CASE
DOCTRINE
RULE 62: INTERPLEADER It must be filed within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by G. R. No. 23851, March 26, 1976 either of the contending claimants. Otherwise,he may be barred by laches or undue delay. It is too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment judgment and neglected neglected the opportunity opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment judgment was entered. entered.
1. Wack Wack Country Club Inc. vs Won
2. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs Metro Container Corporation G. R. No. 127913, September 13, 2001
3. Lim vs Continental Development Corporation G. R. No. 41818, 1976
February 18,
4. Arreza vs Diaz G. R. No. 133113, 2001
August 30,
5. Sy-Quia vs Sheriff of Ilocos Sur and De Leon G. R. No. L-22807, 10, 1924
October
If a property was mortgaged and right has been consolidated consolidate d after failure to t o redeem, interpleader may no longer be filed by the lessee who pretends not to know to whom payment should be made, because the question in the unlawful detainer suit is limited to the question of physical or material possession of the premises. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. The court in a complaint for interpleader shall determine the rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate their respective claims. Such rights, obligations and claims could only be adjudicated if put forward by the aggrieved party in assertion of his rights. In respect to conflicting claims to property seized by the sheriff in the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage, the sheriff may bring an action of interpleader under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure in order to determine the respective rights of the claimants. Though in such cases it may ordinarily be better practice for the 1
sheriff to sell the property and hold the proceeds of the same subject to the outcome of the action of interpleader, his action in suspending the sale pending the determination of the action interpleader seems justified by the facts in the present case and the court will not interfere by mandamus.
6. Ocampo v. Tirona G. R. No. 147812, 2005
April 6,
7. Pagkalinawan vs Rodas G.R. No. L-1806 1948
February 25,
When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint. when it is not provided in a judgment that the defendants are liable to pay jointly and severally a certain sum of money, none of them may be compelled to satisfy in full said judgment.
8. Mesina vs Intermediate Appellate Court G. R. No. 70145, 13, 1986
November
9. Vda. De Camilo vs Arcamo Arcamo G. R. No. 15653, 29, 1961
September
10. Beltran vs People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation G. R. No. 25138, 1969
August 28,
RULE 63:DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES Almeda vs Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc. G. R. No. 150806, 2008
January 28,
As a rule, rule, the petition petition for for declaratory declaratory relief relief should should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer.
Velarde vs Social Justice Society A justiciable justiciable controversy controversy to an existing existing case case or G. R. No. 159357,
April 28, 2004
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. A petition filed with the trial 2
court should contain a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim.
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation vs CA G. R. No. 126911,
April 30, 2003
A petition petition for declarato declaratory ry relief does does not essentially entail an executory process. There is nothing in its nature, however, that prohibits a counterclaim from being set-up in the same action.
Department of Budget and Management vs Manila’s Finest
Retirees Association Association G. R. No. 169466,
May 9, 2007
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation vs CA G. R. No. 126911,
April 30, 2003
Araneta vs Gatmaitan G. R. No. 8895 and 9191, 1957
Jumamil vs Café G. R. No. 144570, 2005
April 30,
A taxpayer taxpayer need not be a party to the contract contract September 21, to challenge its validity. Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. The expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.
Santos vs Aquino G.R. Nos. 86181-82 January 13, 1992
Edades vs Edades
The petition for declaratory relief must be asked before a violation of the ordinance is committed. In this case, it was shown that petitioner did not pay the taxes already due. Another reason is that petitioner is not the real party in the case. Petitioner was only the manager of the theater, not the owner and as such he is not entitled to bring this action. The case (hereditary rights in the property of
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G.R. No. L-8964. July 31, 1956
his alleged father and incidentally the recognition of his status as an illegitimate son of Emigdio) does not fall under the authorized causes for an action for declaratory relief. It does not concern a deed, will, contract or other written instrument. It does not affect a statute or ordinance whose construction or validity is questioned.
Metropolitan Manila Development The requisites are that (a) there must be Authority vs Viron Transportation a justiciable controversy, (b) the Co., Inc controversy must be between persons whose G. R. No. 170656, 2007
August 15,
interests are adverse, (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy, and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination.
Republic of the Philippines vs Cipriano Orbecido III
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
G. R. No. 154380 2005
October 5,
Quisimbing vs Garcia G. R. No. 175527 2008
December 8,
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action has already accrued in favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more for the court to explain or clarify, short of a judgment or final 4
order.
CJH Development Corporation vs. A petition for declaratory relief cannot properly Bureau of Internal Revenue have a court decision as its subject matter. There G. R. No. 172457 2008
December 24,
Ollada vs. Central Bank of the Philippines G. R. No. 11357,
May 31, 1962
Lim vs. Republic G. R. No. 29535 1971
February 27,
Dy Poco vs. Commissioner of Immigration G. R. No. 22313, March 31, 1966
are other remedies available to a party who is not agreeable to a decision whether it be a question of law or fact. If it involves a decision of an appellate court, the party may file a motion for reconsideration or new trial in order that the defect may be corrected. In case of ambiguity of the decision, a party may file a motion for a clarificatory judgment. One of the requisites of a declaratory relief is that the issue must be ripe for judicial determination. This means that litigation is inevitable or there is no adequate relief available in any other form or proceeding. The rule is that an action for Declaratory Relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available through the means of other existing forms of action or proceeding. Declaratory relief in this jurisdiction is a special civil action which may lie only when 'any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by statute or ordinance,' demands construction thereof for a declaration of his rights thereunder. None of the above circumstances exists in the case under consideration. And this Court has already held that there is no proceeding established by law or the rules by which any person claiming to be a citizen may get a declaration in a court of justice to that effect or in regard to his citizenship. Where a declaratory judgment as to a disputed fact would be determinative of issues rather than a construction of definite stated rights, status, and other relations, commonly expressed in written instruments, the case is not one for declaratory judgment." And, here, the material issues are the citizenship of the mother and the 5
illegitimacy of the petitioner, and the rights and status of the latter which are sought to be declared are dependent upon those disputed issues.
Singson vs. Republic G. R. No. 21855 1968
January 30,
Government Service Insurance System Employees Assocoation vs. Alvendia G.R. No. L-15614 1960
May 30,
Lim vs. Republic G. R. No. 29535 1971
February 27,
Dela Llana vs. Commission on Elections
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power . . . At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such as naturalization, by judicial decree. But, there is no similar legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. DECLARATORY RELIEF; PETITION UNNECESSARY IN MOOT CASES. If declaratory relief is not necessary or not proper where there is already an action pending in another court involving the same issue, or where the plaintiff has another more effective relief, with more reason should it be improper or unnecessary when it seeks judicial declaration upon questions already determined in a case in which the petitioner itself is a party. It is now well settled . . . that there is no proceeding established by law, or the rules, for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual . . . and that citizenship is not a proper subject for declaratory judgment.. The matter of whether or not the holding of the December 17, 1977 referendum is unnecessary 6
G. R. No. 47245, 1977
December 9,
Tanda vs. Aldaya O. G. No. 11, 5175 15, 1956
September
Ollada vs. Central bank of the Philippines G. R. No. 11357,
May 31, 1962
Kawasaki Port Service Corporation vs. Amores G. R. No. 58340,
July 16, 1991
because the people, on several occasions, had already expressed their assent to the incumbent President's continuance in office and their approval of his programs of government, is a political and non-justiciable question, involving as it does the wisdom, no more and no less, of the decision to call for a referendum. DECLARATORY RELIEF; COURT DECISION NOT PROPER SUBJECT OF ACTIONS; REMEDY WHERE DECISION IS DOUBTFUL OR AMBIGUOUS. — A court decision cannot be the subject of declaratory relief for the simple reason that if a party is not agreeable to a decision either on questions of law or of fact, he may file with the trial court a motion for reconsideration or a new trial in order that the defect may be corrected (section 1, Rule 37). The same remedy may be pursued by a party with regard to a decision of the Court of Appeals or of the Supreme Court (section 1, Rule 54, section 1, Rule 55, in connection with section 1, Rule 53). A party may even seek relief from a judgment or order of an inferior court on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence if he avails of that remedy within the terms prescribed by section 1, Rule 38. In the present case, the fundamental reason why the decision cannot be the subject of declaratory relief is predicated upon the principle of res judicata which stamps the mark of finality in a case which has been fully and definitely litigated in court. An action for declaratory relief should be filed before there has been a breach of a contract, statute or right. The rule is that an action for Declaratory Relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available through the means of other existing forms of action or proceeding. xxx what is sought is a declaration not only that private respondent is a corporation for there is no dispute on that matter but also that it is separate and distinct from C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha 7
and therefore, not liable for the latter's indebtedness. xxx The prevailing rule is that "where a declaratory judgment judgment as to a disputed disputed fact would would be determinative of issues rather than a construction of definite stated rights, status and other relations, commonly expressed in written instrument, the case is not one for declaratory judgment." judgment." Thus, consider considering ing the nature nature of a proceeding for declaratory judgment, wherein relief may be sought only to declare rights and not to determine or try issues, there is more valid reason to adhere to the principle that a declaratory relief proceeding is unavailable where judgment judgment would have have to be made, made, only only after a judicial judicial investigation investigation of disputed disputed issues. issues. In fact, fact, private respondent itself perceives that petitioners may even seek to pierce the veil of corporate identity.
