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The Seven Failure Modes FMEA Tips and Tricks Making FMEAs Smarter The Forgotten FMEA Manual

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In this issue

ASQ Automotive Division

SUMMER 2008 2007-2008 DIVISION COUNCIL ROSTER Chairperson (Voting Officer) JACKIE PARKHURST Tel: 313/220-0204 E-Mail: [email protected]

Exhibits Chair DENNIS C. SEEGER Tel: 313/235-9601 E-Mail: [email protected]

Past Chair (Voting Officer) CHERYL FRANKS DENMAN Tel: 313/919-3294

Quality Leader Award Chair CAROLE MALONE E-Mail: [email protected]

Chair Elect (2008-2009) (Voting Officer) JOHN CASEY Tel: 248/202-8494 E-Mail: [email protected]

Craig Award Chair LARRY R. SMITH Tel: 313/623-7724 E-Mail: [email protected]

Treasurer (Voting Officer) FRANK BYKAYLO Tel: 248/836-6045 E-Mail: [email protected]

Koth Award Chair ALLY HAMOOD Tel: 586/575-2838 E-Mail: [email protected]

Secretary (Voting Officer) DENISE TISO Tel: 248/431-9852 E-Mail: [email protected]

Awards Chair (Voting Member) JAYNIE L. VIZE Tel: 248/371-2413 E-Mail: [email protected]

07-08 AE Editor AMY LICHONCZAK Tel: 586/214-4131 E-Mail: [email protected]

Ann Arbor Liaison ERIC ZINK Tel: 734/741-5399 E-Mail: [email protected]

Historian/MQC Liaison/AIAG Liaison/ QFD Liaison (Voting Officer) LLOYD D. BRUMFIELD Tel: 248/364-0196 Ext: 170 E-Mail: ldbrumfi[email protected]

Detroit Liaison/Coordinator Team India ABHIJIT SENGUPTA Tel: 313/595-5310 E-Mail: [email protected]

Health Care Liaison DAN REID Tel: 248/857-1166 E-Mail: [email protected] Standards (Voting Officer) DOUGLAS BERG Tel: 248/348-2765 E-Mail: [email protected] Examining Chair Publications Team (Voting Officer) JERRY BOWEN Tel: 810/694-1586 E-Mail: [email protected] Regional Councilor, WCQI/Annual Boat Cruise FRANCIS W. CURTISS Tel: 763/425-3724 E-Mail: [email protected] Membership Chair/Professional Development Detroit Section CLEM GOEBEL (Voting Member) Tel: 810/599-6188 E-Mail: [email protected] ASQ BOD President RON ATKINSON Tel: 248/821-4806 E-Mail: [email protected] Qualkity Professional of the Year KUSH SHAH Tel: 248/830-8525 E-Mail: [email protected]

Northeastern Illinois Section 1212 FRANCES BLOSSER E-Mail: [email protected]

Features 2 The Seven Failure Modes John Lindland

8 FMEA Tips & Tricks Ron Atkinson

10 How Can We Make Our FMEAs Smarter? John Casey

12 The Forgotten FMEA Manual Steven C. Leggett

Upcoming Events Fall Quality Symposium September 2009 Macomb Community College - University Center Updates and information can be found at www.asq.org/auto/

Scholarships HIRA FOTEDAR Tel: 440/933-3626 E-Mail: [email protected] Assistant Scholarships/Saginaw Liaison KEN ZIMMER Tel: 989/868-4811 E-Mail: [email protected]

The American Society for Quality Automotive Division held its annual Awards Event on June 17, 2008 at the Henry Ford Fairlane Estate, Dearborn, MI.

Vice Chair Programs NARAYAN DAS Tel: 586/492-4671 E-Mail: [email protected]

Bennie Fowler, Vice President of Quality, Ford Motor Company delivered the keynote address followed by the awards ceremony.

Chair-Paper Symposium ERIC HAYLER Tel: 864/989-5577 E-Mail: [email protected]

ASQ Automotive Division Awards for 2008

Coordinator Team India Project Team Thailand Leader MARIA STOLETOVA E-Mail: [email protected] ASQ Headquarters Administrator SHIRL FURGER Tel: 800/248-1946 E-Mail: [email protected]

Quality Leader of the Year – Marybeth Cunningham, Global Director, Excellence, Lean & Operations, Delphi Packard Electric/Electronic Architecture Quality Professional of the Year – Dr. Rajinder Kapur, Supplier Development Engineer for Ford Motor Company Koth Award Winner – Lou Ann Lathrop, Design Release Engineer, Engine Sensors Cecil B. Craig Awards for Superior Papers published in the last year – 2 awards

Published by Mirus Graphic Solutions and ASQ Automotive Division

Editor-in-Chief: Amy Lichonczak Publication Comittee: Janie Topp Publisher: Mirus Graphic Solutions

John J. Casey for his paper “3L5Y Explained” and Dan Reid for his paper “Developing the Voluntary Healthcare Standard”

Direct all editorial submissions or advertising information to: Amy Lichonczak @ [email protected]

When reordering request document number B0624 NOTE: Please forward all change of address requests to ASQ headquarters at www.asq.org Automotive Excellence (ISSN) is published by Mirus Graphic Solutions, for ASQ Automotive Division. All editorial submissions should be directed to Amy Lichonczak, Editor-in-Chief, or Mirus Graphic Solutions, Publisher at 25531 Dequindre Rd., Madison Hts, Michigan 48071. Advertising inquiries should be directed to [email protected] Copyright © 2008, ASQ Automotive Division. No information may be copied without the express written permission of the Editor-in-Chief, ASQ, Automotive Division. Neither the ASQ, ASQ Automotive Division, nor the Publisher’s office is responsible for the accuracy of information in editorial articles or advertising in this publication. Readers should independently evaluate the accuracy of any statements in the editorial or advertising of this publication which are important to them and rely on their own independent evaluation.

www.asq.org/auto

ASQ AUTOMOTIVE DIVISION VISION: To be the worldwide automotive industry’s leader on issues related to quality MISSION:Ê/œÊv>VˆˆÌ>ÌiÊVœ˜Ìˆ˜ÕœÕÃʈ“«ÀœÛi“i˜ÌÊ>˜`ÊVÕÃ̜“iÀÊÃ>̈Ãv>V̈œ˜ÊLÞʈ`i˜Ìˆvވ˜}]ÊVœ““Õ˜ˆV>̈˜}Ê>˜`Ê«Àœ“œÌˆ˜}\ÊUÊ+Õ>ˆÌÞʎ˜œÜi`}iÊUÊ>˜>}i“i˜Ì½Ãʏi>`iÀň«ÊÀœiÊUʘ`ÕÃÌÀÞÊ

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from the home office

SUMMER 2008

This edition contains articles on Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). This valuable tool still has its implementation challenges for many companies, but has enormous potential for improving effectiveness. The intent of these articles is to make implementation easier and the tool more user-friendly. It is our way of welcoming in the Fourth edition of the FMEA Manual being printed as you read this newsletter. Fall will be here very soon; the Edition is already underway. With the new council year, it is my pleasure to introduce you to the new Chair Elect 2008-09 year: John Casey. John has long served as volunteer for the ASQ Automotive Council and various ASQ events. John has also been a regular author for Automotive Excellence. It is difficult to believe that my time as Vice-Chair Publications of the ASQ Automotive Division, Automotive Excellence newsletter has ended. It was an honor to have served the last couple of years in bringing members articles and information on important industry topics. Many challenges are ahead for the automotive industry, but no doubt it is here to stay and is evolving in our global market. iÃÌÊ܈ÅiÃÊ̜Ê>]Ê>˜`ÊʏœœŽÊvœÀÜ>À`Ê̜ÊÃiiˆ˜}ÊޜÕʈ˜Ê̅iÊvÕÌÕÀiÊ>ÌÊ
-+ÊiÛi˜Ìð Sincerely, Amy Lichonczak Vice- Chair Publications 2007-08 [email protected]

