Suggested Answers to 2016 Civil Law Mock Bar Examination - Copy

JURISTS BAR REVIEW CENTER™ Suggested Answers to 2016 Civil Law Mock Bar Examination I (a) No, international long distance calls are not personal property of PLDT which may be the subject of theft. In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court held that international long distance calls are not the personal property of PLDT. The reason is that PLDT could not have acquired ownership over such calls since it merely transmits the said calls using its communications facilities. (b) Yes the business of providing telecommunications services is a personal property which may the subject of theft. The Supreme Court has held that interest in business, as well as the business itself, is personal property and hence may be the subject of theft. Here when Luis used the facilities of PLDT without its consent, he was unlawfully taking the telephone services and business of PLDT. Hence such business is personal property which may be the subject of theft. [Luis v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076, 13 January 2009].

II (a)

Only Kate and Kim, nieces of Quintin and Diana, Quintin’s sister will inherit from him in intestacy pursuant to the rule of proximity. The other relatives being farther in degree will be excluded. Kate and Kim as nieces who concur with their aunt, Diana will inherit by right of representation. Thus, they get ½ of the estate of Quintin or P120,000 which they will divide equally and the other half goes to Daisy, the sister of Quintin. (b) If the parents of Quintin are among the survivors, they alone will get the entire estate of Quintin Under the Law on Succession, relatives in the direct line exclude relatives in the collateral line. Here the parents of Quintin would be relatives in the direct line. Hence they would exclude the nieces, nephews, and siblings of Quintin who are relatives in the collateral line. Thus only Quintin’s parents will get the entire estate of Quintin. Suggested Answers in Jurists Mock Bar Examinations in Civil Law. All rights reserved 2016 by Jurists Review Center Inc. Unauthorized reproduction, use, or dissemination is strictly prohibited and shall be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, including administrative complaints with the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court.

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III (a) Yes, Edwin can compel Pia to accept payment from him. Under the Civil Code provisions on obligations and contracts, a person interested in the fulfillment of the obligation can compel the creditor to accept payment from him. Here Edwin who is a surety is a party interested in the fulfillment of the obligation as he is liable together with the principal debtor in favor of the creditor. Hence Edwin can compel Pia to accept payment from him. (b) If Pia refuses to accept Edwin’s payment, Edwin’s recourse is to consign the amount due with the court. Under the Civil Code provisions on obligations and contracts, the debtor may consign the amount due where the creditor unjustifiably refuses the debtor’s tender of payment. Here, Pia’s refusal to accept Edwin’s tender of payment was unjustified since Edwin as a surety is a person interested in the fulfillment of the obligation who can compel the creditor Pia to accept payment from him. Hence Edwin has the recourse of consignation if Pia refuses refuses to accept Edwin’s payment. (c) Yes, Edwin may foreclose upon the mortgage executed by Martin. Under the Civil Code provisions on Obligations and Contracts, there is legal subrogation when a person interested in the fulfillment of the obligation pays the creditor. In such a case, payor steps into the shoes of the creditor and acquires the creditor’s accessory rights such as those arising from mortgage. Here Edwin who is interested in the fulfillment of the obligation had paid Pia. Hence there was legal subrogation and Edwin thus steps into the shoes of Pia and acquires the latter’s rights as mortgagee. Thus Edwin may foreclose upon the mortgage. IV (a) No a Torrens title may not be subject to a collateral attack. Under the Property Registration Decree, a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack.

Suggested Answers in Jurists Mock Bar Examinations in Civil Law. All rights reserved 2016 by Jurists Review Center Inc. Unauthorized reproduction, use, or dissemination is strictly prohibited and shall be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, including administrative complaints with the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court.

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(b) A direct attack is an action the object of which is to nullify the title and hence to challenge the proceeding pursuant to which the title was decreed. An indirect or collateral attack is an action the purpose of which is to seek a different relief but in which an attack on the title or the proceeding is made as an incident thereof. (c) No, the counterclaim should not be dismissed. In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court has held that a direct attack on the title may be by way of a counterclaim in which the certificate of title is sought to be nullified. The reason is that a counterclaim is in the nature of a complaint filed by the defendant against the plaintiff. [Leyson v. Bontuyan, G.R. 156357, 18 Feb 05] Hence the counterclaim should not be dismissed.

V No, Ding’s defense is not meritorious. Under the Civil Code provisions on Torts, moral damages may be recovered in cases of libel, slander, or any other form of defamation. The Supreme Court has held in a recent case that this article does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Here Ding was guilty of libel or defamation when he lambasted ANI in a radio broadcast. Hence he is liable for moral damages to ANI. [Filipinas Broadcasting Corp. v. Ago Medical and Educational Center, G.R. 141994, 17 Jan 05; Article 2219(17)]

VI The marriage between Panfilo and Lala is void and bigamous. It is immaterial that Panfilo is suffering from amnesia because the law considers void any marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of his/her prior marriage. The marriage between Luz and Ponzie is ostensibly valid because Luz had obtained a declaration of presumptive death of Panfilo before contracting the subsequent marriage. However, since Luz was in bad faith and was in fact aware that Panfilo was still alive, it could be argued that the second marriage of Luz to Ponzie is void because the judgment declaring Panfilo presumptively dead is not valid as it was procured in bad faith and was based on false facts. Since the marriage between Luz and Ponzie is void, their property relationship is governed by co-ownership pursuant to the Family Code.


