TERR TE RROR ORIS ISM M
IN
NOR NORTH THER ERN N
REGI REGION ON OF NIGE NIGERI RIA: A:
IMPL IMPLIC ICA ATION ION
FOR FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY CHAPTER ONE BACKGROUND OF STUDY
The rise in level of Global terrorism over the years has continually threatened International peace, stability and security. Terrorism Terrorism has no border and it violates all legal regulatory mechanisms of war. It is brutal, non-conventional and cruel in the existence of human race. Terrorism Terrorism has an age long history from the case of slave rebel Spartan who burnt the roman cities to the ground through terrorist attack. The rench revolution of !"#$ which upset the old order of %ouis &'! in which various terrorist organi(ations like )acobin club led by *obert Spas ire, the the +orde +ordeli lier er club club,, the the Giro Girond ndin in and and the the mo moun unta tain in feat featur ured ed prom promin inen entl tly y in pers persec ecut utin ing g oppositions. itler in the uest of wiping out the )ews terrori(ed them by killing and maiming them them at the concentra concentrati tion on camp. camp. The T(ar of *ussia *ussia banishe banished d opposit opposition ionss to Siberi Siberia, a, The ussolini of Italy also carried his ideology too far by terrori(ing oppositions /0avis !$1"2. The sources from which terrorism originated in the 3!st century can be traced to revolution, nationalism nationalism,, separatist separatist movement, fanatism, fanatism, ideological ideological fissures and arm-race arm-race which begets 4uclear weapons proliferation from which world peace and security are seriously threatened. These problems resorted to mistrust and civil disobedience which paraly(ed the existence of peace and security which are now causing global disorder /+arleton !$152. The terrorists themselves saw it as a 6ustifiable means of fighting for nationalist cause and self-determination for freedom. It is also a 6ust cause since governments resort to terrorism to achieve political end. The uestion now is who is a terrorist and what is terrorism7 8mong the acceptable concepts of
1
terrorism in the contemporary century is that terrorism believes in fighting a 6ust cause and mounting deliberate attack on the civilians. ere civilians are the victims of the conseuence of terrorism. /94 panel 355:2, described terrorism as any act ;intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organi(ation to do or abstain from doing any act.< 8gain the bill for an 8ct to provide for measures to combat terrorism and for related matters 35!5 in its section 3+ defines terrorism as= 8nyone involved or causes an attack upon a person>s life which may cause serious bodily harm or death, kidnapping of a person, destruction to a gov govern ernment ment facility facility includi including ng an inform informati ation on sys system tem,, a fixed fixed platfo platform rm locate located d in the continental shelf, public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in ma6or economic loss. The sei(ure of an aircraft, ship or other means of public or goods transport and the use of such means of transportation for any an y of the purpose. To woods /!$#?2 Terrorism is the weapon of those people that are not prepared to use legal means but violence to achieve a desired goal. The menace of Terrorism is what currently plagues the most populous black nation on @lanet earth /as revealed by the 4igeria 0emographic @rofile of. )uly 35!?, which puts her population at !"A,:5",:?$ persons27 8ccording to the Global Terrorism Terrorism Index Index /GTI2 of)uly 35!?, 4igeria is ranked "th. Terrorism Terrorism is a big issue with no easy solution. The country has suffered plaues of terrorist attacks, leading to thousands of lives lost and destruction of properties. In utmost urgency, the surest antidote to these ailments is help from its patriotic and honest citi(ens with proven integrity, dedication and sense of responsibility.Bver the past five years, 4igeria has
2
terrorism in the contemporary century is that terrorism believes in fighting a 6ust cause and mounting deliberate attack on the civilians. ere civilians are the victims of the conseuence of terrorism. /94 panel 355:2, described terrorism as any act ;intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organi(ation to do or abstain from doing any act.< 8gain the bill for an 8ct to provide for measures to combat terrorism and for related matters 35!5 in its section 3+ defines terrorism as= 8nyone involved or causes an attack upon a person>s life which may cause serious bodily harm or death, kidnapping of a person, destruction to a gov govern ernment ment facility facility includi including ng an inform informati ation on sys system tem,, a fixed fixed platfo platform rm locate located d in the continental shelf, public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in ma6or economic loss. The sei(ure of an aircraft, ship or other means of public or goods transport and the use of such means of transportation for any an y of the purpose. To woods /!$#?2 Terrorism is the weapon of those people that are not prepared to use legal means but violence to achieve a desired goal. The menace of Terrorism is what currently plagues the most populous black nation on @lanet earth /as revealed by the 4igeria 0emographic @rofile of. )uly 35!?, which puts her population at !"A,:5",:?$ persons27 8ccording to the Global Terrorism Terrorism Index Index /GTI2 of)uly 35!?, 4igeria is ranked "th. Terrorism Terrorism is a big issue with no easy solution. The country has suffered plaues of terrorist attacks, leading to thousands of lives lost and destruction of properties. In utmost urgency, the surest antidote to these ailments is help from its patriotic and honest citi(ens with proven integrity, dedication and sense of responsibility.Bver the past five years, 4igeria has
2
been confronting threats posed by Coko aram /the ma6or terrorist sect2 to peace and stability predominantly in the 4orth Dastern part of the country. country. 8ccording to 86ayi/35!?2 EThe dastardly terrorist activities of Coko aram have manifested profoundly in the various bombFgun attacks on police stations, army barracks, prisons, churches as well as some other public institutions, and prominent personalities.< In ausa language Coko means book /especially Hestern or foreign2 while aram is an arabic word meaning forbidden, ungodly or sinful. If the words are pieced together, Coko aram literally means book is sinful /0an6ibo, 355$=" 8deso6i, 35!5=!552. Cut basically the import is that Hestern educationFcivili(ation is sinful, sacrilegious or ungodly and should be forbidden. Thus Coko aram stands for outright re6ection of Hestern education, Hestern culture and modern science. *ather it advocates the propagation of strict adherence to Islam in its purest form. form. Coko aram represents the vision and mission mission of a fundamentali fundamentalist st Islamic movement in 4igeria. The sect known as )amaatu8hlisSunna%iddaawatiwal-)ihad /people committed to the propagation of the prophets teachings and )ihad2 seeks to Islami(e 4igeria by whatever means at its disposal and at whatever human cost. This brings in the terrorism angle. )oe Cavier, a 6ournalist who is a regular visitor to the region, told +44 that the ederal government has completely lost control of the north-east, despite deploying thousands of troops and establishing a )oint Task orce. 4ow, he says, it looks like the situation has broken out of the north-east<. 8nd what>s worrying, he says, is that there>s Enot a whole lot of visible effort from the federal government to calm things down /%ister, 35!3=!A2. 8ccording to 'alrie Thomson, ECoko aram not only reemerged as a threat to 4igeria, but its activities also placed it on the radar of international terrorism watchers with a series of daring
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and successful attacks. Coko aram>s marked increase in its capabilities in a very short period of time has led to speculation that it has 6oined forces with al Jaeda groups in8frica. That is likely the case, but up to now the groups seem to be sharing tactics, but not goals, as Coko aram>s focus seems fixed on 4igeria and its capabilities have yet to exceed that of a regional militant group<
Kour introduction seem better now but, I told u dat all these ur reference are too old and
out dated. @ls find rectify. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
This work is critical as it looks to reveal insight into Terrorism in 4igeria which has turned into an issue of highest worldwide distress. Camidele 35!3 focused on this when he recogni(ed that ;pretty much consistently, T' show, shows, daily papers, maga(ines and web sites run and re-run pictures of sensational demonstrations of brutality completed by this savage gathering called Coko aram.; This implies by and large, Coko aram is standing out as truly newsworthy which have put forth the defense of Terrorism in 4orth Dastern 4igeria both annoying and disturbing and it postures awesome peril to 4igerias national security by upsetting the financial and political life of 4orth-eastern 4igerian states, for example, Corno, 8damawa and Kobe state and 4igeria as a rule. This is seen by the vast number of lives and properties that have been lost in Coko haram assaults, the mental or mental in6ury of living in steady alarm of been assaulted by parts of the gathering, religious mobs that emits as a conseuence of these assaults, loss of employments and wellspring of work, the unending barriers, check focuses, curfews and additionally security dangers that happen as an aftereffect of Terrorism. In adding to this, business life in 4orthern 4igeria is ;battling; to get by because of absence of speculation from outside nations who withdrew their enthusiasm for 4igerian business showcase because of the alarm of been murdered, captured or been held as prisoner by the Coko aram aggregate as on
4
account of +hris canus a Criton and ranco %amolinara an Italian two white ostraci(e who were killed in a salvage offer by 9L and 4igerian drives by their abductors who were parts of the Coko aram bunch /Halker 35!?2.
This extreme threat postured by Coko aram terrorists to 4igerias corporate presence obliges that a concrete study be done on the sub6ectM this has been the enthusiasm to complete this exploration. OBJECTIVE OF STUDY
The primary point of this is to attempt a basic evaluation of Terrorism in 4igeria with a perspective to figuring out its ramifications for 4ational security. Bther ob6ectives are= !. To examine the scenario that led to the breakdown of peace in 4orthern parts of 4igeria. 3. To assess the intervention strategies utili(ed by government to de-escalate terrorism in the 4orthern part of 4igeria. ?. To assess the recorded precedence of Terrorism in 4igeria and recogni(e the remote and uick elements that prompted the rise of terrorism in the nation. A.To evaluate the impacts of Terrorist assaults and its suggestions for national security. :.To make critical thinking suggestions that can serve as format for arrangement reactions to terrorism in 4igeria
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This work aims to answer the uestions below !.
Hhat components strengthen the presence of Terrorism in 4ortheastern 4igeria77
3.
Hhat are the implications of Coko aram Terrorism for 4igeria national security7
?.
Hhat influence does other terrorist group/s2 outside 4igeria have on Coko aram7
A.To what level did the ederal government and other shareholders in the country try to solve the problem of Terrorism in 4igeria7 :.
Hhat likely long lasting solutions could be applied to the problem of Terrorism in
4igeria7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
Through the years, 4igeria has confronted a great deal of security difficulties because of the demonstration of terrorism. This why it is basic to complete a discriminating and brief appraisal of terrorism and how it influences 4igerias 4ational security. Cy this, the value of this exploration cant be over pushed. It would help in uture examination works identifying with terrorism both home and abroad. It would be an advantage for arrangement creators in (ones concerning +ounter terrorism, protection and 4ational security in 4igeria
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SCOPE OF THE STUDY
Corno state is the base of the terrorists in northern 4igeria. This state is made up of A,:##,11# population, according to 4igeria 355: census with 3" local government areasTherefore this pro6ect will focus mostly on Corno State within the time frame of 355$- 35!A LIMITATION TO THESTUDY
Inability to visit the regions shortly confronting terrorism to meeting inhabitants and performing artists included restricted or the other constituted a significant limit. %ikewise, biasness and assessments as an afterthought of numerous productions, scholars and online feelings was additionally a restriction to the work this is basically in light of the politici(ation of 4igerian terrorism. The absence of exact information or the vicinity of misrepresented information by 4igerian military and government itself and numerous distributions constituted an alternate fortification to the work. owever regardless of all these constraints, endeavors were made to guarantee the nature of the study through the utili(ation of sources , for example, online suppositions, scholarly diaries and other applicable materials to guarantee authencity and legitimacy of the study. ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS
This pro6ect is divided into five chapters. The first chapter, is the introduction, it looks at the background to the study, statement of the problem, ob6ective of the study, research uestions, and significance of the study, organi(ation of chapters. This chapter also covered the definition of terms used during the course of carrying out the researchas well as scope of the study. The
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second chapter is dedicated to the review of applicable existing literature with the aim of providing fundamental and historical background to the study of Coko aram insurgency in northern 4igeria. The third chapter ma6ors on the methodology. This included methods of data gathering, research design, research population, sample and sampling techniues, research Instruments, validity and reliability of instruments and data analysis techniue. The fourth chapter discussed presentation and analysis of data collected, interpretation and discussion of findings. The fifth chapter discussed summary and conclusion of research work, as well as recommendations on how the problems raised can be tackled. DEFINITION OF TERMS Muslim= /Dncarta dictionary2 a monotheistic religion based on the word of God as revealed to
uhammad during the "th century. B! H"#"m = /8.I. 86ayi2 Coko aram stands for outright re6ection of Hestern education,
Hestern culture and modern science. T$###ism=/Dncarta dictionary2 political violence= violence or the threat of violence, especially
bombing, kidnapping, and assassination, carried out for political purposes. N"%i&"l s$'u#i%( =/Dncarta dictionary2 protection of nation from danger= the protection of a
nation from attack or other danger by maintaining adeuate armed forces and guarding state secrets. N#%)*E"s%$#& S%"%$s: /The ederal inistry of Information2 the states are divided into Cauchi,
Corno,Kobe, Taraba state and 8damawa state
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CHAPTER T+O LITERATURE REVIE+
The chapter reviewed interrelated literature on Terrorism, Security, 4ational security and relevant concepts that are relevant to the study so as to fill the existing gaps in an attempt to better understand the sub6ect matter Terrorism and its implications for national security. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION ,-.T)$ '&'$/% 0 T$###ism
The term NTerrorism< is not new and even though it has been used since the early times of recorded history, it can be relatively hard to define terrorism. owever, Terrorism is the Npremeditated use or threat of use of violence by individuals or sub-national groups to obtain a political or social ob6ective through intimidation of a large audience, beyond that of the immediate victim< /Dnders, 355?2. The definition of terrorism has been hard to define mainly because the meaning of the term has changed so freuently over the past two hundred years /offman, !$$#2. *ecently, terrorism has been used to refer to broader, less distinct phenomena than before. In the early !$#5, terrorism came to be regarded as a calculated means to destabili(e the EHest< as part of a part of a vast global conspiracy. Then by the middle of the decade, after a succession of suicide bombing directed mainly at 8merican diplomatic and military targets in the iddle Dast, the rising threat of state-sponsored started to gain much attention. Therefore, the meaning terrorism had shifted from an individual phenomenon of sub-national violence to one of several elements, or part of a wider pattern of non-state conflict /offman, !$$#2. Cased on %ut(
9
and %ut( /355#2, here is a working definition that is reasonably inclusive and comprises of six elements= !.
The violence is undertaken primarily for political reasons.
3.
'iolence or the credible threat of violence is present /Cadey, !$$#2.
?.
or violence, or political violence, to ualify as terrorism, it must also affect a target
attempt beyond the immediate victims and influence such as audience as part of the attempt to gain the political ob6ectives of the organi(ation. Some definitions include the specification that the targets of terrorist violence are civilians /Schmid, 355A2. A.
or political violence to be terrorism there must be an identifiable organi(ation.
:.
or purpose of this dissertation terrorism will be situation in which the perpetrators, the
victims, or both are not states or governments. 1.
The last element is that terrorist actions are used to improve the power situation of the
organi(ation that is using this form of political violence /8li, 355#2. It is essential to note that terrorism can take the form of 0omestic terrorism, International terrorism or +ross-border terrorism. The terms terrorism and terrorist /someone who engages in terrorism2 carry strong negative connotations. These terms are often used as political labels, to condemn violence or the threat of violence by certain actors as immoral, indiscriminate and un6ustified or to condemn an entire segment of a population. Terrorist attacks are usually carried out in such a way as to maximi(e the severity and length of the psychological impact. Dach act of terrorism is a Eperformance< devised to have impact on many large audiences. Terrorists also attack national symbols, to show power and to attempt to shake the foundation of the country or
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society they are opposed to. This may negatively affect a government, while increasing the prestige of the given terrorist organi(ation andFor ideology behind a terrorist act. 'ery often, the victims of terrorism are targeted not because they are threats, but because they are specific Esymbols, tools, animals or corrupt beings< that tie into a specific view of the world that the terrorists possess. Their suffering accomplishes the terrorists> goals of instilling fear, getting their message out to an audience or otherwise satisfying the demands of their often radical religious and political agendas /Hikipedia 35!?2. Terrorism incidents and the events of $F!! are an example of a continuing phenomenon which has occurred understandably within existing historical or geographical context. Therefore, the severe reaction seen today to the possible threats from terrorism seems perplexing..
The 9nited States 0epartment of 0efense defines terrorism as Ethe calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fearM intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.< Hithin this definition, there are three key elementsOviolence, fear, and intimidationOand each element produce terror in its victims. The CI uses this definition= ;Terrorism is the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social ob6ectives.; The 9.S. 0epartment of State defines terrorism to be ;premeditated politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience;.
