"Tsarism long term weaknesses caused its collapse" In the context of Russian history 1801-1917 how valid is this view?
The Romanov dynasty ruled over the Russian empire for just over 300 years, and in that time presided over some of the most successful military conquests and symbolic domestic reforms. However turbulence amongst the masses, and even the imperial court was never far away, with 5 Tsars being assassinated and revolution ultimately paving the way to the collapse of the Russian royal family. During this essay I will be assessing the developments of Tsarism, particularly how it confronted the long term weaknesses of the empire, such as agricultural inefficiency and the need for social and economic development between the years 1801-1917, to consider at which moment in time the seeds of revolution were sown. I will then consider short term weaknesses, which will begin from the start of World War 1 and consider whether it a valid view to conclude that it was predominantly the short term effects that "shook the regime into an inevitable collapse", the long term factors, or an element of the two.
One long term issue that Tsarism, both by its very nature refused to embrace and failed to understand, was the need and growing desire to see basic democratic provisions, such as a constitution and a nationally elected Duma, which didn't appear until 1906. Alexander I made some inroads into fighting despotism and attempting to introduce some democratic practices, as can be seen from the constitution granted to Poland in 1815, which has been seen as the most liberal in contemporary Europe at the time. This was just one aspect of Speranskii's vision for the Russian empire, which was to include, "the participation of free social elements in the making of laws" "an independent judiciary" and "open government", three aspects that were completely anathema to an Autocrat. This contradiction certainly was a cause of resentment as Alexander had been encouraging the overthrowing of old regimes in Europe and providing concessions to parts of his own empire. Many Russians were lead to wonder "did we free Europe in order to place ourselves in chains?"The first illustration of such hostility towards the regime and the lack of democratic practices, was shown during the Decemberists uprising, following the death of Alexander. The contrast in systems on the continent revealed even to one Russian nobleman that "the despotism of our regime first became truly present in our hearts and our understanding" and that "the laughable limited rights our people possess" was clear for everyone to see. It can be seen even from their rather ambitious intentions, that post revolution, the wider expansion of citizens rights and the overhaul of Autocracy would certainly be their priority. Although a failure in itself the revolt is significant as Whittock suggests the Decemberists "opened the revolutionary epoch that lasted until the final overthrow of Tsarism in 1917," Nicholas I upon taking office even thought that "Revolution is at the gates of Russia," perhaps this was the genuine feeling of Nicholas who felt the Decemberists aim had touched a nerve with many Russia people, or perhaps it was merely a statement so that he could consolidate and preserve autocracy through the use of repression. Nicholas II made clear his opposition to constitutional reform indeed a close adviser considered "better a Russian revolution and turmoil that a constitution". The 1905 revolution was significant, as this time the Tsarist government made concessions in its October manifesto, clearly it was felt the situation was to revolutionary to handle with repression. However only 2 months later Nicholas abandons his promises and reasserts his rule by decree. The Duma's were established in vain as Pipes argues the establishment of the Duma "was largely wasted, a missed opportunity that would not reoccur." The Duma's were to play a very significant role in opposing the Tsar in the years to come, and in many ways such an objection to the Dumas actions signalled
The agricultural and land reforms during this period must also be seen as a long term generational failure of the Tsars. The emancipation of the serfs was the most significant piece of legislation of the century yet, its terms its timings and its implementation all caused lasting problems. Indeed it was the state of agricultural that triggered the February revolution, the desire for stability in terms of quantity and prices of bread in particular was the concern, that resulted in the initial demonstrations and strikes . The emancipation of the serfs for some Historians can be seen as a real turning point in Russian society and agriculture Bideleux argues that the "transfer of land on such a massive scale by such an oppressive and autocratic state, was in itself remarkable." The act certainly in scope was the first of its kind for Russian agriculture, yet many historians with the use of