Dear ASQ Automotive Division, The constant force of change is upon us, the world will never be the same, now more than ever we need to lead. It is obvious that the competitive offerings and the constant push for savings is causing our industry to challenge everything in order to survive. We continuously push the organization to become more lean, we push for faster product introductions, all in order to get a market place advantage. Our greatest contribution as quality professionals is to show how the quality methods have the greatest leverage for our companies. When you truly improve quality, you achieve it through improving first time yield. This simultaneously improves productivity, it directly improves cost, it improves employee morale and it improves customer confidence making your products worthy of a premium price. Strategic deployment of quality techniques is the only discipline that has a multiplier across all dimensions of business. The massive pressure for financial gains that is on our industry often causes our decision makers to vœÀ}iÌÊ̅ˆÃʓՏ̈«ˆiÀÊivviVÌÊ>˜`Ê̅iÞʓ>ŽiÊÃÕL‡œ«Ìˆ“>Ê`iVˆÃˆœ˜ÃÊ`ÕiÊ̜Ê̅iÊ«ÀiÃÃÕÀi°Ê >ÈV>Þ]Ê̅iÞÊvœÀ}iÌ°Ê WE NEED TO LEAD. The tools and skills that you possess are the one’s the auto industry needs more than ever. If you see a problem, solve it using disciplined methods and teach your peers the techniques you know. Make them problem solvers, just like you. That’s what leaders do, they show people a better way and enable them to duplicate the success. This leadership in quality can create geometric multipliers when hundreds of people follow your lead. My objective over the next year is to find ways to invigorate deployment of the quality tools in our industry. We need an environment to let you show off your skills and demonstrate the multiplying value that a quality professional like you can bring to your company. How can the ASQ Automotive Division serve you and your company making the constant changes that we face have quality in the heart and soul? I am looking for your ideas, and thoughts. iÃÌÊ܈ÅiÃÊ>ÃÊޜÕʏi>`Ê̅iÊÜ>ÞÊ̜Ê̅iÊvÕÌÕÀi° John J. Casey Chair Elect 2008-09 [email protected]

1 AUTOMOTIVE EXCELLENCE

SeVEN FAILURE MODES The Seven Failure Modes

THE FMEA Process

Workshop: Design Failure Mode and Effects Analysis John Lindland

Brainstorm Potential Failure Mode(s)

DFMEA: Selecting the Correct Level of Detail AXIOM: ENERGY CONSUMES ALL MATTER OVER TIME. PARTS LAST LONGER WHEN THEY ARE STRONGER, TOUGHER (RESIST DAMAGE), OR THE STRESS IS LOWERED. UNDERSTAND AND STUDY THE ENERGY STRESS RELATIONSHIPS. Within the mission time, the important characteristics cannot degrade outside of design intent for fit, form function, appearance, or safety. GD&T and Material characteristics will ensure that the design works for a short period of time. How well the design and material parameters handle energy will determine how the design will perform over the mission time.

Structure of the Workshops

Identify Item Details and Functions

Controls to Detect Failure Mode(s) Controls to Prevent Cause(s)

List the Effect(s) of Failure Mode(s)

Assess Severity (S) of the Effect(s)

Identify Failure modes with S > 8

Brainstorm Cause(s) of Failure Mode(s)

Assess Occurrence (O) of the Cause(s)

Calculate Criticality Crit = S X O

List Current Design or Process Controls

Assess Detection (D) of the Failure Mode (D-Type)

Calculate RPN RPN = S X O X D

Scope

Identify Special Characteristics.

When identifying design detail to analyze, consider any detail which:

Create Pareto Charts of Criticalities and RPNs

Ê UÊÊ -̜ÀiÃʜÀÊÀii>ÃiÃʅˆ}…ɏœÜÊÌi“«iÀ>ÌÕÀi]Ê radiation, energy or other type of stress Ê UÊÊ -ˆ`iÃÊ>}>ˆ˜ÃÌÊ>˜Þʜ̅iÀÊÃÕÀv>Vi Ê UÊÊ ,iViˆÛiÃÊÃÌÀiÃÃÊvÀœ“ÊV…i“ˆV>Ê>ÌÌ>VŽ Ê UÊÊ -iVÕÀiÃʜÀʅœ`ÃÊ>Ê«>ÀÌÊ՘`iÀÊÃÌÀiÃÃ Ê UÊÊ >ÃÊv>ˆi`ʈ˜Ê̅iÊ«>ÃÌÊ (similar designs/applications) Ê UÊÊ *ÀœÌiVÌÃÊ>ÊÃÕÀv>ViÊvÀœ“Ê>˜ÞÊÌÞ«iʜvÊÃÌÀiÃÃ Ê UÊÊ
˜ÞÊ`iÈ}˜Ê`iÌ>ˆÊ܅ˆV…Ê“ˆ}…Ìʏi>`Ê̜Ê>ÊwÌ]Ê form, function, appearance, safety, or government failure.

Prioritize Recommended Actions Hold FMEA Reviews and Implement Recommended Actions Risk Reduction

RPN: Risk Priority Number

Primary Focusing Questions Ê UÊÊ 7…ˆV…Ê`ˆ“i˜Ãˆœ˜ÃÊ>ÀiÊÀiµÕˆÀi`Ê̜ÊÃ>̈ÃvÞÊ stated requirements for fit, form, function, appearance, or safety? Ê UÊÊ 7…ˆV…ÊœvÊ̅iÃiÊ`ˆ“i˜Ãˆœ˜ÃÊ܈ÊV…>˜}iÊ>ÃÊ>Ê result of time and energy? Ê UÊÊ 7…>Ìʓ>ÌiÀˆ>ÃÊ܈ÊV…>˜}iÊ>ÃÊ>ÊÀiÃՏÌʜvÊ̈“iÊ and energy (strength, brittleness, resistance to energy transfer/flow, etc.)? Ê UÊÊ 7…ˆV…Ê“œÛˆ˜}Ê­ÌÀ>˜Ã>̈œ˜>ÉÀœÌ>̈œ˜>®Êˆ˜ÌiÀ‡ faces will change as a result of changing resistance (increasing or decreasing resistance)? Ê UÊÊ 7…ˆV…Êi˜iÀ}ÞÊÜÕÀViÃÊ܈ÊV…>˜}iÊ܈̅Ê̈“i¶

2 www.asq.org/auto

Risks

Selecting Detail Ê UÊÊ "LÌ>ˆ˜Êwi`Êv>ˆÕÀiÊ`>Ì>° Ê UÊÊ >̅iÀÊ>Ê>Û>ˆ>LiÊ`iÌ>ˆÊ܅ˆV…Ê`iÃVÀˆLiÃÊ the product design: Assembly drawings, bills of material, schematics, specifications, etc. Ê UÊÊ 1ÃiÊ>ÊÞiœÜʅˆ}…ˆ}…ÌiÀÊ>˜`ʓ>ÀŽÊ̅iÊ selected detail, those which make the product work and those which will change over time (energy, resistance, restriction, strength, etc.). Ê UÊÊ `i˜ÌˆvÞÊ̅iÊÌi“ÃÊ̜ÊÃÌÕ`ÞÊ>˜`ÊÃÌ>ÌiÊ̅iÊ item in terms of the function verb-noun.

