Timaeus (1794) F. W. J. SCHELLING Translated by Adam Arola, Jena Jolissaint, and Peter Warnek
W. J. Schelling’s commentary on the Timaeus, which is presented in English here for the first time, was composed during the end of his time ti me at the Tübinger Stift , sometime between 1793 and 1795. Hartmut Buchner, Buchner, the editor of the first publication of this text in German Ger man (1994) dates the text to the earliest e arliest part of 1794. Buchner Buchner offers a number of reasons for this date. Most importantly, “the first of January, 1794” is found on a page of Schelling’s notebooks immediately before the essay. 1 This early date means that the essay ess ay gives us a glimpse into the young Schelling’s Schelling’s philosophical inclinations prior to his initial and a nd formative encounter with Fichte’ Fichte’s 1794 edition e dition of the Wissenschaftslehre. In any event, it is safe to say that Schelling most likely began his thoroughgoing analysis of the Timaeus and the Philebus when he was only eighteen years old. In his commentary, Schelling deals primarily with the passages of the Timaeus beginning near nea r 28a and ending at 53b and, in the Philebus, from 22e to 30b. On the most m ost superficial superfici al level, Schelling’s Schelling’s essay is an attempt to explain how the account of the th e creation of the world in the Timaeus hangs together on its own, own , and also when it is considered in relationship to human understanding. un derstanding. To To the extent that this th is is his objective, object ive, he works with the sections of the Philebus that deal with the elements ele ments and with the four forms forms of things—to peras, to aperion, to koinon, and to tes aitias genos . The interpretation is both interesting and unique, especially in its employment of the language of both Kant and Reinhold. Of course, one might be tempted to take the reading to be overly reliant on conceptual structures that only emerge with Kant. Yet it is also the case that Schelling’s Schelling’s creative and innovative reading sheds new light on some of the most m ost difficult passages in Plato. At the same time, the essay is important impor tant as a document docume nt of the young Schelling’s thinking in which we see appearing in seminal form key moments of his later thinking. think ing. For For example, one might consider the essay in relationship relat ionship to the organic as it is developed developed in his later Naturphilo Naturphilosoph sophie ie or in relationship to his conception of the distinction between ground and existence in the Freiheitsschrift . A few facts worth noting about the content of this essay: Schelling is often responding to a number of Plato commentators who were extraordinarily influential in Translators’ Introduction: F.
© 2008. Epoché, Volume 12, Issue 2 (Spring 2008). ISSN 1085-1968.
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his time, tim e, but who now no longer play a central role in scholarship. scholarsh ip. The most notable of these figures—simply because Schelling devotes several several pages near the end his essay critiquing him—is Friedrich Victor Victor Lebrecht Plessing (1749–1806). Plessing published two volumes on ancient anc ient philosophy phil osophy,, Versuche zur Aufklärung de derr Philosophie des ältesten älteste n 1788– 1790), which deal with Platonic Pl atonic philosophy as a whole. For For Altherthums Altherthums (Leipzig 1788–1790), the reader of Schelling Schell ing the first volume is the more important one (Plato’ Plato’s metaphysisch me taphysischee t hat Philosophie) since this is where Plessing deals with the Timaeus. Buchner explains that Plessing continually argues for a conception of the ideas in Plato that fastens upon them as intelligible intelligi ble substances, “and a significant part of this th is work serves to substantiate this ancient conception through countless citations supporting it” (10). The other two figures that Schelling mentions me ntions throughout throughout the course of this essay e ssay are Wilhel Wilhelm m Gottlieb Tenneman Tenneman and a nd Dietrich Dietr ich Tiedemann. Tenneman Tenneman composed an essay entitled Über den den göttlichen göttlic hen Verstand Verstand aus der Platonischen P latonischen Philosophie. (nous, logos), which, according to Buchner, “first appeared in 1791 in the first volume of the journal Memora Memora-Eberhard rhard Gottlob Paulus” (11). Tiedemann composed an a n essay bilien, edited by Heinrich Ebe entitled Dialogorum Platonis Argumenta exposita et illustrata illust rata, which was published as an appendix to the Bipontina, or Zweibrücker Zweibrücker edition, of of the Platonic dialogues in 1786—the version of the dialogues that contain Ficino’s translations of Plato into Latin. Regarding this translation of the essay there are a few points to make. For the sake of consistency, we have relied upon the Loeb edition of the Greek to supplement Schelling’ Schelli ng’ss Greek text. Also, as an aid the reader of this essay who may lack lac k a knowledge of ancient Greek, we we have inserted English translation t ranslationss of all of the passages from the Timaeus and Philebus. These immediately follow the Greek text and appear bold in square brackets. For the Timaeus, we have made use of Peter Kalkavage’s translation and Seth Benardete’s for the Philebus. On a few occasions Schelling presents Plato’s text in German. Here we have translated his text but also included Kalkavage’s and Benardete’s translations. In such cases, the translation appears in a footnote. The translators wish to express their gratitude to Jeffrey Librett and Dieter Manderschied from the Department of Germanic Languages and Literature at the University of Oregon for their valuable assistance in interpreting a few key lines from this challenging essay.
NOTES
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Buchner also points points out out the lack of of Fichtean terminology terminolog y in this essay, essay, whereas Schelling “vehemently applies” the language of Fichte’s Wissenschaftlehre in his essay On the Possibility of a Form of Philosophy in General , which can be dated with some certainty to September 1794. For further philological analysis of this essay, see Buchner’s introduction introduct ion to the th e German Germ an edition edit ion of this t his text tex t in F. F. W. J. Schelling Schel ling,, Timaeus (1794), ed. Hartmut Buchner, in Schellingiana 4 (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1994), 3–21.
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his time, tim e, but who now no longer play a central role in scholarship. scholarsh ip. The most notable of these figures—simply because Schelling devotes several several pages near the end his essay critiquing him—is Friedrich Victor Victor Lebrecht Plessing (1749–1806). Plessing published two volumes on ancient anc ient philosophy phil osophy,, Versuche zur Aufklärung de derr Philosophie des ältesten älteste n 1788– 1790), which deal with Platonic Pl atonic philosophy as a whole. For For Altherthums Altherthums (Leipzig 1788–1790), the reader of Schelling Schell ing the first volume is the more important one (Plato’ Plato’s metaphysisch me taphysischee t hat Philosophie) since this is where Plessing deals with the Timaeus. Buchner explains that Plessing continually argues for a conception of the ideas in Plato that fastens upon them as intelligible intelligi ble substances, “and a significant part of this th is work serves to substantiate this ancient conception through countless citations supporting it” (10). The other two figures that Schelling mentions me ntions throughout throughout the course of this essay e ssay are Wilhel Wilhelm m Gottlieb Tenneman Tenneman and a nd Dietrich Dietr ich Tiedemann. Tenneman Tenneman composed an essay entitled Über den den göttlichen göttlic hen Verstand Verstand aus der Platonischen P latonischen Philosophie. (nous, logos), which, according to Buchner, “first appeared in 1791 in the first volume of the journal Memora Memora-Eberhard rhard Gottlob Paulus” (11). Tiedemann composed an a n essay bilien, edited by Heinrich Ebe entitled Dialogorum Platonis Argumenta exposita et illustrata illust rata, which was published as an appendix to the Bipontina, or Zweibrücker Zweibrücker edition, of of the Platonic dialogues in 1786—the version of the dialogues that contain Ficino’s translations of Plato into Latin. Regarding this translation of the essay there are a few points to make. For the sake of consistency, we have relied upon the Loeb edition of the Greek to supplement Schelling’ Schelli ng’ss Greek text. Also, as an aid the reader of this essay who may lack lac k a knowledge of ancient Greek, we we have inserted English translation t ranslationss of all of the passages from the Timaeus and Philebus. These immediately follow the Greek text and appear bold in square brackets. For the Timaeus, we have made use of Peter Kalkavage’s translation and Seth Benardete’s for the Philebus. On a few occasions Schelling presents Plato’s text in German. Here we have translated his text but also included Kalkavage’s and Benardete’s translations. In such cases, the translation appears in a footnote. The translators wish to express their gratitude to Jeffrey Librett and Dieter Manderschied from the Department of Germanic Languages and Literature at the University of Oregon for their valuable assistance in interpreting a few key lines from this challenging essay.
NOTES
1.
Buchner also points points out out the lack of of Fichtean terminology terminolog y in this essay, essay, whereas Schelling “vehemently applies” the language of Fichte’s Wissenschaftlehre in his essay On the Possibility of a Form of Philosophy in General , which can be dated with some certainty to September 1794. For further philological analysis of this essay, see Buchner’s introduction introduct ion to the th e German Germ an edition edit ion of this t his text tex t in F. F. W. J. Schelling Schel ling,, Timaeus (1794), ed. Hartmut Buchner, in Schellingiana 4 (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1994), 3–21.