hindsight quickly point out its failures and how its short-comings contributed greatly to revolution in 1917. Watts for example dismisses the emancipation as a "half hearted concession" which Broido suggests "pleased nobody and ... achieved nothing." I would disagree with the assessments of these historians and point out their relative lack of perspective, the emancipation provided the first opportunities for nearly 30 millions serfs to own land, and enjoy a degree of personal autonomy and freedom. Although the methods used, following emancipation were still inefficient and outdated the emancipation in the words of Kirchner "did most to fundamentally alter the structure of the empire," it provided a foundation for experiment and entrepreneurship, which under serfdom simply wouldn't have been possible. While this restructuring of the countryside was taking place, yields were not significantly increasing however in line with the increase in the population which had expanded from 72 million at the time of emancipation to 161 million by 1910, illustrating the strains the countryside was under to produce consistently higher yields. The policy under Alexander III and his finance minister Vyschnegradsky of exporting food produce, while economically had some benefits, it totally overlooked the social impacts it may have. The policy was widely responsible for the famine of 1891, which affect 20 million people and resulted in outrage that the government would inflict such cruelty on its people Kravchinksy believes this was the "paramount cause" and the justification in the countryside to "rebel against it". In 1903 Pyotr Stolypin embarked upon an ambitious reforming programme in the countryside, yet his reforms contributed to the emergence and isolation of a third of the rural population who were "landless starving proletarians". The open migration to the cities encouraged by Stolypin during these reforms, for surplus labourers had a significant impact too in creating revolutionary fervour. The peasants once subjected to the conditions in the cities, the demonstrations and the propaganda against the Tsar, a cycle was created whereby once those peasants returned to the countryside messages of anger and discontent could spread.
Russia in the 19th century had always prided itself on its military prestige and indeed the childhood of many of the Tsars had been orientated around military teachings. Yet the embarrassment suffered from military defeats and the eventual eroding of the military's loyalty had a significant contribution to the collapse of Tsarism. Yet military weaknesses didn't just appear upon the onset of World War I, the discipline and the opposition provided by the military to Tsarism, had been developing throughout the century. Norman Stone place significant importance on the impact of war particularly the embarrassment that was the Crimean war, Stone suggests that "Russia was on the brink of a crisis in 1855." Its military weakness had been revealed its leadership questioned and its soldiers demoralised. Westwood contrasts this point and he considers the failures in war particularly in the Crimea and Manchuria to not have "threatened the most sensitive cares of the Tsars." Perhaps combined this is the very reason why the Crimean war was a long term cause in the collapse of Tsarism. The point Westwood makes illustrates, that regardless of the situation following military defeats as long as the Russian autocracy was preserved in the short term it can be considered a success, regardless of the destabilising effects it revealed, such as incompetent leadership and "disloyalty amongst the army." Interestingly the leading Marxist historians and revolutionaries Lenin and Stalin commenting on the Crimean war and later the Russio-Japenese war consider them significant events in providing change in Russia, Lenin described the impacts of Crimea as illustrating the "impotence and rottenness of feudal Russia." The radical reforms of the military under Alexander II, made significant improvements, soldiers became increasing educated, length of service was reduced and officials received strategic training. However by 1905 the inadequacies of the military, on this occasion the navy, were revealed once more during the Russio-Japenese war. Whereby in the words of Stalin Tsarism was "losing its main prop-its reliable troops." It was a combination of dented national prestige, blatant incompetence in the leadership and millions of combat deaths that eroded the support and proud patriotism of the Russian people. The most significant impact from military failures however to the February revolution was the weakening of support from the military, without mass mutinies and rebellions from the St Petersburg garrison during the revolution it would have been unlikely that it would have been such a consummate success, the reasoning behind the disloyalty it clear to see from more than a decade of military failures.