Which dimensions or material properties are required to make the product work? Which dimensions, material properties, energy source, resistance/restriction will change over time? Ê UÊÊ œââiÊi˜}̅\Ê/…iÊi>ÀÞÊ«>ÀÌÊ>vviVÌÃÊ laminar flow. For a given pressure, overall length affects flow resistance. Ê UÊÊ œââiÊ >Ãi\ʏ>̘iÃÃÊ«ÀœÛˆ`iÃÊ̅iÊ>LˆˆÌÞÊÌœÊ achieve a seal Ê UÊÊ œââiÊ"«i˜ˆ˜}Ê ˆ>“iÌiÀ\ÊœÀÊ>Ê}ˆÛi˜Ê pressure, affects flow resistance

SUMMER 2008

Examples of Design Functions Absorb energy Absorb heat Absorb impact Absorb moisture Absorb radiation Absorb vibration Absorb x Accept bolt/screw Accept gas/air Accept liquid Accept part Achieve hardness Adjust speed Amplify signal Change chemicals Change state Clip signal Close circuit Control crack Control direction Control feedback Control force Control location Control position Control pressure Control shock Control speed Control speed Control temperature Control x Create vacuum

Dampen noise Develop finish Develop heat Develop pressure Develop seal Develop strain Develop x Direct flow Direct light End cycle Engage part Guide electrical-current Guide energy Guide fluid Guide force Guide heat Guide light Guide movement Guide pressure Guide sound Guide vibration Handle current Hold liquid Hold oil Hold paint Hold part Hold plating Hold pressure Hold x Increase force Increase pressure

Inject air Inject fuel Inject liquid Isolate electrical current Isolate materials Isolate x Limit movement Maintain force Maintain seal Meter flow Modulate brakes Open circuit Open x Orient part Oxidize material Position electrode Position part Protect material Protect microstructure Protect part Protect surface Protect x Provide clearance Provide color Provide continuity Provide feedback Provide force Provide form Provide friction Provide fuel Provide heat

Flow Nozzle

900

1.000 -A-

Provide Identification Provide information Provide light Provide reference Provide seal Provide signal Provide spark Provide stiffness Provide structure Provide tension Provide x Read signal Reduce backlash Reduce chattering Reduce chemical Reduce force Reduce friction Reduce heat Reduce leak Reduce heat-loss Reduce noise Reduce pressure Reduce shock Reduce signal-noise Reduce vibration Reduce wear Reduce x Reflect heat Reflect light Reflect particles Reflect x

Remove chemicals Remove element Remove heat Remove particles Remove seal Remove x Resist chemicals Resist damage Resist deformation Resist fatigue Resist movement Resist radiation Resist Strain Resist wear Resist x Secure part Start cycle Support part Transfer electrical-current Transfer electricity Transfer force Transfer heat Transfer liquid Transfer pressure Transfer x Turn fan Turn shaft Withstand fatigue Withstand force Withstand heat Withstand x

Engine:

FMEA Number:

Model Year: FMEA Scope: System, Sub-system, Part/Component Design Detail(s) Detail Function(s) Functional Requirement Item to be Studied: Fuel Nozzle Sub-categories of Item Verb-Noun Specification (if applicable) Nozzle Length

Length Surface

Resist Erosion

New

Flow Length

Resists Flow

1.00 Basic Dimension

Nozzle Opening Diameter

Cross Sectional Area

Resist Flow

0.15±0.01

Nozzle Opening

Resist Buildup

New

Flatness

Achieve Seal

0.03 Max

Nozzle Base

.15±0.01

.03 Ê UÊÊ /…iÊÃÕÀv>ViʜvÊ̅iʘœââiʓˆ}…ÌÊiÀœ`iʜÛiÀÊ time Ê UÊÊ /…iʘœââiʜ«i˜ˆ˜}ʓˆ}…ÌÊ`iÛiœ«Ê>Ê material buildup over time Ê UÊÊ /…iʘœââiÊL>ÃiÊ܈Ê˜œÌÊV…>˜}iÊ܈̅Ê̈“i Ê UÊÊ /…iʘœââiʏi˜}̅Ê܈Ê˜œÌÊV…>˜}iÊ܈̅Ê̈“i Product: Documenting the Level of Detail Ê UÊÊ -iiVÌÊ̅iÊÌi“ÃÊQÃÞÃÌi“]ÊÃÕLÃÞÃÌi“]Ê«>ÀÌÉ component(s)] for the study Ê UÊÊ œVՓi˜ÌÊ̅iÊ iÈ}˜Ê iÌ>ˆ­Ã®ÊvœÀÊi>V…Ê Item Ê UÊÊ œVՓi˜ÌÊ̅iÊÌi“Ê՘V̈œ˜­Ã®ÊvœÀÊi>V…Ê Design Detail in the “Verb-Noun” format

Understanding Failure Mode Relations Every problem is preceded by the failure mode and the source of the failure mode, the cause. The cause is that which produces a poor quality function/response (failure mode).

(O) Frequency Source of the Failure Mode (Cause) Reduce Frequency through Design Changes (Error Proofing)

(D) Ability to Detect (failure mode and problem)

Failure Mode (Flawed Action/ Response)

Manage the failure mode through Mistake-Proofing and equipment controls. During the Mission Time, the Action/Response becomes flawed.

Effect

Reduce Severity through Design Changes

(S) Severity

Manage Problems through the Process Control Plan for: Verification, Validation, Process Control, in partnership with Inspection and Testing and Control of Nonconforming Product

All problems that relate to customer injury must be given high priority regardless of the RPN that are found during the analysis.

All problems have three components: 1. Frequency of occurrence of the cause. 2. The ability to detect (the failure mode or effect). 3. Severity (how the effect impacts the customer).

Mission Time and Action Response The mission time is the length of time that the product/system must run without failure at its stated level of reliability. Stated reliability is such that when requested to perform, the response (action) will meet all stated requirements. Ê Ê Ê Ê Ê Ê Ê Ê

UÊÊ
ÊL>ÈVʈ˜V>˜`iÃVi˜Ìʏˆ}…ÌÊLՏL\Ê£äääʅœÕÀà UÊÊ ˆŽÊˆ˜Ê>ÊV>À̜˜\Ê£{Ê`>Þà UÊÊ œÌÊÜ>ÌiÀʅi>ÌiÀ\Ê£äÊÞi>Àà UÊÊ >˜Õv>VÌÕÀˆ˜}ÊiµÕˆ«“i˜Ì\ÊÈÊ`>ÞÃÊ>ÌÊÓ{ʅœÕÀà UÊÊ
Õ̜“œLˆi\ÊxÊÞi>ÀÃʜÀÊ£ää]äääʓˆià UÊÊ iÜʅœ“i\Ê£ääÊÞi>Àà UÊÊ œ˜Ãˆ`iÀÊ̅iÊÜ>ÀÀ>˜ÌÞÊ«iÀˆœ` UÊÊ œ˜Ãˆ`iÀÊ̅iÊÀiVœ““i˜`i`ʓ>ˆ˜Ìi˜>˜ViÊ«iÀˆœ`

Mission Time and Action Response The mission time is the length of time that the product/system must run without failure at its stated level of reliability. Stated reliability is such that when requested to perform, the response (action) will meet all stated requirements. Ê Ê Ê Ê Ê Ê Ê Ê

UÊÊ
ÊL>ÈVʈ˜V>˜`iÃVi˜Ìʏˆ}…ÌÊLՏL\Ê£äääʅœÕÀà UÊÊ ˆŽÊˆ˜Ê>ÊV>À̜˜\Ê£{Ê`>Þà UÊÊ œÌÊÜ>ÌiÀʅi>ÌiÀ\Ê£äÊÞi>Àà UÊÊ >˜Õv>VÌÕÀˆ˜}ÊiµÕˆ«“i˜Ì\ÊÈÊ`>ÞÃÊ>ÌÊÓ{ʅœÕÀà UÊÊ
Õ̜“œLˆi\ÊxÊÞi>ÀÃʜÀÊ£ää]äääʓˆià UÊÊ iÜʅœ“i\Ê£ääÊÞi>Àà UÊÊ œ˜Ãˆ`iÀÊ̅iÊÜ>ÀÀ>˜ÌÞÊ«iÀˆœ` UÊÊ œ˜Ãˆ`iÀÊ̅iÊÀiVœ““i˜`i`ʓ>ˆ˜Ìi˜>˜ViÊ«iÀˆœ`

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3 AUTOMOTIVE EXCELLENCE

7 failure modes Energy, Resistance, Action, and Results Energy

Resistance

Action

Example: Failure Mode Brainstorming Worksheets Results

This relationship is true for both people (transactions) and equipment (technical).