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lato states the basic principle according a ccording to which one must must judge the manner of presentation in the Timaeus at 28c: to; n me; n ou\ n poihth; n kai; patev patevra ra tou`de de 1 tou` panto; panto;~ euJrei` n te e[rgon rgon kai euJrov rov nta eij~ pav nta~ ajduv duv naton levgein gein [Now to discover the poet and father of this all is quite a task, and even if one discovered him, to to speak of him to all men is impossible impossible 2]. This main principle is initially stated at 27d–28a: diairetevon on tavde de tiv to; to; o] n [men] aj eiv, gev nesin de; oujk e[ con, kai; tiv to; to; gignovmenon menon me; n, o] n de; oujdev devpote pote [;] to; me; n dh;, noh;sei meta; lov lovgou perilhpto; n, aj ei; kata; kata; tauj taujta; ta; o[ o[ n to; d d’ au\ dov dovxh xh met’
aijsqhv sqhvsew~ sew~ ajlov lovgou gou ddoxasto; n gignov gignovmenon menon kai; aj apolluv p j olluvmenon, menon, o[ntw~ de; ouj oujdevpote pote o[ n [What is it that always always is and has no becoming; b ecoming; and what is it that comes to be and never is? Now the one is grasped by intellection accompanied by a rational account, since it’s it’s always in the same condition; conditi on; but the other in its turn tur n is opined by opinion accompanied accompanied by irrational ir rational sensation, since it comes to be and perishes and never genuinely is]. Plato explains the o[ n at this point as something that is sqhvsew~ sew~), that which is pure and perfectly the object of pure intellect ( a[ neu aijsqhv discernible and not simply an object of uncertain and imperfect opinion opinion (dovxa xa).3 These are all distinctive features that match the ideas of pure understanding and pure reason. But But he explains ex plains gignovmenon menon (that is, the empirical, which has arisen through through experience) through through that which is only an object of opinion opinion and something independent of ideas, and, what’s more, even an intuition that contradicts the ideas (ajlov lovgou gou). (The ideas, among which Plato understands the pure concepts of the power of representation, contradict contradict intuition, i ntuition, insofar as they lie outside outsi de the sphere of intuition, and do not in the least belong under the objects of intuition. Intuition itself, considered as such, is independent of all ideas.) menon kai; ajpolluv polluvmenon, menon, uJp’ aijtiv tivou ou tino;~ The other principle is: pa` n gignovmenon ejx ajnavgkh~ gkh~ givgnesqai gnesqai [Everything that comes to be, of necessity comes to be by some cause] (28a). That Plato Plato only ascribes perfection ( to; kalov kalov n) to that which exists independently of all experience and sensibility, is evident on the basis of the following tou a] n oJ dhmiourgo; dhmiourgo;~ pro;~ to; kata; kata; tauj taujta; ta; e[ con blevpwn pwn aj eiv, sentence. He writes, writes , o{tou
toiouvtw/ tw/ tini; tini; proscrw; proscrw;meno~ meno~ paradeivgmati, gmati, th; n ijdev devan kai; duv duv namin namin aujtou` tou` aj ajperpergavzhtai, zhtai, kalo; n ejx aj navgkh~ gkh~ ou{tw~ ajpotelei` potelei`sqai sqai pa`n. ou| d d’ a] n ei~ to; gegonov gegonov~, ~, gennhtw` / paradeiv paradeivgmati gmati proscrwvmeno~, meno~, ouj kalo; kalo; n [Now so long as the craftsman keeps looking to what’s in a self-same condition, using some such thing as a model, and fashions its look and power, then of necessity everything brought to a finish in this way is beautiful; but if he should look to what has come to be, using a begotten model, the thing isn’t beautiful] (28a–b).
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At this point it is already presupposed that the demiurgos had an ideal before b efore his eyes according to which he brought forth the world. If this ideal were to be an eternal one, something not brought into being, i.e., if it were to be a pure ideal, ide al, independent of all sensibility, sensibility, then the work which he modeled on it must be perfect, perfec t, since all perfection perfect ion is in accordance accordance with ideals. If, on the contrary, the world were an imitation of a sensible image, then it would have to be something thoroughly imperfect and unruly, unruly, since since the character of the sensible is unrulinness. The next question quest ion is at 28b: “is the world eternal or does it have a beginning? beg inning?”” gonen. oJrgato; rgato;~ ga;r aJptov ptov~ tev ejsti sti kai; sw` sw`ma ma e[ cwn, pav nta de; ta; ta; The answer: gevgonen.
toiau`ta ta aijsqhtav sqhtav, ta; de; aij aijsqhtav sqhtav, dovxh perilhpta; meta; meta; aij aijsqhsew~, sqhsew~, gignovmena mena kai; gennhta; gennhta; ej fav nh [It has come to be; for it is visible and touchable and has a body, and all such things are sensed; and things that are sensed, since they’re grasped by opinion accompanied by sensation, came to light as coming to be and begott b egotten]. en]. This follows from the concepts already set forth above, since all that is xh, ajisqhvsei sei) is genhtov n. (Inknowable through experience and perception ( dovxh, cidentally, from this we can see why Plato explains original matter as something invisible.) tovde de d’ ou\ pavlin lin ejpiskeptev piskeptevon on peri; aujtou` tou`, pro;~ povteron teron tw` n paradei paradeigmav gmavtwn twn oJ mus t go back again agai n and investigate i nvestigate tektainovmeno~ meno~ aujto; to; n ajpeirgav peirgavzeto zeto . . . [So one must the following about the all: to which of the two models the builder looked when he fashioned it . . .] (28c–29a). (28c–29a) . (Here we see once more that it is assumed that t hat the maker of the t he world would have to have fashioned the world according to an ideal, since the question is simply: pro;~ povteron fort h.) povteron teron, and so forth.) teron pro;~ to; kata; kata;
taujta; ta; kai; kai; wJsauv sauvtw~ tw~ e[ con, h] pro; pro;~ to; gegonov gegonov~. ~. eij me; n dhv kalov kalov~ ejstin stin o{de de oJ kovsmo~ smo~ o{ te te dhmiourgo;~ ajgaqov gaqov~, ~, dh`lon lon wJ~ pro;~ to; aj aj i>idion >dv ion e[blepen: blepen: eij de; de; mh mh 4 (o} mhd mhd ’ eijpei` pei` n tini; qevmi~) mi~) pro;~ to; gegonov gegonov~. ~. panti; dh; dh; safe; safe;~, ~, ti pro;~ to; aj ajividion. vd> ion. oJ me; me; n ga;r kavllisto~ llisto~ tw` n gegonovtwn, twn, oJ d’ a[risto~ risto~ tw` n aijtiv tivwn. wn.5 o{ ou{tw tw dh; gegenhmev gegenhmev no~, pro;~ to; lov lovgw/ kai; kai; fronhvsei sei perilhpro; n kai; kai; kata; kata; tauj taujta; e[ e[ con dedhmiouvrghtai rghtai [. . . to the one that’s in a self-same condition and consistent, or to the one that has come to be. Now if this cosmos here is beautiful and its craftsman good, then it’s plain that he was looking lo oking to the one that’ t hat’s everlasting, everlasti ng, but if otherwise—which otherw ise—which isn’t isn’t even right for anyone to say—then to the one that has come to be. Now it’s clear to everyone that it was to the everlasting; for the cosmos is the most beautiful of things born b orn and its craftsman the best of causes. Now Now since that’s that’s how it has come to be, then it has been crafted with reference to that which is grasped by reason and prudence and is in a self-same condition] (28c–29b). (Thus, at this point to; kata; tauj taujta; ta; e[ e[ con is yet again parallel with lovgw/ gw/ kai; kai; fronhv fronhvsei sei perilhptov n. The latter is noteworthy because of the Platonic nou`~.)
Touvtwn twn de; uJparcov parcov ntwn au\ pa`sa sa aj navgkh gkh tov nde to; n kovsmon smon eijkov kov na tino;~ ei\ nai [Again, starting from these things, there’s every necessity that this cosmos here
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be the likeness of something] (29a–b). It is at this point that Plato first comes to the principle that the world would have to be the imitation of some kind of archetype. Since Plato makes the world subordinate to the extent that he does, insofar as it was visible ( mundum materialiter spectatum), and even attributes to it an existence that is merely present to the senses ( aijsqhvsei, dovxh)—and since he views it therefore (as a mere object of the senses) as entirely heterogeneous to all forms—he could not possibly view the form of the world in its regularity and lawfulness as inherent in matter itself, nor as a form that was brought forth from matter. He must have held that this form of the world is in its essence something wholly other and distinct from all matter. Accordingly, he locates it in the intellect, and describes it as something to be grasped only by the understanding ( lovgw/ kai; fronhvsei perilhptov n); and because he could find the cause of this connection between form (pevra~) and matter ( a[peiron) neither in the one nor in the other alone, nor in both together (for he saw these [regularity and unruliness] as two things constantly striving against one other), therefore some third was necessary (see the Philebus) that unified each with the other, or, in other words, “gave to the world a form, which was an imitation of the original, pure form of the understanding.” “What moved the maker of the world to bring it forth?”
ajgaqo;~ h\ n, ajgaqw` / de; oujdei;~ peri; oujdeno;~ oujdevpote ejggivgnetai fqov no~. touvtou d’ ejkto;~ w[ n, pav nta o{ ti mavlista genevsqai ejboulhvqh paraplhvsia eJautw` / (an idea that never occurred to Moses or the Jews)
boulhqei;~ ga;r oJ qeo;~ ajgaqa; me; n pav nta, flau`ron dev mhde; n ei[ nai kata; duv namin, ou{tw dh; pa`n, o{son h\ n oJrato; n, paralabw; n, ouj c hJsucivan apgonajllav kinouvmenon plhmmelw`~ kai; ajtavktw~, eij~ tavxin aujto; h[gagen ejk th`~ ajtaxiva~, hJghsavmeno~ ejkei` no touvtou pav ntw~ a[meinon [Good was he, and in one who is good there never arises about anything whatsoever any grudge; and so being free of this, he willed that all things should come to resemble himself as much as possible. . . . For since he wanted all things to be good and, to the best of his power, nothing to be shoddy, the god thus took over all that was visible, and, since it did not keep its peace but moved unmusically and without order, he brought it into order from disorder, since he regarded the former to be in all ways better than the latter] (Tim. 30a). The purest and most magnificent idea of God’s intent in the creation of the world.—At this point the pre-existing original matter of the world is presupposed. It is presented as something restless, moving without order or regularity, because it has not yet been imparted with the form of the understanding. Should the oujk hJsucivan a[gwn, kinouvmenon ajtavktw~ [that which did not keep its peace, but moved without order] be only an exhibition of unruliness AS SUCH made sensible ? qevmi~ de; oujt’ h\ n, ou[t’ e[sti to` / ajpivstw/ dra` / n a[llo plh; v to; kavlliston [And it was not right—nor is it right—for him who is best to do anything except that which is most beautiful] (Tim. 30a).
