany was most likely to conclude a “victorious treaty” with the Entente either in the last weeks of 1916 or the first ones of 1917,862 Constantine dreaded the British naval power.863 And he was right. For after the defeat the Entente task force suffered in Athens, the British, guided by Compton Mackenzie, head of the British “Secret Service” in Athens, occupied Hermoupolis, on Syros island, known as the best harbour in the Eastern Mediterranean.864 It was then and 854 AYE, 1916, A/7, the Town Council of Missolonghi to the Prime Minister of Greece, No. 2009, Missolonghi, March 26, 1917 (OS) 855 AYE, 1916, A/7, the Town Councils of the Elis prefecture to the Prime Minister of Greece, No. 1603, Pyrgos, March 23, 1917 (O. S.) 856 AYE, Archeion Thessalonikēs, 1916, A/7, Memorandum, January 18/31, 1917. 857 AYE, Archeion Thessalonikēs, 1916, A/7, G. J. Angélopoulos, trader, to King Constantine, Athens, April 7, 1917 (letter). 858 AYE, 1916, A/7, the harbour master of Skiathos island to the Ministry of the Navy, No. 537, Skiathos, December 31, 1916. 859 See mainly Yannis G. Mourélos, L’intervention de la Grèce…, pp. 40-42. 860 D. Michalopoulos, “Hē kata ton A’ Pankosmio polemo allēlographia tou hellēnikou vasilikou zeugous… »,doc. 27, Athens, November 23, 1916 (OS), p. 109 861 Ibid., doc. 29, the Kaiser to Sophia, Queen Consort of the Hellenes, December 2, 1916 (N.S.), pp. 111-112. 862 Ibid., doc.32, N. Theotokēs to King Constantine, December 13, 1916, p. 113. 863 Ibid., doc. 37, Eugenios Zalokōstas, Foreign Minister of Greece, to the Greek minister at Berlin, Athens, December 26, 1916, p. 116. 864 AYE, Archeion Thessalonikēs, 1916, A/7, “Memorandum” by G. Sarantopoulos, first secretary of the Cyclades prefecture, Athens, February 10, 1917 (OS).

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there that an “Aegean branch” of the Intelligence Service was founded by the multitalented Mackenzie; and afterwards the Salonika Venizelists were summoned to capture the whole of the Cyclades Islands, the population of which remained fanatically faithful to King Constantine and his pro-German entourage.865 It was an war expedition that took place, indeed. Troops from Salonika came to Cyclades on board of British and French men-of-war and captured one by one the twenty main islands of the group. The populations, mortally exhausted by the starvation, did not oppose serious resistance. But in Apeiranthos, a mountain village on Naxos island, the inhabitants opted to combat. The Venizelists, assisted by the British fleet, attacked the village, conquered it following a bloody fight, and massacred forty civilians, mainly women and children, “for an example to be given” to the followers of King Constantine.866 The things having been so ‘arranged’, only the advance of von Mackensen’s troops from the conquered Romania to Macedonia and Greece could save King Constantine and his friends. Yet such an advance never took place;867 and it is right to blame Paul von Hindenburg for that.868 At last, even the most ardent pro-German people in Greece grew tired of waiting the Germans...869 and though people in the Peloponnese at least were far more pro-German than the Royal House,870 things followed the ‘due course’.

VI Venizelos, on the other hand, was overtly playing the card of the Entente Cordiale. He had agreed that, if France and Britain won the War, the Greek Army would be run by the French and the Navy by the British. He hailed, further, the overthrow of the Russian monarchy and the entrance of the U.S.A. into the world conflict.871 For he was sure that France and Great Britain were struggling “for the sake of the civilization” against the “barbarity”, embodied by the “Prussian militarism”.872 Were the Entente Cordiale, therefore, to lose the war, it would be better for Greece to be destroyed as well.873 Still, he was cunning enough to understand that thanks to the support furnished by the United States, “Prussian barbarity” would be defeated at last.874 Ibid. Ibid. 867 Cf. Général Regnault, La conquête d’Athènes (Juin-Juillet 1917), Paris : L. Fournier, 1919, p. 192. 868 Ibid. 869 D. Michalopoulos, “Hē kata ton A’ Pankosmio polemo allēlographia tou hellēnikou vasilikou zeugous… »,doc. 38, N. Theotokēs to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, December 30, 1916, p. 117. 870 S. B. Chester, Life of Venizelos (New York: George H. Doran, 1921), p. 285. 871 EVP, I/37/1. (Letter of Venizelos to the President Thomas Woodrow Wilson.) 872 Geōrgios Streit, Hēmerologion-Archeion (= Diaries-Archives), vol. I (Athens, 1964), p. 3. 873 Ibid., p. 21. 874 EVP, I/37/1. 865 866