Ê UÊÊ *iÀviVÌÊ ˜iÀ}ÞÊ>˜`Ê,iÈÃÌ>˜Vi\Ê*iÀviVÌÊ Action and Results Ê UÊÊ ˜Vi\Ê No Action Ê UÊÊ /œœÊÕV…Ê ˜iÀ}ÞʜÀÊ/œœÊˆÌ̏iÊ,iÈÃÌ>˜Vi\Ê Too Much Action Ê UÊÊ /œœÊˆÌ̏iÊ ˜iÀ}ÞʜÀÊ/œœÊÕV…Ê,iÈÃÌ>˜Vi\Ê Too Little Action Ê UÊÊ ÀÀ>̈VÊ ˜iÀ}ÞʜÀÊ,iÈÃÌ>˜Vi\Ê ÀÀ>̈VÊ
V̈œ˜ Ê UÊÊ 1˜iÛi˜Ê ˜iÀ}ÞʜÀÊ,iÈÃÌ>˜Vi\Ê Ê Ê 1˜iÛi˜Ê
V̈œ˜ Ê UÊÊ ˜iÀ}ÞÊ,>ÌiÊ̜œÊœÜʜÀʘVÀi>Ãi`Ê Resistance: Action too Slow Ê UÊÊ ˜iÀ}ÞÊ,>ÌiÊ̜œÊˆ}…ÊœÀÊ,i`ÕVi`Ê Resistance: Action too Fast

Item: Fuel Injection Detail Name: Nozzle Detail Function (Verb-Noun): Atomize Fuel 1. Failure Mode (Omission): Does not Atomize Fuel 2. Failure Mode (Excessive Action): Excessively Atomized Fuel 3. Failure Mode (Incomplete Action):Incompletely Atomized Fuel 4. Failure Mode (Erratic Action): Erratically Atomized Fuel

For Product Design: Energy can be by design or a component of Noise (heat, cold, vibration, chemical reactions,...). Resistance can also be by design, or a component of noise (dirt, changing load, corrosion,...)

5. Failure Mode (Uneven Application of Action): Unevenly Atomized Fuel

Simple Example of Function and Failure Modes

6. Failure Mode (Too Much Time): Atomized Fuel too Slowly

Spray Nozzle

Function VerbNoun Atomize Fuel

Make sure that the verb-noun is included in the failure mode statement

[O]

Fuel not Atomized

[+]

Fuel Atomized Too Much

[-]

Fuel not Atomized Enough

[V]

Erratic Atomizing of Fuel

[U]

Uneven Atomizing of Fuel

[+T]

Fuel Atomized too Slowly

[-T]

Fuel Atomized too Quickly



*Ê9"1,   ,-*Ê

1,, / Renew online at: www.asq.org

4 www.asq.org/auto

7. Failure Mode (Too Little Time): Atomized Fuel too Quickly 8. Failure Mode (Other): N/A

Causes, Failure Modes, and Effects

Technical Root Cause Dimension Dimension Changes Surface Interface Material Energy Noise Behavioral Root Cause Human Tactile

Cause Resistance Restriction Failure Mode From Another Part

Failure Mode

Effect

SUMMER 2008

Example: Determining Causes and Effects Begins with Defining the Potential Failure Mode

Technical Root Causes relate to specific product, process, or energy faults that cause the action to fail. Technical causes relate to too much/little resistance or restrictions to an action or energy transfer. Resistance relates to friction and restrictions relate to a material to material interference. Resistance and restrictions also relate to employees working with each other. It is interesting that in the mechanical world resistance creates heat and that resistance between workers creates anger/resentment. In other words, resistance wears out processes and/or breaks down relationships.

Causes Dimension: Nozzle Angle too Small Dimensional Change: None Surface: None Interface: Fuel Viscosity to High

i…>ۈœÀ>Ê,œœÌÊ >ÕÃiÃÊ>ÀiÊ̅iÊëiVˆwVʅՓ>˜Ê tactile (movement/ words) that directly creates the failure mode. Example, the failure mode might be “low specified design margin” while the human tactile is “engineer selected a design margin that was too low.”

Interface Function between Fuel and Pintle Failure Mode: Incompletely Atomized Fuel Effects

Material: None

Local Effect (part): None

Energy: Fuel Pressure too Low

Assembly Effect: None

Noise: Buildup on Pintle A previous failure mode can be a cause, but not a root cause as it has its own causes.

Human Tactile: None Resistance: None

UÊ >ÕÃiÃÊ>ÀiÊ̅iÊÀi>ܘÊ̅>ÌÊÜiʅ>ÛiÊ>Êy>Üi`ÊÊ action (failure mode). The failure mode (flawed action/response) occurs at the exact same time that the correct action should occur, and the resulting problems are preceded immediately by the failure mode (flawed action/response).

to

Restriction: Buildup on Pintle Changes Shape Failure Mode from Another Part: None

System Effect: Engine Vibration User Effect: Poor Cold Starts, Poor Gas Mileage Government Effect: High Emissions List All Important Effects

The components which are missing from this analysis are: Ê UÊÊ
˜Ê՘`iÀÃÌ>˜`ˆ˜}ʜvÊ̅iÊseverity of the effects Ê UÊÊ /…iÊControls for the failure mode (Detection) and causes (Prevention) Ê UÊÊ /…iÊvÀiµÕi˜VÞʜvÊv>ˆÕÀiʓœ`iÊoccurrence

tf Mission

Control Factors

Time of Function

Cause 1 Cause 2 Cause 3 Cause 4 Cause 5

Time Failure Mode

Requirements Local Effect (part) Assembly Effect System Effect User Effect Government Effect

Identify Current Controls Current Controls are not what an organization could be doing to detect failures. Current controls are that which are actually being performed. Controls are used to detect either the failure mode or causes. There are two primary types of controls Preventive (P) and Detection (D). Detection is generally considered to focus on the failure mode and prevention addresses cause controls. Preventive controls do not receive detection ratings (they reduce the frequency of occurrence). Detection controls receive ratings. The ratings will be described later in the materials. Only describe the actual controls that are currently being used.

Time

5 AUTOMOTIVE EXCELLENCE

7 FAILURE MODES Failure Mode Relationship to Causes, Effects and Detections

Time Prevention 1 Cause 1

Effect 1

Prevention 2 Cause 2 Prevention 4 Cause 4 Prevention 5 Cause 5 List the current Ptype controls that will prevent cause. Examples: material specifications, design standards, design reviews, documented procedures/ processes, etc.