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Kalo;n expresses not only beauty, but perfection itself, complete ruliness. This is clearly evident in the following passage, since he locates Kalo; n utterly and exclusively in its participation in the form of the understanding. He says of the demiurgos: logisavmeno~ ou\ n eu{risken ejk tw`n kata; fuvsin oJratw` n oujde; n aj nov hton tou` ov u` n e[ conto~ o{lon o{lou kavllion e[sesqai pot’ e[rgon [so, once he did some calculating, he discovered that of all things visible by nature, nothing unintelligent will ever be a more beautiful work, comparing wholes with wholes, than what has intellect] (Tim. 30b). What is meant here is namely: the demiurgos deemed that no visible world ( ejk tw` n kata; fuvsin oJratw` n o}lon) lacking participation in the form of the understanding would be a work more beautiful than a world united with the form of the understanding ( nou` n e} con o}lon).6 nou` n d’ au\ cwri;~ yuch`~ ajduv naton paragenevsqai tw/. dia; dh; to; n logismo; n
tov nde, nou` n mev n ej n yuch`, yuch; n de; ejn swvmati sunista;~, to; pa` n xonektaiv neto, o{pw~ o{ ti kavlliston ei[ n kata; fuvsin a[ristov n te e[rgon ajpeirgasmev no~ [it’s impossible for intellect apart from soul to become present in anything. Through this calculation, then, by constructing intellect within soul and soul within body, he joined together the all so that he had fashioned a work that would be most beautiful and best in accordance with nature] (Tim. 30b). This first principle is also found at Philebus 30c.7 Plato thus presupposes the original world soul. According to all the passages gathered together by Pleßing (vol. 1, §§26, 27, 28),8 yuchv names nothing other than the original principle of motion, ajrch; kivnhsew~. (Compare this to Tennemann’s essay in Memorabilien.9) Because Plato regarded matter as something wholly heterogeneous to divine being, something entirely contradictory to the pure form of lawfulness in divine understanding, he presupposed that the present world received nothing from God except form. Now, insofar as the form that God imparted to the world refers only to the form of the movement of the world, the world must also have had its own original principle of motion, independently of God, which, as a principle that inheres in matter, contradicts all regularity and lawfulness, and is first brought within the bounds of lawfulness through the form ( pevra~) that the divine understanding gave to it. (B 28) The expression ‘motion’ is itself only one particular way of indicating the form of the alteration of the world as such ( species propria). yuchv is accordingly nothing other than the principle of alteration in the world as such. What is at issue in the sentence, nou` n cwri;~ yuch`~ oujdevpote paragignevsqai tw/ [it’s impossible for intellect to come into being without soul], means as much as: understanding has in and of itself no causality , such that if it were to become visible in something this can come to pass in no other way than when it is bound to some principle of actuality. (Compare the passage from the Philebus at 30c that was just introduced.)
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Since, according to Plato, the world soul was originally present in matter, yuchv in the following words, yuchv n de; ej n swvmati xunista;~, must not be understood as the original soul but rather as the soul already partaking in the form of the understanding.“He united the understanding with the (original) world soul, and this world soul (now with the understanding) with matter, and so on.” Plato now goes on to conclude: ou{tw~ ou\ n dh;, kata; lovgon to; n eijkovta, dei`
levgein, tov nde to;n kovsmon zw` /on e[myucon, e[ nnoun te th` ajlhqeiva/ dia; th; n tou` qeou` genevsqai prov noian [So then, in this way, keeping with the likely account, it must be said that this cosmos here in truth was born an animal having soul and intellect through the forethought of the god] (Tim. 30b). What Plato understands by zw` /on according to this passage is not difficult to judge. zw` /on, according to him, is what as such possesses an original power of movement ( yuchv n). (For nou`~ is not the necessary condition of yuchv, but rather the reverse.) But the world is called e[ nnou~ insofar as it partakes of the form of the understanding. Likewise, it is called o{lon aj nov hton and o{lon nou` n e[ con, among other things (30b). Now, since the visible world is an imitation of an ideal world, it follows that this ideal world must be grounded in the idea of a zwv /ou (a zw` /on nov hton). The world cannot be copied from of any particular kind of animal (since it is gev nhton ti). But the world is the imitation of a pure and ideal archetype, thus the imitation of that one idea of animal that grounds every particular genus and kind, that comprehends all genera and kinds, just as the visible world likewise contains all kinds of animals. 10 Plato assumes that every object that appears ( genhvtw/) is grounded in an idea, and that as such approximates the imitation of the idea. This idea grounds the genus as a whole, encompasses all particular kinds, and unawares is at arrived at by no individual. The visible world is thus grounded in a kovsmo~ nov hto~, namely, a world that does not exist physically as does the visible, since otherwise it would also be something emergent, empirical and knowable through experience. Rather, it is a world precisely insofar as it exists in the ideas (insofar as it is). This ideal world must encompass all individual determinations and parts of the visible world. In its idea there also must be contained an original principle of movement; /on e[myucon. At the same time it must it must also be present in the idea as a zw` hold within itself all the individual genera and kinds of creatures that the visible world contains, and grounding this world as an idea. It must hold within itself (as idea) all zw`a as nov hta. Whoever reads this passage in context will easily realize that it is completely /oi~ nov htoi~ Plato does not understand distorted in Pleßing’s version (§ 31). By zwv ideas in general (e.g., the ideas of quantity, cause and so on), but rather precisely the ideas that ground the creatures (zwv /oi~) of the visible world. He understands zw` /a—insofar as they are nov hta, namely, present in the idea—as creatures, just
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as he understands kovsmo~ novhto~ as the idea of the world, the world insofar as it is nov hto~, namely insofar as it is present in the idea. One has to distinguish in Plato two different kinds of ideas (something that, to my knowledge, has not yet taken place): (1) Those ideas that ground the world with respect to its materiality. (2) Those ideas that ground the world with respect to its form, that AS SUCH pertain to no particular objects at all. (For example, the idea of the good, of quantity, quality, causality, and so on.) The key to the explanation of the entirety of Platonic philosophy is noticing that Plato everywhere carries the subjective over to the objective . It is from this that the principle arose in Plato that the visible world is nothing but a copy of the invisible world (though this principle is present long before him). But no philosophy could have come from this principle, if the philosophical ground for it weren’t already in us. This means, namely, insofar as the whole of nature, as it appears to us, is not only a product of our empirical receptivity, but is rather actually the work of our power of representation—to the extent that this power contains within itself a pure and original foundational form (of nature)—and insofar as the world belongs in representation to a power that is higher than mere sensibility and nature is exhibited as the stamp of a higher world which the pure laws of this world express. The discovery of nature’s legislation as it is prescribed by pure understanding can prematurely lead one to the idea that the visible world is the stamp of one that is invisible, something that leads to fanaticism as soon as one extends this stamping to the intuitions (with regard to their matter [ Stoff ]), and to the extent that one then believes, with regard to the mere lawfulness of nature as such, that it has its ground in humanity itself. Plato now assumes: (1) That the world, with respect to its lawfulness, is an expression of a higher lawfulness. (2) That every living being [Wesen] of the world is grounded in an idea, which holds the character of the whole genus, without it being the case that the idea is ever completely arrived at through a particular kind of being. Had Plato assumed that every worldly being is grounded objectively in an invisible, albeit physically existing, grounding being that contains what is distinctive to its whole genus, this would have been fanaticism—that is, it would have been the carrying over of the merely sensible, of what merely belongs to the empirical intuition, onto the supersensible. But Plato is indeed constantly protesting against this very opinion; and it is astonishing that one for so long has wanted to foist upon him the concept of a physical existence precisely there where he most forcefully, most emphatically and most clearly makes evident his own opposition to this.