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What is more, he was able to realize the huge consequences of the Zionist Central Office being transferred from Berlin to New York merely a couple of days before the First World War started;875 and accordingly he took a step of great importance. As aforementioned, he was associated with Basil Zaharoff, the “mysterious” gun merchant aux yeux ouverts et la main ouverte,876 who ne donnait rien pour rien;877 and Zaharoff ‘worked with’ the most eminent personalities of London City – such as Lord Balfour and James de Rothschild.878 As a result, Venizelos knew about the project of a “Jewish National Home” to be created in Palestine; and as early as June 1917, Nikolaos Politēs, Foreign Minister of the Salonika government, of Jewish descent himself, asked of the “international community” the creation of a Jewish Statehood.879 It was five months before the Balfour Declaration was made! As far as one can see, Venizelos was an unbeliever or rather a Spinoza follower.880 He believed in Nature as his future friend, Mustapha Kemal, the Atatürk, did. It is clear, therefore, that he had absolutely no problem to concur in the Jewish aspirations; and had the way opened to him following the February revolution in Russia and the April war declaration of U.S.A. on Germany. Now the Entente was broken down; the Entente Cordiale did exist but thanks to America. After Emperor Nicholas II was removed, the world conflict was transformed into a “struggle of democracy ideas against autocracy”. To cap it, Alexandre Ribot substituted for Aristide Briand in the premiership of France in March, 1917; he was to remain President of the French Government up to September of that same year. Such a political change was not without impact on Greece; for Briand was said to be a friend of the Royal House of Greece – and it was true.881 Ribot was not; and further he was impelled by a leftist ideology. He made, therefore, his mind at once: Greece should be got out of her “political mess”. A campaign was planned accordingly and duly carried out, in spring, 1917, by the French general Charles Louis Jacques Regnault. In point of fact, Athens was literally “conquered” by the French troops, as if it were an enemy city.882 The Army, backed by 875 Peter Grose, Israel in the Mind of America (New York: Schocken Books, 1984), pp. 51-52. 876 R. Lewinson, Zaharoff…, p. 93. 877 Ibid., p. 113. 878 Ibid., p. 80ff. passim. 879 Réna Molho, « Thessalonique après 1912. Propagandes étrangères et communauté juive », La France et la Grèce dans la Grande Guerre. Actes du colloque tenu en novembre 1989 à Thessalonique (Salonika, 1992), p. 58. 880 I. M. Konidarēs, “Hē symvolē tou Eleutheriou Venizelou sta ekklēsiastika pragmata tēs epochēs tou » (Eleutherios Venizelos’ contribution to the Church affairs of his time), Ho Eleutherios Venizelos hōs nomikos. Hē symvolē tou stē diamorphōsē tou hellēnikou dikaiou (= Eleutherios Venizelos as a jurist. His contribution to the shaping of the Greek legal system), Ant. N. Sakkoulas: Athens-Komotēnē, 2003, pp. 155, 156. 881 PA, LG/F/3/14/21. 882 See his book, La conquête d’Athènes (Juin-Juillet 1917), Paris : L. Fournier, 1919.

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the Reservists and the Piraeus armed workmen, was able to resist – as they had done six months earlier. Another opinion, uttered by Metaxas, would be that the King withdraw to the mountainous central area of the Peloponnese, namely to Tripolitsa, wherein he would be unlikely pursued by the French troop or harmed by the British war vessels. Yet the Sovereign turned down either suggestions and fled to Switzerland on the grounds that he wanted not to “divide his People”. He refused, nonetheless, to abdicate; and given that George, the Crown Prince, was regarded as “as pro-German as his own father”,883 Constantine appointed Alexander, i.e. his second son, as locum tenens of the throne.884 Venizelos reached Athens shortly after Constantine had left. He formed a new cabinet, assumed the premiership and took the War portfolio as well;885 Politēs was given the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, and P. Kountouriōtēs the one of the Marine. The ‘unified’ Greece entered the war at the side of the Entente Cordiale and the U.S.A. in June, 1917. A couple of months later the Greek Fleet was put under British control, and the Army under the French one. The related document reads as follows: “…On the subject of the regulation of the powers of the British Naval Mission to Greece on the basis of the contract which governs the French Military Mission for the reorganization of the Greek Army… [the relevant contract] should be… modified to read as follows: The Rear Admiral, Head of the Mission, will have executive control of the Greek Fleet, under the Minister of the Marine…[Still], in order to promote the efficiency of the Greek Fleet and to maintain it on a war basis, it is to be understood that further proposals are being formulated by the British Admiralty… These will include the authority to be exercised over the Department of the Ministry of Marine and the Arsenal by the British Naval Mission, also over the storing arrangements and methods of supply of material etc.”886 Yet there was no need for such “regulations”; for “Greek Fleet” in practice existed no longer. As a matter of fact, when Athens was nearly conquered by the Dartige du Fournet’s task force late in 1916, the Greek men-of-war, anchored at the naval dockyard on Salamis island were seized by the French,887because the Greek Navy had not adhered to the Salonika government.888

Helena Veniselos, À l’ombre de Veniselos (Paris : Génin, 1955), p. 31. Or King pro tempore. (Memoirs of H.R.H. Prince Christopher of Greece [London: Hurst and Blackett, 1938], p. 141.) 885 Helena Veniselos, À l’ombre de Veniselos, p. 31. 886 AYE, 1917, A/14, the British Legation at Athens to N. Politēs, Foreign Minister of Greece, December 11, 1917. 887 PA, F/55/1/2; Pericles I. Argyropoulos, Anamnēseis (= Memoirs). Edited by Dēmētrēs Michalopoulos (Athens: Arsenidēs, 1996), pp. 159-160. 888 PA, E/3/15/1. 883 884