Effect 2

Failure Mode

Prevention 3 Cause 3

Effect 3 Effect 4 Effect 5

Failure Mode Detection List the current D-type controls that will detect the failure mode. Example: Heat thermography, vibration and sound sensing, etc.

Effect Based Failure Mode Detection 1 Effect Based Failure Mode Detention 2 Effect Based Failure Mode Detention 3 Effect Based Failure Mode Detention 4 Effect Based Failure Mode Detention 5

List the D-type controls to detect the failure mode through the effect. These must be established/ performed prior to the release of the design. Examples: Reliability Testing, Validation Testing, Sensor Based Engine Controls, etc.

Documenting Risks

Identify the Occurrence #'s

2

O

Cause 1 Cause 2 Cause 3 Cause 4 Cause 5

Identify the Severity #'s Identify the Detection #'s

3

Effect 1 Effect 2 Effect 3 Effect 4 Effect 5

D

Failure Mode

S

Cause 2: Pressure Too High

(P) Control 3: Parametric Design of Experiments

Cause 3: Pressure Too Low

(P) Control 4: Internal Auditing

Cause 4: Simulation Not Performed

(P) Control 5:

Cause 5:

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RPN:

¢ QualSAT

4

5 5 4

Detail Function (Verb-Noun): Atomize Fuel YC/YS Description: 1

D 3 Failure Mode Detection: High Speed Digital Pictures

(P) Control 2: Parametric Design of Experiments

SO:

Failure Mode: Fuel Not Atomized Enough

(P) Control 1: Finite Element Analysis

Cause Occurrence # O Cause 1: Wrong Design 6 Angle

S:

3

2

D

Effect FM Det 1 Effect FM Det 2 Effect FM Det 3 Effect FM Det 4 Effect FM Det 5

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Worksheet Item: Fuel Injector Design Detail: Nozzle

3

Identify the Detection #'s

1

S Effect 1: High Emissions Effect 2: Poor Cold Starts Effect 3: Poor Gas Mileage

5

3 YC YS

FM (Effect) Detection 1: 10 Engineering Emission Test

D 3

8

FM (Effect) Detection 2: Cold Room Start Test

5

6

FM (Effect) Detection 3: Highway Road Validation Test

6

Effect 4:

FM (Effect) Detection 4:

Effect 5:

FM (Effect) Detection 5:

SUMMER 2008

Workshop

Severity Evaluation Criteria Ranking Effect 1 None 2 Very Minor

3

Severity of Effect No Effect Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by discriminating customer.

Minor

Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by average customer. 4 Very Low Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most customers. 5 Low Vehicle/item operable, but Comfort/Convenience item(s) operable at reduced level of performance. Customer experiences some dissatisfaction. 6 Moderate Vehicle/item operable, but Comfort/Convenience item(s) inoperable. Customer experiences discomfort. 7 High Vehicle/item operable, at reduced level of performance. Customer Dissatisfied. 8 Very High Vehicle/item inoperable, with loss of primary function. 9 Hazardous – Very high severity ranking when a potential failure With Warning hazardous- mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves with warning noncompliance with government regulation with warning. 10 Hazardous – Very high severity ranking when a potential failure Without hazardous- mode affects safe vehicle operation Warning and/or involves with warning noncompliance with government regulation without warning. Remarks: The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking system which is consistent, even if modified for individual product analysis.

Occurrence Evaluation Criteria Possible Failure Rates Risk Probability of Failure R/100 Cpk Remote: Failure is 1 1 in 1,500,000 0.0000006667 0.00 ≥1.67 unlikely 2 1 in 150,000 0.0000066667 0.00 ≥1.50 3 Low: Relatively few 1 in 15,000 0.0000666667 0.01 ≥1.33 failures 4 1 in 2,000 0.0005000000 0.05 ≥1.17 5 Moderate: Occasional 1 in 400 0.0025000000 0.25 ≥1.00 failures 6 1 in 80 0.0125000000 1.25 ≥0.83 7 1 in 20 0.0500000000 5.00 ≥0.67 High: Repeated failures 8 1 in 8 0.1250000000 12.50 ≥0.51 9 Very High: Failure is 1 in 3 0.3333333333 33.33 ≥0.33 10 almost inevitable 1 in 2 or more ≥ 0.5000000000 >50.00 <0.33 Remarks: The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking system which is consistent, even if modified for individual product analysis. AUTOMOTIVE EXCELLENCE

7

7 Failure modes

tips

Detection Evaluation Criteria Ranking Risk Of Non- Detection Detection 1 0% to 5% Almost Certain

Likelihood of Detection By Current Design Control Current Control will almost certainly detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. 2 5% to 15% Very High Very High chance the Current Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. 3 15% to 25% High High chance the Current Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. 4 25% to 35% Moderately Moderately high chance the Current Control High will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. 5 35% to 45% Moderate Moderate chance the Current Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. 6 45% to 55% Low Low chance the Current Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. 7 55% to 65% Very Low Very low chance the Current Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. 8 65% to 75% Remote Remote chance the Current Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. 9 75% to 85% Very Very remote chance the Current Control will Remote detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. 10 85% to 100% Absolute Current Control will not and/or cannot detect Uncertainty a potential uncertainty cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode; or there is no Current Control. Remarks: The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking system which is consistent, even if modified for individual product analysis.

Summarizing the Results of the Brainstorming on the DFMEA Form Ê UÊÊ /…iʈ˜vœÀ“>̈œ˜Ê˜iÝÌÊ̜Ê̅iʘՓLiÀÃÊÀi>ÌiÊ to the numbers on the DFMEA form on the following page.

Item: Fuel Injector Design Detail: Nozzle

¢ QualSAT

Detail Function (Verb-Noun): Atomize Fuel YC/YS Description:

RPN:

20

(P) Control 3: Parametric Design Cause 3: Pressure Too of Experiments 15 17 Low (P) Control 4: Internal Auditing

Cause 4: Simulation Not 15 17 Performed

(P) Control 5:

Cause 5: 17

8 www.asq.org/auto

15

5 4

Failure Mode: Fuel Not Atomized Enough

SO:

D 3 19 Failure Mode Detection: High Speed Digital Pictures

Cause Occurrence # 16 O (P) Control 1: Finite Element Cause 1: Wrong Design Analysis 15 6 17 Angle 12 (P) Control 2: Parametric Design Cause 2: Pressure Too of Experiments 15 5 17 High S:

18

Effect 1: High Emissions Effect 2: Poor Cold Starts Effect 3: Poor Gas Mileage Effect 4: Effect 5:

14 S

11

21 YC YS

18 D

13

FM (Effect) Detection 1: 10 Engineering Emission Test

13

8

FM (Effect) Detection 2: Cold Room Start Test

5 19

6

FM (Effect) Detection 3: Highway Road Validation Test

6 19

13 13 13

Get the most out of your process Ron Atkinson
-+Ê " Ê*ÀiÈ`i˜Ì]ÊÓääLJän

Give initial FMEA training on an object that is common to the students and not part of their work processes. That way they can concentrate on the concepts. Move on to actual work processes when the concepts are understood. The logical sequence is to do Design FMEA training followed by Process FMEA training. It is actually easier to grasp the concepts by doing the Process FMEA first and then transfer the concepts to the Design FMEA. Failure is the inability of the item or activity being studied to perform its intended function. This can happen even if the part or process does not ‘break’. FMEA is used to evaluate POTENTIAL failures. A FMEA analysis does not mean that the failure has occurred in the past or will occur in the future, just that it potentially could occur. The Cause of the Failure is often given as the Potential Failure Mode. This creates a problem and results in confusion when identifying the Cause. Example: People see a tire without air and state that the Failure Mode is a nail in the tire. The tire losing air pressure slowly is the Potential Failure Mode and a nail in the tire is the Cause. iÌÌiÀÊ`iw˜ˆÌˆœ˜ÊœvÊ̅iÊÀiµÕˆÀi“i˜ÌÃʜvÊ̅iÊ design or process make the rest of the FMEA analysis easier.

