Tears of blood (Tranen van bloed) The siege of' s-Hertogenbosch (Bois-le-Duc ) and the war in the Netherlands, 1629 (‘s-Hertogenbosch (‘s-Hertogenbosch en de oorlog in de Nederlanden, 1629) by Peter de Cauwer 2007
[Excerpt taken from the Summary on pages 292 to 301.] On 20 September 1629, Don Carlos Coloma, a high ranking officer in the Spanish Army of Flanders, wrote to the Count-Duke Count-Duke of Olivares, the king’s valido, that the that the defeats suffered that year were the worst since the war had started 63 years before. Indeed, the loss of the strategic town of Wesel on August 19, and the surrender of the important stronghold of ’s-Hertogenbosch, ’s-Hertogenbosch, on September 14, were a striking blow to both the position and the reputation of Spain in the Netherlands and northern Europe. King Philip IV, on hearing the news, simply concluded that God had wanted to punish him for his sins. The Dutch ‘annus mirabilis’ had in fact started about a year earlier, when Piet Hein, General of the Dutch West Indies Company, captured the Spanish Silver fleet off the coast of Cuba, and it ended in Vught, a village near Den Bosch, where the military governor, the town’s magistrate and the clergy signed the capitulation treaty and handed their city over to Dutch stadholder Frederick Henry of Orange and the States-General. In the nineteen years that followed, the court in Madrid was no longer able to threaten or even challenge the ‘rebels’ in The Hague, who were to emerge to emerge victoriously after the Peace of Munster (1648). Not surprisingly, the last phase of the Eighty Years’ War has been typified as the triumph of of the Dutch Republic. For various observers in Europe, the events in the Netherlands were an unambiguous sign that the balance of power on the continent, at that time divided along the religious frontlines of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48), (1618-48), was shifting from the Catholic to the Protestant side. Fifty years before the siege, in 1579, ’s-Hertogenbosch ’s-Hertogenbosch had defected the cause of the then still young revolt of the Netherlands against their Habsburg ruler, a revolt that had started for religious, economic and political reasons. Since then, it had been besieged several times, but never conquered, con quered, which gave it the reputation of being invincible. Needless to say, its eventual surrender made a huge impression all over the Low Countries and Europe. What made the success even more impressive, was that the Republic had not only brought that important stronghold to its knees, but had also beaten off a combined invasion of Spanish and Imperial troops into the very heart of the country and had taken by surprise the city of Wesel, an important crossing point on the Rhine occupied by the Spaniards since 1614. It is understandable that the events of 1629 have had their share of attention in Dutch historiography ever since, but even a superficial look reveals that little has changed since Pieter Bor, already in 1630, called the siege of ’s-Hertogenbosch ’s-Hertogenbosch ‘the most important of the whole war’. It is indeed hard to deny the fact that Prince that Prince Frederick-Henry’s Frederick-Henry’s achievement was an impressive one, ‘a skillfully conducted formal siege, which
States-General would offer better conditions for peace than they had done in 1609. Yet the shift in Spanish policy from 1625 on towards defensive warfare for budgetary reasons proved disastrous. Reducing the strength of the army did not reduce the huge expenses needed to maintain an army in the Netherlands, and defend the house of Hapsburg’s interests all over Europe. At the same time, a deep economic and monetary crisis had hit Castile very hard. When the first small signs of recovery had finally seemed to appear, a new blow followed around year’s end 1628, when Piet Hein surprised and captured and captured the Silver fleet off the coasts of Cuba and with it deprived Spain of the money it needed so badly. Indeed, the importance of this event does not lie in the Republic’s victory, but in Spain’s defeat. The loss of about 4,000,000 ducats destroyed Madrid’s shaky financial base, and was the second misfortune faced by Madrid after Olivares had embarked on an illconsidered enterprise in Northern Italy a year earlier. Against all odds the intentionally swift intervention failed and for Spain the war became a further drain for much-needed money and troops. The French crown and the States-General on the other hand found a common interest in prolonging or even stirring up this conflict, and at the beginning of 1629 reached a silent agreement to divert Spanish military power. While Louis’ army crossed the Alps towards Northern Italy, Frederick Henry set out to prepare for the siege of ’s-Hertogenbosch, ’s -Hertogenbosch, leaving the court in Madrid little chance to defend de fend itself against the combined offensive. The consequences of the Italian