Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 Facts:
Table of Contents
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Case GSIS v. CSC, Baradero Beronilla v. CSC Cena v. CSC Rabor v. CSC Profeta v. Drilon Santiago v. COA Raro v. ECC Iloilo Dock v. WCC Belarmino v. ECC Alano v. ECC Lazo v. ECC Enao v. ECC Menez v. ECC Narazo v. ECC Dabatian v. GSIS Rodriguez v. ECC ECC v. Arreola Tancinco v. GSIS Panotes v. ECC Jimenez v. ECC Ma-AO Sugar Central v. CA Chua Yeng v. Michael Roma Visayan Stevedore v. WCC Bellosilo v. City of Manila Davao Gulf Lumber v. Del Rosario Batangas Transportation Company v. Vda. de Rivera Marinduque Iron Mines Agents v. WCC De Inguillo v. ECC Clemente v. GSIS, ECC Casumpang v. ECC
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GSIS v. CSC, Dr. Manuel Baradero, Matilde S. Belo GR No. 98395 and 102449,
This is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Matilde S. Belo in the 28 October 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court holding that government service rendered on a per diem basis is not creditable in computing the length of service for retirement purposes. Thus, the orders of the CSC requiring the GSIS to consider as creditable the services of Belo were reversed. Belo rendered service as Vice Governor of Capiz. GSIS likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the same grounds in behalf of Belo and another private respondent Dr. Manuel Baradero, a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of La Castellana, Negros Occidental. Issue: Whether regular government service on a per diem basis, without any other form of compensation or emolument, is compensation within the contemplation of the term service with compensation under the GSIS law. Held:
YES. (Motion was granted) The Court reconsidered its earlier decision and said that the amounts received may be denominated as per diem but are actually in the nature of compensation or pay and that what is controlling in both cases would be the nature of the remuneration and not the label attached to it. In the case of Belo, the Court noted that she held the position continuously from 5 January 1972 to 1 February 1988. In that span of time, she was paid a fixed salary by virtue of her election from 25 January 1972 to 31 December 1972; paid with per diem from 31 December 1976 to 31 December 1979; and fixed salary from 1 January 1980 to 1 February 1988. The per diems received by respondent was actually paid for in the performance of her duties not as per diem referred in Sec. 1 (c) of the GSIS Act. Per diem, based on the GSIS law, is defined as a daily allowance given for each day an officer or employee of government is away from his home base. It is a reimbursement for extra expenses incurred by the public official in the performance of his duties. Generally allowance for expenses incident to the discharge of an office is not a salary office. However, if the remuneration received by a public official in the performance of his duties does not constitute a mere “allowance for expenses” but appears to be his actual base pay, a per diem would take the allowances received by petitioner from the term service with compensation for the purpose of
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 computing the number of years of service in government. In the other case, Dr. Baradero was paid on a per diem basis from 1 January 1976 to 10 October 1978. Applying the Belo case, the Court considered the following: a) the continuous government service rendered; b) being a full time employee although on a hold-over capacity; c) and that no other forms of remuneration was received. Respondent Baradero, who, before and after the period in question had an unblemished record of service to the government as a member of the army and as a medical officer of the Philippine Medicare Commission. The disputed period was served on a full-time basis regardless of the denomination given to the compensation received by him.
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Hilarion Beronilla v. Civil Service Commission GR No. 97419, July 3, 1992
Facts:
From 1917 to 1925, Hilarion Beronilla uniformly indicated in his application for employment, application for life and retirement insurance, and application to take the CSC examination that his birth date is January 14, 1898. He also indicated the same date in his Member’s Service record submitted to the GSIS on October 29, 1954. In 1959, Beronilla requested the Commissioner of Civil Service thru the Auditor General to change his birthdate to January 14, 1900. In his petition, he stated he only found out his true date of birth before his mother’s demise on 1955. His mother said that in 1916, his uncle Alvaro Beronilla, purchased a cedula to show that Hilarion was 18 years old so that he may vote for Alvaro who was then a candidate candidate for election. Since Beronilla was informed of this, it was only in 1959 that he finally found 2 people, a former member of the provincial board and a retired justice of the peace, that could attest to his true date of birth. Together with his letter to the Civil Service Commissioner were affidavits of these two persons. The letter was then endorsed by the commission to the GSIS for action “without intervention of the Civil Service Commission”. In the GSIS, the letter-request was referred to the Legal Counsel who denied the same on October 22, 1959. Upon learning this, petitioner submitted additional evidence consisting of Photostat copies of the yearbooks of the Phil Institute of Accountant in 1954 and 1958. Even with the additional evidence, Legal
Counsel denied petition again on March 21, 1960. On May 21, 1960, petitioner appealed to GSIS General Manager, Mr. Rodolfo Andal, and upon favorable recommendation of the 2nd Asst. General Manager, F.G. Arana, placed “OK” at the foot thereof over his initials, thus indicating approval of the request change. Based on the action of the General Manager, notes of adjustment of the date of birth of petitioner to January 14, 1900 was sent to the Auditor General and Commission on Civil Service and proceeds of petitioner’s policy was recomputed. On May 6, 1963, Mr. Ismael Mathay, then Auditor of the Central Bank detailed to the Phil. Nat’l Bank, wrote the Board of Trustees of the GSIS about the service of the petitioner of petitioner and stated that Hilarion Beronilla has been continuously paid since January 15, 1963, his salary allowances and other fringe benefits notwishtanding the fact that Mr. Beronilla turned 65 on January 14, 1963, the date of his automatic and compulsory retirement. The board referred the letter to the Claims department who then submitted a memorandum tating the facts and evidence in the GSIS records concerning the determination of the date of birth of petitioner including the actions taken by Mr. Andal and the Legal Counsel. On, August 9, 1963, the Board adopted the disputed resolution of Mr. Mathay’s letter without notifying petitioner and without giving him an opportunity to be heard. Issue: Whether or not the GSIS Board of Trustees acted within its powers when it reversed the approval by the General Manager of petitioner’s request for the change of his date of birth. Held:
Yes, it is within the powers of the GSIS Board of Trustees to reverse decisions made by the General Manager. By express statutory authority (See Sec. 16-18 of GSIS charter), the Board of Trustees directly manages the System while the General Manager is only the chief executive officer of the Board. In the exercise of its power to adopt rules and regulations for the administration of the System and the transaction of business, the Board may lodge in the GM the authority to act on any matter the Board may deem proper, but in no wise can such conferment of the authority be considered as a full and complete delegation resulting in the diminution, much less exhaustion, of the Board’s own statutorily-based prerogative and responsibility to manage the affairs of the
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 system and, accordingly, to decide with finality any matter affecting its transactions or business. In other words, even if the Board may entrust to the GM the power to give final approval to applications for retirement annuities, the finality of such approval cannot be understood to divest the Board, in appropriate cases and upon its attention being called a flaw, mistake or irregularity in the GM’s action, of the authority to exercise its power of supervision and control which flows naturally from the ultimate and final responsibility for the proper management of the System imposed upon it by the charter.
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Gaudencio Cena v. Civil Service Commission GR No. 97419, July 3, 1992
Facts:
Gaudencio Cena worked for 7 years as a Legal Officer of the Law Dep’t of Caloocan City. He was then transferred to the Office of the Congressman where he worked as a Supervising Staff Officer for 3 months. He was then appointed as Registrar of the RD (Register of Deeds) in Malabon. In total, he has rendered gov’t service for 11 years, 9 months and 6 days. Before reaching his 65th birthday, he requested the LRA Administrator that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the 15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with full benefits of old age pension. The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the CSC. The CSC denied the extension but Cena filed a motion for reconsideration. This time around, CSC granted a 1-yr extension to him. Cena still filed a case against CSC for grave abuse of discretion when it granted an extension of only 1 yr. He contends that the law (Sec 11 of PD 1146 also known as Revised Gov’t Insurance Act) does not limit or specify the maximum number of years the retiree may avail of to complete the 15-year service. Thus, the CSC has no authority to limit through a memorandum the number of years. In defense, CSC said that since it is the central personnel agency of the gov’t, it is vested with power to grant or allow extension of service beyond retirement age. Issue: Whether or not Cena is allowed to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement?
Held:
Yes. Being remedial in character, a statute creating a pension or establishing retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security and wellbeing of government employees may be enhanced. An administrative circular, such as a memorandum of the CSC cannot limit PD 1146, on extension of service of employees who reach 65. While it is true that CSC is given the authority to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service, it cannot extend to matters not covered. The CSC’s authority is limited only to carrying i nto effect what PD 1146 says. It cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. The CSC Memorandum, being in the nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle that a regulation must be in harmony with the provisions of the law and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. CSC has no power to supply or add perceived omissions in PD 1146.
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Dionisio Rabor v. Civil Service Commission GR No. 111812, May 31, 1995
PD 626
Facts:
Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. He entered the government service as a Utility Worker on 10 April 1978 at the age of 55 years. Sometime in May 1991, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he had already more than 68 years old. Rabor responded by showing a GSIS certificate with a notation to the effect that his service is extended for him to complete the 15year requirement for retirement. The Davao City Government wrote to the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission informing the latter of the foregoing and requesting advice as to what action should be taken on Rabor’s case. Director Cawad replied by saying that Rabor’ s continued employment is contrary to M.C. No. 65 issued by the Office of the President hence which only provides for retention of service for extremely
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 meritorious reasons which should not exceed 6 months. Mayor Duterte furnished Rabor a copy of Cawad’s letter and ordered him not to work anymore. Rabor asked Director Cawad for extension of his job until he completes the 15year requirement but was denied. Rabor then asked the Office of the President for an extension. His request was referred by OP to CSC and thereafter CSC denied Rabor’s request. Rabor asked for reconsideration of CSC ruling citing Cena case but was denied. Rabor reiterated his request to Mayor Duterte but was rebuffed. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON Rabor request for extension should be granted in view of Cena case Held: No. this case modified the Cena doctrine.