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Worksheet 10

FMEA Tips & Tricks

FM (Effect) Detection 4: FM (Effect) Detection 5:

3 19

STAY INFORMED! The Fall Edition of Automotive Excellence is Coming Soon

SUMMER 2008

ASQ Greater Detroit Section 2008 Schedule of Refresher Courses All classes are held on Saturdays at Macomb Community College, South Campus, Building "T" (located between 12 Mile Road & Martin Road, west of Hayes Road). Refresher course starting dates are subject to change, student should verify. Certification

Refresher Course #

Refresher Course Start Date

Examination Application (Last) Date

Examination Date

Fee

Certified Quality Engineer (CQE) 12 Sessions

CQE 808 CQE 209

08-09-2008 02-07-2009

10-03-2008 04-03-2009

12-06-2008 06-06-2009

$450

Certified Quality Technician (CQT) 10 Sessions

CQT 1108 CQT 709

07-12-2008 11-08-2008

08-15-2008 01-09-2009

10-18-2008 03-07-2009

$325

Certified Quality Inspector (CMI) 10 Sessions

CQI 1108 CQI 709

07-12-2008 11-08-2008

08-15-2008 01-09-2009

10-18-2008 03-07-2009

$325

Certified Six Sigma Black Belt (CSSBB) 10 Sessions

CSSBB 608 CSSBB1108

06-21-2008 11-08-2008

08-15-2008 01-09-2009

10-18-2008 03-07-2009

$1000

Certified Six Sigma Green Belt (CSSGB) 10 Sessions

CSSGB908 CSSGB309

09-20-2008 03-14-2009

10-03-2008 04-03-2009

12-06-2008 06-06-2009

$500

REGISTRATION FORM

Name

Last

First

Greater Detroit Section 1000 27350 Southfield Rd., Suite 102 Lathrup Village, MI 48076 www.asqdetroit.org Mid. Initial

Home Address

Home Phone

Employer

Work Phone

Employer Address ASQ Member

No ͘

Yes ͘

Member Number

Payment: Make check payable to Greater Detroit Section, ASQ Mail to: Greater Detroit Section 1000 27350 Southfield Rd., Suite 102 Lathrup Village, MI 48076

For more information call Rajinder Kapur at 248-703-7148 or e-mail [email protected] AUTOMOTIVE EXCELLENCE

9

Smarter fmeas How can we make our FMEA’s Smarter? John Casey /…iÊ1°-°Ê>Õ̜ʈ˜`ÕÃÌÀÞʅ>ÃÊLii˜Ê«ÕÀÃՈ˜}ʵÕ>ity with a passion to stop things that could go wrong—that is, prevent issues and problems from reaching customers. This truly is a smart “œÛi°Ê1˜vœÀÌ՘>ÌiÞ]ʈÌʈÃÊLiˆ˜}Ê`œ˜iʈ˜Ê̅iÊ “things gone wrong” method of Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA), which was a great tool that has now served its purpose. The auto industry has wrung out the maximum benefit out of the approach and needs a new driving force in order to achieve the next level. The auto industry, in fact all industry, needs to move the actions of the engineering and management community into a situation where you can guarantee operator success. Let me illustrate. Quality of products is typically measured ˆ˜Ê*>ÀÌÃÊ*iÀʈˆœ˜Ê`iviV̈ÛiÊqʜÀÊ**ÊvœÀÊŜÀÌ°Ê Most suppliers in the auto industry perform at 100 PPM or better. This means their performance is 99.99% good and only .01% defective (1 bad product out of 10,000). For a production operator, they followed an exact and perfect set of steps almost all of the time but once out of 10,000 tries, the operation was different and made an unacceptable part. The problem with FMEA’s is right here. There are an infinite number of things that an operator can do wrong and FMEA’s are trying to address all of them. Chasing infinity is a very frustrating activity. Isn’t it smarter to focus on the steps that must go right and only look for the deviations? Wouldn’t it be better to have the base philosophy drive our efforts to “Either do it right or we won’t let you do it at all?” This seems simpler to me and I think we would get greater yield on our engineering hours if we had a method that could guide our thinking in this way.

10 www.asq.org/auto

I believe we can document the exact steps of each operator and have simple devices guide the operator’s efforts to help him follow the exact pattern with a guiding principal of “If each part is not made exactly right, we will stop the process and start over.” This is the heart of Success Every Time or SET. SET is a cost effective methodology to help companies move from 200 PPM down to 1 PPM or better and simultaneously maximize profits. The Best Thing about FMEA’s Please recognize that I think FMEA’s bring us a terrific aspect and that we should keep FMEA’s as a fundamental process in the quality discipline. The things I like about FMEA’s are: Ê UÊ 
½ÃÊ>Àiʏœ}ˆV>ÊqÊœœŽÊvœÀʈÃÃÕiÃÊ>ÌÊ operation then create a countermeasure Ê UÊ 
½ÃÊ*ÀˆœÀˆÌˆâiÊ7œÀŽÊqʈ˜`Ê̅iʅˆ}…iÃÌÊ risk and work to reduce it Ê UÊ 
½ÃÊ >Ìi}œÀˆâiÊ“«>VÌÊqÊ/…iÊvœVÕÃʜ˜Ê Ê Ê -iÛiÀˆÌÞÊqÊ iÌiV̈œ˜Ê>˜`Ê"VVÕÀÀi˜Vi Ê UÊ 
½ÃÊ
««i>ÊÌœÊ ˜}ˆ˜iiÀÃÊqÊ/…iÀiʈÃÊ>Ê logical easy to follow formula This approach is so logical and direct, it is difficult to argue with it. In fact, the greatest asset of the FMEA is that it can be applied to various levels of design and manufacturing. This tool has been effective in bringing the industry a long way in improving quality. The problem is, the FMEA approach cannot cost effectively take the industry to the next level. What can we do instead? The difference between the FMEA approach and the SET Approach can best be illustrated described in a Ying Yang Diagram as illustrated in Diagram 1.1. In the world of manufacturing, every operation performs work and can either be done right or done wrong. In the FMEA approach, you focus on stopping activities in the º`œ˜iÊÜÀœ˜}»ÊÈ`i°Ê ÕÌÊ>ÃÊ̈“iÊ}œiÃʜ˜]ÊÜiÊ`ˆÃVœÛiÀÊ new things we never thought of and find new ways to do it wrong. The list of possibilities grow and grow and the time, effort, and expense to protect us from this list grows in proportion.

This continued pursuit of infinity may be a solid explanation of why, after 25 years, the auto industry still has trouble creating totally comprehensive FMEA’s to catch every problem. Anyone facing an infinite task like this will look for shortcuts, take risks, or just go as far as time and energy permits and stop, which is exactly what has happened to the FMEA process. It has passed the point of diminished returns. We need something different now.