University of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals G. R. No. 97827, 1993
February 9,
With respect to the prayer of the complaint for "judgment declaring plaintiff Tasadays to be a distinct ethnic community within the territory defined under Presidential Proclamation No. 995," the lower court is cautioned that the same is akin to a prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship which may not be granted in a petition for declaratory relief. Indeed, it is not the province of the court to make pronouncements on matters beyond its ken and expertise. To be sure, in resolving the complaint for damages, the court may find congruence in what is justiciable and what falls within the field of the sciences. Still, it is best to keep in mind that its proper role and function is the determination of legal issues.
Tadeo vs. The Provincial Fiscal of The appellant not being one of the contracting Pangasinan parties to the deed of sale but took part only as G. R. No. 16474,
January 31, 1962 notary public before whom they acknowledge the execution thereof is not entitled to file an action for declaratory judgment. None of his rights or
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duties thereunder need be declared.
Chan vs. Galang G. R. No. 21732,
Declaratory relief is discretionary upon the court October 17, 1966 to entertain. It may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe instruments in any case where the declaration or construction is not necessary and proper at the time under all the circumstances (Section 5, Rule 64, formerly Section 6, Rule 66, Rules of Court). The case at bar is such one case, for the proper forum in which to first resolve the disputed issue of citizenship is the Board of Commissioners.
Chua U vs Hon. Manuel Lim G. R. No. 19639, 1965
February 26,
Courts are loath to interfere prematurely with administrative proceedings, and will not assume jurisdiction jurisdiction of declaratory declaratory judgment judgment proceedings proceedings until administrative remedies have been exhausted. A petition petition for declarato declaratory ry relief will will be denied denied when other parties who would be necessarily affected by the judgment are not represented in the proceedings.
Adlawan vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court G. R. No. 73022, 1989
February 9,
Tolentino vs. Board of Accountancy G.R. No. L-3062, September 28
In such special civil action the judgment does not essentially entail an executory process since generally, other than a declaration of such rights and duties, other affirmative reliefs, as these are understood in ordinary civil actions, are not sought by the proponent. However, the Court has held that although the action is for a declaratory judgment judgment but the allegations allegations in the complaints complaints are sufficient to make out a case for specific performance or recovery of property with claims for damages, and the defendants did not raise an issue in the trial court to challenge the remedy or form of the action availed of, the court can grant such affirmative relief as may be warranted by the evidence. Where plaintiff seeks declaratory relief not for his own personal benefit, or because his rights or prerogatives as an accountant or as an 9
individual, are adversely affected, but rather for the benefit of persons belonging to other professions or callings, who are not parties in this case; or where plaintiff does not claim to have suffered any prejudice or damage to him or to his rights or prerogatives as an accountant by the use of the disputed trade name by the defendants, who also are certified accountants, the case does not properly come under Rule 66. In order that an action for declaratory relief may be entertained, it must be predicated on the following requisite facts or conditions: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
Commissioner of Customs et. al vs Cloribel et. Al G. R. No. 21036,
June 30, 1977
Visayan Packing Corporation vs Reparations Commission G. R. No. 29673, 1987
November 12,
A third-party third-party complaint complaint is inconceiva inconceivable ble when when the main case is one for nothing more than a declaratory relief. In a third-party complaint, the defendant or third-party plaintiff is supposed to seek contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief from the third-party defendant is respect to the claim of the plaintiff against him. There is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the complaint. A special civil action is after all not essentially different from an ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a special subject matter which makes necessary some special regulation. But the identity between their fundamental nature is such that the same rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.
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Baguio Citizens Action Inc et. al vs The City Council and City Mayor of Baguio G. R. No. 27247,
April 20, 1983
The non-inclusion of the squatters mentioned in the Ordinance in question as party defendants in this case cannot defeat the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Baguio. There is nothing in Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which says that the non-joinder of persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration is a jurisdictional defect. Said section merely states that "all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration; and no declaration shall, except or otherwise provided in these rules, prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the action.'' This section contemplates a situation where there are other persons who would be affected by the declaration, but were not impleaded as necessary parties, in which case the declaration shall not prejudice them. If at all, the case may be dismissed not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but for the reason stated in Section 5 of the same Rule stating that "the Court may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe instruments in any case where a decision would not terminate the uncertainly or controversy which gave rise to the action, or any case where the declaration or construction is not necessary and proper at the time under all circumstances."
RULE 64: REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS OR RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE COMISSION ON AUDIT RULE 65 : CERTIORARI Victorino Francisco vs Winai Permskul G. R. No. 81006,
May 12, 1989
It is clear that where the decision of the appellate court actually reproduces the findings of fact or the conclusions of law of the court below, it is not a memorandum decision as envisioned in the above provision. The distinctive features of the 11
memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered by an appellate court, and second, it incorporates by reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the decision, order or ruling under review. At any rate, the reason for allowing the incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. The idea is to avoid having to repeat in the body of the latter decision the findings or conclusions of the lower court since they are being approved or adopted anyway.
New Frontier Sugar Corporation vs RTC G. R. No. 165001, 2007
January 31,
Jonhson Lee and Sonny Moreno vs CA G. R. No. 137914, 2003
December 4,
Certiorari is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. More importantly, since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy. A petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution, and a motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. The general rule is that, where a motion to quash is denied, the remedy is not certiorari but to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses involved in said motion, and if, after trial on the merits an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. And, even in the exceptional case where such denial may be the subject of a special civil action for certiorari, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed to give the trial court an
12
opportunity to correct its error. Finally, even if a motion for reconsideration were filed and denied, the remedy under Rule 65 would still be unavailable absent any showing of the grounds provided for in Section l thereof. The petition before the Court of Appeals, subject of this appeal, did not allege any of such grounds.
Microsoft Corporation vs Best Deal Computer Center et. al. G. R. No. 148029, 2002
September 24,
A special civil action for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is manifested. For an abuse to be grave the power must be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law. There is grave abuse of discretion when respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Even assuming that the orders were erroneous, such error would merely be deemed as an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. As long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal.
Manuel Camacho vs Coresis et. al. G. R. No. 134372, 2002
August 22,
From the records, we find no valid ground nor cogent reason to hold that the respondent Office had gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution dated June 3, 1997. Institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives and the methods on how best to attain them, free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. 22 It encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds: who may teach, what may
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be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." 23 The right of the school to confirm and validate the teaching method of Dr. Daleon is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught."
Robert Del Mar vs Court of Appeals G. R. No. 139008, 2002
March 18,
Leung Ben vs P. J. O’Brien et. al. G.R. No. 13602 April 6, 1918
Well-settled is the rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Even if for this reason alone, the petition should not be given due course. Where a Court of First Instance issues an attachment for which there is no statutory authority, it is acting irregularly and in excess of its jurisdiction in the sense necessary to justify the Supreme Court in entertaining an application for a writ of certiorari and quashing the attachment. In such case the remedy on the attachment bond or by appeal would not be sufficiently speedy to meet the exigencies of the case. Attachment is an exceedingly violent measure and its unauthorized issuance may result in the infliction of damage which could never be repaired by any pecuniary award at the final hearing.
Matiano Tengco vs Vicente Jocson et. al. G.R. No. 19427 1922
September 2,
CONSOLIDATED CASE: PCGG vs Silangan Investors and Managers et. al. and PCGG vs Polygon Investors and Managers et. al. G. R. Nos. 167055-56 and 170673, March 25, 2010
Where the jurisdiction which a court exercises is special, created by an act of legislature, its modes of proceedings and powers are regulated and defined by the law and it cannot, under any supposed analogy to ordinary proceedings, exercise any power beyond that which the act of the legislature has given. Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. It offers only a limited form of review. Its principal function is to keep an inferior tribunal within its jurisdiction. It can be invoked only for an error of jurisdiction, that is, one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial 14
body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Julie’s Franchise Corporation et.
In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the al vs Hon Chandler Ruiz et. al. court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving G. R. No. 180988 August 28, 2009 only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence such as errors of judgment. Errors of judgment of the trial court are to be resolved by the appellate court in the appeal by and of error or via a petition for review on certiorari in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. It is not a remedy to correct errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by an appeal. Error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Severino Vergara vs Ombudsman This Court has consistently adopted a policy of G. R. No. 174567
March 13, 2009
non-interference in the exercise of the Ombudsman's constitutionally mandated powers. The Ombudsman, which is "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service". However, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is grave abuse of discretion, in which case the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court may be exceptionally invoked pursuant to Section 1,
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Article VIII of the Constitution. We have enumerated instances where the courts may interfere with the Ombudsman's investigatory powers: (a)To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b)When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (c)When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; (d)When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (e)Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (f)When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g)Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h)Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (i)Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.
Concepcion Vda. De Daffon vs Court of Appeals G. R. No. 129017
August 20, 2002
Petitioner argues that the order which denied the Motion to Dismiss is an interlocutory order which is not appealable. Hence, it may be the subject of a special civil action for certiorari. However, for certiorari to lie, it must be convincingly proved that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, or an act too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law; or that the trial court exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility. In the case at bar, the trial court did not 16
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari.