The SC found it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions of service after an employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The physiological and psychological processes associated with ageing in human beings are in fact related to the efficiency and quality of the service that may be expected from individual persons. The policy considerations which guided the Civil Service Commission in limiting the maximum extension of service allowable for compulsory retirees, were summarized by Justice Griño-Aquino, in her dissenting opinion in Cena: Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that extending the service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-comers in the government service and in effect discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the various government examination but must wait for jobs to be vacated by "extendees" who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service to complete 15years so they may qualify for old-age pension. SC’s conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby modified to this
extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof,is hereby declared valid and effective. The law on extension of service under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 (Retirement Law) must, accordingly, be read together with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the head of the government agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow extension of the service of an official or employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age without completing fifteen (15) years of government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be exercised conformable with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.
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Lydia M. Profeta v. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon GR No. 1104149, December 22, 1992
PD 626
Facts
Petitioner, Dr. Lydia M. Profeta, served as Executive Dean of the Rizal Technological Colleges from 24 October 1974 to 15 October 1978 until her promotion to President on 1 May 1979. After the 1986 EDSA revolution or on 5 March 1986, petitioner filed her courtesy resignation as President of the Rizal Technological Colleges and the same was accepted on 21 March 1986. A day before the acceptance of her courtesy resignation, petitioner applied for sick leave. On 4 November 1988, petitioner was appointed Acting President of Eulogio "Amang" Rodriguez Institute of Science and Technology (hereinafter referred to as EARIST) and was thereafter appointed its President on 29 March 1989. After reaching the age of sixty-five (65) years on 16 June 1989, petitioner inquired from the GSIS as to whether she may be allowed to extend her services with the government as President of EARIST beyond the age of sixty-five (65) years, to enable her to avail of the old-age pension retirement benefits under PD 1146 (Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977). Petitioner was advised by the GSIS to return to the service until she shall have fulfilled the 15 years service to qualify for the old-age pension retirement plan. The GSIS declared that petitioner was not yet eligible to retire under PD 1146 and that her creditable service was only 12 years and two 2 months. Therefore, she could
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 only claim one hundred percent (100%) of her average monthly compensation for every year of creditable service or to a refund of her premium contributions with the GSIS. On 6 October 1989 DECS Secretary and the Board of Trustees of EARIST, President Aquino, through Deputy Executive Secretary Magdangal B. Elma, extended the term of petitioner as President of EARIST until she shall have completed the required fifteen (15) years of service after reaching the age of sixty five (65) years on the date of her normal retirement on 16 June 1989 or for an additional period of two (2) years, seven (7) months and twelve (12) days. In March 1990, the EARIST Faculty and Employees Union filed an administrative complaint against petitioner before the Office of the President, for her alleged irregular appointment and for graft and corrupt practices. Pending investigation of the complaint, petitioner was placed under preventive suspension for a period of ninety (90) days. After serving the period of suspension, petitioner re-assumed her duties and functions as President of EARIST. After evaluating the evidence presented before the Ad-Hoc Committee, in a decision dated 23 October 1991, the Office of the President dismissed the administrative complaint against petitioner for lack of substantial evidence. In the same decision, the Office of the President also declared petitioner as compulsory retired from government service as of 15 October 1991, holding that if the sick leave of 62 working days (approximately 3 months) were to be added to the petitioner’s creditable service, together with the period of two (2) weeks where the petitioner served as Professorial Lecturer, the petitioner should be considered as compulsorily retired as of Oct. 15, 1991, having completed the required 15 years in the service on or about the said date after reaching the age of 65. Petitioner requested the GSIS to determine the exact date of her retirement. On 5 November 1991, petitioner was advised by the GSIS that the exact date of her retirement falls on 14 August 1992. Petitioner assailed the portion of the decision of the Office of the President declaring her as compulsorily retired from the service as of 15 October 1991, alleging that the said office has no jurisdiction over the issue of her compulsory retirement from the government service. Issues:
1. Whether or not the Office of the President has jurisdiction over the issue of her compulsory retirement from the government service. 2. Whether or not the petitioner could avail of the old-age retirement after the declaration of the Office of the President the amended exact date of her retirement. Held:
The Court held that it is the GSIS which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a member is qualified or not to avail of the old-age pension benefit under P.D. 1146, based on its computation of a member's years of service with the government. The computation of a member's service includes not only full time but also part time and other services with compensation as may be included under the rules and regulations prescribed by the System. Retirement is compulsory for a member who has reached the age of 65 years with at least 15 years of service. If he has less than fifteen (15) years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the 15 years, to avail of the old-age pension benefit. Retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because their intention is to provide for his sustenance and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security and wellbeing of government employees maybe enhanced. The computation made by the GSIS of petitioner's date of retirement failed to take into account the three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months service of petitioner which was not reflected in her service record. If we deduct this unrecorded three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months service of petitioner from 14 August 1992, petitioner is to be considered retired on 30 April 1992. The Court ruled that the decision of the Office of the President dated 23 October 1991 declaring petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991 is SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby declared to have been in the service as President of EARIST from 16 October 1991 until 30 April 1992 and therefore entitled to all salaries, benefits and other emoluments of said office from 16 October 1991 to 30 April 1992. In addition, she is declared as entitled to her oldage pension benefits for having reached age 65 years while in the service with 15 years of service to her credit, subject to her compliance with all
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 applicable regulations and requirements of the GSIS.
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Teodoro J. Santiago v. COA and GSIS GR No. 92284, July 12, 1991
Facts:
The petitioner was employed in the Commission on Audit as State Auditor IV with a monthly salary of P7,219.00. In 1988, he was assigned to the COA Auditing Unit at the Department of Transportation and Communications and detailed to the Manila International Airport Authority. On July 1, 1988, the board of directors of the MIAA passed a resolution designating the petitioner as Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration subject to the following conditions: (a) he retains his plantilla position in COA, (b) his compensation from MIAA shall be the difference between the salary of AGM for Finance and that of State Auditor IV, and (c) his retirement benefits shall be chargeable against COA. On August 10, 1988, MIAA board of directors issued an office order formally designating the petitioner as Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration, effective August 16, 1988. The petitioner as Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration collected the differential salary of P5,849.00 plus his salary of P7,219.00 for a total compensation of P13,068.00. He received this compensation until December 5, 1988. On March 1, 1989, the petitioner retired after working in the government for 44 years. In computing his retirement benefits, GSIS used as basis the amount of P13,068.00, considering this the highest basic salary rate received by the petitioner in the course of his employment. The COA disagreed and paid his retirement benefits on the basis of only his monthly salary of P7,219.00 as State Auditor IV. It has been argued that the additional compensation received by the petitioner was merely an honorarium and not a salary. As a mere honorarium, it would not fall under the provision of Section 9 of Executive Order No. 966 and should not be added to his salary in computing his retirement benefits. The Solicitor General's main argument is that the petitioner cannot invoke Section 9 Highest Basic Salary Rate of EO No. 966 because he was not appointed to the second position in
the MIAA but only designated thereto. Under the provision, compensation of salary or pay which may be used in computing the retirement benefits shall be received by an official employee as fixed by law and/or indicated in his duly approved appointment. The petitioner's additional salary was fixed not in a duly approved appointment but only in a designation. Issue: (1) Whether or not the petitioner can invoke Section 9 of EO No. 966 for the recomputation of his basic salary rate as basis for his retirement benefits. (2) Whether or not his “designation” as Assistant General Manager constitutes as an approved “appointment” under the purview of Section 9 of EO No. 966. Held:
(1) Yes, the court granted the petition and directed the computation of the petitioner’s retirement benefits on the basis of his Highest Basic Salary Rate of 13,068.00. (2) Yes, the law in question, the term "appointment" was used in a general sense to include the term "designation." In other words, no distinction was intended between the two terms in Section 9 of Executive Order No. 966. The Court held that more reasonable interpretation, especially considering that the provision includes in the highest salary rate "compensation for substitutionary services or in an acting capacity." This need not always be conferred by a permanent appointment. The spirit of EO No. 966 seeks to extend the maximum benefits to the retiree as an additional if belated recognition of his many years of loyal and efficient service in the government. Section 9 clearly covers the petitioner, who was designated Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration on August 10, 1988. The position was then vacant and could be filled either by permanent appointment or by temporary designation. It cannot be said that the second position was only an extension of the petitioner's office as State Auditor IV in the Commission on Audit as otherwise there would have been no need for his designation thereto. The second office was distinct and separate from his position in the Commission on Audit. For the additional services he rendered for the MIAA, he was entitled to additional compensation which, following the letter and spirit of Section 9, should be included in his highest basic salary rate.
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to the public service, he deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his services. That generosity is the least he should expect now that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well, and was rewarded for it. ===== EO No. 966 Sec. 9. Highest Basic Salary Rate. — The compensation of salary or pay which may be used in computing the retirement benefits shall be limited to the highest salary rate actually received by an official/employee as fixed by law and/or indicated in his duly approved appointment. This shall include salary adjustments duly authorized and implemented by the presidential issuance(s) and budget circular(s), additional basic compensation or salary indicated in an appointment duly approved as an exception to the prohibition on additional or double compensation, merit increases, and compensation for substitutionary services or in an acting capacity. For this purpose, all other compensation and/or fringe benefits such as per diems, allowances, bonuses, overtime pay, honoraria hazard pay, flying time fees, consultancy or contractual fees, or fees in correcting and/or releasing examination papers shall not be considered in the computation of the retirement benefits of an official/employee.
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Zaida Raro v. ECC GR No. L-58445, November 26, 1970
Facts:
Petitioner Zaida Raro was in perfect health when she was employed by the Bureau of Mines and Geo Sciences in Camarines Norte, as a Mining Recorder. Later, she began suffering from severe and recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of vision. She was forced to take sick leaves. She was diagnosed with brain tumor at the Makati
Medical Center. Petitioner’s husband filed a claim for disability benefits with the GSIS which was denied. On appeal to the ECC, the GSIS’ decision was affirmed. Issue: (1) Whether petitioner is entitled compensation under the present laws.
