Suggested Answers in 2018 Jurists Mock Bar Examinations in Political Law

`

JURISTS BAR REVIEW CENTER

™

SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO THE 2018 JURISTS POLITICAL LAW MOCK BAR EXAMINATION I The motion to dismiss should be denied. The Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be invoked by the State to defeat a landowner’s valid claim for just compensation arising from the taking of his property without without the proper proper expropriation expropriation complaint complaint being first filed. filed. [ Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu , 40 SCRA 464; Air Transportaton Office v. v . Ramos , G.R. No. 185685, February 23, 2011]

II Yes, Willywally is correct in challenging the law on the ground that it is violative of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has held that under the Constitution, the power to repeal or alter court procedural rules, including the Rules of Court, is exclusively vested in the Supreme Court. Here the law passed by Congress prohibiting plea bargaining in effect repeals or alters the Rules of Court provisions allowing plea bargaining. Hence the law prohibiting plea bargaining is is violative of the Constitution. [See Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, 15 August 2017)]

III No, there is no basis for the quo warranto petition alleging that Stursky was not a naturalborn Filipino citizen. c itizen. The Supreme Court has held that under the 1935 Constitution, an illegitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father acquires from birth the Filipino citizenship of his or her mother and is thus a natural-born Filipino citizen. citizen. Here Stursky was an illegitimate child since his parents never got married. Stursky is thus a natural-born natural- born Filipino citizen, having acquired his mother’s Filipino citizenship, and thus does does not need to elect Filipino citizenship. Thus the quo warranto petition is without basis.

IV (a) If I were the judge, I would deny Attila’s motion to quash.

Suggested Answers Answers to the the 2018 Jurists Mock Bar Bar Examinations Examinations in Labor Labor Law. © 2018 by Jurists Review Review Center Inc. Inc. Copying, dissemination, storage, use, modification, modification, uploading, and downloading without the express written consent of Jurists Review C enter Inc. is strictly prohibited and shall be subjected to criminal prosecution and administrative charges, including the appropriate complaint with the Bar Confidant’s Office and IBP. Page 1 of 6

Under the law creating the Sandiganbayan, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers which are not in relation to their office. Here the offense charged against Atilla was use of dangerous drugs which was not in relation to his office of Police Senior Superintendent. Hence the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense charged and the motion to quash should be denied. (b) If I were the judge, I would sustain Atilla’s objection. The Supreme Court has held that the right against self-incrimination also applies to nontestimonial compulsion if the evidence obtained was not material to the principal cause of the arrest. Here the evidence obtained, the drug-test result, was not material to the principal cause of Atilla’s arrest which was extortion. Hence the right of self-incrimination applies and the drug test result is not admissible against Attila since it was obtained in violation of such right. [Dela Cruz v. People, 730 SCRA 655 (2014)]

V

Yes, Gadfly’s petition to disqualify Dellie is meritorious. Under the Constitution, a member of Congress is prohibited from being appointed to an office which had been created or its emoluments increased during the term of the member. Here, the term of office of Dellie C. Ious is six years. At the time she left the Senate there were three years remaining in her term. The office was created on the fourth year of her term, even if she was no longer in Congress then. Hence Dellie is disqualified from being appointed as Chairperson of the SCEC and the petition is thus meritorious.

VI Yes, Mr. Kospi is entitled to just compensation. Case law holds that material impairment of the property may constitute taking within the ambit of the eminent domain power of the state and which would entitle the owner to just compensation. Here there was material impairment of Mr. Kospi’s prope rty as he was forced to give up his chicken business due to the numerous deaths of his chicken due to the overflights. Hence Mr. Kospi is entitled to just compensation. [U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 [1946]).

Suggested Answers to the 2018 Jurists Mock Bar Examinations in Labor Law. © 2018 by Jurists Review Center Inc. Copying, dissemination, storage, use, modification, uploading, and downloading without the express written consent of Jurists Review C enter Inc. is strictly prohibited and shall be subjected to criminal prosecution and administrative charges, including the appropriate complaint with the Bar Confidant’s Office and IBP. Page 2 of 6

VII No, these delegations are not valid. Under Political Law, the President cannot delegate the power of appointment and the power of pardon because these powers demand the use of personal discretion and judgment which cannot be delegated. [See Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr., 188 SCRA 154 (1990)]

VIII The effects of Tanders’ shift of affiliation on his position as sectoral representative would be that, first, Tanders would be considered as having forfeited his seat in Congress and, second, he would be ineligible for nomination under the Manggagawa sector. Under the Law on Elections, any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation shall forfeit his seat, provided that if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as a party-list representative under his new party or organization. [Amores v. HRET, 622 SCRA 593]