Another long term factor was the regimes inability to control ethnic and cultural minorities and the forces of nationalism that came with them. Under Nicholas I a policy of "Orthodoxy Autocracy Nationality" became his and subsequent Tsars unofficial ideology, this involved the amelioration of minorities through the orthodox faith, with obedience to the Tsar. Evidence of such a policy was clear to see against minorities, following the Polish revolt of 1830, a backlash of internal repression began and there constitution among other liberties were revoked. Under the reign of Alexander III a policy of aggressive Russification was adopted, whereby "Great Russians" had the duty to impose their culture and virtue on Russian minorities, ironic as by 1897 so called minorities accounted for 55 percent of the population. Two groups particularly victimised by such a policy were the Poles and the Jews, it is therefore unsurprising, that both in the 1905 and 1917 revolutions the Poles and Jews played a particularly prominent role. Alexander III continued the ill-treatment of the Poles, he legislated to outlaw the Polish language in all but the teaching of Catholicism. It is unsurprising that Poland became a hotbed for radical Marxism in the late 19th century. In 1892 the Polish socialist party was founded and in 1897 the Polish Bund, both were fiercely opposed to Russification and became a real antagonism to the Tsar and their voices were still prominently heard "calling for national liberation in the February revolution". Continuing throughout the reign of Alexander III and Nicholas II, attacks against the empires Jewish population likewise increased, firstly through archaic legislation, such as the introduction of the pale settlement and then through violent state endorsed Pogroms. These pogroms occurred in many areas of the empire, from Poland to Bessarabia to inside the pale settlement itself. The objectives to assimilate and create a sense of unity amongst Russians completely failed and resulted in "virtual civil war" between many of the empires minorities. It is hardly surprising, when an opportunity arose to demonstrate against the Tsar, that the empires nationalities came out in force in as much a signal of their autonomy and independence in as much as an act of defiance to Tsarism.
The Tsarist impulse it seems throughout this period, whenever their was unrest or disturbance was to use repression to regain and reassert control. All of the Tsars were exponents of this method and reveals a long term weakness and the inability of Tsarism to adapt to changing circumstances. Alexander I had initially shown his reforming intentions, with inroads made into drafting a constitution and relaxing censorship and secret police powers. However his reign soon turned repressive after 1820, in particular the events at the River Don whereby a rural disturbance calling for greater peasant autonomy was ruthless put down by Cossack troops, incidentally this attack in the Ukrainian province was the first illustration of the severe and archaic treatment of the empires nationalities, which was also be a long term weakness of how Tsarism dealt with its provinces. Alexander III following the death of Alexander II, pursued from the outset of his reign a strongly conservative and reactionary agenda, in many ways his reforms were countering those of Alexander II, these intentions were most clearly outlined in his manifesto on Unshakable Autocracy, which Lenin considered the "de facto constitution of Russia" where he promised the consolidation of the empire through his autocratic rule. The repressive "temporary laws" whereby "never before had so much unlimited arbitrary power been granted to the administration and the police," resulted in a great deal of hostility. This power was largely abused by Alexander and his government whereby: powers were revoked from the Duma, university admission and teachings were restricted and citizens were denied the right to a fair trial. Not only did "underground radicalism increase to unimaginable levels," but a heightened feeling of isolation was felt by many Russians, whole could no longer trust and depend upon the Tsar. Finally Nicholas II whose "despotism was tempered by inefficiency" was equally quick to used force in surpressing disturbances. His treatment of the peaceful protestors led by Father Gapon in 1905, was nothing short of a massacre, which fuelled lasting resentment in St Petersburg that the government was unwilling to listen or acknowledge the real grievances of the people, this dismissal of the people by Nicholas was similar to his dismissal of leading politicians in the Duma, indeed Nicholas dismissed the request from Rodzianko the president of the 4th Duma as "nonsense to which I shan't even reply."
