Doctrines in Civil Law

1DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINES

1. Doctrine of Estoppel

DESCRIPTIONS

CASES

It is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who who reaso reasonab nably ly relie relied d there thereon on.. The doctrine springs from equitable principles and the equities in the case. It is designed to aid the law in the administration of justice where without its aid injustice might result. It has been been applie applied d by this this ourt ourt wher where!e e!err and and whene!er special circumstances of a case so demand.

In the the Megan Sugar Corporation v. Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Br. 68, Dumangas, Iloilo; New ronti rontier er Sugar Sugar Corp., Corp., et al., !.R !.R.. No. "#$%&'. (une ", '$"" "ased "ased on the e!ent e!ents s and and circum circumsta stance nces s surr surroun oundin ding g the issuan issuance ce of the assail assailed ed orde orders rs,, this this our ourtt rule rules s that that #E$% #E$%& & is estopped from assailing both the authority of %tty. 'abig 'abig and the jurisdict jurisdiction ion of the (T. (T. )hile it is true, as claimed by #E$%&, that %tty %tty.. 'abig 'abig said in court court that that he was only appearin appearing g for the hearing of *assi *assi 'ugar+s 'ugar+s motion for inter!ention and not for the case itself itself,, his subseq subseque uent nt acts, acts, couple coupled d with with #E$%&+s inaction and negligence negligence to repudiate his authority authority,, eecti!e eecti!ely ly bars #E$%& #E$%& from assailing the !alidity of the (T proceedings under the principle of estoppel. C)ing vs. Ni*+ao !.R. No. """8", """8" , *etitioner hin hing g corr correc ectl tly y argu argued ed that that he, he, as the the oended party, may appeal the ci!il aspect of the case notwithstanding notwithstanding respondent &icdao+s acqui acquittal ttal by the %. The The ci!il ci!il action action was impliedl impliedly y institute instituted d with the criminal criminal action action since he did not reser!e his right to institute it separately nor did he institute the ci!il action prior prior to the criminal criminal action. If the accused accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the ci!il aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal

-DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

from the judgment judgment of acquittal acquittal as it would would plac place e the the accu accuse sed d in doub double le jeop jeopar ardy dy. owe!er, the aggrie!ed party, the oended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the ci!il aspect of the case within the period therefor. -. Doctr octriine of %ppare arent %uth %uthor oriity

It is a co concep cept use used d in in ag agency law law that that refers fers to the situation that arises when a principal, such such as a corpor corporati ation, on, indica indicates tes to a third third party that an o/cer or agent is authori0ed to act on its behalf and the third party relies in good faith upon such authority. It is used a defen defense se when when implie implied d or espre espress ss actual actual authority does not eist. )hen the defense is successfully raised, the principal is estopped from denying the authority of the o/cer or agent.

-)ilippine -)ilippine Realt an+ /ol+ing Corp. vs. 0e Const. Const. an+ Dev. Dev. Corp.1 Corp.10e 0e Cons. Cons. an+ Dev. Dev. Corp. vs. -)ilippine Realt an+ /ol+ing Corp., !.R. No. "6&&81!.R. No. "6#8#2. (une "%, '$"". The ourt 2nds that the signature of %bcede is su/cient to bind *(. %s its construction manage manager, r, his !ery act of signin signing g a lette letterr embo embody dyin ing g the the * 34 mill millio ion n esca escala lati tion on agreem agreements ents produc produced ed legal legal eect, eect, e!en if there was a blank space for a higher o/cer of *( to indicate appro!al thereof. thereof. %t the !ery least, least, he indicated indicated authority authority to make make such representation on behalf of *(. 5n direct eamina eamination, tion, %bcede admitted that, as the construction manager, he represented represented *( in runn runnin ing g its its aai aairs rs with with rega regard rd to the the eecut eecution ion of the aforesaid aforesaid projects. projects. %bcede %bcede had sign signed ed,, on beha behalf lf of *( *(,, othe otherr documents that were almost identical to the questioned letter6agreement. *( does not question the !alidity of these agreements7 it thereby eecti!ely admits that this indi!idual had actual authority to sign on its behalf with respect to these construction projects.

-DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

from the judgment judgment of acquittal acquittal as it would would plac place e the the accu accuse sed d in doub double le jeop jeopar ardy dy. owe!er, the aggrie!ed party, the oended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the ci!il aspect of the case within the period therefor. -. Doctr octriine of %ppare arent %uth %uthor oriity

It is a co concep cept use used d in in ag agency law law that that refers fers to the situation that arises when a principal, such such as a corpor corporati ation, on, indica indicates tes to a third third party that an o/cer or agent is authori0ed to act on its behalf and the third party relies in good faith upon such authority. It is used a defen defense se when when implie implied d or espre espress ss actual actual authority does not eist. )hen the defense is successfully raised, the principal is estopped from denying the authority of the o/cer or agent.

-)ilippine -)ilippine Realt an+ /ol+ing Corp. vs. 0e Const. Const. an+ Dev. Dev. Corp.1 Corp.10e 0e Cons. Cons. an+ Dev. Dev. Corp. vs. -)ilippine Realt an+ /ol+ing Corp., !.R. No. "6&&81!.R. No. "6#8#2. (une "%, '$"". The ourt 2nds that the signature of %bcede is su/cient to bind *(. %s its construction manage manager, r, his !ery act of signin signing g a lette letterr embo embody dyin ing g the the * 34 mill millio ion n esca escala lati tion on agreem agreements ents produc produced ed legal legal eect, eect, e!en if there was a blank space for a higher o/cer of *( to indicate appro!al thereof. thereof. %t the !ery least, least, he indicated indicated authority authority to make make such representation on behalf of *(. 5n direct eamina eamination, tion, %bcede admitted that, as the construction manager, he represented represented *( in runn runnin ing g its its aai aairs rs with with rega regard rd to the the eecut eecution ion of the aforesaid aforesaid projects. projects. %bcede %bcede had sign signed ed,, on beha behalf lf of *( *(,, othe otherr documents that were almost identical to the questioned letter6agreement. *( does not question the !alidity of these agreements7 it thereby eecti!ely admits that this indi!idual had actual authority to sign on its behalf with respect to these construction projects.


-ru+ential Ban3 v. C4. !.R. "$%2&#. (une ", "22%. If a corporation knowingly permits one of its o/cers, or any other agents, to do acts within the scope of an apparent authority, and this holds holds him out to the public public as posses possessin sing g power to do those acts, the corporation will, as against anyone who has in good faith dealt with the corporation through such agents, be estopped from denying his authority.

3. Doctr octriine of 8e 8oci oci eleb lebrati ratio onis

9nder thi this doctr octrin ine e, the the law law of the the place lace !ermann an+ Co. 5. Donal+son, Sim an+ Co. " where a contract, specially a marriage, was -)il. 6%. % power of attorney was eecuted in made or celebrated, go!erns. $ermany $ermany gi!ing the recipient recipient authority authority to bring an action in the *hilippines. 'aid power of attorney was not authenticated by a notary public. public. In $ermany $ermany,, no such authenticati authentication on was needed, contrary to *hilippines rules. The power of attorney was properly made insofar as form form was was conc concer erne ned d beca becaus use e it was was eecuted eecuted in $ermany. There is no reason why le loci celebrationis should not apply. Insula Insularr !overn !overnmen mentt vs. ran3 ran3 "% -)il -)il '%6, '%6, !.R.No.'2%&. Mar*) '%, "2$2. #r. :rank being fully quali2ed to enter into a contract at the place place and time the contract contract was made, he cannot therefore plead infancy as a defense at the the plac place e wher where e the the cont contra ract ct is bein being g enforced. %lthough #r. :rank was still a minor under under *hilippi *hilippine ne laws, laws, he was ne!erthe ne!ertheless less consider considered ed an adult adult under under the laws of the state of Illinois,the place where the contract

;DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

was made. &o rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the eecution, interpretation and !alidity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. #atters connected to its performance are regulated by the law pre!ailing at the place of its performance. #atters respecting a remedy, such as bringing of a suit, admissibility of e!idence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought. ;. Doctrine of 8e 8oci Delicti ommissi

It is the 8atin term for was committed<=1> in the con?ict of laws. on?ict of laws is the branch of law regulating all lawsuits in!ol!ing a
Sau+i 4raian 4irlines vs. C4 !.R. "''"2". )ith the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of le loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liability ha!e been ad!anced to oer fresh judicial approaches to arri!e at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we 2nd here an occasion to apply the <'tate of the most signi2cant relationship< rule, which in our !iew should be appropriate to apply now, gi!en the factual contet of this case.

In applying said principle to determine the 'tate which has the most signi2cant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and e!aluated according to their relati!e importance with respect to the particular issue@ AaB the place where the injury occurred7 AbB the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred7 AcB the domicile,

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residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and AdB the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. %s already discussed, there is basis for the claim that o!er6all injury occurred and lodged in the *hilippines. There is likewise no question that pri!ate respondent is a resident :ilipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of international air carriage. Thus, the

packaging, distribution, sale, etc., of the said chemical. This is in consonance with the le loci delicti commisi theory in determining the situs of a tort, which states that the law of the place where the alleged wrong was committed will go!ern the action. I9IT% and the other defendant companies also submitted themsel!es to the jurisdiction of the (T by making !oluntary appearances and seeking for a/rmati!e reliefs during the course of the proceedings. &one of the defendant companies e!er objected to the eercise of jurisdiction by the courts a quo o!er their persons. I9IT%, thus, prays for the remand of i!il ase &os. C41F and -;,-C16G4 to the (T of $eneral 'antos ity and the (T of Da!ao ity, respecti!ely. C. Doctrine of 8e 8oci (ei 'it ae

It is the 8atin term for Hlaw of the place where the property is situated. It is a doctrine which states that the law go!erning the transfer of title to property is dependent upon, and !aries with, the location of the property for the purposes of the con?ict of laws. on?ict is the branch of public law regulating all lawsuits in!ol!ing a
ells argo Ban3 9 :nion Trust Compan v. T)e Colle*tor of Internal Revenue. !.R. No. 06#'$, (une '8, "2$. e etended his acti!ities with respect to his intangibles, so as to a!ail himself of the protection and bene2ts of the laws of the *hilippines, in such a way as to bring his person or property within the reach of the *hilippines, the reason for a single place of taation no longer obtains6 protection, bene2t, and power o!er the subject matter are no longer con2ned to alifornia, but also to the *hilippines. In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the *hilippines, the corporation being domiciled therein. %nd besides, the

FDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

certi2cates of stock ha!e remained in this country up to the time when the deceased died in alifornia, and they were in possession of one 'yrena #cJee, secretary of the "enguet onsolidated #ining ompany, to whom they ha!e been deli!ered and indorsed in blank. This indorsement ga!e 'yrena #cJee the right to !ote the certi2cates at the general meetings of the stockholders, to collect di!idends, and dispose of the shares in the manner she may deem 2t, without prejudice to her liability to the owner for !iolation of instructions. :or all practical purposes, then, 'yrena #cJee had the legal title to the certi2cates of stock held in trust for the true owner thereof. In other words, the owner residing in alifornia has etended here her acti!ities with respect to her intangibles so as to a!ail herself of the protection and bene2t of the *hilippine laws. %ccordingly, the jurisdiction of the *hilippine $o!ernment to ta must be upheld. Manila !as Corporation vs. Colle*tor of Internal Revenue, 6' -)il. 82& <"2%&=. The absence of ?ight operations to and from the *hilippines is not determinati!e of the source of income or the situs of income taation. The test of taability is the KsourceL7 and the source of an income is that acti!ity which produced the income. 9nquestionably, the passage documentations in these cases were sold in the *hilippines and the re!enue

MDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

therefrom was deri!ed from a business acti!ity regularly pursued within the *hilippines. The word KsourceL con!eys one essential Idea, that of origin, and the origin of the income herein is the *hilippines 4. The 5perati!e :act Doctrine

The law is recogni0ed as unconstitutional but the eects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the in!ocation of the operati!e fact doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional.

-lanters -ro+u*ts, In*. v. ertip)il Corporation, Mar*) ", '$$8, !.R. No. "66$$6. The doctrine of operati!e fact, as an eception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nulli2es the eects of an unconstitutional law by recogni0ing that the eistence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operati!e fact and may ha!e consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.

The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who ha!e relied on the in!alid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it. ran*is*o I. C)ave7 v. National /ousing 4ut)orit, RII Buil+ers, In*., RII /ol+ings, In*., /arour Centre -ort Terminal, In*., an+ Mr. Reg)is Romero II. !.R. No. "6&'#, 4ugust "&, '$$#. )hen the petitioner 2led the case,

GDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

the N% had already been terminated by !irtue of #5% between ("I and &%. The properties and rights in question after the passage of around 1O years from the start of the project+s implementation cannot be disturbed or questioned. The petitioner, being the 'olicitor $eneral at the time '#D(* was formulated, had ample opportunity to question the said project, but did not do so. The moment to challenge has passed. F. Doctrine of (elations

That principle of law by which an act done at one time is considered by a 2ction of law to ha!e been done at some antecedent period. It is a doctrine which, although of equitable origin, has a well6recogni0ed application to proceedings at law7 a legal 2ction in!ented to promote the ends of justice or to pre!ent injustice end the occurrence of injuries where otherwise there would be no remedy. The doctrine, when in!oked, must ha!e connection with actual fact, must be based on some antecedent lawful rights. It has also been referred to as
4l)amra Cigra vs S>C, !.R. No. 0'%6$6, (ul '2, "268. <'ince the pri!ilege of etension is purely statutory, all of the statutory conditions precedent must be complied with in order that the etension may be eectuated. %nd, generally these conditions must be complied with, and the steps necessary to eect the etension must be taken, +uring t)e life of t)e *orporation, an+ efore t)e e?piration of t)e term of e?isten*e as original @?e+  its *)arter or t)e general law, sin*e, as a rule, t)e *orporation is ipso fa*to +issolve+ as soon as t)at time e?pires. 'o where the etension is by amendment of the articles of incorporation, t)e amen+ment must e a+opte+ efore t)at time. %nd, similarly, the 2ling and recording of a certi2cate of etension after that time cannot relate back to the date of the passage of a resolution by the stockholders in fa!or of the etension so as to sa!e the life of the corporation. The contrary is true, howe!er, and the doctrine of

1ODOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

relation will apply, where the delay is due to the neglect of the o/cer with whom the certi2cate is required to be 2led, or to a wrongful refusal on his part to recei!e it. %nd statutes in some states speci2cally pro!ide that a renewal may be had within a speci2ed time before or after the time 2ed for the termination of the corporate eistence M. :air 9se Doctrine

The general public is gi!en the right to reproduce a work subject to speci2c limitations. 9nder *hilippine law, fair use of a work for criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, including multiple copies for classroom use, scholarship, research and similar purposes does not infringe copyright. :air use has no eact de2nition under the law. owe!er, authorities ha!e agreed on the following criteria enumerated in sec. 1MC.1 of the ode@ 1.Bthe purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non6pro2t educational purposes7 the nature of the copyrighted work7 the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole7 and -.B The eect of the use upon the potential market for or !alue of the copyrighted work.

The *hilippines has not had any case brought before the courts to challenge fair use in this contet. To illustrate the point, we must draw on %merican court decisions. In *rinceton 9ni!ersity !s. #ichigan Document 'er!ice, Inc. Aunreported, 1GG-B, the 9.'. ourt did not consider photocopying of materials for compilation in course packs as fair use because photocopying was done by a commercial !endor. 5n the other hand, in another case, the 9.'. ourt tended towards the more fundamental aim of protecting the progress of science and the arts. In )illiams !s. )ilkins o. A;MF :-d 13;CB it ga!e the opinion that medical science would be seriously hurt if library photocopying was stopped.


Traditionally, fair use is more easily accepted when the purpose of copying is educational in character and purpose than when it is commercial or for pro2t. It does not mean, howe!er, that all copying for educational or classroom purposes is fair use. G. :raus Et us &unquam ohabitant

H:raud and ustice ne!er agree together. % Repuli* v. C4, !.R. No. 06$"62, Mar*) '%, maim meaning that fraud corrupts justice "22$. 5f course, we are well aware of the rule regardless of the good faith or just intentions reiterated in (epublic !s. ourt of %ppeals and 'antos, that, generally, the 'tate cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its o/cials or agents. In that !ery case, howe!er, citing 31 ' 4FC64F4, we went further by saying@ H&e!ertheless, the go!ernment must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citi0ens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing7 and subject to limitations , the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be in!oked against public authorities as well as against pri!ate indi!iduals Repuli* of t)e -)ilippines v. !regorio 4guno, Sr., >t al., Spouses >+uar+o an+ 4r*elita MarAue7 an+ Rural Ban3 f !apan, Nueva >*ia. !.R. No. "&&%2., eruar "#, '$$&. In any e!ent, the !eri2cation sur!ey conducted by $eodetic Engineer #elencio #angahas on :ebruary 1C, 1GMM came almost

1-DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

twenty6two A--B years after the :ebruary -M, 1G44 certi2cation of ose #endigoria7 more than twenty6one A-1B years after the issuance of %gunoy 'r.+s :ree *atent &o. 31;;CO on anuary 1M, 1G4F and its registration as 5riginal erti2cate of Title &o. *6;C-- on :ebruary 4, 1G4F7 and more than eight AMB years reckoned from uly 31, 1GFG when, upon the death of the wife of $regorio %gunoy, 'r., the heirs eecuted a Deed of Etrajudicial *artition with 'ale in fa!or of oaquin 'angabol. In the meanwhile, for about half a decade thereafter, ownership o!er the properties transferred from one buyer to another, with each and e!ery transferee enjoying the presumption of good faith. If only on this score alone that the present petition must fall. There can be no debate at all on petitioner+s submission that no amount of legal technicality may ser!e as a solid foundation for the enjoyment of the fruits of fraud. It is thus understandable why petitioner chants the dogma of fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant. 'igni2cantly, howe!er, in the cases cited by petitioner (epublic, as well as in those other cases where the doctrine of fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant was applied against a patent and title procured thru fraud or misrepresentation, we note that the land


co!ered thereby is either a part of the forest 0one which is de2nitely non6disposable, as in %nimas, or that said patent and title are still in the name of the person who committed the fraud or misrepresentation, as in %cot, %nimas, (epublic !s. % and Del #undo and Director of 8ands !s. %banilla, et al. and, in either instance, there were yet no innocent third parties standing in the way. ere, it bears stressing that, by petitioner+s own judicial admission, the lots in dispute are no longer part of the public domain, and there are numerous third, fourth, 2fth and more parties holding Torrens titles in their fa!or and enjoying the presumption of good faith. This brings to mind what we ha!e reechoed in *ino !s. ourt of %ppeals and the cases therein cited@ E!en on the supposition that the sale was !oid, the general rule that the direct result of a pre!ious illegal contract cannot be !alid Aon the theory that the spring cannot rise higher than its sourceB cannot apply here for )e are confronted with the functionings of the Torrens 'ystem of (egistration. The doctrine to follow is simple enough@ a fraudulent or forged document of sale may become the (55T of a !alid title if the certi2cate of title has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name of the forger or the name indicated by the forger.

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It is e!en worse in this case because here, there is no forger to speak of. The remark of 8and Inspector ose #endigoria about the abandonment by Eusebio *ere0 and Nalenciano Espiritu cannot, by itself, be fraudulent. %nd, for all we know, that remark may e!en turn out to be the truth. )hat petitioner percei!es as fraud may be nothing more than the dierences of professional opinions between 8and Inspector ose #endigoria and $eodetic Engineer #elencio #angahas. "ut regardless of who between the two is correct, the hard reality is that the properties in question are no longer ?oating objects on a spring that cannot rise higher than its source, as they are now !ery much ashore and 2rmly standing on the high solid ground of the Torrens system of land registration. 1O.

&emo Dat uod &on abet

8iterally meaning
>gao vs C4, !.R. No. 0#2#8#. (une '2, "282. Deeds of sale of patented lands, perfected within the prohibited 2!e ACB year period are null and !oid A'ec. 1-;, *ublic 8and %ctB. &o title passed from the Egaos to #arfori which could be !alidly transferred to herein respondents "ontilao and Dignos. Nemo +at %lso, where goods are sold by a person who is Auo+ non )aet Anobody can dispose of that not their owner, and who does not sell them which does not belong to himB. under the authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to )hile the go!ernment has not taken steps

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the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of goods is by his conduct precluded to assert its title, by re!ersion, to a from denying the sellerLs authority to sell. homestead sold in !iolation of the *ublic 8and %ct, the !endor or his heirs is better entitled to the possession of the said, the !endee being in no better situation than any intruder. %ccordingly, respondents who are not innocent purchasers for !alue ha!e no standing to question petitionersL right to the land and to 2le an action for quieting of title. Del Rosario v. errer, !.R. No. "8#$&6, Septemer '$, '$"$. 'ince the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operati!e and 2nal. The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of the donee+s acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the property donated.

$i!en that the donation in this case was irre!ocable or one gi!en inter !i!os, 8eopoldo+s subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property to %suncion should be regarded as !oid for, by then, he had no more rights to assign. e could not gi!e what he no longer had. Nemo +at Auo+ non )aet . The trial court cannot be faulted for passing upon, in a petition for probate of what


was initially supposed to be a donation mortis causa, the !alidity of the document as a donation inter !i!os and the nullity of one of the donor+s subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property. The ourt has held before that the rule on probate is not in?eible and absolute. #oreo!er, in opposing the petition for probate and in putting the !alidity of the deed of assignment squarely in issue, %suncion or those who substituted her may not now claim that the trial court improperly allowed a collateral attack on s uch assignment. 11. Doctrine of *rocessual *resumption

)here a foreign law is not pleaded or, e!en if 4TCI verseas Corporation, 4malia !. I3+al pleaded, is not pro!ed, the presumption is an+ Ministr of -uli* /ealt)uwait v. Ma. (osefa >*)in. !.R. No. "#8&&", *toer "", that foreign law is the same as ours. '$"$. In the present case, the employment contract signed by $ran speci2cally states that 'audi 8abor 8aws will go!ern matters not pro!ided for in the contract Ae.g. speci2c causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.B. "eing the law intended by the parties Ale loci intentionesB to apply to the contract, 'audi 8abor 8aws should go!ern all matters relating to the termination of the employment of $ran. In international law, the party who wants to ha!e a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of pro!ing the foreign

1FDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and pro!ed as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. e is presumed to know only domestic or forum law. 9nfortunately for petitioner, it did not pro!e the pertinent 'audi laws on the matter7 thus, the International 8aw doctrine of presumed6 identity approach or processual presumption comes into play. Nort)west rient 4irlines, In*. v. Court of 4ppeals an+ C.. S)arp 9 Compan In*., !.R. No. ""'&#%. eruar 2, "22&. %lternati!ely in the light of the absence of proof regarding apanese law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so6called processual presumption 1O may be in!oked. %pplying it, the apanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the *hilippine law on s er!ice of summons on a pri!ate foreign corporation doing business in the *hilippines. 'ection 1;, (ule 1; of the (ules of ourt pro!ides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the *hilippines, ser!ice may be made@ A1B on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, A-B if there is no such resident agent, on the go!ernment o/cial designated by law to that eect7 or A3B on any of its o/cers or agents within the *hilippines. In as much as '%(* was admittedly doing business in apan

1MDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

through its four duly registered branches at the time the collection suit against it was 2led, then in the light of the processual presumption, '%(* may be deemed a resident of apan, and, as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to ha!e assented to the said courtsL lawful methods of ser!ing process. -F %ccordingly, the etraterritorial ser!ice of summons on it by the apanese ourt was !alid not only under the processual presumption but also because of the presumption of regularity of performance of o/cial duty. )e 2nd &5(T)E'TLs claim for attorneyLs fees, litigation epenses, and eemplary damages to be without merit. )e 2nd no e!idence that would justify an award for attorneyLs fees and litigation epenses under %rticle --OM of the i!il ode of the *hilippines. &or is an award for eemplary damages warranted. 9nder %rticle --3; of the i!il ode, before the court may consider the question of whether or not eemplary damages should be awarded, the plainti must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate, or compensatory damaged. There being no such proof presented by &5(T)E'T, no eemplary damages may be adjudged in its fa!or.

1GDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

1-.

The (en!oi Doctrine

The doctrine whereby a jural matter is presented which the con?ict of laws rules of the forum refer to a foreign law which in turn, refers the matter back to the law of the forum or a third state. )hen reference is made back to the law of the forum, this is said to be
In t)e Matter of t)e Testate >state of >+war+ >. C)ristensen, De*ease+. 4+olfo C. 47nar, >?e*utor an+ 0u* C)ristensen, /eir of t)e +e*ease+, >?e*utor an+ /eirappellees, v. /elen C)ristensen !ar*ia. !.R. No. 0"6#2, (anuar %", "26%. It is argued on eecutor+s behalf that as the deceased hristensen was a citi0en of the 'tate of alifornia, the internal law thereof, which is that gi!en in the Jaufman case, s hould go!ern the determination of the !alidity of the testamentary pro!isions of hristensen+s will, such law being in force in the 'tate of alifornia of which hristensen was a citi0en. %ppellant, on the other hand, insists that %rticle G;4 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the ren!oi, the question of the !alidity of the testamentary pro!ision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent+s domicile, which is the *hilippines.