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Butside the 9nited States Government, there are greater variations in what features of terrorism are emphasi(ed in definitions. The 9nited 4ations produced the following definition of terrorism in !$$3M ;8n anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by /semi-2 clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets.; The most commonly accepted academic definition starts with the 9.4. definition uoted above, and adds two sentences totalling another "" words on the endM containing such verbose concepts as ;message generators; and ;violence based communication processes;. %ess specific and considerably less verbose, the Critish Government definition of terrorism from !$"A is ;...the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any section of the public, in fear.; Terrorism is a criminal act that influences an audience beyond the immediate victim. The strategy of terrorists is to commit acts of violence that draws the attention of the local populace, the government, and the world to their cause. The terrorists plan their attack to obtain the greatest publicity, choosing targets that symboli(e what they oppose. The effectiveness of the terrorist act lies not in the act itself, but in the public>s or government>s reaction to the act. or example, in !$"3 at the unich Blympics, the Clack September Brgani(ation killed !! Israelis. The Israelis were the immediate victims. Cut the true target was the estimated ! billion people watching the televised event. Those billion people watching were to be introduced to fear - which is terrorisms ultimate goal. The introduction of this fear can be from the threat of physical harmFgri((ly death, financial terrorism from the fear of losing money or negative effects on the economy, cyber terrorism harming the critical technological infrastructures of society and
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psychological terrorism designed to influence peoples behaviour. Terrorism is designed to produce an overreaction and anecdotally, it succeeds at that almost all the time. The Clack September Brgani(ation used the high visibility of the unich Blympics to publici(e its views on the plight of the @alestinian refugees. Similarly, in Bctober !$#?, iddle Dastern terrorists bombed the arine Cattalion %anding Team eaduarters at Ceirut International 8irport. Their immediate victims were the 3A! 9.S. military personnel who were killed and over !55 others who were wounded. Their true target was the 8merican people and the 9.S. +ongress. Their one act of violence influenced the 9nited States> decision to withdraw the arines from Ceirut and was therefore considered a terrorist success. There are three perspectives of terrorism= the terrorist>s, the victim>s, and the general publics. The phrase Eone man>s terrorist is another man>s freedom fighter< is a view terrorists themselves would gladly accept. Terrorists do not see themselves as evil. They believe they are legitimate combatants, fighting for what they believe in, by whatever means possible to attain their goals. 8 victim of a terrorist act sees the terrorist as a criminal with no regard for human life. The general public>s view though can be the most unstable. The terrorists take great pains to foster a E*obin ood< image in hope of swaying the general public>s point of view toward their cause. This sympathetic view of terrorism has become an integral part of their psychological warfare and has been countered vigorously by governments, the media and other organi(ations. owever the central ob6ective of all terroristorgani(ations is to overthrow the government for control of all or a portion of its territory, or force political concession in sharing political power. The hoisting of flags over some towns and villages in 4ortheastern 4igeria by Coko aram afford us recent examples
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Terrorists always resort to the use of violence to change or influence policies that they believe discriminated against particular groups /e.g. ethnic, religious, racial, or economicetc2 in the population. 8 good example of this is the Sudanese terrorists in the !$15s, where blacks in the south demanded a change in policies related to economic power resource. 8nother good example is the periodic attempts by moderate Shiite and 0ru(e elements in %ebanon to redress the perceived uneual distribution of political and economic assets that favored the +hristian community /Card, 355:2. This violence in most cases is usually mated out against noncombatants. This is done to prove that they can effectively challenge government as well as make citi(en loose competence in their government and therefore run to terrorists for protection. Bne of the most bi(arre cases along these lines in 4igeria was the attack against St. Theresa +atholic +hurch in adala 4iger state on the 3:th of 0ecember 35!! causing a black +hristmas for +hristians all over the country on a day they celebrate the birth of their savior )esus +hrist. untington /!$132 cited in Card, /355:2 stated that Ethe violent aspect of terrorists is manifested in different forms of warfare<. 8ccording to him Ethree forms of warfare have been associated with terrorism and they include terrorism, guerrilla war, and conventional warfare /cited in Card, 355:2. This idea goes hand in hand with that of Tomes /355A2 who viewed that terrorism differ in their use of tactics and methods. e spoke of four elements that are typically used by insurgent group. This included= +ell-networks that maintained secrecyM terror used to foster insecurity among the population and drive them to the movement for protectionM multifaceted attempts to cultivate support in the general population, often by undermining the new regimeM and attacks against the government.
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,-, BOKO HARAM PHENOMENOM: TERRORISM OR INSURGENCY1
@resent writings have demonstrated that discourses on Coko aram event in 4igeria has stayed uncertain such these studies have neglected to satisfactorily talk about the genuine reason for the gathering gathering creation and its suggestion suggestion for 4igerias national security. security. These These studies studies have talked about different fighting issues coming about because of the issue of Coko aram in 4igeria going from the socio- political element that have prompted the presence of the gathering, the ascent of Islamic revival that have empower the development of Coko haram in the north, Islamic obsession that have urged uslim to take to arms in their offer to attain to a specific course, the reuirement for absolution to be conceded to Coko aram parts, the impact of Coko aram on local security reuest and so on. or example Dkanem et al /35!32 on their part saw Coko aram and absolution absolution from a philo-lawf philo-lawful ul measurement measurement.. In their study they investigat investigated ed the legitimate ramifications of Coko aram exercises inside the extent of 4igerian law and the constitution of 4igeria as it identifies with the commonness of the nation. They were of the sentiment that ;Coko aram constitutes a break of segment 35A and 35: /!2 and /32 of the criminal code; and that ;the spate of sporadic roughness perpetrated on the country by the Coko aram order underscores the disappointment of the nations nations insights system.; They likewise said that ;reprieve to Coko aram can prompt rebellion in 4igeria.; 0an6ibo /35!52 then again took a gander at Islamic undamentalism and partisan brutality utili(ing aitasine; and Coko aram; emergencies in 4orthern 4igeria as careful investigation. In his study he sees Islamic fundamentalism as the main thrust of partisan viciousness brought on by gatherings, for example, aitatsine and Coko aram in 4orthern 4igeria. %ike this is the
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contention of 8deso6i /35!52 who noted that Coko aram dissimilar to its ancestors broadened the extent of Islamic revivalism. e additionally accepted that the financial conditions that supported the aitatsine uprising in !$#5 are significant to the Coko aram circumstance. 8s indicated by 8demowoeto6o /35!32 ;Coko aram is impacted by religious slant or possibly puts on a show to be;. 8mong other thing they noted that the gathering is reuesting for= The change of 4orthern 4igeria to an Islamic group, administered by Sharia standards and orders. 8nnihilation of western thoughts and introduction in 4igeria, including western training and in conclusion the giving over of the official power in the nation to a uslim president of 4orthern extraction. Cintube /35!A2 then again, as he would like to think gave a sociological investigation of Coko aram terrorism in Corno state. e was of the idea that ;numerous variables helped for the volunteers of Coko aram and they incorporate lessening estimations of training, neediness, awful administration, unemployment, politico-religious, foul play, and defilement in addition to everything else.; e submitted that ;Coko aram has nothing to do with Islam and that it has been censured by numerous eminent Islamic priests however that the beginning set of Coko aram has been substituted with more complex and muddled gatherings by Har Har %ords;. Hhats more, 8liyu /35!!2 inspected the effect of Coko haram terrorism on the 4igerian state and how it turns to influence Hest Hest 8frican territorial security other. Ket Ket still much academic work has not been done do ne on the effect of Coko aram terrorism for 4igerias 4ational security. It is as a conseuence of this that this study chooses to attempt an evaluation of Coko aram terrorism in 4igeria and its Implications for 4ational security. security. ,-23 SIGNIFICANTLEGACY OF NIGERIA
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ive decades after freedom, 4igeria has not possessed the capacity to make social orders that guarantee human poise and admiration for all. Since picking up autonomy in !$15, military upsets, ethnic and religious strains have described post-independence4igeria. The end of the common war /!$1"-!$"52 was accepted to be a chance to unite 4igerians. Ket, in the postcommon war time, 4igeria has been faced with overwhelming security difficulties including militancy, revolts and repetitive public savagery that have set different groups against each other in the nation. 8fter numerous years of military run, the reintroduction of regular citi(en control in !$$$ has corresponded or appears to have prodded the increase of ethnic and religious milita militancy ncy,, descri described bed by demons demonstra trati tions ons of disast disastrou rouss terror terrorism ism,, common common strife strife and mass mass challenges. To be sure, following !$$$, with the opening of the fair space, different volunteer army gatherings sticking to religion, ethnicity or other extraordinary hobbies have sprung up in 4igeria and the ghastliness that they have unleashed on the individuals must be similar to the common war years. 4otwithstanding their horrendous compassionate toll, the exercises of these gatherings and their clash inclined association with security authorities have been a steady threat to peace, security, dependability and the regional honesty of 4igeria. The nation is getting to be progressively ungovernable. ... Dthnic and local parts are developing, a situationmade more terrible by an increment in the uantity of states from !$ to ?5 and a multiplying in the uantity of nearby overseeing powers. *eligious cleavages are more genuineM uslim fundamentalism and fervent +hristian militancy are on the ascentM and northern uslim nervousness over southern P+hristianQ control of the economy is extraordinary . . . the will to keep 4igeria together is currently extremely frail. These same conditions that Laplan depicted in ebruary !$$A appear to be pervasive as Coko aram is resolved to decreasing 4igeria to rubbles if sharia and their adaptation of Islam are not generally connected the nation over. Hhats
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more, intermittent religious viciousness and cataclysmic terrorism and defiance in the 4iger 0elta area have further rendered Laplans fates prediction additionally telling. In reality, the risk of crumbling weaving machines these days in 4igeria than amid the pre‐civil war years. 8s indicated by numerous individuals, including @rofessor Hole Soyinka, ;4igeria is as of now deteriorating. anaging these cataclysmic terrorist or local army bunches has throughout the years turn into a standout amongst the most pressing security difficulties to the administrations of presidents Blusegun Bbasan6o, Karadua, and Goodluck )onathan, who have ruled 4igeria since the vote based arousing of !$$$. The generally held view by masters is that the politici(ation of religion and ethnicity in 4igeria has been in charge of the development of gatherings, for example, the Bduduwa @eoples +ongress /B@+2, Dgbesu, the ovement for the 8ctuali(ation of the Sovereign State of Ciafra /8SSBC2, 8rewa @eoples +ongress /8@+2, the Cakassi Coys, Igbo Kouth +ongress /IK+2, Igbo @eoples +ongress /I@+2, 4iger 0elta 'olunteer orce /40'2, 4iger 0elta *esistant ovement /40*2, ovement for the Survival of the I(on 4ationality of the 4iger 0elta /BSID402, the 4igerian or Kobe Taliban, ovement for the Dmancipation of the 4iger 0elta /D402, )amaatahlus al-Sunnahliddawatiwal-)ihad or otherwise called Coko aram, and a group of numerous other savagery wieldinggroups. Surely, the political hypothesis has been the most predictable if not sound clarification of the ascent and fall of local armies and disastrous terrorist assembles in 4igeria. Hritings on Coko aram stay uncertain about the bunchs raison dRtre or the genuine reason for its creation and presence, not the slightest the reasonability of its exercises. 0ifferent written works have proffered dissimilar perspectives, underscoring distinctive causal elements, for example, emergency regarding citi(enship and between ethnic contentions, lacunae in the !$$$ constitution, institutional shortcomings and disappointments of the administration /the
18
thought of fi((ling or a fi((led state2, neediness and ineualitiesamong the overwhelming ethnic and religious gatherings, pioneer legacy and the relics of the Critish onarchy in 4igeria /or recorded legacies2, and worldwide political powers and the worldwide 6ihad development or the ideological legacy of Bsama Cin %aden. /Isa, 35!52, for instance, sees the wellspring of the issue in the acting of the 4igerian government. 8s he puts it, ;The 4igerian state has, after some time, been described by unmitigated imperialism, eccentric government arrangements, financial emergencies, obligation ridden economy, imbalances and treacheries, awful administration, expansive scale debasement, fractionali(ation of the decision class, feeble political and monetary establishments, and a close unlucky deficiency of security of lives and property .The apparently 6aded way the state deals with the rising issue of activist Islamic gatherings focuses to one certainty the powerlessness of the decision class to legitimately deal with the state issue. In like manner, /Ibaba, 355#2 faults the state or lawmakers for the terrorism in the 4iger 0elta. In the same vein /Ikelegbe, 355:2 notes that, ;the political issues that persuade the civilian armies, and the unemployment and neediness that make the pool of aggressors, have stayed uncertain.; Some researchers, for example, /8dibe, 35!32 follow the issue to the fi((led build of country building in 4igeria. 8t the same, different researchers have clarified the ascent of Coko aram from its religious measurement, focusing on religious fanaticism or fundamentalism as the key spurring variable. ere, Islam and the verifiable interchange of legislative issues and religion in 4igeria have gone under extraordinary examination. In this setting, the age-old +hristian-uslim clash in 4igeria has been recogni(ed as the principle driver of Coko aram. 0efenders of the religious hypothesis have accentuated neediness, social disparities and abnormal state of lack of education as elements invigorating and fuelling religious-based roughness. In clarifying the reasons for ethno-religious clash in 4igeria, /Salawu, 35!52 focuses out issues of command,
19
abuse, exploitation, underestimation, nepotism, and in addition disappointment of 4igerian pioneers to build great administration, breakdown of vehicles of social control regular to conventional 8frican social orders, and the long military mediation in governmental issues. 8s indicated by /0an6ibo, 35!52, Coko aram is the result of the ;aitatsine; convention or a brand of Islamic devotees and fundamentalists acuainted with northern 4igeria in !$A:, and he contends that the aitatsine or Coko aram mobs of !$#5 and 355$ were connected to the disappointment of administration in 4igeria. Bthers, for example, /Busman, 355A2 would clarify Coko aram as a component of the resurgence of Islamic developments and militancy around the world. In an article, ;The @otential of Islamist Terrorism in Sub-Saharan 8frica,; Busman follows the issue of advanced Islamic developments in 4igeria to the openingof vote based pluralism in !$$$, which moved the offset of force from uslim military leaders of the north to +hristian regular citi(en manage in the south. Terrorism which was generally obscure when it rose in 3553 in aiduguri, a remote city in north eastern 4igeria, bordering +ameroon, surged to transcendence in 355$ through some noteworthy however fatal chain of occasions that happened in aiduguri. Dverything started on 3: )uly, 355$ with a throughout the night assault on 0utsen-Tanshi police in Cauchi State. The assault pulled in one of the heaviest and heartless security crackdowns in 4igerian history. The five-day standoff between terrorists and security strengths brought about around #55 individuals killed and a few hundreds more harmed, and also the catch and killing of a few Coko aram aggressors including their establishing pioneer, ohammed Kusuf. The executing of Kusuf and endeavors by security strengths to destroy Coko aram denoted a defining moment in the Islamic group history and changed the gathering into one of 8fricas most fierce and deadliest cataclysmic terrorist bunches. The gathering rose up out of the )ulys difficulty much stronger, bolder and
20
additionally brave in its assaults. It has from that point forward sought after a battle of dread, in charge of fatal and wrecking disastrous terrorist acts in northern and the focal cinch of 4igeria, with 35!! viewed as the deadliest year of Coko arams exercises following 355$. 8 uantitative appraisal of the effect of Coko aram abominations in 4igeria somewhere around 355$ and ebruary, 35!3 freuently does not reflect the genuine humane, financial and ecological expense to groups. The absence of an exact study and a focal database has brought about different assessments and pro6ections. 9nassuming gauges by /uman *ights Hatch, 35!32, for instance, put the aggregate passing at $?: in nearly !1A assaults. The report additionally gauges that ::5 individuals were executed in !!:Coko aram attacks in 35!! alone, while /8mnesty International, 35!32 estimates that, Ein 35!!, at least :55 people were killed in attacks by Coko aram, often targeting police officers and government officials.< Such uantitative assessment reflects the plight of the thousands of people that have been displaced, forced orphaned and widowed caused by the deadly attacks. It also reflects the negative impacts the threat that Coko aram activities pose to the economy, unity and territorial integrity of 4igeria, 8frica and the world at large. 8ny past event that u aid must come with a source/reference2 take note
,-2. PRE BOKO HARAM TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN BORNO
In a study led by 0avid /35!!2 cited in Cintube, /35!A2, the discovering uncovered that the ascent of Coko aram in 4igeria lied in the Islamic history of 4orthern 4igeria /refered to in Cintube, 35!A2. This is on account of before 4igerias autonomy the western impact of Critish colonialists brought on a division among the populace of 4orthern 4igeria, who were once
21
united by Islam. This division as indicated by /Bwolade, 35!A2 ;saw, on one side, the purported cultivated by Hestern world class who were utili(ed by the Critish as operators of coloni(ation and on the other side, the everyday people, who passionately opposed Hestern impact in the locale;. This coupled with the way that +hristian ministers utili(ed western training as an apparatus for evangelism had prompted mainstream instruction being seen with suspicion. Bwolade further noted that this division to him reali(ed ;disappointment with Hestern impact; which additionally prompted a ;rise of Islamist fundamentalists among individuals of the 4ortheastern district of 4igeria; /Bwolade, 35!A=!52. +ase in point in !$#5 the aitatsine mob overwhelmed significant urban areas in the 4orthern piece of 4igeria. These mobs began from Lano in 0ecember of !$#5 and stretched out to Culumkutu close aiduguri, the +apital of Corno state, these uproars likewise influenced different towns, for example, *igasa in Laduna state in Bctober !$#3, )imeta-Kola in the middle of ebruary and arch !$#A, preceding at long last berthing at Gombe in 8pril !$#: /Blomo6i, 35!?=!"12. 8s per Isichei /!$#"=!$A-35#2 the aitatsine uprising of !$#5 denoted the start of savage clashes and emergencies in 4igeria. Some of such emergencies incorporated= the etropolitan uproar of Bctober !$#3, the Ilorin mob of arch !$#1, the 9niversity of Ibadan emergency of ay !$#1, the across the nation emergency regarding 4igerias enrollment of the association of the Islamic meeting in )anuaryFebruary !$#1, the LafanchaFLadunaFaria untua religious mobs of arch !$#", the Laduna @olytechnic mob of arch !$##, the sharp across the country discuss on sharia /Islamic law2 at the constituent 8ssembly in BctoberF4ovember !$##, the Cayero 9niversity emergency of !$#$, the CauchiFLastina mob of archF8pril !$$!, the Lano mob of Bct !$$!, the angon-Lataf mob of ay !$$3, the Lano common aggravation of 0ecember !$$! and the )os emergency of 8pril !$$A fair to say yet a couple of /refered to in
22
8deso6i,35!!=$"2. %ikewise it had been watched that the Coko aram terrorism in 4igeria took roots from the aitasine uproars of !$#5. ,-2,- ORIGIN OF BOKO HARAM AS A TERRORIST GROUP IN NIGERIA
)amaatu8hlisSunna%iddaawatiHal-)ihad, better known by its ausa name Coko aram, is a 6ihadist terrorist organi(ation based in the northeast of 4igeria. It is an Islamist movement which strongly opposes man-made laws. ounded by ohammed Kusuf in 3553, the organisation is a uslim sect that seeks to abolish the secular system of government and establish Sharia %aw in the country. The movement, whose name in the ausa language, Coko aram, translates as ;Hestern education is sacrilege; or ;a sin; is divided into three factions, and in 35!!, was responsible formore than !555 killings in 4igeria /Dme, et. al, 35!32. Though the group first became known internationally followingsectarian violence in 4igeria in 355$, it does not have a clear structure or evident chain of command. It has, however, been severally alleged that the group has links with several terrorist networks such as 8l-Jaeda, e(bolla, Taliban etc. The group adopted )amaatu8hlisSunna%iddaawatiwal-)ihad as its official name which translates into N@eople +ommitted to the @ropagation of the @rophets Teachings and )ihad>. Coko aram is an indigenous Salafist group which only turned itself into a Salafist )ihadist group in 355$. It propagates that not only interaction with the Hestern Horld is forbidden, but it is also against the uslim establishment and the government of 4igeria. The group publicly extols its ideology despite the fact that its founder and former leader uhammad Kusuf was himself a highly educated man who lived a lavish life and drove a ercedes Cen( /Cartollota, 35!?M DmeIbietan, 35!32.