war were felt greatly in the Netherlands, where the Spanish army – chronically short of money – money – was was on the brink of a general mutiny. Additionally, its generals were on very bad terms with each other since Ambrosio Spinola, the undisputed commander-in-chief, had left Brussels for Madrid. The army was in no way prepared for the upcoming offensive and in the following months never really managed to stand up to the challenge posed by Frederick Henry. Prophetically, the Archduchess Isabella had written in February 1629 to her nephew that if the Dutch should attack Breda or ’s-Hertogenbosch, ’s-Hertogenbosch, there would be no way whatsoever to save either eithe r city. The military defeats during the summer of 1629 1 629 were not only a clear sign that Spanish policy in the Netherlands had failed, but also proved the deep and substantial crisis the monarchy was in. Yet it has to be stressed that Spain was in no way defeated by its enemies: surely it had suffered some serious setbacks, but that did not mean that it was beaten by the States-General. In 1635, for example, a combined Franco-Dutch invasion was beaten off outside the walls of the Brabant town of Leuven, and though the monarchy proved on several occasions to be quite resilient, it had lost the initiative to the
was not only financial hardship that caused the invasion to fail, there were also geographical, strategic, and political considerations. The long communication lines between the Southern Netherlands, the Rhineland, and the Veluwe were heavily obstructed by the States’ army, especially army, especially after the loss of Wesel, while the Spanish generals continually quarreled over questions of honor. Count Hendrik van den Bergh did not enjoy the respect of many of his, mainly Spanish, subordinates, who openly distrusted him for being related to the House of Orange, and vaguely suspected him of heretic sympathies. Worse still, the government in Brussels wanted the last word on all decisions taken in the field: more than once the army was immobilized for days because the high command had to wait wa it for orders to come from Brussels. The outcome of the military victories of that year was not all positive for the Dutch Republic, as contradictory as this may seem. Naturally they hugely enhanced the international prestige of both the state and the Prince of Orange, but on the other hand they generated a whole series of new problems. The strategic position of the Republic was altered by the capture of ’s-Hertogenbosch. ’s-Hertogenbosch. The town had always been an important stronghold to the Spanish army, which, by its very presence created a threat to large parts of the southern provinces of the Republic. After the loss of ’s-Hertogenbosch, ’s-Hertogenbosch, Spanish defensive lines were pushed far to the south, while the new States’ garrison then forced the Southern generals Southern generals to keep a close watch on the town. Furthermore the loss of Wesel weakened Spain’s position along the Rhine, having lost the most important crossing. In fact, after 1629, Spain never again managed to pose a threat to the Republic’s weak Republic’s weak eastern border. The answer to the question of what had to be done after the victories, however, was unclear. Although the Republic was re-confirmed as a European power, the States-General were unable to take up the role Protestant propaganda had attributed to them. All political actors were well aware of the t he fact that they were financially in no position to intervene in the Thirty Years’ War on on behalf of the threatened Protestants. The war against Spain was continued, however, although enthusiasm slowly, but surely began to wane. While in some quarters it was still believed that the re-conquest – re-conquest – or or liberation – liberation – of of the Southern Netherlands was still a desirable goal, doubts were raised elsewhere. An important reason for doubting the desirability of conquering large parts of the South, were the lessons learned learned in ’s-Hertogenbosch ’s-Hertogenbosch and the surrounding countryside, where the ‘liberated’ local population treated the States’ officials with open hostility. open hostility. Especially after the siege of Breda in 1637, it became clear that the towns of the South did not want to be ‘liberated’, while the strategic gains became smaller became smaller and
Sweden, France, the Ottoman Empire and perhaps even the Dutch Republic, and having lost the confidence of his allies, Ferdinand had no other choice than to back down: the execution of the Edict of Restitution, the crowning of his victory, was postponed, while during the Imperial Diet of Regensburg in 1630 he was forced to make heavy concessions in order to get his son recognized recognized as his successor. However, although the siege of ’s’s Hertogenbosch played a significant role it was not the most important factor in the reversal of the Emperor’s fortunes.