Gabriel Duero vs Court of Appeals Indeed, ". . . the trial court was duty-bound to G. R. No. 131282, 2002
January, 4,
take judicial notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction and its failure to do so, makes its decision a 'lawless' thing." Since a decision of a court without jurisdiction is null and void, it could logically never become final and executory, hence appeal therefrom by writ of error would be out of the question. Resort by private respondent to a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was in order.
Eladio Dillena vs Court of Appeals The petition for certiorari which was belatedly G. R. No. 77660,
July 28, 1988
filed by petitioner before the Court of Appeals on February 20, 1986 should have been dismissed outright because the remedy of certiorari does not lie where appeal has been lost. Certiorari cannot take the place of an appeal.
Remedios Velasco Vda de Caldito Petitioner cannot avail of the remedy of certiorari vs Hon Rosalio Segundo et. al. as a substitute for appeal as the questioned order G. R. No. 58187, 1982
September 30,
MMDA V. JANCOM
of dismissal is appealable. The proper remedy should have been to appeal the same. No circumstance had been shown to explain why such procedure was not observed, nor to justify a deviation from the same as to make available a petition for certiorari in lieu of taking an appropriate appeal. As may be noted, the petition was filed more than one year after the issuance of the order of dismissal complained of. Even in situations wherein certiorari is allowed as a remedy in lieu of appeal, said period may not be considered as a reasonable time within which to avail of such remedy. Moreover, the imputed error to the challenged order is not jurisdictional but merely one of judgment which is not correctible by certiorari. The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of 17
ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION G. R. No. 147465, 2002
January 30,
the judgment on the merits is appeal. This is true even if the error, or one of the errors, ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision. The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes a resort to certiorari, because one of the requirements for availment of the latter remedy is precisely that "there should be no appeal" The few significant exceptions were: when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; or when the broader interests of justice so require, or when the writs issued are null . . . or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority."
RODRIGUEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 134278
August 7, 2002
Clearly, where a police officer is dismissed by the PNP Director General and the dismissal is affirmed by the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board, the proper remedy is to appeal the dismissal with the DILG Secretary. Neither certiorari nor mandamus can substitute for appeal where the latter is the proper remedy. The extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus will lie only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error of law in dismissing petitioner's special civil action for certiorari and mandamus.
CONEJOS V COURT OF APPEALS Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari should be G. R. No. 149473, 2002
August 9,
summarily dismissed for adopting the wrong mode of appeal. Petitioner resorted to this special civil action after failing to appeal within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period. This cannot be countenanced. The special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which petitioner already lost. Certiorari lies only where there is no appeal nor any plain,
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speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. There is no reason why the question being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether the appellate court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitions, could not have been raised on appeal. Concededly, there were occasions when this Court treated a petition for certiorari as one filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, the circumstances prevailing in the instant case do not justify a deviation from a general rule. Notably, the instant petition was filed way beyond the reglementary period allowed under Rule 45 without any justifiable reason therefor nor any reasonable explanation being proffered by petitioner.
FELIZARDO V COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 112050
June 15, 1994
When the Municipal Trial Court ruled that it could act on the complaint for ejectment filed by the private respondent even without prior barangay conciliation proceedings, it committed a mere error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. We have held in many cases that while the referral of a case to the Lupon Tagapayapa is a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in court, non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has already acquired over the subject matter and over the person of the defendant. Hence, the remedy available to the petitioner was to question the ruling of the court a quo in an ordinary appeal and not, as he mistakenly did, in a special civil action for certiorari.
ESCUDERO V DULAY G. R. No. 60578, 1988
February 23,
ACAIN V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Ordinarily, a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not be a substitute or cure for failure to file a timely petition for review on certiorari (appeal) under Rule 45 of the Rules. Where, however, the application of this rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the rule may be relaxed. Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the defendants had the 19
G. R. No. 72706,
October 27, 1987 right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case, and even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief.
SALUDES V. PAJARILLO G.R. No. L-1121
July 29, 1947
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK V. FLORENDO G. R. No. 62082, 1992
February 26,
Although an appeal from the decision of the municipal court was available, the same was not an adequate remedy, there being an order of execution issued by the municipal court, and certiorari therefore lies. The term excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board or officer has jurisdiction over a case but oversteps such jurisdiction while acting thereon. Even when appeal is available and is the proper remedy, this court has allowed a writ of certiorari when the orders of the lower court were issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction
JOSE V. ZULUETA G. R. No. 16598,
May 31, 1961
MARCELO V. DE GUZMAN G. R. No. 29077
June 29, 1982
It is true that in instances where the right to appeal still existed but would be inadequate to prevent the injury or wrong sought to be recovered; as for instance where execution had already been commenced, certiorari may be allowed, however, this pronouncement cannot be invoked in the instant case because not only is there no showing that appeal from the disputed orders would be inadequate and insufficient remedy, but also that, the right to such appeal, at the time the petition for certiorari was filed, has already been lost and no longer available. An appeal from the order of Judge de Guzman would neither be an adequate nor speedy remedy to relieve appellee of the injurious effects 20
of the warrant. The seizure of her personal property has resulted in total paralyzation of her business, and recourse in appeal would have unduly delayed recovery of the articles and documents which have been improperly seized. Where the remedy of appeal cannot afford an adequate and expeditious relief, certiorari can he allowed as a mode of redress to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party.
ST. PETER MEMORIAL PARK V. CAMPOS, JR. G. R. No. 38280
March 21, 1975
MARAHAY V. MELICOR G. R. No. 44980 1990
February 6,
A restraining order issued by the Supreme Court enjoining a judge from enforcing his decision is intended to retain the status quo insofar as said decision and other circumstances surrounding it are concerned. Any court action or order that would change any circumstance of the decision is necessarily included in the scope of the restraining order. Thus, where the enjoined decision had been appealed when the restraining order was issued, an order dismissing the appeal tended to change the status quo, since by reason of the dismissal, the enjoined decision became final, Said dismissal constitutes a grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. Nevertheless, in the broader interests of justice, this Court has given due course to the present petition in consideration of the fact that this is not the first time we have passed upon a petition for certiorari, although the proper remedy is appeal, where the equities warrant such extraordinary recourse. This is especially true where, as in the case, petitioner's affidavit of merits shows that she has a good cause of action, that her counsel's affidavit of merits avers justifiable reasons for his non-appearance at said hearing, and the trial court is faulted with gravely abusing its discretion to the extent of denying due process to therein plaintiff. Significantly, it was respondent judge himself who advised petitioner to avail of said remedy in his order dismissing petitioner's second motion for reconsideration, obviously because appeal would not be a speedy and adequate remedy under the
21
circumstances and considering that dismissals on technicalities are viewed with disapproval.
ASIAN TRADING CORPORATION Apt and proper is the observation by the V. COURT OF APPEALS respondent court that instead of filing a motion for G. R. No. 76276 1999
February 15,
MANGALIAG V PASTORAL G. R. No. 143951 2005
October 25,
reconsideration of or appealing from, subject judgment, the petitioners resorted to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is unavailable under the antecedent facts and circumstances. Although this Court, the RTCs and the Court of Appeals (CA) have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition.
SPOUSES ROMERO V. COURT OF Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, APPEALS refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a G. R. No. 142406,
May, 16, 2005
court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; 22
and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently.
HEIRS OF HINOG V MELICOR G. R. No. 140954
April 12, 2005
Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.
LAW FIRM OF ABRENICA, TUNGOL AND TIBAYAN V. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 143706,
April 5, 2002
An appellate court is imbued with sufficient discretion to review matters, not otherwise assigned as errors on appeal, in the following instances: (a) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter; (b) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise
23
or which the lower court ignored; (e) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; (f) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent.
FORTUNE GUARANTEE AND Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper INSURANCE CORP. V. COURT OF remedy, as in this case, his petition may be APPEALS dismissed outright. However, in the interest of G. R. No. 110701 2002
March 12,
substantial justice, the strict application of procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of this case on the merits. Thus, while the instant petition is one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the assigned errors are more properly addressed in a petition for review under Rule 45.
METRO TRANSIT ORGANIZATION The general rule is that a motion for V. COURT OF APPEALS reconsideration is indispensable before resort to G. R. No. 142133 2002
November 19,
the special civil action for certiorari to afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its error, if any. However, the following have been recognized as exceptions to the rule: (a) where the order is a patent of nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
24
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved."
Government of the United States of America v. Purganan G. R. No. 148571 2002
This Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari September 24, when there are special and important reasons therefor. In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Butuan Bay Word Export Corporation v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-45473
April 28, 1980
Indeed, before a petition for certiorari can be brought against an order of a lower court, all available remedies must be exhausted. Likewise, in a host of cases. We ruled that before filing a petition for certiorari in a higher court, the attention of the lower court should first be called to its supposed error and its correction should be sought. If this is not done, the petition for certiorari should be denied. The reason for this rule is that issues which Courts of First Instance are bound to decide should not summarily be taken from them and submitted to an appellate court without first giving such lower courts the opportunity to dispose of the same with due
25
deliberation.