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(2) Whether the present law is oppressive and arbitrary as the presumption of compensability cannot be applied if the disease is not listed as an occupational disease. Held:
(1) No, the law says they are not. Under the Labor Code, “sickness” is defined as “any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment.” Also, Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation defines who are entitled: “Sec 1b. For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions."
Hence, under the law, the claimant must prove that the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions and to say that the trust fund has the obligation to pay because the proof required is not applicable is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise nonexistent proof cannot be presumed. The present law, in essence, has struck out the “presumption of compensability” and incorporated a new system based on social security principles with a system administered by social insurance agencies (GSIS and SSS). The reason for this was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer’s obligation to pay workmen’s compensation and the employee’s right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability.
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015
Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer, we now have a social insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid by employers and employees to a trust fund and claims are paid from the trust fund to those who can prove entitlement. Since there is no employer fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have significance. “The employer is spared the problem of proving a negative proposition that the disease was not caused by employment. It is a government institution which protects the stability and integrity of the State Insurance Fund against the payment of non-compensable claims. The employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove a positive proposition, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by working conditions.”
The fixing of the amount of contributions are based on actuarial studies. The actuarially determined number of workers who would probably file claims within any given year is important in insuring the stability of the trust fund and making certain that the system can pay benefits when due to all who are entitled and in the increased amounts fixed by law. Thus, if diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently included, the integrity of the State Insurance Funds is endangered.
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Iloilo Dock and Engineering v. WCC GR No. L-26341, November 27, 1980
Facts:
Pablo Santiago worked for petitioner company as an iron worker with a weekly compensation of Php 38.64. On August 16, 1955, while doing repairs at work, the petitioner suffered “slight compression fracture of the 12th thoracic vertebrae” which prevented him from performing his work for 14 and 6/7 weeks. The company physician certified that Santiago suffered “partial permanent disability of the back due to slight stiffness at the 12th thoracic vertebrae of the back.” Petitioner company in its Employer’s Report of Accident stated that it will not controvert Santiago’s right to claim for compensation.
Santiago then reported for work and performed his usual tasks before the accident without any complaints about the injury. He was also given the same wages he used to receive. Before the manifestation of the petitioner that it will not controvert the right for compensation, the Regional Administrator of the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. V, Iloilo City, computed the compensation benefits and awarded Santiago the total sum of P1, 148.10, as per letter-computation dated January 16, 1958. This amount is based on the sum of all compensations under Sections 13, 14 and 18 of the Workman’s Compensation Act. Petitioner company settled the first two items but refused to settle item 3 (compensation under Sec. 18 concerning amputations) Issue:
Whether the injury of Pablo Santiago was compensable under Section 18 of the WCA. Ruling:
Yes. Under the law, where the employer fails to controvert the employee’s right to compensation, he shall be deemed to have renounced his right to controvert and the Hearing Officer may, if a claim has already been filed, receive evidence for the claimant, if necessary, and treat the same as uncontested. The Labor Administrator’s task was then to award the claimant in accordance with the law which he did. The pertinent provisions of Section 18, WCA, states Amputation. - Amputation between elbow and wrist shall be considered as equivalent to the loss of a hand. Amputation between knee and ankle shall be considered as loss of a foot. Amputation at or above the elbow shall be considered as equivalent to the loss of an arm. Amputation at or above the knee shall be considered as equivalent to the loss of a leg. x x x In all other cases of this kind of disability not mentioned in other sections of this Act, x x x”
Petitioner claims that the above provision does not apply to the case of Santiago as there was no amputation at all. Petitioner also contends that the compensation could not be computed as Santiago returned to work with the same pay as before the accident and that he was already cured of whatever disability he might have had. Argument is untenable.
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 The cited section even if entitled “Amputation” does not exclude other injuries similar in nature. In fact, included in the provision is serious disfigurement. Paragraph 4 even provides among other things that "in all other cases of this kind of disability not mentioned in other sections of this Act." Santiago’s injury is akin to those mentioned in the said section and which is not covered by other sections of the law. Petitioner is also wrong when it claimed that the compensation could not be computed as Santiago returned to work with the same pay as before the accident. As cited in Azucarera de Don Pedro v De Leon and Alla , "an injured laborer's capacity for work is not measured solely by the wages he receives, or his earning, after the injury, since the amount of such wages or earning may be affected by various extraneous matters or factors, x x x for there are a number of possible explanations of the fact that an employee who receives higher wages after an injury than what he earned before may still have suffered an impairment of earning capacity." Meaning, under the law, the criterion is earning capacity and not the wages given. The WCC was correct when it said that "it is sufficiently clear that once a workman sustains a permanent impairment he is entitled to what the law provides for such condition regardless of the actual remuneration he receives after the injury. A laborer who lost an arm in an accident may still have the fortune of landing a job where the rate of pay is the same what he was receiving before the accident but surely as his lost arm should be compensated because it is a permanent partial disability contemplated under the Workmen's Compensation Law". Finally, it has been held that the Workmen's Compensation Act should or must be construed fairly, reasonably or liberally in favor, or for the benefit, of employees and their dependents, all doubts as to the right to compensation being resolved in their favor, and all presumption indulged being in their favor.
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Manuel Belarmino v. ECC GR No. 90204, May 11, 1990
cramps. For several days, she still continued to suffer from recurrent abdominal pains and a feeling of heaviness in her stomach. Her coteachers told her to take a leave of absence but she continued to report to school. On January 25, 1982, she went into labor and delivered a premature baby girl at home. Her abdominal pains persisted even after delivery, accompanied by high fever and headache. She was brought to the hospital and found that she was suffering from septicemia post partum due to infected laceration of the vagina. She was discharged after 5 days but died 3 days later. COD: septicemia post partum. Her husband claimed for death benefits but was denied by GSIS claiming that the cause of death if petitioner's wife is not an occupational disease. On appeal, ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS. Issues: Whether the death of Mrs. Belarmino is a compensable disease.
Held:
Yes. The illness, which resulted in the death of Mrs. Belarmino, is admittedly not listed as an occupational disease in her particular line of work as a classroom teacher (See Rule III, Section 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation). However, her death from that ailment is compensable because an employment accident and the conditions of her employment contributed to its development. The condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the development of post partum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the proximate or responsible cause that set in motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise. ECC and GSIS were ordered to pay death benefits to the petitioner.
Facts:
Mrs. Belarmino, a classroom teacher and was 8 months pregnant, accidentally slipped and fell on the classroom floor. Moments later, she complained of abdominal pain and stomach
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Generoso Alano v. ECC GR No. L-48594, March 16, 1988
9
Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015
Facts:
Dedicacion de Vera was a principal in a public school. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 a.m., while waiting for a ride on her way to school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her death. She is survived by her four sons and a daughter. The brother of the deceased claimed for income benefit with the GSIS for and behalf of the descendant's children. The claim was denied on the ground that the injury upon which compensation is being claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law. Appellant requested for reconsideration but was denied and the case was elevated for review. The respondent Commission affirmed the decision of the GSIS. The deceased's accident did not meet any of the aforementioned conditions (Section I (a), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation). First, the accident occurred at about 7:00 a.m. or thirty minutes before the deceased's working hours. Second, it happened not at her workplace but at the plaza where she usually waits for a ride to her work. Third, she was not then performing her official functions as school principal nor was she on a special errand for the school. The case, therefore, was dismissed Issue:
Whether or not the injury sustained by the deceased resulting in her death is compensable under the law as an employment accident. Held:
In the earlier case of Vda. de Torbela v. Employees' Compensation Commission which has a similar factual background, this Court held: When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's
being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there.
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Salvador Lazo v. ECC GR No. 78617, June 18, 1990
Facts:
Salvador Lazo is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines. His regular tour of duty is from 2pm to 10pm. One day, the Security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, so, Lazo rendered over time up to 5am of July 19,1986. He then asked permission from his superior to leave early order to take home his sack of Rice. On his way home, the jeepney he was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. As a result, he sustained injuries and was confined to National Orthopedic Hospital for 6 days. Lazo claimed for disability benefits under PD 626. However, his claim was denied by GSIS for the reason that he was not at his work place performing his duties when the incident occurred ECC affirmed GSIS' decision. Issue: Whether the injury sustained by Lazo was due to the vehicular accident on his way home from work and should be construed as "arising out of or in the course of employment" and thus, compensable? Held:
The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.There is no evidence on record that petitioner deviated from his usual,regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the journey. It is significant that the liberality of the law in general in favor of the workingman still subsists. As an agent charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by the Constitution, the Employees Compensation Commission should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection to the accident.
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015
There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be protected for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises. The rule is to interpret the law liberally in favor of the employee because the Employees Compensation is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working men and women in our society.
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Emelita Enao v. ECC GR No. L-46046, April 5, 1985
Facts:
On August 1, 1975, while on her way to Dipolog City for the purpose of purchasing supplies and other training and school aids for her office, Emilita Enao together with others, were ambushed by unidentified men believed to be communist insurgents. As a result of the ambush, the appellant sustained gunshot wounds on her left forearm and abdomen which compelled her confinement at the Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Hospital from August 1 to 6, 1975, for surgical removal of foreign bodies (shrapnel) from her left arm and later at the Dipolog Medical Center from September 10 to 12, 1975 for definitive treatment. She also developed interstitial pneumonia as a result. On August 5, 1975, petitioner sent a notice of claim of injury to the Secretary of Education and Culture, through the Division Superintendent of Schools, Zamboanga City. It is said that this claim was not controverted. On the same date, a claim for income benefits for disability was filed by the herein petitioner with the GSIS but this claim was denied on its reasoning that said accident happened outside her time and place of work, not to mention the fact that she was not in the performance of her official functions when it happened. Enao appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission. ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS appealed from and dismissed the Petitioner's claim, on the grounds that:
(1) the day when the accident occurred was an off-day, hence, the injury was incurred not during office hours, (2) appellant incurred injury while en route to Dipolog City while outside the school premises where she normally discharges her official (3) while appellant's witnesses testified in an affidavit that appellant left her official station for Dipolog City on the day in question for the purpose of procurring school supplies and training aids to enhance her teaching efficiency, we find the version of the Acting Administrative Officer more credible-that is, the appellant was on her way home from station-for there is nothing which indicates that it is false. At the time of the incident in question, the pertinent and governing provisions of law are to be found in Section 1, Rule 11, of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, which provides: SECTION 1. Grounds.— (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours; (2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; and (3) The employee must have been performing his official function. Issue: Whether the petitioner's claim for loss of income benefits should be awarded? Held:
Yes, for the Petitioner, in proceeding to Dipolog City on August 1, 1975, intended to procure supplies and other training aids which are needed facilities in connection with her services as a school teacher at the Wilbon Primary School, cannot be at all disputed - "for the purpose of securing supplies and other training and school aids necessary for the furtherance of their services as school teachers." As it can be rightfully ruled that the Claimant-Petitioner was actually then performing her official functions, it hardly matters then whether such task which Petitioner was then engaged in or discharging, happened outside the regular working hours and not in the Petitioner's place of work. It is rather obvious that in proceeding to purchase school materials in
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 Dipolog City, Petitioner would necessarily have to leave the school premises and her travel need not be during her usual working hours. What is significant and controlling is that the injuries she sustained are work-connected, which the Court finds to be so. It was therein ruled that "where an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place of work, while she is going to and from her work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of her employment.