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VII Ad extirpanda…889 Such was the policy that Venizelos and his close associates put into effect immediately after Athens was “conquered”. “Constantinism” was –rightly- regarded as an ultra-rightist people’s movement; and the combined minds of the Greek and French Liberals opted not for the peaceful proselytism of the lower social strata to the democratic ideals but for the eradication of Constantine’s “idolization” instead. Thus started the reign of terror. The protagonists of the “royalist bias”, their deportation to French territory notwithstanding, were sentenced to death in absentia.890 Army officers said to cooperate with the Germans were shot; and refugees flows crowded the mountain villages of the Peloponnese and Mainland Greece.891 The courts-martial overworked, indeed, and the State machinery was being systematically purged.892 It seems most likely that the Venizelist regime and Venizelos’ life as well were jeopardized. Although lots of fake denunciations reached almost everyday the Asphaleia893 department of the Police, moulded on the French Sûreté, it is beyond any doubt that Venizelos’ life was endangered.894 Paradoxical as it may appear, and though he was of fragile health, he did not suffer from any malady in spite of his ups and downs from 1916 on.895 He had merely a nervous breakdown, 896 but was quite able to conduct business. Yet so great was his fear that he took measures for the first time seen in Greece.897 The world war was over in November, 1918. Venizelos thought the time to be ripe for his popularity to grow real, nay! overwhelming. He saw accordingly an opportunity in the dissensions between the victorious Allies. Having gained the complete trust of Thomas Woodrow Wilson beforehand (by displaying a noisy interest in the League of Nations,898 notorious obsession of the American President), he grasped the chance of an Italian dreadnought being dispatched to Smyrna in late April, 1919.899 In the beginning of May, “further suspicious movements of Italian troops” took place towards the same city.900 It was enough; for neither the French nor the British and the Americans wished to see Smyrna seized by the Italians. Venizelos, Cf. I. Metaxas, Hē Historia tou Ethnikou Dichasmou, p. 15. The relevant documents: AYE, 1920, 1.2. 891 See mainly Geōrgios Tsontos-Vardas, Hē Venizelikē tyrannia. Hēmerologio, 19171920 (= The Tyranny of Venizelos. Diaries, 1917-1920). Edited by Giōrgos Petsivas, Athens: Petsivas, 2006. 892 Ibid., p. 7. 893 Asphaleia= Security. 894 The relevant documents: AYE, 1919, A/2 (2). 895 EVP, I/37/8, The results of Venizelos’ medical examination by a physicians’ committee headed by A. Portokalēs (Salonika, April 22, 1917.) 896 Yannis G. Mourélos, L’intervention de la Grèce…, p. 235. 897 G. Tsontos-Vardas, Hē Venizelikē tyrannia…, p. 7ff. passim ; I. Metaxas, Hē Historia tou Ethnikou Dichasmou, p. 331ff. 898 Steph. I. Stephanou, Eleutherios Venizelos…, pp. 116-118. 899 PA, LG/F/206/4/2. 900 Ibid. 889 890

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therefore, suggested to the Three out of the Big Four, namely Wilson, Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau, the megalopolis of Asia Minor to be occupied by Greek troops, on the grounds that a “solid Greek population” dwelled therein.901 The relevant decision was reached on May 6, 1919: Greek troops were to be landed in Smyrna.902 The city was to remain under the suzerainty of the Sublime Porte; still, the administration would pass down to the Greeks.903 Venizelos, nonetheless, announced urbi (namely Smyrna) et orbi (viz. the Greek public opinion) that Smyrna was to be annexed to Greece and that he himself “did not intend to restrain the Smyrna Greeks from expressing their joy”.904 This statement was interpreted as a call for uprising by the local Christian Orthodox element against the Ottoman authorities and the autochthonous Moslems as well. As a result, on May 2/15, 1919, i.e. the very day during which the landing of Greek troops in Smyrna took place, hundreds of Moslems, either officials and civilians, were massacred, and their property looted.905 Even… Persians were put to death then and there; for they were supposed to be “Turks”.906 It was a dies irae, indeed; yet a quite unjustified one. Needless to say that the Greek side was universally acknowledged as responsible for the atrocities.907 Venizelos, in view to alleviate his situation, had sentenced to death some people who had “exaggerated”.908 But it was too late. The “Smyrna episode” was the spark that ignited the 1919-1922 conflict between the Greeks and the Nationalist Turks.909 It was to end with the total eradication of Asia Minor’s Greek populations and Greece being overflowed by 1,500,000 refugees.

*** On August 10, the Treaty between the victors of WW I and the Porte was signed in Sèvres, near Paris. Greece was given the vilayet of Aydin, viz. the Smyrna district. It was to be administered by Greek authorities but under Ottoman suzerainty; and after a lapse of five years under such an administration a plebiscite was to be held on whether the whole district should be annexed to Greece. Yet the Porte

PA, LG/F/206/2/5. Ibid. 903 PA, LG/206/3/18. 904 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, IV (Athens: Papyros, 1968) p. 287. 905 See mainly Edward Hale Bierstadt, The Great Betrayal. A Survey of the Near East Problem (London: Hutchinson, 1924), p. 115. 906 AYE, 1919, A/5/VI, Bachman Khan, Persian Ambassador to the Balkans [sic], to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, Athens, October 30/November 12, 1920. 907 PA, LG/F/206/4/5; I. Metaxas, Hē Historia tou Ethnikou Dichasmou, p. 367. 908 Doros Alastos, Venizelos (London: Percy Land Humphries & Co., 1942), p. 193; cf. Dimitris Michalopoulos, The Asia Minor Peripeteia and the Aftermath. An Overview (Athens, 2007), p. 23. 909 Halidé Edib, The Turkish Ordeal (London : John Murray, 1928), pp. 22-23. 901 902

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was all but a shadowy institution by then; the real power was at the hands of Mustapha Kemal and his nationalist followers. If truth be told, the British tolerated Kemal’s movement. For the future Atatürk had proved that –contrary to the Allies’ expectations910the Turkish Army was still strong and warlike.911 In contrast, the British military forces in the Near East were small; still “enormous” were the British interests there.912 As a matter of fact, the point was the oil fields in Mosul, northern Iraq.913 The corollary was that the Turkish Army should ‘make war’ with the Greeks in western Asia Minor and not with the British in south-eastern Anatolia.914 That is why Constantinople was held by the British as a “guarantee” until the settlement of the Greek-Turkish “dispute” and, above all, of the Turkish-British one over the Mosul district.915 As a matter of fact, the Mosul issue began being settled in 1923 thanks to the Lausanne Treaty and following the crushing defeat that suffered the Greeks at the hands of Mustapha Kemal’s Nationalist Turks. Meanwhile Venizelos was carried away by what he considered to be his triumph. Though the whole of his opponents saw in the Sèvres Treaty merely a scrap of paper,916 he believed that beautiful Lethe917 was to ‘swallow’ the Terror of his 1917-1920 administration. No matter that the Treaty of Sèvres was never ratified – not even by the Greek Parliament;918 no matter that, while returning to Greece after he signed the famous Treaty, was nearly killed in the Gare de Lyon, Paris, by two Greeks, victims of his regime’s “purges”.919 When he managed to reach Athens, nonetheless, he was presented by the Greek Parliament with a golden wreath920 and proclaimed Digne de la Patrie.921 It was the highest honour to be awarded in Greece. And now the time was ripe for his apotheosis. For in the Stadium of the Greek capital an enormous, open air festivity took place on September 14/27, with priests chanting, troops parading, crowds cheering and himself being the very object of the ‘deification’.922 It was then that his decision was reached: he was going to hold elections. For he wanted to be cleansed of the “tyranny stigma”, insofar he was blamed for the awesome reprisals put in effect in Greece following the murder attempt in Paris.923 910

PA, LG/F/206/3/22.