Philippine Consumers Inc v National Telecommunications Commission G. R. No. 63318 1983
November 25,
Yau v Manila Banking Corp. G. R. No. 126731
July 11, 2002
CERTIORARI; REMEDY AVAILABLE DESPITE EXSISTENCE OF APPEAL IF DICTATED BY PUBLIC WELFARE AND ADVANCEMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY. Anent the question that petitioner should have appealed the decision of respondent NTC, instead of filing the instant petition, suffice it to say that certiorari is available despite existence of the remedy of appeal where public welfare and the advancement of public policy so dictate, or the orders complained of were issued in excess of or without jurisdiction. The petition before the appellate court could have been dismissed outright since, as a rule, the CA, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, will not take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, unless the lower court has been given the opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. This Court has settled that as a general rule, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non in order that certiorari shall lie. However, there are settled exceptions to this Rule, one of which is where the assailed order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction, which is evident in this case.
Aquino v National Labor Relations On the procedural issues raised, we hold that Commission where an interlocutory order was allegedly issued G. R. No. 98108 1993
September 3,
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such order may be questioned before this Court on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. To delay the review of the order until the appeal from the decision of the main case, would not afford the party adversely affected by the said order a speedy, plain and adequate remedy. Regarding the failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC, such failure may be excused where the order sought to be reviewed is a patent nullity. 26
Bache and Co. v Ruiz G. R. No. 32409 1971
February 27,
When the questions raised before this Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in and passed upon by the court below, the filing of a motion for reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in this Court is no longer a prerequisite. In the case at bar time is of the essence in view of the tax assessments sought to be enforced by respondent officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue against petitioner corporation, On account of which immediate and more direct action becomes necessary. Lastly, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the deprivation of petitioners' fundamental right to due process taints the proceeding against them in the court below not only with irregularity but also with nullity.
National Electrification In the eyes of the law, the two disputed Orders Administration v Court of Appeals were patent nullities, thus excepting the instant G. R. No. 32490 1983
December 29,
case from the general rule that before Certiorari or Mandamus may be availed of petitioner must first file a Motion for Reconsideration. Respondent Judge, in effect, deprived petitioner of its right to appeal and any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, hence, making petitioner's resort to the instant petition a virtual necessity. Public interest being involved, a Motion for Reconsideration need not be availed of. Petitioner averred that time was of the essence because respondents were in the process of executing the assailed judgment of the Trial Court with precipitate haste, the enforcement of which would have impaired petitioner corporation's operations and funds. Motion for Reconsideration is no longer a prerequisite where there is urgent necessity and any further delay would prejudice the interests of
27
the Government.
Vda. De Sayman v Court of Appeals G. R. No. 25596
April 28, 1993
It is true that as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration should precede recourse to certiorari in order to give the trial court an opportunity to correct the error that it may have committed. The said requirement is not absolute and may be dispensed with in instances where the filing of a motion for reconsideration would serve no useful purpose, such as when the motion for reconsideration would raise the same point stated in the motion. In the case at bar, the question of whether a writ of execution may issue under the circumstances obtaining is purely one of law, and the need for urgent relief therefrom is patent from the fact that the trial court had already issued a writ for the execution of the judgment complained of in the petition for relief.
Peroxide Philippines Corporation A motion for reconsideration was correctly v Court of Appeals dispensed with by respondent court since the G. R. No. 92813
July 31, 1991
Central Bank v Cloribel G. R. No. 26971
April 11, 1972
questions raised in the certiorari proceeding had beer duly raised and passed upon by the lower court. Also, under the circumstances therein a motion for reconsideration would serve no practical purpose since the trial judge had already had the opportunity to consider and pass upon the questions elevated on certiorari to respondent court. It is true that petitioner herein did not seek a reconsideration of the order complained of, and that, as a general rule, a petition for certiorari will not be entertained unless the respondent has had, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the error imputed to him. This rule is subject, however, to exceptions, among which are the following, namely: 1) where the issue raised is one purely of law; 2) where public interest is involved; and 3) in case of urgency. These circumstances are present in the case at bar. Moreover, Judge Cloribel has already had an 28
opportunity to consider and pass upon the very same questions raised in the petition herein, so that a motion for reconsideration of his contested order would have served no practical purpose. The rule requiring exhaustion of remedies does not call for an exercise in futility.
Laguna Metts Corporation v Court If the Court intended to retain the authority of the of Appeals proper courts to grant extensions under Section 4 G. R. No. 185220
July 27, 2009
of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such authority would have been preserved. The removal of the said paragraph under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari. The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.
Ouano vs. PGTT International Investment Corporation G. R. No. 134230
July 17, 2002
Relampagos v Cumba and Commission on Elections
Concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant a party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his choice. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. The hierarchy of courts determines the appropriate forum for such petitions. Thus, petitions for the issuance of such extraordinary writs against the first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the RTC, and those against the latter, with the CA. Although the Constitution grants the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction, it does not grant it any 29
G. R. No. 118861
April 27, 1995 power to exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, unlike in the case of this Court which is specifically conferred with such authority in Section 5(1) of Article VIII. It also pointed out that the doctrine laid down in Pimentel vs. COMELEC (101 SCRA 769 [1980]) — that neither the Constitution nor any law has conferred jurisdiction on the COMELEC to issue such writs — still finds application under the 1987 Constitution.
Monteban v Tanglao-Dacanay G. R. No. 136062
April 7, 2005
Uy v Sandiganbayan G. R. No. 11544
July 6, 2004
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari , which is extra ordinem — beyond the ambit of appeal. Stated elsewise, factual matters, now being raised by petitioner, cannot normally be inquired into by this Court in a certiorari proceeding. It cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them again, in order to ascertain if the trial and the appellate courts were correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other. special civil action for certiorari is limited to the determination of whether or not public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed decisions. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. We do not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in this case.
RULE 65: PROHIBITION 30
Pacificador v Commission on Elections G. R. No. 178259 2009
March 13,
Rivera v Espiritu G. R. No. 135547 2002
January 23,
Vera v Avelino G.R. No. L-543
August 31, 1946
Clearly, not only does prohibition not lie against the COMELEC First Division which has the mandate and power to hear and decide preproclamation controversies; the assailed Resolution has also become final and executory in view of the failure of petitioners to file a timely motion for reconsideration of said Resolution in accordance with the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and the Rules of Court. The assailed agreement is clearly not the act of a tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. It is not the act of public respondents Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu and Labor Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma as functionaries of the Task Force. Neither is there a judgment, order or resolution of either public respondents involved. Instead, what exists is a contract between a private firm and one of its labor unions, albeit entered into with the assistance of the Task Force. The first and second requisites for certiorari and prohibition are therefore not present in this case. Furthermore, there is available to petitioners a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While the petition is denominated as one for certiorari and prohibition, its object is actually the nullification of the PAL-PALEA agreement. As such, petitioners' proper remedy is an ordinary civil action for annulment of contract, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts. Neither certiorari nor prohibition is the remedy in the present case. Petitioners pray for a writ of prohibition. Under the law, prohibition refers only to proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, exercising functions judicial or ministerial. (Rule 67, section 2, Rules of Court.) As the respondents do not exercise such kind of functions, theirs being legislative, it is clear the dispute falls beyond the scope of such special remedy.
31
The Nacionalista Party v Bautista G.R. No. L-3452 1949
December 7,
Montes v Court of Appeals G. R. No. 143797
May 4, 2006
Gonzales v Narvasa G. R. No. 140835 2000
August 14,
Tan v Commission on Elections G. R. No. 73155,
July 11, 1986
The authorities and decision of courts are almost unanimous that prohibition will not lie to determine the title of a de facto judicial officer, since its only function is to prevent a usurpation of jurisdiction by a subordinate court. The act sought to be enjoined having taken place already, there is nothing more to restrain. Thus, the instant petition has been unmade as a mere subject matter of purely theoretical interest. Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli. Clearly, prohibition is an inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. It is well established that prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli. At this point, any ruling regarding the PCCR would simply be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which is definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial power. Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very excuse for perpetuation of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the respondents' urging that, as there has been fait accompli, then this Court should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents' submission will 32
create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.
RULE 65: MANDAMUS Sy Ha versus Emilio Galang G. R. No. L-18513 1963
April 27,
Mantrade/FMMC Division Employees and Workers Union versus Bacungan G. R. No. L-48437 1986
September 30,
It should be recalled that this is a petition for mandamus which will only lie to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary duty, for, as it was aptly held, mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. 2 Likewise, it was held that the determination of whether or not an applicant for a visa has a non-immigrant status, or whether his entry into this country would be contrary to public safety, is not a simple ministerial function, but one involving the exercise of discretion, which cannot be controlled by mandamus. Respondent corporation contends that mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act which the law does not clearly enjoin as a duty. True it is also that mandamus is not proper to enforce a contractual obligation, the remedy being an action for specific performance (Province of Pangasinan vs. Reparations Commission, November 29, 1977, 80 SCRA 376). In the case at bar, however, in view of the above-cited subsequent decisions of this Court clearly defining the legal duty to grant holiday pay to monthly salaried employees, mandamus is an appropriate equitable remedy 33
(Dionisio vs. Paterno, July 23, 1980, 98 SCRA 677; Gonzales vs. Government Service Insurance System, September 10, 1981, 107 SCRA 492).
