Social Legislation Cases
1. GSIS v CSC, G.R. No. 98395 and 102449 (1995) 2. Hilarion Beronilla v GSIS, L-21723, Nov. 26, 1970 3. Gaudencio Cena v CSC, G.R. No. 97419, July 3, 1992 4. Dionisio Rabor v CSC, 244 SCRA 614 5. Profeta v Drilon, G.R. No. 104149, Dec. 22, 1992 6. Santiago v COA, G.R. No. 92284, July 12, 1991 7. Raro v ECC, G.R. 58445, April 27, 1989 8. Iloilo Dock & Engineering v WCC, L-26341, Nov. 27, 1968 9. Belarmino v ECC, G.R. 90104, May 11, 1990 10. Alano v ECC, G.R. 48594, March 16, 1988 11. Lazo v ECC G.R. 78617, June 18, 1990 12. Enao v ECC, 135 SCRA 660 13. Gloria D. Menes v. ECC G.R. L-48488, April 25, 1980 14. Narazo v ECC G.R. 80157, Feb. 6, 1990 15. Dabatian v GSIS, G.R. 47294, April 8, 1987 16. Rodriguez v ECC, G.R. 46454, Sept. 28, 1989 17. Beronilla v GSIS, G.R. 21723 (1970) 18. ECC v CA, G.R. No. 121545 (1966) 19. Tancinco v GSIS, G.R. 132916 (2001) 20. Jimenez v ECC, G.R. L-58176 (1984) 21. Panotes v. ECC, G.R. L-64802 (1984)
GSIS vs CSC
Issues: (1) Is government service rendered on a per diem basis creditable for computing the length of service for retirement purposes; and (2) Is CSC the proper government agency in determining what service is creditable for retirement purposes? Held: 1. NO. PD. 1146, Sec. 2(i) defines “Compensation” as the basic pay or salary received by an employee, pursuant to his employment/appointments, excluding per diems, bonuses, overtime pay, and allowances. xxx In essence, the grant of retirement benefits necessitates an obligation on the part of the employee to contribute to the insurance fund of petitioner. Such obligation only arises where the employee is receiving "salary, pay or compensation" and not per diem, which is not capable of paying off the premium contributions to
petitioner. xxx Joint CSC, DBM and GSIS Circular No. 1-89 states that services rendered on a per diem bases are not creditable for retirement purposes. 2. NO. In Profeta v. Drilon , 216 SCRA 777 (1992), held that the GSIS has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a member is qualified or not to avail of the old-age pension benefit under P.D. No. 1146, based on its computation of a member's years of government service. By analogy, we reiterate our ruling in the cases at bench. The above mentioned circular also confirms that it is the GSIS, and not the CSC which is the proper agency in determining services which are creditable for retirement purposes.
Beronilla vs GSIS
Facts: Mr. Hilarion Beronilla requested CSC to change his date of birth indicated in the records from 1902 to 1900, as he only later discovered his true date of birth. It was initially granted by the General Manager Andal but the decision was later reversed by the GSIS Board of Trustees. Beronilla, in a special civil action for prohibition, seeks to reverse the Resolution by the BOT to the effect that “the p etitioner be considered compulsorily retired from the service (as Auditor of PNB) effective January, 14, 1963” as null and void. Issue: (1) WON the GSIS BOT acted within its powers when it reversed the approval by General Manager Andal of petitioner’s request for change of his date of birth. (2) WON the respondent guilty of laches or held in estoppels to change or alter the action of GM for failure to act within three years. Held: (1) Yes. Based on Commonwealth Act, the Charter of the GSIS, as amended, together with the relevant resolutions of the BOT, the SC upheld the super authority of the Board over the General Manager. The General Manager’s approval is not beyond review and reprobation by the BOT. The BOT directly manages the System and the GM is only the chief executive officer of the Board. In this case, all that the BOT has done is to set aside what it found to be an erroneous decision of the GM in approving the change of date of petitioner’s birth, because from the evidence before it, the BOT was convinced that the originally recorded date of birth should not be disturbed.