The biggest problem for the Brussels government during the 1629 campaign was that it was left to its own devices, since Madrid could not supply the necessary money. As the so-called ‘obedient provinces’, the Southern Netherlands, led by the aging aging Infanta Isabella, enjoyed some autonomy as a ‘dependent territory’ within the composite state of the Spanish Hapsburgs. Over the years, however, the old Archduchess and her government had slowly lost grip on the political life in the Southern Netherlands, while the creeping crisis had increased the influence exercised by the provincial states. Even though they often complained about the bad behavior of the troops quartered in their provinces, the states remained committed to the royal cause. In their eyes the king remained the sole guarantee for the maintenance of the Catholic faith, local privileges, and integrity of the territory. Therefore the provincial states were prepared to contribute substantial sums to the war treasury. At least, this is the traditional version of the story. Although they provided most of the substantial sums needed by the ailing government, this study does not subscribe to this point of view. Religion, privileges, and security were indeed significant elements of the loyalty of the South, but were backed by the lack of an alternative: neither full independence, nor Dutch or French domination were an attractive substitute to Spanish rule. Yet, before, during and after the military campaign large sections of the clergy, the nobility, the Provincial States and the population at various points expressed their dissatisfaction with the way the court led the country into war. The supposed loyalty of the provincial states during the general crisis that followed the loss of ’s’sHertogenbosch was not as general as some historians supposed: the call to summon the Southern StatesGeneral, to name but one example, does not fit in this traditional picture. This drastic move is generally accepted to have only taken place during the ‘grand finale’ of the political crisis in the Southern Netherlands, Southern Netherlands, after the surrender of Maastricht in the summer of 1632, when the Infanta actually followed the advice of the
extra contributions to the military treasure in return for their goal of choice, ’s -Hertogenbosch. The provinces played a more prominent role during the campaign than is often assumed. Decisions on strategy were taken by the stadholder, his military commanders and a small circle of so-called so-called ‘deputies in the army’, who, unlike their unlike their Spanish counterpart enjoyed full independence. The States-General, assisted by the Council of State, however, bore large responsibilities. First of all, the ‘Binnenhof’ in in The Hague was the junction where all information from abroad and the different war theatres came together, which was a vital aspect of warfare. Furthermore, the States-General arranged the continuous supply of money to the field armies, both before ’s-Hertogenbosch ’s-Hertogenbosch and in the Veluwe. This was often easier said than done, as the provinces were not an example of zeal and diligence when it came down to the financial side of warfare. Time and again they had to be urged to pay their dues, and even when they did – did – or more often, when they did not – the States-General were forced to turn to the rich province of Holland or the West-Indies Company to help them out. However, during the 1629 campaign, there were no disputes on the contributions as such: the quotes of the provinces were fixed in the so-called so- called ‘Staat van Oorlog’, which can be seen as a war budget or budget or an estimate of costs. The question was not, as in Brussels, where to find the large sums needed for the war effort, but how to get them into the treasury. This system provided the States-General with a much firmer budgetary base that, unlike the Spanish, provided the ability to improvise and quickly force the financial means needed. It proved to be more reliable and stable in the long run. As also in the Southern Netherlands, financial policy was symptomatic of the nature of decision making in the Dutch Republic. Unlike the South, where the court was strong enough to rule against opposition from below (as has been pointed out), central government in the Dutch Republic was weak. The States-General did not have sufficient means to force the provincial and local authorities into complying with its plans. The reason for this problem lay in the nature of the Dutch state, that was not based on segregation, but integration. Ideally, policy was decided upon at three levels: from the States-General, composed of members from the provincial States, which in turn was manned by deputies of the towns, and back. Unlike the court in Brussels, the central government in The Hague developed policy on a larger base: decision-making may have been slower than in the South, where the government excelled in relatively quick improvisation, but was based on a far greater consensus. In addition the crude representative system depended more on ‘institutions’ – the the States, the towns, and their representatives than on individuals, providing it with stability, whereas in the South individuals, not
Collection Noordbrabants Museum, 's-Hertogenbosch
Paulus van Hillegaert (1596-1640)
a form of military racketeering, the system had d eveloped into an institutionalized arrangement that more or less effectively limited military violence. Nevertheless intimidation and the threat of arson and looting were still its cornerstones, as was proven during the summer of 1629, when the Veluwe was punished for having failed (or refused) to pay its dues over the previous years. In political terms the relations between governments and the population were not surprisingly characterized by exclusion. The masses were not involved in decision-making in either the North or the South, and neither were most of the local authorities. Especially in the Southern Netherlands the rural councils and smaller towns lacked the means to complain effectively to the central government: in Flanders, for instance, the ‘four members’ represented in the States continually States continually ignored the grievances of the subordinate authorities, who had to pay time and again for military supplies and transport. Yet the relations between the government and the ‘common man’ cannot be limited to oppression, violence, and violence, and (possibly) rebellion. Governments felt the need to defend their policies towards their population and thereby create a common cause. Unlike the segregated, more authoritarian style of government in the South, the integrated structure of the state and the diverse population of the Republic forced the States-General States-General to answer for its policies. During the campaign the ‘common man’ gave man’ gave evidence of being committed to war effort, be it the Northern struggle for religious and political freedom, or the Southern war on heresy and rebellion. Religion as a binding factor was stronger than national or other ties, as was demonstrated by the Catholics in the North. Dutch historians have often described them as calculating subjects, balancing the lack of religious freedom against Spanish political oppression, and deciding in favor of the former. The events analyzed in this book do not subscribe to this point of view. To all contemporaries the King of Spain and Catholicism were as inseparable as were Calvinism and ‘Holland’. The reason Catholics did not rise against their Protestant overlords was not calculation, but the fact that their political and military power was non-existent, or insignificant at most. They depended solely on the Spanish army for their ‘liberation’. So when during the summer of 1629 the moment seemed to have arrived, this was a sign for Catholics to come out of the shadows, creating small disturbances in several towns across the North. In similar vein the Protestants in the South greeted the victories of Frederick Henry as a sign that the end of subjugation was near, also causing disorder in many towns in Flanders and Brabant. It was not only these oppressed minorities, but large parts of the general population too who showed an interest in what was going on. News, written and oral, was a much-