23
The group was founded by ohammed Kusuf in 3553 in the city of aiduguri with the aim of establishing a Shariagovernment in Corno State under former Governor 8li odu Sheriff. e established a religious complex that included a mosue and a school where many poor families from across 4igeria and from neighbouring countries enrolled their children. The centre had ulterior political goals and soon it was also working as a recruiting ground for future 6ihadists to fight the state. The group includes members who come from neighbouring +had and 4iger and speak only 8rabic. In 355A the complex was relocated to Kusufs home state of Kobe in the village Lanamma near the 4iger *epublic border. Kusuf was able to recruit membership from numerous unemployed youths, whose situation has made them become dissatisfied with the state. %ate Kusuf also took advantage of the irresponsible leadership of all levels of government, unemployment, poverty, corruption and insecurity. 8nd as he points out such failures, citing verses of Juran and the saying of the prophet, the youth see him as the leader that will indeed deliver them from malevolence to the promises land. any 4igerians are hungry for progress and an improvement in their lives, but northern 4igerians feel this need most acutely. %ife in 4igeria for many is tough, but across the 4orth, life is grim. 8 94 study shows that poverty inthe !3 most northern states is nearly twice that of the rest of the country. The health indicators reflect this. +hildren in the far north are almost four times as likely to be malnourished. +hild mortality is over 355 deaths per !555 live births, leading to lower life expectancy. Dducational standards are 6ust as bad. %iteracy in the far north is ?: percent as opposedto "" percent in the rest of the country. Seventy-seven percent of women in the far north have no formal education,compared to only !" percent in the rest of the country. In northern 4igeria, primary school attendance is only A! percent, while youth unemployment is extremely high. 8ll of this contributes to 6oblessness and a deepening cycle of poverty /+arson, 35!32. In the same vein,
24
8bdulkarim ohammed, a researcher on Coko aram, added that violent uprisings in 4igeria are ultimately due to ;the fallout of frustration with corruption and the attendant social malaise of poverty and unemployment>> /+ook, 35!!2. The members of the group do not interact with the local uslim population and have carried out assassinations in the past of anyone who critici(es it, including uslim clerics. In a 355$ CC+ interview, uhammad Kusuf, then leader of the group, re6ected scientific explanation for natural phenomena, such as the sun evaporating water being the cause of rain, 0arwinian evolution, and the Darth being a sphere if it runs contrary to the teachings of 8llah;. Cefore his death, Kusuf reiterated the groups ob6ective of changing the current education system and re6ecting democracy. In the wake of the 355$ crackdown on its members and its subseuent re-emergence, the growing freuency and geographical range of attacks attributed to Coko aram have led some political and religious leaders in the north to the conclusion that the group has now expanded beyond its original religious composition to include not only Islamic militants, but criminal elements and disgruntled politicians as well. The group conducted its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence. That changed in 355$ when the 4igerian government launched an investigation into the groups activities following reports that its members were arming themselves. @rior to that, the government reportedly repeatedly ignored warnings about the increasingly militant character of the organi(ation, including that of a military officer. Hhen the government came into action, several members of the group were arrested in Cauchi, sparking deadly clashes with 4igerian security forces which led to the deaths of an estimated "55 people. 0uring the fight with the security forces, Coko aram fighters reportedly used fuel-laden motorcycles and bows with poison arrows to attack a police station. The groups founder and then leader ohammed Kusuf was also killed during this time while
25
still in police custody. 8fter Kusufs killing, a new leader emerged whose identity was not known at the time. 8fter the killing of ohammed Kusuf, the group carried out its first terrorist attack in Corno in )anuary 35!5. It resulted in the killing of fourpeople. Since then, the violence has only escalated in terms of both freuency and intensity /DmeIbietan, 35!32. ollowing the death of Kusuf, a man later known as 8bubakar Shekau took control of the group. 8uthorities had previously believed that Shekau died during the violence in 355$. Cy mid-8pril, 35!3, the group was responsible for over !555 deaths. 8ccording to the Corno State Governor LashimShettima ECoko aram has become a franchise that anyone can buy into. It is something like a Cermuda Triangle,< /Caiyewu, 35!?2. The Coko aram onslaught in the 4orthern part of the country employs the use of suicide bombing, outright shooting and abduction in its activities. This has led to loss of many lives and property. ,-22ACTIVITIES AND ATTACKS OF BOKO HARAMFROM ,334*,3.5
Dver since 355$, Coko aram has established a serious security threat in the 4orthern part of 4igeria. Its terror war assumed an alarming dimension from 35!5 till date. owever, until )une !1, 35!!, the onslaught was restricted to the 4orth Dast geo-political (one. The first attack outside the (one was the bombing of the 4igeria @olice eaduarters in 8bu6a. That attack was triggered off by the utterances of afi( *ingim-the then Inspector General of @olice who threatened to smoke Coko aram out in a press statement on his duty tour to aiduguri where the sect launched an attack. The attack on the @olice eaduarters was followed up with the bombing of the 9nited 4ation ouse also in 8bu6a on 8ugust 31, 35!! /8loe6ewa 35!3=1#2.
26
T"6l$ ,-. ACTIVITIES AND ATTACKS OF BOKO HARAM- ,334*,3.5
SF4
08TD KD8* %B+8TIB4
!
)un 31-3#
355$
8TT8+LS
Corno, Cauchi, Kobe, Gombe Lano and Lastina State.
Coko
aram sectarian violence /0an6ibo 35!5="2. 3
Sept " 35!5
Cauchi State @rison raid /The Dconomist, 35!52.
?
0ec ?! 3 5!5
.+.T 8bu6a 8bu6a attacks /+hris 35!!2.
A
ar !3 35!!
8ssassinated uslims +leric Imam Ibrahim 8hmed 8bdullahi for
critici(ing the violent groups in northeastern 4igeria /CC 4ews, 355$2. :
8pr 33 35!!
8damawa State
Coko aram freed !A @risoners during a 6ailbreak in
Kola /'oanews, 35!32. 1
ay 3$
35!!
4orthern 4igeria Combings /The Guardian, 355$2.
"
)un !1 35!!
.+.T 8bu6a
The group claimed responsibility for the bombing of
%oiusDdeth @olice ead Juarters /)oe, 35!32. #
)un 31 35!!
aiduguri State
Combing attack on a beer garden in aiduguri,
leaving 3: dead and !3 in6ured /The Guardian, 355$2. $
)ul !5 35!!
4iger State
Combing at the 8ll +hristian ellowship +hurch in Sule6a
/8frican 4ews and 8nalysis, 35!?2. !5
)ul !! 35!!
aiduguri State
The 9niversity of aiduguri temporarily c losed
down its campus citing security concerns /4ossiter, 355$2.
27
!!
8ug !335!!
@rominent uslim +leric %imanCana is shot dead by Coko aram
/Bnuha, 35!A=!:#2. !3
8ug 3135!!
.+.T 8bu6a
3? died, !!1 other sustained in6uries of varying degrees.
The 94 building was seriously damaged as well as assets worth millions of dollars wasted /8demowoetB6o, 35!32. !?
4ov A 35!!
Kobe State.
8ttacks occurred in Kobe state police command, several
government buildings and two banks as well as six churches. 8bout !55 people were confirmed dead /uman *ights Hatch, 35!!2. !A
0ec 3:35!!
4iger State.
St. Theresa adalla +hristmas day bombing. ?3 were
reported dead that morning. 8 lot of people were in6uredM a part of the church building was destroyed as well as cars of cars of some church members. /onica, 35!!2 !:
)an :-135!3
Gombe State 0eeper %ife Cible +hurch. @astor says ? people were killed
while !5 were in6ured /@remium Times, 35!32. !1
)an 35 35!3
Lano State.
)anuary 35!3 Lano bombing in the northern city of Lano
left at least !#: police and residents dead /uman *ights Hatch, 35!32. !"
)an 3# 35!3
aiduguri State
4igerian army said it killed !! Coko aram
terrorists /Ibrahim 35!32. !#
eb # 35!3
Laduna State Coko aram claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing
at the army headuarters in Laduna /)ancito, 35!32. !$
eb !1 35!3
Lano State.
8nother prison break staged in central 4igeriaM !!$
prisoners are released, one warden killed /4ossiter, 35!32
28
35
ar # 35!3
aiduguri State
0uring a Critish hostage rescue attempt to free
Italian engineer ranco %amolinara and Criton +hristopher canus, abducted in 35!! by a splinter group Coko aram, both hostages were killed /)acob, 35!?2. 3!
8pril 3$
35!3
Lano State
embers of Coko aram attacked two lecture
theatres in Cayero 9niversity Lano /C9L2. ? professors, a doctor and some other people died while 3? were in6ured /+hristian, 35!32. 33
ay ?!
35!3
@lateau State 0uring a )oint Task orce raid on a Coko aram
den, it was reported that : sect members and a German hostage were killed /The )amestown oundation, 35!32. 3?
)un ? 35!3
Cauchi State !: church-goers were killed and several in6ured in a church
bombing in Cauchi state while A5 were in6ured. Coko aram claimed responsibility through spokesperson 8bu Jaa /Cill, 35!32. 3A
)un !" 35!3
Laduna State Three suicide bombers attacked three churches in Laduna
killing !3 people and wounding about #5 /Cill, 35!32 3:
)uly : 35!3
.+.T 8bu6a
8 suspected bomb rocked Huse II shopping mall in 8bu6a
/+hristian, 35!32. 31
Sept !1
35!3
Cauchi StateF Lano State.
Six were shot dead and nine in6ured
when gunmen fired a group of %ugo game players. 8lso a 4igerian security officer and three members of his family were killed in Lano /Irin 4ews, 35!A2.
29
3"
Sept !"
35!3
Cauchi State 4igerian soldiers shot dead Coko aram spokesman
on the outskirt of Lano. Gunmen kill Corno State commissioner in his hometown of Cama and also an ex 4igerian prisons chief 8(are town in Cauchi state /Irin 4ews, 35!A2. 3#
Bct 3 35!3
8damawa State
Gunmen suspected to be Coko aram Islamist shot
and slit the throats of 31 people in a student housing area in ubi town in 8damawa State on border with +ameroon /Irin 4ews, 35!A2. 3$
ar !#35!?
Lano State
8 suicide attack at a bus station in Lano kills A!. Coko
aram also released video showing rench family of seven abducted in +ameroon /Irin 4ews, 35!A2. ?5
ay " 35!?
Cauchi State Coko aram launches coordinated attacks in northern town
of Cama against security formations, killing :: people and freeing !5: inmates /Irin 4ews, 35!A2 ?!
)ul 1
35!?
Kobe State
Coko aram attacks a government secondary school in
amudo in Kobe State, killing A! student and teachers and setting dormitories on fire. /Irin, 4ews, 35!A2 ?3
Sept 3#
35!?
Kobe State
Coko aram gunmen open fire in a dormitory at
college of 8griculture, in the town of Gu6ba in Kobe State, while students were asleep. orthy students were killed /Irin 4ews,35!A2 In 35!A alone, there have been !! attacks carried out by Coko aram. +heck out a timeline of crime and chaos perpetrated by the terrorist group below
30
??
ebruary !:, 35!A= 8n attack blamed on the extremist sect leaves more than !55 people
dead in the mostly +hristian village of I(ghe in the north-eastern state of Corno. ?A
8pril !A, 35!A= Gunmen kidnap 3"1 female high school students in +hibok, Corno. ifty-
seven managed to escape but the rest are still being held. Several foreign countries, including the 9nited States, have 6oined forces to try to find the girls.
?:
8pril !A, 35!A= 8 blast at a bus station packed with morning commuters at 4yanya, on
the southern outskirts of 8bu6a, kills at least ": people, the most deadly attack to date on the capital. Coko aram claims responsibility. Bn ay !, a car bomb at the same spot kills !$, and leaves #5 in6ured.
?1
ay :, 35!A= 8t least ?55 people are killed in an attack in Gamboru4gala, in Corno state
near the border with +ameroon, which totally destroys the town.
?"
ay 35, 35!A= 8t least !!# are killed and :1 in6ured in two car bomb attacks on a market
in )os, central 4igeria, which go off within 35 minutes of each other. The regional governor blames Coko aram.
?#
)une !, 35!A= 8t least A5 are killed when a bomb explodes at a football stadium in ubi
in the north-east of the country shortly after a match. The attack is blamed on Coko aram.
31
?$
)une ?, 35!A= undreds are feared dead in a suspected Coko aram attack on four
villages in Corno state, with local leaders putting the dea th toll as high as :55.
A5
)une !", 35!A= 3! football fans are killed when a bomb rips through the viewing centre
where they are watching the Horld +up in 0amaturu, northern 4igeria.
A!
)une 3A, 35!A= %ocal official>s report ?5 killed and more than 15 women kidnapped in a
series of attacks over several days in Corno state, although the 4igerian government denies the abductions.
A3
)une 3:, 35!A= 8t least 3! people are killed and !" in6ured in a bombing at a crowded
shopping centre in the center of 8bu6a. The attack O the third on the city in three months O is blamed on Coko aram.