(2) No. “Mere innocent silence will not work estoppels. There must also be some element of turpitude or negligence connected with the silence by which another is misled to his injury” and that “the doctrine of estoppels having its origin in equity and therefore being based on moral and natural justice, its applicability to any particular case depends, to a very large extent, upon the special circumstances of the case.” Importan t also it is not to overlook that as regards the actuations of government officials, the general rule is that their mistakes and omissions do not create estoppels.
Cena vs CSC
Facts: Gaudencio Cena worked for 7 years as a Legal Officer of the Law Dept of Caloocan City. He was then transferred to the Office of the Congressman where he worked as a Supervising Staff Officer for 3 months. He was then appointed as Registrar of the RD (Register of Deeds) in Malabon. In total, he has rendered gov’t service for 11 years, 9 months and 6 days. Before reaching his 65th bday, he requested the LRA Administrator that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the 15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with full benefits of old age pension. The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the CSC. The CSC denied the extension but Cena filed a motion for reconsideration. This time around, CSC granted a 1-yr extension to him. Cena still filed a case against CSC for grave abuse of discretion when it granted an extension of only 1 yr. He contends that the law(Sec 11, PD 1146 also known as Revised Gov’t Insurance Act) does not limit or specify the maximum number of years the retiree may avail of to complete the 15-year service. Thus, the CSC has no authority to limit through a memorandum the number of years. In defense, CSC said that since it is the central personnel agency of the gov’t, it is vested with power to grant or allow extension of service beyond retirement age. Issue: WON Cena is allowed to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement? Held: Yes. An administrative circular, such as a memorandum of the CSC cannot limit PD 1146, on extension of service of employees who reach 65. While it is true that CSC is given the authority to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service, it cannot extend to matters not covered. The CSC’s authority is limited only to carrying
into effect what PD 1146 says. It cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. The CSC Memorandum, being in the nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle that a regulation must be in harmony with the provisions of the law and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. CSC has no power to supply or add perceived omissions in PD 1146. “The Court held that a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but at the same time has not yet completed fifteen (15) years of government service required under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 to qualify for the Old-Age Pension Benefit, may be granted an extension of his government service for such period of time as may be necessary to "fill up" or comply with the fifteen (15)-year service requirement.”
The petition was granted. The LRA and DOJ has the discretion to allow Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months, and 6 days of government service to complete the 15-year service so that he may retire with full benefits.
Dionisio Rabor vs CSC
Facts: Rabor entered government service as utility worker on 10 April 1978 in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City at the age of 55. He was advised to retire in May 1991, with 13 years and 1 month of service. He requested from the Mayor an extension of services to 15 years so he could be entitled to the retirement benefits. Director Cawed of CSRO-XI advised Mayor Duterte that the extension of his services is contrary to MC 65 of the Office of the President. Duterte then furnished Rabor with a copy of the letter and advised him to stop reporting effective August 16, 1991. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990 provides, in part: 1. Any request for extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen years service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who are regular members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and shall be granted for a period of not exceeding one (1) year . Rabor sent another letter in 1993 requesting to be allowed to continue
rendering services, but it was once more denied by the Mayor stating that he is nearly reaching 70yo and his position has already been filled up. In Toledo vs CSC , CSRPAP prohibited the appointment of persons 57yo without prior approval from CSC. Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 5 provides that they may be appointed provided that (1) the exigencies of the government service so required and provided that (2) the appointee possesses special qualifications not possessed by other officers or employees in the Civil Service and that the vacancy cannot be filled by promotion of qualified officers or employees of the Civil Service. Issues: WON Rabor should be allowed to continue rendering service tocomplete his 15-year service. Rabor asserts that his case is analogous to Cena. Held: NO. SC conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby modified to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly, be read together with Memorandum Circular No. 27. SC reiterated, however, the holding in Cena that the head of the government agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow extension of the service of an official or employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age without completing fifteen (15) years of government service; this discretion is nevertheless, to be exercised conformably with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.