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Gloria Menez v. ECC GR L-48488, April 25, 1980
Facts:
Gloria D. Menez was as a school teacher who retired on August 31, 1975 under the disability retirement plan at the age of 54 years after 32 years of teaching, due to rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis. Before her retirement, she was assigned at Raja Soliman High School in Tondo-Binondo, Manila near a dirty creek. 1976, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with respondent Government Service Insurance System GSIS denied said claim on the ground that petitioner's ailments, rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis, are not occupational diseases taking into consideration the nature of her particular work. Based on the evaluation of medical authorities, her ailments were found to be the least causally related to her duties and conditions of work and thus, the ailments are not work-connected. GSIS reaffirmed its stand on the case and elevated the entire records thereof to the Employees' Compensation Commission for review and ECC and with its decision. The Commission fully agrees with the respondent system that appellant's employment has nothing to do with the development of her disabling illnesses. Appellant's ailments are not listed as occupational diseases for the employment she was engaged in as to merit compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended Menez claims she contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis after wetting and chilling and aggravated by the condition and
nature of her work during the course of employment which are permanent and recurring in nature and work-connected. Again respondents contend that petitioner's ailments are not among the occupational diseases listed as compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, or under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation and Commission' is supported by substantial evidence in the form of accepted medical findings. Issue: Whether Menez ailment can be considered occupational disease and can claim for compensation. Held:
Yes, her ailment may be considered as occupational disease and she can claim for compensation. As defined occupational disease is one which results from the nature of the employment, and by “nature” is meant conditions to which all employees of a class are subject and which produce the disease as a natural incident of a particular occupation, and attach to that occupation a hazard which distinguishes it from the usual run of occupations and is in excess of the hazard attending the employment in general. To be occupational, the disease must be one "due wholly to causes and conditions which are normal and constantly present and characteristic of the particular occupation that is, those things which science and industry have not yet learned how to eliminate. Thus the ailment of Menez is considered as occupational disease. All public high school teachers are the most underpaid but overworked employees of the government, are subject to emotional strains and stresses. In the case of the Menez, her emotional tension is heightened by the fact that the high school in which she teaches is situated in a tough area Binondo district, which is inhabited by thugs and other criminal elements and further aggravated by the heavy pollution and congestion therein as well as the stinking smell of the dirty Estero de la Reina nearby. There is ample proof that petitioner contracted such ailments by reason of her occupation as a public high school teacher due to her exposure to the adverse working conditions. Republic Act 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Charta for Public School Teachers, recognized the enervating effects on the health of school teachers when it directed in one of its provisions that "Teachers shall be protected
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 against the consequences of employment injury in accordance with existing laws. The effects of the physical and nervous strain on the teachers's health shall be recognized as compensable occupational diseases in accordance with laws" Under the New Labor Code Rule 111 of its Implementing Rules, "only sickness or injury which occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules. It must be borne in mind that petitioner was a teacher of a High school in Binondo District and exposed to the heavily polluted air and congestions and other elements. Consequently, this Court finds petitioner to have substantially shown that the risk of contracting her ailments had been increased by unfavorable working conditions. Citing Dimaano v. WCC, the Court held that illnesses of rheumatic arthritis with subacute exacerbation and hypertension by Dimaano who was herself a teacher is service-connected considering her working conditions and nature of employment. As the petitioner is similarlysituated, the same rule should apply. Furthermore, it must be stressed that "the approval of petitioner's application for retirement is a clear indication that she was physically incapacitated to render efficient service. Petitioner was allowed to retire under the disability retirement plan on August 31, 1975 at the age of 54 which is way below the compulsory retirement age of 65. Under Memorandum Circular No. 133 issued by the retirement shall be recommended for approval only when "the employee applicant is below 65 years of age and is physically incapacitated to render further efficient service." Obviously, petitioner thus retired by reason of her ailments.
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Amalia Narazo v. ECC GR No. 80157, February 6, 1990
Facts:
Geronimo Narazo was employed for 38 years as Budget Examiner in the Office of the Governor, Province of Negros Occidental. His duties included preparation of the budget of the Province, financial reports and review or examination of the budget of some provincial and municipal offices.
Narazo died at the age of 57. Medical records shows that he was confined 3 times at the Doña Corazon L. Montelibano Hospital in Bacolod City, for urinary retention, abdominal pain and anemia and diagnosed to be suffering from "obstructive nepropathy due to benign prostatic hypertrophy", commonly known as "Uremia."cralaw virtua1aw library Petitioner, as the widow of the deceased, filed a claim with the GSIS for death benefits for the death of her husband, under the Employees’ Compensation Law but was denied on the ground that the cause of death of Narazo is not listed as an occupational disease Petitioner moved for reconsideration claiming the cause of her husband’s death is not considered as an occupational disease but his job as Budget Examiner which required long hours of sedentary work, coupled with stress and pressure, caused him many times to delay urination, which eventually led to the development of his ailments. The GSIS denied said motion for reconsideration. The ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS on the ground that the ailments of the deceased could not be attributed to employment factors and as impressed by medical experts, benign prostatic hypertrophy is quite common among men 50 years of age. Petitioner avers that the nature, length of time, and circumstances of the occupation of the deceased were not considered in determining whether the work of the said deceased had increased the risks of contracting the ailments which caused his death. The work of the deceased, which required long sedentary work under pressure, aggravated the risk of contracting the disease leading to his hospital confinement and death. The ECC argues that petitioner failed to show proof that the disease which caused the death of her husband is work-connected; and that no credence could be given to petitioner’s claim that her husband’s delayed urination gave rise to the development of his ailments, for lack of medical bases. Allthat petitioner has shown, according to the ECC, are mere aggravation, and not work-connection causes. 5 Issue: Whether the widow of the deceased can claim of death benefits under GSIS under ECL Held:
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 Yes. The ECC is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and workrelated illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment. Under Rule III, section 1, paragraph 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, defines a "compensable sickness" as any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the ECC or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. Sickness or death caused by said sickness is compensable if the same is listed as an occupational disease. If it is not so listed, compensation may still be recovered if the illness was aggravated by employment. It is incumbent upon the claimant to show proof that the risk of contracting the illness was increased by his working conditions. The cause of death of petitioner’s husband is by Uremia and it was proved that it is work-connected disease the risk of contracting the illness was aggravated by the nature of the work as a Budget examiner was dealt with many factors, so much so that petitioner is entitled to receive compensation benefits for the death of her husband.
As per finding of the ECC, "Uremia is a toxic clinical condition characterized by restlessness, muscular twitchings, mental disturbance, nausea, and vomiting associated with renal insufficiency brought about by the retention in blood of nitrogeneous urinary waste products." One of its causes is the obstruction in the flow of urinary waste products. Under the increased risk theory the claimant must show proof of reasonable work-connection, not necessarily direct causal relation. The degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which means such relevant evidence as will support a decision, or clear and convincing evidence.
15 Facts:
Hilaria Dabatian v. GSIS GR No. L-47294, April 8, 1987
PD 626
Sigfredo A. Dabatian was employed as Garbage Truck Driver in the General Services Department of the City Government of Cagayan de Oro City. He was mostly assigned in the night shifts. It was also noted that Sigfredo was a heavy coffee drinker which was his way to wardoff sleep during his duty. Prior to his death, his co-workers observed that he grew paler and weaker until he collapsed and became unconscious during his tour duty. He was then brought to his residence. Despite hospitalization, he died 2 weeks after with the diagnosis of peptic ulcer. A claim for income benefits under ECP (Employee's Compensation Program) was filed by the widow, Hilaria Dabatian. GSIS decided against the compensability of the claim on the ground that Sigfredo's ailment, Peptic Ulcer, is definitely not accepted as an occupational disease as listed under the present law on compensation. Neither was there a showing that the disease was directly caused by his employment and the risk of contracting the same was increased by the working conditions. The case was then elevated to ECC which ruled that deceased's ailment was not related to his duties and work conditions. His ailment is principally not work-connected. Aggravation of illness is not a ground for compensation under the present compensation law. ECC found no sufficient basis to reverse GSIS's ruling which denied the petitioner's claim. Hence, this petitioner's certiorari. Issue: Whether or not under the premises the death of Sigfredo A. Dabatian is compensable. Held:
No. The records show that petitioner died on July 3, 1976 when the old compensation law had already been abrogated. No competent evidence whatsoever was submitted to prove that Dabatian's ailment was contracted prior to January 1, 1975 in order to bring it under the protective mantle of the old compensation law. Thus, under the present law, in order for the employee to be entitled to sickness or death benefits, the sickness or death resulting therefrom must be, or must have resulted from either a) any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission or
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 b) any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. Since peptic ulcer is not included in the list of occupational diseases as drawn up by the Commission, then petitioner has the burden of proving that the nature of her husband's work increased the risk of contracting the disease. Aside from the undisputed fact that the deceased is a heavy coffee drinker, which was his way of warding off sleepiness, no evidence was ever adduced by petitioner to bolster the theory that her husband's work increased the risk of contracting the ailment. Being a heavy coffee drinker may have aggravated his peptic ulcer, but, aggravation of an illness is no longer a ground for compensation under the present law. This Court takes notice of the fact that the conditions in this case are not peculiar to the work mentioned herein. Many, if not most, employees are equally exposed to similar conditions but have not been victims of peptic ulcer.