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Plato only accepted the ideas that grounded worldly beings to the extent that these ideas could be the object of pure thinking, the expression of the pure form of the power of representation. He thus had to accept the ideas that as such ground the objects only insofar as these are also dependent mediately or immediately upon the pure form of the understanding. If we recall his theory of the origin of the world, this becomes clear to us at once. Plato assumed, after all, a pre-existing matter, but one that had absolutely no determinate empirical form. For a proof of this see 51b–52a. Thus, according to his theory, insofar as all worldly beings were the work of the demiurgos, they did not belong to matter , but rather to the form with which the demiurgos brought it into unity. Matter in and of itself could not bring forth any zw` /a, for this was the work of the master builder of the world, who brought the form of the understanding into unity with matter, and thereby brought into being not only the universal lawfulness of nature but also the lawfulness of the individual products themselves. Or, to put it another way, he made the universal laws of nature harmonize with the productivity of the individual ordered products. Every individual worldly being was thus not the work of matter , but rather actually a product of the concordance of an individual pure law to a whole—that is, it was the work of an idea, a representation of the concordance of an individual pure law to a whole. Moreover, if this concordance of a pure law with the productivity of a whole takes place for its part according to rules, then the concordance of this law itself was for its part not a work of matter, but rather a work of a pure form of unity, a work of an intelligence. Furthermore, we have to remember that Plato viewed the entire world as a zw` /on, that is, as an organized being, thus as a being whose parts are possible only through their relation to the whole, whose parts are reciprocally related against each other as means and end, and thus which reciprocally bring themselves forth according to both their form and connectedness. 11 We must keep in mind that we, according to the subjective orientation of our power of knowing, simply cannot think the emergence of an organized being otherwise than through the causality of a concept or idea; we must think that everything that is contained within a being must be determined a priori and—just as the particular parts of the organized being bring themselves reciprocally in relation to each other and so bring forth the whole—on the contrary, the idea of the whole must be thought as determining a priori and in advance the form and parts in their harmony. 12 Plato could thus assume that the ideas ground natural beings; and it was even necessary for him to make such an assumption. But these ideas are, namely, also only ideas, that is, the ideas of natural beings, only zw` /a nov hta, only the originary images, in which reason comes to think itself, as if in outline, as the form that is in concordance with a whole and an end. It was one of Plato’s great ideas, and one which easily could have led him to flights of fancy, to seek the harmony of natural beings, not only in their relation
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to each other, but also in each individual as it relates to itself, and not along the path of empirical research, but in the investigation into the pure form of the power of representation. It is no wonder that he expressed himself with regard to this noble idea in a language that sailed far beyond all other philosophical language. No wonder that the work of his language is itself philosophically inspired; such a discovery of a supersensible principle of the form and harmony of the world in ourselves necessarily had to give rise to this inspiration. But precisely the inspired insight into this noble principle that lies beyond all sensibility caused him to express himself so strongly and forcefully, such that it really cannot be comprehended how one so often attributes to him the assertion of a physical existence of these ideas. For he directly presents the form of their existence in direct opposition to the form of all physical existence. Equally impressive to him had to be the observation that all natural beings, grounded in a concept in us, a concept that express the form of every individual object that belongs to that concept, are to be arrived at, however, not through an individual, but rather only through the genus. He was able to think such a concordance of all beings in one concept in no other way than through the causality of a concept as it intentionally grounds the artful knowing of the master builder of the world, but also as it is able to contain a universality that is sufficient for all in concreto individual presentations of this universality, yet without being wholly expressible by any one of them. Such a concept could not be the work of matter, but had to be the product of a pure form of the understanding, through which matter first became capable of exhibiting the concepts. This is elaborated in the passage cited by Pleßing in §46. For if the form of unity, which ultimately gathers together every object, was the original form of the divine understanding, then the concept of all individual objects in their universality had to be present in the divine understanding before the objects could be brought forth. A universal concept (even one in accord with pure rules independent of experience), at least as it is available to us in human understanding, can emerge only empirically. But insofar as Plato views all concepts as derivative in relation to a supreme intelligence, as the form of a highest understanding, in which the ideal of the world was grounded, he nevertheless had to regard these universal concepts as original concepts that are present prior to all experience. They do not first emerge through the objects of sensible intuition, but rather they themselves make sensible intuition first possible, because the individual objects of the world can only arise through the causality of the concepts that are already at hand, so that an empirical understanding through comparison and abstraction could again discover these concepts in the objects. The concepts had to be present in order to be able grant to objects some indication of their heritage and in order to leave a lasting mark of their origination. The universal concepts had to be present in a higher intelligence, because they were the condition of the possibility of universal
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law, according to which humans establish their empirical research. Plato says this clearly enough at Philebus 15d: “We notice,” says he, “that this form, the unity within the manifold, from time immemorial up until now has a commanding presence throughout all speeches and inquiries. This form, as something to think, will never cease to be, nor has it just now begun. Rather, it is an eternal, never altering quality of every inquiry. The youth who first discovers this kind of philosophizing is as joyful as if he had found a treasure trove of wisdom; his joy inspires him to take on gladly every inquiry, at times bringing together what he encounters into one concept, at other times dissolving and dividing all things.”13 According to Plato, the form of this inquiry would be a pure and original form without which no empirical inquiry would be possible. It would thus be a form which was also originally present in divine understanding, then imposed upon matter by the demiurgos, and imparted to human understanding as pure original form. This becomes clearer still in the following passage: “This form is a gift from the gods to humans which was once sent by Prometheus along with the purest fire of the heavens. For this reason the ancients (humans greater and nearer to the gods than us) also bequeathed to us the legend that from out of unity and manifold (the many) everything that ever was became present, in that it united within itself what is unbounded (a[peiron, the universal) and what is limited (to; pevra~, the particular): such that we also, with this arrangement of things, presuppose one idea for every object and ought to seek it out.14 The gods who instruct, instruct us to think, to learn, and to teach according to this” ( Philebus, 16c–e).15 The idea of the connection between the unity and the manifold, or the many, is the one dominant idea throughout all of Plato that he applies not only logically, but rather also as a natural concept (in these dialogues namely, for example, in the passage cited above). It is everywhere considered as one form that embraces of the whole of nature, and through its application upon formless matter not only are individual objects brought forth, but rather also the relation of objects to each other and their subordination to genera and kinds becomes possible. In all these ways Plato must hold that every object corresponds to an original idea in divine understanding. This idea embraces all the individual kinds, and can exist only insofar as it comes to be in divine understanding, not first through an abstraction from individual objects but rather by first making these objects possible. It can be only by being ungenerated, indestructible and utterly not subordinated to the form of time. 16 According to this, the world as a great zw`on would have to be grounded in an idea in divine understanding, an idea that would not only exhibit a particular genus or kind of organic being, but rather would be able to serve as the universal idea of all beings. Just as there is only one idea of the world, so too could there be
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only one visible world. (tw` / ga;r tw` n nooumev nwn kallivstw/ kai; kata; pav nta televw/ mavlist’ aujto; n oJ qeo;~ oJmoiw`sai boulhqeiv~ zw`on e} n oJratov n, pav nq’ o{sa aujtou` kata; fuvsin xuggenh` zw`a ej nto;~ e[ con eJautou` xunevsthsen [For since the god wanted to make it as similar as possible to the most beautiful things intellected and in all ways complete, he constructed it as an animal visible and one, holding within itself all those animals that are akin to it according to nature] [30d–31a]).) Here one can clearly see what Plato understands by the archetype that grounds the world. Namely, that it is nothing other than an idea. For only the idea of the world is necessarily one. But then Plato says that the visible world is a copy of the perfect archetype, and on account of this can be only one. In passing, he states what has already been assumed, that the archetype of the visible world is only one. However, had he not understood this to be an idea, then he could not have assumed it. For only the idea of the world necessarily imposes itself as the form of unity; the reason for this is that this idea itself only properly emerges through the form of absolute unity that is grounded in the power of representation. Precisely in this way, however, what once again becomes apparent is the carrying over of the subjective onto the objective that holds sway throughout the whole of Platonic philosophy. For the world is only properly a unity as a representation in us. This is because the subjective form of reason is everywhere ascending to absolute unity, and thus because every part of the world that can be considered as a particular world of reason ascending without hindrance to the unconditioned is likewise formed into a representation of the whole. That Plato’s reasoning arises from attending to the particular way our reason proceeds is evident from the following passage at 31a. Here he says, To; ga;r periev con pav nta ojpovsa nohta; zw`a meq’ ejtevrou deuvteron oujk a[ n pot’ e[ih [For that which embraces all the intelligible animals (however many they are) wouldn’t ever be second in company with another one]. (But this can only be said of the intelligible world insofar as it is present in the form of the power of representation, and thus it can only be said of the idea of the world.) pavlin (alioquin) ga;r a[ n e{teron ei\ nai to; peri; ejkeiv nw/ devoi zw`on, ou| mevro~ a] n ei[thn ejkeivnw/ [for again there would have to be another animal surrounding them both, of which both would be a part]. (A completely straightforward description of the procedure of reason, clear evidence that Plato / only speaks of an idea of the world.) kai; oujk a]n e[ti ejkeiv noin, ajll’ ejkeiv nw/ tw` periev conti, tovd’ a] n aj fwmoiwmevnon levgoito ojrqovteron [and then this cosmos would be more correctly spoken of as copied no longer from those two but from that other one which embraced them] (31a). (Again, a description of the way in which reason subjectively generates the idea of the world.)