University of the Philippines versus Judge Ruben Ayson G. R. No. 88386
August 17, 1989
Niceta Suanes versus The Chief Accountant of the Senate G. R. No. L-2460 1948
October 26,
Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which rightly pertain to their legislative functions and over which they have exclusive control. In the case at bar, there is no pure or exclusive legislative function involved. The instant action relates to the performance of respondents' ministerial duty to disburse to the Electoral Tribunal the funds that rightly belong to it. "The Courts will not interfere by mandamus proceedings with the legislative department of the government in the legitimate exercise of its powers, except to enforce mere ministerial acts required by law to be performed by some officer thereof."
Benjamin Aquino versus Herminio Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that can Mariano be resorted to only in cases of extreme necessity G. R. No. L-30485
May 31, 1984
One Heart Sporting Club, Inc. versus Court of Appeals G. R. No. L-53790 1981
October 23,
where the ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief where there is no other clear, adequate and speedy remedy. Before a writ of mandamus may be issued, it is obligatory upon the petitioner to exhaust all remedies in the ordinary course of law. He must show that the duty sought to be performed must be one which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office. The principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal one. In the present case, the specific question submitted 34
for resolution before the court a quo is whether or not P.D. 1535 intended to grant Dipolog Coliseum, an extension in the operation of its cockpit. The question being purely legal, there was no need for private respondent to exhaust administrative remedies and its action in seeking judicial redress is therefore justified.
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority versus Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay G. R. Nos. 171947-48, 18, 2008
December
While the implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. A discretionary duty is one that "allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform." Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.
RULE 66: QUO WARRANTO Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon versus Antonio Mendez G.R. No. 103702 1994
December 6,
The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise." When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or any other credit proceeding. It must be brought "in the name of the Republic of the Philippines" and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal "when directed by the President of the Philippines . . . ." Such officers may, under certain circumstances, bring such an action "at the request and upon the relation of another person" with the permission of the court. The Rules of Court also allows an individual to commence an action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when he claims to be "entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another." 35
Newman vs United States 238 US 537
April 13, 1915
The District Code makes a distinction between a "third person" and an "interested person" in maintaining quo warranto proceedings. While every citizen and every taxpayer is interested in the enforcement of law and in having only qualified officers execute the law, such general interest is not a private but a public interest, which is not sufficient to authorize the institution of quo warranto proceedings. The mere fact that one is a citizen and taxpayer of the District of Columbia does not make him an interested party who may maintain quo warranto proceedings against the incumbent of an office on the consent of the court, although the law officers of the government refuse such consent. An interested person within the meaning of the provisions of the District Code in regard to quo warranto proceedings is one who has an interest in the office itself peculiar to himself whether the office be elective or appointive.
Ferdinand Topacio versus Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan Gregory Santos Ong G. R. No. 179895 2008
In the instance in which the Petition for Quo Warranto is filed by an individual in his own name, he must be able to prove that he is entitled to the controverted public office, position, or December 18, franchise; otherwise, the holder of the same has a right to the undisturbed possession thereof. In actions for Quo Warranto to determine title to a public office, the complaint, to be sufficient in form, must show that the plaintiff is entitled to the office. In Garcia v. Perez, this Court ruled that the person instituting Quo Warranto proceedings on his own behalf, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, must aver and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute. Without such averment or evidence of such right, the action may be dismissed at any stage.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs National
A franchise is a property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited without due process of law. 36
Telecommunications and Cellcom, Inc G. R. No. 88404 1990
October 18,
MADRIGAL VS LECAROZ G. R. No. 46218 1990
October 23,
The determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to the State "upon complaint or otherwise" the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not a private injury. A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the State because a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of Government. The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect that a petition for quo warranto and mandamus affecting titles to public office must be filed within one (1) year from the date the petitioner is ousted from his position. We find this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment. There are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience that demand the adoption of a similar period for persons claiming rights to positions in the civil service. There must be stability in the service so that public business may (sic) be unduly retarded; delays in the statement of the right to positions in the service must be discouraged.
UNABIA VS CITY MAYOR G. R. No. 8759
May 25, 1956
In view of the period of one year within which actions for quo warranto may be instituted, any person claiming right to a position in the civil service should also be required to file his petition for reinstatement within the period of one year otherwise he is thereby considered as having abandoned his office.
37
CRISTOBAL VS. MELCHOR G. R. No. 43203
July 29, 1977
FORTUNO VS. PALMA G. R. No. 70203 1987
December 18,
CAESAR VS. GARRIDO G.R. No. 30705
March 25, 1929
LUISON VS. GARCIA G.R. No. L-10981 19581
April 25,
'The pendency of administrative remedies does not operate to suspend the period of one year within which a petition for quo warranto should be filed. While it may be desirable that administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do so, and as said remedies neither are pre-requisite to nor bar the institution of quo warranto proceedings, they should not be allowed to suspend the period of one year. Public interest requires that the right to a public office should be determined as speedily as practicable' In quo warranto proceedings instituted for the sole purpose of questioning the legality of the election of the directors of a corporation . . . preliminary injunction does not lie to prevent said directors and officers from discharging their offices and to restore the former directors, and the issuance thereof constitute an excess of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion. A proceeding in the nature of quo warranto, to try the question of the eligibility of a candidate for office, can only be instituted against one who has been proclaimed as elected to the disputed office. A candidate who files a protest against one who has been proclaimed as having received the highest number of votes basing his protest merely on the ground of his ineligibility to hold office, cannot disguise his action so as to make his protest a justification to be seated in office. In other words, he cannot convert an action for quo warranto into an election protest. This is because these two cases are fundamentally different in nature and in purpose. In quo warranto, "there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, and the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate," while in a protest, "the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots"
38
GAERLAN VS. CATUBIG G. R. No. 23964
June 1, 1966
TEODORO M. CASTRO vs AMADO DEL CASTILLO as Commissioner of Civil Service G. R. No. L-17915 1967
January 31,
PEDRO T. ACOSTA vs DAVID FLOR G.R. No. 2122 1905
September 13,
DR. NENITA PALMA-FERNANDEZ vs DR. ADRIANO DE LA PAZ, DR. SOSEPATRO AGUILA, and THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH
Distinction should be drawn between quo warranto referring to an office filed by election and quo warranto involving an office held by appointment. In the first case, what is to be determined is the eligibility of the candidate elect, while in the second case, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filed by election, when the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate occupying the second place had been elected, even if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his certificate of candidacy. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filed by appointment, the court determines who had been legally appointed and can and ought to declare who is entitled to occupy the office. The action of quo warranto involving right to an office, must be instituted within the period of one year. This provision is an expression of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment. A private person can not maintain an action for the removal of a public officer unless he alleges that he is entitled to the same office. When such an allegation is made but not proven, the court is justified in dismissing the case without inquiring into the right of the defendant to retain the office. An action for quo warranto must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues (Sec. 16, Rule 66, Rules of Court), and the pendency of administrative remedies does not operate to suspend the running of the one-year period.
G.R. No. 78946 April 15, 1988 39
JESUS GALANO, ET. AL. vs NEMESIO ROXAS, Mayor of San Mateo, Rizal G.R. No. L-31241 September 12, 1975
A petition for quo warranto and mandamus affecting titles of office must be filed within one (1) year from the date the petitioner is ousted from his position. This period is not interrupted by the prosecution of any administrative remedy. Accordingly, after said period had lapsed the remedy of the aggrieved party, if any lies exclusively with administrative authorities. While it may be desirable that administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do so; and as said remedies neither are prerequisite to nor bar the institution of quo warranto proceedings, it follows that he who claims the right to hold a public office allegedly usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in the courts, should file the proper judicial action within the reglementary period. Public interest requires that the right to public office should be determined as speedily as practicable.
RULE 67: EXPROPRIATION Charles River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge 11 Pet. 420, 641, U.S. 1837
The Court held that the state had not entered a contract that prohibited the construction of another bridge on the river at a later date. The legislature neither gave exclusive control over the waters of the river nor invaded corporate privilege by interfering with the company's profit-making ability. In balancing the rights of private property against the need for economic development, the Court found that the community interest in creating new channels of travel and trade had priority and it was enhanced by opening a second bridge. The Court acknowledged that only Congress had the power to regulate interstate commerce, but the states possessed a ―police power,‖ entitling them to enact regulatory laws for the public benefit.
BARDILLON vs BARANGAY MASILI OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA G.R. No. 146886
An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with April 30, 2003 the exercise by the government of its authority 40
and right to take property for public use. As such, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the regional trial courts.