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Niceta C. Rodriguez v. ECC GR No. L-46454, September 28, 1989
Facts:
Hector P. Rodriguez was a public school teacher assigned at Salaan Elementary School in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. On November 19, 1975 he went on sick leave and was confined at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital after complaining of severe stomach pains accompanied by nausea and vomiting, later diagnosed as "Intestinal Lipomatosis of the Large Colon with Obstruction of the Ascending Colon." His ailment called for a surgical operation which was performed on November 27,1975 but this proved unavailing. A few days thereafter, on December 2, 1975, he died. On January 28, 1976, the wife filed a claim for death compensation under the Labor Code with Government Service Insurance System. In a letter-decision dated February 23, 1976, the GSIS denied the claim finding that the cause of the death of petitioner's husband is not an occupational disease since the nature of his duties as a teacher, as well as the working conditions of his employment, could not have directly caused his ailment which eventuated in
his subsequent death. Motion for reconsideration, dated August 11, 1976, was denied upon the finding that the evidence failed to establish that the decedent's employment had any causal relationship with the contraction of the ailment and there was no showing that the same directly arose therefrom or resulted from the nature thereof. A second motion for reconsideration filed on October 18, 1976 having been denied by the GSIS, petitioner's claim was elevated for review to the respondent commission where it was docketed as ECC Case No. 0266. On March 16, 1977, respondent commission affirmed the ruling of the GSIS and denied the claim of petitioner. The case is now before us on a petition for review. Issue:
Whether petitioner should be given the compensation. Held:
No. The applicable rule established in law and jurisprudence concerning claims based on the provisions of the Labor Code on employees' compensation, particularly on death benefits under Article 194, is that they must result from an occupational disease. A compensable disease means any illness accepted and listed by the Employees' Compensation Commission or any illness caused by the employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same was increased by the working conditions. If the disease is listed in the Table of Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex A of the Rules on Employees' Compensation, no proof of causation is required. However, if it is not so listed, it has been held that the employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove, a positive proposition, that is, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. The fact that the cause of the disease was not positively identified does not dispense with this burden of proof. The observations heretofore made do not mean that proof of direct causal relation is indispensably required. It is enough that the claimant adduces proof of reasonable work connection, whereby the development of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. Strict rules of evidence are not demanded, the degree of proof required being merely substantial
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 evidence, which has been held to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that the principal duties of her husband as a classroom teacher alone would not have any connection with his disease. However, she posits that the deceased's auxiliary activities as a classroom teacher directly affected his physical constitution and indubitably caused him to have sustained some trauma in his abdominal cavity and other parts of the body. It is our considered view that the circumstances alleged by the petitioner and the evidence she presented are not enough to discharge the required quantum of proof, liberal as it is. There is no clear evidence as to when the disease commenced and supervened; the tumors which developed in the deceased's colon may have been growing for many years even before he was employed as a teacher. Neither was there any indication as to what really caused the disease: in fact, the nature of the disease as described militate against a finding of a causal nexus. The "trauma" that was supposed to have caused or at least contributed to the disease was neither satisfactorily clarified nor adequately proved. Surely, the activities relied upon by the petitioner, being outside the regular or primary functions of a teacher, could not have been done every working day. It is safe to assume that they were done only for certain limited periods of time and on isolated occasions as, for instance, during competitions. Thus, it cannot be said that decedent's work as a teacher exposed him to hazards different or greater from those involved in ordinary or normal life-styles. There is no showing that he did not engage in other extraneous activities, aside from playing basketball or being a member of the Boy Scouts. Of further note is the observation that the abdomen of the deceased was markedly obese, which circumstance may also have been a causative or contributive factor considering the etiological and pathological particulars of said ailment.
17 Facts:
ECC vs. CA, Lilia Arreola GR No. 121545, November 14, 1996
Lilia Arreola was employed as a Chemical Laboratory Technician in the NBI since 1972. She was later promoted to Engineer II. In 1993, Arreola suffered pains at her left flank accompanied by nausea, vomiting and low moderate fever. She was diagnosed as having Ureterolithiasis and filed before GSIS an application for compensation benefit under PD 626. GSIS denied her claim on the ground that (1) ailment is a non-occupational disease and (2) she failed to show that the position has increased the risk of contracting the sickness. Arreola appealed to ECC which deemed the case without merit because there was lack of proof that the illness was a result of an occupationl diseased listed uner the rules and that it was increased by her working conditions. She filed a petition for review before the CA reversed the decision of ECC and ordered GSIS to pay. Issue:
Whether the illness compensable under PD 626.
of
Arreola
is
Held:
Yes, her illness is compensable. Although PD. 626 abandoned the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, a claimant may still be entitled to compensation even if the same is not listed as an occupational disease if he can prove that the risk of contracting the illness or disease was increased by his working conditions. Despite the abandonment of the presumption of compensability established by the old law, the present law has not ceased to be an employees’ compensation law or a social legislation; hence the liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman still prevails, and the official agency charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially in light of the compassionate policy towards labor of the 1987 Constitution. Indeed private respondent concedes that her ailment, ureterolithiasis, is not included in the list of occupational diseases but she was able to prove that the risk of contracting it was increased by the exigency and nature of her work. The work of private respondent exposed
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 her to drugs, insecticides, volatile poisons, fuels and inorganic compounds and chemical laboratory equipment. She also attended to field cases and rendered holiday and night duties once a week. Neither have the petitioner refuted the claim of the private respondent that she missed some important health habits such as regularly drinking enough water and urination.
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Rufina Tancinco v. GSIS GR No. 132916
Facts:
In 1995, while being on off duty and at home, SPO1 Eddie Tancinco who was repairing a service vehicle was shot dead by five unidentified armed men. Tancinco was a member of the NCR Security Protection Group of the PNP and was assigned as a close-in security detail of VP Joseph Estrada. Tancinco was off-duty at the time inasmuch as the VP was in the US for medical treatment. His widow, Rufina, filed a claim for benefits before the GSIS which denied the claim on the ground that there was no proof that her husband’s deah was work -related. ECC affirmed the finding since SP)1 was on off duty status and thus, his death did not arise out of and in the course of his employment as a member of the PNP. Petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA which denied the petition on technicalities, i.e. certificate of non-forum shopping was defective, etc, in May of 1997. However, Rufina only filed a motion for reconsideration on January 27, 1998 or 7.5 months after receipt of the assailed decision. The Solicitor General adopts the view that Tancinco’s death is work -related given the fact that the deceased was a policeman and the killing was done in a professional manner. Issues: (1) Whether the Court may still take cognizance of the petition. (2) Whether the death of Tancinco is workrelated. Held:
(1) No, a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the CA must be made within 15
days from notice of the judgment. Rufina filed the MR 231 days late, thereby making the resolution final and executory. The gap of seven months is too large to ignore. The period of appeal is not only mandatory, but it is also jurisdictional. Even the SC cannot ignore the immutable character of a final judgment. (2) No, his death is not work-related, and is thus not compensable. The grounds for the injury and resulting disability or death to be compensable are as follows: (a) employee msut have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; (b) employee must have been performing his official functions; and (c) if the injury is sustained elsewhere, employee must be executing an order for the employer. These requirements have not been met. Tancinco was at home and off-duty at that time. It was not sufficiently established that he was performing official functions at the time of his death. Although the Court in ECC vs CA has held that a soldier or policeman are by the nature of their functions technically on duty 24 hours a day, the 24-hour doctrine was modified in the recent case of GSIS vs. CA where the court held that: “At any rate, the 24 -hour duty doctrine serves more as an after-the fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police service in character.”
Tancinco was repairing a service vehicle when he was killed. This cannot, in any way, be said to be in line with his task as a policeman in “maintaining order, preventing and detecting crimes, and enforcing the laws.” Finally, Tancinco being at home, it was incumbent on petitioner to show that her husband was discharging a task pursuant to an order issued by his superiors. This also was not done.
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 With regret, the Court denies the
petition.