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* * *
Yet the individual ideas of individual genera are still just as readily able to be bound to the general idea of the world as such. Plato expresses this at 39e: “God intuited a manifold of ideas in the idea of the zw`on as such.”17 But Plato never asserts that each individual in the world is to have its own individual idea. Rather, he only grants to each particular genus of objects a grounding idea which, precisely because it is in fact the idea of the genus, also does ground each individual object (individuum). One can see what he means most clearly at 39e, where he says,
h|per ou\ n nou`~ ej nouvsa~ ijdeva~ tw` / o} e[sti zw`on, oi|ai te e[ neisi kai; o{sai kaqora` /, toiauvta~ kai; tosauvta~ dienohvqh dei` n kai; tovde (to; gev nhton zw`on) scei` n [So just as intellect sees looks of whatever sorts and however many that are in the Animal that is, those sorts and that many he thought this animal {the one which came into being—trans.} must have]. (Now insofar as the ideas contained within the / o[ nti] zw`on were intuited by the understanding at all—to the extent and ideal [tw` in the manifold ways in which it did intuit them—precisely to this extent, namely to the same degree and in the same way, the visible zw`on should also contain the imitations of those archetypes.) He clarifies this point more precisely in this way: eijsi; de; tevttare~ (idevai), miva me; n oujrav nion qew` n gev no~ (stars), a[llh de; pthno; n kai; aj eropovron, trivth de; e[ nudron ei`do~, pezo; n de; kai; cersai`on tevtarton [Now the form of these looks are four: one the heavenly kind to gods belong, another the winged airborne kind, a third the water-dwelling form, and the form that’s footed and land-living fourth.] One thus sees that what is at issue is here is only the genera, only the ideas as concepts of genera. Now since nothing visible and tangible comes into being without fire and something dense (a[ neu tino;~ stereou`), the basic material constitutive parts are fire and earth (31b). As a binding medium he made use of both fire and water (32b). filivan te e[scen ejk touvtwn (to; pavn), w{st’ eij~ tauto; n aujt / w` xunelqo; n, a[louton uJpov tou` xundhvsanto~ (qeou`) genevsqi [from them came to have friendship, so that having come together with itself in self-sameness, it was born indissoluble by none other save him who bound it together] (32c). God entirely incorporates these elements into the world, mevro~ oujde; n oujdeno;~ oujde; duvnamin e[xwqen uJpolipwv n, because (1) the world is the most perfect all-encompassing zw`on, and because (2) there should be only one (and thus nothing should be lef t behind from which a new world might emerge), and finally, (3) so that thereby the order of the world would be neither disrupted nor destroyed by external forces. dia; dh;
th; n aijtivan kai; to; n logixmo;n tov nde e} n o{lon ejx aJpav ntwn tevleon kai; ajghvrwn kai; a[ noson aujtov n ejtekthv nato [Through this very cause and calculation he built it to be this one whole of all wholes taken together, perfect and free of old age and disease] (33a).
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Kai; sch`ma ( formam) de; e[dwken aujt /w` to; prevpon kai; xuggenev~. tw` / de; ta; pav nt’ ej n auJt `w/ zw`a periev cein mevllonti zwvw/, prevpon a] n ei[ n sch`ma to; perieilhfo;~ ej n aujt /w` pav nta ojpovsa schvmata. dio; kai; sfairoeidev~, ejk mevsou pavnth prov~ ta;~ teleutav~ i[son ajpev con, kuklotere;~ aujto; ejtorneuvsato, pav ntwn telewvtaton oJmoiovtatov n te aujto; ejautw` / schmavtwn [But for the animal that is to embrace within itself all animals, the fitting figure would be the one that has embraced all figures within itself, however many there are; so for this reason too, he worked it in circular fashion, sculpting it into the form of a sphere, the figure that keeps itself in all directions equidistant from its center to its extremities and which, of all figures, is the most perfect and most similar to itself, since he considered that similar is vastly more beautiful than dissimilar] (33b). Concerning the movement of the world, he gave to it a tw` n ejpta (kinhsevwn) th; n peri; nou` n kai; frov nhsin mavlista . . . ou\san [that motion among the seven kinds that especially attends intellect and prudence] (34a), that is, that particular kind of movement which, within the seven kinds of movement, is most akin to the understanding. (How did Plato arrive at that point where he regarded the different forms and relations in space to be always tethered to an idea? For example, the spherical forms as those most similar to the divinity, and circular movement as that which is most akin to the understanding—so that in this way the human face was also arrived at? Without doubt because he encountered all spatial configurations as resting upon ideas, and because of the lofty ideas he had for a science created from the power of representation alone with no recourse to experience, 18 and finally because he regarded all ideas as related to one another,19 and thus also regarded the forms of space as something formally related to divine nature and in general to everything ideal ( nou`~, frov nhsi~). ta;~ de; e}x ajpavsa~ kinhvsei~ (tw` / pav nti) aj fei`len kai; ajplane;~ ajpeirgavsato ejkeiv nwn [He took away from it all the other six motion and fashioned it free their wanderings] (34a). (See Ficino: ab eorum errore et pervagatione penitus liberavit). What is important at this point about the world soul is that it was older than the body of the world and that the Demiurgos bound it together with the body in order to rule over it. (thv n) kai; genevsei kai; ajreth` protevran kai; presbutevran
yuch; n swvmato~, wJ~ despovtin kai; a[rxousan ajrxomev nou, sunesthvsato (oJ dhmiourgov~) [He, however, constructed soul, as prior to the body in both birth and excellence and as its elder, since she was to be mistress and ruler of body, and it was to be ruled] (34c). How the two kinds were bound together he presents in this way: “From out of the indivisible and unchangeable oujsiva (the world soul) and from out of the divisible corporeal matter he (the demiurgos) mixed a third kind of substance that stands in the middle between both. Since each resisted the other, because the one is at all times the same and the other is thoroughly of such a kind as to be different (to; ajmere;~—to; meristo; n—t’aujto; duvsmikton), he forced them together with violence, and mixed this material that had been forced
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together once again with the meristo; n and the ajmere;~ and brought forth from this kind a whole” 20 (35a).21 Plato now further describes the different proportions according to which God built the world, a harmony that is never to be understood by us! The world-soul was dispersed throughout the entire universe. He set it in the middle from out of which it spread itself out over the whole. ejk mevsou pro;~ to; n e[scaton oujrano; n pav nth diaplakei`sa, kuvklw te aujto; n (to; n oujrano; n) e[xwqen perikaluv yasa, aujthv te ej n aujth` stpefomev nh, qeivan ajrch; n h[rxato ajpauvstou kai; d[mfrono~ bivou pro;~ to; n xuvmpanta crov non—qeivan [and once she had been woven in every direction from center to the outermost heaven and had covered it in a circle from the outside as with a veil, she herself turned within herself and began a divine beginning of a life unceasing and thoughtful and for all time] (36e), as well as at 34b: dia; pav nta dh; tau`ta ej hdaivmona qeo; n (uiJon qeo< u>?) aujto; n (to; n kosmon) ejgennhvsato [For all these very reasons, he begat it a happy god]. With regard to the communicating of the form of the understanding , Plato now expresses himself in this way: kai; to; me; n dh; sw`ma ojrato; n oujranou` gevgonen, aujth; de; ajorv ato~ me; n, logismou` de; metev cousa, kai; aJrmoniva~ yuchv . . . tw` n gennhqev ntwn [And while the heaven’s body was born visible, soul herself was invisible and partook of calculation and attunement—she, the best of begotten things, born by the best of things intelligible and which are always] (37a). Thus we find nothing about the communicating of a substance to the world-soul, but rather only a communicating of the logismov~ (that is not a communicating of the lovgo~, of the understanding, but rather of that which is the product of the understanding, namely, the form of the understanding) and the communicating of the aJrmoniva tw` n nohtw`n to the world-soul (a communicating of a form of unity proper to the intelligible world). Plato goes on to describe the efficacy of the rational world-soul as entirely analogous with efficacy of human reason. For this reason, he says that the worldsoul, insofar as it is put together out of the divisible and the indivisible , separates on its own the mere objects of sensibility (ta; gignovmenav) and those of intelligibility (ta; kata; taj uta e[ conta aj eiv). He presents the whole efficacy of the world-soul in a sensible manner as a circular movement. On the one hand, insofar as the world-soul is put together from out of the divisible, opinion and belief come to be (dovxa kai; pivsti~) when its circular efficacy is related to something sensible, and, on the other hand, insofar as the world-soul is related to something intelligible (logikov~), understanding and science come to be ( nou`~ kai; ejpisthvmh ). This is completely in accord with what he says about the human soul, namely, that this receives only dovxa~ through sensible objects. Thus, the world-soul, insofar as it is related to such things, is able to bring forth nothing other than dovxa~, whereas through ideas it achieves science, and thus generates this science only to the extent that it participates in the ideas. 22
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JW~ de; kinhqevn aujto; kai; zw` n ehnenov hse tw` n djikivwn qew` n gegono;~ a[galma oJ gennhvsa~ pathvr . . . te kai; euj franqei;~ e[ti dh; ma`llon m{moion pro;~ to; para vdeigma ejpenov hsen ajpergavsasqai [And when the father who begat it noticed that it was moved and living—a sanctuary born for the everlasting gods—he rejoiced in it, and, being well-pleased, thought of fashioning it to be still more similar to its model] (37c). It does not yet follow from this passage with certainty that Plato called the ideas ajidivou~ qeou` `~ [everlasting gods] (Pleßing §32). For, insofar as he also presented the ideas as products of a divine intelligence, he was able to designate the world formed according to the ideas not only the image of the ideas, but rather also the image of the eternal gods. Furthermore, Plato also repeatedly calls the stars qeou`~ (among which the earth is also included), for example at 39e, just as he called in the above passage the world as such qeo; n. The qeoi; aj idivoi can thus be the ideas of the body of the world which God imitated during the production of the stars, and which he called qeou`~ ajidivou~, not because they were ideas, but because they were the ideas of the stars, which he calls qeou`~, just as above he named the ideas of all living beings zw`a nohvta, not as ideas, but rather as ideas of living beings. (See Tiedemann, Argumenta Platonis, p. 317.) pro;~ to; paravdeigma—this again refers to the ideal archetype of the world according to which it was brought forth— kaqavper ou\ n aujto; tugcav nei zw`on ajid` ion o[ n, kai; tov de to; pa`n ou{tw~ eij~ duv namin ejpeceivrhse toiou`ton ajpotelei` n [And just as the model happens to be an everlasting Animal, so too did he attempt as far as possible to bring this all to a similar perfection] (37d). That ideal archetype was eternal, because in Plato whatever is an object of pure reason (namely, whatever comes under the form of necessity and unchangeability) is eternal . This is further proof that he could not have held that these paravdeigma were physically existing, since he only explicitly distinguishes two kinds of existence, the pure and the physical. Under the category of the latter, however, he cannot have placed the archetype of the world, for the simple reason that he takes this archetype to be eternal, whereas he explains all that exists physically to be genh`ton, as we shall see directly. “Plato, however, still had to accept a third kind of existence, a real but still pure existence, as with, for example, the existence of god.”23 The concept of existence, as soon as it is applied to supersensible—be it applied to ideas or objects, to the extent that these exist beyond their ideas—loses all physical significance and obtains one that is merely logical. The idea of the existence of supersensible (real) objects coincides with the idea of the existence of mere ideas. The concept of existence applied to the idea of God is an abyss for human reason—either reason loses itself the most extreme and reckless fanaticism or it does not manage to take one step beyond the bounds of the idea. For in that moment in which reason wants to extend the idea and attach to it something
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other than a logical determination, reason then necessarily also restricts the idea, because it has no form for the concept of existence other than the one which is kept within the bounds of nature, and so remains forever inadequate to every supersensible concept. Plato, who penetrated so deeply into the human spirit, albeit only through a kind of intimation—yet nevertheless deeply enough—and who had more deeply and more thoroughly than any other ancient philosopher attained an insight into reason insofar as it is the mother of the ideas, had in his abiding life in the world of ideas found the concept of existence everywhere much too narrow for the full range of the ideas. This is not simply speculation, for he explicitly states that every kind of existence, with the exception of those which are present for pure reason, amounts to nothing when applied to the ideas—and he says this not only with regard to the ideas as the forms of reason but rather also with regard to the ideals (of the objects of the ideas that are beyond these ideas). Thus, he says, for example, the human soul as noumenon is similar to the idea with respect to its existence. Accordingly, he knew no concept of existence like the one that resides in pure thinking, a concept which is as appropriate to the real objects of the supersensible world as it is to the ideal objects. As carefully as one may wish to proceed, it is not possible to decide whether Plato did not attribute to the ideas the kind of existence which he attributed to God and the human soul (as noumenon), or whether he had attributed to them a merely logical existence. But even so, one would be no further ahead in this way, for both concepts collapse into one. There is no existing object of the supersensible world that, with regard to its existence, might allow one to proceed any further than to that point where one arrives at an existence that is, once again, ideal .