DE LA PAZ MASIKIP vs THE CITY OF PASIG G.R. No. 136349 2006
January 23,
THE CITY OF MANILA vs CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL. G. R. No. L-14355 1919
October 31,
J. M. TUAZON & CO., INC. vs THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, G.R. No. L-21064 June 30, 1970
MUNICIPALITY OF BIÑAN vs HON. JOSE MAR GARCIA
The motion to dismiss contemplated in the above Rule clearly constitutes the responsive pleading which takes the place of an answer to the complaint for expropriation. Such motion is the pleading that puts in issue the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the defendant's property for the use specified in the complaint. All that the law requires is that a copy of the said motion be served on plaintiff's attorney of record. It is the court that at its convenience will set the case for trial after the filing of the said pleading. The right of expropriation is not inherent power in a municipal corporation and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. A municipal corporation in this jurisdiction cannot expropriate public property. The land to be expropriated must be private, and the purpose of the expropriation must be public. If the court. upon trial, finds that neither of said condition exists, or that either one of them fails, the right to expropriate does not exist. If the property is taken in the ostensible behalf of a public improvement which it can never by any possibility serve, it is being taken for a use not public, and the owner's constitutional rights call for protection by the courts. The conclusion that inevitably was called for is worded thus: "It is, therefore, imperative that we declare, as we now do, that Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3453 which prohibits the filing of an ejectment proceeding, or the continuance of one that has already been commenced, even in the absence of expropriation proceedings offends our Constitution and, hence, is unenforceable." There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with the 41
G.R. No. 69260 December 22, 1989
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard." The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY The outcome of the first phase of expropriation vs. HEIRS OF ISIDRO proceedings, which is either an order of GUIVELONDO expropriation or an order of dismissal, is final G.R. No. 154411
June 19, 2003
since it finally disposes of the case. On the other hand, the second phase ends with an order fixing the amount of just compensation. Both orders, being final, are appealable. An order of 42
condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.
CITY OF ILOILO vs HON. LOLITA CONTRERAS-BESANA, G.R. No. 168967 2010
February 12,
APO FRUITS CORPORATION vs THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 164195 2007
February 6,
When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Even under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Procedure, under which the complaint for expropriation was filed, just compensation is to be determined "as of the date of the filing of the complaint." Here, there is no reason to depart from the general rule that the point of reference for assessing the value of the Subject Property is the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation. But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.
THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY vs. ROMANA VELASQUEZ, MELECIO ALLAREY and
The Supreme Court may substitute its own estimate of value as gathered from the record submitted to it, in cases where the only error of the commissioners is that they have applied DEOGRACIAS MALIGALIG illegal principles to the evidence submitted to G.R. No. L-10278 November 23, them; or that they have disregarded a clear 1915 preponderance of the evidence; or that they have used an improper rule of assessment in arriving at the amount of the award; provided always that 43
the evidence be clear and convincing and the amount allowed by the commissioners is grossly inadequate or excessive.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, vs COURT OF APPEALS and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION G.R. No. 160890 2004
November 10,
In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the just compensation which the owner of condemned property is entitled to is the market value. Market value is "that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor."
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP. G.R. No. 172410
Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the implementing agency of the government pays just compensation twice: (1) immediately upon April 14, 2008 the filing of the complaint, where the amount to be paid is 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR (initial payment); and (2) when the decision of the court in the determination of just compensation becomes final and executory, where the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation as determined by the court (final payment).
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON G.R. No. 166429 2005
December 19,
The most crucial difference between Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974 concerns the particular essential step the Government has to undertake to be entitled to a writ of possession. . . . Rule 67 merely requires the Government to deposit with an authorized government depositary the assessed value of the property for expropriation for it to be entitled to a writ of possession. On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 8974 requires that the Government make a direct payment to the property owner before the writ may issue. Moreover, such payment is based on the zonal valuation of the BIR in the case of land, the value of the improvements or structures under the replacement cost method, or if no such valuation is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the proffered value of the property to be seized. 44
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs HON. ENRIQUE T. JOCSON G.R. Nos. 94193-99 1992
February 25,
BIGLANG-AWA vs HON. JUDGE BACALLA G.R. Nos. 139927 and 139936. November 22, 2000
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL.
Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the petitioner has the right to take or enter upon the possession of the property involved upon compliance with P.D. No. 42 which requires the petitioner, after due notice to the defendant, to deposit with the Philippine National Bank in its main office or any of its branches or agencies, "an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation." This assessed value is that indicated in the tax declaration. The court has the discretion to determine the provisional value which must be deposited by the plaintiff to enable it "to take or enter upon the possession of the property." Notice to the parties is not indispensable. The only requisites for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings are: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the making of a deposit equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with the requirements the issuance of the writ of possession becomes "ministerial." The requisites of taking in eminent domain, to wit: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property;
G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974 (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period. (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. 45
Diudipio Earth Savers Multipurpose Association, Inc. et al vs DENR Sec. Elisea Gozun G.R. No. 157882
March 30, 2006
Manila Electric Company vs Pineda G. R. No. 58791 1992
February 13,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA G. R. No. 27006
June 30, 1979
Manila Water District vs Sixto De los Angeles 55 Phil 776
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement right of way. Prior to the determination of just compensation, the property owners may rightfully demand to withdraw from the deposit made by the condemnor in eminent domain proceedings. Upon an award of a smaller amount by the court, the property owners are subject to a judgment for the excess or upon the award of a larger sum, they are entitled to a judgment for the amount awarded by the court. Thus, when the respondent court granted in the Orders dated December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 the motions of private respondents for withdrawal of certain sums from the deposit of petitioner, without prejudice to the just compensation that may be proved in the final adjudication of the case, it committed no error. The existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of the person or persons claiming ownership of the properties to be expropriated would not preclude the commencement of the action nor prevent the court from assuming jurisdiction thereof. The Rules merely require, in such eventuality, that the entity exercising the right of eminent domain should state in the complaint that the true ownership of the property cannot be ascertained or specified with accuracy. It appearing from the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, filed during the pendency of this appeal, that the expropriation of the land is no longer a public 46
necessity, the proceedings should be dismissed, and the cause remanded to the lower court for the determination of damages suffered by the defendants for the use and occupation of the land by the plaintiff.
Republic v. Baylosis 96 Phil. 461
Since it is obvious that the preliminary deposit serves the double purpose of a prepayment upon the value of the property, if finally expropriated, and as an indemnity against damages in the eventuality that the proceedings should fail of consummation, it would be premature to order its withdrawal before the damages resulting from the owners' dispossession of the property shall have been determined and adjudicated, because this would unjustly deprive them of this legal safeguard for the payment of their damages in case they are finally held to have the right to collect such damages in the same proceedings. Inasmuch as the only issue involved in the decision denying plaintiff's right to expropriate the land of defendants, is the propriety or impropriety of said expropriation, the latter's right to damages not having been litigated therein, said decision cannot be res judicata as to the matter of damages, with the result that said defendants may still prove and recover their damages in this action.
RULE 68: FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE Soriano vs Enriquez G.R. No. 34147 1935
September 24,
De Villa vs Fabricante G.R. No. L-13063
April 30, 1959
In an action to foreclose a mortgage under the Code of Civil Procedure, all persons liable to pay the mortgage debt, including any deficiency, are necessary parties to the action. all of them have an interest in the proceedings. In a foreclosure of mortgage if the encumbered property is sold to another person, the mortgage debtor, as well as the person to whom it is sold, must both be made defendants in the suit.
47
DE LA RIVA v REYNOSO GR L-41701
August 9, 1935
Section 255 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that only the second mortgagee or any other person claiming a right or interest subordinate to the mortgage sought to be foreclosed be included in the complaint to foreclose a real estate mortgage, but it will be noted that there is no provision in said Code prohibiting the joinder of a first mortgagee in a complaint filed for the same purpose by the second mortgagee. And there is less reason for the prohibition where, as in the present case, the joinder of the first mortgagee was made with the latter's consent and conformity. We see no good reason to hold that in a suit to foreclose a real estate mortgage, the second mortgagee cannot join the first mortgagee as defendant, with the latter's consent and when the principal obligation or the terms of the mortgage had become due and payable.
Top Rate International Services vs Equity of redemption is the right of the mortgagor Intermediate Appellate Court to redeem the mortgaged property after his G.R. No. L-67496
July 7, 1986
default in the performance of the conditions of the mortgage but before the sale of the property or the confirmation of the sale, whereas the right of redemption means the right of the mortgagor to repurchase the property even after confirmation of the sale, in cases of foreclosure by banks, within one year from the registration of the sale.
HUERTA ALBA RESORT INC. vs COURT OF APPEALS
"The equity of redemption is, to be sure, different from and should not be confused with the right of redemption. The right of redemption in relation to a mortgage — understood in the sense of a prerogative to re-acquire mortgaged property after registration of the foreclosure sale — exists only in the case of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. No such right is recognized in a judicial foreclosed of the mortgage. No such right is recognized in a judicial foreclosed except only where the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a bank or banking institution.
G.R. No. 128567 2000
September 1,
LIMPIN vs Intermediate Appellate
The effect of the failure to implead a subordinate 48
Court G.R. No. 70987
lien-holder or subsequent purchaser or both is to January 30, 1987 render the foreclosure ineffective as against them, with the result that there remains in their favor the "unforeclosed equity of redemption." But the foreclosure is valid as between the parties to the suit.
Juan De Castro, et al versus Intermediate Appellate Court G.R. No. 73859 1988
September 26,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue versus United Coconut Planters Bank G.R. No. 179063 2009
October 23,
The matter of redemption is wholly statutory. Only such persons can redeem from an execution sale as are authorized to do so by statute. In determining whether a person is included within the terms of a redemption statute, the principle is stated to be that, if one is in privity in title with the mortgagor, and he has such an interest that he would be a loser by the foreclosure, he may redeem. Redemption is proper where made by debtors, grantee, or assignee for the benefit of creditors, or assignee or trustee in insolvency proceedings. But the Supreme Court had occasion under its resolution in Administrative Matter 99-10-05-0 to rule that the certificate of sale shall issue only upon approval of the executive judge who must, in the interest of fairness, first determine that the requirements for extrajudicial foreclosures have been strictly followed. For instance, in United Coconut Planters Bank v. Yap, this Court sustained a judge's resolution requiring payment of notarial commission as a condition for the issuance of the certificate of sale to the highest bidder.