Profeta vs Drilon
GSIS has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a member is qualified or not to avail of the old-age pension benefit under P.D. No. 1146, based on its computation of a member's years of government service.
Santiago vs COA
Facts: Santiago was employed in COA as State Auditor IV with a monthly salary of P7,219.00. In 1988, he was assigned to COA Auditing Unit in DOTC and detailed to MIAA. MIAA issued a resolution which included his authority to collect RATA of P1,200 and other allowances. In total, he collects a compensation of P13, 068. 00. In computing his retirement benefits, GSIS based on the P13, 068 but COA disagreed and based only on his monthly salary of P7,219 as State Auditor. Issue: (1) Whether the honorarium should be added to the salary in computing Santiago’s retirement benefits. —NO (2) WON “designated” falls under the general term “appointment”, and thus be allowed to invoke Section 9 of Act 4187. —YES Held: (1) Act 4187, Sec. 17 excludes (2) Auditor and accountants from officer prohibited from receiving any kind of additional or extra compensation. The SolGen argues that the additional compensation received by Santiago was merely an honorarium and not a salary, thus would not fall under the provision of Sec. 9 and so should not be added to his salary in computing his retirement benefits. The Court disagrees. An honorarium is defined as something given not as a matter of obligation but in appreciation for services rendered, a voluntary donation in consideration of services which admit of no compensation in money. The additional compensation given to the petitioner was in the nature of a salary because it was receive by him as a matter of right in recompense for services rendered by him xxx. (2) While appointment is essentially executive and designation is legislative in nature, the Court held in the case at bar that the term “appointment” was used in a general sense to include the term “designation.” Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to the public service, he deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his services. That generosity is the least he should expect now that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well, and was rewarded for it.” Petition is granted, directing the computation of petitioner’s retirement benefits on the bases of his Highest Basic Salary rate of P13,068.
Raro vs Employees’ Compensation Commission and GSIS
Facts: Zaida Raro was in perfect health when employed in Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences. 4 years later, she lost her memory, sense of time, vision and reasoning power after and frequently taking sick leaves. She was then Mining Recorded in the Bureau. Issue: (1) Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during employment is compensable under the present compensation laws. (2) Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable under the present compensation laws when a disease is not listed as occupational disease. Held: (1) No. It does not fall under Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment under the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. What the law requires is proof that the illness is caused by the employment. Dissenting, Paras: while “brain tumor” is not expressly referred to as an occupational disease xxx we may say that the disease is akin to “cancer of the brain” and should therefore be regarded as either compensable or borderline case. (2) Yes. The presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation is espoused under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, is now abandoned under the New Labor Code.
Iloilo Dock & Engineering (IDECO) v W orkmen’s Compensation Commission (WCC)
Facts: Teodoro Pablo and Rodolfo Galopez, had just finished overtime work at 5:00 pm and was going home. At around 5:02 pm, while Pablo and Galopez were walking along the IDECO road, about20 meters from the IDECO main gate, Pablo was shot by Martin Cordero. The motive for the crime was and still unknown since Martin Cordero was himself killed before he could be tried for Pablo’s death.
Issues: (1) WON Pablo’s death occurred in the course of employment and arising out of the employment. (2) WON the PROXIMITY RULE should apply in this case. (3) WON the death of Pablo was an accident within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Held: (1) Yes. Workmen’s compensation is granted if the injuries result from an accident which arises out of and in the course of employment. Both the “arising” factor and the “course” factor must be present. If one factor is weak and the other is strong, the injury is compensable but not where both factors are weak. Ultimately, the question is whether the accident is work connected. The words “arising out of” refer to the origin or ca use of the accident and are descriptive of its character, while the words “in the course” refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place. The presumption that the injury arises out of and in the course of employment prevails where the injury occurs on the employer’s premises. While the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it was using the same as the principal means of ingress and egress. The private road leads directly to its main gate. Its right to use the road must then perforce proceed from either an easement of right of way or a lease. Its right therefore is either a legal one or a contractual one. In either case the IDECO should logically and properly be charged with security control of the road.