hJ me; n ou\ n tou` zwvou fuvsi~ sjtuvgcanen ou\sa aijw nio~. v kai; tou`to me; n dh; tw` / gennhtw/ ` pantelw`~ prosavptein, oujk h\n dunatov n. eijkw; d ’ ejpinoie` kinhtov n tina aijw no~ ` (aeternitatis) poih`sai, kai;, diakosmw` n a{ma oujrano; n, poiei`, mevnonto~ aijw no~ ` ej n eJni;, kat’ ajriqmov n ijou`san aijwvnion eijkov na, tou`ton, o} n dh; crov non wj nomavkamen [Now to be sure, the nature of the Animal happened to be eternal, and in fact it was just this feature that it wasn’t possible to attach perfectly to that which is begotten. So he proceeded to think of making a certain moving likeness of eternity; and just as he’s putting heaven in an array he makes of eternity, which abides in unity, an eternal likeness that goes according to number, that very thing we have named time] (37d). According to its material form the world cannot possibly be an image of eternity. This can be only a pure form, on account of which Plato now explains time precisely in that he presents it as a copy of eternity. Time is an image of eternity only to the extent that it is only through time that the question of eternity is possible; but as the form to which we are bound time itself unceasingly hinders the answering of this question. Later it becomes clear, however, that by aijw nv Plato does not mean the pure form of time in us that is not yet applied to appearances,
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although there has to be something like this, precisely so that it can then first be applied to appearances. Time, to the extent that succession is in it (that is, to the extent that it is applied to appearance), is ei[kwn of the idea of time. To the extent that it is not at all applied to appearances, it only knows ei\nai.
hJmevra~ ga;r kai; nuvkta~ kai; mh` na~ kai; ej niautou;~ oujk o[ nta~ pri; n oujrano; n genevsqai, tovte a[ma ejkeiv nw/ xunistamev nw/ th; n gev nesin aujtw` n mhcana`tai. tau`ta de; pav nta mevrh crov nou, kai; to;, t’ h\ n, to;, t’ e[stai, crov nou genonovta eijdh, a{ dh; fevronte~ lanqav nomen ejpi; thv n ajivdion aujsivan [For since there were no days and night and months and years before heaven was born, he contrives their birth to come about just when heaven was constructed. All these are parts of time, and “was” and “will be” are forms of time that have come to be—exactly those forms which, without noticing it, we incorrectly apply to everlasting Being] (37e). Succession in time begins only with the beginning of a substratum (oujk o[ nta~ pri; n oujrano; n genevsqai) and, insofar as time is a form of our intuition only to the extent that we perceive succession, only to this extent can one say that there was no time before the world or some substratum was present. Yet Plato seems to be acquainted with a mere ei\ nai of time that is wholly independent of our intuition and that has nothing to do with succession. For he says only that years, months and the like began with the world. But one relates the form of succession as such quite improperly to time itself as an idea, without having an inkling of it, and about which one is able only to say: it is. (oujk ojrqw`~. levgomen ga;r dh; wj~ h] n e[sti
te kai; e[stai, th` de; to; e[sti mov non kata; to;n ajlhqh` lovgon proshvkei. to; de; h\n, tov, t’ e[stai, peri; th; n ej n crov nw/ gev nesin ijou`san prevpei levgesqai [For this is just what we say—“it was,” and “it is” and “it will be.” But “is” alone is suited to it, in keeping with the true account, whereas “was” and “will be” are fittingly said of becoming, which goes on in time] [38a].) Thus Plato maintains that there is a form of time independent of all succession of matter—a pure time-form about which one can only say that it is and the determinations of which one must not confuse with the determinations of time as it is applied to matter. to; gavr h\ n, tov, ’ e[stai, peri; th; n ej n crov nw/ gev nesin ijou`san prevpei levgesqai. kinhvsei~ gavr
ejston to; de; aj ei; kata; taujta; e[ con ajkinhvtw~ ou[te presbuvteron ou[te newvteron proshvkei givgnesqai dia; pote;, oujde; gegonev nai nu` n oujd ’eijsau`qi~ e[sesqai [But “is” alone is suited to it, in keeping with the true account, whereas “was” and “will be” are fittingly said of becoming, which goes on in time—for both are motions, but it isn’t suitable for that is always in the same unmoving condition to be in the process of becoming either older or younger through time, nor suitable that it ever became so, nor that it has become so now] (38a). Plato thus distinguishes the idea of time (to; kata; taujta; e[ con) from time, to the extent that time appears in the succession of matter. It can be said that there is a pure and simple form of time present in us in which neither change nor succession take place, because these namely are only generated through intuition. As long as the form of time is
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not applied to phenomena, it knows no succession.—Plato’s understanding of eternity , however, is now elucidated. It is nothing other than the pure time-form in us that is not yet applied to appearances, and that therefore is only acquainted with succession (to; h\ n tov t’ e[stai) when it is applied to appearances. All successions are only parts of time to that extent that time is a mere imitation of the pure time-idea, which as such knows no change ( crov nou aijw nav ` te mimoumev nou kai; kat’ ajriqmo; n kukloumev nou ei[dh [these were born as forms of time, which imitates eternity and circles around according to number] (38a). That is to say, these successions are nothing other than parts of the time-form insofar as this is applied to appearances (since independently of appearances there is no succession in time). The pure time-form only is. Plato makes use of the ei\ nai here again precisely in the primary sense in which he uses it elsewhere, and maintains in this connection precisely in order to make his meaning more clear that ei\ nai cannot be used with regard to appearances. He says clearly enough that it would be false to say that what happens is a happening, and so on, since in all such expressions what is at issue is just as nothing as change, since against this only proper (unchanging) being can be predicated of the ideas. (kai; pro;~ touvtoi~ e[ti
ta; toiavde, tov te gegono;~ ei\ nai gegono;~, kai; to; gignovmenon ei\ nai gignovmenon. e[ti de; to; genhsovmenon ei] nai genhsovmenon, kai; to; mh; o] n, mh; o]n ei\ nai. w| n oujde;n aj cribe;~ levgomen [and there are further expressions besides the ones we mentioned: “what has become is become,” and “what is becoming is becoming,” and “what is not is not”—none of which we say with precision] (38b).) This entire passage concerning time can thus aid in the determination of the meaning that Plato ties to the oujsiva of ideas. Crov no~ d’ ou\ n met’ oujranou` gevgonen. The sense in which this is said can now be grasped easily, namely, that time, insofar as it is at all genh`ton ti, is simultaneously emergent with the world, that is, time, insofar as it is intuited in appearances, but not insofar as it is the pure form of intuition—since it can never be said of this that it has emerged. * * *
At 46c in the Timaeus, Plato comes to speak of the properties of quality. This passage can be elucidated by the passage already cited from the Philebus. In this passage Plato maintains namely that the world arose through the combining of the elements, insofar as these are a[peira, that is, insofar as they only stand under the category of quality with the form of the understanding that he names pevra~, and by which he understands quantity, and every other determination of the pure form of the power of representation. Now he says that the properties of quality, insofar as they inhere originally in the elements, are only xunaivtia, not ai[tia tw` n pav ntwn, that is, that they were
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co-efficacious in the emergence of the world, or as he expressed it before, God as server ( uJphretountwn) put them into service in order to present the idea of the good (through the world) as perfectly as possible. He thus states explicitly what he also says in the Philebus, that that there must still be some third, through which the elements are to be determined in order to contribute toward the realization of the ideas in the world. According to the Philebus this third must be an ai[tia, and precisely an ai[tia that possesses intelligent self-activity. Thus, these properties of quality that inhere in matter originally (heat, cold, liquid, and so on) and that according to the physical cosmogony of the ancient Greeks had formed the world, could not have been a cause of the world, since they are incapable of the understanding (as effective force) and would have to have obtained the form of understanding externally. For understanding is only possible in a soul. This is, however, something utterly invisible. But fire, water, air, and earth at least became visible (even if they nevertheless in the beginning were able to be invisible, they are still capable of the forms of sensible intuition). Accordingly, Plato says that one must distinguish sharply between two kinds of cause, those that by means of the activity of the understanding bring forth the form of the beautiful and the good ( o{sai meta; nou` kalw` n kai; aj gaqw` n dhmiourgoi; [those which, with the aid of intellect, are craftsmen of things beautiful and good]), and the other which without understanding and orderliness acts according to chance (o{sai monwqei`sai fronhvsew~ to; tuco; n a[takton eJkavstote ejxergavzontai [on the other side those which, bereft of prudence, produce on each occasion a disordered chance effect] (47e)).24 * * *