911

PA, LG/F/206/4/24. AYE, 1925, A/5/I, Memorandum by the lieutenant (Engineers) E. Stasinopoulos, Athens, August 26, 1925. 914 PA, LG/F/206/4/24. 915 PA, LG/F/206/5. 916 G. Tsontos-Vardas, Hē Venizelikē tyrannia…, p. 917 Lethe (in classical Greek)= Oblivion. 918 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, IV, p. 320. 919 Steph. I. Stephanou, Eleutherios Venizelos…, p. 160. 920 To be found nowadays in the Historical Institute for Studies on Eleutherios Venizelos and his Era, at Athens. 921 Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, IV, p. 319. 922 Ibid., p. 317. 923 G. Tsontos-Vardas, Hē Venizelikē tyrannia…, p. 727ff. 912 913

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Yet his well was running dry. Alexander, the locum tenens of the royal throne, a puppet in Venizelos’ hands, died suddenly on October 12/25, 1920, due to a banal accident; 924 and the political atmosphere changed abruptly. Who was now to be the King? Prince Paul perhaps, one of Constantine’s sons; still he declined the crown’s offer. It was then that the people, their oppression notwithstanding, began asking the King Constantine to “come back”. It was P. Kountouriōtēs, Venizelos’ “glorious acolyte”, who was then appointed Regent - in order to “have the spirits calmed down”. In vain! The field officers of the Greek Army got upset, and warned Venizelos that time was by no means ripe for election. Still, the Prime Minister could not step back: legislative elections were now an issue of prestige for him, the Kemalists being still unbeaten notwithstanding and his domestic foes literally enragés. Thus the elections took actually place on November 1/14, 1920: they were a crushing defeat for Venizelos and nearly all his followers.925 A couple of days later Venizelos fled abroad and thanks to a referendum held on November 22/December 5, 1920, King Constantine returned to Athens and was acclaimed by the populace with enthusiasm. The British, nonetheless, were categorical: they kept seeing in the Sovereign of Greece their “pro-German” enemy.926 The impact of such an attitude was to be terrible for Greece…

924 925 926

Ibid., p. 320. Sp. V. Markezinēs, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados…, IV, p. 322. PA, LG/F/206/4/24.

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THE AFTERMATH World War One had been foreseeable since the very beginning of the twentieth century. Still, it had already been germinating when the Great Powers decided, tacitly but irrevocably after the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War, to dismember the Ottoman Empire. Venizelos was to play an important part in the disintegration process – but not as a Greek irredentist. He was associated with the British in aiming to make of Crete an independent statehood – a British protectorate indeed. In the context of such a policy, his major achievement had been the removal of the Russophile Prince George of Greece from the office of the Powers’ High Commissioner in the island. For as early as the late nineteenth century the drive was to prevent the Russians at all costs from reaching the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, other major tasks laid ahead of him. Crete was not to be independent at length; for the British had most likely to consider the mind of other European leaders – such as, for instance, the French. The widening gap, moreover, between the two Powers constellations, namely the Entente and the Triple Alliance, had speedily revealed itself the first years of the twentieth century. Venizelos was, therefore, summoned to Athens in order to repudiate the Austrian connections of King George I; to have Greece decisively aligned with the Entente Powers, and to assure the capture of Southern Macedonia by Greece. He fulfilled these tasks brilliantly; still, he was covertly but decisively backed by the British, who had paved the way for the 1912 Ottoman defeat in Salonika. What is more, Venizelos did not hesitate to abandon the Argyrokastron and Korytsa districts, northward of Janina, Epirus, in order for Greece to expand to the eastern islands of the Aegean Sea. The crux was when he tried to avert a Greco-Bulgarian war. He was undermined by one of his closest associates and, subsequently, taught a lesson he was never to forget. Nonetheless, his failure to prevent the Greco-Bulgarian conflict meant that the last hope of a Russo-German rapprochement had vanished for ever. The corollary was the outbreak of the First World War – and the Drama of the Greek National Divide as well.

*** Nobody knows why the post-November 1920 administration in Greece preferred to continue with the war. Neither the King nor the government seemed to have illusions about the campaign in Asia Minor in which they used rightly to see a Venizelist action. Military operations were nonetheless going on; but simultaneously, in Anatolia, the Kemalist resistance was becoming fiercer. İsmet Pasha, Kemal’s alter ego, stopped the Greek advance at İnönü; and in summer, 1921, the Greek troops failed to capture Ankara, the capital of the Kemalist Anatolia. And then the entire front became strangely quiet. In point of fact, the catastrophe broke out nearly a year later. 125

For in mid-August, 1922 (OS), the Greek army collapsed following a sudden attack of the Kemalist troops. Some days later the Greek authorities were abolished in Smyrna; and in the night of August 27 (OS) the Greek men-of-war weighed anchor. The Greek peripeteia in Asia Minor was over.