A?
)une 3$, 35!A= Suspected Coko aram gunmen riding on motorcycles target a number of
churches during Sunday mass, opening fire on worshippers and chasing them into the bush. Hitnesses fear do(ens are killed.
32
Su#'$: N(m"7-'m
,-25 STRUCTURE OF THE TERRORIST SECT
33
Coko aram does not have an agreeable structure or obvious levels of leadership. Halker /35!32 likewise accepted that the gathering has a phone like structure which is open for factions and braces and that there is no ensure that somebody representing the gathering is representing the ma6ority of the parts. Cesides, he noted that the gathering is partitioned into three factions with a fragment bunch known as 8nsaru. Cintube /35!A2 in his statement uncovered that notwithstanding the 31 sub organi(ations, there exist the arrangement of the Coko aram parts into typology. This typology, they brought up are= The Kusuffiya Coko aramM amman 4uribomo aramM Imam Shakkau Coko aramM group based procured shootersFprofessional killer Coko aramM political Coko aramM pre6ihadskiped out Coko aram. Bthers, they said, are 0iaspora Coko aramM euipped burglars Coko aramM crafty Coko aramM self-destructive outsiders Coko aramM invade Coko aramM bank thieves Coko aram and usa-ataranboko aramM ollowingCintube /35!A2 Coko aram branch in each one ward is called u6umua and is going by a pioneer called 8mir who is saddled with the obligation of social event data relating to the ward in connection to who exists in which house, including the calling of individual, parts and general remarks. e passes on these sagacity reports about the ward he is speaking to on a week by week premise to the Coko aram akas. The parts of the gathering call themselves Kusuffiya, they additionally call themselves Kaa-naa. These gatherings of people are effectively included in 0aawa, interpreted as lecturing. Their clothing regulation includes diverse shade of turbans= red turban is an evidence of Coko aram militaryM dark turban is a sign of Coko aram policeM white turban is a sign of Coko aram brainpower officer Cintube further noted that as a conseuence of details and working underground, they utili(e codes to name their exercises. or example, Hashangam is a code for a by regional
34
standards made unstable bomb and Tabdir is development code for complex weapon and ad libbed ha(ardous gadget /ID02. e additionally noted that afis is effectively utili(ed as a part of this content yet has nothing to do with the idea of Coko aram. It implies somebody who has conferred the Juran to memory. The gathering additionally has different terms, for example, Lufar andFor Tboot significance agnostic or icon worshiping. 4otwithstanding this, most parts of Coko aram have set out on ubaya, downright devotion to the will of Coko aram belief system. Coko aram parts who performed ubaya are those with open responsibility to doing any task given to them. They additionally called researchers from distinctive grounds 9luma> usuu, which is a term utili(ed by Coko aram to depict pastors who are not in concurrence with their belief system or perspective their activities and assaults as un- Islamic. ,-28 TACTICAL9OPERATIONAL MOBILITY
The Coko aram bunch has been known to utili(e terrorism style strategy against regular people, noncombatant or easy ob6ectives in the nation. They likewise routinely assault 4igerian military and security drive as a method for sending political message to the legislature. rom its earliest reference point in the late !$$5s, the group for the most part meant to authori(e a strict manifestation of Shariah law. It started to target +hristians at a much later stage, subseuent to 355$. It utili(ed the Internet to proliferate its exercises and improve its radicali(ation and course of fanatic belief systems. The gathering has additionally been accounted for to have been included in a recruitment drive, and they are professedly focusing on uslims between ages of !" and ?5, and have likewise been enlisting liberated detainees through 6ail breaks. The gathering is likewise known to dole out non-Lanuris on suicide missions. 8s a feature of its strategies it is
35
additionally referred to for utili(ing cruisers as a vehicle for killing government authorities and security officers. In some different cases Coko aram use cruiser borne drive-by shootings as an early fear strategy, took after by progressively advanced and substantial scale ID0 assaults /counting vehicle based Ieds and suicide bombings2.
The gathering additionally sei(ed for payment albeit a greater amount of the hi6acks are completed by 8nsaru the fragment bunch. This has prompted bike boycott in the city of aiduguri. onica /35!32 included that in the decade since it initially showed up, Coko aram has moved on from unrefined commute by assaults on brewskie parlors to bombarding security structures in the northern uslim heartland. Its most nervy assault was focused on the 9nited 4ations assembling in the capital, 8bu6a, slaughtering 3: in 8ugust. 8s of late, +hristians establishments had progressively experienced harsh criticism. 8 +hristmas 0ay bomb assault on a catholic church 6ust outside the capital asserted very nearly A5 lives.
In arch 35!3, it was accounted for that Coko aram had taken a techniue to recreate caravans of prominent 4igerians and to get to target structures that are secured with fortresses. Coko aram has additionally supposedly assaulted +hristian love focuses to ;trigger. backlash in all parts of the nation;, diverting powers so they can unleash assaults somewhere else Bfficials say Coko aram warriors control no less than !5 nearby government region of Corno State and are utili(ing permeable outskirts with +ameroon, +had and 4iger to carry in arms and mount assaults /8l )a(eera, 35!32. 4otwithstanding these it has likewise been as of late watched that the
36
gathering has imitated the 8l Jaeda twin bomb method in this way taking the spate of savagery to an altogether new level. ,-2 THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY
The word security generally means protection, safety or freedom from risk, danger and protection from external attacks. 0efining security concept is not a simple thing to do since there are various understanding of the term and the concept has greatly evolved in time. Security has different dimensions in psychology, public safety, defense and military matters, and information access. There are also different levels of security which includes human security, group security, national security, regional security and global security. The +oncept national security h as been in presence all through the historical backdrop of global relations. *ichard /35!!2 prominent that ;the idea created in the 9nited States after Horld Har II and has been a vital piece of 9.s. national security approach making following !$A". 8s per Crown /!$#?2 the term was utili(ed amid exchanges on war, for instance, Halter %ippmann in !$A? censured an unwillingness of political investigator to examine the establishments of national security in a period of peace /refered to in Hatson, 355#2. 4otwithstanding, ;the soonest specify of the term national security can be followed to !"$5 in Kale 9niversity in reference to its connection with local commercial enterprises; /@rabhakaran, 355#2.
Since the origin of Nnational security in !$A", no acceptable meaning of what constitutes the idea has risen up out of global statute however there have been meanings of national security from the conventional military point of view. This point of view is viewed as the realist school. 8s indicated by abadi /355!2 this realist school saw national security from the military point
37
which incorporates military reaction and administration of dangers. ;e was of the thought that national security is seen as the condition of military readiness to safeguard a nation against /to a great extent2 outer dangers.; ans orgenthau and Halter %ippmann have significantly helped this school of thought as well and they declare that ;national security climbs and fall with the capacity of a country to dissuade an assault or to thrashing it accordingly seeing national security as the capacity of a state to secure its center ualities; /Imobige, !$$#2. 8ll the more uneuivocally Halter %ippmann, in !$A?, characteri(ed it regarding war saying that ;a country has security when it doesnt need to yield its authentic diversions to dodge war, and is capable, if tested, to keep up them by war;. 8dditionally, aniru((aman /!$#32 affirmed that national security is the ;insurance and safeguarding of inimum center estimations of any country= political autonomy and regional honesty;. The customary thought of national security was tight so there was a movement to a non-military idea taking after arrangement of changes on the planet and the global framework. This new thought of national security includes a wide scope of aspects, all of which encroached on the non-military or financial security of the country and the ualities embraced by the general public. It was as a conseuence of this that Brwa /!$#A2 characteri(ed 4ational security as ;the insurance of 4ational enthusiasm including 4ational ualitiesM political and monetary lifestyles against interior and outer dangers and difficulties.; In arvard 9niversity, a teacher of history aier /!$$52 characteri(ed national security through the viewpoint of national force. e saw 4ational security as ;an ability to control those residential and outside conditions that the general sentiment of a given group accepted was important to appreciate its own particular determination toward oneself or self-governance, success and wellbeing.
38
*elated to this is the announcement of 4wolise who communicated that= 8ny overall population that looks to fulfill attractive military security against the establishment of serious sustenance need, people impact, low level of creation and each capita pay, low imaginative progression, needing and inefficient open utilities and steady issue of unemployment, has a confused impression that all is well and great; refered to in /4wolise, 355#2. e further advised against desperation in a state, as it by and large results to conflict, internal changes, violence and increasing speed of devotion as we have by virtue of Coko aram terrorism in 4igeria. or making social reuests, he urged political pioneers to note that without progression there can be no national security. e accentuated these by communicating that= In a moderni(ing society, security infers headway, security is not military gear, be that as it may it may fuse itM security is not a military vitality, notwithstanding it may incorporate itM security is not customary military development, on the other hand it may encompass itM security is change, and without progression there can be no security. 8 making nation that does not really make simply cant stay secure for the unshakable reason that its own specific nationals cant shed. arold /!$#?2 9.S Secretary of 0efense from !$"" to !$#! in the +arter association intensified the significance of national security by including parts, for instance, financial and environmental security= 4ational security then is the ability to spare the nations physical respectability and localeM to keep up its financial relations with the straggling leftovers of the world on sensible termsM to ensure its propensity, association, and organi(ation from unsettling influence from outsideM and to control its edges.
39
Bbasan6o /!$$$2 in his own specific viewpoint envisioned national security to mean ;the aggregate of security eagerness of all individuals, bunches, human and ethnics social events and entire political substance.; rom this, we can reason that the insurance of the wellbeing of 4igerians at home and abroad and end of degradation, @ursuit of progression, headway, improvement and the change of the welfare and individual fulfillment of every occupant of 4igeria constitute our national security concern. Bbasan6os definition according to 8bolurin /35!52 showed the imperativeness of security to any nation that has the welfare of its sub6ects as its essential venture. This records for the inspiration driving why under the widespread lawM the state is stacked with the commitment to serve as the guarantor of human rights since a state exists fundamentally for the protection of lives and property furthermore ensuring the wellbeing of the people. Bf course, a great part of the time the state defies a couple of challenges in palatably giving supportable advantages for the security of its kinfolk and these troubles are seen as national dangers which accomplish insecurity. 4ational dangers are executed by not 6ust country state on-screen characters additionally by non- state performers, for example, 0rug dealers, terrorist bunches, insurrection bunches, multinational organi(ations and non-administrative associationsM a few powers incorporate characteristic calamities and occasions bringing about serious natural harm in this class. 8bolurin, et al/35!52 expressed that the Coko aram bunch known for ;bombarding, blast, executing, damaging, and gigantic demolition; is a danger to 4igerias national security.8bolurin et al /35!52 went further to express that= 8ll these dangers as per him constitute dangers to the countrys security. Bbasi /35!52 additionally raised four critical national security issues in 4igeria that ought to be tended to.
40
8.
The first is the deficiencies of 4igerias federalismM
C.
Secondly, the disappointment of the foundations of the express that should ensure
security, euity and valueM +.
The third is the emergency of an era of youth growing up to adulthood without being
appropriately taught, utili(ed and having innovative ualitiesM and
0.
inally, the multiplication and accessibility of little arms in contemporary 4igerian
culture that are currently turning the adolescent from the uest for genuine work to militancy /refered to in abadi, 355!="!2.
B6ukwu /35!!2 underlined that ;there is a need to plan proper strategic activities to legitimately address the issues of national security;. Subseuently in other to address the issuesFdangers to 4ational security, states in the global framework generally uphold certain measures to ensure their wellbeing and security. These measures generally incorporated, the utili(ation of tact to rally associates and separate dangers, keeping up a monetary force euipped for convincing collaboration in the global framework, keeping up a decently prepared standing furnished power, the utili(ation of brainpower systems to locate and crush or evade dangers and secret activities, and to ensure grouped data utili(ing counterintelligence administrations or mystery police to shield the country from inner dangers. 4otwithstanding this satiates additionally set up a useful national security committee in their different nations. 8s per *ichard /35!!2 ;the 4ational
41
Security +ouncil lies at the heart of the national security device, being the most noteworthy coordinative and counseling body inside the Government.; In 4igeria the national Security +ouncil is comprised of the +hief of 0efense Staff, the +hiefs of the 8rmy, 8ir compel and 4avy and the Inspector General of @olice and the 0irector General of the State Security Service.
In synopsis, national security can be seen as the totality of a countrys push to protect and maintain its presence as a state in the worldwide enclosure and it involves measures taken to ward of security dangers to a country state. 8s on account of national power, the military part of security is a vital, however not the sole, segment of national security. To be genuinely secure, a country needs different types of security, for example, sustenance security, employer stability, wellbeing security, human security, worldwide security et cetera. %ikewise, powers vary in their decision of national security components whats more the military part of security, different viewpoints, for example, tact or legislative issuesM societyM environmentM vitality and regular assetsM and financial aspects are regularly recorded. THEORETICAL FRAME+ORK
There are a great deal of speculations in clash contemplates that can be utili(ed to clarify the wonder of Coko aram Terrorism in 4igeriaM however the hypothetical structures that support this study are%udwig von Certalanffy>s Systems Theory and unctionalist hypothesis of clash. ,-2;LUD+IG VON BERTALANFFY
This study is anchored on the Systems Theory as propounded by %udwig von Certalanffy. Systems theory is the interdisciplinary study of systems in general, with the goal of elucidating
42
principles that can be applied to all types of systems at all nesting levels in all fields of research.The Systems theory explains the interconnection or nexus between security and development. Systems theorydefines the regular interaction or interrelation between groups of activities in the society, as any occurrence in a sector of the society positively or negatively affects other sectors of the society. The sense of insecurity occurs when there is wanton destruction of lives and property, incessant armed robbery incidents, increase in kidnapping resulting in ransom or death, or both, armed insurgency such as the Coko aram menace etc. This leads to a saturation of the society with anguish, fear and trepidation. In a society where insecurity abounds, the pace of development suffers a great setback. This is because development is a product of several activities in the society. 8ctivities such as industriali(ation and technological advancement which accelerate development and the deployment of funds to development ventures are hampered in a state of insecurity. Sustainable development can only occur in a reasonably secure and peaceful environment. Industriali(ation has to do with serious investments in fixed machinery, labour, intensive capital and entrepreneurship. Investment, by its very nature, is risky. Insecurity in the system not only increases the risk, but also discourages prospective investors, increases the cost of doing business and leads to imminent closure of existing industries.
,-2= FUNCTIONALIST THEORY OF CONFLICT
unctionalism was a human science endeavor to restore social reuest and steadiness /referred to in Todd, 355#2. It is a macro methodology to concentrating on societyM it characteri(es society as an arrangement of interrelated, reliant parts, or subsystems and that for society to work, all parts
43
of the entire must have a general understanding. or instance, they must have imparted ualities to give societal desires of people. The hypothesis places that foundations must satisfy essential human needs in other that all gatherings assume a part in accomplishing steadiness in the general public. 0urkheim comprehends the single person to be a result of social constrains in the earth. +onseuently a change in the conduct of one section influences the others. Cy this when one piece of the framework is not meeting expectations or is useless, it influences all different parts and makes social issues which prompt social change. In nineteenth century Durope, the mechanical transformation and the rench insurgency were changing the social atmosphere. These progressions were prompting what was seen as a social emergency. unctionalism has gotten feedback for dismissing the negative capacity of an occasion, for example, separation. unctionalism has likewise been reprimanded for not swaying individuals to take dynamic part in changing their social surroundings, actually when such change may advantage them. *ather functionalism sees dynamic social change as undesirable in light of the fact that the different parts of society will remunerate characteristically for any issue that may emerge /refered to in +rossman 35!A2. The functionalist hypothesis notwithstanding its feedback has been identified with Coko aram uprising in 4igeria in light of the fact that the terrorists called Coko aram are result of our social surroundings. 8ctually Cintube /35!A2 remarkable that= The annihilation of discriminating open framework in 4igeria by the Coko aram was a capacity of disappointment of the structure of the 4igerian culture as it needs legitimate checking to human direct and checks to its overabundances.
44
Thus, Hicker /!$":2 expressed that the Coko aram marvel is a record of a slaughter that sensationali(ed a few shortcoming in the social structure of the general public and the law authori(ation specialists specifically /refered to in Cintube, 35!A2. oreover, Blomo6obi/35!32 exceptional that= It is misdirecting to recommend that the Coko aram uproar can be seen as 6ust against bigotry for westerni(ation additionally as saw grievance in appreciation of financial stagnation, youth
unemployment,
well known
impoverishment
and disempowerment.