According to Plato, all things, including what is in the human body, are related to purpose. The entire human body is for him constructed only so that the order of the world can be wondered at and, through a vision of the movement of the heavens, properly human understanding can be brought closer to the image of divine understanding. Plato calls the movement of the heavens ta;~ tou` nou periodou~ [the circuits of intellect] (47c), insofar as it is based upon the form of human understanding. 25 The intuition of these movements, says Plato, should promote in accordance with them the development of the activity of our understanding (according to its form). touvtou legesqw par’ hJmw` n, au{ta; ejpi; tau`ta aijtiva/ qeo; n hJm n i` aj neurei` n, dwrh vsasqaiv te opyin, na i{ ta;~ ej n oujranw` / katidov nte~ tou` ov u` periovdou~ crhsaivmeqa ehpi; ta;~ perifora;~ ta;~ th`~ par’ hJm n i` dianohvsw~, xuggenei`~ ejkeiv nai~ ou[sa~, ajtarktoi~ tataragmev na~, ejkmaqov nte~ de; kai; logismw` n,26 kata; fuvsin, ojrqovthto~ metascov nte~, mimouvmenoi ta;~ tou` qeou` pav ntw~ ajplanei`~ ou[sa~, ta;~ ej n hJm n i` peplanhmevna~ katasthsaivmeqa [For our part let it be said that this is the cause
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and these the reasons for which god discovered vision and gave it to us as a gift: in order that, by observing the circuits of intellect in heaven, we might use them for the orbits of the thinking within us, which are akin to those, the disturbed to the undisturbed; and, by having thoroughly learned them and partaken of the natural correctness in their calculations, thus imitating the utterly unwandering circuits of the god, we might stabilize the wander-stricken circuits in ourselves] (47b–c). Similarly, he says that God gave us hearing and speech in order to bring harmoniously to unity the activity of our soul. See Pleßing §134 and following. o{son t’ au\ mousikh`~ fwnh` crhsimo; v pro;~ ajkoh; n, e{ neka aJrmoniva~ ejsti; doqev n. hJ de;
aJrmoniva, xuggenei`~ e[ cousa fora;~ tai`~ ij n hJm n i` th`~ yuch`~ periovdoi~, tw` / meta; nou` proscrwmev nw/ Mouvsai~, oujk ej f’ (B 49) hJdonh; n a[logon, kaqavper nu` n, ei\ nai docei` crhvsimo~, ajll ’ejpi; th; n gegonui`an ej n hJm n i` aj navrmoston yuch`~ periodon, eij~ katakovsmhsin kai; sumfwnivan eJauth` xuvmmaco~ . . . ejpidea`, gignomev nhn ej n toi`~ pleivstoi~ e{xin, ejpivkouro~ ejpi; tau`ta uJpo; tw` n aujtw`n ejdovqh [As much of music as, through its sound, is useful for hearing, this much was given to us for the sake of attunement. And attunement, which has coursings akin to the circuits in our soul, has been given by the Muses to him who makes use of the Muses with his intellect—not for the purpose of our irrational pleasure (which is what it’s now thought to be useful for), but as an ally to the circuit of the soul within us once it’s become untuned, for the purpose of bringing the soul into arrangement and concord with herself. Again, because the condition becomes unmeasured in us and deficient in grace for most, rhythm too was given to us by those same Muses as our companion in arms for the same reason] (47d–e). Plato now turns to necessity which, as he puts it, was at work in the emergence of the world, and to the prior existing elements and the way in which these elements were co-efficacious in the emergence of the world. The basic principle assumed by Plato here is: Memigmev nh hJ tou`de kovsmou gev nesi~ ejx ahnavgkh~ te kai; nou` sustavsew~ ejgennhvqh [For mixed indeed was the birth of this cosmos here, and begotten from a standing together of necessity and intellect] (48a). The relation both of these hold to each other in the bringing forth of the world is thus expressed by Plato in a manner that is entirely figurative: The understanding (namely, the form of understanding) came to dominate over blind necessity (precisely because the pure form of the understanding is unchangeable and cannot take its direction from matter, but rather, on the contrary, matter makes itself subservient), by persuading matter to bring everything that is generated as much as possible to the most excellent form. In this way the world is said to have emerged.27 (Why Plato allowed himself to make use of precisely the image of persuasion is not easy to see. Perhaps because he was not able to think a causality lying in the form of the understanding itself that is related to raw matter?
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And thus relied upon a personification of the receptacle in which he was able to make use of a mediating expression?) Regarding the emergence of the world Plato had already previously distinguished (1) the archetype that grounds the world ( paravdeigma nov hton, kai; ajei; kata; tau`ta o[ n) and (2) the imitating of this archetype through the visible world (mivmhma paradeivgmaro~ gev nesin e[con kai; oJratov n) (49a). Now he speaks of a third, the matter of the world , that was presupposed by the second. Is this constituted out of the elements? “What ARE THESE?” Plato asks. The answer is: no element is immutable— what’s more, one notices a continual transition from one to the other—for example, water becomes stone through cold, stone again turns to water through warmth, and water becomes air through heat, but again, through heat this becomes fire, and from out this in turn air emerges which, when thickened, brings forth rain and clouds, from out of which water emerges anew, and so on. Thus, we notice a constant cycle of the elements. 28 Who could, without fear of being refuted in the next moment, be able to give to one of the elements a particular name? Who can say: this is fire and this water! (One see that Plato speaks of an empirical and special alterability of the elements [see the passages from the Philebus and from the Miscellania that have already been cited], an alterability that inheres in the elements not only insofar as they are empirical objects as such and are opposed to the intelligible objects: rather, he speaks here of a special empirical alterability of the elements.) Most certainly, he goes on to say, one expresses oneself about this in this way: that which is continually appearing in various forms but which appears usually as fire is not fire but rather always only something fire-like, nor is it water, but always only something water-like. Thus, neither can we give a determinate name to the elements, inasmuch as they are visible, precisely for the reason that they are always mutable. The elements flee from every determinate designation.29 And yet, Plato explains himself on this point most clearly when he sets forth the general principle: all things that change in appearance cannot be an object of determinate empirical knowledge. (a{pan o{sonper a] n per e[ ch gev nesin.) With this words he obviously does not mean all that is as such empirical , which admittedly he designates otherwise in opposition to what is intelligible and unchangeable, namely as gev nhton kai; ajpolluvmenon. For he clarifies precisely these words through an example which immediately introduces in an entirely different way.—He says namely as an elaboration of his assertion concerning the elements: “If someone were to transform continually all the possible figures that can be brought forth from one and the same gold into each other, and if this someone were to be asked about one of these figures,“whatever is it?” surely he would only be able to answer: it is gold—but that it may be a triangle, for example, he could not express with such certainly, because these figures would be in constant change” (50b). 30
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Thus, one sees that at this point Plato is not speaking about change in appearances as it is opposed to the unalterability of intelligible objects, but rather change as it is opposed to the perdurance of substance, the accidents of which are changing. Thus, he also speaks, for example, of the elements as thoroughly changeable and alterable things, not insofar as they are appearances as such, but rather insofar as they become visible as appearances only in their change, while that substance that grounds them remain invisible. That something like an empirical substance persistently grounds this change of appearances, Plato himself states now directly at 50b. This substance that grounds all change of appearances, he names pavsh~ gevnevsew~ uJposoch; n, oi|on tiqhv nhn [a receptacle for all becoming, a sort of wet-nurse] (49a). What is called here gevnesi~ has already been elaborated in the preceding. It expresses, namely, the change of appearances as such. He explains himself about this most clearly at 50b: th;n pavnta decomev nhn swvmata fuvsew~ tajuto; n aj ei; prosrhtevon [It’s the same account concerning the nature that receives all bodies]. One sees that he sets what perdures over and against change. (The issue here cannot concern the intelligible archetype of the world, since, to be sure, it expressly concerns merely empirical objects, an empirical substrate—indeed, he himself states explicitly at 48d that he wants to speak of a third that differs from the intelligible archetype.) This is even more distinctly evident from the following. He says: ejk th`~eJauth`~ to; paravpan oujk ejxivstatai dunavmew~ [One must always call it by the same name, since it never at all abandons its own power] ( 50b). This is to say, substance, according to its nature, never alters itself, but always remains the same and only passes into another ( ejxivstatai (50c))—dev cetaiv ajei; ta; pav nta, kai; morqh; n oujdemivan pote; oujdeni; tw` n eijsiov ntwn ojmoivan eijlhqen oujdamh` [it both always receives all things, and nowhere in no way has it ever taken any shape similar to the ones that come into it]. It takes everything upon itself, that is, every change can be perceived in it, but it itself (as substance) never changes into the form of those phenomena that change in it. Plato thus establishes three things: (1) a substance, in which every form must inhere; (2) the forms themselves, which are in constant empirical change; and (3) originally pure forms through which the empirical forms are necessarily determined throughout their constant change. Thus, substance itself (which unalterably from eternity has existed di ’ aj navgkh~) became the substrate of all the different forms that emerged through imitating the original, pure and intelligible forms. Substance itself did not originally partake of these forms, and also according its essence is not capable of this, but is rather only the substrate of all the forms that emerged through the imitating of those forms that belong to the intelligible world. For this reason, Plato also says that only those forms which are always changing could be imitations of the intelligible forms (which he always distinguishes precisely from the empirical