Leonio Barrameda versus Carmen The court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of Gontang possession in favor of the purchaser at public G.R. No. L-24110 1967
February 18, auction of the property mortgaged without the necessity of an independent action when the mortgagor continues in the possession thereof after the confirmation of the sale by final decree.
Ramos vs. Manalac G.R. No. L-2610
June 16, 1951
The issuance of a writ of possession in a foreclosure proceeding is not an execution of judgment within the purview of section 6, Rule 49
39, of the Rules of Court, but is merely a ministerial and complementary duty of the court to put an end to the litigation which the court can undertake even after the lapse of five years, provided the statute of limitations and the rights of third person have not intervened in the meantime. The general rule is that after a sale has been made under a decree in a foreclosure suit, the court has the power to give possession to the purchaser, and the latter will not be driven to an action at law to obtain possession. The power of the court to issue a process and place the purchaser in possession, is said to rest upon the ground that it has power to enforce its own decree and thus avoid circuitous actions and vexatious litigation.
The Government of the Philippine A court authorizing the mortgagee in a decree of Islands vs Margarita Torralba Vda. foreclosure of mortgage to recover from the De Santos mortgagor the deficiency of the mortgage credit G.R. No. L-41573 1935
August 3,
El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs Palanca G.R. No. L-11390 1918
March 26,
Philippine Trust Co. v. Tan Siua G.R. No. L-29736 1929
February 28,
before the sale and before it is known whether or not a deficiency exists, exceeds its jurisdiction, and the authority so given is null and void. Where the defendant in a mortgage foreclosure lives out of the Islands and refuses to appear otherwise submit himself to the authority of the court, the jurisdiction of the latter is limited to the mortgaged property, with respect to which the jurisdiction of the court is based upon the fact that the property is located within the district and that the court, under the provisions of law applicable in such cases, is vested with the power to subject the property to the obligation created by the mortgage. In such case personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant is nonessential and in fact cannot be acquired. One who mortgages his property to secure the debt of another without expressly assuming personal liability for such debt cannot be compelled to pay the deficiency remaining due 50
after the mortgage is foreclosed.
Reyes vs Rosenstock G.R. No. L-23718 1925
August 28,
Bachrach Motors Company vs Icarangal and Oriental Commercial 68 Phil. 287
Alpha Insurance and Surety Co. Inc. vs Reyes G. R. No. 26274
July 31, 1981
Bank of the Philippine Islands vs Green G.R. No. L-24127 1925
November 23,
Where during his lifetime E executed a mortgage on real property to R upon which R brought a suit to foreclose and obtained a decree against E for the amount of the debt and the foreclosure of the mortgage, after which E died, and an executor of his estate was appointed, and the property was then sold to satisfy the decree, leaving a deficiency judgment, under the provisions of the second clause of section 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure, R may then prove his deficiency judgment before the committee on claims against the estate of E. Most of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are taken from that of California, and In that jurisdiction the rule has always been, and still is, that a party who sues and obtains a personal judgment against a defendant upon a note, waives thereby his right to foreclose the mortgage securing it. Even if the Development Bank of the Philippines were just an ordinary first mortgagee without any preferential liens under Republic Act No. 85 or Commonwealth Act 459, the statutes mentioned in the Associated Insurance case relied upon by the trial court, it would he unquestionable that nothing may be done to favor the plaintiffappellant, a mere second mortgagee, until after the obligations of the debtors-appellees with the first mortgagee have been fully satisfied and settled. In law, strictly speaking, what was mortgaged by the debtors-appellees to the second mortgagee was no more than their equity of redemption. Inasmuch as the opposition to the confirmation of the sale made by the sheriff pursuant to the execution only alleged as a ground that the price for which the mortgaged property was sold was absolutely inadequate and. unreasonable, and 51
whereas it has heretofore been held by this court that a smaller price, for which the same property was sold at the first auction, notwithstanding that it was inadequate, was not sufficient by itself alone to annul the order confirming the sale (which was annulled for a different reason); therefore, the fact that the opponent was not given an opportunity to present evidence in support of the allegations of his opposition does not constitute a prejudicial error which would nullify the order confirming the sale made by the sheriff.
Tiglao vs Botones G.R. No. L-3619 1951
October 29,
Notice and hearing of a notice for confirmation of a sheriff's sale is essential to the validity of the order of confirmation. An order of confirmation, void for lack of notice and hearing, may be set aside at any time. Moratorium cannot be invoked against a motion for confirmation of sheriff's sale and corresponding motion for writ of possession filed pursuant to a final foreclosure judgment.
Ocampo vs Domalanta et. al. G. R. No. 21011 1967
August 30,
An order of confirmation of sale of real estate in judicial foreclosure proceedings cuts off all interests of the mortgagor in the real estate sold, vests them in the purchaser, and retroacts to the date of the sale. Where a suit merely challenges the legality of the sheriffs foreclosure sale made in an anterior proceeding for foreclosure of mortgage between the same parties, such suit is barred by conclusiveness of judgment, since the issue raised should be "deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto"
Ponce De Leon vs Rehabilitation Finance Corporation G. R. No. 24571
December 18,
We have already declared that" . . . (only foreclosure of mortgages to banking institutions (including the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation) 52
1970
and those made extrajudicially are subject to legal redemption, by express provision of statute, ..." The terms 'banking institution' and 'bank,' as used in this Act, are synonymous and interchangeable and specifically include banks, banking institutions, commercial banks, savings banks, mortgage banks, trust companies, building and loan associations, branches and agencies in the Philippines of foreign banks, hereinafter called Philippine branches, and all other corporations, companies, partnerships, and associations performing banking functions in the Philippines.
Consolidated Bank vs Intermediate Appellate Couet G. R. No. 73976
May 29, 1987
Barican et.al vs. Intermediate Appellate Court G. R. No. 79906
June 20, 1988
Petitioner has acquired by operation of law the right of redemption over the foreclosed properties pursuant to Sec. 6 of Act No. 3135, to wit: "In all such cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made . . . any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage . . . may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of sale. It has been held that "an attaching creditor may succeed to the incidental rights to which the debtor was entitled by reason of his ownership of the property, as for example, a right to redeem from a prior mortgage" The well-settled rule is that the purchaser in a foreclosure sale of a mortgaged property is entitled to a writ of possession and that upon an ex-parte petition of the purchaser, it is ministerial upon the court to issue such writ of possession in favor of the purchaser. However, the rule is not an unqualified one. There is no law in this jurisdiction whereby the purchaser at a sheriff's sale of real property is obliged to bring a separate and independent suit for possession after the one-year period for redemption has expired and after he has obtained the sheriff's final certificate of sale.
53
There is neither legal ground nor reason of public policy precluding the court from ordering the sheriff in this case to yield possession of the property purchased at public auction where it appears that the judgment debtor is the one in possession thereof and no rights of third persons are involved.
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage bank vs Pardo et. al. G. R. No. 55354
June 30, 1987
Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, the purchaser at the auction sale, in this instance, the petitioner/mortgagee, is entitled to a writ of possession pending the lapse of the redemption period upon a simple motion and upon the posting of a bond. It has been held that in such a case, "no discretion is left to the court." Furthermore, " [s]uch petition shall be . . . in the form of an ex parte motion . . ." This was the recourse in fact taken by the petitioner. There is accordingly no necessity for the petitioner to file an ejectment case. The remedy of the mortgagors-respondents is to have "the sale . set aside and the writ of possession cancelled," in accordance with Section 8 of the Act.
RULE 69: PARTITION Ciriaco Fule vs. Anastacio Fule G. R. No. L-29008 1929
February 8,
Eulalia Russel, et al. vs. Hon. Augustine A. Vestil G. R. 119347
March 17, 1991
PARTITION; COLLATIONABLE ADVANCEMENTS; RIGHT TO PARTITION AS AFFECTED BY VALUE OF ADVANCEMENTS. An action for partition cannot be maintained by a coheir who is in possession of portions of the common inheritance which are of a value in excess of the value of the share that would come to him upon a judicial division of the property. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims 54
asserted therein.
Maglucot-Aw et. al. vs. Maglucot et. al. G. R. No. 132518 2000
March 28,
Miranda vs Court of Appeals G. R. No. 33007
June 18, 1976
An action of partition is comprised of two phases: first, an order for partition which determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and whether partition is proper; and, second, a decision confirming the sketch or subdivision submitted by the parties or the commissioners appointed by the court, as the case may be. The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. . . . . The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the court after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereof, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question." Such an order is, to be sure, final and appealable. The order recognizing the right of the plaintiff to a partition is not the judgment, for under Section 7 of Rule 71, 2 it is only after hearing (the report of the commissioners) that the court is supposed to render a final judgment.