(2) Yes. The general rule in workmen’s compensation law known as going and coming rule provides that in the absence of special circumstances, an employee injured in going to, or coming from his place of work is excluded from the benefits of workmen’s co mpensation acts. The following are the exceptions: a. Where the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his employer b. Where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the premises of his employer by way of exclusive or customary means of ingress and egress. Where the employee is charged while on his way to or from his place of employment or at his home or during his employment, with some duty or special errand connected with his employment. Where the employer, as an incident of the employment provides the means of transportation to and from the place of employment. The second exception is known as the “proximity rule.” The place where the employee was injured being immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question
must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and therefore arose out of or in the course thereof.
(3) Yes. An “assault” although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is considered an “accident” within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act since the word accident is intended to indicate that the act causing the injury shall be casual or unforeseen, an act for which the injured party is not legally responsible.
Belarmino v ECC
Facts: Oania Belarmino was a classroom teacher of the Department of Education Culture and Sports assigned at the Burucan Elementary School in Dimasalang, Masbate for 11 years. On Jan. 14, 1982, Mrs. Belarmino who th was in her 8 month of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on the classroom floor. She complained of abdominal pain and stomach cramps but she continued reporting for work because there was much work to do. On Jan. 25, 1982, whe went into labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl at home. However, her abdominal pain persisted even after delivery. When she was brought to the hospital, her physician informed her that she was suffering from septicemia post partum (severe bacterial infection) due to infected lacerations of the vagina. After she was discharged from the hospital, she died three days thereafter. The GSIS denied the claim on the ground that septicemia post partum, the cause of death is an occupational disease and neither was there any showing that the ailmentwas contracted by reason of her employment. On appeal to the ECC, latter also denied the claim.
Issue: WON the cause of death of Mrs. Belarmino is not a work-related and therefore not compensable.
Held: No. The death of Mrs. Belarmino from septicemia post partum is compensable because an employment accident and the conditions of her employment contributed to its development. The condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as aresult. The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her fall on theclassroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the development of postpartum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore was that set in motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise. The right to compensation the proximate cause (cause or event that sets all other events in motion) extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury. Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant’s own negligence or misconduct. Mrs. Belarmino’s fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of here mployment as a classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from it: her recurrent abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia post partum and death are compensable.
Alano v ECC
Facts: Dedicacion De Vera worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her usual tour of duty was from 7:30 am to 5:30 pm. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00AM while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to school, she was bumped and ran over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted to her instantaneous death. Her brother Generoso Alano filed the instant claim for income benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the decedent’s children. The claim was denied by GSIS on the ground that the injury upon which compensation is being claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law. The ECC affirmed the denial by GSIS. It claimed that the deceased’s accident did not meet the conditions under the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. First, the accident occurred at about 7:00 am or thirty minutes
before the deceased’s working hours. Second, it happened not at her workplace but at the plaza where she usually waits for a ride to her work. Third, she was not then performing her official functions as school principal nor was she on a special errand for the school.
Issue: WON the injury sustained by the deceased Dedicacion de Vera resulting in her death is compensable under the law as an employment accident.
Held: Yes. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment. In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal’s being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there.