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Venusto Panotes v. ECC GR No. L-64802, September 23, 1985
Facts:
On Mar 29, 1984, the Supreme Court rendered a decision granting compensation benefits to petitioner Venusto Panotes for the death of his wife, Agustina Garfin Panotes. She died of colonic malignancy cancer of the colon, a fatal disease considered by the Court as having been contracted due to or at least the risk of contracting the same had been increased by the working conditions to which the deceased had been subjected as a public school teacher, and accordingly, ordered respondent Government Service Insurance System to pay death benefits, reimburse medical and hospital expenses duly supported, funeral expenses and attorney’s fees. On May 2, 1984, respondent GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration based on the following grounds: 1) reasonable work-connection is required by the law for an employees'compensation claims, the alleged fact of impossibility of proof notwithstanding; 2) the legal requirement of work-connection should prevail upon the general liberality of the law; 3) award of attorney's fees is not within the contemplation of the law and which this Court had previously reduced to 5% (p. 82, rec.). Issue: Whether the disease which caused the death of Agustina Panotes has a reasonable workconnection despite cause of the ailment being unknown Held:
Yes. The motion for reconsideration is devoid of merit. The respondent contends that the standard reasonable work connection for compensation of cases was rendered meaningless because the petitioner was granted death benefits despite the fact that the cause of her colon cancer is unknown. Adding that it would be unfair to grant compensation to cases where causes of disease are unknown compared to those whose causes are known but cannot be proved as work-connected. Respondent GSIS
further alleges that the evidences presented tended to prove a mere case of aggravation and not reasonable work-connection Under the employees' compensation law, there are two categories of occupational illness or disease deemed compensation; a) those listed as occupational disease by the Commission, and b) any illness caused by the employment, subject to a showing by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working condition An occupational disease generally providing compensation therefor, is a disease which is caused by, or especially incident to, or the natural consequence of, the particular employment in which the workman is engaged, which results from exposure therein to hazards greater or different than those involved in ordinary living, which generally develops gradually over a considerable period of time in the employment, and which industry has not learned to fend against or eliminate. In determining the cause of disability, and whether the cause was an occupational disease within the provisions of the statute, all factors must be taken into consideration; and whether a disease is compensable must be determined on the basis of the particular facts involved in each case and the peculiar characteristics of each employment In the case at bar, this Honorable Court went on to describe in detail the physical, mental and emotional pressures undergone by the deceased public school teacher who entered the service in perfect health was not confined in the classroom but engaged in other school activities, was exposed to the elements, missed her meals because of workloads, etc. —all of which factors weakened her body resistance and made her susceptible to diseases. It is apparent from respondent's arguments that what it seeks is a direct, actual proof of the causal connection between the fatal disease and the working conditions of the deceased. WE, however, rule in this case as WE did in the other cases that actual proof of causation is not necessary to justify compensability. The degree of proof required to establish proof of work-connection between ailment and the deceased's employment is only substantial evidence or reasonable work connection
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 Finally, with respect to the award of attorney's fees, respondent argues that the award is not proper or should have been reduced to only 5% of the compensation claim. The argument is devoid of merit. There is no prohibition against imposing attorney's fees on the employer, for the benefit of the counsel for the claimant
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Ruth Jimenez v. ECC GR No. 58176, March 23, 1984
Facts:
Petitioner is the widow of Alfredo Jimenez, a constable in the Philippine Constabulary since 1969. In 1978 he was confined at V Luna Medical Center where he was diagnosed of ‘aortic aneurysm, medrastinal tumor’. His ailment continued and became more serious leading to his death on May 12, 1980. The cause of death, as found by the doctors, is "bronchogenic carcinoma" which is a malignant tumor of the lungs. In June 1980 an administrative hearing was conducted before the PC Board, the findings that the subject enlisted man ‘died in line of duty’, the he is a member of t he PC, died through bronchonegenic carcinoma; and that he died not as a result of misconduct and did not violate any provisions of the articles of war. The board then recommended all benefits due to the subject. Nevertheless, petitioner filed a claim for death benefits under PD No. 626, as amended with the respondent GSIS. Said claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground that her husband’s death is not compensable "for the reason that the injury/sickness that caused his death is not due to the circumstances of the employment or in the performance of the duties and responsibilities of said employment". It is also the opinion of the respondent that since there is evidence of the deceased to be a smoker, "the late Sgt. Jimenez may have indulged heavily in smoking and drinking, not merely ‘occasionally’ . ECC affirmed the decision. Issue: Whether her husband’s death from bronchogenic carcinoma is compensable under the law.
Yes. The theory of increased risk is applicable in the instant case. The SC had the occasion to interpret the theory of increased risk in the case of Cristobal v. Employees Compensation Commission that to establish compensability under the said theory, the claimant must show proof of work-connection. Impliedly, the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence, which means ‘such relevant evidence to support a decision’ or clear and convincing evidence. In this connection, it must be pointed out that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. Respondents however insist on evidence which would establish direct causal relation between the disease rectal cancer and the employment of the deceased. Such a strict requirement which even medical experts cannot support considering the uncertainty of the nature of the disease would negate the principle of the liberality in the matter of evidence, Apparently, what the law merely requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the new Labor Code which states that ‘all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.’ The case deals with possibilities and medical authorities have given credence to the stand of the petitioner that her husband developed bronchogenic carcinoma while working as a soldier with the Philippine Constabulary. The records show that when the deceased enlisted with the Philippine Constabulary in 1969, he was found to be physically and mentally healthy. A soldier’s life is a hard one. As a soldier assigned to field duty, exposure to the elements, dust and dirt, fatigue and lack of sleep and rest is a common occurrence. Exposure to chemicals while handling ammunition and firearms cannot be discounted. SC took note also of the fact that he became the security of one Dr. Emilio Cordero of Anulung, Cagayan, and he always accompanied the doctor wherever the latter went. Such assignment invariably involved irregular working hours, exposure to different working conditions, and body fatigue, not to mention psychological stress and other similar factors which influenced the evolution of his ailment.
Held:
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 In compensation cases. strict rules of evidence are not applicable. A reasonable workconnection is all that is required or that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions." Respondent GSIS was ordered to pay death benefits, reimburse medical and hospital expenses and burial expenses.
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Ma-Ao Sugar Central Co v. CA GR No. 83491, August 27, 1990
Facts:
On March 22, 1980, Julio Famoso was riding with a co-employee in a cargo train of the petitioner, when the locomotive was suddenly derailed. He and his companion jumped off to escape injury, but the train fell o n its side, caught his legs by its wheels and pinned him down. He was declared dead on the spot. The claims for death and other benefits having been denied by the petitioner, the herein private respondent filed suit in the Regional Trial Court of Bago City. RTC ruled in her favor but deducted from the total damages awarded 25% thereof for the decedent's contributory negligence and the total pension that would be received from the SSS for the next five years. The widow appealed, claiming that the deductions were illegal. So did the petitioner, but on the ground that it was not negligent and therefore not liable at all. On appeal, the CA sustained the rulings of the trial court except as to the contributory negligence of the deceased and disallowed the deductions protested by the private respondent.
the scene of the accident. There is no question that the maintenance of the rails was the responsibility of the petitioner, and that this responsibility was not discharged. According to Jose Treyes, its own witness, who was in charge of the control and supervision of its train operations, cases of derailment in the milling district were frequent and there were even times when such derailments were reported every hour. The petitioner should therefore have taken more prudent steps to prevent such accidents instead of waiting until a life was finally lost because of its negligence. The argument that no one had been hurt before because of such derailments is of course not acceptable. For what is important is that the petitioner should act on these reports and not merely receive and file them. The fact that it is not easy to detect if the fish plates are missing is no excuse either. The fact that the fish plates were not found later at the scene of the mishap may show they were never there at all to begin with or had been removed long before. At any rate, the absence of the fish plates – whatever the cause or reason – is by itself alone proof of the negligence of the petitioner. Obviously, merely ordering the brakemen and conductors to fill out prescribed forms reporting derailments-which reports have not been acted upon as shown by the hourly derailments is-not the kind of supervision envisioned by the Civil Code.
Held:
We also do not see how the decedent can be held guilty of contributory negligence from the mere fact that he was not at his assigned station when the train was derailed. That might have been a violation of company rules but could not have directly contributed to his injury. Contributory negligence has been defined as "the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury." It has been held that "to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body." There is no showing that the caboose where Famoso was riding was a dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of impending danger.
1. No. Investigation of the accident revealed that the derailment of the locomotive was caused by protruding rails which had come loose because they were not connected and fixed in place by fish plates. Fish plates that should have kept the rails aligned could not be found at
2. No. Art. 173 of the Labor Code, as amended provides that any amount received by the heirs of a deceased employee from the Employees Compensation Commission, whose funds are administered by the SSS, shall be
Issues:
1. Whether CA erred for finding the petitioner guilty of negligence notwithstanding its defense of due diligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code and for disallowing the deductions made by the trial court. 2. Whether the CA erred in disauthorizing the deduction from the total damages awarded the private respondent by the SSS.
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 exclusive of all other amounts that may otherwise be claimed under the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. The amount to be paid by the SSS represents the usual pension received by the heirs of a deceased employee who was a member of the SSS at the time of his death and had regularly contributed his premiums as required by the System. The pension is the benefit derivable from such contributions. It does not represent the death benefits payable under the Workmen's Compensation Act to an employee who dies as a result of a work-connected injury. Indeed, the certification that the respondent herein is receiving a monthly pension from SSS submitted by the petitioner does not indicate that the pension is to be taken from the funds of the ECC. Famoso's widow and nine minor children have since his death sought to recover the just recompense they need for their support. Instead of lending a sympathetic hand, the petitioner has sought to frustrate their efforts and has even come to this Court to seek our assistance in defeating their claim. That relief-and we are happy to say this must be withheld.