IX (a) No, a dual citizen under R.A. No. 9225 may not be elected or appointed to public office. The Supreme Court has held that for a dual citizen to be eligible for election or appointment to public office, he must first swear allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and renounce any and all foreign citizenships. He is further required to thereafter comply with all other requirements for election or appointment to public office, including, but not limited to, residence. [Section 5, RA 9225; Jacot v. Dal, 572 SCRA 295; Japzon v. COMELEC, 576 SCRA 331] (b) Under the Law on Elections, the citizenship status of a person who, after renouncing any and all foreign citizenships under the provisions of R.A. 9225, is found to have continued using his foreign passport would be that he is considered to have reverted to his dual citizenship. [Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013; Maquiling v. COMELEC, April 16, 2013]

X No, a “second-placer” may not be proclaimed as the winner . Under the Law on Elections, the disqualification of the first placer for vote-buying would give rise to the operation of the rules on succession under the Local Government Code. Accordingly, it is the Vice-Governor, and not the second placer, who should ascend to the governorship. [Talaga v. COMELEC, 683 SCRA 197] .


XI No, the Ombudsman cannot validly take cognizance of the case. The Supreme Court has held that the correctness of the decisions of the Supreme Court as final arbiter of all justiciable disputes is conclusive upon all other departments of the government. Here the charge before the Ombudsman involves knowingly and deliberately rendering an unjust decision which involves a determination of the correctness of the decisions of the Supreme Court. Hence the Ombudsman cannot take cognizance of the case.

[In re Laureta, 148 SCRA

382] XII No, the “comfort women” may not bring a class suit against the Japanese Government before the International Court of Justice. Under International Law, only States may be parties in cases before the International Court of Justice. [Article 34, Statute of the International Court of Justice]

XIII Regarding the establishment of local government units, the law would be valid with respect to the legislative council’s authority to create municipalities and barangays only. The Supreme Court has held that provinces and cities, which are potentially legislative districts, may under the Constitution be established only by Congress. [Sema v. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700] With respect to the creation of special courts, the law would be valid with respect to the creation of special courts with special family, personal, and property jurisdiction. Under the Constitution, the organic acts for the autonomous regions shall provide only for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction. With respect to the creation of special courts with penal jurisdiction, the law is not valid as the creation of criminal courts is not provided for in the Constitution.

XIV No, the Civil Service Commission may not properly take cognizance of the administrative charges against Dahlia Daldal. The Supreme Court has held that administrative jurisdiction over a court employee is vested exclusively with the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after employment with the judiciary. [Ampong v. Civil Service Commission, 563 SCRA 293; Civil Service Commission v. Andal, 608 SCRA 370]


XV Yes, Manny Mandirigma would be qualified to run again for the office of mayor after his last term. The Supreme Court has held that the period prior to a local government official’s recall term, when his opponent held the office, constitutes an interruption in the local government official’s continuity of service and cannot be credited to him even if he had won in the recall election. Here Mandirigma had after his first term, lost in the next election. Hence there was already an interruption even though he won the recall election. Thus he is deemed to have served only two consecutive terms and therefore can run again for the same office after his last term. [ Adormeo v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002].

XVI The flight attendant’s challenge on the ground of the equal protection clause is without merit. The Supreme Court has held that the equal protection clause may be invoked only against governmental interference or action and not against the acts of private individuals or entities. Here PAL is a private entity. Hence the flight attendant’s challenge is without merit. [ Yrasuegui v. Philippine Air Lines , G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008]

XVII Yes, the COMELEC is correct in pointing out that Polneo has no valid right of action. Under the Constitution, the prohibition against political dynasties requires for its implementation that Congress pass a law defining political dynasties Congress has not yet passed a law defining political dynasties. Hence the prohibition cannot yet be implemented and thus Polneo has no valid right of action.

XVIII

No, the RTC did not act correctly in dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Under the Constitution, what the President may suspend in case of rebellion is the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus not the writ of habeas corpus itself. The writ, which directs the officer to produce before the court the person detained, issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the petition. What is suspended is the privilege of the writ, that is, once the officer making the return


shows to the court that the person is being detained for rebellion, the court may not inquire further and should dismiss the petition. Here the RTC forthwith dismissed the petition without issuing the writ of habeas corpus and directing the military to file a return. Hence the RTC judge acted incorrectly in dismissing the petition. [Article III, Sec. 15, Constitution].

XIX If I were the lawyer for Luke Shaw, I would file a motion to quash the information on the ground of double jeopardy.

Under the Constitution, a person may not be charged again with the same offense for which he was previously acquitted and a motion to quash the second charge on the ground of double jeopardy would lie. Here Luke Shaw had been previously acquitted of the crime of illegal sale of opium and the second charge for illegal possession of opium involved the same tins subject of the first charge. Hence the illegal possession of opium was necessarily included in the first charge of illegal sale of opium and thus Luke Shaw was being charged anew of the same offense. Thus the motion to quash should be granted. [U.S. v. Luk Chaw, 18 Phil. 513]

NOTHING FOLLOWS


Suggested Answers in 2018 Jurists Mock Bar Examinations in Political Law

Recommend Documents