Lazo v ECC
Facts: Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office in Malate, Manila. His regular tour of duty is from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On 18 June 1986, the petitioner rendered duty from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. But, as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, the petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, when he asked permission from his superior to leave early in order to take home to Binangonan, Rizal, his sack of rice. On his way home, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, the passenger jeepney the petitioner was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. As a result, he sustained injuries and was taken to the Angono Emergency Hospital for treatment. He was later transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital where he was confined until 25 July 1986. For the injuries he sustained, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefit
under PD 626, as amended. His claim, however, was denied by the GSIS. Upon review of the case, the respondent ECC affirmed the decision since the accident which involved the petitioner occurred far from his work place and while he was attending to a personal matter. Issue: WON the injuries sustained due to the vehicular accident on way home from work should be construed as "arising out of or in the course of employment" and thus, compensable. Held: YES. While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code, it is significant that the liberality of the law in general in favor of the workingman still subsists. As agent charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by the Constitution, the ECC should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection to the accident. There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be protected for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises. If the Vano ruling awarded compensation to an employee who was on his way from home to his work station one day before an official working day, there is no reason to deny compensation for accidental injury occurring he is on his way home one hour after he had left his work station. The SC did not consider the defense of the street peril doctrine and instead interpret the law liberally in favor of the employee because the Employees Compensation Act, like the Workmen's Compensation Act, is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working men and women in our society.
Enao v ECC
Facts: On August 1, 1975, Emelita Enao, a Public School Teacher, together with others, was on her way from her official station at Sergio Osmena, Sr., Zamboanga del Norte to Dipolog City. According to the Acting Administrative Officer of her employer, 'Having held classes on July 26, in lieu of August 1, 1975, as per District Memorandum hereto attached, Miss Enao was on her way home from station when their group was ambushed and fired. According to
appellant's witnesses, who were members of the ambushed party, she was on her way to Dipolog City for the purpose of 'securing supplies and other training and school aids necessary for furthering services as a school teacher.' As a result of the ambush, the appellant sustained gunshot wounds on her left forearm and abdomen which compelled her confinement. On August 5, 1975, a claim for income benefits for disability was filed by the herein petitioner with the Government Service Insurance System but this claim was denied by the System. Petitioner appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission. On October 26, 1976, the ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS appealed from and dismissed the Petitioner's claim.
Issue: (1) WON the petitioner’s injury incurred when she left her official station for Dipolog City for the purpose of procurring school supplies and training aids to enhance her teaching efficiency is compensable. (2) WON the sworn statements of the witnesses are to be set aside.
Held: (1) Yes, it is compensable. The Petitioner, in proceeding to Dipolog City on August 1, 1975, which is a Friday, from her station, intended to procure supplies and other training aids which are needed facilities in connection with her services as a school teacher, cannot be at all disputed. The companions of the Petitioner at the time of the ambush and who appear to be co-teachers of the Petitioner, have attested in their respective affidavits. Furthermore, the SC held that it is obvious that in proceeding to purchase school materials in Dipolog City, Petitioner would necessarily have to leave the school premises and her travel need not be during her usual working hours. What is significant and controlling is that the injuries she sustained are work-connected, which the Court finds to be so. In the case of Vda. de Torbela vs. ECC, where, by a significant majority vote of this Court, it was held that a claim arising from a vehicular accident sustained by a school principal on his way from Bacolod City where he lived to his school at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where he was the school principal of, is compensable. It was therein ruled that "where an employee is acci dentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place of work, while she is going
to and from her work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of her employment.
(2) No, the sworn statements by the witnesses should not be set aside. The SC finds no basis at an for the findings made by the ECC in its decision that the statements of Petitioner and her witnesses are merely self-serving declarations because SC can discern no circumstance that would indicate or support such a conclusion. Uncontroverted and unrefuted by any evidence, then such statements of appellant's witnesses would suffice to establish that the multiple gunshot wounds and injuries sustained by appellant and which caused her confinement are definitely work-connected.