)e note that %rticle G;4 of the alifornia i!il ode is its con?ict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Jaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession and the con?ict of laws rules of alifornia are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Jaufman should apply to citi0ens li!ing in the 'tate, but %rticle G;4 should apply to such of its citi0ens as are not domiciled in alifornia but in other

-ODOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element in!ol!ed is in accord with the general principle of %merican law that the domiciliary law should go!ern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner. Testate >state of Bo)anan v Bo)anan, et al. "$6 -)il. 22#. 'ince the laws of the 'tate of &e!ada allow the testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, his testamentary dispositions depri!ing his wife and children of what should be their legitimes under *hilippine laws, should be respected and the project of partition made in accordance with his testamentary dispositions respected, and with the project of partition made in accordance with his testamentary dispositions appro!ed.

13. Doctrine of &ullum Tempus 5ccurrit (egi

It is the 8atin of
4g*aoili v. Suguitan, 8 -)il 62%. If the statute of limitation or prescription cannot run against the state, it is di/cult to understand how in the same action they may be used as a defense against a public o/cer who has been forcibly, with threats and intimidation, ousted from a public o/ce by the $o!ernment itself as was done in the present case. The principle that acts of limitation do not bind the Jing Athe 'tateB or the people, applies to proceeding by quo warranto, the rule being that the representati!e of the state may 2le

-1DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

an information on behalf of the people at any time7 and the lapse of time constitutes no bar to the proceeding, in conformity with the maim &ullum tempus occurrit regi. :or the state to claim that the statutes of limitation do not apply to it and yet insist that it may plead such statutes to bar the action of quo warranto brought by one of its public o/cials whom it itself has ousted from o/ce, appears to us to be unjust, unfair, unreasonable, and not within the contemplation of sound jurisprudence. Min+anao Development 4ut)orit, now t)e Sout)ern - )ilippines De velopment 4+ministration v. T)e Court of 4ppeals an+ ran*is*o an+ Bansing. !.R. No. 02$8#, 4pril &, "28'. In any e!ent, the real plainti in this case is the (epublic of the *hilippines and prescription does not run against the 'tate ADe la Nina !s. $o!ernment of the *.I., 4C *hil. -4-, -4C7 (epublic !s. (ui0, 86-3F1-, %pril -G, 1G4M, -3 '(% 3;MB.

The maim is nullum tempus occurrit regi or nullum tempus occurrit reipublicae Alapse of time does not bar the right of the crown or lapse of time does not bar the commonwealthB. The rule is now embodied in article 11OMA;B of the i!il ode. It is a maim of great antiquity in English law. The best reason for its eistence is the great

--DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

public policy of preser!ing public rights and property from damage and loss through the negligence of public o/cers. A3; %m ur. 3O17 "allentinesLs 8aw Dictionary, p. MG17 9.'. !s. &ash!ille, hattanooga P 't. 8ouis (ailway o., 11M 9.'. 1-O,1-CB. Thus, the right of re!ersion or recon!eyance to the 'tate of lands fraudulently registered or not susceptible of pri!ate appropriation or acquisition does not prescribe A#artines !s. ourt of %ppeals, 8631-F1, %pril -G, 1GF;, C4 '(% 4;F, 4CC7 (epublic !s. (amos, 11F *hil. ;C, ;GB. The go!ernment o/cials concerned were negligent in not inter!ening in the land registration proceeding or in not promptly asking %ng "anging to recon!ey the disputed lot to the ommonwealth or to the (epublic of the *hilippines. 'uch negligence does not prejudice the 'tate. The negligence or omissions of public o/cers as to their public duties will not work an estoppel against the 'tate A1O (..8. FOC, cited in "achrach #otor o. !s. 9nson, CO *hil. GM1, GGO7 entral %0ucarera de Tarlac !s. ollector of Internal (e!enue, 1O; *hil. 4C3, 4C47 *eople !s. Nentura, 11; *hil. 14-, 14GB. 1;. Doctrine of Indefeasibility of Torrens Titles

% doctrine that a certi2cate of title, once De -e+ro vs Romasan, !R "&8$$'. %ccording registered, should not thereafter be to the report, the land claimed by the


impugned, altered, changed, modi2ed, petitioners was co!ered by the title under the enlarged or diminished ecept in a direct name of respondent corporation, the proceeding permitted by law. petitioners+ claim for damages had no leg to stand on. 1C. Doctrine of *iercing the Neil of orporate :iction

The doctrine used whene!er a court 2nds that a corporate 2ction is used to defeat public con!enience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, or to confuse legitimate issues, or that a corporation is the mere alter ego or business conduit of a person or where the corporation id so organi0ed and controlled. 5ne of the ad!antages of a corporate form of business organi0ation is the limitation of an in!estor+s liability to the amount of the in!estment. This feature ?ows from the legal theory that a corporate entity is separate and distinct from its stockholders. owe!er, the statutorily granted pri!ilege of a corporate !eil may be used only for legitimate purposes.

San (uan Stru*tural v. Court of 4ppeals '26 SCR4 6%"<"228=. The ourt 2nds no reason to pierce the corporate !eil of (espondent #otorich. *etitioner utterly failed to establish that said corporation was formed, or that it is operated, for the purpose of shielding any alleged fraudulent or illegal acti!ities of its o/cers or stockholders, or that the said !eil was used to conceal fraud, illegality or inequity at the epense of third persons like petitioner. Neil can only be disregarded when it is utili0ed as a shield to commit fraud, illegality or inequity, defeat public con!enience, confuse legitimate issues or ser!e as a mere alter ego or business conduit of a person or an instrumentality, agency or adjunct of another corporation. Davi+ ins)ip v. -)il. Trust Co., !.R. 0%862, (anuar %", "2&'. During war, we may pierce the !eil of corporate identity, and go to the !ery nationality of the controlling stockholders regardless of where the incorporation had been made. Thus a $erman6controlled corporation, e!en if incorporated in the *hilippines, was considered an enemy corporation during the war for the purpose of free0ing its assets. % contrary rule may

-;DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

endanger *hilippine security. 14.

The de facto orporation Doctrine

:ormulate to safeguard the security of Sevent) Da 4+ventist Conferen*e C)ur*) of commercial transactions whene!er they Sout)ern -)ilippines, In*. v Nort)eastern in!ol!e the corporation. *arties dealing with Min+anao Mission of Sevent) Da 4+ventist, said corporation are secured by the fact that In*. !.R. No. "&$"6 (u '", '$$6. HThe de the transactions entered into with said facto doctrine thus eects a compromise corporations may be sued upon and they can between two con?icting public interest=s>Qthe reco!er. That is why aside from the other two one opposed to an unauthori0ed assumption requisites there must be a set of o/cers Ai.e. of corporate pri!ileges7 the other in fa!or of assumption of corporate powersB or directors doing justice to the parties and of establishing because of the principle that a corporation a general assurance of security in business can only act through its o/cers. dealing with corporations. In !iew of the foregoing, petitioners+ arguments anchored on their supposed de facto status hold no water. )e are con!inced that there was no donation to petitioners or their supposed predecessor6in6interest. )ell6entrenched is the rule that a erti2cate of Title is generally a conclusi!e e!idence of =ownership> of the land. There is that strong and solid presumption that titles were legally issued and that they are !alid. It is irre!ocable and indefeasible and the duty of the ourt is to see to it that the title is maintained and respected unless challenged in a direct proceeding. The title shall be recei!ed as e!idence in all the ourts and shall be conclusi!e as to all matters contained therein.

-CDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

%ccording to %rt. 1;FF of the i!il ode, the ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the !endee upon the actual or constructi!e deli!ery thereof. ere, transfer of ownership from the spouses osio to 'D%6 &E## was made upon constructi!e deli!ery of the property on :ebruary -M, 1GMO when the sale was made through a public instrument. TT &o. ;;4M was thereafter issued and it remains in the name of 'D%6 &E##. 1F.

9njust Enrichment

The principle that no person may unjustly C)ieng vs. Spouses Santos, !R "626#, enrich himself at the epense of another 4ugust %, '$$#. The principle of unjust A&emo cum alterius detrimento locupletari enrichment obliges the respondents to pay potestB is embodied in %rticle -- of the &ew the remaining balance of the loan plus i!il ode. There is unjust enrichment when interest. (elie!ing the respondents of their A1B a person is unjustly bene2ted, and A-B obligation to pay the balance of the loan such bene2t is deri!ed at the epense of or would, indeed, be to sanction unjust with damages to another. The main objecti!e enrichment in fa!or of respondents and cause of the principle of unjust enrichment is to unjust po!erty to petitioner. pre!ent one from enriching oneself at the epense of another. It is commonly accepted In the eercise of our mandate as a court of that this doctrine simply means that a person justice and equity, we hold, pro hac !ice, that shall not be allowed to pro2t or enrich himself respondents are still liable to pay the inequitably at another+s epense. remaining balance of the loan. (espondents Eulogio and Teresita 'antos are hereby 5(DE(ED to pay petitioner %ntonio hieng, substituted by )illiam hieng, the balance of the loan amounting to *G3,OOO.OO, plus legal interest of 1-R per annum from 3O uly 1GGup to the 2nality of this Decision, and an


additional legal interest of 1-R per annum from the 2nality of this Decision up to its satisfaction. 1M.

*ari Delicto

% doctrine that pro!ides that courts will not enforce an in!alid contract and that no party can reco!er in an action where it is necessary to pro!e the eistence of an illegal contract in order to make his or her case.

/ulst vs. -R Buil+ers In*., !R "&6%6, Septemer %, '$$#. % uni!ersal doctrine which holds that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract7 no suit can be maintained for its speci2c performance, or to reco!er the property agreed to be sold or deli!ered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its !iolation7 and where the parties are in pari delicto, no a/rmati!e relief of any kind will be gi!en to one against the other. This rule, howe!er, is subject to eceptions that permit the return of that which may ha!e been gi!en under a !oid contract to@ AaB the innocent party A%rts. 1;116 1;1-, i!il odeB7 AbB the debtor who pays usurious interest A%rt. 1;13, i!il odeB7 AcB the party repudiating the !oid contract before the illegal purpose is accomplished or before damage is caused to a third person and if public interest is sub ser!ed by allowing reco!ery A%rt. 1;1;, i!il odeB7 AdBthe incapacitated party if the interest of justice so demands A%rt. 1;1C, i!il odeB7 AeB the party for whose protection the prohibition by law is intended if the agreement is not illegal per se but merely prohibited and if public policy would be enhanced by permitting reco!ery A%rt. 1;14, i!il odeB7 and AfB the party for whose bene2t the law has been intended such

-FDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

as in price ceiling laws A%rt. 1;1F, i!il odeB and labor laws A%rts.1;1M61;1G, i!il odeB. Men*)ave7 vs. Teves, !.R. No. "&%'$". (anuar '6, '$$&. %!oid contract is deemed legally noneistent. It produces no legal eect. %s a general rule, courts lea!e parties to such a contract as they are, because they are in pari delicto or equally at fault. &either party is entitled to legal protection.

% !oid contract is equi!alent to nothing7 it produces no ci!il eect. It does not create, modify or etinguish a juridical relation.=-;> *arties to a !oid agreement cannot epect the aid of the law7 the courts lea!e them as they are, because they are deemed in pari delicto or Hin equal fault. To this rule, howe!er, there are eceptions that permit the return of that which may ha!e been gi!en under a !oid contract. 5ne of the eceptions is found in %rticle 1;1- of the i!il ode, which states@ H%rt. 1;1-. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal oense, the following rules shall be obser!ed@ HA1B )hen the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may reco!er what he has gi!en by !irtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other+s undertaking7

-MDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

HA-B )hen only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot reco!er what he has gi!en by reason of the contract, or ask for the ful2llment of what has been promised him. The other, who is not at fault, may demand the return of what he has gi!en without any obligation to comply with his promise. 5n this premise, respondent contends that he can reco!er from petitioners, because he is an innocent party to the ontract of 8ease. *etitioners allegedly induced him to enter into it through serious misrepresentation 1G.

(es Ipsa 8oquitur

8atin for
-rofessional Servi*es In*. vs. 4gana, !R "'6'2#, (anuar %", '$$#; It is the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plainti+s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an eplanation. 'tated dierently, where the thing which caused the injury, without the fault of the injured, is under the eclusi!e control of the defendant and the injury is such that it should not ha!e occurred if he, ha!ing such control used proper care, it aords reasonable e!idence, in the absence of eplanation that the injury arose from the defendant+s want of care, and the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish that he has

-GDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

obser!ed due care and diligence. :rom the foregoing statements of the rule, the requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are@ A1B the occurrence of an injury7 A-B the thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the defendant7 A3B the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not ha!e happened if those who had control or management used proper care7 and A;B the absence of eplanation by the defendant. 5f the foregoing requisites, the most instrumentalist the Hcontrol and management of the thing which caused the injury. In this jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substanti!e law, hence, does not per se create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere e!identiary rule. In other words, mere in!ocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. (oaAuinita -. Capili v. S-S. Domina+or Car+ana an+ Rosalita Car+ana. !.R. No. "$6, Novemer ', '$$6. The fact, howe!er, that respondents+ daughter, asmin, died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the school+s premises shows that the tree was indeed an ob!ious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where


A1B the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not ha!e happe appene ned d ecept cept for for the the defe defend ndan ant+ t+s s negligence7 A-B the accident must ha!e been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the eclusi!e management or control of the pers person on char charge ged d with with the the negl neglig igen ence ce complained of7 and A3B the accident must not ha!e ha!e been been due due to any !oluntar !oluntary y action action or contribution on the part of the person injured. In the case of D.#. onsunji, Inc. !. ourt of %ppeals,1C this ourt held@ %s a rule of e!idence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recogni0es that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnish furnishes es a substitute substitute for speci2c speci2c proof proof of negligence. The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been eplained in this wise@ )hile negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally gi!e rise to an inference inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendant+s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or


circums circumstance tances s accompany accompanying ing an injury injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence. )here it is shown own that that the the thi thing or instr instrume umenta ntalit lity y which which caused caused the injur injury y comp compla lain ined ed of was was unde underr the the cont contro roll or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordin ordinary ary course course of thing things s would would not happ happen en if thos those e who who had had its its cont contro roll or manage manageme ment nt used used prope properr care, care, there there is su/cient e!idence, or, as sometimes stated, reas reason onab able le e!id e!iden ence ce,, in the the abse absenc nce e of eplanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant+s want of care. The procedural procedural eect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that petitioner+s negligence is presumed presumed once respondents respondents established the requ requisi isites tes for the doctr doctrine ine to apply apply.. 5nce 5nce respondents made out a prima facie case of all requisites, the burden shifts to petitioner to eplain. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or o!ercome by other e!idence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable presu presumpt mption ion,, such such as that that of due due care care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. -O.

Ignorantia 8e 8egis no non Ecus at at

It is is a 8a 8a ti tin ma maim me meaning ig ignorance of of la law 4gustin De 0una, et al., v. (ose 0inato*, !.R.


is not an ecuse ecuse to a criminal charge. charge. The purpose of this maim is that if ignorance is considered an ecuse, a person charged with criminal oenses or a subject of a ci!il lawsuit would merely claim that sShe is unaware of the the law law in ques questi tion on to a!oi a!oid d liab liabil ilit ity y. Ignorantia juris non ecusat is also known as ignorantia legis non ecusat.

No. 08$%, *toer '8, "2'. #istake of law does not make a contract !oidable, because ignorance of the law does not ecuse anyone from from its complian compliance ce Aart. Aart. -, i!il i!il ode7 ode7 M #anresa, 4;4, -d ed.B. That the petitioners did not know the prohibition against partition of the conjug conjugal al partne partnersh rship ip prope property rty durin during g marriage marriage Aart. 1;3-, i!il odeB is no !alid reason why they should ask for the annulment of the the sale sales s made made Ehib Ehibit its s  and and D and and recogni0ed in Ehibit I. T)e :nite+ States v. 4) C)ong, !.R. No. 0 &'#' &'#' Mar* Mar*) ) "2, "2, "2"$ "2"$.. The question then squar squarely ely prese present nts s it self, self, wheth whether er in this this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be eempt eempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would const onstit itu ute the the crim rime of homic omicid ide e or assassination if the actor had known the true stat state e of the the fact facts s at the the time time when when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circums circumstance tances s there there is no criminal criminal liability, liability, pro!ide pro!ided d always always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such such igno ignora ranc nce e or mist mistak ake e of fact fact is su/cient su/cient to negati!e a particular intent which


under the law is a necessary ingredient of the oense charged Ae.g., in larcerny, animus furendi7 in murder, malice7 in crimes intentB
8e prospicit, non respicit

The law looks forward, not backward.

4ntonio v. Rees, Mar*) "$, '$$6, 8 SCR4 %&%. In these cases, we eplained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this ourt is o!erruled, and a dierent !iew is adopted, that the new doctrine may ha!e to be applied prospecti!ely in fa!or of parties who ha!e relied on the old doctrine and ha!e acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of Hle prospicit, non respicit.


4lfre+o Tolentino, et al., v. 4ntonio . 4l7ate, et al., !.R. No. 02'6#, 4pril "", "2&6. (epublic %ct &o. 11GG was appro!ed on %ugust 3O, 1GC;. 'aid %ct enumerates the cause whereby a tenant may be dispossessed of the land among them being the desire of the alndlord to culti!ate the land
)e 2nd this claim to be without merit. )hile it is true that under the new %ct there is need to comply wit h the abo!e procedural


requirement in order that a landlord may dispossess a tenant and gi!e jurisdiction to the industrial court to act on the matter, the same cannot be in!oked in the present case it appearing that the petition herein was 2led on %ugust 1-, 1GC;, or prior to the appro!al of (epublic %ct &o. 11GG. It is a well known rule that <8aws shall ha!e no retroacti!e eect, unless the contrary is pro!ided< A%rticle ;, new i!il odeB. 5r, as this ourt well said, <% statute operates prospecti!ely and ne!er retroacti!ely, unless the legislati!e intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the epress terms of the statute or by necessary implication< A'ego!ia !s. &oel, ;F *hi., C;3B. There is nothing in said %ct which would make its pro!isions operate retroacti!ely e!en with respect to the pro!ision regarding mechani0ed farming. --.

Dura 8e 'ed 8e

The law may be hard to obser!e or di/cult to obey, but it remains the law and must be therefore followed just the same. This is the plain and simple meaning and implication of the abo!e cited 8atin maim which is well known in a special way by those in the legal profession. The 8atin principle is objecti!ely right and the legal eperts are professionally right as well when in!oking the 8atin truism U but only by !irtue of the following three fundamental premises@

4nselma Dia7, guar+ian of 5i*tor, Ro+rigo, 4nselmina an+ Miguel, all surname+ Santero, an+ eli?erta -a*ursa, guar+ian of e+eri*o Santero, et al., petitioners, v. Interme+iate 4ppelate Court an+ elisa -amuti (ar+in, !.R. No. 066&#, eruar '", "22$.

'enator Tolentino, while supporting majority !iew of this ourt states@

the

In the present article, the ode ommission took a step forward by gi!ing an illegitimate :irstly, that the law is just in its objecti!e child the right of representation, which he did


content, just for the subject party concerned, and just to the society as a whole it is mandated for obser!ance. In other words e!en but there is an iota of injustice in the law in conjunction with any of the said qualifying factors, a law may be di/cult to comply with, but an unjust law it remains. Thus it is that it loses its nature and 2nality as a law.

not ha!e under the old ode. "ut in retaining without change pro!isions of the old ode in %rticle GG-, it created an absurdity and committed an injustice, because while the illegitimate descendant of an illegitimate child can represent, the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child cannot. The principle that the illegitimate child should succeed by operation of law only to persons with the same status of illegitimacy has thus been preser!ed. %nd this is unfair to the illegitimate descendants of legitimate children. Dura le, sed le.

'econdly, that the law equally applies to all U Hwithout fear or fa!or. This simply means that e!erybody has eactly the same standing U the same basic human dignity and the basic human rights U before the law. This is the cornerstone of the majesty of the law@ it bows Salem 4le? -alo  Tour v. /on. ran*is (. to no one for consideration of power and Militante, -resi+ing (u+ge, Regional Trial Court wealth. of Ceu, #t) (u+i*ial Region, Bran*) EII, !.R. No. #6"$$, 4pril "8, "22$. It is suggested that 8astly, that the law is interpreted and applied petitionerLs depri!ation of the bene2ts of by a legal system that is not simply working probation was a product of misunderstanding as designed and epected U but categorically or miscommunication and that he would not working according to the demands of social ha!e pleaded guilty had that amendment by justice specially in terms of its distributi!e *residential Decree &o. 1GGO been brought to dimension that is pro!ident of public welfare his attention. )e are, howe!er, bound by the or common goods. actual proceedings that transpired and not by what is represented to ha!e been a partyLs intent. et, assuming that there is some truth in said surmise, from what has been said and while one may empathi0e with petitionerLs submission, still e!en if he had not pleaded guilty the end result would ha!e been the same. :rom the judicial record, a guilty !erdict, and e!en a higher penalty, would


ha!e been a distinct probability. %ll told, dura le sed le is the trite dictum which those caught in the toils of the law ha!e to li!e with, including the changes therein and the misapprehensions thereon. -3.

Doctrine of 'tare Decisis

The operation of the doctrine of stare decisis Tala Realt Servi*es v. Ban*o ilipino Savings is best eplained by reference to the English an+ Mortgage Ban3. !.R. No. "%#28$. (une translation of the 8atin phrase. H'tare decisis '$, '$$$. It is about a disagreement between literally translates as Hto stand by decided parties on which lease contract should pre!ail. matters. The phrase Hstare decisis is itself The ourt ruled that tt is the policy of the an abbre!iation of the 8atin phrase Hstare court to maintain judicial stability in decisis et non quieta mo!ere which accordance to stare decisis. The case in!ol!es translates as Hto stand by decisions and not to the same questions relating to similarly disturb settled matters. "asically, under the situated conditions which the court already doctrine of stare decisis, the decision of a litigated abd decided upon and the rule on higher court within the same pro!incial stare decisis is a bar to attempt to relitigate jurisdiction acts as binding authority on a the same issue AHstare decisis et non quieta lower court within that same jurisdiction. The mo!ere U follow past precedents and do not decision of a court of another jurisdiction only disturb what has already been settled.B 'tare acts as persuasi!e authority. The degree of decisis should apply if the facts are persuasi!eness is dependent upon !arious substantially the same e!en if the parties may factors, including, 2rst, the nature of the other be dierent. jurisdiction. 'econd, the degree of persuasi!eness is dependent upon the le!el of Benamin !. Ting v. Carmen M. 5ele7Ting, court which decided the precedent case in the !.R. No. "66&6', Mar*) %", '$$2. The other jurisdiction. 5ther factors include the principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by date of the precedent case, on the lower courts to doctrinal rules established by assumption that the more recent the case, the this ourt in its 2nal decisions. It is based on more reliable it will be as authority for a gi!en the principle that once a question of law has proposition, although this is not necessarily been eamined and decided, it should be so. deemed settled and closed to further


argument. "asically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons@ economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in %rticle M of the i!il ode. This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and was later adopted by the 9nited 'tates. To be forthright, respondent+s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in 'antos and #olina should not be applied retroacti!ely for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in *esca !. *esca, and again in %ntonio !. (eyes. In these cases, we eplained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this ourt is o!erruled, and a dierent !iew is adopted, that the new doctrine may ha!e to be applied prospecti!ely in fa!or of parties who ha!e relied on the old doctrine and ha!e acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of Hle prospicit, non respicit. -;.

Doctrine of 8e &ationalii

iti0enship i s t he b asis for determining the (uan Mi*iano v. 4n+re Brimo, !R No.''&2&, Novemer ", "2'#. Though the last part of the personal law applicable. second clause of the will epressly said that %rticle 1C of the i!il ode pro!ides that Hlaws Hit be made and disposed of in accordance


relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citi0ens of the *hilippines, e!en though li!ing abroad. This is the rule of le nationalii in pri!ate international law. Thus, the *hilippine 'tate may require, for eecti!ity in the *hilippines, recognition by *hilippine courts of a foreign judgment aecting its citi0en, o!er whom it eercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citi0en.

with the laws in force in the *hilippine Island, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoe!er, e!en should the testator otherwise pro!ide. Impossible conditions are further de2ned as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall go!ern in his testamentary dispositions. The court appro!ed the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner (egardless of where a citi0en of the as to include %ndre "rimo, as one of the *hilippines might be, he or she will be legatees. go!erned by the law of his nationality A*hilippine 8awsB with respect to his or her Bellis vs. Bellis. !.R. No. 0'%6#8, (une 6, family rights and duties, or to his status, "26#. The 'upreme ourt held that the said condition or legal capacity. children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Teas 8aw, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes. The parties admit that the decedent, %mos $. "ellis, was a citi0en of the 'tate of Teas, 9.'.%., and that under the laws of Teas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. %ccordingly, since the intrinsic !alidity of the pro!ision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Teas law, the *hilippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of %mos $. "ellis. %rticle 14, par. -, and %rt. 1O3G of the i!il ode, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary

;ODOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

successions, with regard to four items@ AaB the order of succession7 AbB the amount of successional rights7 AeB the intrinsic !alidity of the pro!isions of the will7 and AdB the capacity to succeed.