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Chua Yeng v. Michaela Roma GR No. L-14827, October 31, 1960
Facts:
Santos Romeo was, on May 16, 1956, working for petitioner as cargador in loading and unloading copra at the former's warehouse. In the morning of that day, after asking permission from his employer, Santos Romeo went to petitioner's house just across the street from the warehouse to get a drink of water, the water pump in the warehouse being out of order and no supply being available. Reaching the kitchen of said house and while he was drinking, he saw a puppy eating some fried fish inside an open cabinet. He tried to drive away the puppy, but as the puppy still continue to eat the fish, Santos made a motion with hand to drive it away, in the course of which his right hand was bitten by said puppy. On June 26, 1958, Santos Romeo died of hydrophobia from the dog bite. It appears that the puppy was not owned by petitioner. Appellant contends that, under the circumstances narrated, the death of the laborer cannot be considered to arise "out of and in course" of his employment. Issue:
Whether the death of the laborer be considered to rise out of and inside of his employment. Held:
Yes. Such acts as are reasonably necessary to the health and comfort of an employee while at work, such as satisfaction of his thirst, hunger, or other physical demands, or protecting himself from excessive cold, are nevertheless incidental to the employment, and injuries sustained in the performance of such act are generally held to be compensable as arising out of and in the course of the employment. That Santos Romeo was in the kitchen of appellant's house and not at his usual place of work does not bring the case out of the operation of the rule previously quoted, for the reason that the laborer was practically driven to that place through the appellant's fault in not providing an adequate supply of drinking water at the warehouse. Appellant urges that the dog bite was provoked by Santos' trying to take the fish away from the puppy and hence, while he was engaged in an independent activity. But the act of the deceased was practically an instinctive one, that would naturally be expected from any person in his position. Moreover, it was motivated by a sense of loyalty to his employer, a desire to protect the latter's property, that cannot be deemed wholly foreign to the duties of the laborer as such. At any rate, the resulting injury is not without causation in the conditions under which deceased was required to perform his work. It appears that there were no adequate and sanitary means of water supply in the place of work; that petitioner's workers used, for drinking purposes, water from a well at the back of the warehouse; that this well was out or order at the time of the incident, so that the deceased had to cross a wide public street to petitioner's house just to get a drink, thereby exposing himself to hazards which may well have been avoided if there were drinking facilities at, or more proximate to, the place of work. Finally, the Workmen's Compensation Act being a social legislation, and in line with the intent of the law to effect social justice, the provisions thereof should be liberally construed in favor of the workingman
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Visayan Stevedore & Trans Co. v. WCC, Julieta Labiyo GR No. L-26657, September 12, 1974
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015
Facts:
The deceased, employed as engineer by Visayan Stevedore & Transportation Company with a monthly salary of P235.00 was part of a 3man crew of the tugboat "M/T DILIS." His main duty consisted in his starting the engine and seeing to it that it functioned properly during the voyage, with the actual navigation of the tugboat being the responsibility of his 2 other companions, the "Patron" who controlled the wheel and a helper (timonel) who operated the rudder. According to Federico Sespene, "patron" of the tugboat when the deceased died, prior to that they were ordered to tow and load cargos. They also had to shift or bring barges and as a consequence of this work, they were compelled to stay in the tugboat. While they were navigating Eduardo visibly tired and inactive asked permission to take a rest and was granted. But when he was called to start the engine, there was no answer from him. The quartermaster was the one who responded instead and was ordered to wake up Eduardo, who at the time was already dead. It was about 6:30am in the morning of February 17, 1964. A subsequent autopsy of the deceased's remains conducted by Dr. Raymundo L. Torres, the assistant medicolegal officer of the Iloilo City Police Department, — traced the cause of Eduardo Labiyo's death to "bangungot." On March 16, 1964 respondent Julieta Labiyo, the widow, filed a claim for compensation with the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. VII, Iloilo City. After appropriate proceedings, the acting referee of the Workmen's Compensation Unit in Iloilo City dismissed the case upon a finding that "the cause of death of Eduardo Labiyo did not arise out of and was aggravated by the nature of his employment." Upon review this decision was set aside by the Workmen's Compensation Commission in a decision dated June 16, 1966, ordering at the same time the petitioner to pay compensation benefits, burial expenses and costs. Petitioner thereafter moved to reconsider but the Commission, in a resolution en banc dated August 30, 1966, denied the motion. Issue: Whether petitioner VISAYAN STEVEDORE & TRANSPORTATION COMPANY liable to pay benefits and other expenses to respondent. Held:
Yes .
We do not think that the main point pressed by petitioner, namely, that death caused by "bangungot" is not compensable, is at all decisive in the case at bar. What is not denied, and this is crucial insofar as the compensability of Eduardo Labiyo's death is concerned, is that when death came to the deceased he was in active duty as an engineer-employee of the petitioner. This being the case, the need to pinpoint the cause of his death as work — connected in order to render it compensable assumes very little importance. "(It) is to be presumed, under section 44 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, that the employee's death, supervening at the time of his employment, either arose out of, or was at least aggravated by said employment. With this legal presumption the burden of proof shifts to the employer, and the employee is relieved of the burden to show causation. ... The mere opinion of doctors presented by petitioner as evidence cannot prevail over the presumption established by law." Jurisprudence provides that it proceeds from an awareness of the fact that when an employee undertakes to satisfy, in the course of employment, certain human wants, i.e. eating, freshening up, sleeping and the like, "and something takes place that may cause injury, harm or death to the employee or laborer, it is fair and logical that the happening be considered as one occurring in the course of employment for under the circumstances it cannot be undertaken in any other way ” unless it can be clearly shown that the mishap occurred because the employee acted beyond his duty or outside the course of employment, which is not so in the case at bar.
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Natividad Bellosillo v. City of Manila GR No. 34552, November 9, 1931
Facts:
This is an action to recover from the City of manila the sum of P937.60 as compensation to the widow and minor child of Andres Taborda under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The deceased Taborda was a laborer in the employ of the City and at the time the accident occurred, he was then assigned to work on Dewey Boulevard. During working hours, in answer to a call of nature, Taborda with another laborer crossed Dewey Boulevard to the shore of Manila Bay. On their way back, Taborda was run over by
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 a garage car which was negligently drive, thus causing his death. Issue: (1) Whether the accident was due to and in pursuance of the employment (2) Whether the injury was caused by the notorious negligence of the deceased. Held:
(1) The injury was caused by an accident due to and in the pursuance of the employment. The workman was then employed by the City and in the course of that employment, it was necessary for him to relieve himself. As there were no toilet accommodations available, he was compelled to cross the street. It cannot then be said that the workman, to satisfy a call of nature, went to a dangerous and unauthorized place. (2) Neither was there notorious negligence which implies willful negligence, and that is not the equivalent of contributory negligence or simple negligence. The law would serve little purpose if the general rules relating to damages and negligence were invariably invoked.
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Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation v. Hon. Del Rosario GR No. L-115978, December 29, 1960
Facts:
On September 29, 1967, the truck of Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation carrying some lumber from its sawmill to Davao City, accidentally overturned on the road. Vicente Soriano, its driver, was killed instantly together with his son, Vicente Soriano Jr. His widow, Flavia A. Soriano, claimed compensation on November 11, before the Regional Office No. 8, at Davao, of the Department of Labor. Having found the driver guilty of notorious negligence, the hearing officer denied compensation. On appeal, the Chairman of the Workmen's Compensation saw differently. He found no such negligence, and awarded compensation. Notorious negligence was imputed to the driver because: 1. Preceding the accident the truck was running 40 to 50 kilometers per hour;
2. That the road was dangerous forming a steep slope and the curve of the road was very near the accident; 3. That the machine of the truck was very defective as the truck that met the accident has no more brakes at the time it was going down at a distance of 5 kms; 4. That the trip in question was personal to meet the relative of the wife of the deceased and the loading of the lumber on that day SUNDAY was never authorized by the respondent nor any of its representatives. 5. That the trip was made solely at the instance of the deceased; 6. That the dump truck that met the accident was not registered in the Motor Vehicle Office as the same must be utilized only in carrying slabs inside the sawmill compound; so that its brakes are not in good condition and unworthy to be taken to the public highway; 7. That despite the defective condition of the truck the deceased (Vicente Soriano Sr.) still drove the truck until he met the accident; 8. That the members of his family were all seated in the front seat and immediately preceding the accident his Jr. jump into his arms as a consequence of which he lost control of the steering wheel thus hitting a kilometer post. (Affidavit of Mario Bariquit). (Exh. 7-B) Issue: Whether or not Soriano was guilty of notorious negligence barring his death from being compensable. Held:
No, the court finds that Soriano was without negligence in the performance of his duties. The truck was running fast just before overturning because it was then on a slope, and (as declared by the Commission) the "gear of the truck went out of order rendering the gear shift useless," and that the brake "would not function." As to the fourth and fifth circumstances, the Commissioner's decision says the Company consented to or authorized the trip. Concerning the non-registration of the truck in Motor Vehicle Office, and its defective condition - there is no finding that the driver knew this at the time of driving. Registration of the vehicle was not his concern. As to the presence of members of his family in the vehicle, supposing it was in violation of company regulations, it is not certain that it caused the accident. 1Indeed, as his wife and children were present, this driver must have been
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 extremely careful - not reckless. What happened must have been unforeseen; it may only be blamed upon the worn-out condition of the motor transport or as an "accident," for which the employer is responsible, it having arisen out of and in the course of the deceased's regular duties as driver. The death was, consequently, compensable. The Commission and this Court find no notorious negligence. Judgment affirmed, with costs.
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Batangas Transportation Company v. Vda de Rivera GR No. L-7658, May 8, 1956
Facts: Aurelio Rivera was one of the petitioner's bus driver. While he was driving his bus, a passenger shot him from behind leading to his death. At the hearing before the Workmen's Compensation Commission, the petitioner claimed that the motive behind the killing was personal. However, he failed to prove this. Issue: Whether in the absence of proof of motive for the killing, the heirs of the deceased driver are entitled to compensation. Held:
If it is proved that the employee died in the course of the employment, the legal presumption is that the claim comes within the provisions of the compensation law. Here, the driver died in the course of the employment. In defense, the petitioner alleged before the commission that the cause of death was a "personal grudge" on the part of the assailant, but they failed to prove this. In the absence of proof on the part of the employer to support its defense, the statutory presumption that the death of the employee arose out of employment should prevail. This is in line with Section 6, Article XIV of the constitution, which enjoins the state "to afford protection to labor". Judgement affirmed.
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Marinduque Iron Mines Agents v. WCC GR No. L-8110, June 30, 1956
Facts:
On August 23, 1951, at 6:00 a.m, the deceased Mamador together with other laborers of Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. (Petitioner Company) boarded a truck belonging to the latter, which was then driven by one Procopio Macunat, also employed by the corporation, and on its way to their place of work at the mine camp at Talantunan, while trying to overtake another truck on the company road, it turned over and hit a coconut tree, resulting in the death of said Mamador and injury to the others. Procopio Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. He has paid nothing however, to the latter. Referee Ramon Villaflor of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission (the Commission) awarded compensation to the heirs of Pedro Mamador for his accidental death to be paid by Petitioner Company which was confirmed by the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner in an order. The Petitioner Company, thru its Vice President, denied its liability under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended. Petitioner Company questioned by certiorari said order before the Supreme Court. Issues: (1) Whether or not proceedings before the Commission are not valid because Petitioner Company had not been given the opportunity to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.