*** Messieurs, c'est la paix! In this way Venizelos announced to the journalists, in Lausanne, the agreement of all the Parties concerning the terms of a new treaty, which was going to replace that of Sèvres: it was on July 24, 1923. The victors of the First World War, on the one hand, and Mustafa Kemal’s Nationalist/Modern Turkey, on the other, were the signatories; and this treaty is in effect up to now. Eleutherios Veniselos was the head of the Greek delegation at the Lausanne conference. For the 1922 disaster brought about a putsch in Greece. King abdicated; and he died soon at Palermo, Sicily, of azotaemia, at the age of merely 55. His successor was George II, i.e. his elder son. The new administration was a Venizelist one; it was only natural therefore that Venizelos was appointed the head of the Greek delegation at Lausanne. Meanwhile, the 1,500,000 Christian refugees from Asia Minor in Greece were sunk in squalor and misery. Still, in December 1923 elections were held. Nonetheless, Venizelos did not put himself forward as a candidate. For he was in absentia elected in… twenty constituencies! And on January 11, 1924, he was once more the Prime Minister of Greece. Yet it was not later than early March, 1924, that he had a heart attack; he quitted hastily the premiership, sailed to France, and settled in Paris. A couple of months later, Greece was proclaimed a Republic… Whatever the facts of the matter, Venizelos came back to Greece in 1927. And in August 1928 he gained the elections and formed a government (practically his last one). Still, Thus, in order to save Salonika from the Serbs, who coveted it, Venizelos brought about a spectacular rapprochement with Benito Mussolini’s Fascist Italy. This new alliance meant simply that in case of a new World War Greece, most probably, would not be at the side of the United Kingdom and France. Moreover, it is certain that in the early 1930s he planned a crucial shake-up of the Greek political system, with clearly authoritarian lines. These decisions were fateful ones; and having lost the confidence of his traditional Western friends, he lost also the 1933 elections. As a result he tried a military coup in 1935, but he failed. Even today nobody knows clearly how and why his Liberals, then still controlling the Army, proved to be incapable of seizing the power. Be that as it may, Venizelos sought refuge first in Italy and finally in Paris. He was to die there, on March 18, 1936, most likely murdered. For the monarchy having been restored in Greece on November 3, 126

1935, he wrote a letter to King George II imploring him to respect the alliance that he himself, i.e. Venizelos, had built up with Italy. Yet the Second World War was already now ante portas; thus Venizelos, now a potential ally of Fascist Italy, must be eliminated… … And so was done…

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BIBLIOGRAPHY SOURCES A. Unpublished 1. HISTORIKO ARCHEIO TOU HYPOURGEIOY EXŌTERIKŌN (= HISTORICAL ARCHIVES OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY [AYE]),927 Athens 1839, 49 (2-3); 1843, 49/1; 1865, 49/2b; 1865, 98/5b; 1890, AAK; 1898, A/11/1; 1940, 60.1.

2. ELEUTHERIOS VENIZELOS PAPERS (EVP), Historical Institute for Studies on Eleutherios Veniselos and his Era, Athens928 Ι/2/1; I/3/1; I/3/ 2; I/4/1-9; I/5/1; I/6/1-2; I/8/1-16; I/9/117; I/12/1-55; I/14/3-18; I/15/1-31; I/16/1-4; I/17/1; I/21/1; I/22/1-195; I/23/1-95; I/28/3; I/30/4; Ι/30/18; Ι/31/4; I/31/7-22; I/32/5; Ι/32/9; I/32/108; I/33/85; I/33/103; I/33/30-51; I/50/101.

3. PANAGIŌTĒS KANELLOPOULOS PAPERS (PKP), Society of the Friends of Panagiōtēs Kanellopoulos, Athens929 I/1/1; I/58/209.

4. PARLIAMENTARY ARCHIVES (PA), London BL/53/4/3.

B. Published 1. DOCUMENTS COLLECTIONS Aus den Geheimarchiven der Entente, vol. 5: Die europäischen Mächte und Griechenland während des Weltkrieges, (Dresden: Carl Reissner, 1932. Bridge, F. R., Austro-Hungarian Documents relating to the Macedonian Struggle, 1896-1912, Salonika: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976. Kuneralp, Sinan [ed.], Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on the Eastern Question. The Cretan Uprising, 1866-1869, 1-2, Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2010. 927

The 1911-1914 files are not available. An excellent Catalogue: Nika Polychronopoulou-Klada, Historiko Archeio Eleutheriou Venizelou (= Eleutherios Venizelos’ Historical Archives), Athens : Historical Institute for Studies on Eleutherios Venizelos and his Era, 2004. 929 An also excellent Catalogue: Nika Polychronopoulou-Klada, Historiko Archeio Panagiōtē Kanellopoulou (= Panagiōtēs Kanellopoulos’ Historical Archives), Athens: Society of the Friends of Panagiōtēs Kanellopoulos, 2006. 928

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___, Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of World War One. The Final Stage of the Cretan Question, 1899-1913, Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2009. ___, Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of World War One. The Turco-Italian War, 1911-1912, I-II, Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2011. ___, Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of World War One. The Aegean Islands Issue, 1912-1914, Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2011. Politis, Athanase G., Le conflit turco-égyptien de 1838-1841 et les dernières années du règne de Mohamed Aly d’après les documents diplomatiques grecs, Cairo: Société royale de géographie d’Égypte, 1931. ___, Les rapports de la Grèce et de l’Égypte pendant le règne de Mohamed Aly (1833-1849), Rome : Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato per la Reale Società di Geografia d’Egitto, 1935. Hypourgeion epi tōn Exōterikōn (=Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Diplōmatika engrapha, 1913-1917 (= Diplomatic Papers, 19131917), Athens: National Publishing House, 19202. Hypourgeion Exōterikōn, Diplōmatika engrapha aphorōnta eis to methoriakon zētēma [= Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Documents concerning the Border Question], Athens, S. K. Vlastos, 1882 Hypourgeion Stratiōtikōn. Genikon Epiteleion Stratou. Polemikē Ekthesis (= Ministry of War. General Staff of the Army. Account of the War), Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous tou 1912-1913 (= The Greek Army in the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars), vol. I. Parartēma (=Annex), Athens: National Printing House, 1932. Also: Enepekides, P. K., Gloria und Spaltung, Athens: Zacharopoulos, 19922. Stephanou, S. I., Eleutheriou Venizelou ta Keimena (Eleutherios Venizelos’ Texts), vols.I-IV, Athens, 1981. (Used: vol.I.)