-C. &emo e alterius incommode debet lecupletari

&o man ought to be made rich out of another+s injury.

Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic !alidity of testamentary pro!isions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whate!er may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (a*ous Bern)ar+ /ulst v. -R Buil+ers, In*., !.R. No. "&6%6, Septemer %, '$$#. Ineluctably, the 89(" Decision resulted in the unjust enrichment of petitioner at the epense of respondent. *etitioner recei!ed more than what he is entitled to reco!er under the circumstances. %rticle -- of the i!il ode which embodies the maim, nemo e alterius incommode debet lecupletari Ano man ought to be made rich out of another+s injuryB, states@ %rt. --. E!ery person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the epense of the latter

;1DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. The abo!e6quoted article is part of the chapter of the i!il ode on uman (elations, the pro!isions of which were formulated as basic principles to be obser!ed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order7 designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience7 guides for human conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice.=;M> There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a bene2t at the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. % sense of justice and fairness demands that petitioner should not be allowed to bene2t from his act of entering into a contract to sell that !iolates the constitutional proscription. This is not a case of equity o!erruling or supplanting a positi!e pro!ision of law or judicial rule. (ather, equity is eercised in this case Has the complement of legal jurisdiction that seeks to reach and to complete justice where courts of law, through the in?eibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their

;-DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so.= The purpose of the eercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to pre!ent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution. Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of the in?eibility of its statutory or legal jurisdiction. Repuli* of t)e -)ilippines, represente+  t)e Department of -uli* or3s an+ /ig)was, Commission on 4u+it an+ t)e National Treasurer, v. Carlito 0a*ap, +oing usiness un+er t)e name an+ stle Carwin Constru*tion an+ Constru*tion Suppl, !.R. No. "&8'&% Mar*) ', '$$#.%rticle -- of the i!il ode which embodies the maim &emo e alterius incommode debet lecupletari Ano man ought to be made rich out of another+s injuryB states@

%rt. --. E!ery person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the epense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. This article is part of the chapter of the i!il


ode on uman (elations, the pro!isions of which were formulated as Hbasic principles to be obser!ed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order,    designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience,    guides human conduct =that> should run as golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice. The rules thereon apply equally well to the $o!ernment. 'ince respondent had rendered ser!ices to the full satisfaction and acceptance by petitioner, then the former should be compensated for them. To allow petitioner to acquire the 2nished project at no cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice of respondent. 'uch unjust enrichment is not allowed by law. -4.

*arens patriae

8iterally, parens patriae means father of the country. This doctrine has been de2ned as the inherent power and authority of the state to pro!ide protection to the persons and property of the persons non6sui juris. &on6sui juris persons are those who lack the legal capacity to act on his own behalf like the child or the insane persons.

Mel*)ora Caanas v.ran*is*o -ilapil. !.R. No. 0'&8%, (ul '&, "2#. The onstitution pro!ides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that whene!er any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be aected then the judiciary if a litigation has been 2led should resol!e according to the best interest of that person. The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relati!e of the minor child and it is assumed that the

;;DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

mother shall show more care towards the child than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in consonance with this country+s tradition of fa!oring con?icts in fa!or of the family hence preference to the parent AmotherB is obser!ed. T)e -eople of t)e -)ilippines v. Domi*iano Balon !.R. No. 0%&, Ma '2, "2#. %s was noted in a recent case, *eople !. #olina, 3- it is manifest in the decisions of this ourt that where the oended parties are young and immature girls like the !ictim in this case, 33 there is a marked recepti!ity on its part to lend credence to their !ersion of what transpired. It is not to be wondered at. The state, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimi0e the risk of harm to those, who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themsel!es fully. Those of tender years deser!e its utmost protection. #oreo!er, the injury in cases of rape is not in?icted on the unfortunate !ictim alone. The consternation it causes her family must also be taken into account. It may re?ect a failure to abide by the announced concern in the fundamental law for such institution . 3; There is all the more reason then for the rigorous application of the penal law with its se!ere penalty for this oense, whene!er warranted. It has been aptly remarked that with the ad!ance in ci!ili0ation, the disruption

;CDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

in public peace and order it represents de2es eplanation, much more so in !iew of what currently appears to be a tendency for seual permissi!eness. )here the prospects of relationship based on consent are hardly minimal, self6restraint should e!en be more marked. -F.

'olutio indebiti

(efers to the juridical relation which arises whene!er a person unduly deli!ers a thing through mistake to another who has no right to demand it.

-)ilippine National Ban3 v. Court of 4ppeals an+ B.-. Mata an+ Co., In*. !.R. No. 2#22&, (anuar '", "22%. The instant case ful2lls the indispensable requisites of solutio indebiti as de2ned in %rticle -1C; that something Ain this If something is recei!ed when there is no right case moneyB has been recei!ed when there to demand it, and it was unduly deli!ered was no right to demand it and A-B the same through mistake, the obligation to return it was unduly deli!ered through mistake. There arises. is a presumption that there was a mistake in the payment
)hile petitioner may indeed opt to a!ail of an action to enforce a constructi!e trust or the quasi6contract of solutio indebiti, it has been depri!ed of a choice, for prescription has eecti!ely blocked quasi6contract as an alternati!e, lea!ing only constructi!e trust as the feasible option.


*etitioner argues that the lower and appellate courts cannot indulge in semantics by holding that in %rticle 1;C4 the recipient commits the mistake while in %rticle -1C;, the recipient commits no mistake. -4 5n the other hand, pri!ate respondent, in!oking the appellate courtLs reasoning, would impress upon us that under %rticle 1;C4, there can be no mutual mistake. onsequently, pri!ate respondent contends that the case at bar is one of solutio indebiti and not a constructi!e trust. !on7alo -uat 9 Sons, In*., v. Cit of Manila an+ Mar*elo Sarmiento, as Cit Treasurer of Manila, !.R. No. 0"##, 4pril %$, "26%. In refutation of the abo!e stand of appellants, appellee a!ers tht the payments could not ha!e been !oluntary.%t most, they were paid
In a recent case, )e said@
;FDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

claim or demand for its refund< Aiting the #edina case, supra7 East %siatic o., 8td. !. ity of Da!ao, $.(. &o. 8614-C3, %ug. -1, 1G4-B. 8astly, being a case of solutio indebiti, protest is not required as a condition sine qua non for its application.. -M. 8egis interpretatio legis !im obtinet

% 8atin maim which means HThe construction of law obtains the force of law. The interpretation placed upon a written law by a competent court has the force of the law. udicial decisions applying and interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the *hilippines.

-eople v. 0i*era, 6& SCR4 '#$. The application and interpretation placed by the ourt upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the 'upreme ourt+s application and interpretation merely established the contemporaneous legislati!e intent that the construed law purports to carry into eect. Se*retar of (usti*e ve. Catoli*o, 68 SCR4 6$#. udicial Decisions of the 'upreme ourt are authoritati!e and precedent setting while those of the inferior courts and ourt of %ppeals are merely persuasi!e. Indeed it is the duty of the judges to apply the law as interpreted by the 'upreme ourt.

-G.

*rejudicial uestion

The doctrine that comes into play generally in a situation where ci!il and criminal actions are pending and the issues in!ol!ed in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must be pre6empti!ely resol!ed in the ci!il case before the criminal action can proceed. Thus, the eistence of a prejudicial question in a ci!il case is alleged in the criminal case to

-eople versus 4+elo 4ragon 0&2%$, eruar "#, "2&. The 'upreme ourt de2ned it as one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issues in!ol!ed in said case and the cogni0ance of which pertains to other tribunal.

In the action of bigamy, if the accused claims that the 2rst marriage is null and !oid, and

;MDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

cause the suspension of the latter pending 2nal determination of the former. It is one which must be decided 2rst before a criminal action may be instituted or may proceed because a decision therein is !ital to the judgment in the criminal case.

the right to decide such !alidity is !ested in another tribunal, the ci!il action for nullity must 2rst be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed7 hence the !alidity of the 2rst marriage is a prejudicial question. Fuimao vs. sorio !.R. No. 08"&#. )hether the administrati!e case between the pri!ate parties in!ol!ing the lot subject matter of the ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question which would operates as a bar to said ejectment case.

*etition $ranted, the ' held &o prejudicial question. % prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue in!ol!ed in said case and the cogni0ance of which pertains to another tribunal The Doctrine of *rejudicial uestion comes into play generally in a situation where ci!il and criminal actions are pending and the issues in!ol!ed in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must be pre6 empti!ely resol!ed in the ci!il case before the criminal action can proceed. Thus, the eistence of a prejudicial question in a ci!il case is alleged in the criminal case to cause the suspension of the latter pending 2nal determination of the former.

;GDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

3O.

. %ction De in (em Nerso

%ction de in rem !erso is an action for unjust enrichment. In an action de in rem !erso, the plainti should show that enrichment was bestowed, that the enrichment caused an impo!erishment, that there is no justi2cation for the enrichment and impo!erishment, and that the plainti has no other adequate remedy at law, including no remedy under an epress or implied contract. In (oman law, action de in rem !erso is an action brought against a paterfamilias or a sla!e6owner who bene2ted from the transaction of a child or sla!e.

S)inro <-)ilippines= Compan, In*. v. RRN In*orporate+, !.R. No. "#'&'&, *toer '$, '$"$. %rticle -- of the &ew i!il ode reads@ E!ery person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the epense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

In order that accion in rem !erso may prosper, the essential elements must be present@ A1B that the defendant has been enriched, A-B that the plainti has suered a loss, A3B that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground, and A;B that the plainti has no other action based on contract, quasi6 contract, crime or quasi6delict. %n accion in rem !erso is considered merely an auiliary action, a!ailable only when there is no other remedy on contract, quasi6 contract, crime, and quasi6delict. If there is an obtainable action under any other institution of positi!e law, that action must be resorted to, and the principle of accion in rem !erso will not lie. %s found by both the I% and a/rmed by the %, petitioner failed to pro!e that respondentLs free use of the manlift was without legal ground based on the pro!isions of their contract. Thus, the third requisite is

CODOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

31. Doctrine of actio personalis moritur cum persona

missing. % 8atin epression meaning a personal action 0apu7S v. >ufemio, !.R. No. 0%$2##, dies with the person. 'ome legal causes of (anuar %", "2#'. The i!il ode of the action can sur!i!e the death of the claimant *hilippines recogni0es this in its %rticle 1OO, or plainti, for eample actions founded in by allowing only the innocent spouse Aand no contract law. owe!er, some actions are one elseB to claim legal separation7 and in its personal to the plainti, defamation of %rticle 1OM, by pro!iding that the spouses can, character being one notable eample. by their reconciliation, stop or abate the Therefore, such an action, where it relates to proceedings and e!en rescind a decree of the pri!ate character of the plainti, comes to legal separation already rendered. Being an end on his death, whereas an action for personal in character, it follows that the the publication of a false and malicious death of one party to the action causes statement which causes damage to the the death of the action itself. plaintiLs personal estate will sur!i!e to the bene2t of his or her personal representati!es. )hen one of the spouses is dead, there is no The principle also eists to protect the estate need for di!orce, because the marriage is and eecutors from liability for strictly dissol!ed. The heirs cannot e!en continue the personal acts of the deceased, such as suit, if the death of the spouse takes place charges for fraud. during the course of the suit A%rticle -;;, 'ection 3B. The action is absolutely dead. % further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plainti, e!en if property rights are in!ol!ed, is that these rights are mere eects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself7 without the decree such rights do not come into eistence, so that before the 2nality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in epectation. If death super!enes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and de2niti!e separation7 and the

C1DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

epected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn. Santos v. Se*. f 0aor, et.al , !.R. No. 0 '"6', eruar '#, "268. In!oking the doctrine of a*tio personalis moritur *um persona, the death of the deceased terminates any action. :urthermore, public o/ce is a public trust7 it is personal and that which cannot be passed to his heirs.

The ourt held that the jurisdiction of the court had attached before the death of 'antos and the same jurisdiction continues until the termination of the suit. Death will not dislodge jurisdiction on the money claim U it subsists. The court went on the merits despite the death of the deceased with the case pending. 3-.

Doctrine of %lter Ego

% doctrine based upon the misuse of a corporation by an indi!idual for wrongful or inequitable purposes, and in such case the court merely disregards the corporate entity and holds the indi!idual responsible for acts knowingly and intentionally done in the name of the corporation. The doctrine imposes upon the indi!idual who uses a corporation merely as an instrumentality to conduct his own business liability as a consequence of fraud or injustice perpetuated not on the corporation, but on third persons dealing with the corporation.

Sulo ng Baan, In*. vs. 4raneta, In*. !R 0 %"$6". It is a doctrine well established and obtains both at law and in equity that a corporation is a distinct legal entity to be considered as separate and apart from the indi!idual stock holders or members who compose it, and is not aected by the personal rights, obligations, and transactions of its stockholders or members. The property of the corporation is its property and not that of the stockholders, as owners, although they ha!e equities in it. *roperties registered in the name of the corporation ordinarily ha!e no

C-DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

interest in the indi!idual property of its stockholders unless transferred to the corporation, He!en in the case of a one6man corporation. The mere fact that one is president of a corporation does not render that property which he owns or possesses the property of the corporation, since the president, as indi!idual, and the corporation are separate similarities. 'imilarly, stockholders in a corporation engaged in buying and dealing in real estate whose certi2cates of stock entitled the holder thereof to an allotment in the distribution of the land of the corporation upon surrender of their stock certi2cates were considered not to ha!e such legal or equitable title or interest in the land, as would support a suit for title, especially against parties other than the corporation. Con*ept Buil+ers, In*. vs N0RC !R "$8#%. It is a fundamental principle of corporation law that a corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its stockholders and from other corporations to which it may be connected. "ut, this separate and distinct personality of a corporation is merely a 2ction created by law for con!enience and to promote justice. 'o, when the notion of separate juridical personality is used to defeat public con!enience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, or is used as a de!ice to defeat the labor laws, this separate personality of the


corporation may be disregarded or the !eil of corporate 2ction pierced. This is true likewise when the corporation is merely an adjunct, a business conduit or an alter ego of another corporation. The conditions under which the juridical entity may be disregarded !ary according to the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. &o hard and fast rule can be accurately laid down, but certainly, there are some probati!e factors of identity that will justify the application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate !eil, to wit@ A1B 'tock ownership by one or common ownership of both corporations7 A-B Identity of directors and o/cers7 A3B The manner of keeping corporate books and records7 and A;B #ethods of conducting the business. The 'E en banc eplained the
C;DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

control must be shown to ha!e been eercised at the time the acts complained of took place. #oreo!er, the control and breach of duty must proimately cause the injury or unjust loss for which the complaint is made.< The test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the !eil of corporate 2ction is as A1B ontrol, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of 2nances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or eistence of its own7 A-B 'uch control must ha!e been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the !iolation of a statutory or other positi!e legal duty or dishonest and unjust act in contra!ention of plaintiLs legal rights7 and A3B The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proimately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of. The absence of any one of these elements pre!ents
CCDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

33.

Doctrine of *ri!ity of ontract

This doctrine pro!ides that a contract cannot confer rights or impose obligations arising under it on any person or agent ecept the parties to it. The basic premise is that only parties to contracts should be able to sue to enforce their rights or claims to damages as such.

MarAue7 an+ !utierre7 0ora vs. 5arela an+ 5arela !.R. No. 08&. The principle underlying defendantsL objection is one of substanti!e law, recogni0ed under common law, where no one could sue for a breach of a contract who was not a party thereto, and the action allowed to be brought only in the name of the one holding the legal title. The requirement was based upon the doctrine of pri!ity of contract. Gu vs. C4 !.R. 8668%. onorable esar N. %lejandria, *residing udge said@ (esol!ing plaintiLs motion embodied in the complaint for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction after hearing, but without prejudging the merits of the case, and 2nding from the e!idences adduced by the plainti, that the terms and conditions of the agency agreement, Ehibit <%6inj.< between the plainti and The ouse of #ayfair of England for the eclusi!e distributorship by the plainti of the latterLs goods, apertain to them7 that there is no pri!ity of contract between the plainti and the defendant7 that the contro!ersy in this case arose from a breach of contract by the :&: Trading of $ermany, for ha!ing shipped goods it had purchased from The ouse of #ayfair to the *hilippines7 The ouse of #ayfair was demanding payment of ;,COO.OO from the :&: Trading for restitution of plaintiLs alleged loss on account of the shipment of the goods in question here in the *hilippines and now in


the possession of the defendant7 it appears to the ourt that to restrain the defendant from selling the goods it has ordered from the :&: Trading of $ermany, would be without legal justi2cation. 3;. Doctrine of indefeasibility of torrens titles

3C. Doctrine of #ortgagee in $ood :aith

% doctrine that a certi2cate of title, once registered, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modi2ed, enlarged or diminished ecept in a direct proceeding permitted by law.

De -e+ro vs Romasan !R "&8$$' . %ccording to the report, the land claimed by the petitioners was co!ered by the title under the name of respondent corporation, the petitioners+ claim for damages had no leg to stand on.

The rule that all persons dealing with property co!ered by a Torrens erti2cate of Title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. The public interest in upholding the indefeasibility of a certi2cate of title, as e!idence of the lawful ownership of the land or of any encumbrance thereon, protects a buyer or mortgagee who, in good faith, relied upon what appears on the face of the certi2cate title.

Cavite Devt. Ban3 vs. Sps. 0im !R "%"6#2. Despite the fact that the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, his title being fraudulent, the mortgage contract and any foreclosure sale arising therefrom are gi!en eect by reason of public policy. This is the doctrine of
CFDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

obligation to undertake further in!estigation. This doctrine pre6supposes, howe!er, that the mortgagor, who is not the rightful owner of the property, has already succeeded in obtaining Torrens title o!er the property in his name and that, after obtaining the said title, he succeeds in mortgaging the property to another who relies on what appears on the title. This is not the situation in the case at bar since 'antos was not the registered owner for he merely represented himself to be the attorney6in6fact of the spouses 'an *ablo. In cases where the mortgagee does not directly deal with the registered owner of real property, the law requires that a higher degree of prudence be eercised by the mortgagee. 34.

Doctrine of lean ands

% person who has acted wrongly, either morally or legally, will not be helped by a court when complaining about the actions of someone else. % legal doctrine which is a defense to a complaint, which states that a party who is asking for a judgment cannot ha!e the help of the court if heSshe has done anything unethical in relation to the subject of the lawsuit. Thus, if a defendant can show the plainti had
Nan* 0. T v. Ban*o ilipino Savings an+ Mortgage Ban3, !.R. No. "88%$', (une '#, '$"'. %n implied trust could not ha!e been formed between the "ank and Tala as this ourt has held that
The bank cannot use the defense of nor seek enforcement of its alleged implied trust with Tala since its purpose was contrary to law. %s admitted by the "ank, it
CMDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

common
CGDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

The "ank and Tala are in pari delicto, thus, no a/rmati!e relief should be gi!en to one against the other. The "ank should not be allowed to dispute the sale of its lands to Tala nor should Tala be allowed to further collect rent from the "ank. The clean hands doctrine will not allow the creation or the use of a juridical relation such as a trust to sub!ert, directly or indirectly, the law. &either the "ank nor Tala came to court with clean hands7 neither will obtain relief from the court as the one who seeks equity and justice must come to court with clean hands. Serrano vs. NSDB "$ SCR4 6'6. e who comes into equity must come in clean hands

3F.

Doctrine of part performance

%n e quitable p rinciple t hat a llows a court t o recogni0e and enforce an oral contract despite its legal de2ciencies and pro!ides a way around the statutory bar to the enforcement of an oral contract. "y applying the doctrine, a party can establish the eistence of a contract despite the lack of any written e!idence. $enerally, without written e!idence, a contract does not satisfy the formal requirements set by the legislature under the statute of frauds. The doctrine is an eemption to this as it allows failure to comply with the statute of frauds to be o!ercome by a party+s eecution, in reliance on an opposing party+s oral promise, of an oral contract+s

Rosario Caronnel v.(ose -on*io, Ramon Infante, an+ >mma Infante, !.R. No. 0""'%", Ma "', "2&8. 'ubject to a rule to the contrary followed in a few jurisdictions, it is the accepted !iew that part performance of a parol contract for the sale of real estate has the eect, subject to certain conditions concerning the nature and etent of the acts constituting performance and the right to equitable relief generally, of taking such contract from the operation of the statute of frauds, so that chancery may decree its speci2c performance or grant other equitable relief. It is well settled in $reat "ritain and in this country, with the eception of a few


requirement.

states, that a su/cient part performance by the purchaser under a parol contract for the sale of real estate remo!es the contract from the operation of the statute of frauds. The true basis of the doctrine of part performance according to the o!erwhelming weight of authority, is that it would be a fraud upon the plainti if the defendant were permitted to escape performance of his part of the oral agreement after he has permitted the plainti to perform in reliance upon the agreement. The oral contract is enforced in harmony with the principle that courts of equity will not allow the statute of frauds to be used as an instrument of fraud. In other words, the doctrine of part performance was established for the same purpose for which, the statute of frauds itself was enacted, namely, for the pre!ention of fraud, and arose from the necessity of pre!enting the statute from becoming an agent of fraud for it could not ha!e been the intention of the statue to enable any party to commit a fraud with impunity. )hen the party concerned has pleaded partial performance, such party is entitled to a reasonable chance to7 establish by parol e!idence the truth of this allegation, as well as the contract itself.

e!idence is admissible in such cases to pro!e both the contract and the part performance of the contract<. Marta C. rtega v. !ariel 0eonar+o, !.R. No. 0""%"", Ma '8, "2&8.
It is also stated that

together with his making !aluable and permanent impro!ements on the property which are referable eclusi!ely to the contract, in reliance on the contract, in the honest belief that he has a right to make them, and with the knowledge and consent or acquiescence of the !endor, is deemed a part performance of the contract. The entry into possession and the making of the impro!ements are held on amount to such an alteration in the purchaserLs position as will warrant the courtLs entering a degree of speci2c performance.< %gain, it is stated that <% tender or oer of payment, declined by the !endor, has been said to be equi!alent to actual payment, for the purposes of determining whether or not there has been a part performance of the contract. This is apparently true where the tender is by a purchaser who has made impro!ements. "ut the doctrine now generally accepted, that not e!en the payment of the purchase price, without something more, is a su/cient part performance. %nd the relinquishment of rights or the compromise thereof has likewise been held to constitute part performance. In the light of the abo!e four paragraphs, it would appear that the complaint in this case described se!eral circumstance indicating


partial performance@ relinquishment of rights continued possession, building of impro!ements, tender of payment plus the sur!eying of the lot at plaintiLs epense and the payment of rentals. ence, as there was partial performance, the principle ecluding parol contracts for the sale of realty, does not apply. The judgment will accordingly be re!ersed and the record remanded for further proceedings. )ith costs against appellee. 3M. Doctrine of Immutability and Inalterability of a :inal udgment

5nce a judgment has become 2nal and eecutory, it can no longer be disturbed, altered or modi2ed. The court loses jurisdiction o!er the judgment to amend Aecept for clerical errorsB or alter the same but it retains jurisdiction to eecute it during the its lifetime.

0an+ Ban3 of t)e -)ilippines v. /ermin 4r*eo, Romeo 0. Santos, Ma*ario 4. Igna*io, 4gnes D.C. MarAue7 an+ Ro+el 5. Dela Cru7, !.R. No. "&8'#$, (ul '", '$$8. )hen a 2nal judgment is eecutory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modi2ed in any respect either by the court which rendered it or e!en by this ourt. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become 2nal at some de2nite point in time.

The doctrine that has a two6fold purpose@ 1B to a!oid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business and -B to put an end to judicial contro!ersies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why The doctrine of immutability and inalterability courts eist. of a 2nal judgment has a two6fold purpose@ A1B to a!oid delay in the administration of justice The doctrine admits se!eral eceptions, like@ and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the A1B the correction of clerical errors7 A-B the so6 discharge of judicial business and A-B to put called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no an end to judicial contro!ersies, at the risk of


prejudice to any party7 A3B !oid judgments7 and A;B whene!er circumstances transpire after the 2nality of the decision rendering its eecution unjust and inequitable.

occasional errors, which is precisely why courts eist. ontro!ersies cannot drag on inde2nitely. The rights and obligations of e!ery litigant must not hang in suspense for an inde2nite period of time. (ecords re!eal that the (T decision had attained 2nality. *er certi2cation issued by the *ostmaster of 'an :ernando, *ampanga, petitioner 8"* recei!ed a copy of the (T decision on December 3, -OO1. It had 2fteen A1CB days, or until December 1M, -OO1, to 2le a motion for reconsideration or to appeal the (T decision. *etitioner 2led a motion for reconsideration only on December -O, -OO1, or two A-B days beyond the reglementary period. %t that time, the (T decision was already 2nal and eecutory. It is well6settled that court orders and decisions become 2nal and eecutory by operation of law. It is the lapse of time which renders a court decision 2nal and immutable. Tan Tia* C)iong v. Cosi*o, 4.M. No. C4$'%%, (ul %", '$$', %8& SCR4 &$2. The ourt, in dismissing the administrati!e complaint 2led against % ustice (odrigo osico, necessarily sustained the recall of the entry of judgment made by ustice osico, as ponente, in a criminal case appealed to the %. The ourt eplained that the recall of entry of judgment might ha!e been an error of judgment, for which no judge should be administrati!ely


charged, in the absence of showing of any bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose. It noted that ustice osico had recalled the entry of judgment to aord due process to the accused, because the % decision had been sent to the house of the counsel of the accused but had been returned with the notation H#o!ed 5ut. The % was thus prompted to resend the decision to the counsel+s new address, thereby allowing the accused to 2le a motion for reconsideration. 3G.