(2) Whether or not the claim was barred by section 6 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, because (a) Macunat was prosecuted and required to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and (b) an amicable settlement was concluded between said heirs and Macunat. The settlement consisted of an affidavit wherein, for the sum of 150 pesos, Mamador’s widow promised “to forgive Macunat for the wrong committed and not to bring him before the authorities for prosecution.” (3) Whether or not the deceased has no right to compensation for having violated the employer’s prohibition against laborers riding the haulage trucks constituting “notorious negligence” which under the law, precludes recovery. Held:
(1) No, the proceedings before the Commission are valid because Petitioner Company was given notice, and therefore had the chance, to examine and cross-examine the
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 witnesses against it. Records show that pursuant to a request made by this Commission on March 28, 1953 to investigate the case, the Public Defender of Boac notified Geronimo Ma. Coll and the general manager of the Petitioner Company, Mr. Eric Lenze, to appear before him in an investigation twice when neither of them appeared after the first notice, and when only Mr. Geronimo Ma. Coll appeared on the second. In an investigation conducted on February 8, 1954 by Referee Villaflor, the Petitioner Company thru Mr. Lenze who was assisted by counsel, was allowed to examine the records of the case including the sworn declaration of Ma. Coll and was given all the opportunity to rebut the same by additional evidence. Furthermore, the statute (Section 48, Act 3428 as amended) even permits the Commissioner (or his referee) to take testimony without notice provided such ex parte evidence is reduced to writing, and the adverse party is afforded opportunity to examine and rebut the same which was done in this instance. (2) No, because as already decided in Nava v. Inchausti Co . (57 Phil 751), the indemnity granted to the heirs in a criminal prosecution of the “other person” does not affect the liability of the employer to pay compensation. It was erroneous for the Petitioner Company to contend that the criminal case and its outcome constituted an election by the employee (or his heirs) to sue the third person, such election having the effect of releasing the employer. The criminal case was not a suit for damages against the third person, it being alleged, without contradiction that the heirs did not intervene therein and have not so far received the indemnity ordered by the court. As to the alleged amicable settlement, all the widow promised was to forego the offender’s criminal prosecution not the compensation.
those paid or allowed under this Act, such excess shall be delivered to the injured employee or any other person entitled thereto, after deduction of the expenses of the employer and the costs of the proceedings. The sum paid by the employer for compensation or the amount of compensation to which the employee or his dependents are entitled, shall not be admissible as evidence in any damage suit or action.” (3) No, the deceased (or his heirs) has the right to compensation because the order of the employer (prohibition rather) could not be of a greater obligation than the rule of a Commission or board. The referee correctly considered this violation as possible evidence of negligence but it declared that under the circumstance, the laborer could not be declared to have acted with negligence since the prohibition had nothing to do with personal safety of the riders. Such finding is virtually a finding of fact which the Supreme Court may not overrule in this certiorari proceeding. Nevertheless, even granting there was negligence, it surely was not “notorious” negligence, which have been interpreted to mean the same thing as “gross” negligence. Getting or accepting a free ride on the company’s haulage truck could not be gross negligence, for as the referee found, “no danger or risk was apparent.” Also, the Commission has not declared that the prohibition was known to Mamador and the employer does not point out in the record evidence to that effect.
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Emilia vda De Inguillo v. ECC GR No. L-51543, June 6, 1989
Facts: Section 6 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law provides as follows: “Sec. 6. Liability of third parties. — In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in accordance with law; and in case compensation is claimed and allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer who paid such compensation or was found liable to pay the same, shall succeed the injured employee to the right of recovering from such person what he paid: Provided, That in case the employer recovers from such third person damages in excess of
Petitioner's husband, the late Enrique V. Inguillo, during his lifetime, worked as a janitor at the E. Jacinto Elementary School in Tondo, Manila. He was in the government service for thirty-one (31) years. From February 25 to June 5, 1978, he was confined at the Veteran's Memorial Hospital on "complaints of difficulty in swallowing of food, solid and liquid, accompanied by chest pains difficulty of breathing, fever and productive cough." As indicated in his Death Certificate, he died on June 20, 1978, at the age of 52, the cause of death being attributed to "Terminal malignancy, Poorly differentiated Esophageal Edenocarcinoma with Bone and Cervical Metastasis, Pneumonia."
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 The surviving spouse, Emilia Inguillo, filed a claim for death benefits with the GSIS. The claim was denied on the ground that the cause of death, cancer of the esophagus, is not an occupational disease. A motion for reconsideration of the GSIS decision having been denied, claimant-petitioner appealed to respondent ECC. On August 9, 1979 respondent ECC affirmed the GSIS denial and dismissed petitioner's claim. Hence, she filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the death of petitioner's husband is compensable. Held:
Yes, although cancer ailments, except for specified few, are not compensable, ECC failed to adequately take into consideration that there was another cause of death which was pneumonia. Even though, all of the qualifying conditions to consider pneumonia compensable do not concur as provided by Annex “A” of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, there was substantial compliance therewith, added to the fact that punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules may be relaxed in the interest of the working man, who has less in life, and in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor. Under the Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, pneumonia is a qualifiedly occupational disease under all the following conditions: (a) There must be an honest and definite history of wetting and chilling during the course of employment, also industrial injury to the chest wall with or without rib fracture, or inhalation of noxious gases, fumes and other deleterious substances in the place of work. (b) There must be a direct connection between the offending agent or event and the worker's illness. (c) The signs of consolidation should appear soon (within a few hours) and the symptoms of initial chilling and fever should at least be twenty-four (24) hours after the injury. (d) The patient must present one of the following findings within a few days of the accident: (1) Severe chill and fever. (2) Headache and pain, agonizing in character in the side. (3) Short, dry painful cough with blood-tinged expectoration. (4) Physical signs of consolidation with fine rales (ECC Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1988).
Noteworthy is the fact that the decedent's complaint of "difficulty in swallowing of food, solid and liquid" was accompanied by "chest pains, difficulty of breathing, fever and productive cough." The latter are clearly some of the above-specified symptoms of pneumonia, which by itself can also be a killer disease (Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 8th ed., pp. 802-804). Further, a review of the deceased's work activities, as janitor, will show that they included the regular use of "deleterious substances" such as muriatic acid, the fumes from which are inhaled when used in cleaning and clearing of toilet bowls and unclogging of toilet pipes and plumbing connections. The deceased also performed other varied manual work such as sweeping, scrubbing and mopping school corridors, with the resultant inhalation of a lot of dust, lifting heavy objects, painting classrooms, preparing seats for pupils during school programs, as well as going to and from his place of work thus exposing him to occasional "wetting and chilling" from downpours and rains. The combination of all these, coupled with the fact that the decedent was working in Tondo, a depressed and congested area characterized by unsanitary conditions and heavy pollution, must have lowered his resistance to fight the microbes causative of pneumonia. The risk of contracting the said disease, therefore, was increased by his working conditions, thereby satisfying an additional condition for compensability.
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Carolina Clemente v. GSIS, ECC GR No. L-47521, July 31, 1987
Facts:
Petitioner is the wife of the late Pedro Clemente. Pedro was a janitor in the Department of Health, assigned at the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic for 10 years. He was hospitalized for 11 days in 1976 due to his ailment of “nephritis.” He was also found to be suffering from such ailments as portal cirrhosis and leprosy. In November 1976, Pedro died of uremia due to to nephritis. His wife filed a claim with the GSIS for employee’s compensation but the same was denied because the ailments of her husband are not occupational diseases and/or were not in the least causally related to his duties and conditions of work. ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS. Petitioner argues that the death of her husband is compensable under the theory of
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Social Legislation Atty. R. Raypon 1st Semester, AY 2014-2015 increased risk. Respondent GSIS asked to be dropped as a party. Issues: (1) Whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain theory of increased risk (2) Whether the fact that Pedro’s existing ailment was aggravated by his work may still be compensable when this is no longer a ground for compensation under the present law. (3) Whether GSIS may be dropped as a party. Held: (1) Yes, for Pedro worked in a skin clinic and as a janitor, he was exposed to different carriers of viral and bacterial diseases. He had to clean the clinic itself where patients with different illnesses come and go. He had to put in order the hospital equipment that had been used. He had to dispose garbage and wastes that accumulated in the course of each working day. He was the employee most exposed to dangerous concentration of infected materials, and not being a medical practitioner, least likely to know how to avoid infection.
It is therefore not unreasonable to conclude that Pedro’s working conditions definitely increased the risk of his contracting the aforementioned ailments. (2) Yes, the fallacy in the theory of respondent is its failure to explain how a sick person was able to enter the government service more than ten year before he became too ill to work and at a time when aggravation of disease was still compensable. There is no evidence to show that pedro was hired inspite of having an existing disease liable to become worse. (3) No, GSIS should not be dropped as a party in the case for it is the ultimate implementing agency of the ECC.
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Gliceria Casumpang v. ECC, GSIS and BoP GR No. L-47521, July 31, 1987
Facts:
Petitioner is the widow of the late Jose Casumpang. Jose Casumpang was a prison guard of the Bureau of Prisons with assignment at the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm in Zamboanga City. He died due to cancer of the stomach. When petitioner claimed for death benefits, the
same was denied because the cause of death is not an occupational disease nor the result of the deceased’s nature of occupation as prison guard. Issue: Whether cancer of the stomach is an occupation disease and hence, compensable under PD 626. Held:
No. Under Art. 167 (b) of the New Labor Code and Section I (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupation disease listed under Annex “A” of the Rules with the condition set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. Under the Labor Code, cancer of the stomach is not an occupation disease. In ECC Resolution No. 247-A, cancer of the stomach and other lymphatic and blood forming, vessels was considered occupational only among woodworkers; wood products industry carpenters, loggers and employees in pulp and paper mills and plywood mills. The complained illness is therefore not compensable under the first group provided in the Labor Code. Under the second group for compensability, it should be shown that an illness is caused by employment and that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. Petitioner failed to show that the conditions, i.e. missed meals, overtaken by rain, work at night, brought about cancer of the stomach. Why is it important to determine which law is applicable? Under the former Workmen’s Compensation Act or Act. No. 3428, the claimant was relieved of the duty to prove causation as it was ten legally presumed that the illness arose out of employment under the presumption of compensability. (Tortal v. WCC)
However, under the new law, the principles of aggravation and presumption of compensability have been stricken off by lawmakers as grounds for compensation. In order to be compensable, the injury or illness must be listed under Annex “A” with the conditions set therein or it must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
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