2.EPHĒMERIS TĒS KYVERNĒSEŌS TOU VASILEIOU TĒS HELLADOS (= Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Greece), I, Nos 44 [September 24th,1858); 75 [November 15th, 1856]; 101 (May 3rd,1911); 121( June 21st, 1913; 151 (June 7th,1914); No. 186 (June 9th, 1914).

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Gazette of the State of Crete) I, First Year, Nos. 24 (April 16th, 1899), 28 (April 28th, 1899); Eighth Year, Nos. 32 (July 12th, 1906), 44 (September 2nd, 1906), 45 (September 2nd, 1906), 51 (September 16th, 1906), 53 (September 18th, 1906); Ninth Year, Nos. 7 (8th of February, 1907); Tenth Year, No. 19 (April 28th, 1908). 130

4.VASILEION TĒS HELLADOS. PARARTĒMA TĒS EPHĒMERIDOS TĒS KYVERNĒSĒŌS EN KRĒTĒ (= Kingdom of Greece. Cretan Annex of the Official Gazette), I, Nos.

1 (September 24th, 1908), 9 (October 2nd, 1908), 14 (October 15th, 1908), 30 (May 31st, 1910).

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Hansard of the Greek Parliament), Sittings of May 19th, 1912; May 12th, 1914.

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__, Hē historia tou Ethnikou Dichasmou (=The Story of the Greek National Divide), Athens: Kathēmerinē, 1935. Karavitēs, Iōannēs, Ho Makedonikos Agōn. Apomnēmoneumata (= The Macedonian Struggle. Memoirs). Edited by Giōrgos Petsivas, vols III, Athens: Petsivas, 1994. Kavvadias, Epameinōndas P. Ho Nautikos Polemos tou 1940 opōs ton ezēsa.Anamnēseis, 2 Martiou 1935-25 Martiou 1943 (= The Naval War of 1940 as I witnessed it. Memoirs, March 2, 1935-March 25, 1943), Athens: Pyrsos, 1950. Koundouros, Manousos, Historikai kai diplōmatikai apokalypseis. Historika gegonota, 1890-1923. (= Historical and Diplomatic Disclosures. Historical Events). Edited by Charikleia G. Dēmakopoulou and Eleutherios Skiadas, Athens: ELIA, 19972 Lawrence, T. E., Seven Pillars of Wisdom. A Triumph, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co, 1936. Londres, Albert, Comitadjis ou le terrorisme dans les Balkans. Translated into Greek by Dēmētrēs Michalopoulos, Athens: Petsivas, 2008. Melas, George M., Ex-King Constantine and the War, London: Hutchinson (no date given). Melas, Spyros, Hē epanastasē tou 1909 (= The 1909 uprising), Athens: Birēs, 1957. __, Hoi polemoi tou 1912-1913 (= The 1912-1913 Wars), Athens: Birēs, 1958. Memoirs of H.R.H. Prince Christopher of Greece, London: Hurst and Blackett, 1938 [ninth impression]. Nikoltsios, Vasileios and Gounarēs, Vasilēs (eds.), Apo to Sarantaporo stē Thessalonikē. Hē hellēnotourkikē anametrēsē tou 1912 mesa apo tis anamnēseis tou Stratēgou Hasan Tahsin Pasa (= From Sarantaporon to Salonika. The 1912 Greek-Turkish Conflict through the Memoirs of the General Hasan Tahsin Pasha), Salonika, 2002. Prince Nicholas of Greece, Ta penēnta chronia tēs zōēs mou (= The fifty years of my life), Athens: Greca, 1926. Stratēgos, X. Ho hellēnotourkikos polemos tou 1912 (= The 1912 Greek-Turkish War), Athens: “Hellēnikē”, 1932 Thomson, Sir Basil, The Allied Secret Service in Greece. Translated into Greek by Kōstas Barbēs, Athens: Logothetēs (no date given). Tsekouras, Athan. D., Apo tou 98ou hypsōmatos (= From the 98th Hill), Athens: The Epirotic Society, 1979 Tsirimonakē, Maria, En Rethymnō ( = In Rethymnon), Rethymnon, 19982. Tsontos-Vardas, Geōrgios Ho Makedonikos Agōn (= The Macedonian Struggle). Edited by Giōrgos Petsivas, vols. I-III, Athens: Petsivas, 2003. Vaka, Demetra, In the Heart of German Intrigue, Boston-New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1918. __, Constantine: King and Traitor, London-New York: John Lane, 1918. Zavitzianos, Kōnstantinos G. Hai anamnēseis tou ek tēs historikēs 132

diafōnias Vasileōs Kōnstantinou kai Eleutheriou Venizelou opōs tēn ezēse, 1914-1922 (=Kōnstantinos Zavitzianos’ Memoirs from the Historical Disagreement between King Constantine and Eleutherios Venizelos as he witnessed it, 1914-1922), vols. I-II, Athens, 1946. Zormpas, Nikolaos, Apomnēmoneumata. Hē epanastasē tou Goudi,1909 (= Memoirs. The Goudi Revolution, 1909), Athens: Metron, 20052. Wagner, Hermenegild, With the victorious Bulgarians (London: Constable and Co., 1913) And also: [Anonymous], Hē stratiōtikē zōē en Helladi (= Military Life in Greece), Athens :Galaxias, 19702 (first edition in 1870). Dostoyevski, Fyodor Journal d’un écrivain. Translated [into French] by Jean Chuzeville, Paris: Gallimard, 1951. Jonesco, Take, Souvenirs, Paris: Payot, 1919. Kolokotrōnēs, Theodōros K., Aphēgēsis Symvantōn tēs Hellēnikēs Phylēs (= Account of Events Concerning the Greek Nation). Edited by Tasos Ath. Gritsopoulos,Athens, 1981 (first edition in 1846). Lord Howard of Penrith, Theatre of life: Life seen from the stalls, 19051936, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1936. Misirkov, Kriste, On Macedonian Matters. Translated into Greek by Dēmētrēs Karagiannēs, Athens: Petsivas, 2003 Phōtopoulos, Athanasios Th.(ed.), Theodōrou Rhigopoulou, grammateōs tōn Kolokotrōnaiōn, Apomnēmoneumata (= The Memoirs of Theodōros Rhigopoulos, Secretary of Kolokotrōnēs family), Athens, 1979