Doctrine of (es udicata

The 8atin term for
Spouses Ro+olfo 4. No*e+a an+ >rna T. No*e+a v. 4urora 4ri7oDire*to, !.R. No. "#82&, (ul '6, '$"$. The principle of res judicata lays down two main rules, namely@ A1B the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties and their pri!ies and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit in!ol!ing the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal7 and A-B any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily in!ol!ed in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusi!ely settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their pri!ies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two suits are the same. These


are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, howe!er, the two actions rest upon dierent states of facts, or if dierent proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the maintenance of the other.

two main rules mark the distinction between the principles go!erning the two typical cases in which a judgment may operate as e!idence. The 2rst general rule abo!e stated, and which corresponds to the afore6quoted paragraph AbB of 'ection ;F, (ule 3G of the (ules of ourt, is referred to as Thus, petitioners can no longer question respondent+s ownership o!er 8ot &o. 11-1 in the instant suit for quieting of title. 'imply put, conclusi!eness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a dierent claim or cause of action.=1;> :urthermore, we agree that petitioners instituted the instant action with unclean hands. %ware of their defeat in the pre!ious case, they attempted to thwart eecution and


assert their alleged ownership o!er the land through their purported purchase of a lot from ecilia 5bispo6Dahipon. This later transaction appears to be suspect. % perusal of $.(. &o. 11GF3O re!eals that the ourt was not unaware of Dahipon+s alleged claim o!er the same parcel of land. It noted that Dahipon did not e!en bother to appear in court to present her free patent upon respondent+s request, or to inter!ene in the case, if she really had any legitimate interest o!er the land in question. =1C> In any e!ent, petitioners+ assertion of alleged good title o!er the land cannot stand considering that they purchased the piece of land from Dahipon knowing fully well that the same was in the ad!erse possession of another. Thus, we 2nd no re!ersible error in the appellate court+s ruling that petitioners are in fact buyers in bad faith. Calalang v. Register of Dee+s of Fue7on Cit, !.R. Nos. #6'6& an+ 8%'8$, Mar*) "", "22, '%" SCR4 88. The second concept Q conclusi!eness of judgment Q states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusi!ely settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties t o that action and persons in pri!ity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in


any future action between such parties or their pri!ies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or dierent cause of action, while the judgment remains unre!ersed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusi!e as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their pri!ies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their pri!ies will be 2nal and conclusi!e in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the 2rst suit A&abus !. ourt of %ppeals, 1G3 '(% F3- =1GG1>B. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue. ;O.

*rinciple of %buse of (ights

The principle of abuse of rights is found under !loe Ma*3a Cale an+ Ra+io Corporation v. %rticles 1G, -O and -1 of the i!il ode of the Court of 4ppeals, '&# -)il. #8% <"282=. It was *hilippines, which states that@ elucidated that while %rticle 1G Hlays down a rule of conduct for the go!ernment of human %rt. 1G. HE!ery person must, in the eercise of relations and for the maintenance of social his rights and in the performance of his order, it does not pro!ide a remedy for its duties, act with justice, gi!e e!eryone his due !iolation. $enerally, an action for damages and obser!e honesty and good faith. under either %rticle -O or %rticle -1 would be proper. %rt. -O. HE!ery person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to The ourt said@ 5ne of the more notable another, shall indemnify the latter for the inno!ations of the &ew i!il ode is the


same. %rt. -1. H%ny person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. )hen a right is eercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in %rticle 1G and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. %lthough the requirements of each pro!ision is dierent, these three A3B articles are all related to each other. The elements of an abuse of right under %rticle 1G are the following@ A1B There is a legal right or duty7 A-B which is eercised in bad faith7 A3B for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. %rticle -O speaks of the general sanction for all other pro!isions of law which do not especially pro!ide for their own sanction. Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the eercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his !ictim for injuries suered thereby. %rticle -1 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements@ 1B There is an act which is legal7 -B but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy7 3B and it is done with intent to injure. Thus, under any of these

codi2cation of should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice.< AId.B :oremost among these principles is that pronounced in %rticle 1G which pro!ides@ %rt. 1G. E!ery person must, in the eercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, gi!e e!eryone his due, and obser!e honesty and good faith. This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be obser!ed not only in the eercise of oneLs rights, but also in the performance of oneLs duties. These standards are the following@ to act with justice7 to gi!e e!eryone his due7 and to obser!e honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recogni0es a primordial limitation on all rights7 that in their

FODOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

three three A3B pro!i pro!isio sions ns of law, law, an act which which eerc eercise, ise, the norms of human human conduct conduct set causes causes injury to another another may be made the forth in %rticle 1G must must be obser!ed. obser!ed. % right, basis for an award of damages. though by itself legal because recogni0ed or granted granted by law as such, such, may ne!ertheles ne!ertheless s 5f the three articles, %rt. 1G was intended to become the source of some illegality. )hen a epan epand d the conce concept pt of torts torts by grant grantin ing g right is eercised in a manner which does not adequate legal remedy for the untold number conform with the norms enshrined in %rticle of mora morall wron wrongs gs whic which h is impo imposs ssib ible le for for 1G and results in damage to another, a legal human human foresi foresigh ghtt to pro!i pro!ide de speci speci2ca 2cally lly in wrong wrong is thereby thereby committed committed for which which the statutory law. If mere fault or negligence in wrongd wrongdoer oer must must be held respon responsibl sible. e. "ut one+s acts can make him liable for damages while %rticle 1G lays down a rule of conduct for injury caused thereby, with more reason for the go!ernment of human relations and for should abuse or bad faith make him liable. the maintenance of social order, it does not The absence of good faith is essential to pro!ide a remedy for its !iolation. $enerally, abus abuse e of righ right. t. $ood $ood fait faith h is an hone honest st an action for damages under either %rticle -O inte intent ntio ion n to abst abstai ain n from from taki taking ng any any or %rticle -1 would be proper. unconscientious ad!antage of another, e!en Repuli*, i*, et al. v. 0a*ap, 0a*ap, !.R !.R.. No. "&8'&%, "&8'&%, through the forms or technicalities of the law, Repul together with an absence of all information or Mar*) ', '$$#. The ' had the occasion to beli belief ef of fact fact whic which h woul would d rend render er the the once once again again say that that %rticl %rticle e --, --, & was transa transacti ction on uncon unconsci scien entio tious. us. In busin business ess formulated as basic principles to be obser!ed relations, it means good faith as understood for the rightful rightful relation relationship ship between between human by men of aairs. beings and for the stability of the social order, desig designat nated ed to indic indicate ate certai certain n norm norms s that that )hile %rticle 1G may ha!e been intended as a spring from the fountain of good conscience, mere mere declaratio declaration n of principl principle, e, the Hcardin Hcardinal al guid guides es human human condu conduct ct that that should should run run as law on human human conduct conduct epressed epressed in said golden golden threads threads through through society society to the end article has gi!en rise to certain rules, e.g. that that that law may appro approach ach its supre supreme me ideal ideal where a person eercises his rights but does which is the sway and dominance of justice. so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties 'ince 'ince respond respondent ent had render rendered ed ser!ices ser!ices to in a mann manner er that that is not not in keepi eeping ng with with the the full full sati satisf sfac acti tion on and and acce accept ptan ance ce by honesty and good faith, he opens himself to peti petiti tion oner er,, then then the the for former mer shou should ld be liability. compensated for them. To allow petitioner to

F1DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

%rticl %rticle e 1G of the i!il ode, ode, sets sets certa certain in standards which may be obser!ed not only in the eercise of one+s rights but also in the performance of one+s duties. These standards are the following@ to act with justice7 to gi!e e!eryone his due7 and to obser!e honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recogni0es the primordial limitation on all rights@ that in their eerc eercise, ise, the norms norms of human human conduct conduct set forth in %rticle 1G must be obser!ed. % right, though by itself legal because recogni0ed or granted granted by law as such, such, may ne!ertheles ne!ertheless s become the source of some illegality. ;1. ;1.

Doct Doctri rine ne of mobi mobili lia a sequ sequun untu turr

Doct Doctri rine ne hold holdin ing g that that pers person onal al prop proper erty ty held held by a person is go!erned by the same law that go!erns that person, so that if a person who is legally domiciled in one jurisdiction dies with property in a second jurisdiction, that property is legally treated as though it were in the 2rst jurisdiction.

acquire the 2nished project at no cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice of respondent. 'uch unjust enrichment is not allowed by law. In this case, the respondent undertook works for the go!ernment, go!ernment, made ad!ances for the purchase purchase of materials materials and payment payment for labor costs. The 'tate howe!er refused to pay on the ground that it had an epired license at the time of the eecut eecution ion of the contract contract.. Despite the same, it is entitled to be paid for completed projects. ells argo v. Colle*tor, #$ -)il %'&. This case in!ol!es the collection of inheritance taes on shar shares es of stoc stock k issu issued ed by the the "eng "engue uett onsolidated #ining orporation and owned by 8illia 8illian n Eye. Eye. 'aid 'aid share shares s were were alread already y subjecte subjected d to inheritan inheritance ce taes taes in aliforni alifornia a and and are are now now bein being g tae taed d by *hil *hilip ippi pine ne authorities.

5riginally, the settled law in the 9nited 'tates is that intangibles ha!e only one situs for the purpose of inheritance ta U the domicile of the decedent at the time of death. "ut this rule has, of late, been relaed. relaed. The maim mobilia sequuntur personam, upon which the rules rests, has been decried as a mere 2ction of law ha!ing its origin in considerations of general general con!eni con!enience ence and public public policy policy and

F-DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

cannot be applied to limit or control the right of the the 'tat 'tate e to ta ta prop proper erty ty with within in its its jurisdiction. It must yield to established established fact of legal ownership, actual presence and control elsewhere, and cannot be applied if to do so woul would d resu result lt in ines inesca capa pabl ble e and and pate patent nt injustice. The relaation of the original rule rests on either of two fundamental fundamental considerations@ 1. 9pon the recognition recognition of the inherent inherent power power of each go!ernme go!ernment nt to ta persons, persons, properties properties and rights within its jurisdiction and enjoying the protection of its laws7 or -. 9pon 9pon the the prin princi cipl ple e that that as to intangibles, intangibles, a single location in space is hardly possible possible,, consider considering ing the multiple multiple,, distinct distinct relationships which may be entered into with respect thereto. The actual situs of the shares shares of stock is in the *hilippines, *hilippines, the corporation being domiciled therein. %nd besides, the certi2cates of stock ha!e remained in this country up to the time when when the deceased deceased died in aliforni alifornia, a, and they were in the possession of the secretary of the "enguet orporation. The secretary had the right to !ote, !ote, collect collect di!iden di!idends, ds, among among othe others rs.. :or :or all all prac practi tica call purp purpos oses es,, the the secretary had legal title to the certi2cates of stock held in trust for Eye. Eye etended in


the *hilippines her acti!ities re@ her intangible personal property so as to a!ail herself of the protection and bene2ts of the *hilippine laws. T)e Colle*tor of Internal Revenue v. 4ntonio Campos Rue+a, !.R. No. 0"%'&$, *toer '2, "2#". The "oard found from the documents submitted to it Q proof of the laws of 8iechtenstein Q that said country does not impose estate, inheritance and gift taes on intangible property of :ilipino citi0ens not residing in that country. )herefore, the "oard declared that pursuant to the eemption abo!e established, no estate or inheritance taes were collectible, 8udwig Jiene being a resident of 8iechtestein when he passed away.< -O Then came this de2niti!e ruling@
F;DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

;-. Doctrine of contra!ent legis

;3.

aequitas

nunquam Equity ne!er acts in contra!ention of the law.

Doctrine of %ttracti!e &uissance

% person who maintains in his premises a dangerous instrumentality of a character which is attracti!e to children if tender years at play and who fails to eercise due diligence to pre!ent such children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child who is injured thereby, e!en if the child is technically a trespasser.

4ir -)ilippines Corporation v. International Business 4viation Servi*es -)ils., In*. !.R. No. "&"26%, Septemer 2, '$$. The interests of justice require that positi!e law be equally obser!ed. *etitioner has not su/ciently pro!ed the injustice of holding it liable for the negligence of its counsel. 5n the contrary, there is a preponderance of e!idence to demonstrate that both law and justice demand otherwise. #uch leniency has already been shown by the lower court to petitioner, but
/i+algo >nterprises In*. v. !uillermo Balan+an, 4nselma 4nila an+ T)e Court of 4ppeals, !.R. No. 0%'', (une "%, "2&'. The doctrine of attracti!e nuisance states that H5ne who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to eercise ordinary care to pre!ent children from playing therewith or resorting The principle reason for the doctrine is that thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who

FCDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

the condition or appliance in question although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this attracti!eness is an implied in!itation to such children

;;.

In %rticulo #ortis

is injured thereby, e!en if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. %merican urisprudence shows us that the attracti!e nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, arti2cial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or arti2cial feature other than the mere water and its location. In the case bar, the tanks themsel!es cannot fall under such doctrine thus the petitioners cannot be held liable for #ario+s death.

The translation of articulo mortis is
De 0oria v eli? !.R. No. 02$$&, (une '$, "2&8. The marriage in %rticulo #ortis is !alid. The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license7 but it requires the priest to make the a/da!it and 2le it. 'uch a/da!it contains the data usually required for the issuance of a marriage license. The 2rst practically substitutes the latter. &ow then, if 'ome locales allow these marriages to be a marriage celebrated without the license is solemni0ed without a marriage license and to not !oidable Aunder %ct 3413B this marriage be solemni0ed by a ship captain, an airplane should not also be !oidable for lack of such pilot, or a military commander. a/da!it. -eople v. Bautista !.R. No. ""#68&. (une '", "222. % dying declaration, also known as an ante mortem statement or a statement in articulo mortis, is admissible under the following requisites@ A1B that death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact7 A-B that the declaration refers to the


cause and surrounding circumstances of such death7 A3B that the declaration relates to facts which the !ictim is competent to testify to7 and A;B that the declaration is oered in a case wherein the declarant+s death is the subject of the inquiry. In the case at bar, the trial court correctly rejected the ante mortem statement of the !ictim. (ecords show that ose $aga0a, r., the person who allegedly heard the !ictim+s ante mortem statement, was ne!er presented in court to testify on the matter. It has been held that if the dying declaration was made orally, it may be pro!ed by the testimony of the witness who heard the same or to whom it was made. ;C.

Doctrine of Triennial ohabitation

% doctrine of common law, which declares the presumption that the husband is impotent should the wife still remain a !irgin after li!ing together with the husband for three years. This is in contrast to the general presumption under our law in fa!or of potency.

Tomp3ins v. Tomp3ins 2' N.(. >A. ""% """ 4tl. &22. The court held that under the doctrine of triennial cohabitation, the husband In this case is presumed to be impotent. The claim of the husband that the wife did not want carnal intercourse is hard to belie!e. 'uch solicitation of a groom is noble7 of a husband, heroic. The husband+s plea does not inspire con2dence. ommon eperience discredits it. %nd if in fact he had the physical power and refrained from seual intercourse during the 2!e years he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of sympathy for her feelings,

FFDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

he deser!es to be doubted for not ha!ing asserted his rights, e!en though she balked. The presumption of impotency has not been o!ercome, and the decree of annulment will be granted. ;4.

8e 8oci ontractus

The law of the place where the contract was made.

Halanea vs. Court of 4ppeals, 228 SCRA 23. This ourt applied the doctrine of le loci contractus. %ccording to the doctrine, as a general rule, the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into go!erns with respect to its nature and !alidity, obligation and interpretation. This has been said to be the rule e!en though the place where the contract was made is dierent from the place where it is to be performed, and particularly so, if the place of the making and the place of performance are the same. ence, the court should apply the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued, when the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such 'tate by the defendant airline.

;F.

Doctrine of 9ltra Nires

% corporation is a creature of the law and has only such powers and pri!ileges as are granted by the 'tate U the ultra !ires doctrine is a product of the theory of concession7 it upholds the 2duciary duty of directors and o/cers to the stockholders or members U such duty dictates that the corporation engage only in transactions to which the stockholders and members bind themsel!es

4trium Management Corp. v. Court of 4ppeals. !.R. No. "$22". eruar '8, '$$". De 8eon was authori0ed and such issuance is not an ultra !ires act. (atio@ De 8eon as treasurer of the corporation is authori0ed to sign checks for the corporation. %s a rule, the act of issuing checks is within the ambit of a !alid corporate act. %nd securing a loan to 2nance the acti!ities of the

FMDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

by way of the pro!isions of the purposes clause. This is also necessarily include an obligation not to enter into transactions which !iolate the law. )hether the act in question is in direct and immediate furtherance of the corporation+s business, fairly incident to the epress powers and reasonably necessary to their eercise. The strict terms Hdirect and immediate refers to the business of the corporation while the liberal terms Hfairly incident and Hreasonably necessary with reference to the powers of the corporation. )ith regard to the business of the corporation as the reference point, much latitude is gi!en to the corporation to enter in to !arious contracts as long as they ha!e logical relation to the pursuit of such business. 5n the other hand, when the purpose clause used limiting words that ourt will hold such corporation to such limited business. 'econd Type of 9ltra Nires@ )hen the *resident enters into speculati!e contracts, without prior board appro!al, and without subsequent submission of those contracts to the "oard for appro!al or rati2cation, nor were the transactions included in the reports of the corporation, such contracts do not bind the corporation. It must be pointed out that the "oard of

corporation is not an ultra !ires act. )hile an ultra !ires act is one committed outside the object or which a corporation is created as de2ned by law of its organi0ation and therefore beyond the power conferred upon it by law, the act pertained to in the case is not an illegal act. De 8eon on the other hand was negligent in con2rming that such checks were issued to ET enry as payment for their company+s debt with the former. That is why she was held to be personally liable to %trium. Sa@* 4l*an 9 Cie v.Imperial 5egetale il Co., In*. %&& SCR4 &&2 <'$$"=. The grant or donation in question is remunerati!e in nature and was gi!en in consideration of the ser!ices rendered by the heirs+ father to the corporation. The donation has already been perfected such that the corporation could no longer rescind it. It was embodied in a "oard (esolution. (epresentati!es of the corporation and e!en its creditors as the &D ha!e gi!en their concurrence. The resolution was actually carried out when the corporation and Estefania entered into an agreement that the proceeds will be entered as a loan. Estefania accepted the donation and such was recorded by the corporation. The "oard of Directors appro!ed Estefania+s purchase of the house in &ew ork. ompany stockholders formally rati2ed the donation. The donation was a corporate act carried out by the corporation not only with the sanction of the "oard of

FGDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

Directors, not the corporate powers.

*resident,

eercises Directors but also of its stockholders. The donation has reached a stage of perfection which is !alid and binding upon the corporation and cannot be rescinded unless there eists legal grounds for doing so. The 'E opinion nor the subsequent "oard (esolution are not su/cient reasons to nullify the donation. The donation is also not an ultra !ires act. The corporation was gi!en broad and unlimited powers to carry out the purpose for which it was organi0ed which includes the power to A1B in!est and deal with corporate money not immediately required in such manner as from time to time may be determinedA-B aid in any other manner to any person, association or corporation of which any obligation is held by this corporation. The donation undoubtedly comes within the scope of this broad power. %n ultra !ires act is A1B an act contrary to law, morals, or public order or contra!ene some rules of public policy or duty. It cannot acquire !alidity by performance, rati2cation, estoppel. It is essentially !oid A-B those within the scope of the %rticles of Incorporation and not always illegal. It is merely !oidable and may become binding and enforceable when rati2ed by stockholders. 'ince it is not contended that the donation is illegal or contrary to any of the epressed pro!isions of the %rticles of Incorporation nor prejudicial to the creditors of the corporation, said donation e!en if ultra !ires is not !oid and if !oidable, its in2rmity

MODOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

has been cured by rati2cation and subsequent acts of the corporation. The corporation is now estopped or pre!ented from contesting the !alidity of the donation. To allow the corporation to undo what it has done would be most unfair and contra!ene the well6settled doctrine that the defense of ultra !ires cannot be se up or a!ailed of in any completed transaction. ;M.

Trust :und Doctrine

onsiders the subscribed capital stock as a trust fund for the payment of the debts of the corporation, to which the creditors may look for satisfaction. 9ntil the liquidation of the corporation, no part of the subscribed capital stock may be turned o!er or released to the stockholder Aecept in the redemption of the redeemable sharesB without !iolating this principle. Thus di!idends must ne!er impair the subscribed capital stock7 subscription commitments cannot be condoned or remitted7 nor can the corporation buy its own shares using the subscribed capital as the consideration therefore.

Donnina C. /alle, v. -rintwell, In*., !.R. No. "&#&2, Ma %$, '$"". "oth the (T and the % applied the trust fund doctrine against the defendant stockholders, including the petitioner.

The trust fund doctrine enunciates a rule that the property of a corporation is a trust fund for the payment of creditors, but such property can be called a trust fund Vonly by way of analogy or metaphor.+ %s between the corporation itself and its creditors it is a simple debtor, and as between its creditors and stockholders its assets are in equity a fund for the payment of its debts. )e clarify that the trust fund doctrine is not limited to reaching the stockholder+s unpaid subscriptions. The scope of the doctrine when the corporation is insol!ent encompasses not only the capital stock, but also other property and assets generally regarded in equity as a trust fund for the payment of corporate debts. %ll assets and property belonging to the

M1DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

corporation held in trust for the bene2t of creditors that were distributed or in the possession of the stockholders, regardless of full payment of their subscriptions, may be reached by the creditor in satisfaction of its claim. %lso, under the trust fund doctrine ,a corporation has no legal capacity to release an original subscriber to its capital stock from the obligation of paying for his shares, in whole or in part,> without a !aluable consideration, or fraudulently, to the prejudice of creditors. The creditor is allowed to maintain an action upon any unpaid subscriptions and thereby steps into the shoes of the corporation for the satisfaction of its debt. To make out a prima facie case in a suit against stockholders of an insol!ent corporation to compel them to contribute to the payment of its debts by making good unpaid balances upon their subscriptions, it is only necessary to establish that the stock holders ha!e not in good faith paid the par !alue of the stocks of the corporation. To reiterate, the petitioner was liable pursuant to the trust fund doctrine for the corporate obligation of "#*I by !irtue of her subscription being still unpaid. *rint well, as "#*I+s creditor, had a right to reach her unpaid subscription in satisfaction of its claim. Boman >nvironmental Dev. Corp. v.C4, "6#

M-DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

SCR4 &$ <"288=. The requirement requirement of unrestricted unrestricted retained earnings to co!er the shares is based on the trust trust fund fund doctr doctrin ine e which which means means that that the capital stock, property and other assets of a corporation are regarded as equity in trust for the paymen paymentt of corpor corporate ate cred credito itors. rs. The The reason is that creditors of a corporation are pref prefer erre red d o!er o!er the the stoc stockh khol olde ders rs in the the distribution of corporate assets. There can be no distr istrib ibu ution tion of asse ssets amon among g the the stockhol stockholders ders without without 2rst paying paying corporate corporate creditors. ence, any disposition of corporate funds to the prejudice of creditors is null and !oid.

;G.

Doctrine of 8aches

The doctrine of of la laches or or of of Hs Hstale demands is based upon grounds of public policy which requ equire ires, for for the the peace peace of societ society, y, the d is is c ou ou ra ra ge ge me me nt nt o f s ta ta l e c la la im im s a nd nd , unlik unlike e the statute statute of limita limitation tion,, is not merel y a question question of time but but is principally principally a quest question ion of the inequ inequity ity or unfai unfairn rness ess of permitting a right or claim to been forced or asserted. There is no absolute rule as to what constitut constitutes es laches laches or staleness staleness of demand7 demand7 each case is to be determined according according to its particular circumstances. 9ltimately, howe!er, the question question of laches laches is addressed addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, since it is an equi equita tabl ble e doct doctri rine ne,, its its appl applic icat atio ion n is contro controlle lled d by equit able consider ation.