Success Every Time (SET) - as an Alternative ÞÊVœ˜Vi˜ÌÀ>̈˜}ʜ˜Ê̅iÊii“i˜ÌÃÊ̅>ÌÊ`ÀˆÛiÊÃÕVcess, you focus on a much smaller set of actions than the infinite listing of what can go wrong (such as with FMEA). Instead, you need to define what must go right and set up assisting devices on these actions to help operators do their work exactly right. For line associates, it is just as easy to make a part correctly as it is to make a part improperly, so you generally won’t get any resistance from them regarding this idea of doing it right. The problem, however, is that normal actions within a day cause disruptions that distract people for a very short while. These distractions could last a few seconds or a few minutes, but as soon as you have a small mental lapse and day dream, boom—a mistake is made. Although this is normal and utterly human, it still causes an error. Success Every Time is investing in devices to help operators remember what to do, and help them do it right. One operator I worked with described it most profoundly: “Set the system up so that the process is telling me everything I need to know”. If you look quickly, you may be thinking that this is just a different way of describing the Poke 9œŽiÊ«ÀœViÃÃiÃÊÕÃi`Ê>ÊœÛiÀÊ>«>˜°Ê ÕÌÊ-ÕVcess Every Time is much larger. Here’s why: the typical concept of error-proofing is looking at the device level. It is looking for means to detect defects, many of which are discovered one at a time. I define error proofing as a method that PREVENTS an error from occurring. It has two key pieces. The first is some type of mechanism or sensing device that for this operation everything is exactly right. The second feature is a control element that will only allow the operation to proceed based on the devices sensing that every element is right. If they are not right the potential defective operation is stopped before the actual error is built in to the product before the value adding step builds the part. In simple terms, either the product is right or it is stopped. Error Proofing Prevents the defects from being created.

SUMMER 2008

A Simplified Look at Manufacturing The Other Side of the World A Tough Question: What’s our method to SYSTEMATICALLY focus on what needs to go right?

What needs to go

FMEA’s Focus our attention here.

RIGHT? What can go

WRONG FMEA’S Systematically Reduce Risk

bl Pro

Prob lem

Problem

The elements of the Success Every Time Process I believe there are a very clear set of actions done on every job that makes perfect parts to standard. This set of actions is done every day, hundreds of times by each operator as they make the thousands of great parts every week. The Set of “perfect” Actions by Operators 1. Select the correct part Ê Ó°Ê"Àˆi˜ÌÊ̅iÊ«>ÀÌÊ­,ˆ}…ÌÊÈ`iÊÕ«ÊqÊ«Àœ«iÀÞÊ rotated) 3. Place the part in the exact correct location within the tooling (multiple parts go return to step 1 and repeat the sequence) 4. Activate the value adding energy

Pr ob le m

Currently We Have Nothing That Aims at This target

em

Problem

The operators need the correct tooling to do each job correctly 5. The Correct Set of Tools (including gages) 6. Properly aligned to mating fixtures and equipment The Parameters governing the value added energy 7. Correct amount of energy 8. Correct dwell time or parameters on each job 9. Energy deployed to the correct location on the part

ob Pr

l em

Potential Problems can be infinite

What will be the result? ÞÊvœVÕȘ}ʜ˜Ê܅>ÌʈÃʈ`i>Ê>˜`ʜ˜ÞÊ>œÜˆ˜}Ê value add to proceed if the ideal is in place, we have a much smaller task to drive quality and productivity. All you need to do is monitor 9 specific elements and ask the question “Is everything right?” If it is, allow the process to proceed. If any one of the 9 elements are not right, STOP, make a correction or dispose of the part. I think this is a smarter way to approach FMEA’s because it is a finite set and we can stop chasing infinity. John Casey is a Supply Chain improvement expert at the Whitehall Group LLC in Troy, Michigan. [email protected]

11 AUTOMOTIVE EXCELLENCE

FORGOTTEN FMEA MANUAL The Forgotten FMEA Manual Steven C. Leggett The Automotive Division requested authors submit articles on technical subjects. What better subject than FMEA’s! This subject is always misunderstood, and there are many interpretations about FMEA’s and how they are applied. It has been my experience that most organizations and suppliers do an excellent job, but there are times when Design/Process FMEAs, have many errors or conflicting information, or the failure mode was never thought through or incorporated into the original documents. The Potential Failure Modes are always added after the fact, or after the failure occurred. Then the FMEA Team scrambles to update the latest documents. On many occasions, the Quality or Engineering Manager or Quality Engineer is the FMEA Team, and completes the required documentation just prior to the PPAP submission deadlines. People need to understand that all FMEA Teams should be cross-functional, multidisciplinary teams, and this is a real life scenario. Please review these reference manuals to help you facilitate your PPAP Requirements. The Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) are an important tool for evaluation and process analysis for finding and identifying any potential irregularities and weaknesses in the production and manufacturing processes. For the past three decades, two groups have collaborated to develop and improve these FMEA Reference Manuals. The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) developed SAE J1739 with the coordination of the Chrysler Corporation, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors Corporation FMEA Reference Manual for both design and process analysis of failure modes. The Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG) developed Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (PFMEA) Reference Manual with again, the coordination of Chrysler Corporation, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors Corporation. Throughout the years, the FMEA Manuals have added key features and elements for the advancements and improvements in an automotive FMEA application. The reference guidelines have been published to help ensure that any FMEA is interpreted and developed with a consistent process. The reference manuals and guidelines are helpful, but the interpretations are still broad and objective. There is still a need to further improve and develop this subject, especially in the areas of prevention and detection rankings. The detection ranking is very hard to understand, very subjective, and difficult to apply in a consistent manner. The Risk Priority Number (RPN) will not show the true value upon completion of your analysis.

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There are more revisions to the reference manuals that will be released soon; that will help guide the FMEA Team. The guidelines for detection and prevention have been used in automotive applications to help develop consistent Process FMEAs (PFMEA) for manufacturing and production applications. There are a number of factors to be considered when using these guidelines, based on the cause or mechanism of the detected failure. Look at the type of inspection, whether manual (visual) or automated, and how close the failure mode is to the cause. This is just one of the questions that need to be asked before you start the entire Machinery FMEA (MFMEA) process. This Lesson learned will provide a relationship between the FMEA and the production and manufacturing environment; and it makes the FMEA process easier to understand, and easier to use, especially for the novice. To ensure consistency throughout the entire document is very important. This will also ensure better quality processes and parts for your customers. Your main objective, before starting the process, is to have all D/P/M FMEA Team members properly trained and knowledgably about the entire FMEA process. Have you ever heard of the Forgotten FMEA Manual? Some people will even ask, what is a FMEA? How do you make a FMEA? What does FMEA stand for and how does it apply to me? Others will tell you that FMEA helps people in national emergencies. That FMEA is FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency. Please don’t get the two mixed up! The FMEA that this article refers to is the Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis for Tooling & Equipment (Machinery FMEA or MFMEA). This MFMEA is a Reference Manual and is the technical equivalent of SAE J1739, Section 5. The Machinery FMEA Manual should been used by all suppliers to companies subscribing to the old QS-9000 Tooling and Equipment Supplement, or an Equivalent Document. Since there is no more QS-9000, all organizations, and suppliers to customers subscribing to ISO/TS 16949 should also be using the Machinery FMEA Manual. You can obtain your copy of this excellent and “Forgotten” Machinery FMEA Manual from the Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG), Southfield, Michigan. A little history behind the AIAG-MFMEA Manual, First Edition: In 2000, the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) had just released their SAE J1739 and it had Section 5 about the Tooling & Equipment. Not all Suppliers make their own tooling and equipment, and it would be a non-functional part of the current AIAG-FMEA Manual, Third Edition. So it was decided to remove the tooling and equipment (Section 5), out of the SAE J1739 Specification, and make this