7. Other Sources Gnōmateusis tou eisēgētou tou A´ Diarkous Stratodikeiou Styl. A. Kolokytha kata tou teōs Genikou Hellēnikou Epiteleiou Dousmanē V., Metaxa Iōan., Stratēgou X. kai Hexadaktylou Athanasiou (= Report of Stylianos Kolokythas, reporter of the First Permanent Court Martial, against the former Greek General Staff [i.e.] V. Dousmanēs, I.Metaxas, X. Stratēgos and Athanasius Hexadaktylos), Athens: National Printing House,1919. Iraq and the Persian Gulf (B.R. 524. Naval Intelligence Division, September 1944.

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GENERAL WORKS Aspreas, G. Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados (= Political History of Modern Greece), vol. I-II Athens: Chrēsima Vivlia (no date given; second edition). Brekēs, Spyros, Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados. Dekatos enatos aiōnas (= A History of Modern Greece [Nineteenth Century]), Athens, 20014. Driault, Édouard and Lhéritier Michel, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours, vols. I-V, Paris : Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1925-1926. (Used : vols. III- V.) Markezinēs, Sp. V, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados, 1828-1964 (= Political History of Modern Greece, 1828-1964), vols. I-IV, Athens: Papyros, 1966-1968. (Used vols. II and III.) Paparrhēgopoulos, Kōnstantinos Historia tou Hellēnikou Ethnous (= A History of the Hellenic Nation), books I- XVI (Athens: Galaxias, 1969-1972 [first edition in 1860-1874). (Used: book XV.) Provatas, Alcibiades, Politikē Historia tēs Neōteras Hellados apo 1821 mechri 1980. Nomothetika kai ektelestika Sōmata (= Political History of Modern Greece from 1821 to 1980. Legislative and Executive Bodies), Athens,1980. Seignobos, Ch., Histoire politique de l’Europe contemporaine. Évolution des partis et des formes politiques, 1844-1896, Paris : Armand Colin, 1903. Shaw, Stanford J., and and Shaw Ezel Kural, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vols.I-II (Cambridge University Press, 1978 (reprinted). And also: Bréhier, Louis ,Vie et mort de Byzance (Paris : Albin Michel, 19692. Ostrogorsky, Georges, Histoire de l’État byzantin, Paris : Payot, 1969. Paisij Hilandarski, Istorija Slavenobolgarskaja. Translated into Greek by Vaïtsa Hanē, Salonika: Kyriakidēs Bros, 2003. Zakythēnos, Dion. A., Hē Vyzantinē Autocratoria, 324-1071 (= The Byzantine Empire, 324-1071), Athens, 1969.

MONOGRAPHS Born, Karl Erich, Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des Deutschen Kaiserreichs (1867/71-1914), Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1985. Cosmin, S., Diplomatie et Presse dans l’Affaire Grecque, Paris : Société mutuelle d’édition, 1921. __, L’Entente et la Grèce pendant la Grande Guerre, vols. I-II, Paris : Société mutuelle d’édition, 1926. Dalampira, Helenē, Ho tafos tēs Stylianēs Venizelou stē Mēlo (= The grave of Stylianē Venizelos on Milos island), Athens 1992. 134

Dalby, Andrew, Eleftherios Venizelos (London: Haus Publishing, 2010. Dēmakopoulos, Geōrgios D., “Tina peri tou N. P. Dēmētrakopoulou kai tou nomothetikou tou ergou” (= On the Life and Legislative Work of N. P. Dēmētrakopoulos), Anakoinōseis hēmeridos (17 Martiou 2008) gia tēn epeteio tou thanatou tou Eleutheriou Venizelou (= Proceedings of the Congress [March 17, 2008] on the Anniversary of Eleutherios Venizelos’ Death), Athens: Historical Institute for Studies on Eleutherios Venizelos and his Era, 2008, pp. 43-64. Dēmētriadēs, Iasōn A., Ho heligmos tou Sarantaporou kai hē strophē pros Thessalonikēn (= The Sarantaporon maneuver and the move to Salonika), Athens, 1948. Drakakēs, Andreas Th., T’agnōsta chronia. Ho Eleutherios Venizelos stē Syro (= The Obscure Years. Eleutherios Venizelos on Syros Island), Athens, 1985. Driault, Édouard, La Question d’Orient depuis ses origines jusqu’à la paix de Sèvres (1920), Paris : Félix Alcan, 19218. Ēliakēs, Iōannēs, Ho Eleutherios Venizelos ōs dēmosiographos (= Eleutherios Venizelos as journalist), Athens: Dēmētrakos, 1932. __, Ho Venizelos kai hē politikē (= Venizelos and politics), Athens: Kalergēs [no date given]. Fotakis, Zisis, Greek Naval Strategy and Policy, 1910-1919, London and New York: Routledge, 2005. Gardika-Katsiadakē, Helenē (ed.), Ho thanatos tou Eleutheriou Venizelou ston athēnaïko typo (=Eleutherios Venizelos’ Death in the Newspapers of Athens), Canea: “Eleutherios Venizelos” National Foundation, 2004. Garin, Michel, Les Grecs de Paris pendant la Première Guerre mondiale, Istanbul : The Isis Press, 2010. Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsē Historias Stratou (= General Staff of the Army. Department of Military History), Ho Hellēnikos Stratos kata tous Valkanikous Polemous tou 1912-1913 (= The Greek Army in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913), vols. I-III, Athens: History Department of the Army, 1988-1992. Gibbons, Herbert Adam, Venizelos, Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1920. Hē Penēlopē Delta kai ho kosmos tēs (= Penelope Delta and her World), Athens: Benaki Museum, 2006. Iōannidēs, Iōan. E., Kōnstantinos IB´ (= Constantine XII), Athens: Govostēs [no date given]. Iordan, Constantin, Venizelos şi Românii, Bucharest: Omonia, 20102. Kampanēs, Aristos, Ho Dēmētrios Gounarēs kai hē hellēnikē krisis tōn etōn 1918-1922 (=Dēmētrios Gounarēs and the 1918-1922 crisis in Greece), Athens: Pyrsos, 1946. Kerofilas, Dr. C., Eleftherios Venizelos. His life and work. With an introduction by Take Jonesco. Translated by Beatrice Barstow, New York: E. P. Dutton [ no date given. Kitromilidis, Paschalis M (ed.), Eleftherios Venizelos. The Trials of Statemanship (Edinburgh University Press, 20082. Kladas, N. Th., entry “[Hellēnikos] Stratos” (= [ The Greek] Army] in