5+a. +e Tirona v. >n*arna*ion, !R "682$', '8 )hile e juri jurisp spru rude denc nce e is Septem Septemer er '$$# '$$#. )hil sett settle led d on the the impr impres escr crip ipti tibi bili lity ty and and inde indefea feasib sibili ility ty of a Torre orrens ns title, title, there there is equa equally lly an abund abundanc ance e of cases cases wher where e we unequi unequi!ocal !ocally ly ruled ruled that register registered ed owners owners may lose their right to reco!er possession of propert property y through through the equitabl equitable e principl principle e of laches. 8aches means Hthe failure or neglect, for an unreasonable unreasonable and uneplained uneplained length of time, to do that which, by eercising due diligen diligence, ce, could or should should ha!e been done done earlier7 it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. The defense of laches is an equitable one


and does not concern itself with the character of the defendant+s title, but only with whether or not by reason of plainti+s long inaction or inecusable neglect, he should be barred from asserting asserting his claim at all, because because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust to defendant. defendant. H8aches has been de2ned as Hsuch neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances circumstances causing prejudice to an ad!er ad!erse se party, party, as will will operat operate e as a bar in equity. It is a delay in the assertion of a right Hwhic which h work works s disa disad! d!an anta tage ge to anot anothe her r because because of the Hinequity Hinequity founded on some change change in the condition condition or relation relations s of the prope property rty or parti parties. es.  It is based based on publi public c policy which, for the peace of society, ordains that relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a !alid claim. It is diere dierent nt from and applies applies indepen independen dently tly of prescription. prescription. )hile prescription is concerned concerned with the fact of delay, delay, laches laches is concern concerned ed with with the eec eectt of delay delay. *resc *rescrip riptio tion n is a matter of time7 laches is principally a question of inequ inequity ity of perm permitt itting ing a claim claim to been been forced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the property or the relat elatio ion n of the the part partie ies. s. *rescr escrip ipti tion on is statut statutory ory77 lache laches s is not. not. 8ache 8aches s applie applies s in equity, equity, wherea whereas s prescrip prescription tion applies applies at law. law. *rescription *rescription is based on a 2ed time, laches is not.

M;DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

0lemos 0lemos vs. 0lemos, 0lemos, !R "&$"6', '6 (anuar '$$#. '$$#. It is a well6settled doctrine that laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetuate frau fraud d and and inju injust stic ice. e. &eit &eithe herr shou should ld its its applicat application ion be used to pre!ent pre!ent the rightful rightful owners owners of a propert property y from reco!ering reco!ering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.

CO.

%ction of (econ!eyance

8egal an a nd eq equitable re remedy gr granted to t o th t he rightful rightful owner of the land which which has been been wrongfu wrongfully lly or errone erroneously ously register registered ed in the name ame of anot anoth her for for the the purpos rpose e of compelling the latter to transfer or recon!ey the land to him.

/eirs of Salonga Bituin, v Teo@lo Caoleng, Sr., et al., al., !R "&#& "&#&6# 6#,, "$ 4ugu 4ugust st '$$# '$$#.. )ell entr entren enche ched d is the rule that that an action action for recon!e recon!eyanc yance e prescrib prescribes es in ten years, years, the reck reckon onin ing g poin pointt of whic which h is the the date date of regi regist stra rati tion on of the the deed deed or the the date date of issuance issuance of the certi2cate certi2cate of title o!er the property. In an action for recon!eyance, the decree decree of registrat registration ion is highly highly regarde regarded d as incontro!ertible. incontro!ertible. )hat is sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title, which has been erroneously or wrongfully registered in another person+s name to its rightful or legal owne owner, r, or to one who has a better better right. right. owe!er, in a number of cases in the past, the ourt declared that if the person claiming to be the owner of the property is in actual poss posses essi sion on ther thereo eof, f, the the righ rightt to see seek recon!eyance, which in eect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the the owne ownerr ther thereo eoff may may wait wait unti untill his his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked

MCDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

before taking steps to !indicate his right, the rationale for the rule being that his undisturbed possession pro!ides him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the ad!erse claim of a third party and its eect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by the one who is in possession. Crisostomo v. !ar*ia, &"6 -)il. #% <'$$6=. )hen property is registered in anotherLs name, an implied or constructi!e trust is created by law in fa!or of the true owner. The action for recon!eyance of the title to the rightful owner prescribes in 1O years from the issuance of the title. %n action for recon!eyance based on implied or constructi!e trust prescribes in ten years from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certi2cate of title o!er the property.

It is now well settled that the prescripti!e period to reco!er property obtained by fraud or mistake, gi!ing rise to an implied trust under %rt. 1;C4 of the i!il ode, is 1O years pursuant to %rt. 11;;. This ten6year prescripti!e period begins to run from the date the ad!erse party repudiates the implied trust, which repudiation takes place when the ad!erse party registers the land.


C1.

*resumption of 'ur!i!orship

If there is a doubt, as between two or more (oaAuin vs. Navarro. 2% -)il. '&. )here the persons who are called to succeed each other, death of the mother and her son occurred as to which of them died 2rst, whoe!er during the massacre of ci!ilians in :ebruary, alleges the death of one prior to the other, 1G;C and at the time when #anila was being shall pro!e the same7 in the absence of proof, bombarded during the war, the 'upreme court it is presumed that they died at the same upheld the ruling of the trial court Awhich was time and there shall be no transmission of re!ersed by the ourt of %ppealsB that, from rights from one to the other. the e!idence presented, the son died before the mother. *ertinently, it was based from the )hen two persons perish in the same testimony of one of the witnesses of the calamity, such as a wreck, battle, or incident who was with oaquin &a!arro r., #r. con?agration and it is not shown who died 8ope0. 2rst, and there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the sur!i!orship is presumed the probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sees, according to the following rules. If both were under the age of 2fteen years, the older is presumed to ha!e sur!i!ed. If both were abo!e the age of sity, the younger is presumed to ha!e sur!i!ed. If one be under 2fteen and the other abo!e sity, the former is presumed to ha!e sur!i!ed.

C-. Doctrine of implications Anecessary implicationsB

The doctrine of implications means that Hthat which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a part of it as that which is epressed.

Cit of Manila an+ Treasurer vs. (u+ge !ome7. !.R. No. 0%#'&". 4ugust %", "28". The 'upreme ourt held that the doctrine of implications in statutory construction and sustained the ity of #anila+s contention that the additional one6half percent realty ta was sanctioned by the pro!ision in 'ection ; of the 'pecial Education :und 8aw. The doctrine of

MFDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

implications means that Hthat which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a part of it as that which is epressed. The ob!ious implication is that an additional one6half percent ta could be imposed by municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law Athe ordinanceB 2ed at two percent the realty ta that would accrue to a city or municipality. 'ection ; of the 'pecial Education :und 8aw, as con2rmed by the (eal *roperty Ta ode AlaterB, in prescribing a total realty ta of three percent impliedly authori0ed the augmentation by one6half percent of the pre6 eisting one and one6 half percent realty ta. National 4sso*iation of Tra+e :nions
MMDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

managerial employees as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor organi0ation, under the doctrine of necessary implication, con2dential employees are similarly disquali2ed. This doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is epressed, as elucidated in se!eral cases -4 the latest of which is hua !. i!il 'er!ice ommission -F where we said@ &o statute can be enacted that can pro!ide all the details in!ol!ed in its application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. )hat is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all6embracing legislation may be inadequate to pro!ide for the unfolding e!ents of the future. 'o6called gaps in the law de!elop as the law is enforced. 5ne of the rules of statutory construction used to 2ll in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. E!ery statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such pro!isions as may be necessary to eectuate its object and purpose, or to make eecti!e rights, powers, pri!ileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. E necessitate legis . In applying the doctrine of necessary implication, we took into consideration the rationale behind the disquali2cation of

MGDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

managerial employees epressed in "ulletin *ublishing orporation !. 'anche0, -M thus@
GODOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

course of collecti!e bargaining, they might jeopardi0e that interest which they are duty6 bound to protect. %long the same line of reasoning we held in $olden :arms, Inc. !. :errer6alleja 31 reiterated in *hilips Industrial De!elopment, Inc. !. &8(, 3- that
Doctrine of ollat era l %ttack

% d ecree o f r egis tra tion a nd r egistered t itle cannot be impugned, enlarged, altered, modi2ed, or diminished either in collateral or direct proceeding, after the lapse of one year from the date of its entry. In terms of marriage, as a general rule, a !oid marriage may be collaterally attacked. This means that the nullity of a marriage can be asserted e!en if it is not the main or principal issue of a case and that no pre!ious judicial declaration of nullity is required by law with respect to any other matter where the issue of the !oidness of a marriage is pertinent or material, either directly or indirectly.

De Castro vs. 4ssi+aoDe Castro. !.R. No. "6$"#'. *etitioner 2led a complaint for support against her husband to compel the latter to support their child. The husband interposed an a/rmati!e defense claiming that the petitioner and she were not married. The 'upreme ourt ruled that while the case was one of support, the lower court can make a declaration that the marriage was !oid to determine the rights of the child to be supported. The 'upreme ourt rejected the contention that a separate case for judicial declaration of nullity must be 2led 2rst before the lower court, in a case for support, can rule that the marriage was !oid.

)here a direct attack is necessary has been alluded to by the 'upreme ourt in Ninal vs. Badayog !"# SCRA $""%, when it said that

G1DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. owe!er, for other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the !alidity of a marriage e!en in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. )hen such need arise, a 2nal judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary e!en if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause Hon the basis of a 2nal judgment declaring such pre!ious marriage !oid in %rticle ;O of the :amily ode connotes that such 2nal judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. Gane7 v. I4C, !.R. No. 68'2", Mar*) 6, "22". % collateral attack is not allowed. It was erroneous for %rcidio to question the Torrens 5T issued to Nalentin in an ordinary ci!il action for reco!ery of possession 2led by the registered owner U Nalentin U of the said lot, by in!oking as a/rmati!e defense in his answer the 5rder of the "ureau of 8ands issued pursuant to the in!estigatory power of the Director of 8ands under 'ection G1 of *ublic 8and 8aw A% &o. 1;1 as amendedB. 'uch a defense partakes of the nature of a

G-DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

collateral attack against a certi2cate of title brought under the operation of the Torrens system of registration pursuant to 'ec. 1--, 8and (egistration %ct, now 'ec. 1O3, *D 1-CG. C;.

Doctrine of )ai!er

It is the intentional or !oluntary relinquishment of a known right or such conduct as warrants and inference of the relinquishment of such right.

DM Consuni, In*. 5s C4 !.R. No. "%#8#%. *ri!ate respondent #aria uego 2led in the *asig (egional Trial ourt a complaint for damages against petitioner for the death of her husband ose uego. ose was employed (equisites for a !alid wai!er@ by petitioner as a construction worker who fell 1. wai!ing party must actually ha!e the right 1; ?oors from the (enaissance Tower in *asig he is renouncing and died. #aria a!ailed of the death bene2ts -. he must ha!e full capacity to make the from the 'tate Insurance :und. *etitioner is wai!er claiming that she can no longer reco!er 3. wai!er must be clear and unequi!ocal damages under the i!il ode because her 6wai!er must not be contrary to law, public prior a!ailment of the bene2ts from the 'tate order, public morals, etc. Insurance :und. The trial court and % 6when formalities are required, they must be decided in fa!or of #aria complied with. )hether #aria+s a!ailment of the death bene2ts pro!ided under the 8abor ode amounts to a wai!er of her rights to claim for damages from petition under the i!il ode.

#aria was only ignorant of the fact and of her rights as well. #aria+s election of the death bene2ts does not bar any action inconsistent with the elected remedy. :or a wai!er to become !alid there must be an intentional relinquishment of a known right. )here one lacks knowledge of a rights, there is no basis upon which wai!er of its can rest. )ai!er


requires acknowledge of the right wai!ed with an awareness of its consequences. Thus ignorance of material fact negates wai!er. 5elas*o v. Court of 4ppeals 26 SCR4 6"6. If a corporation wai!es Aby sellingB in fa!or of the $'I' all the former+s right in a subdi!ision, and assumes the payment of debts for materials used, and later said corporation becomes insol!ent, the $'I' should answer for said debts for it has obtained the bene2ts Athe impro!ements of which the $'I' is now the ownerB.

CC.

Doctrine of ontra "onus #ores

#eans against good morals and is applied through %rticle 1G, -O and -1 of the &ew i!il ode of the *hilippines. %rticle -1 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements@ 1B There is an act which is legal7 -B but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy7 3B and it is done with intent to injure. Thus, under any of these three A3B pro!isions of law, an act which causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of damages.

!as)em S)oo3at Ba3s), petitioner, v. /on. Court of 4ppeals an+ Marilou T. !on7ales, !.R. No. 2#%%6, eruar "2, "22%. In the light of the abo!e laudable purpose of %rticle -1, )e are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a manLs promise to marry is in fact the proimate cause of the acceptance of his lo!e by a woman and his representation to ful2ll that promise thereafter becomes the proimate cause of the gi!ing of herself unto him in a seual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or decepti!e de!ice to entice or in!eigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the seual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to %rticle -1 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud

G;DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, howe!er, that such injury should ha!e been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. In the instant case, respondent ourt found that it was the petitionerLs
GCDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

of moral seduction. Beatri7 -. assmer v. ran*is*o E. 5ele7, !.R. No. 0'$$82, De*emer '6, "26. It must not be o!erlooked, howe!er, that the etent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for %rticle -1 of said ode pro!ides that
The record re!eals that on %ugust -3, 1GC; plainti and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued AEhs. %, %61B. Their wedding was set for 'eptember ;, 1GC;. In!itations were printed and distributed to relati!es, friends and acquaintances ATsn., C7 Eh. B. The bride6 to6beLs trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased ATsn., F6MB. Dresses for the maid of honor and the ?ower girl were prepared. % matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. "ridal showers were gi!en and gifts recei!ed ATsn., 47 Eh. EB. %nd then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then -M years old,@ simply left a note for plainti stating@ <)ill ha!e to postpone wedding Q #y mother opposes it ... < e enplaned to his home city in #indanao, and the net day, the day before the wedding, he


wired plainti@ <&othing changed rest assured returning soon.< "ut he ne!er returned and was ne!er heard from again. 'urely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. %s stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. "ut to formally set a wedding and go through all the abo!e6described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemni0ed, is quite dierent. This is palpably and unjusti2ably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with %rticle -1 aforesaid. Defendant urges in his afore6stated petition that the damages awarded were ecessi!e. &o question is raised as to the award of actual damages. )hat defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and eemplary damages, in the amount of *-C,OOO.OO, should be totally eliminated. *er epress pro!ision of %rticle --1G A1OB of the &ew i!il ode, moral damages are reco!erable in the cases mentioned in %rticle -1 of said ode. %s to eemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him because under %rticle --3- of the &ew i!il ode the condition precedent is that
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oppressi!e, or male!olent manner.< The argument is de!oid of merit as under the abo!e6narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a oppressi!e manner.< This ourtLs opinion, howe!er, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case, *1C,OOO.OO as moral and eemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award. C4.

#olina Doctrine

The ourt created the #olina guidelines to aid Danilo 4. 4urelio v. 5i+a Ma. Cora7on -. the courts in the disposition of cases in!ol!ing 4urelio, !.R. No. "#&%6#, (une 6, '$"". This psychological incapacity, t o wit@ ourt, purs ua nt to 'upreme ourt %dministrati!e #atter &o. O-61161O, has A1B "urden of proof to show the nullity of the modi2ed the abo!e pronouncements, marriage belongs to the plainti. particularly 'ection -AdB thereof, stating that A-B The root cause of the psychological the certi2cation of the 'olicitor $eneral incapacity must be@ AaB medically or clinically required in the #olina case is dispensed with identi2ed, AbB alleged in the complaint, AcB to a!oid delay. 'till, %rticle ;M of the :amily su/ciently pro!en by eperts and AdB clearly ode mandates that the appearance of the eplained in the decision. prosecuting attorney or 2scal assigned be on A3B The incapacity must be pro!en to be behalf of the 'tate to take steps to pre!ent eisting at Hthe time of the celebration of the collusion between the parties and to take care marriage. that e!idence is not fabricated or suppressed. A;B 'uch incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. *etitioner anchors his petition on the premise ACB 'uch illness must be gra!e enough to that the allegations contained in respondent+s bring about the disability of the party to petition are insu/cient to support a assume the essential obligations of marriage. declaration of nullity of marriage based on A4B The essential marital obligations must be psychological incapacity. 'peci2cally, those embraced by %rticles 4M up to F1 of the petitioner contends that the petition failed to :amily ode as regards the husband and wife, comply with three of the #olina guidelines, as well as %rticles --O, --1 and --C of the namely@ that the root caus e of the

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same ode in regard to parents and their children. 'uch non6complied marital obligationAsB must also be stated in the petition, pro!en by e!idence and included in the tet of the decision. AFB Interpretations gi!en by the &ational %ppellate #atrimonial Tribunal of the atholic hurch in the *hilippines, while not controlling or decisi!e, should be gi!en great respect by our courts. AMB The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or 2scal and the 'olicitor $eneral to appear as counsel for the state. &o decision shall be handed down unless the 'olicitor $eneral issues a certi2cation, which will be quoted in the decision, brie?y stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

psychological incapacity must be alleged in the complaint7 that such illness must be gra!e enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage7 and that the non6complied marital obligation must be stated in the petition. It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically incapacitated to ful2ll their marital obligations is a matter for the (T to decide at the 2rst instance. % perusal of the #olina guidelines would show that the same contemplate a situation wherein the parties ha!e presented their e!idence, witnesses ha!e testi2ed, and that a decision has been reached by the court after due hearing. 'uch process can be gleaned from guidelines -, 4 and M, which refer to a decision rendered by the (T after trial on the merits. It would certainly be too burdensome to ask this ourt to resol!e at 2rst instance whether the allegations contained in the petition are su/cient to substantiate a case for psychological incapacity. 8et it be remembered that each case in!ol!ing the application of %rticle 34 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generali0ations but according to its own attendant facts. ourts should interpret the pro!ision on a case6to6case basis, guided by eperience, the 2ndings of eperts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and

GGDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

by decisions of church tribunals.=1M> It would thus be more prudent for this ourt to remand the case to the (T, as it would be in the best position to scrutini0e the e!idence as well as hear and weigh the e!identiary !alue of the testimonies of the ordinary witnesses and epert witnesses presented by the parties. Benamin !. Ting v. Carmen M. 5ele7Ting, !.R. No. "66&6', Mar*) %", '$$2. In hindsight, it may ha!e been inappropriate for the ourt to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in #olina, in resol!ing all cases of psychological incapacity. )e said that instead of ser!ing as a guideline, #olina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases in!ol!ing psychological incapacity to 2t into and be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on Hall fours with another.

CF. #eeting of the #inds in a ontract This doctrine speaks of the intent of the of 'ale parties in entering into the contract respecting the subject matter and the consideration thereof, and if the words of the contract appear to be contrary to the e!ident intention of the parties, the latter shall pre!ail o!er the former.

Sps. Buenaventura an+ (oaAuin, et.al. v. C4. !.R. No. "'6%#6. % contract of sale is not a real contract but a consensual contract, !alid and binding upon the meeting of the minds as to the price. If there is a meeting of the mind of the parties as to the price, the contract of sale is !alid, despite the manner of paymen , or e!en the breach of that manner of

1OODOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

payment. If there is no meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, because the price stipulated in the contract is simulated, then the contract is !oid, according to %rticle 1;F1 of the i!il ode. It is not the act of payment of the price that determines the !alidity of a contract of sale. In the present case, petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deed of 'ale were absolutely simulated, thus there was meeting of the minds. San Miguel -roperties -)ilippines, In*. v. Sps. /uang !.R. No. "%#'2$. In the present case, the ' held that the stages of a contract of sale are@ 1. &egotiation, co!ering the period from the time the prospecti!e contracting parties indicate interest in the contract to the time the contract is perfected7 -. *erfection, which takes place upon the concurrence of the essential elements of the sale, which is the meeting of the minds of the parties as to the subject of the contract and upon the price,7 and 3. onsummation, which begins when the parties perform their respecti!e undertakings under the contract of sale, culminating upon the etinguishment thereof.

CM.

5wnership by (ight of %ccretion

%rticle ;CF of the i!il ode pro!ides that to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of ri!ers belong the accretion which they gradually recei!e from the eects of the current of the waters. This doctrine has 3

Martine7 Canas vs Tuason. & -)il 688. This is a case of boundary dispute between the owners of two estates A#ariquina estate and *ayatas estateB, in which dispute the Tuasons claimed 3O hectares of land which had been swifted

1O1DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

CG. %llu!ial :ormation %long the 'eashore :orms *art of the *ublic Domain

requisites@ 1. that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible7 -. that it be made through the eects of the current of the water7 and 3. that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of ri!ers.

o!er to the *ayatas estate side of the #ariquina (i!er. Though the e!idence for the owners of the #ariquina estate was much stronger than that of the *ayatas estate in this case, the 'upreme ourt, ne!ertheless, held that the owner of the *ayatas estate had acquired title to the land by accretion.

%llu!ial formations along the seashore forms part of the public domain and therefore, not open to the acquisition by ad!erse possession by pri!ate persons. The adjoining registered owner of the foreshore land cannot claim ownership by right of accretion

Igna*io vs. Dire*tor of 0an+s, !.R. No. 0 "'2&8 Ma %$, "26$. It is not disputed that the land applied for adjoins a parcel owned by the applicant which he had acquired from the $o!ernment by !irtue of a :ree *atent in 1G34. It has also been established that the parcel in question was formed by accretion and allu!ial deposits caused by the action of the #anila "ay which boarders it on the southwest. %pplicant and petitioner Ignacio claims that he had occupied the land since 1G3C, planting it with api6api trees, and that his possession thereof had been continuous, ad!erse and public for a period of twenty years until said possession was disturbed by oppositor and pri!ate respondent Naleriano. 5n the other hand, the Director of 8ands sought to pro!e that the parcel is foreshore land, co!ered by the ebb and ?ow of the tide and, therefore, formed part of the public domain. /rs. of Navarro vs I4C !.R. No. 68"66 . In the

1O-DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

light of the !intage but still !alid pro!ision of %rticle ; of the 'panish 8aw of )aters of 1M44, which is where the said doctrine on allu!ial formations is deri!ed, unequi!ocal is the public nature of the disputed land in the contro!ersy of the present case, the same being an accretion on a sea bank which, for all legal purposes, the foreshore of #anila "ay is. %s part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and Hso long as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is reser!ed for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by any pri!ate person, ecept through epress authori0ation granted in due form of a competent authority. 4O. 5wnership of %bandoned (i!er "eds by (ight of %ccession

(i!erbeds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of waters ipso facto belongs to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. owe!er, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed, shall ha!e the right to acquire the same by paying the !alue thereof U which !alue shall not eceed the !alue of the area occupied by the new bed. (equisites of the application of %rt. ;41 of the &ew i!il ode in accordance to the aforementioned doctrine are@ 1. The change must be sudden in order that the old ri!er may be identi2ed7 -. The changing of the course must be more or less permanent, and

Sps. !alang vs. Sps. Rees !.R. No. "8#6 . If indeed a property was the former bed of a creek that changed its course and passed through the property of the claimant, then, pursuant to %rticle ;41, the ownership of the old bed left to dry by the change of course was automatically acquired by the claimant. "efore such a conclusion can be reached, the fact of natural abandonment of the old course must be shown, that is, it must be pro!en that the creek indeen changed its course without arti2cial or manmade inter!ention. Thus, the claimant, in this case the (eyeses, must pro!e three key elements by clear and con!incing e!idence. These are@ 1. The old course of the


not temporary o!er?owing of another+s land7 3. The change of the ri!er must be natural7 ;. There must be de2nite abandonment of the go!ernment7 C. The ri!er must continue to eist, that is, it must not completely dry up or disappear.

41. Doctrine of ollateral %ttack on Titles

creek7 -. The new course of the creek7 and 3. The change of course of the creek from the old location to the new location by natural occurrence. In this regard, the (eyeses failed to adduce indubitable e!idence to pro!e the old and new course, and the natural abandonment. In the face of a Torrens title issued by the go!ernment, which is presumed to ha!e been regularly issued, the e!idence of the (eyeses was clearly wanting. 9ncorroborated testimonial e!idence will not su/ce to con!ince the opurt to order the re6 con!eyance of the property to them.