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VII (1) Yes, the other siblings of Father Edwin are right in questioning the effectivity of the donation. Under the Law on Property, a donation is perfected and becomes valid only if the acceptance is made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. A valid acceptance of a donation of real property must be made in a public instrument. Here, the donation of a parcel of land, a real property, was not validly accepted by the donee during the donor’s lifetime since the donee accepted the donation in a public instrument only after the death of the donor. Hence, no donation was perfected and thus the other siblings of Father Edwin are right in questioning the effectivity of the donation. [Arts. 734, 746 & 749, Civil Code]

(2) No, the action to cancel the donation has not yet prescribed. Under the Law on Donations, the prescriptive period to cancel an onerous donation is ten years from the violation of the condition. Here the donation was onerous since the value of the schools and chapel to be constructed is at least equal to or more than the value of the land donated. Hence the prescriptive period was ten years from the violation or non-compliance with the condition. Thus the action to cancel the donation has not yet prescribed.

VIII (A) No, Theodore does not cease to be a partner when he assigned his interest in the partnership. Under the Law on Partnership, a partner who assigns his interest in the partnership does not cease to be a partner. (B) Under the Law on Partnership, the following are the rights of Dave as assignee of Theodore’s interest in the partnership: 1. To get whatever profit Theodore the assignor would have obtained. 2. To avail himself of the usual remedies in case of fraud in the management. 3. To ask for the annulment of the assignment if he was induced to enter into the same through any of the vices of consent. 4. To ask for an accounting in case the partnership is dissolved.


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IX (a) No, the parents may not use the P200,000 out of the P1,000,000 for the family’s daily collective needs. Under the Family Code, the property of the unemancipated child acquired through gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted to the latter’s support or education. (Art. 226, Family Code). Here the P200,000 came from the P1,000,000 which was acquired by Donna Mae by gratutitous title or by donation. Hence the parents may not use the P200,000 for the family’s daily collective needs since it should be devoted to Donna Mae’s support or education. (b) Yes, but only secondarily. Under the Family Code, the rights of the parents over the fruits or income of the child’s property shall be limited primarily to the child’s support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family. (c) No, the parents may not use P300,000 out of the P1,000,000 for the collective needs of the family. Under the Law on Family Relations, the earnings and other income of the working child shall belong to her in ownership and shall be set aside primarily for her support, education or skills acquisition, and secondarily to the collective needs of the family. Provided that not more than 20% of the child’s income may be used for the collective needs of the family. Hence the parents may not use P300,000 since it would exceed 20% of the child’s income of P1,000,000. [Section 12-B of R.A. No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Act)].

X As between Brenda and Marissa, it is Marissa who has the better right. The Supreme Court has held that an ineffective adverse claim cannot prejudice the rights of a subsequent purchaser for value who would thus be considered as being innocent or in good faith. Under the Property Registration Decree, an adverse claim is effective only if there is no other provision in the decree for the registration of the claimant’s adverse interest. Here the adverse claim filed by Brenda was ineffective because her adverse interest in the form of a deed of absolute sale could have been registered as a voluntary instrument pursuant to the Property Registration Decree. Hence Brenda’s adverse claim was ineffective and did not prejudice the rights of Marissa who is thus considered as an innocent purchaser for value. Suggested Answers in Jurists Mock Bar Examinations in Civil Law. All rights reserved 2016 by Jurists Review Center Inc. Unauthorized reproduction, use, or dissemination is strictly prohibited and shall be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, including administrative complaints with the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court.

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XI Yes, De Jesus’ action for removal or demolition will prosper. Under the Civil Code provisions on Property, the provisions on builder in good faith refer to a person who has built on the property of another and not to an owner who has built on his own land. Here Ignacio had erected the building entirely on lands owned by him. PNB thus cannot claim to have acquired the rights of a builder in good faith from Ignacio. Hence De Jesus can file an action for removal of the encroaching improvement pursuant to his right as the owner of Lot B. [PNB v. De Jesus, G.R. 149295, 23 Sep. 03].

XII (a) The name of the contract entered into among Peter, Andy, and Beth is the contract of commodatum. Under the Civil Code provisions on loan, there is commodatum when a person gratuitously lends to another a non-consummable thing for the latter to use for a certain time and to return it. Here Peter lent his car, a non-consummable thing, for Andy and Beth’s free or gratuitous use for one week. Hence there was a contract of commodatum entered into among them. (b) Yes Andy should be held liable to Peter for the full value of the car or P500,000. Under the Civil Code provisions on loan, the bailee in commodatum is liable for the loss of the thing even if through a fortuitous event if the bailee keeps it for a period longer than that stipulated. Here Beth kept the car longer than one week. Hence Beth is liable. Andy should also be liable. Under the Civil Code provisions on loan, when there are two or more bailees to whom a thing is loaned in the same contract, they are liable solidarily. In solidary liability the fault of one is the fault of all. Here the car was lent to Andy and Beth hence they are liable solidarily. The liability being solidary, Andy is liable for the full value of the car or P500,000 even if the one at fault was Beth.