Gloria D. Menes v. ECC
Facts: Petitioner, Gloria D. Menes, was a Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC)-employed school teacher for 32 years and was assigned in Raja Soliman High School, Tondo-Binondo, Manila just before her retirement on 21 August 1975. She had opted to retire early due to her rheumatoid arthritis pain and bronchiectasis with hemoptysis related to long-term pneumonitis. On October 21, 1976, petitioner filed for a disability benefits under P.D. 626 with GSIS. However, GSIS denied said claim on the ground that rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are not occupational diseases related to her line of work. But on, November 24, 1976, petitioner requested for a reconsideration of the denied claim; contending that her ailments arose in the course of employment and were aggravated by the conditions of the work place and the nature of her work. GSIS denied her claim again, reiterating their previous decision. Hence, elevated to ECC but ECC issued a decision affirming the decision of the GSIS.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner, Gloria Menes, is entitled to disability benefits from respondent GSIS. HELD: Yes, Gloria Menes is entitled to disability benefits . All public high school teachers are admittedly the most underpaid and overworked employees of the government; they are subject to emotional strains and stresses, dealing with teenagers and harassed as they are by various extra-curricular or nonacademic assignments, aside from preparing lesson plans until late at night, if
they are not badgered by very demanding superiors. In the case of the petitioner, her emotional tension is heightened by the fact that she teaches in a tough-situated area: Binondo district, which is inhabited by thugs and other criminal elements and further aggravated by the heavy pollution and congestion therein as well as the stinking smell of the dirty Estero de la Reina nearby. Women, like herein petitioner, are most vulnerable to such unhealthy conditions. The pitiful situation of all public school teachers is further accentuated by poor diet for they can ill-afford nutritiously-balanced meals and would resort to poor man’s staple diet of tuyo, daing, mongo and rice. Furthermore, judicial notice should be taken of the fact that our country is in a typhoon belt and that annually we experience torrential storms. The petitioner would go through the ordeal of perspiring and getting drenched from downpours in her daily commute from home to school and vice versa. Petitioner is also in contact with at least 250 students everyday who might be carriers of contagious disease, which would be a factor as to how she got her ailments.
Narazo v ECC
Facts:
Dabatian v GSIS
Facts: At the time of his death, Sigfredo A. Dabatian was employed as Garbage Truck Driver in the General Services Department of the City Government of Cagayan deOro City. As Garbage Truck Driver, he was assigned mostly in the night shift. Infact, at the time of his death, his time of duty started from 10:00 o'clock at night to6:00 o'clock in the morning the next day. It was gathered from the evidence onrecord that the deceased was a heavy coffee drinker which was his way of warding off sleepiness.Prior to his death, he was observed by his co-employees to have been getting paler and weaker while at work until the time he collapsed and becameunconscious while on his tour duty and was brought to his residence by hiscompanions. Despite hospitalization, he died two weeks later on July 3, 1976.A claim for income
benefits under the Employee's Compensation Program wasfiled by the widow, the herein appellant. The GSIS denied the petition on the ground that decedent's ailment, Peptic Ulcer, is not definitely accepted as an occupational disease, as listed under the present law on compensation. Neither was there a showing that the same was directly caused by his employment and that the risk of contracting the same was increased by the working conditions attendant to thedeceased's employment. The case was then elevated to the ECC which ruled that the ailment is not work-connected, specifically, his inherent predisposition to drinkingcoffee heavily which could have aggravated his contraction of the diseaseresulting to his death. However, aggravation of an illness is not a ground for compensation under the present compensation law. Issue: Whether or not under the premises the death of Sigfredo A. Dabatian is compensable. Held: No, not compensable. No competent evidence whatsoever was submitted to prove that Dabatian's ailment was contracted prior to January 1, 1975 in order to bring it under the protective mantle of the old compensation law. There are no medical findings, affidavits,reports or any other evidence that deceased suffered from pain or any discomfort prior to the effectivity of the New Labor Code. No allegation was even made to this effect. True it is, that strict rules on evidence do not apply in cases such as this and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of labor. However, We cannot over-extend the limits of such rules. Justice and fair playdictate otherwise. The new law on compensation should be applied to this case. The present Labor Code, P.D. 442 as amended, abolished the presumption of compensability andthe rule on aggravation of illness caused by the nature of employment. Thus, under the present law, in order for the employee to be entitled to sickness or death benefits, the sickness or death resulting therefrom must be, or must have resulted from either a)any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission or b) anyillness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. Since peptic ulcer is not included in the list of occupational diseases as drawn up by the Commission, then petitioner has the burden of proving that the nature of her husband's work increased the risk of contracting the disease. Aside from the undisputed fact that the deceased is a heavy coffee drinker, which was his way of warding off sleepiness, no evidence was ever adduced by petitioner to bolster the theory that her husband's work increased the risk of contracting the ailment.Being a heavy coffee drinker may
have aggravated his peptic ulcer, but, aggravation of an illnessis no longer a ground for compensation under the present law. This Court takes notice of the fact that the conditions in this case are not peculiar to the work mentioned herein. Many, if not most, employees are equally exposed to similar conditions but have not been victims of peptic ulcer.