% doctrine stating that collateral attack on 4oon vs 4oon, et.al. !.R. No. "&&8%$ . In titles is not allowed, pursuant to 'ec. ;M of order to properly assail the !alidity of the *.D. 1C-G, which states that H% certi2cate of respondent+s TT, he must himself bring an title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It action for that purpose. Instead of bringing cannot be altered, modi2ed, or canceled that direct action, he mounted his attack as a ecept in direct proceeding in accordance merely defensi!e allegation herein. 'uch with law. manner of attack against the TT was a collateral one, which was disallowed by 'ection ;M of *.D. 1C-G. 4mun+o an+ -erla De !u7man v. -ra?i+es (. 4gagala, !.R. No. "6%&66, eruar "2, '$$8. 9pon the epiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certi2cate of title issued shall become incontro!ertible. %ny person aggrie!ed by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages

1O;DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

against the applicant or any other person responsible for the fraud. 'E. ;M. erti2cate not subject to collateral attack. W % certi2cate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modi2ed, or canceled ecept in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. AEmphasis suppliedB Indeed, a decree of registration or patent and the certi2cate of title issued pursuant thereto may be attacked on the ground of falsi2cation or fraud within one year from the date of their issuance. 'uch an attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding. The rationale is this@ The public should be able to rely on a registered title. The Torrens 'ystem was adopted in this country because it was belie!ed to be the most eecti!e measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recogni0ed. %n action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. 5n the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral

1OCDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

when, in an action to obtain a dierent relief, an attack on the judgment is ne!ertheless made as an incident thereof. In the present case, the attack on 5T &o. *6 3O1MF was merely collateral because the action was principally for the declaration of nullity of the deed of donation and the other deeds of con!eyance which followed. owe!er, the principle of indefeasibility does not apply when the patent and the title based thereon are null and !oid. %n action to declare the nullity of a !oid title does not prescribe and is susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral, attack. 5T &o. *63O1MF was registered on the basis of a free patent which the (T ruled was issued by the Director of 8ands without authority. The petitioners falsely claimed that the land was public land when in fact it was not as it was pri!ate land pre!iously owned by armen who inherited it from her parents. This 2nding was a/rmed by the %. There is no reason to re!erse it. The settled rule is that a free patent issued o!er a pri!ate land is null and !oid, and produces no legal eects whatsoe!er. *ri!ate ownership of land W as when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear showing of open, continuous, eclusi!e, and notorious possession, by present or pre!ious occupants


W is not aected by the issuance of a free patent o!er the same land, because the *ublic 8and law applies only to lands of the public domain. The Director of 8ands has no authority to grant free patent to lands that ha!e ceased to be public in character and ha!e passed to pri!ate ownership. onsequently, a certi2cate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certi2cate issued in a judicial proceeding only if the land co!ered by it is really a part of the disposable land of the public domain. 'ince the Director of 8ands has no authority to grant a free patent o!er pri!ately owned land, any title issued pursuant thereto is null and !oid. Therefore, although 5T &o. *63O1MF was merely collaterally attacked, it was still correctly nulli2ed because the free patent on which it was based was null and !oid ab initio. 4-. (escission by (eason of 'ubject being 9nder 8itigation

(esolution of 8itigation is not a condition to rescission. ontracts which are rescissible due to fraud or bad faith include those which in!ol!e things under litigation, if they ha!e been entered into by the defendant without the knowledge and appro!al of the litigans or of competent judicial authority. Thus, %rticle 13M1 A;B of the i!il ode pro!ides@ HThe following contracts are rescissible@ A;B Those

0u7, et.al. vs. Balon !.R. No. "8'%&. It bears stressing that the right to ask for the rescission of a contract under %rticle 13M1 A;B of the i!il ode is not contingent upon the 2nal determination of the ownership of the thing subject of litigation. The primordial purpose of the said pro!ision is to secure the possible eecti!ity of the impending judgment by a court with respect to the thing subject of

1OFDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

which refer to things under litigation if they ha!e been entered into by the defendant without the knowledge and appro!al of the litigans or of competent judicial authority. The rescission of a contract under %rticle 13M1 A;B of the i!il ode only requires the concurrence of the following@ 2rst, the defendant, during the pendency of the case, enters into a contract which refers to the thing subject of litigation7 and second, the said contract was entered into without the knowledge and appro!al of the litigans or of a competent judicial authority. %s long as the foregoing requisites concur, it becomes the duty of the court to order the rescission of the said contract. 43.

Doctrine of jus sanguinis

litigation. It seeks to protect the binding eect of the court+s impending adjudication !is6X6!is the thing subject of litigation regardless of which among the contending claims therein would subsequently be upheld. %ccordingly, a de2niti!e judicial determination with respect to the thing subject of litigation is not a condition sine qua non before the rescissory action contemplated under %rticle 13M1 A;B of the i!il ode may be instituted.

8atin of right of blood, it is a principle of Cirilo R. 5alles v. Commission on >le*tions an+ nationality law by which citi0enship is not Rosalin+ Gas*o 0ope7, !.R. No. "%#$$$, determined by place of birth but by ha!ing 4ugust 2, '$$$. The ommission on Elections instead one or both parents who are citi0ens ruled that pri!ate respondent (osalind basco of the state or more generally by ha!ing state 8ope0 is a :ilipino citi0en and therefore, citi0enship or membership to a nation quali2ed to run for a public o/ce because A1B determined or conferred by 6ethnic, cultural or her father, Telesforo basco, is a :ilipino other6 descent or origin citi0en, and by !irtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a :ilipino citi0en under the 1GMF *hilippine onstitution7 A-B she was married to a :ilipino, thereby making her also a :ilipino citi0en ipso jure under 'ection ; of ommonwealth %ct ;F37 A3B and that, she renounced her %ustralian citi0enship on anuary 1C, 1GG- before the Department of

1OMDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

Immigration and Ethnic %airs of %ustralia and her %ustralian passport was accordingly cancelled as certi2ed to by the %ustralian Embassy in #anila7 and A;B furthermore, there are the 5#E8E (esolutions in E* &o. G-6 C; and '*% ase &o. GC6O44, declaring her a :ilipino citi0en duly quali2ed to run for the electi!e position of Da!ao 5riental go!ernor. The *hilippine law on citi0enship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citi0enship of the parents regardless of the place of hisSher birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citi0enship on the basis of place of birth. *ri!ate respondent (osalind basco 8ope0 was born on #ay 14, 1G3; in &apier Terrace, "roome, )estern %ustralia, to the spouses, Telesforo basco, a :ilipino citi0en and nati!e of Daet, amarines &orte, and Theresa #arque0, an %ustralian. istorically, this was a year before the 1G3C onstitution took into eect and at that time, what ser!ed as the onstitution of the *hilippines were the principal organic acts by which the 9nited 'tates go!erned the country. These were the *hilippine "ill of uly 1, 1GO- and the *hilippine %utonomy %ct of %ugust -G, 1G14, also known as the ones 8aw. 'o also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citi0enship by !irtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1GF3; and

1OGDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

1GMFC onstitutions. Thus, the herein pri!ate respondent, (osalind basco 8ope0, is a :ilipino citi0en, ha!ing been born to a :ilipino father. The fact of her being born in %ustralia is not tantamount to her losing her *hilippine citi0enship. If %ustralia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, pri!ate respondent can also claim %ustralian citi0enship resulting to her possession of dual citi0enship. Hoilo 4ntonio 5ele7 v. Ronal+ 4llan elle -oe, a.3.a. ernan+o -oe, (R., !.R. No. "6"6%. Mar*) %, '$$. 'ection -, %rticle NII, of the 1GMF onstitution epresses@

<&o person may be elected *resident unless he is a natural6born citi0en of the *hilippines, a registered !oter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the *hilippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.< The term

naturali0ation, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis U had been in !ogue. 5nly two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a Hnatural6born citi0en of the *hilippines. us soli, per (oa !s. ollector of ustoms A1G1-B, did not last long. )ith the adoption of the 1G3C onstitution and the re!ersal of (oa in Tan hong !s. 'ecretary of 8abor A1G;FB, jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citi0enship by birth. Documentary e!idence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of :* was his paternal grandfather 8oren0o *ou, married to #arta (eyes, the father of %llan :. *oe. )hile the record of birth of 8oren0o *ou had not been presented in e!idence, his death certi2cate, howe!er, identi2ed him to be a :ilipino, a resident of 'an arlos, *angasinan, and M; years old at the time of his death on 11 'eptember 1GC;. The certi2cate of birth of the father of :*, %llan :. *oe, showed that he was born on 1F #ay 1G1C to an EspaYol father, 8oren0o *ou, and a mesti0a EspaYol mother, #arta (eyes. Introduced by petitioner was an Huncerti2ed copy of a supposed certi2cate of the alleged marriage of %llan :. *oe and *aulita $ome0 on OC uly 1G34. The marriage certi2cate of %llan :. *oe and "essie Jelley re?ected the date of their marriage to be on 14 'eptember 1G;O. In the


same certi2cate, %llan :. *oe was stated to be twenty62!e years old, unmarried, and a :ilipino citi0en, and "essie Jelley to be twenty6two years old, unmarried, and an %merican citi0en. The birth certi2cate of :*, would disclose that he was born on -O %ugust 1G3G to %llan :. *oe, a :ilipino, twenty6four years old, married to "essie Jelly, an %merican citi0en, twenty6one years old and married. 4;.

Doctrine of political question

These are non6justiciable cases that are Maanag v. 5ito, #8 -)il. ". It was held that if beyond the jurisdiction, competence or ability rati2cation of an amendment is a political of e!en the 'upreme ourt to decide. question, a proposal which leads to rati2cation has to be a political question. The two steps The so6called *olitical uestion Doctrine holds complement each other in a scheme intended that it would be a meaningless, inconsistent, to achie!e a single objecti!e. It is to be noted contradictory and unacceptable self6 that the amendatory process as pro!ided in referential in!alidation for a 'upreme ourt to section I of %rticle ZN of the *hilippine e!en take up the !alidity or legitimacy or onstitution Hconsists of AonlyB two distinct onstitutionality of the re!olution, coup parts@ proposal and rati2cation. There is no dLetat, or other political process that logic in attaching political character to one established that onstitution and the ourt. and withholding that character from the other. *roposal to amend the onstitution is a highly political function performed by the ongress in its so!ereign legislati!e capacity and committed to its charge by the onstitution itself. The eercise of this power is e!en in dependent of any inter!ention by the hief Eecuti!e. If on grounds of epediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the !alidity


of a proposal. !on7ales v. Comele*, !.R. No. 0'8"26. The 'enate and the ouse of (epresentati!es passed res olutions &o. 1, - and 3. 'ubsequently, ongress passed a bill, which, upon appro!al by the *resident, on une 1F, 1G4F,became (epublic %ct &o. ;G13, pro!iding that the amendments to the onstitution proposed in the aforementioned (esolutions &o. 1 and 3 be submitted, for appro!al by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on &o!ember 1;, 1G4F.Two cases were 2led against this act of ongress@ 5ne is original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction by (amon %. $on0ales, in 86-M1G4, a :ilipino citi0en, a tapayer, and a !oter. %nother one is by *I85&'%, in 86-M--;, a corporation duly organi0ed and eisting under the laws of the *hilippines, and a ci!ic, non6pro2t and non6partisan organi0ation the objecti!e of which is to uphold the rule of law in the *hilippines and to defend its onstitution against erosions or onslaughts from whate!er source.

The issue whether or not a (esolution of ongress acting as a constituent assembly !iolates the onstitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial re!iew.


4C.

Doctrine of 8is pendens

8is pendens literally means a pending suit. Doctrine that refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires o!er a property in!ol!ed in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, until 2nal judgment.

5olunta+ v. Spouses Di7on. The ourt allowed the issuance of an alias writ of eecution against the transferees pendente lite, who had knowledge of the pending litigation on the basis of the annotation of the notice of lis pendens on their titles. The ourt clari2ed therein that there was no need for the The reason behind the doctrine are 2rst, o !ictorious =parties> to 2le a separate action to protect the rights of the party causing the enforce their right to reco!er the property as registration of the lis pendens, second is to against the new registered owners. ad!ise third persons who purchase or contract on the subject property that they do so at 4sso*iate+ Ban3 v. -ronstroller, !.R. No. their peril and subject to the result of the "8, (ul ", '$$8, &&8 SCR4 ""%. The pending litigation. It may in!ol!e actions that ourt a/rmed the judgments of the trial and deal not only with title or possession of a appellate courts cancelling the titles of the property but also with the use and occupation spouses Naca, who were transfereespendente of a property. The litigation must directly lite of %ssociated "ank, despite the fact that in!ol!e a speci2c property which is the spouses Naca were not parties to the case necessarily aected by the judgment. The between %ssociated "ank and the notice of lis pendens is a notice to the whole *ronstrollers. world that a particular real property is in litigation. The inscription ser!es as a warning The ourt eplained therein@ that one who acquires interest o!er litigated %dmittedly, during the pendency of the case, property does so at his own risk, or that he respondents timely registered a notice of lis gambles on the result of the litigation o!er the pendens to warn the whole world that the property property was the subject of a pending litigation. 8is pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires o!er property in!ol!ed in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until 2nal judgment. :ounded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens


is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to pre!ent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. The 2ling of a notice of lis pendens has a twofold eect@ A1B to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the 2nal judgment to pre!ent the defeat of the 2nal judgment by successi!e alienations7 and A-B to bind a purchaser, bona 2de or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. This registration, therefore, gi!es the court clear authority to cancel the title of the spouses Naca, since the sale of the subject property was made after the notice of lis pendens. 9pon %ssociated "ank+s #(, the spouses Naca 2led a motion to inter!ene arguing that they had a real interest in assailing the uly 1;, -OOM Decision, which ordered the cancellation of their title. The ourt denied the inter!ention. It was held that the interests of the spouses Naca in the subject property were properly represented in the action by their transferorS!endor %ssociated "ank, which was already a party thereto. %s transferees


pendente lite, the spouses Naca stand eactly in the shoes of their predecessor6in6interest, %ssociated "ank. 44.

8ack of apacity to 'ue

#eans that the plainti is not in the eercise of his ci!il rights, or does not ha!e the necessary quali2cation to appear in the case, or does not ha !e t he character or representation he claims such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disquali2cations of a party.

olumbia *ictures, Inc., et.al, !s. %. $.(. &o. 11O31M. %ugust -M, 1GG4. The 'upreme ourt discussed the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the (ules of ourt are lack of legal capacity to sue and that the complaint states no cause of action. 8ack of legal capacity to sue means that the plainti is not in the eercise of his ci!il rights, or does not ha!e the necessary quali2cation to appear in the case, or does not ha!e the character or representation he claims. 5n the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plainti is not the real party6in6interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. The term Hlack of capacity to sue should not be confused with the term Hlack of personality to sue. )hile the former refers to a plainti+s general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disquali2cations of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plainti is not the real party6 in6interest. orrespondingly, the 2rst can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue7 whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, e!idently


states no cause of action. %pplying the discussion to the instant petition, the ground a!ailable for barring recourse to our courts by an unlicensed foreign corporation doing or transacting business in the *hilippines should properly be Hlack of capacity to sue, not Hlack of personality to sue. ertainly, a corporation whose legal rights ha!e been !iolated is undeniably such, if not the only, real party6in6interest to bring suit thereon although, for failure to comply with the licensing requirement, it is not capacitated to maintain any suit before our courts. >vangelista, et. 4l vs. Santiago. !.R. No. "&##. 4pril '2, '$$&. The 'upreme ourt said that 2rst, it should be clari2ed that Hthe plainti has no legal capacity to sue and Hthe pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action are two dierent grounds for a motion to dismiss or are two dierent a/rmati!e defenses. :ailure to distinguish between Hthe lack of legal capacity to sue from Hthe lack of personality to sue is a fairly common mistake. The dierence between the two is eplained by this ourt in olumbia *ictures, Inc. !. ourt of %ppeals.

In the present case, the ourt assumes that the respondent is raising the a/rmati!e defense that the omplaint 2led by the petitioners before the trial court stated no


cause of action because the petitioners lacked the personality to sue, not being the real party6in6interest. It is the respondent+s contention that only the 'tate can 2le an action for annulment of his certi2cates of title, since such an action will result in the re!ersion of the ownership of the 'ubject *roperty to the 'tate. 4F.

Doctrine of 5stensible %gency

The doctrine which imposes liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of the actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into belie!ing that the relationship or the authority eists.

-rofessional Servi*es In*. v. Court of 4ppeals, et.al., >n Ban*, !R No. "'6'2#, eruar ', '$"$. The ourt, while a/rming the eisting doctrine that hospitals as a general rule are not ci!illy liable for the tortuous acts of their medical consultants in !iew of the absence of an employer6employee relationship between, nonetheless made the following pro hac !ice doctrinal pronouncements on the liability of the respondent hospital based on the doctrines of Hostensible agency and Hcorporate negligence, thus@

%fter gathering its thoughts on the issues, this ourt holds that *'I is liable to the %ganas, not under the principle of respondeat superior for lack of e!idence of an employment relationship with Dr. %mpil but under the principle of ostensible agency for the negligence of Dr. %mpil and, pro hac !ice, under the principle of corporate negligence for its failure to perform its duties as a hospital.


The ourt cannot speculate on what could ha!e been behind the %ganas+ decision but would rather adhere strictly to the fact that, under the circumstances at that time, Enrique decided to consult Dr. %mpil for he belie!ed him to be a sta member of a prominent and known hospital. %fter his meeting with Dr. %mpil, Enrique ad!ised his wife &ati!idad to go to the #edical ity $eneral ospital to be eamined by said doctor, and the hospital acted in a way that forti2ed EnriqueLs belief. This ourt must therefore maintain the ruling that *'I is !icariously liable for the negligence of Dr. %mpil as its ostensible agent. %ll this notwithstanding, we make it clear that *'I+s hospital liability based on ostensible agency and corporate negligence applies only to this case, pro hac !ice. It is not intended to set a precedent and should not ser!e as a basis to hold hospitals liable for e!ery form of negligence of their doctors6consultants under any and all circumstances. The ruling is unique to this case, for the liability of *'I arose from an implied agency with Dr. %mpil and an admitted corporate duty to &ati!idad. Megan Sugar Corporation v. Regional Trial Court of IloIlo, Bran*) 68, Dumangas, IloIlo; New rontier Sugar Corporation an+ >Auitale -CI Ban3. !.R. No. "#$%&', (une ", '$"". #E$%& can no longer deny the authority of %tty. 'abig as they ha!e already clothed him


with apparent authority to act in their behalf. It must be remembered that when %tty. 'abig entered his appearance, he was accompanied by oncha, #E$%&+s director and general manager. oncha himself attended se!eral court hearings, and on December 1F, -OO-, e!en sent a letter=-M> to the (T asking for the status of the case. % corporation may be held in estoppel from denying as against innocent third persons the authority of its o/cers or agents who ha!e been clothed by it with ostensible or apparent authority.=-G>%tty. 'abig may not ha!e been armed with a board resolution, but the appearance of oncha made the parties assume that #E$%& had knowledge of %tty. 'abig+s actions and, thus, clothed %tty. 'abig with apparent authority such that the parties were made to belie!e that the proper person and entity to address was %tty. 'abig. %pparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the
1-ODOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

epress or conform to the real intention of the parties when some error or mistake has been committed. It is predicated on the equitable maim that equity treats as done that which ought to be done. The rationale of the doctrine is that it would be unjust and unequitable to allow the enforcement of a written instrument which does not re?ect or disclose the real meeting of the minds of the parties. owe!er, an action for reformation must be brought within the period prescribed by law, otherwise, it will be barred by the mere lapse of time.

of sale to epress the true intention of the parties, to wit@ the same be made as a deed of mortgage ... < and that defendants be ordered to pay actual and moral damages and attorneyLs fees. The ourt !iewed, based upon the allegations, and the relief prayed for, in the complaint, that the action is clearly one for the reformation of an instrument as contemplated in %rticles 13CG and 134C of the i!il ode of the *hilippines. The lower court is in error. The action for reformation of instrument should not be confused with the action for annulment of contract. (eformation of instrument presupposes a !alid, eisting contract, in which there had been a meeting of the minds of the parties but the instrument drawn up and signed by them does not correctly epress the terms of their agreement. %nnulment of a contract, on the other hand, presupposes a defecti!e contract in which the minds of the parties did not meet, or the consent of one was !itiated. The equity of reformation is ordinarily limited to written agreements, and its purpose is to establish and perpetuate the true agreement7 annulment, on the other hand, is intended to declare the ine/ciency which the contract already carries in itself and to render the contract ine/cacious.

1-1DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

Rosello  Bentir vs. 0ean+a . !.R. No. "'822". 4pril "', '$$$. *etitioner entered into a contract of lease of a parcel of land with Defendant for a period of -O years starting from 1G4M. * is the lessee7 D is the lessor. In 1GMG, D sold the leased premises to the o6 Defendant. * questioned the sale alleging that it had a right of 2rst refusal. * 2led a case seeking reformation of the epired contract of lease on the ground that its lawyer inad!ertently omitted to incorporate in the contract of lease eecuted in 1G4M. The action for reformation did not prosper since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritati!e statement of the rights and obligations of the parties for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith and not to settle issues arising from the breach thereof, it maybe entertained only before the breach or !iolation of the law or contract to which it refers. ere, * brought the present action for reformation after an alleged breach or !iolation of the contract was already committed by D.

4G.

Doctrine of *ublic *olicy

The doctrine under which, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recogni0e or uphold a transaction when its object, operation, or tendency is calculated to

S Suan v. -alo 0. Regala, !.R. No. 02&$6, (une %$, "2&6. It is a general rule that agreements against public policy are illegal and !oid. 9nder the principles relating to the

1--DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound doctrine of public policy, as applied to the law morality or to ci!ic honesty. of contracts, courts of justice will not recogni0e or uphold any transaction which, in its object operation, or tendency, is calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound morality, or to ci!ic honesty. The test is whether the parties ha!e stipulated for something inhibited by the law or inimical to, or inconsistent with, the public welfare. %n agreement is against public policy if it is injurious to the interests of the public, contra!enes some established interest of society, !iolates some public statute, is against good morals, ends to interfere with the public welfare or society, or as it is sometimes put, if it is at war with the interests of society and is in con?ict with the morals of the time. %n agreement either to do anything which, or not to do anything the omission of which, is in any degree clearly injurious to the public and an agreement of such a nature that it cannot be carried into eecution without reaching beyond the parties and eercising an injurious in?uence o!er the community at large are against public policy. There are many things which the law does not prohibit, in the sense of attaching penalties, but which are so mischie!ous in their nature and tendency that on grounds of public policy they cannot be admitted as the subject of a !alid contract.


The question whether a contract is against public policy depends upon its purpose and tendency, and not upon the fact that no harm results from it. In other words all agreements the purpose of which is to create a situation which tends to operate to the detriment of the public interest are against public policy and !oid, whether in the particular case the purpose of the agreement is or is not eectuated. FO.

Doctrine of 'elf6help

Doctrine in juridical science which holds that a person has the right to eclude another from the enjoyment and disposal of his property, with authority to use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or pre!ent an actual or threatened unlawful physical in!asion or usurpation thereof.

!erman Management 9 Servi*es, In*., v. /on. Court of 4ppeals an+ >rnesto 5ille7a. !.R. No. #6'"# Septemer ", "282. "oth the #unicipal Trial ourt and the (egional Trial ourt ha!e rationali0ed petitionerLs drastic action of bulldo0ing and destroying the crops of pri!ate respondents on the basis of the doctrine of self6help enunciated in %rticle ;-G of the &ew i!il ode. 11 'uch justi2cation is una!ailing because the doctrine of self6help can only be eercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. )hen possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the reco!ery of property. This is clear from %rticle C34 of the i!il ode which states,
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the holder should refuse to deli!er the thing.< *eople !s Depante, .%., CM 5.$. G-4 If the propety is immo!able, there should be no delay in the use of force to reco!er it7 a delay, e!en if ecusable, such as when is due to the ignorance of the dispossession, will bar the right to the use of force. F1.

Doctrine of (egalian

%ll lands of public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, 2sheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the *hilippines belong to the 'tate. )ith the eception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, or resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the eploration, or utili0ation of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period eceeding twenty2!e years, ecept as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, 2sheries, or industrial uses other than de!elopment of water power, in which cases, bene2cial use may by the measure and the limit of the grant.

Cru7 v. Se*retar of >nvironment an+ Natural Resour*es, !.R. No. "%&%8&, De*emer 6, '$$$. %ll lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within pri!ate ownership are presumed to belong to the 'tate. Incontro!ertible e!idence must be shown that the land is alienable or disposable in order to o!ercome such presumption. It does not negate nati!e title to lands held in pri!ate ownership since time immemorial. CariJo vs Insular !overnment, " -)il 2%&. %n Igorot applied for the registration of a certain land. e and his ancestors had held the land as owners for more than CO years, which he inherited under Igorot customs. There was no document of title issued for the land when he applied for registration. The go!ernment contends that the land in question belonged to the state. 9nder the 'panish 8aw, all lands belonged to the 'panish rown ecept those with permit pri!ate titles. #oreo!er, there is no prescription against the rown.

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The land in question does not belong to the 'panish rown under the (egalian Doctrine. 8aw and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land. The 9nited 'tates 'upreme ourt, through ustice olmes declared@ HIt might perhaps, be proper and su/cient to say that when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by indi!iduals under a claim of pri!ate ownership, it will be presumed to ha!e been held in the same way from before the 'panish conquest, and ne!er to ha!e been public land. There is an eistence of nati!e title to land, or ownership of land by :ilipinos by !irtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the 'panish rown, as an eception to the theory of jura regalia. F-.

$uardian ad litem

%n independent party appointed in family law disputes to represent parties that cannot represent themsel!es, such as minors, de!elopmentally disabled, or elderly.