However these long term weakness were exacerbated by several critical short term impacts, the most significant of which being the First World War. The weaknesses and inefficiencies revealed in the economy, military and indeed the political system eventually eroded peoples loyalty and by 1917 with estimations of 6 million people killed attitudes had changed towards the war and the Tsar. Russia did not enter the war on a strong economic foundation, it is this fact that Waldon suggests was the primary reason for the revolution that "the unmodernised Russian economy was to weak to survive the war." Service on the other hand would challenge this assumption, he suggested that the economy was steadily improving leading up to and during the war years, a view which Stone takes even further and suggests the war "stimulated economic growth to new levels." He argues it wasn't the engrained economic weakness, rather it was an uncontrollable "crisis of growth" during the war that caused disruptions. While indeed in heavy industry production was matching advanced economic nations, with munitions productions at 80% of German output , Stone may have overlooked the imbalances of the economy as a whole and that this short term economic growth was blighted by rampant inflation which on consumer goods had increased over a 1100% from 1914 to January 1917. Aside from the economy, political naivety and ineptitude seemed to characterise decision making during the war. Nicholas' original decision to leave Petrograd, to become Commander in Chief of the army, which many advisors had warned against illustrates this. Not only was he inept as a military leader, but created a power vacuum in St Petersburg at a time when decisive leadership was most needed. The general appearance was that the hated Tsarina and the disreputable Rasputin were heading the government, which in elite sections of Russian society was a betrayal of Autocracy and amongst the peasants the damaging rumours of sexual affairs evoked hatred and distrust. Damaging rumours were also circulating about German infiltrations in the aristocracy as Sukhomlinov was so "incompetent that many believed he was German agent," while his protégé Myasoyedov was convicted as a German spy, whether these accusations were true was irrelevant, what matter was the peoples reaction and the sense of anger and hostility it caused, that was undoubtedly reverberating in the cities throughout the war years.
"Russia is being threatened with humiliation and disgrace"
. The decision also to suspend the Duma mid session September 1915 and also too suppress to Central War industries Committees, which would have had an important role in controlling Industrial management during the war, was politically a fatal misjudgement. Which only strengthen the progressive bloc and opposition to the Tsar from within the Duma. Lastly the military impacts of the war need to be assessed, Russia's military performance in the war was naturally heavily reliant on its economic base and its leadership, both of which were weak and unstable. Russia throughout the war suffered a number of fatal problems, which were often translated into hostility and unrest back in the towns and cities. The first problem was the leadership which Figes perfectly summarises "as long as commanders were appointed for their loyalty to the court rather than their abilities there was little prospect of any effective military leadership." Strategies used on the front line demonstrated the lack of effective leadership,
The February revolution which undoubtedly was the trigger which lead to Nicholas' abdication on the 2nd March 1917, must also be seen as a short term factor, one where a culmination of problems resulted in a series of strikes and demonstrations predominantly in the capital, yet as Shlyapnikov notes in the villages there was "grumbling and discontent all round" and a "silent revolutionary atmosphere." Tensions had been increasing throughout the war, both in the military which in 1916 alone suffered 1.5 million deserters and domestically where the poor transportation and agricultural problems resulted in severe food shortages, it would be when the discontent from both of these groups combined in the capital where the heart of the revolution was formed. One trigger influential in starting the demonstrations and strikes was the announcement on the 19th February that bread rationing would take place from the 1st of March, not only was this a poorly timed message when the Russian people were most deeply suffering from the long cold winter, but it also spread fear and panic that this prized commodity would not be available for long. Only days after this announcement came International women's day whereby estimates of 100,000-130,000 women demonstrated on the streets of st Petersburg in fury over shortages of bread, by the 25th February their is evidence that the strikes were becoming increasingly organised and increasingly political, as the messages from agitators in the factories started to have an effect. The ominous signs were clear, only a few days later estimates of 200,000 over half the workforce of Petrograd were mobilised in the centre, while the red flags of revolution and banners reading down with the Tsar were displayed. The Tsarina's message to Nicholas on the 25th illustrates just how naive and out of touch they were with the situation, "this is a hooligan campaign, with boys and girls shouting they have no bread, simply to create excitement... all this will surely pass." Yet neither the Tsar who at this stage, who was still on the front lines, or his ruling officials, had the knowledge, the willingness or the popular support to repress the protests. Nicholas' orders to shut down the Duma, and fire at the protestors, illustrates his single mind approach, that repression was always the best response, this resulted in fury from many in political circles and defiance from many of the Cossack and army troops as a result the day before the revolution "18 of the 21 military divisions if the St Petersburg garrison had voluntarily come over to the revolution." This illustrates how deep-rooted this problem had become, a problem which Milyukov, the Kadet leader suggest the Tsar brought about himself by "consciously chooses chaos and disorganisation." His last orders to fire at the protestors eroded the remaining loyalties of soldiers and Cossacks alike, the Petrograd garrison along with sailors in Kronstadt and Cossacks of Schlisselburg all mutinied in the final act of disobedience to the tsar. Without the loyalty of the army, through which the entire foundations of Tsarism were built, there was no possibility of its survival.