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XIII (a) Yes, the certificate of title in the Saberons’ names may be nullified. The Supreme Court has held that entry of a transaction or deed in the primary entry book is sufficient registration and will bind a subsequent purchaser whose certificate of title may accordingly be nullified. Here the deed or notice of levy on execution was entered in the primary entry book. Hence the notice of levy on execution was sufficiently registered and is thus binding upon the subsequent purchasers who are the Saberons. Thus the certificate of title in the Saberons’ names may be nullified. [Saberon v. Ventanilla, 21 April 2014] (b) No, the trial court may not order the demolition of the house built by the Saberons. In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court held that the purchaser who was unaware of a prior registered lien and who builds on the land bought is a builder in good faith. Since the Saberons are builders in good faith, the owner spouses Ventanilla do not have the right of demolition as against them. Hence the trial court cannot order the demolition of the house. [Art. 448, Saberon v. Ventanilla]

XIV (a) No, the action of the heirs of Usman will not prosper. Under the Law on Property, in order for ejectment to prosper, the plaintiff must have a right to possession over the land subject thereof. Accretion on foreshore land belongs not to the riparian owner but to the State. [Art. 84, Spanish Law of Waters] Here the accretion took place along foreshore land or that fronting Butuan Bay. Hence the land belongs not to the heirs of Usman but to the State. Thus the heirs of Usman do not have right of possession over the accretion and hence their action for ejectment will not prosper. (b) No, Ulysses may not file an application for original registration of the increased northern tip. Under the Law on Land Titles, land of the public domain cannot be acquired by prescription and registered in the possessor’s name. Here the accretion belongs not to the riparian owner but to the State and is thus land of the public domain. Suggested Answers in Jurists Mock Bar Examinations in Civil Law. All rights reserved 2016 by Jurists Review Center Inc. Unauthorized reproduction, use, or dissemination is strictly prohibited and shall be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, including administrative complaints with the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court.

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Thus it cannot be acquired by prescription by Ulysses and cannot be registered in his name.

XV The marriage was attended by the following defects or irregularities 1. Zandro and Zita were both 18 years of age and hence, the consent of their parents would still be required. This does not make the marriage void but merely voidable. 2. The license was irregularly issued because of lack of posting but this does not affect the marriage but may subject the LCR to civil, criminal or administrative sanctions. 3. The solemnizing officer had no authority because only incumbent members of the judiciary may solemnize marriages. The marriage on this score is void unless either or both parties believed in good faith that he had authority. 4. There was no marriage ceremony which is one of the formal requisites. Be it noted that the judge merely asked the parties to fill up the blank form and he did not really perform the ceremony. Total absence of the ceremony makes the marriage void.

XVI Yes the trial court may award moral damages to Makisig. The Supreme Court has held that a husband may recover moral damages from a defendant whose negligence caused him loss of consortium. Here the negligence of defendant Pantranco caused severe physical injuries which disfigured Maganda’s face and caused her to suffer from chronic back pain thus affecting her conjugal and sexual relations with her husband Makisig and causing him loss of consortium. Hence the trial court may award damages to Makisig. [See Kierulf v. CA, 13 March 1997]

XVII Yes, ABC is entitled to the payment of the balance of P20 million. Under the Civil Code provisions on Obligations and Contracts, if the obligation has been substantially performed in good faith, the obligor may recover payment as though there had been a strict and complete fulfillment. Here there was a substantial performance by ABC as it was able to complete the construction of the condominium and its failure to submit the performance bond and the “asbuilt” drawing was in good faith as it though the same were not necessary. Hence ABC is entitled to the payment of P20 million.


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XVIII No, Cocoy’s suit would not prosper. Under the Statute of Frauds, a representation as to a third person’s credit is unenforceable if it is not in writing. Here Luis’s assurance to Cocoy that he can safely lend to Dencio was a representation as to the credit of Dencio, a third person. Hence the representation is unenforceable since it was not in writing. Thus Cocoy’s suit would not prosper. [Cook v. Churchman, 104 Ind. 141].

XIX (Disregard as same with VI)

XX No, Benjie may not sue for the annulment of the contract on the ground of vitiated consent. Under the Law on Obligations and Contracts, annulment of contract on the ground of vitiated consent is not available if the fraud involved was not use to obtain the consent of the aggrieved party but was done during the performance of the contract. Here the fraud employed by Sam was fraud in the performance or delivery of the object of the sale or the ring and not used to obtain the consent of Benjie. Hence Benjie may not sue for the annulment of the contract. The remedy available to Benjie to set aside the contract is an action for rescission. Under the Law on Obligations and Contracts, rescission is available in case of material breach of a contract. Here there was a material breach by Sam of the contract of sale when he delivered a fake ring to Benjie. Hence Benjie may avail of the remedy of rescission of contract.

-oOo-


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Suggested Answers to 2016 Civil Law Mock Bar Examination - Copy

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