Boron v. C4 !.R. No. "%82& De*. 2, '$$. *etitioner, through his brother, andido "orbon, 2led with the (egional Trial ourt, "ranch 1;C, #akati ity a complaint for recon!eyance of property against spouses (enato and *rincesita 'itay, %mparo In!estment orporation and Ernesto atindig, docketed as i!il ase &o. GF6113C. *etitioner, in his complaint, alleged that the contracts of sale and mortgage of the subject


property are all !oid because of lack of consent on his part as he was then suering from acute schi0ophrenia. 5n une G, 1GGF, the trial court appointed andido "orbon as petitioner+s guardian ad litem. elimon Tse an+ 4li*e Tse t)ru t)eir guar+ian a+ litem >smaela Dawat, v. Repuli* of t)e -)ilippines, !.R. No. 0'$#$8, 4ugust %", "26#. In accordance with %rticle 314, paragraph 1 of the &ew i!il ode, the father and the mother ha!e, with respect to their unemancipated children, the duty to represent them in all actions which redound to their bene2t. In the present case, the basic petition shows that the same was 2led in the name of the minor petitioners, assisted by their mother as their guardian ad litem. )hether the latter was or was not actually appointed by the lower court in that capacity seems to be of little consequence considering that under the legal pro!ision just cited she may be deemed to ha!e 2led the petition jointly with her children or in their behalf.

8astly, it may not be amiss to remember that the jurisdiction of courts o!er the subject matter depends upon the nature of the action or proceeding and not upon the capacity or incapacity to sue on the part of one of the parties7 neither is it an absolute pre6requisite to jurisdiction o!er an action by a minor that he sue by guardian ad litem. The action is not

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deemed !oid on such ground alone because if the lack or absence of a guardian ad litem constitutes any defect at all, the same is amendable. In the present case, it is clear that the lower court was fully cogni0ant of the fact that the mother of the petitioners appeared as their guardian ad litem. This being so, the lack of any positi!e proof that no order appointing her as such has e!er been issued justi2es the presumption either that she was actually so appointed or that the lower court inferentially authori0ed her appearance as such. F3.

Doctrine of %ct6of6$od

F;.Doctrine of (es &ullius

The doctrine that requires all human agencies to be ecluded from creating the cause of the mischief. 'uch doctrine cannot be in!oked to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible ad!erse consequences of loss or injury. 'ince the delay in payment in the present case was partly a result of human participation [ whether from acti!e inter!ention or neglect [ the whole occurrence was humani0ed and was therefore outside the ambit of a *aso fortuito.

MI44 v. 4la In+ustries Corp., !.R. No. "#%2, eruar "%, '$$. :irst, processing claims against the go!ernment are certainly not only foreseeable and epectable, but also dependent upon the human will. 'econd, the hristmas season is not a casofortuito, but a regularly occurring e!ent. Third, the occurrence of the hristmas season did not at all render impossible the normal ful2llment of the obligation. :ourth, #I%% cannot argue that it is free from any participation in the delay. It should ha!e laid out on the compromise table the problems that would be caused by a deadline falling during the hristmas season. :urthermore, it should ha!e eplained to %8% the process in!ol!ed for the payment of %8+s claim.

(es nullius, is a 8atin6based legal term that Sps. !ulla vs 0ara+or !.R. No. "2"8 (ul

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refers to a property or object that has no owner or has been abandoned. The term is deri!ed from (oman law and, when translated, literally means
'#, '$$6. The spouses $ulla insisted that the trial court erred in relying on the sur!ey report of Engr. #agarro. In contrast, their e!idence showed that 8ot %, with an area of C4- square meters, is alienable and disposable, and is co!ered by a 1G34 ta declaration under the name of %lfonso "actad. 'ince the property is located within the sal!age 0one, it is res nullius, hence, could not ha!e been acquired by the 8abradors through accession under %rticle ;;O of the &ew i!il ode. They also insisted that the trial court had no jurisdiction to declare them entitled to the possession of 8ot % since the (epublic of the *hilippines was not a party to the case. The spouses $ulla concluded that they cannot be held liable for monthly rentals, actual damages and attorney+s fees, since the claimed title o!er the subject property is fraudulent.

The trial court, the (T and the % were one in ruling that the C4-6square6meter property, 8ot %, is part of the public domain, hence, beyond the commerce of men and not capable of registration. In fact, the land is within the sal!age 0one fronting the hina 'ea as well as the property co!ered by 5T &o. *6 133CO in the name of respondents. The pro!ision relied upon is %rticle ;;O of the &ew i!il ode, which states that Hthe ownership of property gi!es the right by accession to e!erything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto,

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either naturally or arti2cially. The pro!ision, howe!er, does not apply in this case, considering that 8ot % is a foreshore land adjacent to the sea which is alternately co!ered and left dry by the ordinary ?ow of the tides. 'uch property belongs to the public domain and is not a!ailable for pri!ate ownership until formally declared by the go!ernment to be no longer needed for public use. (espondents thus ha!e no possessory right o!er the property unless upon application, the go!ernment, through the then "ureau of 8ands, had granted them a permit. FC.

Doctrine of :orce #ajeure

:orce majeure is generally intended to include risks beyond the reasonable control of a party, incurred not as a product or result of the negligence or malfeasance of a party, which ha!e a materially ad!erse eect on the ability of such party to perform its obligations, as where non6performance is caused by the usual and natural consequences of eternal forces Afor eample, predicted rain stops an outdoor e!entB, or where the inter!ening circumstances are speci2cally contemplated.

(apan 4irlines v. C4, !.R. No. ""866, 4ugust #, "228. The #t. *inatubo eruption pre!ented %8 from proceeding to #anila on schedule. 'uch e!ent can be considered as nterprises, !.R. No. "6#"2&, Ma 8, '$$2. The matter of fortuitous e!ents is go!erned by %rt. 11F; of


the i!il ode which pro!ides that ecept in cases epressly speci2ed by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those e!ents which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were ine!itable. The elements of a fortuitous e!ent are@ AaB the cause of the unforeseen and unepected occurrence, must ha!e been independent of human will7 AbB the e!ent that constituted the caso fortuito must ha!e been impossible to foresee or, if foreseeable, impossible to a!oid7 AcB the occurrence must ha!e been such as to render it impossible for the debtors to ful2ll their obligation in a normal manner, and7 AdB the obligor must ha!e been free from any participation in the aggra!ation of the resulting injury to the creditor. % fortuitous e!ent may either be an act of $od, or natural occurrences such as ?oods or typhoons, or an act of man such as riots, strikes or wars. owe!er, when the loss is found to be partly the result of a person+s participationUwhether by acti!e inter!ention, neglect or failure to actQthe whole occurrence is humani0ed and remo!ed from the rules applicable to a fortuitous e!ent. F4.

Doctrine of %dherence urisdiction

5nce jurisdiction is !ested in the court, it is -0DT vs. Dula !.R. no. 0&%6 4pril "2,


retained up to the end of the litigation , it remains with the court until the case is 2nally terminated .

"282. The rule of adherence of jurisdiction until a cause is 2nally resol!ed or adjudicated does not apply when the change in jurisdiction is curati!e in character. Thus in the instant The eception to the rule@ when a newly case, there is nothing wrong in holding that enacted statute changing the jurisdiction of a ourts of :irst InstanceS(egional Trial ourts court is gi!en retroacti!e eect. It can di!est no longer ha!e jurisdiction o!er aforesaid a court of jurisdiction o!er cases already monetary claims of labor. pending before it is which were 2led before the statute came to force or became eecti!e. There is therefore no reason why *.D. 14G1 should not be gi!en retroacti!e application to this pending case. *.D. 14G1 merely restored the jurisdiction earlier !ested in 8abor %rbiters before the enactment of *.D. 134F. It was intended to correct a situation where two tribunals would ha!e jurisdiction o!er separate issues arising from the same labor con?ict.

In any case, pri!ate respondents can still 2le an action before the administrati!e machineries in the Department of 8abor and Employment. )hile it is true that the respondents6employeesL cause of action has already prescribed, since %rticle -G1 of the 8abor ode pro!ide for a three6year prescripti!e period for all money claims arising from employer6 employee relations, equity dictates that petitioners be allowed to 2le the proper action before the appropriate labor tribunal. %t the time the petitioners 2led their complaint with the then ourt of :irst Instance, the regular courts were the proper


forum for all claims for damages arising from employer6employee relations. 9nder these circumstances, the retroacti!e application of *res. Decree 14G1 should not unduly depri!e petitioners of the right to pursue their claim in the proper tribunal if they choose to do so. Barrame+a 5+a. De Ballesteros vs. Rural Ban3 f Canaman In*. !.R. No. "#6'6$ Novemer ', '$"$. The ourt recogni0es the doctrine on adherence of jurisdiction. 8ucia, howe!er, must be reminded that such principle is not without eceptions. It is well to quote the ruling of the % on this matter, thus@

This ourt is neither unmindful nor unaware of the doctrine on the adherence of jurisdiction. owe!er, the rule on adherence of jurisdiction is not absolute and has eceptions. 5ne of the eceptions is that when the change in jurisdiction is curati!e in character In sum, this ourt holds that the consolidation is proper considering that the liquidation court has jurisdiction o!er 8ucia+s action. It would be more in keeping with law and equity if 8ucia+s case is consolidated with the liquidation case in order to epeditiously determine whether she is entitled to reco!er the property subject of mortgage from ("I and, if so, how much she is entitled to recei!e from the remaining assets of the bank.


FF.

Doctrine of *resumed (e!ocation

)here a will which cannot be found, is shown to ha!e been in the possession of the testator when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent e!idence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed.

!ago v. Mamua* , !.R. No. '6%"#, (anuar '2, "2'#. The Doctrine of *resumed (e!ocation applies, which pro!ides that@ where a will which cannot be found, is shown to ha!e been in the possession of the testator when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent e!idence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death.

The presumption is, howe!er, not conclusi!e and anyone who has proof to the contrary may rebut the presumption. FM. Doctrine of *ower to (escind 5bligations

The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. The injured party may choose between the ful2llment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. e may also seek rescission, e!en after he has chosen ful2llment, if the latter should become impossible.

:niwi+e /ol+ings, In*., vs (an+e*s Trans. Co. !.R. No. "68&'' De*emer "2, '$$#. The right of rescission is implied in e!ery reciprocal obligation where one party fails to perform what is incumbent upon him while the other is willing and ready to comply. ertainly, petitionerLs failure to deli!er the units on the commencement date of the lease on 5ctober 1, 1GGF ga!e respondent the right to rescind the contract after the latter had already paid the contract price in full.

The court shall decree the rescission claimed, :urthermore, respondentLs right to rescind the unless there be just cause authori0ing the contract cannot be pre!ented by the fact that 2ing of a period. petitioner had the option to substitute the This is understood to be without prejudice to stalls. E!en if petitioner had that option, it did the rights of third persons who ha!e acquired not, howe!er, mean that it could insist on the


the thing, in accordance with 8aws.

continuance of the contract by forcing respondent to accept the substitution. &either did it mean that its pre!ious default had been obliterated completely by the eercise of that option. Benos vs. 0awilao !.R. no. "#''&2 De*emer &, '$$6. The court said@ The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him is clear from a reading of the i!il ode pro!isions. owe!er, it is equally settled that, in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, this power must be in!oked judicially7 it cannot be eercised solely on a party+s own judgment that the other has committed a breach of the obligation. )here there is nothing in the contract empowering the petitioner to rescind it without resort to the courts, the petitioner+s action in unilaterally terminating the contract in this case is unjusti2ed.

It is e!ident that the contract under consideration does not contain a pro!ision authori0ing its etrajudicial rescission in case one of the parties fails to comply with what is incumbent upon him. This being the case, respondents6spouses should ha!e asked for judicial inter!ention to obtain a judicial declaration of rescission. "e that as it may, and considering that respondents6spouses+ %nswer Awith a/rmati!e defensesB with


ounterclaim seeks for the rescission of the Deed of 'ale with %ssumption of #ortgage, it behoo!es the court to settle the matter once and for all than to ha!e the case re6litigated again on an issue already heard on the merits and which this court has already taken cogni0ance of. a!ing found that petitioners seriously breached the contract, we, therefore, declare the same is rescinded in fa!or of respondents6spouses. FG. Doctrine of Dependent (elati!e (e!ocation

The doctrine that regards as mutually interrelated the acts of a testator destroying a will and eecuting a second will. In such cases, if the second will is either ne!er made or improperly eecuted, there is a rebuttable presumption that the testator would ha!e preferred the former will to no will at all, which allows the possibility of probate of the destroyed will.

Molo v. Molo, !.R. No. 0K'&%8, Septemer '", "2&". $ranting for the sake of argument that the earlier will was !oluntarily destroyed by the testator after the eecution of the second will, which re!oked the 2rst, could there be any doubt, under this theory, that said earlier will was destroyed by the testator in the honest belief that it was no longer necessary because he had epressly re!oked it in his will of 1G3G\ In other words, can we not say that the destruction of the earlier will was but the necessary consequence of the testatorLs belief that the re!ocatory clause contained in the subsequent will was !alid and the latter would be gi!en eect\ If such is the case, then it is our opinion that the earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of
This doctrine is known as that of dependent relati!e re!ocation, and is usually applied where the testator cancels or destroys a will


or eecutes an instrument intended to re!oke a will with a present intention to make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new disposition is not made or, if made, fails of eect for same reason. The doctrine is n limited to the eistence of some other document, howe!er, and has been applied where a will was destroyed as a consequence of a mistake of law. A4M ..*. FGGB. The rule is established that where the act of destruction is connected with the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator meant the re!ocation of the old to depend upon the e/cacy of a new disposition intended to be substituted, the re!ocation will be conditional and dependent upon the e/cacy of the new disposition7 and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperati!e, the re!ocation fails and the original will remains in full force. A$ardner, pp. -3-, -33.B This is the doctrine of dependent relati!e re!ocation. The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose !alidity the re!ocation depends, is equi!alent to the non6ful2llment of a suspensi!e conditions, and hence pre!ents the re!ocation of the original will. "ut a mere intent to make at some time a will in the place of that destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It must appear


that the re!ocation is dependent upon the !alid eecution of a new will. A1 %leander, p. FC17 $ardner, p. -C3.B MO. Doctrine of 'ubstantial ompliance

% legal principle which says that if a good faith attempt is made to perform the requirements of the agreement e!en if it does not precisely meet the terms of the agreement or statutory requirements, the performance will still be considered complete if the essential purpose is accomplished.

Spouses >fren Mason an+ Digna Mason v. T)e /onorale Court of 4ppeals an+ Columus -)ilippines Bus Corporation, !.R. No. "66', *toer "%, '$$%. The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under 'ection 11, (ule 1; of the 1GGF (ules of i!il *rocedure has been settled in Nillarosa which applies squarely to the instant case. In the said case, petitioner E.". Nillarosa P *artner o. 8td. Ahereafter NillarosaB with principal o/ce address at 1O- uan 8una 't., Da!ao ity and with branches at -;G- "ay Niew Dri!e, Tambo, *araYaque, #etro #anila and Jolambog, 8apasan, agayan de 5ro ity, entered into a sale with de!elopment agreement with pri!ate respondent Imperial De!elopment orporation. %s Nillarosa failed to comply with its contractual obligation, pri!ate respondent initiated a suit for breach of contract and damages at the (egional Trial ourt of #akati. 'ummons, together with the complaint, was ser!ed upon Nillarosa through its branch manager at Jolambog, 8apasan, agayan de 5ro ity. Nillarosa 2led a 'pecial %ppearance with #otion to Dismiss on the ground of improper ser!ice of summons and lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion and ruled that there was substantial


compliance with the rule, thus, it acquired jurisdiction o!er Nillarosa. The latter questioned the denial before us in its petition for certiorari. )e decided in Nillarosa+s fa!or and declared the trial court without jurisdiction to take cogni0ance of the case. )e held that there was no !alid ser!ice of summons on Nillarosa as ser!ice was made through a person not included in the enumeration in 'ection 11, (ule 1; of the 1GGF (ules of i!il *rocedure, which re!ised the 'ection 13, (ule 1; of the 1G4; (ules of ourt. )e discarded the trial court+s basis for denying the motion to dismiss, namely, pri!ate respondent+s substantial compliance with the rule on ser!ice of summons, and fully agreed with petitioner+s assertions that the enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited and eclusi!e, following the rule in statutory construction that epressio unios est eclusio alterius. ad the (ules of ourt (e!ision ommittee intended to liberali0e the rule on ser!ice of summons, we said, it could ha!e easily done so by clear and concise language. %bsent a manifest intent to liberali0e the rule, we stressed strict compliance with 'ection 11, (ule 1; of the 1GGF (ules of i!il *rocedure. &either can herein petitioners in!oke our ruling in #illenium to support their position for said case is not on all fours with the instant case. )e must stress that #illenium was


decided when the 1G4; (ules of ourt were still in force and eect, unlike the instant case which falls under the new rule. ence, the cases cited by petitioners where we upheld the doctrine of substantial compliance must be deemed o!erturned by Nillarosa, which is the later case. S-S. /eer 9 C)arlita >+illo v. S-S. Norerto 9 Desi+eria Dulpina. !.R. No. "88%6$, (anuar '", '$"$ There was substantial compliance with the (ules because the background facts can be found within the four corners of the petition and its incorporated annees, is not a no!el ruling for this ourt. In the case of Deloso !. #arapao3Ccralaw Ain!ol!ing the same de2ciency for lack of a speci2c and separate statement of facts outlining the factual background relied uponB, we said@

%n eamination of the petition 2led with the ourt of %ppeals re!eals that while it does not contain a separate section on statement of facts, the facts of the case are, in fact, integrated in the petition particularly in the discussionSargument portion. #oreo!er, the decision of the D%(%" which contains the facts of the case was attached to the petition and was e!en quoted by the appellate court. The petition also su/ciently discusses the errors committed by the D%(%" in its assailed decision.

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There was, therefore, substantial compliance with 'ec. 4, (ule ;3 of the (ules of ourt. It is settled that liberal construction of the (ules may be in!oked in situations where there may be some ecusable formal de2ciency or error in a pleading, pro!ided that the same does not sub!ert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the (ules. %fter all, rules of procedure are not to be applied in a !ery rigid, technical sense7 they are used only to help secure substantial justice. $i!en this precedent, it only remains for us to determine if we can apply a liberal construction of the (ules because a meaningful litigation of the case can ensue gi!en the *etitions prima facie merit. M1.

Doctrine of #irror

The general rule is that a purchaser may be considered a purchaser in good faith when he has eamined the latest certi2cate of title. %n eception to this rule is when there eist important facts that would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man to go beyond the present title and to in!estigate those that preceded it. Thus, it has been said that a person who deliberately ignores a signi2cant fact which would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for !alue. % purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a

0u*ena vs. C4, !.R. No. ##68, 4ugust '&, "222. 5ne who purchases real property which is in the actual possession of another should, at least make some inquiry concerning the right of those in possession. The actual possession by a person other than the !endor should, at least put the purchaser upon inquiry. e can scarcely, in the absence of such inquiry, be regarded as a bona 2de purchaser as against such possessors. 4man*io, et al. vs. C4, et al., !.R. No. "&'6'#,

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reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the !endor as has been held in other cases, if the buyer fails to take the ordinary precautions which a prudent man would ha!e taken under the circumstances, specially in buying a piece of land in the actual, !isible and public possession of another person, other than the !endor, constitutes gross negligence amounting to bad faith.

Septemer "6, '$$&. "eing a corporation engaged in the business of buying and selling real estate, it was gross negligence on its part to merely rely on the seller+s assurance that the occupants of the property were mere squatters considering that it had the means and the opportunity to in!estigate for itself the accuracy of such information.

In this connection, it has been held that where, the land sold is in the possession of a person other than the !endor, the purchaser is required to go beyond the certi2cate of title to make inquiries concerning the rights of the actual possessor. :ailure to do so would make him purchaser in bad faith. M-.

Doctrine of Etrajudicial *artition

)ithout creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan dierent from those pro!ided by the rules from which, in the 2rst place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the partition to be !alid.

Cua 5s. 5argas et.al. !.R. No."&6&%6 *toer %", '$$6. The 'upreme ourt said that the procedure outlined in 'ection 1 of (ule F; is an e parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, howe!er, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an etrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement andSor partition is agreed upon Ai.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of etrajudicial settlement and partitionB, and not after such an agreement

1;-DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

has already been eecuted as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the 2rst deed of etrajudicial settlement among heirs. The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructi!e notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of eecution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was ne!er intended to depri!e heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent+s estate. In this connection, the records of the present case con2rm that respondents ne!er signed either of the settlement documents, ha!ing disco!ered their eistence only shortly before the 2ling of the present complaint. :ollowing (ule F;, these etrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is in!alid insofar as they are concerned. Bautista v. Bautista et.al !.R.no. "6$&&6 4ugust %, '$$#. The deed of etra6judicial partition in the case at bar being in!alid, the action to ha!e it annulled does not prescribe.

'ince the deed of etra6judicial partition is in!alid, it transmitted no rights to Teo2lo+s co6 heirs. onsequently, the subsequent transfer by %ngelica and %legria of ] of the property to *acita and her husband *edro, as well as


the transfer of ] of the property to esar Tamondong is in!alid, hence, conferring no rights upon the transferees under the principle of nemo dat quod non habet. M3. Doctrine of a $ood :ather of a :amily or (easonably *rudent #an.

The 'upreme ourt described a good father of -i*art v. Smit), !.R. No. 0K"'$6, Mar*) "&, a family by 2rst stating who is not. e is not "2"8. and is not supposed to be omniscient of the The 'upreme ourt described a good father of future7 rather, he is one who takes a family by 2rst stating who is not. e is not precautions against any harm when there is and is not supposed to be omniscient of the something before him to suggest or warn him future7 rather, he is one who takes of the danger or to foresee it precautions against any harm when there is something before him to suggest or warn him of the danger or to foresee it. % good father of a family is likewise referred to as the reasonable man, man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, or ordinary reasonable prudent man. In English law, he is sometimes referred to as the man on top 4ntonio ran*is*o, sustitute+  )is )eirsL Nelia >.S. ran*is*o, >milia . Berti7, Ree**a >.S. ran*is*o, 4ntionio >.S. ran*is*o, (r., So*orro . ontanilla, an+ (ovito >.S. ran*is*o v. C)emi*al Bul3 Carriers, In*orporate+. !.R. No. "2%&##, Septemer #, '$"". The heirs of :rancisco argue that the ourt of %ppeals erred when it ruled that :rancisco was liable to "I because he failed to eercise the diligence of a good father of a family when he bought the diesel fuel. They argue that since

1;;DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

:rancisco was blind, the standard of conduct that was required of him was that of a reasonable person under like disability. #oreo!er, they insist that :rancisco eercised due care in purchasing the diesel fuel by doing the following@ A1B :rancisco asked his son to check the identity of "acsa7 A-B :rancisco required direct deli!ery from *etron7 A3B :rancisco required that he be named as the consignee in the in!oice7 and A;B :rancisco required separate receipts from "acsa to e!idence actual payment. 'tandard of conduct is the le!el of epected conduct that is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of the person, time and place. The most common standard of conduct is that of a good father of a family or that of a reasonably prudent person. To determine the diligence which must be required of all persons, we use as basis the abstract a!erage standard corresponding to a normal orderly person. owe!er, one who is physically disabled is required to use the same degree of care that a reasonably careful person who has the same physical disability would use. *hysical handicaps and in2rmities, such as blindness or deafness, are treated as part of the circumstances under which a reasonable person must act. Thus, the standard of

1;CDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

conduct for a blind person becomes that of a reasonable person who is blind. M;.

#ercado !s Espiritu Doctrine

MC.

"urca Doctrine

'ale of real estate, made by minors who Aor acti!ely misrepresentedB to be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is !alid and they will not be permitted to ecuse themsel!es from the ful2llment of the obligations contracted by them or to ha!e them annulled AMer*a+o vs >spiritu, 3F *hil -1C, 1G1FB

"y constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who marries a :ilipino citi0en, dies not by mere fact of marriage automatically become a :ilipino iti0en A Bur*a vs Repuli*, 86-;-C-, anuary 3O, 1G4F, 1G '(% 1M4B

In the #ercado case, the minors who pretended or acti!ely misrepresented their age were estopped from contesting the contract eecuted by him. owe!er, in the case of Bamalan vs Marama AC1 *hil ;1F $.(. &o. 86-FF1O, 1G-MB, it was not applied because the minors passi!ely misrepresented or did not pretend their age and his minority was known to the purchaser. This was also the same in the case of Bragan7a v. 5illa 4rille A1OC *hil. ;C4 $.(. &o. 861-;F1, 1GCGB where it held that failure of minor to disclose his minority when making contract does not constitute fraud Mo Ga 0im Gao et al vs. T)e Commissioner of Immigration. !.R. No. 0'"'82 *toer , "2#" " SCR4 '2'. "y constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who marries a :ilipino citi0en, dies not by mere fact of marriage automatically become a :ilipino iti0en. The reason is that she must possess all the quali2cation and none of the disquali2cations for naturali0ation as held in 0 !io3 /a et al vs !alang A863133-, #arch 13, 1G44B. This rule was applied to natural6 born :ilipino in the case of 4ustria vs Con*)u A86-OF14, une --, 1G4CB, in the case of naturali0ed :ilipino in 0ao C)a et al vs !alang A861GGFF, 5ctober 3O, 1G4;B and by


election. owe!er, the said case was re!ersed M4.