Rodriguez v ECC
Facts: Hector Rodriguez was a public school teacher assigned at Salaan ElementarySchool in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. On November 19, 1975, he went on sick leave and was hospitalized at Pangasinan Provincial Hospital after he complained of severe stomach pains accompanied by nausea and vomiting. He was later diagnosed to have an “Intestinal Lipomatis of theLarge Colon with Obstruction of the Ascending Colon.” He underwent surgery but the same was unsuccessful. He died on December 2,1975.4. When his widow filed a claim with GSIS, the same was denied. GSIS contended that the nature of the deceased duties as a teacher could not have directly caused his ailment which eventuated in his subsequent death. The ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that the principal duties of her husband as aclassroom teacher alone would not have any connection with the disease. However, she posits that the deceased’s auxiliary activities as a classroom teacher directly affected his physical consatitution and caused him to have sustained some trauma in his abdominal cavity and other parts of the body. ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the deceased caused by Intestinal Lipomatis of the Large Colon with Obstruction of the Ascending Colon, is compensable. HELD: NO. Claims on death benefits under Art. 194 must result from an occupational disease. A compensable disease means any illness accepted and listed by the ECC or any illness caused by the employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same was increased by the working conditions. If the disease is listed in Annex A, no proof of causation is required. If it is not so listed, it has been held that the employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove, a positive proposition, that is, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by working conditions. Proof of direct causal relation is indispensably required. It is enough that the claimant adduces proof of reasonable work connection, whereby the development of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. Strict rules of evidence, which has been held to be such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. The circumstances alleged by the petitioner and the evidence she presented are not enough to discharge the required quantum of proof, liberal as it is. There is no clear evidence as to when the diseased commenced and supervened; the tumors which developed in the deceased’s colon may have been growing for many years even before he was employed as a teacher. The trauma that was supposed to have caused or at least contributed to the disease was neither satisfactorily clarified nor adequately proved.
Casumpang v ECC
Facts: Petitioner’s husband, Jose Casumpang, then working as Prison Guard of the Bureau of Prisons with assignment at the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm, Zamboanga City. Mr. Casumpang died due to Cancer of the Stomach. Thus, Mrs. Casumpang claims for income benefits for death. However the GSIS, together with ECC, denied the petition on the ground that the cause of death is not an occupational disease nor the result of the deceased's nature of occupation as Prison Guard. Issue: WON cancer of the stomach is an occupational disease and hence, compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.
Held: NO. The contention of the appellant that compensability is presumed once the ailment is shown to have supervened in the course of employment cannot be accorded merit. The doctrine of presumptive compensability which was then expressly provided under the old Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428) is not recognized under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, the present law on employees' compensation. In the latter law, proof of causation by the claimant is imperative, such burden being incompatible with the presumption of compensability. Thus, SC affirmed the decision appealed.