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Megalē Hellēnikē Enkyklopaideia (= The Great Greek Encyclopedia), vol. X (Athens: Pyrsos, 1934), pp. 275-291. __, entry “Prōtos Valkanikos Polemos” (= The First Balkan War) in Megalē Hellēnikē Enkyklopaideia(= The Great Greek Encyclopedia), vol. VI (Athens: Pyrsos, 1928), pp. 548-565. Kuhne, Victor, Les Bulgares peints par eux-mêmes, Paris-Lausanne : Payot, 1917. Makrakē, Lilē, Eleutherios Venizelos, 1864-1910. Hē diaplasē henos ethnikou hēgetē (=Eleutherios Venizelos, 1864-1910. The Forming of a National Leader), Athens: Educational Foundation of the National Bank of Greece, 1992. Manōlikakēs, Giannēs, Eleutherios Venizelos. Hē agnōstē zōē tou (= The Unknown Life of Eleutherios Venizelos), Athens: Gnosē, 1985. Megas, Giannēs, Hoi Varkarēdes tēs Thesalonikēs. Hē anarchikē voulgarikē homada kai hoi vomvistikes energeies tou 1903 [= The Salonika Boatmen. The Bulgarian Anarchist Group and the 1903 Bomb Attacks], Athens: Trochalia, 1994. Michalopoulos, Dēmētrēs “Dēmētrios Gounarēs. Hē zōē kai to telos henos anthrōpou, 1867-1922” (=Dēmētrios Gounarēs. The Life and Death of a Man, 1867-1922], in Hē Dikē tōn Oktō kai hē ektelesē tōn Hexi (= The Trial of the Eight and the Execution of the Six), Athens: Historical Institute for Studies on Eleutherios Venizelos and his Era, 20102. Michalopoulos, Dimitris, Attitudes parallèles. Éleuthérios Vénisélos et Take Ionescu dans la Grande Guerre, Athens : Institut de recherches sur Éleuthérios Vénisélos et son époque, 20083. Païzēs-Paradelēs, Commodore K., Ta ploia tou Hellēnikou Polemikou Nautikou, 1830-1979 (= The ships of the Greek War Navy), Athens : General Staff of the Navy, 1979. Personnaz, Charles, Venizélos, le fondateur de la Grèce moderne, Paris: Bernard Giovangeli, 2008. Petridēs, Paulos V., Xenikē exartēsē kai ethnikē politikē, 1910-1918 (= Greece’s dependence on foreign Powers and [her] national policy, 1910-1918), Salonika: Paratērētēs, 1981 Pournaras, Dēmētrēs, Eleutherios Venizelos, Athens: “Eleutheros” (no date given). Stephanopoulou, Alexandra, Hē politikē tēs Rōsias dia tēn Kōnstantinoupolin kai ta Stena kata ton A’ Pankosmion Polemon (= The Russian policy with regard to Constantinople and the Straits during WWI), Athens, 1975. Stephanou, Steph. I., Eleutherios Venizelos, plastourgos Historias (= Eleutherios Vénselos, a History Maker), Athens, 19772. Svōlos, Alexandros, Hē syntagmatikē Historia tēs Hellados. Ta hellēnika syntagmata, 1822-1955 (= The Constitutional History of Greece. The Constitutions of Greece, 1822-1955), Athens: Stochastēs, 1972. Tōmadakēs, Nik. V., Ho Venizelos ephēvos (= The Puberty of Venizelos), Athens: Kydōnia, 1964.

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Vaïdēs, Thomas Ath., Eleutherios Venizelos (in Greek), Athens: Patris, 1934. Ventērēs, Geōrgios, Hē Hellas tou 1910-1920, vols. I-II, Athens: Pyrsos, 1931. (Used: vol. I.) Wood, H. Charles, The Danger Zone of Europe. Changes and Problems in the Near East, London and Leipzig: T. Fisher Unwin, 1911. And also : Duret, Alain, Moyen-Orient. Crises et enjeux, Paris : Le MondeÉditions, 1994. Kyrkinē-Koutoula, Anastasia, Hē othomanikē dioikēsē stēn Hellada. Hē periptōsē tēs Peloponnēsou, 1715-1821 (Ottoman administration in Greece. The case of the Peloponnese, 1715-1821), Athens: Arsenidēs, 1996. Martin, Vanessa and Nouraei, Morteza, “Foreign Land Holdings in Iran 1828 to 1911”, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (April 2011), pp.131- 145. Michalopoulos, D., Vie politique en Grèce pendant les années 18621869, Athens: National University of Athens/Saripoleion, 1981. Montefiore, Simon Sebag, Young Stalin, London: Phoenix, 2008. Service, Robert, Lenin. A biography, London: Pan Books, 2003. Soulis, George C., “On the Slavic Settlement in Hierisos in the Tenth Century”, Byzantion, XXIII (1953), pp. 67-72. __, “The Legacy of Cyril and Methodius to the Southern Slavs”, Dumbarton Oaks Papers, XIX (1965), pp. 19-43.

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