Doctrine 5f %pparent 'ign

Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they acti!ely or passi!ely pertain. The eistence of apparent sign under %rt. 4-; is equi!alent to a title. It is as if there is an implied contract between the two new owners that the easement should be constituted, since no one objected to the continued eistence of the windows.

: v. C4,!.R. No. "'$6&, Septemer 2, "222. %gents are not a party with respect to that contract between his principal and third persons. %s agents, they only render some ser!ice or do something in representation or on behalf of their principals. The rendering of such ser!ice did not make them parties to the contracts of sale eecuted in behalf of the latter.

The fact that an agent who makes a contract for his principal will gain or suer loss by the performance or nonperformance of the contract by the principal or by the other party thereto does not entitle him to maintain an action on his own behalf against the other party for its breach. %n agent entitled to recei!e a commission from his principal upon the performance of a contract which he has made on his principalLs account does not, from this fact alone, ha!e any claim against the other party for breach of the contract, either in an action on the contract or otherwise. %n agent who is not a promisee cannot maintain an action at law against a purchaser merely because he is entitled to ha!e his compensation or ad!ances paid out of the purchase price before payment to the principal .

1;FDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

MF. Error *lacitandi %equitatem &on Tollit

% clerical error does not take away equity.

Ingson vs laar, !.R. No. 0'8#%, De*emer , "2'8. 5ut of the foregoing descripti!e narration of the history of the case, there arise certain de2nite points. The 2rst point is that the clerk of the ourt of :irst Instance of 5ccidental &egros made a mistake in informing the clerk of this court that the attorney for the defendant was noti2ed on %ugust 1G, 1G-F, of the order denying his motion for a new trial, when the true date was 'eptember -;, 1G-F. The second point is that while this court accepted in good faith the original statement of the clerk of the ourt of :irst Instance of 5ccidental &egros, in the motion presented by the attorney for the appellant in which he attempted to set right the court, he did no more than make an assertion and ask the court to re!ise the record to substantiate the truth assertion, without corroborating his allegation by the necessary a/da!its. The question now is what to be done at this late date. %n error was made but the case is an old one and some !iolence will ha!e to be done to regular proceduree if it be reinstated.

There is in ci!il law what is known as errors in fact. There is in the common law what is known as a mistake of fact. In applying the principles relating to errors in fact and a mistake of fact, the courts are guided by the maim >rror pla*itan+i aeAuitatem non tollit A<% clerical error does not take away equity
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and the maim >rror s*rientis no*ere non +eit A%n error made by a clerk ought not to injure7 a clerical error may be corrected
Doctrine of ulpa %quiliana

In ulpa %quiliana, o r quasi6delict, A aB when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or AbB where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, M moral damages may aptly be reco!ered. This rule also applies, as aforestated, to contracts when breached by tort.

Spouses >rlin+a Batal an+ ran3 Batal v. Spouses 0u7 San -e+ro an+ eni*)iro Tominaga, Calleo, Sr. an+ C)i*oNa7ario, ((. !.R. No. "66$", Septemer '#, '$$6

ulpa, or negligence, may be understood in two dierent senses@ either as culpa aquiliana, which is the wrongful or negligent act or omission which creates a !inculum juris and gi!es rise to an obligation between two persons not formally bound by any other obligation, or as culpa contractual, which is the fault or negligence incident in the performance of an obligation which already eisted, and which increases the liability from

1;GDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

such already eisting obligation. ulpa aquiliana is go!erned by %rticle -1F4 of the i!il ode and the immediately following %rticles7 while culpa contractual is go!erned by %rticles 11FO to 11F; of the same ode. %rticles 11FO and 11F3 pro!ide@ %(T. 11FO. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contra!ene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. %(T. 11F3. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. )hen negligence shows bad faith, the pro!isions of articles 11F1 and --O-, paragraph -, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be obser!ed in the performance, that which is epected of a good father of a family shall be required. In the present case, it is clear that the petitioners, in carrying out their contractual obligations, failed to eercise the requisite diligence in the placement of the markings for the concrete perimeter fence that was later

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constructed. The placement of the markings had been done solely by petitioner :rank "atal who is not a geodetic engineer. It was later disco!ered that it was not he but his wife, petitioner Erlinda "atal, who is the licensed geodetic engineer and who is, therefore, the one quali2ed to do the work. *etitioner :rank "atal+s installation of the concrete cyclone monuments had been done without the adequate super!ision of his wife, Erlinda. %s a result, the placement of the monuments did not accurately re?ect the dimensions of the lot. The respondents, upon assurance gi!en by petitioner :rank "atal that they could proceed with the construction of the perimeter fence by relying on the purported accuracy of the placement of the monuments, erected their fence which turned out to encroach on an adjacent easement. "ecause of the encroachment, the respondents had to demolish and reconstruct the fence and, thus, suered damages. >l*ano vs. /ill, $. (. &o. 86-;MO3, #ay -4,1GFF, FF '(% GM. % separate ci!il action lies against the oender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminality prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, pro!ided that the oended party is not snowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recei!er damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such e!entuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made

1C1DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

in the two cases !ary. In other words, the etinction of ci!il liability referred to in *ar. AeB, 'ection 3, (ule III, refers eclusi!ely to ci!il liability founded on %rticle 1OO of the (e!ised *enal ode, whereas the ci!il liability for the same act considered as a quasi6delict only and not as a crime is not etinguished e!en by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. "rie?y stated, )e here hold, in reiteration of $arcia that culpa aquiliana includes !oluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. MG. Distingue Tempora et oncordabis ura

Distinguish times and you will harmoni0e laws.

T)e :nite+ States v. 4lvir, !.R. No. 0%28", (anuar ", "2$8. The defendant did not appeal nor attempt to appeal from the judgment of the court below. %fter ha!ing undergone his term of imprisonment, and upon a writ of attachment being issued against his property to enforce the payment of the *COO, which, according to the judgment, he was required to pay the oended party, he 2led a motion asking the court to permit him to keep the child in his own house and to be released from the obligation of paying to the oended party the *1C monthly, as ordered by the court below. The accused based his claim on article 1;G of the i!il ode. The motion of the accused was o!erruled by the court in the following terms@

1C-DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

The court holds that such option can not be eercised by an accused against whom 2nal judgment ordering him to support the ospring has been entered in a cause instituted against him for seduction, ra!ishment, or rape, in !iew of the fact that the pro!ision contained in article 1;G is not applicable to cases wherein the obligation to pro!ide support constitutes one of the 2ndings of the decision rendered in criminal causes. :rom the abo!e decision the accused has appealed to this court, and the question at issue now is, whether the party who pro!ides the subsistence is in this case entitled to claim that the person who enjoys the same shall li!e with him in his own house, and there recei!e the support which he is under obligation to pro!ide. It is a juridical maim, +istingue tempora et *on*or+ais ura . GO.

E Dolo #alo &on 5ritur %ctio

5ut of fra ud no action arises.

Titong vs C4, !.R. No. """"" Mar*) 6, "228. *etitioners ha!e not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and just title. %s aptly obser!ed by the trial court, the plaintiLs admitted acts of con!erting boundary line A"ugsayon (i!erB into a rice2eld and thereafter claiming ownership thereof were acts constituting depri!ation of the rights of others and therefore

own wrong would run counter to the maim e? +olo malo non oritur a*tio Ano man can allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoingB. Etraordinary acquisiti!e prescription cannot similarly !est ownership o!er the property upon petitioner. %rt. 113F of the i!il ode states that nage, !.R. No. 0'##", (ul '2, "268 EasternLs cause of action is anchored on the deed of assignment and a/da!it both eecuted by Jittilst!edt on December -G, 1GCG con!eying to Eastern all his rights under 5rdinary Timber 8icense 1-M46LCG A&ewB. "ut did Eastern acquire any right under these documents to entitle it to sue for the performance of any prestation thereunder by Jittilst!edt\

The 'upreme ourt answer is &o. :irst, the license had already epired. There was no license to transfer. 'econd, the license itself says that such license is non6transferable. %nd, Eastern is duty bound to be guided by

1C;DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

that prohibition. Third, the con!eyance was illegal. E dolo malo non oritur actio. % party to an illegal contract cannot come to court and ask to ha!e his illegal objects carried out. G1.

E *acto Illicito &on 5ritur %ctio

% 8atin maim which means that :rom an illicit contract no action arises. % right does not arise from an unlawful act. % right to 2le an action does not arise upon an unlawful agreement. To render an agreement !alid, it should comply with the requisites of a !alid contract.

0ita >nterprises v. Se*on+ Civil Cases Division, !.R. No. 0662% 4pril '#, "28. The parties herein operated under an arrangement, comonly known as the
is the tune6honored maim that must be applied to the parties in the case at bar. a!ing entered into an illegal contract, neither can seek relief from the courts, and each must bear the consequences of his acts.

1CCDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

Tea Mar3eting an+1or 4ngel (au*ian v. /onorale Interme+iate 4ppellate Court an+ -e+ro N. Nale. !.R. No. 06&&"$, Mar*) 2, "28#.
owe!er, as the purchase of the motorcycle for operation as a trimobile under the franchise of the pri!ate respondent aucian, pursuant to what is commonly known as the . G-.

(es Inter %lios %cta

This is a technical phrase which signi2es acts of others, or transactions between others. &either the declarations nor any other acts of those who are mere strangers, or, as it is

/arol+ 5. Tamargo v. Romulo 4wingan, 0lo+ 4ntipor+a an+ 0i*erio 4ntipor+a, (r., !.R. No. "###'#, (anuar "2, '$"$. The rule on res inter alios acta pro!ides that the rights of a


usually termed, any res inter alios ada, are admissible in e!idence against any one when the party against whom such acts are oered in e!idence, was pri!y to the act, the objection ceases7 it is no longer res inter alios.

party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. onsequently, an etrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co6accused and is considered as hearsay against them. The reason for this rule is that@ on a principle of good faith and mutual con!enience, a man+s own acts are binding upon himself, and are e!idence against him. 'o are his conduct and declarations. et it would not only be rightly incon!enient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthori0ed strangers7 and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as e!idence against him. %n eception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under 'ection 3O, (ule 13O of the (ules of ourt@ %dmission by conspirator. Q The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its eistence, may be gi!en in e!idence against the co6conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by e!idence other than such act or declaration. This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy

1CFDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

and during its eistence may be gi!en in e!idence against co6conspirators pro!ided that the conspiracy is shown by independent e!idence aside from the etrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be recei!ed against his or her co6conspirators, it is necessary that AaB the conspiracy be 2rst pro!ed by e!idence other than the admission itself AbB the admission relates to the common object and AcB it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. 5therwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co6conspirators without !iolating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross6eamine them. ere, aside from the etrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of e!idence was presented to pro!e the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution e!idence, direct or circumstantial, which the etrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of olumna, which was the sole e!idence against respondents, had no probati!e !alue and was inadmissible as e!idence against them. Cruz vs CA, .R. !o. "2#$"3 %uly 2$, "&&8. (espondent ourt found that se!eral deeds of sale and real estate mortgage, which petitioners eecuted when they sold or

1CMDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

mortgaged some parcels adjudicated to them under the D**, contained the statement that the !endorSmortgagor was the absolute owner of the parcel of residential land and that he or she represented it as free from liens and encumbrances. 5n the basis of these pieces of e!idence, (espondent ourt held that petitioners were estopped from claiming that there was a co6ownership o!er the disputed parcels of land which were also co!ered by the D**. *etitioners contend that (espondent ourt, in so ruling, !iolated the res inter alios a*ta rule. *etitionersL contention is untenable. Res inter alios a*ta , as a general rule, prohibits the admission of e!idence that tends to show that what a person has done at one time is probati!e of the contention that he has done a similar acts at another time. E!idence of similar acts or occurrences compels the defendant to meet allegations that are not mentioned in the complaint, confuses him in his defense, raises a !ariety of irrele!ant issues, and di!erts the attention of the court from the issues immediately before it. ence, this e!identiary rule guards against the practical incon!enience of trying collateral issues and protracting the trial and pre!ents surprise or other mischief prejudicial to litigants. The rule, howe!er, is not without

1CGDOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

eception. )hile in admissible in general, collateral facts may be recei!ed as e!idence under eceptional circumstances, as when there is a rational similarity or resemblance between the conditions gi!ing rise to the fact oered and the circumstances surrounding the issue or fact to be pro!ed. E!idence of similar acts may frequently become rele!ant, especially in actions based on fraud and deceit, because it sheds light on the state of mind or knowledge of a person7 it pro!ides insight into such personLs moti!e or intent7 it unco!ers a scheme, design or plan7 or it re!eals a mistake. G3.

Impossibilium &ulla 5bligation Est

% maim meaning that a legal obligation that is impossible to perform must be of no legal obligation.

Ramon 4. !on7ales v. /on. ran*is*o I. C)ave7, in )is *apa*it as Soli*itor !eneral, -resi+ential Commission on !oo+ !overnment, an+ Commision on 4u+it. !.R. No. 2#%&", eruar , "22'. %s to matters that are of great pith and moment, su/ce it to say that the recent "enedicto

pri!ate practice, although constant consultation and ad!ice are sine qua non in both types of relationship. The relationship is rather one, created as it is by law, where imposed upon 5'$ is the responsibility to present to the courts the position that will uphold the best interests of the *eople, the $o!ernment and the 'tate, albeit the same may run counter to its clientLs position or route of action. %t any rate, the *$$ through nationwide TN broadcast and print media, publicly announced that *$$ had disposed with or otherwise did not need the legal ser!ices of the 8awyer of the $o!ernment, and thus 5'$ descended, not the unmerited remark of ha!ing

C)ui vs -osa+as, !.R. No. 0'%8#, eruar "", "2'&. It may possibly be, as intimated by udge ooley in his standard treatise on Taation, !olume -, page GO1, that
G;.

8e &eminem ogit %d Nana

The law compels no one to perform a !ain or useless act.

. >. /i*3s v. Manila /otel Compan, !.R. No. 022#%, Novemer 6, "2". The legitimate object is to enable the party upon whom it is made to perform his contract and discharge his liability agreeable to the nature of it without a suit at law7 and whene!er such party wholly denies the right of the other to assert title in himself or unquali2edly refuses performance of the obligation, a demand is made useless, and therefore unnecessary, since le? neminem *ogit a+ vana. :or the same reason and upon the same principle the failure to make a demand before suit may be


cured by proof that the defendant could not ha!e complied with the demand if it had been made7 as where a person contracts to assign his interest in certain lands to another within a speci2ed t ime upon payment of consideration therefor, and the !endor prior to the stipulated time assigns his interest to a stranger. In such case a request by the !endee for the performance of the contract is unnecessary. The rule stated otherwise is to the eect that where a party bound to the future performance of a contract puts it out of his power to perform it, the other party may treat this as a breach and sue him at once, ha!ing thus an immediate right of action for breach of the contract by anticipation. GC.

8ongi Temporis *ossessio

The acquisition of title to property by long period of possession, or by continued or uninterrupted possession.

!allosa v. 4r*angel, !.R. No. 0'2%$$ (une '", "2#8. % rudimentary knowledge of substanti!e law trial procedure is su/cient for an ordinary lawyer to conclude upon a causal perusal of the 1G4F complaint that it is baseless trial unwarranted.

)hat the plaintis seek is the

court dismissed in 1GC-. It is e!ident from the allegations of the complaint complaint trial from defendant defendantsL sL motion motion to dismiss that plaintisL 1G4F action is barred u+i*ata, a double6barrelled by res u+i*ata double6barrelled defense, tria triall by pres prescr crip ipti tion on,, acqu acquis isit iti! i!e e tria triall etinct etincti!e, i!e, or by what are known in the us *ivile *ivile trial the us gentium as usu*apio, longi temporis possesio and praes*riptio. Ramos Ram os vs. Ram Ramos, os, 0"28#' "28#',, De*eme De*emerr %, e!ident nt from the "2#, "2#, 6" SCR4 SCR4 '8. It is e!ide alle allega gati tion ons s of the the comp compla lain intt tria triall from from defendantsL motion to dismiss that plaintisL 1G4F 1G4F acti action on is barr barred ed by res res judi judica cata ta,, a double6barrelled double6barrelled defense, trial by prescription, prescription, acquisiti acquisiti!e !e trial etincti!e etincti!e,, or by what are known in the jus ci!ile trial the jus gentium as usuc usucap apio io,, long longii temp tempor oris is poss posses esio io and and praescriptio

G4. &emo cum alte alteri riu us de detrim trime ento protest

-a*i@* @* Mer* Mer*)a )an+ n+is isin ing g v. Cons Consol ola* a*io ion n &atural law is clear in that no one shall be -a*i Insura Insuran*e n*e,, !.R !.R.. No. 0%$'$ %$'$ *toe *toerr '2, enriched by the injury or loss of another "2#6. %s the trial court aptly obser!ed <... it is 5ne cannot unjustly unjustly enrich enrich himself himself at the only simple justice that *ajarillo should pay for epense of another. the the said said clai claim, m, othe otherw rwis ise e he woul would d be enriching enriching himself without paying plainti for the cost of certain materials that went into its construction. ... It is howe!er, that he did so only as a recei!er of 8eo *ajarillo by !irtue of the judgment in i!il ase &o. CO-O1 all of the


properties of 8eo Enterprises, Inc. passed on to *ajarillo by !irtue of the judgment in i!il ase &o. CO-O1. This (oman 8aw principle of <&emo um alterious detrimento locupletari protest< protest< is embodied embodied in %rticle %rticle -- Auman (elat elatio ions nsB, B, and and %rti %rticl cles es -1;-1;- to -1FC -1FC AuasiontractsB of the &ew i!il ode. 8ong before the enactment of this ode, howe!er, the principle principle of unjust unjust enrichm enrichment ent which is basic basic in e!ery e!ery legal legal system system,, was was alread already y epres jurisdiction. Serrano v. Court of 4ppeals, 0%&&'2, (ul "6, imperati! ti!e e to "28 "28;; "%$ "%$ SCR4 SCR4 %&%. %&%. It is impera dissect the rationale of the insurance scheme en!isioned by the 'ocial 'ecurity 'ystem. The #ortgage (edemption (edemption Insurance de!ice is not only for the protection of the ''TE# but also for the bene2t of the mortgagor. 5n the part of the ''TE#, it has to enter into such form of cont contra ract ct so that that in the the e!en e!entt of the the unepected demise of the mortgagor during the subsistence of the mortgage contract, the proceeds from such insurance will be applied to the payment of the mortgage debt, thereby relie relie!in !ing g the heirs heirs of the mortga mortgagor gor from from paying the obligation. The ''TE# insures the payme ayment nt to itse itself lf of the the loan loan with with the the insurance proceeds. proceeds. It also negates any future problem that can crop up should the heirs be not in a position to pay the mortgage loan. In short, the process of amorti0ation is hastened and possible litigation in the future is a!oided.


In a similar !ein, ample protection is gi!en to the mortgagor under such a concept so that in the the e!en e!entt of his his deat death7 h7 the the mort mortga gage ge obli obliga gati tion on will will be eti eting ngui uish shed ed by the the application of the insurance proceeds to the mortgage indebtedness. The interpretation interpretation of the 'ocial 'ecurity ommission goes against the !ery rationale of the insura insuranc nce e schem scheme. e. It cannot cannot unjus unjustly tly enrich itself at the epense of another A Nemo *um alteri alterius us +etrim +etriment ento o protest protest B.

against the ha0ards of disability, sickness, old age, and death with a !iew to promote their well6being in the spirit of social justice< GF.

&emo Tenetur 'eipsum %ccusare

&o person shall be compelled to accuse 5illaor vs Summers, !.R. No. "6, Septemer 8, "2'$. The maim of the himself. common law, Nemo tenetur seipsum a**usare, was recogni0ed in England in early days, but not in the other legal systems of the world, in a re!olt against the thumbscrew and the rack. % legal shield was raised against odious inquisitorial methods of interrogating an accused person by which to etort unwilling confessions with the e!er present temptation to commit the crime of perjury. The kernel of the pri!ilege as disclosed by the tetwriters was testimonial compulsion. %s forcing a man to be a witness against himself was deemed contrary to the fundamentals of republican go!ernment, the principle was taken into the %merican onstitutions, and from the 9nited 'tates was brought to the *hilippine Islands, in eactly as wide Q but no wider Q a scope as it eisted in old English days. The pro!ision should here be approached in no blindly worshipful spirit, but with a judicious and a judicial appreciation of both its bene2ts and its abuses. *erhaps the best way to test the correctness of our position is to go back once more to elements and ponder on what is the prime purpose of a criminal trial. %s we !iew


it, the object of ha!ing criminal laws is to purgue the community of persons who !iolate the laws to the great prejudice of their fellow men. riminal procedure, the rules of e!idence, and constitutional pro!isions, are then pro!ided, not to protect the guilty but to protect the innocent. &o rule is intemended to be so rigid as to embarrass the administration of justice in its endea!or to ascertain the truth. &o accused person should be afraid of the use of any method which will tend to establish the truth. :or instance, under the facts before us, to use torture to make the defendant admit her guilt might only result in including her to tell a falsehood. "ut no e!idence of physical facts can for any substantial reason be held to be detrimental to the accused ecept in so far as the truth is to be a!oided in order to acquit a guilty person. GM.

Doctrine of 5biter Dictum

These are opinions not necessary to the determination of a case. They are not binding and cannot ha!e force of judicial precedents. It has been said that an obiter dictum is an opinion Huttered by the way, not upon the point of question pending. HIt is as if the court were turning aside from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects.

-eople of t)e -)ilippines v. /on. /iginio Ma*a+aeg. !.R. No. 0%"6. Ma '8, "2&' %n obiter dictum is an opinion

determination and is made without argument or full consideration of the point, and is not professed deliberate determinations of the judge himself. % cursory reading of the decision of this ourt in $. (. &o. 86-1MM ^^ against respondent %ntonio $uillermo discloses that the ruling of the ourt that the said respondent is not entitled to the bene2ts of the amnesty is not an obiter dictum, but is a ruling of the ourt on an issue epressly raised by the party appellant on facts or e!idence adduced in the course of the trial of his case. It is not an opinion uttered by the way7 it is a direct ruling on an issue epressly raised by a party. It was not unnecessary to make that ruling7 the ruling was absolutely essential to a determination of a question of fact and of law directly in issue. It was not made without argument or full consideration of the point7 it was deliberately entered by the ourt after arguments on both sides had been heard. This could not ha!e a!oided determining the issue without the peril of rendering an incomplete decision. GG.

Doctrine of (atio Decidendi

San+e 4guinal+o v. /onorale Commission on >le*tionn. !.R. No. 0&%2&%, (anuar &, "28". It is of

the ratio decidendi is, as a general rule, binding on courts of lower and later jurisdictionQthrough the doctrine of stare decisis. ertain courts are able to o!errule decisions of a court of coordinate jurisdiction Qhowe!er, out of interests of judicial comity, they generally try to follow coordinate rationes.

1OO

Doctrine of *ari #ateria

% designation applied to statutes or general laws that were enacted at dierent times but pertain to the same subject or object. 'tatutes in pari materia must be interpreted in light of each other since they ha!e a common purpose for comparable e!ents or items.

election or after the proclamation of the winner since T>0>!R4-/ 4ND T>0>-/N> CR-R4TIN, C4-IT0 IR>0>SS, INC. an+ R4DI CMM:NIC4TINS  T/> -/I0I--IN>S, INC. !.R. No. 06$&8 Novemer "$, "286. In 5pinion &o. F4 the !iew taken was that a message, to fall within the pur!iew of the franchise, once sent by a transmitter within the *hilippines, cannot be recei!ed by any station within the *hilippines e!en for the purpose of retransmitting such message to points outside the *hilippines. I belie!e that the interpretation gi!en to the abo!e6quoted clause was too strict and does not conform with the spirit of said pro!ision. I

1FODOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

take the !iew that the franchise has reference to the destination of the message and not to the manner of transmittal. &ot as to whether it should be sent to the point of destination directly or through relays. The reser!ation in fa!or of the *hilippine $o!ernment under section ; of the franchise of
1F1DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

#ari!eles, "ataan, which will recei!e interstate communications for onward transmission by its main station in #anila. The abo!e6stated opinions of the 'ecretary of ustice and 9ndersecretary of ustice are material because (epublic %cts &os. ;43O and ;41F are in pari materia. %s the ourt has reiterated@ 'tatutes are said to be in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or ha!e the same purpose or object. A'utherland 'tatutory onstruction, Nol. 11, pp. C3C6C34B )hen statutes are in pari materia7 the rule of statutory construction dictates that they should be construed together. A"lack on Interpretation of 8aws, 'ec. 1O4B ... Aity of &aga !s. %gna, #ay 31, 1GF4, F1 '(% 1F4, 1M;B Cit of Naga v. Catalino 4gna, !.R. No. 0 %6$2 Ma %", "2#6. 'ection -3OG of the (e!ised %dministrati!e ode and 'ection - of (epublic %ct &o. --4; A8ocal %utonomy %ctB refer to the same subject matter6enactment and eecti!ity of a ta ordinance. In this respect they can be considered in pari

Doctrines in Civil Law

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