4onetheless, it is conceivable to con6ecture that the causal connection is because of view of hardship as far as financial, mental needs and asset control. In synopsis, it can be derived that some piece of the issue of Coko aram Terrorism in 4orthern 4igeria is as an aftereffect of financial battle brought by preoccupation of assets implied for people in general, bootleg market and shortage of assets, among others. 8s indicated by 0amba(au /355"2 these has represented the best test to the excellent techniue for 4igerias national security, the essential target of wish is ;to reinforce the ederal *epublic of 4igeria, to propel her advantage and destinations to contain unsteadiness, control wrongdoing, dispense with defilement enhance the welfare and personal satisfaction of each citi(en;.
CHAPTER THREE METHODOLOGY
45
This chapter takes a glimpse at the system for information gathering for this study and it includes a few routes, for instance the (one of study, the study populace, information gathering systems and information examination methods. 2-. RESEARCH DESIGN
This study utili(ed the clear Survey *esearch 0esign to survey Terrorism and it Impact for 4ational Security. Juantitative research techniue will be utili(ed in get-together data in numeric structure with organi(ed exploration instruments, the research instruments included surveys and meeting schedule. 2-, POPULATION OF STUDY
The range of study for this examination will be Corno state. This is on account of Corno state is one of the significant states Coko aram applied impact. 8dditionally this state has the same trademark with other 4orthern states influenced by Coko aram rebellion and they both existed inside the 4orthern pivot. In like manner, Corno is collection of all 4igerians that will be fatalities of the assaults completed by Coko aram terrorists and such assaults will be decently arranged, and executed paying little respect to where the terrorists lived. 2-2 RESEARCH POPULATION
The populace contemplated for this exploration included occupants of some influenced (ones of Coko aram assault in Corno state. It additionally incorporates law reuirement operators, for example, military men, 6ail officers, cops and state security officers included in the 6oint operation in fighting Coko aram terrorism in the nation. !55 duplicates of survey will be dispersed to inhabitants of 8bu6a and 4iger state who will be purposively chosen. These polls
46
will be circulated to the examination populace in the accompanying extent= : duplicates will be disseminated to each of the accompanying classifications of respondents= cops at 4@ central station, 6ail officers, +ivil 0efense officers and religious pioneers. 8lso, !5 duplicates will be conveyed to surviving casualties of Coko aram assaults and additionally arbitrarily chose people, and an alternate !5 duplicates will be appropriated to ilitary faculty at assigned checkpoints in 8bu6a city. 4otwithstanding this an aggregate of !5 people will be talked with purposively chosen from among security faculty, the media, scholastics, common society, religious pioneers and surviving casualties of Coko aram terrorism. 2-5 SAMPLE AND SAMPLING TECHNIQUES
Sampling techniues is the method used to choose the specimen si(e for the examination. It is the method for picking assigned amounts or extents as representations of the entire populace. In this study the testing procedure utili(ed will be @urposive Sampling. The target region will be chosen at irregular and surveys will be extraordinarily dispersed to the surviving casualties of Coko aram assaults /If any is found2 , the general masses, security specialists and ministers.
2-8 RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS
47
The examination instrument for this exploration is a uantitative method using a self-structured administered uestionnaire. The specialist will gather information by utili(ing surveys on the grounds that it is the most proper device for social affair information in Survey research. Similarly with poll the specialist will solicit arrangement from inuiries, to evoke data /information2 from the respondent on the theme under study. Hhile organi(ing the inuiries, the analyst would attempt to dodge twofold Ubarrel, twofold Unegative or driving inuiries and this will empower the respondent to give precise and tremendously reuired answers. 2- DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES S9 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION
The method of data gathering includes both primary and secondary data gathering methods. @rimary 0ata The primary source of data for this pro6ect will be was gotten by controlling surveys on people who has in restricted other seen, heard or experienced damage the exercises of the Coko aram revolt. This incorporates contact with persons and faculty, for example, officers and security specialists in the 4igerian 8rmy, the 4igerian @olice orce, and @aramilitary 8gencies, for example, the 4igerian @rison administration and the 4igerian +ivil 0efense +orps utili(ing the up close and personal regulated style. The inuiries asked by the scientist will be fixed to the examination issue, exploration inuiries and examination goals. The Juestionnaire will be was partitioned into two segments which incorporates Sections 8n and C. Segments 8n arrangements with demographic ualities of the respondent while area C manages inuiries went for getting the assessment of the sub6ect concerning the topic. 8lso the analyst has eye to eye contact with the respondents. Information gathered with the help of overview survey instruments will be
48
considered as essential information on the grounds that they will be direct information got by the specialist from individual experience or direct perception.
Secondary 0ata The secondary sources of data came from was harvested from learned 6ournal, archival and library sources, for example, books, daily papers, maga(ines, diaries, Internet, insightFsecurity reports and reports of boards and tribunals. This will be was utili(ed to substantiate the information accumulated from the essential source. 8lso, it helped in auditing an inside and out examination of the topic Coko aram Terrorism. 2-; DATA ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE
The method of data analysis and interpretation for this research will be basic rate examination. inished surveys will be gathered, coded and dissected utili(ing straightforward rate examination. 2-= VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF INSTRUMENTS
To guarantee the legitimacy and unwavering uality of this study , the analyst altogether examined these instruments by checking on it regarding their clarity, the fittingness of the dialect and interpretations to the respondents and also the propriety of the directions, and, more essential the capacity of the instrument to accumulate the fundamental and obliged data. The examination verified that the surveys will be decently organi(edM twofold checked pretested and decently confined polls before they will be dispersed. 8dditionally the researcher looked for the cooperation of the sub6ects as their interest will be need in attaining to the exploration ob6ect.
49
CHAPTER FOUR DATA PRESENTATION> ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 5-. PREAMBLE
This chapter is concerned with presentation of data obtained from the researcher>s investigation and the statistically analysis of data so far collected.The uestionnaire as a primary source of data was used to collect the data for testing the basic assumption for the pro6ect. Tabulation and percentage were employed to present the data collected so as to ensure consciousness completeness and accuracy of information. The items on the uestionnaire were analy(ed using basic statistical techniues of percentage i.e. ormat= VW
4o of responses
Total no of respondents
&!55
5-,PRESENTATION OF DATA COLLECTED T"6l$ 5-.: Dis%#i6u%i& 0 ?u$s%i&&"i#$ "''#@i&7 % #$s/&@$&%s s"m/l$@
50
+%8SSDS *DJ9D4+K I%%D0 840 *DT9*4D0 $5 4BT *DT9*4D0 !5 TBT8% 80I4ISTD*D0 !55 Su#'$: R$s$"#') Su#$(> ,3.8
@D*+D4T8GD $5V !5V !55V
The table above shows that hundred /!552 uestionnaires were distributed, ninety /$52 which represents ninety percent /$5V2 were returned while ten/!52 uestionnaires which represent ten percent /!5V2 were not returned 5-2 ANALYSIS OF DATA COLLECTED
aving carefully administered the instrument designed to investigate the problem under study, a good number of responses were generated. These constituted the data that is hereby analy(ed. This analysis is then followed with an interpretation of the responses and possibly an explanation for the observation. SECTION A: BACKGROUNG CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENTS T"6l$ 5-,: Dis%#i6u%i& 0 #$s/&@$&%s 6( s'i*@$m7#"/)i' ')"#"'%$#is%i's
J9DSTIB4
Sex
*eligion
ighest
*DS@B4SD
*DDJ9D4+
@D*+D4T
ale
K A!
A:.1V
emale
A$
:A.AV
Total +hristianity
$5 A3
!55V A1."V
Islam
A1
:!.!V
Traditional
3
3.3V
$5 !
!55V !.!!V
Total ormal 4one
51
Dducational 8ttained
8ge
Bccupation
+ommon entrance
!
!.!!V
Juranic education
A
A.AAV
H8S+FSS+DFG+D
31
3.#$V
B40
A
A.AAV
40
!!
!3.33V
C.S+FC.8
?3
?:.:1V
.ScF.8.
A
A.AAV
@h.0.
"
"."#V
Total !#-3$
": 35
!55V 33.3V
?5-?$
!$
3!.!V
A5-A$
3$
?3.3V
:5-:$
!3
!?.?V
15 and above
!5
!!.3V
TBT8% 4one
$5 3
!55V 3.33V
ilitary
!5
!!.!!V
@ara-military
!5
!!.!!V
@olice
!5
!!.!!V
9nemployed
?
?.??V
Self-employed
:
:.:1V
8rtisan
5
5V
CusinessFtrading
3
3.33V
+ivil servant
!#
35V
52
Student
35
33.3V
State security serviceman
!
!.!!V
*etired
:
:.:1V
Bthers R$s$"#') su#$(> ,3.8
A
A.AAV
Table A.? showed all responses gathered from the research population on sociodemographic issues. The table also shows the distribution of the respondents based on their sex, the table showed that the percentage of male respondent was :A.A V as against their female counterpart who constituted A:.1V of the respondent, this distribution effect showed that more en were more interested in issues relating to terrorist attacks than Homen. In the area of religion, :!.!V of the respondents were +hristians, while A1."V were uslims which showed more +hristians were victims of terrorist attacks than uslims. In the case of age A3."V of the respondents fell within the age group of !#-3$ which showed that youths In 4igeria suffered more of the havoc caused by terrorism in the country. %astly +ivilians constitute /:A.AV2 which is the highest portion of respondents which showed that the highest targets of terrorist attacks as the group often use civilians and noncombatants as soft target because of their vulnerable nature. SECTION B: SIGNIFICANT ISSUES
The significant issues will be represented and addressed in the order which they answered the research uestions. T"6l$ 5-2: Dis%#i6u%i& 0 #$s/&@$&%
J9DSTIB4
*DS@B4S
*DJ9D4+
@D*+D4T8GD
53
D @olitical
K ?"
A!.!V
Selfish
35
33.3V
Dconomic
!#
35V
resources
!:
!1."V
5
5
4o answer 0o you agree that terrorism has political Kes
1"
"A.AV
support77
35
33.3V
4o answer 0o you agree that bad governance motivates Kes
? ""
?.?V #:.1V
terrorist attacks7
!?
!A.AV
4o answer 0o you agree that the high rate of illiteracy in Kes
5 15
5V 11."V
northern
3?
3:.1V
Terrorism7 4o answer 0o you agree that poverty in northern 4igeria Kes
" 1:
".#V "3.3V
has encouraged the growth of terrorism in the 4o
33
3A.AV
country7
?
?.?V
"!
"#.$V
Hhat is the main cause of Terrorism7
interest
+ommunica tion breakdown others
4o
4igeria
4o
assisted
the
rise
of 4o
0o you agree that porous borders is one of the
4o answer
S8
54
factor responsible for terrorism in 4igeria 8
!5
!!.!V
S0
$
!5V
R$s$"#') su#$(> ,3.8
The table above showed the responses of individual as regards the main cause of Terrorism. The table showed that /A!.!V2 of the respondent indicated that Terrorism is caused by political related issues while /33.3V2 were of the opinion that Terrorism is caused by selfish interest. 8lso /35V2 believed that Terrorism is more of dispute caused by economic resources while /!1."V2 respondents believed terrorism is caused by communication breakdown. In another direction /"A.AV2 respondent opined that Terrorism has political support while /33.3V2 respondents posited that there is no nexus between terrorism and political support, ?.?V didn>t answer. urthermore, /#:.1V2 of the respondents believed that bad governance motivates terrorist attacks while /!A.AV2 stated that bad governance doesn>t motivate terrorist attacks. urthermore, /11."V2 agreed that the high rate of illiteracy in northern 4igeria assisted the rise of Terrorism /3:.1V2 disagreed. In like manner, /"3.3V2 opined that poverty in northern 4igeria has encouraged the growth of terrorism in the country while /3A.AV2 disagreed. +onclusively, "#.$V of the respondent strongly agreed that porous borders is one of the factor responsible for terrorism in 4igeria while !5 agreed, $V strongly disagreed. rom the response of the respondents, it could be deduced that=
55
!. The main cause of terrorism is more of political than selfish interest, economic resources or communication breakdown. 3. Terrorism has political support whether remotely, financially or morally. ?.
Cad governance has a part to play in the emergence of Terrorism in the country
A.
Ignorance and illiteracy has contributed greatly to the growth of Terrorism in 4igeria
:. Heak border is one of the factors responsible for Terrorism in 4igeria. T"6l$ 5-5: Dis%#i6u%i& 0 #$s/&@$&% "ss$ssm$&% 0# $00$'%i$&$ss 0 7$#&m$&% "&@ %)$# s%"!$)l@$#
J9DSTIB4 *DS@B4SD ow can you access the intervention 'ery strong
*DJ9D4+K :"
@D*+D4T8GD 1?.?V
strategies by the security forces to put an
Heak
?5
??,?V
end to terrorism in the north7 0o victims of terrorist attacks get any
'ery weak Kes
? :$
?.?V 1:.1V
?5
??.?V
support to alleviate the effect of the 4o answer
!
!.!V
attacks7 If yes please mention
A$
#?.!V
!5
!1.$V
4one 0o you think the law enforcement Kes
1$
"1."V
agencies have been well euipped for 4o
35
33.3V
form
of support
from government 4o
onetary support, edical support and Security, @rayers
56
the challenges of controlling Terrorism7 4o answer Hhat is the level of policeFpublic Good
! ?
!.!V "3.3V
response
1:
?.?V
33 1?
3A.AV "5V
!?
!A.AV
4o answer !A +reating awareness 1?
!:.1V !55V
as
regards
monitoring poor
Terrorism activities in the country7 0o you think media response terrorism attacks have been effective7
If yes what impacts7
air to Kes 4o
about religion, Speaking out against Terrorism
R$s$"#') su#$(> ,3.8
The table above showed the responses of individual as regards efforts made by the government and other stake holders in solving the problem of Terrorism. The table showed that /1?.?.?V2 of the respondent were of the opinion that intervention strategies put in place by security forces to end terrorism in the north is very strong. Hhile /??.?V2 of the respondents were of the opinion intervention strategies put in place by security forces to end terrorism in the north is week, /?.?V2 posited that the intervention strategies are very weak. /1:.1V2 of the respondents confirmed that they get support from the government and other stake holders after Terrorist attacks to help them while /??.?V2 of the respondents say they don>t. Thosesupports include monetary, medical, security support and prayers. /"1."V2 of the respondents believed that law enforcement agencies are well euipped for the challenges of controlling Terrorism while /33.3V2 of the respondents thought they were not. 8lso /?.?V2 of the respondent thought
57
the level of police-public response in monitoring Terrorist activities in the country is very poor /"3.3V2 think it is good while /3A.AV2 it is fair. /1AV2 of the respondents thought media response to terrorist attacks have been effective while /!".?V2 thought it is not. %astly, /"5V2 of the respondents believed that religious institutions are making remarkable efforts to end Terrorism by creating awareness about religion, prayer for the end of Terrorism, and speaking out against it. rom the above table it can be dedued that= !. The security forces had put in place extraordinary intervention strategies to end terrorism in the north. 3. 'ictims of Terrorist attacks got support from government and other stakeholders to alleviate the attacks. ?. The law enforcement agencies were well euipped for the challenges of controlling terrorist attacks. A. The level of policeFpublic activities has been effective and has also helped in creating awareness about the dangers of terrorism as well as bringing support to the victims. :. *eligious institution are making remarkable efforts to end terrorism by creating awareness about Islam that it is a religion of peace, saying prayer to facilitate the end of Terrorism in 4igeria, and speaking out against it. T"6l$ 5-8: T)$ @is%#i6u%i& 0 #$s/&@$&% "ss$ssm$&% 0# %)$ i&0lu$&'$ 0 i&%$#&"%i&"l %$###is% 7#u/s & Ni7$#i"
J9DSTIB4
*DS@B4SD
*DJ9D4+K
@D*+D4T8GD
58
0o you think Terrorism have links with some Kes
"3
#5V
external groups7
4o
!3
!?.?V
If yes please mention
4o answer ISIS
1 1?
1."V "5V
8l Juaeda
31
3#.$V
3 ##
3.3V $".#V
3
3.3V
8l Shabab Hhat form of support do you think Terrorism inancial , members get from these groups7
%ogistics and Ideology 4o answer
R$s$"#') su#$(> ,3.8
The above table showed the response of individuals as regards the response of external terrorist group on 4igerian terrorism. /#5V2 of the respondent agreed that Coko get support from external terrorist group while /!?.?V2 disagreed. /"5V2 of the respondents believed that 4igeria>s terrorists Coko haram has established links with ISIS, /3#.$V2 of the respondent believe that Coko aram had established links with 8l Juedawhile /#V2 of the respondent think Coko aram had established withal Shabab. 8lso /"".#V2 of the respondents believed that Coko aram got inancial, %ogistic and ideological from 8l Jaeda and other terrorist groups they engage with.rom this it can be deduced that= !. Coko aram has been motivated or influenced by international terrorist group 3. Coko aram has links with ISIS, 8l Jaeda and 8l Shabab.