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This manual is the technical equivalent of SAE J1739, Section Five (5), Potential Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for Machinery (MFMEA). This reference manual is for the FMEA of Tooling and Equipment Suppliers to Chrysler LLC, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors Corporation and other Global OEM’s is intended to clarify questions regarding the technical development of Machinery FMEAs. The Supplier Quality Requirements Task Force Charter is consistent to the standardization of reference manuals, procedures, reporting formats and the technical nomenclature used by Organizations and their Suppliers. Accordingly, the MFMEA has been written to provide guidance for the Organization and their Suppliers. The MFMEA reference manual does not define requirements; it does provide a baseline and guides users to cover situations that would normally be used when preparing MFMEAs during the machinery design phase. Also, the AIAG-MF
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ÊqÊ/…ˆÀ`Ê `ˆtion Reference Manuals should be used together, to reduce the possibility of any failures used during the design and process of any production or manufacturing facility and its suppliers. The Fourth Edition MFMEA Reference Manual should be available later this summer. Once this new edition has been released, it is recommended for each Team Member to be retrained to the new Fourth Edition MFMEA Reference Manual, and then complete your MFMEA requirements. The Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis for Tooling & Equipment (MFMEA) concepts should be applied to machinery to reduce the likelihoods and the probability of possible or potential failure modes related to machinery. The MFMEA supports the machinery design process from design development through the design approval process. The MFMEA should be a thorough review of each element, function or step, in the overall operation of the machinery. The MFMEA manual addresses the design concepts used to develop an effective MFMEA. During the development of the build and installation process MFMEA, covers concepts by all Global OEM’s, and therefore, the MFMEA manual should be considered and followed. The build and installation process FMEA should be initiated prior to the creation of any machinery. Machinery is considered any and all tooling and equipment combined to process or manufacture, fabricate, machine or assemble of all hardware. This includes all tooling, fixtures, conveyors, equipment, components, details, electrical motors and wiring, switches, or any possible combination. Additional examples include: gages, stamping presses, injection molding, metal cutting tools, welding, painting, and cleaning equipment, all of which contribute to the manufacturing process, including the necessary operational computer hardware and software.

SUMMER 2008

Also take into consideration: a) the human element; b) training related to the operational content of each element and c) the process step related to the process. These three items also include documentation, manuals, procedures, and employee training records. Remember 100% inspection is not an effective way to catch all nonconformances. The Design MFMEA should be used as a continuous improvement process and should be used to evaluate the reliability, availability, maintainability, and durability of the tooling, equipment and machinery. MFMEAs are living documents and should be reviewed and updated at regular intervals and as process changes occur. Don’t forget the supporting documents used during the machinery operations and the development process. When you start the MFMEA process, you should have a cross-functional team lead by the machinery responsible engineer and is expected to involve all areas at the manufacturing site. The manufacturing facility should include plant & product engineers, safety, quality, maintenance, production, support personnel and the customer. This also includes supplier engineering and their MFMEA from the machinery system, subsystem and all components. The customer of the MFMEA is the manufacturing facility where the tooling and equipment will be installed for the production process. A starting point should be defined; and become a catalyst to simulate and stimulate the interactive and interchange of ideas between all parties. There should be a team approach during the activities and include all commercial components and their responsible engineer from each supplier. Each component should be reviewed in detail for their MFMEA criteria. The responsible machinery engineer should be experienced with FMEA to help facilitate and to help assist the team. The Potential Machinery FMEA (Process) should be used by the responsible machinery engineer and the team as an analytical tool to evaluate any possible failures during the design, install, manufacture, or operation on all tooling and equipment. These techniques should take in consideration all potential failure modes and their possible causes and/or mechanisms of failure, related to the operation of the machinery as a means to ensure that all failures are considered and addressed. The MFMEA should be used as an input to the manufacturing facilities preventative maintenance program and should be used to determine the machinery controls that may be used during the operation, manufacturing and production processes. There will also be a need to review all outside suppliers operations with the causes and effects of any possible failures. Other considerations: I recommend having the customer preventative maintenance and supplier field service represented on the MFMEA Team. Otherwise, it will be impossible to develop an effective MFMEA.

The MFMEA Team should concentrate on improving the reliability, availability, maintainability, and durability of the tooling, equipment and machinery while conducting the analysis. During the deep dive process, the MFMEA Teams questions, thoughts, documentation, lessons learned, and analysis of each line element, should be based on items that could potentially fail by their associated causes and/or mechanisms of failures related to the operation of the machinery. This should also be considered on the basis on their past experiences concerns regarding the entire operating production environment and performance of the machinery. The MFMEA improves the reliability, availability, maintainability, and durability of the machinery. It helps in the evaluation and understanding of the line elements and steps of the device’s, it aids in the objective evaluation and helps provide the necessary information to aid in the planning of an effective and efficient process for the supplier preventative maintenance programs. When the process of the MFMEA had been initiated and implemented, the results are reduced life cycle costs, improved machinery repair and maintenance, and reduction in mean time to repair. The MFMEA shows the probability of their potential failure modes and all the effects of the shop floor should be considered before “>˜Õv>VÌÕÀˆ˜}Ê̅iÊ̜œˆ˜}Ê>˜`ÊiµÕˆ«“i˜Ì°Ê1«œ˜Ê completion of the process, the MFMEA Team has a ranked list of the potential failure modes and their potential causes and mechanisms. The list will be ranked accordingly, and then establish a priority system for preventative and corrective actions. Once the MFMEA Team has assembled and all pertinent back up information prepared, the machinery responsible engineer should lead the group in the MFMEA development process. The process begins with the preparation of all documents and each member should have a full understanding of what the entire process can and will do, during the manufacturing and production processes. Each Team member should be trained prior to the start of the development of the MFMEA process as to what the machinery is expected to do or not do, in the production and manufacturing environment, under the specified conditions and for the required time period. (e.g. hot, cold, humidity, oil, water, cutting fluids, machining chips, etc…..). This criteria is expected from sources such as design requirements, validation testing, preventative maintenance programs, program and performance criteria, reliability, maintainability, availability and durability results, contract and engineering specifications, production and ongoing testing, including lot control testing, traceability requirements, prevention, detection and corrective actions.

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ÊÃÌ>ÀÌÃÊ̅iÊÀiۈiÜÊ>˜`Ê`iÛiopment process, the MFMEA Team should have access to the process flow diagram, sequence of steps of the operation of the machinery and detailed descriptions. The tooling and equipment machinery brochures, with engineering drawings, detail prints and machinery reliability data and capability studies. The responsible machinery engineer leads the Team, to help facilitate all of the documented results and analysis of the potential failure modes and cause mechanism of failures, and their possible consequences and recommended actions. This is just the tip of the iceberg, and I could write another 20 pages of this fantastic FMEA material. It can be a very dry subject, but I would like you to get excited about new AIAG Fourth Edition FMEA Reference Manual, and please don’t forget about “The Forgotten FMEA Manual”, about Machinery FMEA’s. Steven C. Leggett is a General Motors Corporation, Senior APQP Supplier Quality Engineer. In his current position, Mr. Leggett is responsible for Cradle to Grave APQP Functions and Warranty regarding Chassis Components. He has been and is active in the development of quality publications by the Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG). He is the co-author of the AIAGFMEA Manual-Third Edition and is Chair of the AIAG-PPAP Manual-Fourth Edition, as well as a Speaker at various local and national conferences. Steve is also active within the Automotive Division and Detroit Section of ASQ, he can be reached at [email protected]. Reference Information can be found on the links below: SAE J1739, AIAG-FMEA, MFMEA, PPAP, APQP, MSA, SPC, ISO/TS 16949, and Juran’s Quality

œ˜ÌÀœÊ>˜`Ê œœŽ° Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) www.sae.org Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG) www.aiag.org American Society for Quality (ASQ) www.asq.org

This would also include the lessons learned, preventative maintenance historical records of the same machines, and possible federal, state and/or local regulatory laws.

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