As highlighted throughout this essay , there are many factors which played a significant role in the collapse of Tsarism. I believe as the question indicates that the long term weaknesses were ultimately responsible for the collapse of Tsarism and I would indeed highlight several watershed moments, that turned the tide of the country towards revolution. Firstly from 1861 and the failure of the emancipation edict, expectations had been unduly raised about the significance of the act, yet the acts results in the short term were confusion and disgust and in the long term to "isolate and undermine the stability of the regime in the eyes of the peasants." The assassination of Alexander II in 1881, likewise indicated a significant attitude change. For the first time Truly revolutionary groups such as the Peoples Will were emerging, whose intentions were clear the complete overhaul of Autocracy, such groups were not dealt with decisively and as a result "The methods of the 1917 revolution can be seen, in the process of formation, under the reign of Alexander II" Lastly the 1905 revolution, could be seen as a mirror image to the 1917 revolution, with the only difference being the eroding of the loyalties of the military in 1917, Nicholas II attitude to conceding democratic provisions following 1905 illustrates his indifference to a potentially revolutionary situation. I believe following 1905 the seeds of revolution were sown for the final time for the Tsar, and that revolution was impending from this point, the crises experience in Russia throughout the war had been experience before, bread shortages and weak leadership were nothing new in the Russian cities. The collapse I believe had already been written into history before it had even happened.
1984 Rex.A.Wade The Long Revolution: Russia 1880-1930,p67
Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitution-making in the Region of Former Soviet Dominanc, Duke University Press, 1996
Mikhail Speranskii (1810) "Ancient and Modern Russia" memorandum
An extract from Prince Volkonsky memoirs. Quoted by L Kochan, Making of modern Russia, 1983 p156
An extract from Prince Volkonsky memoirs. Quoted by L Kochan, Making of modern Russia, 1983 p156
Michael Whittock Russia's December Revolution 1825 p536,537
Cgs Red booklet source 64
R.Pipes The Russian Revolution-1899-1919 (1990)
Carl Watts Alexander II 's reforms, causes and consequences (1998)
Vera Briodo Apostles into terrorists (1982)
Walther Kirchner Russian History 1991 p87
Sergie Kravchinksy writing in 1894. Quoted in P Cummins Russia 1800-1914 Problems Issues and souces (1996)
Norman Stone
J.N. Westwood: Endurance and endeavour: Russian history 1812-1992 (1993) p197
J.N. Westwood: Endurance and endeavour: Russian history 1812-1992 (1993) p209
V.Lenin quoted in H.S. Watson: The Russian Empire 1801-1917 (1967)
J.Stalin writing about the Russio-Japenese war 1905 in works Lawence and Wishart (1952)
J.N. Westwood: Endurance and endeavour: Russian history 1812-1992 (1993) p197
Orlando Figes: A peoples tragedy: The Russian revolution (1996) p313
G. Stephenson History of Russia 1812-1945 (1969) p309
Lenin
An extract from the diary of DA Milyutin a government minister 22nd Jnauary 1880, quoted in Russia 1855-1991 From Tsars to commissars 2001.
Wade
Robert Service, The Russian revolution 1900-1927
Norman Stone, The Eastern Front 1914-1917 p240
Norman Stone the eastern Front 1914-1917 p223
Mikhail Rodzianlo, president of the duma, quoted in Russia 1855-1991 From Tsars to commissars
Orlando Figes: Interpreting the Russian revolution (1999) p142
Quoted by John Daborn, Russia: Revolution and Counter-Revolution.
A letter from the Tsarina to Nicholas 25th February 1917 Quoted in Russia 1855-1991 From Tsars to Commissars
L. Trotsky: Bolshevik workingmen lead the revolt: (1930) p30
A speech by P.Milyukov leader of the Kadets quoted in M.McCauley Octoberists to Bolsheviks 1984
Carl Watts: Alexander II 's reforms, causes and consequences (1998)
Morris Murphy: The consolidation of Russian conservatism. (1999) P49