59
?. Coko aram gets inancial, %ogistic and ideological support from 8l Jaeda and other terrorist groups outside 4igeria. T"6l$ 5-:T)$ @is%#i6u%i& 0 #$s/&@$&% "ss$ssm$&% 0# %)$$00$'%s 0 %$###ism 0# Ni7$#i"
J9DSTIB4 Hhat are the effects of been a victim7
*DS@B4SD @sychological
@ain
*DJ9D4+K and #"
@D*+D4T8GD $1."V
Trauma, %oss of life andproperty HoundsFhigh degree burns, 4o answer
?
?.?V
#$
$#.$V
!
!.!V
4o answer 0o you think the economic situation in Kes
"#
#1."V
4orth Dastern 4igeria is worse than the 4o
#
#.$V
rest of the country7 4o answer 0o you think terrorism has affected Kes
A #1
A.AV $:.1V
inter-personal
3
3.3V
4o answer %abeling
3 #!
3.3V $5V
0istrust
$
!5V
Hhat do you think are the general Insecurity, Tension, ear, effects on the society7
*eduction in economic and social activities.
4igerians7 If Kes ow7
relationship
among 4o
60
Hhat do you think are the specific Homen and children became #$
$#.$V
effects terrorist attacks have on the poor ,Homen Cecome bread social economic life of women and winners, children7
Homen became widows, +hildren become orphans, children are used as child soldiers,
Homen
and
children became internally !
!.!V
displaced and in some case became refugees 4o answer 0oes terrorism have any significant Kes
!3
!?.?V
effect on western education7
"#
#1."V
4o
R$s$"#') su#$(> ,3.8
The table above showed the responses of respondent as regards effects and implications of Coko aram terrorism for 4igeria. The table showed that /$1."V2 of the respondent agreed that effects of Coko aram attacks on victims included @sychological @ain and Trauma, %oss of life and property, HoundsFhigh degree burns. 8lso the table showed that /$#.$2 of the respondent agreed that the general effect of Coko aram on the society includes insecurity, tension, fear, reduction in economic and social activities. In addition the table revealed that /#1."V2 of the respondents also believed that the economic life in 4orthern 4igeria presently is worse than the rest of the country while /#.$V2 of the respondents are saying it is not. /$:.1V2 of the respondent also believed that Coko aram affected inter-personal relationship among 4igerians while
61
/3.3V2 of the respondents said it does not. /$5V2 of the respondent that said yes claimed that Coko aram had encouraged labeling among 4igerians while /$V2 of the respondent were saying Cokoaram encouraged distrust. /$#.$V2 believed that Coko had affected the socioeconomic life of women and children by making women and children poor, by making women become the bread winners of their families after the death of their husbands, by making a lot of women widows, by making children orphans, by using children as child soldiers and lastly by making women and children internally displaced and in some case refugees. %astly /!?.?V2 of the respondents agreed that terrorism had a significant effect on western education while /#1."2 of the respondents disagree to this. rom the above table it was deduced that= !. The economic situation in the 4orth is extremely worse than the rest of the country. 3. The effects of been a victim of terrorist attacks arepsychological @ain and Trauma, %oss of life and property, HoundsFhigh degree burns, ?. The general effects of terrorist attacks on the society included insecurity, tension and fear, reduction in economic activities, and reduction in social activities. A. Terrorism affects inter-personal relationship among 4igeria :. Terrorism had cause labeling and distrust among 4igerians 1. 8lso, terrorism had affected the socio- economic life of women and children women and children by making women and children poor, by making women become the bread winners of their families after the death of their husbands, by making a lot of women
62
widows, by making children orphans, by using children as child soldiers and lastly by making women and children internally displaced and in some case refugees. ". Coko aram had no significant or important effect on western education. 5-5 DISSUSSION OF FINDINGS .- ELEMENTS THAT LED TO THE GRO+TH OF TERRORISM IN NIGERIA
8 few components have been recogni(ed as central point empowering the presence of Coko aram terrorism in 4igeria by this examination and they include= Pli%i'"l issu$s "s "& $l$m$&% $m/$#i&7 B! H"#"m
Bne of the significant finishes of this examination is that political element assumes a discriminating part in the rise of Coko in 4igeria. /A!.!V2 of my respondents in poll concurred that Coko aram was a political battle owing to the way that individuals from the Coko aram gathering needed the Islami(ation of 4igeria, the entrenchment of Sharia law and the development of a uslim president who is from northern extraction. 8dditionally this contention is generally bolstered by the implication that Coko aram individuals are acting the scripts of some political tip top. This cant likewise be led especially when you take a gander at how they are bolstered ideologically, fiscally logistically in the 4orth and by a few contacts with people and gathering outside 4igeria. Coko aram had asserted they needed energy to go toward the north. The way that @resident )onathan a southerner is in charge of undertakings in 4igeria is additionally a significant wellspring of contention. This is apparent in 355$ when force moved from the 4orth to South after the passing of @resident usa Kar 8dua which achieved religious emergency.
63
R$li7ius /)ils/)( "s " /$#su"@i&7 $l$m$&% 0# B! H"#"m
8s indicated by the field meeting led, the vast ma6ority of the respondents of the respondents accepted that Coko aram was not a religious issue and had nothing to do with Islam. 4otwithstanding they accepted that the Coko aram issue had some ideological undercurrent which cant be stick pointed in light of the fact that researchers and Islamic educators had disavowed these agitators expressing that they were not so much proliferating the Islamic reason. Truly they asserted that Islam is an encapsulation of peace and of reason different prophets amid the Juranic period were prophet of peace aside from in events when they needed to participate in Islamic extension and )ihad. This uncovered that the Coko aram gathering had a different ideological theory which is at change with essential Islamic religion. @ioneers of Coko aram had openly pronounced that they were restricted to westerni(ation, +hristian thoughts, and western instruction which nullified the teachings of oly prophet uhammad in the Juran who directed all his adherents to go and look for learning regardless of the fact that it implied going to +hina on the grounds that to them +hina was then the most distant spot known to them. So for somebody now saying western learning is ;aram; is not genuine and it doesnt acclimate with the teachings of Islam. 8dditionally the Islamic religion which they claim is controlling them disallows anybody to confer suicide talk less of taking the life of someone else. They say training is haram yet 6ust instructed individuals can make refined weapons, for example,
bombs and extempori(ed
unstable gadgets /ID02 which demonstrated that they themselves had western instruction and are 6ust been naughty. B"@ G$#&m$&% "s "& $l$m$&% $m/$#i&7 B! H"#"m
64
In the field study channeled /#:.1V2 of the respondents affirmed that Government as an element had been faulted both at the national, elected and state level to have fi((led in the social contract and obligation regarding a long while thus the north has been abandoned in the formative procedure. This does not so much imply that there is undue or uickened advancement over the south however the certainty remains that the north has been poor socially and monetarily and government had neglected to address these issues through long haul arrangement reactions and these entangled the issue. It was firmly accepted that the reasons for Terrorism in 4igeria is identified with 6oblessness, neediness, treachery, coupled with general feeling of misery that made the 6obless adolescents to grasp conflict of civili(ation because of the rising ideological convictions of Salapism, Hahabism and Ibnthaimyya precept /Cintube, 35!A= 3":2. Bthers incorporate social disparity, political underestimation, financial disregard and so on. To likewise bolster this is the contention of 0an6ibo /35!5=!12 who expressed that= aybe the most suitable clarification for the repetitive savagery, including religious and partisan brutality, is the disappointment of great administration in 4igeria.; e further noticed that amid the ;Coko aram; emergency, 8l6a(eera made a noteworthy investigation about the circumstance in 4igeriaM a nation that is the fifth biggest maker of oil on the planet however where the unfathomable main part of the populace live beneath the destitution line of !X a day.
%ikewise +harles Soludo the previous +entral Cank Governor expressed that ;4orthern 4igeria is the most exceedingly bad hit by destitution.; is measurements demonstrated that the 4orth+entral recorded 1"VM the 4orth-Hest recorded "!.!V and the 4orth-Dast recorded "3.3V of individuals living beneath the neediness line;.
65
L"'! 0 $@u'"%i&96liius&$ss
The field review directed uncovered that ignorance and obliviousness have a colossal part to play in promising the development of Coko aram in 4igeria. This is the place the 8lma6iri framework comes in. 8s indicated by Galtimari /35!!2 8lma6iri were utili(ed as standard organi(ers to touch off and manage emergencies in Corno /refered to in Cintube2. The 8lma6iri framework is not Islamic however more like sub6ugation. 8 dominant part of the 8lma6iri young men are not instructed both in western and Islamic ways yet they remember the Juran by heart however they do no truly comprehend what it implies and as a rule this young men got to be devices of pulveri(ation in the hands of their allams or Islamic researchers as alluded to in Dnglish. %ack of education made a road whereby semi Islamic researchers swindle youngsters to submit un Godly acts while mis-citing certain verses of the oly Juran. 8lso, on the grounds that these young men are nourished and prepared by these allam they are easygoing to them and they can be effectively convinced to execute for the sake of 8llah promising them that they would go to paradise a short time later. 8s indicated by the respondents the most well-known of such verses is the particular case that says battle in the reason for Islam and while that verse 6ust expressed that a uslim who is been sought after amid the reason for his obligation ought to rushed to a position of wellbeing and in the event that he is been sought after to peril he ought to battle back until the foe surrenders and that if the foe surrenders, he ought to uit battling them in light of the fact that God does not care for the assailant and he doesnt care for the transgressor too. To bolster this is the contention of 0an6ibo /35!5=#2 who noticed that in northern 4igeria there is a refinement between ;akarantanboko; /schools giving ;Hestern; instruction2 and
66
;makarantanaddini; /schools for religious guideline2 or ;makaranthanallo; /school of the slate, comprehended to be Loranic schools2. This as indicated by him represents the ;8lman6eri disorder; /male understudiesF understudies learning Loran2 to the degree that students who go to schools for western instruction are treated with hatred and criticism. 8ctually 0an6ibo said that a prominent ausa melody that infested 4orthern 4igeria, and regularly sang by 8lma6irai, goes like this= Kan makarantaboko, Ca karatu, baSallah, Saiyawan(aginmallam. The melody interprets as= Students of western schools, you dont learn or read the Juran, spare ceaseless misuse of your instructor. 0an6ibo further noticed that a decent number of these youngsters in 8lma6iri School originated from rich homes yet are sub6ected to the homeless person lifestyle, i.e. getting by asking. 8 talked individual of the 4ational 8gency for the @rohibition for @eople Trafficking said, these youngsters are defenseless against a wide range of social issues, misuse, and roughness. They can be carefully selected for any bad habit that grown-up need to utili(e them for /refered to in Cen6amin, 35!32. The adolescent weakness is executed now and again by tricky mallams /Islamic teachers2, who have turned into the main wellspring of instruction for some alma6iri a result of complex recorded methodology /refered to in Cen6amin 35!32.
P#us 6#@$#s "s " 0"'%# 0# B! H"#"m
/"#.$V2 of the respondent in the field survey conducted proved large proportion Coko aram members were drawn from aliens who successful crossed the borders of Corno state and found refuge there. In 4igeria, the number of illegal routes surpasses the legal routes and also the
67
security at the legal routes are not entirely effective because the borders are poorly manned and managed hence this had facilitated the influx of illegal alien, arms and ammunitions into the country. 8lso there is access to explosives material as a result of inadeuate control it. These findings had shown that poorly manned borders were another security challenge facing law enforcement agents. The findings had been supported by the work of Lura /35!!2 who noted that Gamboru- 4galaCanki and )ibe borders facilitated the influx of illegal aliens with attendant inflow of arms and ammunition into the country /cited in Cintube 35!A=!1$2. ,- THE
EFFECTIVNESS
OF
GOVERNMENT
RESPONSE
AND
MAJOR
STAKEHOLDERS T)$ $00$'%i$&$ss 0 7$#&m$&% #$s/&s$
/1?.?V2 of the respondent in the field survey conducted believed that the 4igeria government is showing remarkable effort to end the problem of Terrorism in the country. This is evident in the number of strategies that had been enforced to tackle the problem of Terrorism in the country. Some of the strategies that had been applied by the 4igerian government in curbing the Coko aram insurgence in 4igeria from 355$-35!? include= B"&&i&7 0 B! H"#"m The federal government on )une A 35!? proscribed two terrorist groups unleashing mayhem, on the polity describing their activities as illegal and acts of terrorism. The outlawed groups were )amatu8hlis- Sunna%iddawatiHal )ihad otherwise known as Coko aram and the )ama> atu8nsaruuslimina i Ciladis Sudan also known as 8nsaru. In proscribing the sects, president Good-luck )onathan authori(ed the ga(etting of Ean order declaring their activities illegal and as an actof terrorism< /'anguard, 35!?2.
68
T)$ D$'l"#"%i& 0 s%"%$ 0 $m$#7$&'(
8ccording to 86ayi /35!?2 on Tuesday ay !A 35!?, president Good-luck declared a state of emergency on 8damawa, Kobe and Corno state in a bid to fight the activities of Coko aram. e ordered the 4igerian 8rmed orces to the three areas around %ake +had in exercise of power conferred on him by the provision of section ?5:= /? /c2 /d2 /f2 +onstitution of the ederal *epublic of 4igeria !$$$, as amended which states that= The @resident shall have power to issue a state of emergency only when, there is actual breakdown of public order and public safety in the federation or any part to reuire extraordinary measures to restore peace and security measures to advert such danger /86ayi, 35!?2. Cy this declaration, the president ordered the security agencies to take all necessary actions and measures to an end to the impunity going in such states. e also granted them the authority to arrest and detain suspected members of Coko haram group. Pli'i&7 0 %)$ N"%i&s 6"#@$# i& %)$ &#%) $"s%$#& s%"%$s 0 B#&> Y6$ "&@ A@"m""
embers off the 4igerian senate, Sen. 0omingo Bbende, in Geneva, Swit(erland called for effective measures in policing the 4igerian borders. Bbende /8@+-Ddo2 made the call at an interactive session with newsmen at the conference in Geneva /%eadership, 35!A2. To this effect the 4igerian government hadopened ?5 new border posts mainly in the crisis Utorn 4orth-Dast region. The ?5 new posts are expected to beef up the #? existing ones and enhance the nation>s overall security /The citi(en, 35!A2. I&%$#*"7$&'( 'll"6#"%i&
69
Therehave been remarkable inter-agency collaboration among security agencies such as StateSecurity Service, 4igerian 8rmy, 4igerian 8ir force, 4igerian @olice, 0efence Intelligence 8gency, 4igerian Intelligence 8gency, and 0irectorate of military intelligence as regard finding lasting solutions to Terrorism. +hief of 8rmy staff, %t. Gen 8(ubuikeIhe6irika, had said= The inter-agency collaboration helped security agencies to foil a terror attack in the country recently /8depegba, 35!32. Su//#% 7i$& % i'%ims
In the field survey conducted /"#V2 of the respondents agreed that victims of Coko aram attacks got support from government and other non-state stake holders to alleviate the effects of the attack. Such support included monetary donations from state and federal government, good willed 4igerians, 4GB>s etc. They also added that they get medical and security support as well.
Some of the agencies mentioned include 4igerian @olice force,
4igerian +ivil 0efence corps, 4D8, 0elta, state government, Dnugu state government, 4iger state general ospital, 8bu6a general hospital etc. T)$ $00$'%i$&$ss 0 s$'u#i%( "7$&'i$s i& '&%#lli&7 B! H"#"m
The field survey also showed that "1."V2 of the respondentobserved that security agents are well euipped for the challenges of controlling Coko aram in the country. The problem however, is that there is no political will on the @art of government. @art of the findings also showed that the motivations of security agencies were not encouraging. Galtimari /35!!2 observed that the general lack of effective and co-ordinated intelligence gathering and sharing and its deployment to forestall events which undesirable conseuences were another challenge
70
facing the security apparatus. e also stressed that government inability to create the statutory national security institution as another problem. T)$ l$$l 0 /li'$*/u6li' #$s/&s$ i& m&i%#i&7 B! H"#"m "'%ii%i$s
The field survey revealed that /"3.3V2 of the respondent agreed that the level of police public relationship as regards monitoring Coko aram activities in the country is very poor. @art of the observation was also that there is lack of adeuate protection for citi(ens who are willing to give useful information to security agencies. 8ccording to Cintube /35!A2 oneof the challenges security agencies facedwas the inability of key stakeholders especially the imams, clerics, leaders of thought, elders and affected persons to give information to law enforcement agencies for fear of reprisal attack. 8lso in page /!#32 Cintube noted that it was evident when Coko aram embarked on silent attacks and assassinations of ward and district heads. urthermore Cintube noted that some Coko aram members declared the spilling of blood of anyone who tries to stop them from declaring war on the society which according to them was legitimate and they would leave no stone unturned in their fight to achieve their goal. M$@i" #$s/&s$ % T$###ism
The findings revealed that that media response to Terrorism had been effective owing to the fact that it helps in creating awareness about Coko aram attacks, danger (ones as well as dissemination of useful information to security and humanitarian agencies to help bringing support to victims of Coko aram.