55
LIM DE MESA vs Court of Appeals In the decision ordering partition, the execution of G.R. No. 109387
April 25, 1994
Pancho, et al. v. Villanueva, et al. G.R. No. L-8604
July 25, 1956
that part of the judgment which will not necessitate any further proceedings may be enforced. Further proceedings, such as the appointment of commissioners to carry out the partition and the rendition and approval of the accounting, may be had without prejudice to the execution of that part of the judgment which needs no further proceedings. Thus, it has been held that execution was entirely proper to enforce the defendant's obligation to render an accounting and to exact payment of the money value of the plaintiffs' shares in the personal property and attorney's fees due defendants, as well as the costs of the suit and damages. On action for partition shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies. It appearing that petitioners' predecessors-ininterest had never been in possession of the property in question, they could not have acquired the same by acquisitive prescription and the action of respondents, as co-owners of said property, to demand its partition could not have prescribed.
MANUEL T. DE GUIA vs COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 120864 2003
October 8,
DELIMA, ET. AL. vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-46296 24, 1991
September
An action to demand partition is imprescriptible and not subject to laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership under certain conditions. From the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership. In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or applied when one of the coowners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription. 56
Emmanuel Cordova vs Miguel Cordova 102 Phil 1182
ARRIOLA vs ARRIOLA G.R. No. 177703 2008
January 28,
The rule regarding prescription among co-heirs is that generally prescription cannot be pleaded between them except when one heir openly and adversely occupies the property for a period sufficiently long to entitle him to ownership under the law. As long as the other heirs acknowledge their co-ownership or do not set up any adverse title to the property, prescription is unavailable. Tested under the above principle, the pleadings in this case do not allege enough facts indicative of adverse possession on the part of defendants, which may serve as basis for the claim of prescription. In any event, the ground on which prescription is based does not appear to be indubitable, and under the rules the court may do well to defer the action on the motion to dismiss until after trial on the merits. More importantly, Article 159 (Family Code) imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the family home regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to the coownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home.
Valmonte V Court of Appeals G.R. No. 108538
Private respondent's action, which is for partition January 22, 1996 and accounting under Rule 69, is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendant's interest in a specific property and not to render a judgment against him.
FRANCISCO DEL VAL ET AL. vs. ANDRES DEL VAL G.R. No. 9374
Where a life-insurance policy is made payable to one of the heirs of the person whose life is February 16, 1915 insured, the proceeds of the policy on the death 57
of the insured belong exclusively to the beneficiary and not to the estate of the person whose life was insured; and such proceeds are his individual property and not the property of the heirs of the person whose life was insured.
Lavarro v Labitoria 54 Phil 788
Trees and plants annexed to the land are parts thereof, and unless rights or interests in such trees or plants are claimed in the registration proceedings by others, they become the property of the persons to whom the land is adjudicated. By timely proceedings in equity matters of that character, if fraudulent, may sometimes be corrected. That all improvements were determined and adjudicated by the court in the former case and that the matter was res judicata.
Noceda v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 119730. September 2, 1999
There is no co-ownership where portion owned is correctly determined and identifiable, though not technically described, or that said portions are still embraced in one and the same certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable or identifiable, or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners. A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him.
Crucillo v. Intermediate Appellate As the existence of the oral partition of the estate Court of Balbino A. Crucillo by his heirs has been well G.R. No. 65416
October 26, 1999 established, it stands to reason and conclude that Rafael Crucillo could validly convey his share therein to the spouses Felix Noceda and Benita Gatpandan-Noceda who then became the true and lawful owners thereof, including the ancestral house existing thereon. Petitioners have, therefore, no right to redeem the same property from the spouses Noceda because when the sale was made, they were no longer co-owners thereof, the same having become the sole property of respondent Rafael Crucillo. 58
De Borja v. Jugo G.R. No. L-45297
July 16, 1937
The respondent judge did not abuse his discretion in not permitting the petitioner to intervene in the case for partition of property mentioned in the decision. In this jurisdiction the right to intervene in an action is not absolute. It depends upon the sound discretion of the court and when there is no evidence that the person who desires to intervene as such has an interest in the subject matter of the litigation, his right thereto should not be recognized
Sepulveda v. Pelaez
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an G.R. No. 152195. January 31, 2005 interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties. The mere fact that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. has repudiated the coownership between him and the respondent does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for partition, for, in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject property; and, second, the conveyance of his lawful shares.
Heirs of Bartolome Infante v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 77202
June 22, 1988
The trial court had jurisdiction to decree a partition of real estate in an action for reconveyance, on the ground that the petitioners therein were already barred by estoppel from impugning said court's jurisdiction.
Heirs of Jardin v Heirs of Hallasgo While the action for partition of the thing owned in G.R. No. L-55225 September 30, 1982
common does not prescribe, the co-ownership does not last forever since it may be repudiated by a co-owner. In such a case, the action for partition does not lie. What may be brought by the aggrieved co-owner is an accion reinvindicatoria or action for recovery of title and possession. That action may be barred by prescription. "If the co-heir or co-owner, having possession of the hereditary or community property, holds the same in his own name, that is, under the claim of exclusive ownership, he 59
may acquire the property by prescription if his possession meets all the other requirements of the law, and after the expiration of the prescriptive period, his co-heir or co-owner may lose their right to demand partition, and their action may then be held to have prescribed"
RULE 70: FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER VICTORIANO ENCARNACION vs NIEVES AMIGO G.R. No. 169793 2006
In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real property are:
September 15, 1.Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court; 2.Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession, which should be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and 3.Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion, which is an action for the recovery of ownership which must be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court.
GOLDEN GATE REALTY CORP. VS INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. NO. 74289
JULY 31 1987
When the private respondents defaulted in the payment of rents in the amount of P18,000.00, they lost their rights to remain in the premises. Hence, when the petitioner demanded payment of the P18,000.00 due and unpaid rentals or a case for ejectment would be filed against them, the owner was giving strong notice that "you either pay your unpaid rentals or I will file a court case to have you thrown out of my property." The word "vacate" is not a talismanic word that must be employed in all notices. The alternatives in this case are clear cut. The tenants must pay rentals which were fixed and which became 60
payable in the past, failing which they must move out.
La Campana Food Products, Inc versus Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-88246
June 4, 1993
SALANDANAN VS SPS MENDEZ G.R. NO. 160280 March 13,2009
WONG VS. CARPIO G.R. No. 50264
October 21, 1991
The trial court denied the motion, holding that the complaint had alleged therein that the plaintiff gave notice to the defendant that he would be sued for ejectment if he failed to pay the rentals. This Court, agreeing with the lower court, said that there was no necessity to categorically use the word "vacate" in the lessor's demand. Verily, in ejectment cases, the word "possession" means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession, in the sense contemplated in civil law. The only issue in such cases is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved, independently of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants. It does not even matter if the party's title to the property is questionable. The act of entering the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary. Under the rule, entering upon the premises by strategy or stealth is equally as obnoxious as entering by force. The foundation of the action is really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right. The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another who has had prior possession therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere 61
acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party.
JAVIER vs VERIDIANO II. G.R. No. L-48050 October 10, 1994
A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership.
Victorino Quinagoran vs. Court of a complaint must allege the assessed value of Appeals the real property subject of the complaint or the G.R. NO. 155179 2007
August 24,
ABRIN VS CAMPOS G.R. No. 52740 1991
November 12,
Go, Jr. Vs Court of Appeals G. R. No. 142276 2001
August 14,
interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is because the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein. Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the Court which has jurisdiction over the case, is the allegation made by the plaintiff in his complaint. To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, the Court must interpret and apply the law on jurisdiction vis-a-vis the averments of the complaint. The defenses asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss are not to be considered in resolving the issue of jurisdiction, otherwise the question of jurisdiction could depend entirely upon the defendant. What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant's entry into the land. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be filed within one year from the date of the 62
last demand.
ANICETO G. MEDEL vs TIBURCIO There can be no doubt that the action of unlawful MILITANTE detainer, under section 80 of the Code of Civil G.R. No. 16096
March 30, 1921
MATEO MADDAMMU vs JUDGE OF MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA G.R. No. L-48940 1943
June 22,
SARONA, ET AL. vs FELIPE
Procedure, is appropriate; and it is not necessary that the plaintiff should resort primarily to ejectment in the Court of First Instance. By the very language of section 80, the possessory remedy is given to the landlord whenever the right of the tenant to retain possession is ended, and no good reason occurs to us why the plain intent of the statute should not be given effect in a case like that now before us. As will be seen from the language of the complaint, the plaintiff seeks to recover possession only, without raising the question of title; the right to have possession is proved; and it cannot be permitted that the defendant should defeat this action merely by inserting in his answer a claim of ownership in himself. Whether the court of a justice of the peace has jurisdiction to entertain an action of this character must be determined from the form in which the complaint is drawn — not from the allegations of the answer. Plaintiff's complaint in the respondent Court purports to be one for forcible entry, but the facts alleged therein fail to show that such is the nature of the action. In forcible entry cases, the only issue is physical possession or possession de facto of a real property. To confer jurisdiction upon the respondent Court the complaint should have alleged prior physical possession of the house by plaintiff or by his vendors and deprivation of such possession by defendant through any of the means specified by the Rule. (Rule 72, sec. 1). Had plaintiff alleged that defendant unlawfully turned him out of possession of the property in litigation, the allegation would have been sufficient, because plaintiff's prior physical possession may then be implied therefrom. Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts 63