71
T)$ #$s/&s$ 0 'l$#i's "&@ #$li7ius i&s%i%u%i&s
indings also revealed that clerics and religious institutions are doing all within their power to end the problem of Coko aram in their own little capacity. indings also revealed that clerics have embarked on awareness programmes to enlighten people that Islam is a religion of peace. 8lso these clerics hold prayer sessions for 4igeria against Coko aram. THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS ON TERRORISM
International terrorist group to a large extent had a huge influence on Coko aram. 8ccording to one of myrespondents= Kou would know that Coko aram has links with international terrorist group with their mode of attacks. They seemed to have adopted the 8l Jaeda twin bombing style for example they detonate a bomb then few seconds when sympathi(ers gather round they will detonate the second one. Then another thing is for them to be able to operate in 4igeria and then run to another country to seek refuge. Then it means that they have support of some individuals in that country for them to be able to side them /0r.%awal2. 8nother reason to show that international terrorist groups have influence on Coko aram is that they have very strong financial backing and weaponry.To support this is the argument of onika /35!32 who mentioned that that 8bu Jaa the spokesman for the group in the first ma6or interview with a western newspaper, said=
72
The groups members were spiritual followers of al-Jaida, and claimed they had met senior figures in the network founded by Bsama bin %aden during visits to Saudia 8rabia. In addition the case of Coko aram EBperation Sawdust< carried out in 355: by the military and the police
which covered Corno, Cauchi and Kobe State and led to the arrest of some
fundamentalists whose activities posed a threat to the security of the 4igerian state proved that Coko aram had been influenced by international terrorist groups. 8mong those arrested were Kusuf ohammed the leader of the Coko haram sect, a certain Cello aiduga and 8shafa. This arrest provided the first fact of the links between the fundamentalists and the 8l>ueda terrorist group. The Three arrested revealed they had been trained in the act of terrorism in 8fghanistan, %ebanon, @akistan and Ira. Items recovered during the operation included maps and diagrams of the government establishments and of some specific buildings in 8bu6a /0an6ibo, 35!5= !:2. 8lso 0an6ibo /35!5= !52 noted that a certain 8bdulrasheed8bdullahi confessed to the police that he and another members of the group were sent to 8fganistan to train in the art of Comb and explosive making devices /This 0ay, Thursday, September ?, 355$, p.!2 which leaves the impression that the sect had been receiving financial and military support from foreign countries and other terrorist groups. 2-
THE IMPLICATIONS OF TERRORISM FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
T)$ 7$&$#"l $00$'%s 0 B! H"#"m & %)$ s'i$%( E'&mi' $00$'%: 8ll activities of the 4igerian people were affected by Terrorism. or
instance economic activities in the north has paralysed and traders from the south and west no longer go to the north for economic activities because the last set of people that went from
73
Ibadan were all massacred and killed. This has made economic activities to stand still. There are no exchange of goods and services across the states. 8lso the insurgencies of Coko aram have reduced drasticallyM government derivation from the affected region due to restiveness in those places as well as reduced investment and growth of business in the affected places without excluding government executed pro6ect. 4o wonder 35!! Horld Investment *eport of the 9nited 4ations +onference on Trade and 0evelopment reported that lull in business activities caused by insecurity in Lano State alone has cost the 4igerian economy 4!.?trillion /X1 billion2 as a result of attacks by the Coko aram group. It was further reported that the report monitored on the 'oice of 8merica /'o82 also shown that +entre for *esearch and 0ocumentation in Lano attributed the development to a drop in earnings for nearly all businesses in the state /%eadership 4ewspaper= 35!32. In like manner, interstate borders are also affected. armers are no longer safe to plant in the farm because of Coko aram members whom they claimed come under the disguise of herds men to disturb them. 8ccording to the field survey carried out /#1."V2 of the respondent agreed that the economic effects in the 4orth is worse than the rest of the county. I&s$'u#i%(: The situation of insecurity arising from the fear of Coko aram is very high in
the country. The situation is so bad that people no longer even attend social functions such as going to churchFmosue, market, parties, business meetings, work, going to the hospital, school and so on. The entire life of the nation is being negatively affected the in areas such as human security, health security, 6ob security, health security, national security.
8s part of the
implications, a lot of children had been forced out of schools. In a survey carried out by /Cintube, 35!A= !$32 as many as 15,555 children euivalent to /A"V2 of primary school enrolment were pushed out of schools as a result of Coko aram activities in Corno state.
74
T)$ $00$'% 0 B! H"#"m & +$s%$#& E@u'"%i&:
Surprisingly a vast ma6ority of the
respondent emphasi(ed that it had no negative effect on western education because there has been no policy statement to end western education in 4igeria or the stoppage of educational activities instead you would hear of state government campaign for free education for all. 8 vast ma6ority of the respondents claimed that instead Coko aram had a positive effect on education because it had encouraged uslim clerics and religious institutions to start educating people that Islam is a religion of peaceand that acuiring western knowledge is good and not Earam< as claimed by Coko aram members.
I&%$#*/$#s&"l #$l"%i&s)i/ "m&7 Ni7$#i"&s: In the field survey conducted /$:.1V2 of
the respondent revealed that Coko aram affected inter-personal relations among people of diverse culture in the country. They added that Coko aram had caused stereotyping and distrust among 4igerians and that in most situations an average 4igerian from Corn is often seen as a Coko aram member. SPECIFIC EFFECT OF BOKO HARAM ON VICTIMS Ps(')l7i'"l $00$'%: The field survey showed that /$#.$V2 of the respondent noted that
Coko caused psychological and traumatic experience to the victims. To support this edical and 0ental +onsultants 8ssociation of 4igeria /35!!2 disclosed that Coko aram activities in the north have increased trauma cases in 4igerian hospitals /cited in in Cintube, 35!A2. 8lso Cala /35!!2 pointed out that=
75
ost patients attended to at various hospitals in Corno State reported cases which were merely psychological than physical, and was largely due to trauma associated with hearing sounds of gunshots and bomb blast in their neighborhood, loss of close family members, friends and relations /cited in Cintube, 35!A=!A"2. D$"%)9 Clss"l D"m"7$s:
indings of the research showed that part of the effects of
been a victim of Coko aram included deathFmass killing of individuals, family members, relatives, colleagues, friends etc. as well as damages to properties, building, cars and so on. In St. Theresa>s +atholic +hurch adalla in 4iger State for instance a part of the church was destroyed, the church fence as well as the church Cook Shop was destroyed. 8lso a total of 31 parishioners were accounted dead. E00$'% 0 B! H"#"m & %)$ s'i$'&mi' li0$ 0 +m$& "&@ C)il@#$&: The
findings of the research showed that Coko aram had affected the socio- economic lives of women and children.indings from the research showed that a lot of women became widows as a result of Coko aram attack. These women also became bread winners of their families as a result of Coko aram attacks. The findings also revealed that a lot of children became orphans and that a lot of childrenwere used as child soldiers. Similarly, findings further revealed that a lot of women and children became internally displaced and in some case refugees as a result of Coko aram attacks.
76
CHAPTER FIVE SUMMARY
OF
FINDINGS>
DISSUCSSION>
CONCLUSION
AND
RECOMMENDATION 8-.
SUMMARY
4o nation can afford to treat with levity the security of its territorial integrity and of its people. Indeed every aspect of human endeavors, be it health, environmental, food, economy, political, social and physiological and so on, stands to be greatlyaffected by the state of security or insecurity of a nation. It is no longer news that in recent timeM 4igeria has beenbogged down with challenging security issues championed by the Coko aram terrorist acts. Terrorism and insecurity,especially internal insecurity is not a problem that is uniue to 4igeria. The 9nited states, the 9nited kingdom and many other countries, facethe challenges of insecurity within their borders on a daily basis /8de6umo, 35!32. The difference between those countries and4igeria is how they manage the threatsM how knowledgeable and prepared they areM how they deploy resources againstthe threatsM how effective they areM how patriotic and united these people are against threats of insecurity.. +onseuently, government at all levels would need to ensure security of lives andproperties of their various citi(ens in order to create the necessary enabling environment for investment and industrial growth. Insecurity is inimical to industriali(ation. 8 lot of security challenges such as armed robbery, assassination, kidnapping, which has createdpalpable fear and
77
grave sense of insecurity in the polity and undermines the country>s growth and development, all these crisis and security threats shouldbe tackled with all seriousness by the government. Security agencies must be empowered, motivated and adeuatelymobili(ed to combat criminality and insecurity to the barest minimum. 8lso, effective legislation that will adeuately punishoffenders and deter potential criminals must be put in place. 8 situation where criminals are offered amnesty and put onbumper payroll will not only undermine state security, but also encourage more people to take into criminality with theexpectation of amnesty and conseuent monthly wages from the government, 6ust for being repentant criminals. 8nexample of this is the 4iger 0elta 8mnesty @rogramme and the offer of amnesty to the various terrorists and insurgents group in 4igeria especially the northern area. 8-, CONCLUSION
rom the study it is evident that Terrorism has been recogni(ed as a threat to 4igerian 4ational security, and in addition political and financial dependability in the nation. This is on the grounds that it has not been appropriately overseen by the 4igerian government and this has to a substantial degree demorali(ed outside financial specialists from connecting with the nation. The examination has found that terrorist revolt has turned into an obstinate clash in 4igeria and that if the main drivers of the rebellion are not legitimately tended to it has the potential for 4ational breaking down and withdrawal. 8long these lines, to guarantee managed peace, national security and political dependability in the nation, government ought to set out on ama(ing method including political structural, monetary established and worldwide ways to deal with location the main perpetrators of Terrorism in the nation.
78
Cesides the legislature ought to leave on brain transformation which addresses the psyches of terrorists and potential guerillas which incorporates any young especially from the north through uality ideological introduction. 8dditionally group policing ought to be set out upon as honed ahead of time nations of the world. This would to an extensive degree address the smilingly aloof reactions of the masses. This would likewise empower them to take part in dynamic organi(ation with government and significant partners in the nation. 8-2 RECOMMENDATIONS
The researcher has critically examined the assessment of respondents in accordance with the ob6ective of the research bearing in mind the research problems. Cased on the findings the researcher recommends as follows= .- Yu%) u&$m/l(m$&%: The evil of youth unemployment should be seriously looked into by
the government. Dmployment generation for the teeming population should be more aggressively pursued as a matter of priority by government at all levels. If more youths are employed, it automatically depletes the army of youths available for recruitment into various criminal activities. rom all indications, the reduction of youth unemployment will translate into reduction in crime, and engender sustainable national development. The youths are an important part of the society, who should be encouraged to channel their energies to national development by being positively engaged in the system, and discouraged from activities that could be detrimental to the growth of the country. Therefore, every action taking towards youth employment is an action towards crime reduction as well as promoting national development. ,- C##u/%i&: Government at all levels must eschew corruption in the fight against terrorism
and insecurity. The Cillions of 4aira voted for security both at State and ederal levels for
79
inexplicable reasons are not made available to combat these problems. eanwhile citi(ens continue to pay their taxes and fulfilled other obligations to the Government of the day amid this state of insecurity, fear and siege /Bshio, 355$2. There must be sincerity on the part of government functionaries to ensure 6udicious use of funds meant for security of lives and property. ?. P$#%( "ll$i"%i& = Government should embark on veritable poverty alleviation programs that will impact positively on the lives of the people. The physical, social and psychological uality of life of a society and its members both in domestic setting and within the larger regional and global system will give the citi(ens a deeper sense of patriotism. 8ccordingly, national security policy must include the capacity to provide the citi(ens with social, economic and political conditions conducive to happiness and relative prosperity. Thus, tranuility and well being of a society are necessary components of national security. 5- D$$l/m$&% 0 l&7 )"ul /li%i'"l m&$%"#( "&@ s$'u#i%( approaches= It was watched that
the variables empowering Terrorism rebellion in 4igeria included governmental issues, terrible administration, lack of education and frail fringes. It is conseuently suggested that Terrorism can be gotten to end 4igeria if the 4igerian government set out on solid strategy explanation on security, constructing a solid knowledge drive and applying a long haul approach articulation to address destitution and frailty in 4igeria. Such approaches ought to contribute all the more on human improvement, instruction, medicinal services, nature and also regions that would prompt occupation creation. 8- M%i"%i&s= Security operators ought to be properly persuaded to empower them in their
battle against Terrorists. Such inspirations ought to incorporate procurement of disaster
80
protectionM procurement
of free access to
medicinal considerationM procurement of
wagesFremittanceM consistent increment in compensationsM advancements and procurement of advanced weapons that can be utili(ed in counteracting, controlling and battling wrongdoings, for example, current helicopters, bomb indicators, and firearms et cetera. - Es%"6lis)m$&% 0 S%#&7 !&l$@7$ "##"&7$s i& Ni7$#i" = Intelligence organi(ations ought
to be furnished with innovative security gadgets. The 4igerian discernment organi(ations such 4ational Intelligence 8gency, State security administration and 0efense insight office ought to gain from cutting edge nations how they figure out how to keep up a solid knowledge system. 8dditionally insight and security operators ought to try for legitimate preparing and retraining. In this respect different colleges in 4igeria ought to take after 8feCabalola 9niversity in creating Intelligence and Security studies to their scholastic pro6ects. oreover discernment gave ought to be utili(ed to identify security dangers, for example, Terrorism rebellion, secure arranged data also to advance bury office cooperation, collaboration and participation amongst security orgs. 8dditionally group policing ought to be exhorted as rehearsed ahead of time countries ; Bil"%$#"l "&@ Mul%il"%$#"l R$l"%i&s)i/ = The 4igerian government to go into respective and
multilateral collaboration among neighboring state to help in fighting the issue of terrorits in the nation. = C#$"%i& 0 A"#$&$ss= +lerics and religious establishment ought to continue making
mindfulness about religion. They ought to make individuals reali(e that Islam is a religion of peace. They ought to lecture peace, religious resilience and pacifism.
81
4 I&%$&si0i'"%i& 0 B#@$# s$'u#i%( = Corder security ought to be fixed, unlawful courses ought
to be blocked. The 4igerian government ought to manufacture solid outskirts and reconnaissance in fringes ought to likewise be supported. 10 Education: Government must look into the Almajiri system in the North !t
shoul" #e re$orme" in or"er to make the %hil"ren in the system use$ul to themselves an" the so%iety &o this en"' e"u%ation must #e a((ressively )ursue" an" ma"e %om)ulsory $or the %hil"ren !t is %ontention o$ this stu"y' that the *oko +aram terrorism (ives #a" )u#li%ity to the %ountry' shrinks the market si,e' "is%oura(esinvestors' $urther "e)letes national $un"s availa#le $or "evelo)ment' "is%oura(es investments an" re"u%es -.!s that shoul" have %ome into the %ountry an" sti/es "evelo)ment onseuently' terrorism is a"euately %he%kmate"' an" se%urity o$ lives an" )ro)erty is (uarantee" in every )art o$ the %ountry' ra)i" "evelo)ment' hi%h is mu%h nee"e" at this sta(e o$ the nations eisten%e' ill have an ena#lin( environment to o%%ur
82
BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS
A#"ulkarim' 2011 Analysis :n"erstan"in( Ni(erias *oko +aram ra"i%als;' irinnesor( !e%urity an" !ts ana(ement in Ni(eria A%hievements an" %hallen(es o$ the Ni(erian >e%urity an" ivil .e$en%e %or)s !#a"an =ohn Ar%hers ?( 35 A#olurin' A 2011 ?ara ilitary A(en%ies an" the )romotion o$ Goo" Governan%e $or National >e%urity !n Ni(eria; !n A"e A#olurin e" !ssues an" hallen(es Ni(erias National >e%urity !#a"an =ohn Ar%hers )( 26@29 A"esoji' A 2010 &he *oko +aram :)risin( an" !slami%
)e%trum Akanmu' G 2012 ana(in( on/i%ts in A$ri%as .emo%rati% &ransitions
83
*ar"' 2005 Nature o$ !nsur(en%ies; !n !nsur(en%y an" &errorism $rom revolution to A)o%aly)se 2n" e"ition' Bashin(ton' an" . ?otoma% *ooks' !n% are' & 2000 &he =iha"s the >e%ret Bar in A$(hanistan ainstream ?u#lishin( urtis' 2006 Government o$ the i""le Cast; !n urtis e" !ntro"u%tion to %om)arative Government' Ne Dork Eon(man .am#a,au' A 2007 riminolo(y an" riminal =usti%e 2n" e"ition' !#a"an >)e%trum *ooks .een' A 1989
!nsur(en%ies atta%ks an" its im)li%ations
to the )oliti%al
"evelo)ment at Ee#anon;' i%roso$t Cn%atao)eration' treet Bithout =oy &he -ren%h "e#a%le in !n"o%hina' >ta%k)ole >%ho%ken *ooks Eeis' * 1990 &he e)tem#er' 266 3 47@60 Eeis' * 1995 ultures in on/i%t hristians' uslims an" =es in the A(e o$ .is%overy $or" $or" :niversity ?ress Eittle' . 1996 our%es o$ an" tates !nstitute o$ ?ea%e ?ress' 79@ 92 aier' 1993
?ea%e an" se%urity $or the 1990s :n)u#lishe" )a)er $or the
a%Arthur -elloshi) ?ro(ram' >o%ial >%ien%e
ur)hy' G 2011 *oko +aram +it Eist' ?u#lishe" #y >un"ay >un ay 22' 2011 ol 14 Nesat%h 2009 2009 Au(ust 10'2009'))33@35 10'2009'))33@35 F43 F43 Nolise' 2008 National >e%urity an" >ustaina#le .emo%ra%y; !n Cmmanuel jo e" hallen(es o$ >ustaina#le .emo%ra%y in Ni(eria !#a"an =ohn Ar%hers 350@351 #asanjo' 1999 Gran" Gran" strate(y $or National se%urity; se%urity; A#uja -e"eral inistry o$ !n$ormation' )) 1@3 lomojo#i' D 2013 !slam an" %on/i%t in Northern Ni(eria' althouse ?ress limite" Ea(os mar' B 2004 >o%ial ovement' >el$@Eimitin( alaH =iha" threat in Ni(eria; in ar%@Antoine ?Irouse "e ont%los*oko +aram !slamism' )oliti%s' se%urity an" the state in Ni(eria :niversity o$ !#a"an A$ri%an >tu"ies entre Balter Ei))mann :> -orei(n ?oli%y >hiel" o$ the
INTERNATIONAL INTERNATIONAL JOURNALS
Aliyu' 2011 *oko +aram' Ni(eria an" >u#@re(ional >e%urity; !n Ni(erian =ournal o$ !nternational AJairs ol 37' No 3 se)tem#er@ .e%em#er 2011 Ea(os !nternatonal =ournal o$ !nternational AJairs
85
*ami"ele' 2012 *oko +aram atastro)hi% &errorism @An Al#atross to National ?ea%e ?ea%e'' >e%urit >e%urity y an" >ustaina >ustaina#le #le .evelo .evelo)me )ment nt in Ni(eri Ni(eria; a; =ourna =ournall o$ >ustain >ustaina#l a#le e .evelo .evelo)me )ment nt in A$ri% A$ri%a a ol14' ol14' No1' No1' lario larion' n' ?ennsylv ennsylvania ania lario larion n :nivers :niversity ity o$ ?ennsylvania -alola & 1998 iolen%e in Ni(eria &he risis - atur"ay' ay 14' 2001' )a(e 50 +untin(ton' > 1993 &he lash o$ ivili,ation;' &he $orei(n AJairs =ournal ol 72' No3 +untin(ton' > 1996 &he lash o$ ivili,ations an" the imsonF >%huster :k Et" !(#u,or' 2011 ?ea%e ann" >e%urity C"u%ation A riti%al -a%tor $ >ustaina#le .evelo)ment' !nternational =ournal $ ?ea%e An" .evelo)ment >tu"ies ol2 1' 1@ 7' =anuary =an uary ?ra#hakaran' ? 2008 National >e%urity !m)eratives an" hallen(es Ne .elhi &ata &ata %Gra@ +ill) 521
A#olurin' A 2011 &errorism Ni(eria an" (lo#al "imensions !#a"an Gol"en@(ems uniue A#olurin' A 2011 &errorism Ni(eria an" (lo#al "imensions !#a"an Gol"en@(ems uniue 86
Ckanem' .a"a FCjue 2012 *oko +ara an" Amnesty A ?hilo LEe(al A))raisal;' !nternational =ournal o$ +umanities an" so%ial s%ien%es vol 2 No 4 Clai(u' 2005 &he ilitary an" ana(ement o$ in%e 1980' Ka"una Ni(erian .e$en%e A%a"emy -all' * 1998 &he theory an" )ra%ti%e o$ insur(en%y an" %ounterinsur(en%y;' :> Naval Bar olle(e e%urity;' >e%urity;' !nau(ural Ee%ture' Ee%ture' C"o >tate :niversity' Ck)oma' 1998' ?14 ?14 !si%hei' C 1987 &he aitatsine e%urity;' Ni(erian =ournal o$ !nternational AJairs ol 37' No3 se)tem#er@ "e%em#er 2011' Ea(os usman usman'' A 2004 2004 &he ?oten ?otentia tiall o$ !slami !slamist st &errori errorism sm in >u#@>aha >u#@>aharan ran A$ri% A$ri%a;' a;' !nternational =ournal o$ ?oliti%s' ulture an" >o%iety' ol 18' N 1O2 inter 77 ar' . 1984 National se%urity An A$ri%an )ers)e%tive;' in * Arlinhaus e" A$ri%an >e%urity !ssues >overei(nty' >ta#ility >ta#ility an" >oli"arity >oli"arity olora"o Best Best ie )ress ?aul' ?aul' lark larke' e' Grill Grill an" .uni(an .uni(an 2013 2013 ?aths aths to vi%tor vi%tory y lessons lessons $rom $rom mo"ern mo"ern insur(en%ies' National .e$ense
87
>e%retary
o$
.e$ense
A))rove"
$or
releaseM
"istri#ution
unlimite"
>ee
ran"or(ervi%e;' &he National >e%urity %oun%il An r(ani,ational Assessment en(hass' . 1998 A %lash o$ %ivili,ation an i"ee HeQ; =ournal o$ ?ea%e treet' Eon"on B!- CG :>A 180 ari%k >treet' Ne Dork ND 10014@4606 &haroor' ! 2 014 8 uestions you ant ansere" a#out the missin( s%hool (irls;' &he Bashin(ton ?ost &he Guar"ian 2009 Ni(eria a%%use" o$ i(norin( se%t arnin(s #e$ore ave o$ killin(s; &he Guar"ian Eon"on 2 Au(ust 2009
=
2008-un%tional
an"
on/i%t
&heory
a
?oint
o$
ie;
htt)OOs%ien%es360%om tates Army Bar olle(e &usi%isny' A 2004 ivili,ation on/i%t ore -reuent' Eon(er' an" *loo"ierQ; =ournal o$ ?ea%e
88
Balker' A 2012 Bhat is *oko +aramQ; >)e%ial tates !nstitute o$ ?ea%e Bashin(ton' . :nite" >tates .e)artment o$ .e$en%e 2014 =oint )u#li%ation 1@02 .e)artment o$ .e$en%e
.i%tionary
o$
ilitary
an"
Asso%iate"
&erms
htt)OO"ti%milO"o%trineO"o"R"i%tionary national se%urity a re$eren%e han"#ook;' ontem)orary orl" issues 2 revise" e" ) 281 e%urity .e%ision@ makin( ?ro%ess in a .emo%ra%y' a le%ture "elivere" at the Nation Bar olle(e' A#uja' on 16 =anuary' 2001 Se#ulon' & 2004 >mall Arms ?roli$eration ?osses hallen(es in Best A$ri%a -o%us on Arms in A$ri%a'ol 3' issue 1 %ite" in +elenhumakoro ?roli$eration o$ >mall Arms an" Ei(ht Bea)ons in Ni(eria Ee(al !m)li%ations INTERNET RESOURCES
A"e)e(#a' A 2012 Be $oile" terror atta%k throu(h inter a(en%y eJort L ihejirika;' &he ?un%h u"an;' &his .ay Eive
hristians
#y
*oko
+aram;
16@05@2014
$rom
htt)OOa$ri%ajournalismtheorl"%om 89
Ajayi' - 2013 >tate o$ Cmer(en%y in *oko +aram Ni(eria *oar"er >tates to restore the lost Glory o$ Kanem*orno Cm)ire;' Ni(eria Borl" olumist 2012 lari$yin( *oko +arams &ransnational !ntention' :sin( ontent Analysis o$ )u#li% >tatement !n 2002;' ?ers)e%tives on &errorism ui%i"e #om#er Kill 15 at Ni(erian hur%h;' A #lo( o$ the Eon( Bar =ournal e%urity *rie$ A$ri%a enter $or >trate(i% >&u"ies
03@03@2013 $rom
htt)OOn"ue"uO)ress hristian' T2012 Ni(eria *oko +aram Atta%k .e% 2011@=uly 2012
A
2014
>o%iolo(y
-un%tionalists
&heory
An
overvie
htt)OOs)%iolo(ya#out%om .anji#o' N 2010 !slami% -un"amentalism an" >e%tarian iolen%e &he aitatsine; an" *oko +aram; rises in Northern Ni(eria' !#a"an :niversity o$ !#a"an )ress
90
>ee i$rani(eria r(OUON@[email protected]#o@R !slami%R-un"amentalism
&he
Guar"ian
19@05@2014
$rom
htt)OOthe(uar"ian%om Gala"ima' > 2011 Ni(eria &he metamor)hosis o$ *oko +aram' htt)OOalla$ri%a%om >oni' . 2014 ay .ay &ra(e"y >%ores .ie in -resh A#uja *om#in(;' o"eit Borl" Nes
+umanitarian
Nes
an"
Analysis
18@05@2014
$rom
htt)OOmirinnesor( =a%into' E 2012 &he *oko +aram terror %hie$ ho %ame #a%k $rom the "ea"
intervention;
*ee(ea(les
*lo(
16@05@2014
$rom
htt)OO#ee(ea(leor")ress%om 91
=ameston -oun"ation 2012 ilitant
Eea"ershi) onitor ?ersonalities *ehin"
the !nsur(en%y;' htt)OOmlmjamestonor( =oe' * 2012 Ni(eria *oko +aram 101 ?ulit,er%enteror( enator alls -or CJe%tive ?oli%in( o$ Ni(eria *or"ers
A$ter Ni(erias hur%h *om#in(s &he A"vent o$ hristian L
uslim on/i%tQ;' &ime %ores .ie as -i(hters *attle Ni(erian ?oli%e;' &he Ne Dork &imes %our(e; &he >un Nes htt)Osunnesoline%omOnesOs)e%ialsOi%onOinsur(en%y@ni(erias$esterin(@s%our(e
92
?i)es' . 1990 &he uslims are %omin(V &he uslims are %omin(V; National
Novem#er
19
1990
A%%esse"
on
the
2n"
o$
july
2013
at
htt)OO"aniel)i)esor( ?remium &imes 2012 *oko +aram atta%ks %hur%h in Gom#e' three $eare" "ea" un
3
>e)tem#er
2011
2011@09@07
htt)OOe%onomist%omOno"eO21528307 &he C%onomist 2014 Bhose $aith' hose (irls hekauWs asso%iate $oun" "ea"' says .e$en%e+trs
ork
&he
Nation
2014@05@19
2013@07@06
$rom
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93
oa Nes 2012 *oko +arams )arks ivil -ears;' oanes%om
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94
*o"un"e . 2013 Ameri%an strate(y an" strate(i% intelli(en%e )ara"i(m shi$t on terrorism im)li%ation $or !ra A ?h. &+C>!> >:*!&&C. & &+C .C?A<&CN& 9!N&C' CK!&! >&A&C :N!C<>!&D Galtimari' G 2011 -inal
&he ?resi"ential ommittee on >e%urity
hallen(es in the North LCast Sone o$ Ni(eria' !nau(urate" #y the )resi"ent 2n" Au(ust 2011 =ohnson & 2011 *a%k(roun"er *oko +aram; oun%il on -orei(n e%ular >tate; *erkeley :niversity o$ ali$ornia ?ress ark' 2012 *oko +aram vos to H(ht until Ni(eria esta#lishes sharia la; the (uar"ian nes hekauWs asso%iate $oun" "ea"' says .e$en%e+trs
ork
&he
Nation
2014@05@19
2013@07@06
$rom
htt)OOthe(uar"ian%om
95
J9DSTIB448I*D
96
0epartment of Intelligence and Security Studies, 8fe- Cabalola 9niversity, @..C :A:A, 8do-Dkiti, Dkiti State. 0ear SirF a, This is a uestionnaire onA& "ss$ssm$&% & %)$ im/"'% 0 T$###ism & Ni7$#i"
Security Studies 8feCabalola 9niversity 8do-Dkiti /8C9802 in partial fulfillment of C.S+ in Intelligence and Security Studies. Lindly be very coherent in answering the outlined uestions and I promise that the identity of respondents will be kept secret. T84L KB9. RESEARCHER PERSONAL DATA
97
SECTION A
Socio U 0emographic Cackground √
@lease tick
¿
2 against appropriate.
.- G$&@$#ale / 2
emale
/ 2
,- A7$ !# to 3$ / 2
?5 to ?$ / 2
A5 to A$ / 2
:5 to :$ / 2 15 and above / 2
2- R$li7i& Islam / 2+hristianity / 2 Traditional religion / 2 5- P#0$ssi& 4one /
2
ilitary /
employed / 2 9nemployed / 2
2
@ara-military /
8rtisan / 2
2
8theist / 2 +ivil Servant /
CusinessFTrading / 2
2
Self-
arming / 2
Student / 2 others /please specify2 .. 8- T#i6$/please specify2. - A'"@$mi' Qu"li0i'"%i& 4one /
H8S+FSS+DFG+D / 2 B40 / 2
2
+ommon Dntrance / 40 / 2
!st degree / 2
2
Juranic education /
2
3nd degree / 2 @h.0. / 2
Bthers /please specify2.. SECTION B
98
!. Hhat is the main cause of Terrorism7 @olitical / 2 Selfish interest / 2 Dconomic resources /
2
+ommunication
breakdown
/
2
others
/please
specify2
.. 3. 0o you agree that terrorism has political support7 Kes / 2
4o / 2
?. 0o you agree that bad governance motivatesterrorist attacks7 Kes / 2
4o / 2
A. 0o you agree that the high rate of illiteracy in northern 4igeria assisted the rise of Terrorism7 Kes / 2
4o / 2
:. 0o you agree that poverty in northern 4igeria has encouraged the growth of terrorismin the country7 Kes / 2
4o / 2
1. 0o you agree that porous borders is one of the factor responsible for terrorism in 4igeria Strongly agree / 2 8gree / 2 Strongly disagree / 2 ". 8ccess the intervention strategies by the security forces to put an end to terrorism in the north7 'ery strong / 2 Strong / 2 Heak / 2 'ery weak / 2 #. 0o you think victims of terrorism in 4igeria get any form of government support to alleviate the effect of the attack7 Kes /
2
4o
/
2 If yes please mention
$. 0o you think the law enforcement agencies have been well euipped by the 4igerian government for the challenges of controlling Terrorism7 Kes
/ 2
4o
/ 2
If no what is /are2 lacking7...................................................... .........................
99
!5. Hhat is the level of police-public relations as regards monitoring Terrorism in the country7 Good / 2 @oor / 2 air / 2 !!. 0o you think media response to Terrorism attacks have been effective7 Kes / 2 4o / 2 If yes what impact did the media have in bringing support to victims7.................................
.. !3. ave you ever being a victim of Terrorism attack7 Kes / 2
4o / 2
!?. ow were you attached7 Suicide Combing / 2 Sporadic attack / 2 igh way attacks / 2 !A. Hhat are the effects of being a victim7.. !:. Hhat do you think are the general impacts of Terrorism on the bigger society7 . !1. 0o you think the economic situation in 4orth Dastern 4igeria is worse than the rest of the country as a result of terrorist activities7 Kes / 2
4o / 2
!". 0o you think Terrorism affect interpersonal relationship among people of diverse background7 Kes
/
2 4o
/ 2
If yes ow.
!#. Hhat do you think are the specific effects Terrorism attacks have on the social-economic life of women and children7.................................................................................. !$. 0o you think Terrorism has any significant effect on western education7.....................
100