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and persistent substrate of the world). ( ta; eijsiov nta kai; ejxiov nta31 tw` n o[ ntwn aj ei; mimhvmata, tupwqev nta ajp’ aujtw` n trov pon tina; duvsfraston kai; qaumastov n [It appears different at different times; and the figures that come into it and go out of it are always imitations of the things that are, having been imprinted from them in some manner hard to tell of and wondrous] (50c)). Concerning this, he expresses this most definitively at 50c: ejn d’ ou\n tw`/ parov nti crh’ gev nh dianohqh` nai trittav. to; me; n gignovmenon (empirical forms of appearances, that change) to; d’ ej n / wJ givgnetai (the substrate of these forms), to; ’ o{qen ahfomoiouvmenon fuv etai to; gignovmenon (that through which the forms of appearances are necessarily determined, the pure form of understanding or, as he says elsewhere, to; pevra~).32 “Substance, insofar as it is to be the mother of all things and, however, of a form that is most manifold, must be utterly a[morfo~,” which is to say, as one can clearly see from this passage, that it has no determinate, unalterable empirical form (from which everything that would emerge in it would have to take its guidance). (Its form must exclude no other form.) If it were to have a determinate form, then this would have to be similar to any other form which it itself receives (for it is to receive all possible forms). And so there would also be forms that are opposed to its forms and which it nevertheless as the universal substrate of all forms would have to accept, without it being able to completely present them, since it would strive to import to them only its own form. 33 Plato’s meaning becomes most clearly evident in its difference from all the wooly-headed fancy that has been fabricated by all later commentators when one views the image where he at once makes the matter plain.34 He says, namely, that just as an artist who wants to impress various forms into a soft mass does not allow any determinate figure to remain in it that was there beforehand, so too would it be fitting for it to be this way with the matter that grounds the world. 35 But the issue here does not concern just any matter, one which at all times has no form, but rather it concerns the one matter that possesses no determinate unchangeable form and that is receptive to every form. See the Miscellania on the most ancient philosophy, p. 7. Plato continues: “dio; th; n tou` gegonovto~ ojratou` kai; tav nto~ aijsqhtou` mhtevra
kai; uJpodoch; n, mhvte gh` n, mevte ej evra, mevte pu`r, mevte u{dwr levgwmen, mhvte o{sa ijk touvtwn, mhvte ejx w| n tau`ta gevgonen ajll’ aj novraton ei`dov~ ti kai; a[morfon, pandecev~ metalambav non ed; ajporwvtatav ph (modo vix explicabili) tou` nohtou`, kai; dusalwtovtaton aujto; levgonte~, ouj yeusovmeqa. Kaqo{son de; kjk tw` n proierhmev nwn dunato; n ej fiknei`aqai th`~ fuvsew~ aujtou`, th`d a[ n ti~ ojrqovtata levgoi. pu`r me; n eJkavstote, aujtou` to; pepurwmev non mevro~ faiv nesqai to; de; uJgranqe;n u{dwr. gh` n de; kai; ajerv a, kaq’o{son a[ n mimhvmata touvtwn dev chtai [For this very reason, let us speak of the mother and receptacle of that which has been born visible and in all ways sensed as neither earth nor air nor fire nor water, nor as any of the things that have been born composites or constituents of these. On the contrary, if we
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say that it’s invisible and shapeless form—all-receptive, but partaking somehow of the intelligible in a most perplexing way and most hard-to capture—then we won’t be lying. And to the extent that it’s possible to arrive at the nature of this form from what was said previously, to this extent someone might speak most correctly if he said that the part of it that’s been ignited appears each time as fire; the part that’s been liquefied, as water; as both earth and air appear to the extent that it receives imitations of these] (51a–b). Plato already claimed that the elements, insofar as they are visible, are to be wholly differentiated from the matter in which they are grounded and which as such never becomes visible, and that they are not properly matter itself, but rather forms, determinations of matter, which matter obtains externally. 36 For the elements were originally invisible because they had not yet acquired the form of the understanding (through which alone they are able to appear and become objects of experience). Next they obtained this form through the divine understanding, and precisely thereby became visible, but not, however, according to their ultimate empirical constitution, since once the elements appear to us, they also appear to us in the determinate and necessary forms of our intuition, not however as they were originally constituted in the ground, namely with neither this nor any necessary and determinate form. Now matter, insofar as it is consists of the elements, and insofar as it is the ultimate empirical substrate of forms that were brought forth through the creation of the world, cannot become visible to us because when it does become visible to us it does so as nothing other than these forms (imitations, copies of the pure form of the understanding). On account of this one also cannot say that the matter which grounds the world is earth, fire, water, and so on, for matter only became fiery, watery, and so on, by having obtained, in a manner that is difficult to grasp, a determination through which these forms were imparted to it, through the application of which upon the original material the elements that appear emerged. The elements do not appear to us as objects, but rather only in objects, which is to say, they do not appear to us as a substance that is homogenous with matter, but rather as mere determinations of matter. These determinations appear to us through objects only under a form that is not their form, but that is rather the form that comes to be through the ordering of the understanding and that was imparted to matter as a form foreign to them. (And so, one cannot grasp in this form the original essence of these determinations of matter.) The ultimate substrate of all appearances, the ultimate substance in which the elements appear, is ajovraton tiv, because as the original substrate it was receptive to no form as necessary; rather, once it received these, it was no longer the original substrate. It was as such formless, that is, as Plato himself explains, receptive to every form ( pav ndece~), subordinated to no form as necessary and originally peculiar to it. That the intelligible world is not to be understood according to the world as the substrate of appearances is evident when Plato says that “the invisible
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mother of all things first came to participate in the form of the understanding through a kind that is wholly incomprehensible.” * * *
At this point it is fitting to include the explanation of a passage from the Philebus at 22e–25b, which has been explained incorrectly in the Miscellania, p. 12. Plato’s central principles concerning matter are these, namely: (1) Prime matter [ Urstoff ] (which he also presented under the category of a[peiron) was receptive to every form, and had utterly no necessary or determinate original form. It receives every form only from outside itself. (2) The general form that it received externally is unity, pevra~, through which the particular forms, which change in it as substrate, are then determined. (3) Matter does not consist of these forms. It is, for example, not fire, not water, and so on, since these emerge only through the form that they come to have from outside. The elements, insofar as they appear, are nothing less than forms applied to matter. The are determinations of original substance that are not peculiar to this substance and, for this reason, one may not confuse them with it. Thus, in the elements it is not matter that appears but rather determinations of matter through a form that is foreign to it, not the original substance but rather the forms that this substance has received. Matter itself is not fire, water, and so on, but rather it is made fiery, made watery, and so on. This means that it has received the form of fire and water. The passage from the Philebus (22e–25b) must now be carefully considered in its context. Plato investigates the concepts of hJdonhv and frov nhsi~. In order now to be able to determine concepts with precision, he seeks out all possible forms under which objects can be subsumed. The first forms taken up are those of a[peiron and pevra~. Accordingly, he divides objects into a[peira and pevra~ ej conta. As appearances that have to be subsumed under the concept of a[peiron, he adduces particular sensations (according to the fundamental principle of quality). qermotevrou kai;
yucrotevrou pevri prw`ton o{ra, pevra~ ei] potev ti nohvsai~ a[ n, h] to; ma`llov n te kai; h|tton kj n aujtoi`~ oijkou` n toi`~ gev nesin, e[wsper a] n ej noikh`ton, tevlo~ oujk a] n ejpitreyaivthn givgnesqai. genomev nh~ ga;r teleuth`~, kai; aujt / w` teteleuthvkaton [First off, in the case of hotter or colder, see whether you could ever conceive of some limit, or would the more and less, which dwell as a pair in them, as long as the pair is dwelling within, disallow to the genera an end and completion to come to be, for when an ending occurs, the pair of them also has come to an end] (Philebus 24a–b). In these words one sees quite clearly traces of Kant’s fundamental principle of quality. In particular, the last words express clearly enough the necessity by means of which anything real in sensation can continuously grow and diminish to infinity. This continuity in growth and diminishment is the
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necessary form of all sensation, such that if the infinite were not to occur in the continuous growth and diminishment of sensation ( genomev nh~ teleuth`~), then neither could sensation itself be present (kai; aujt / w` teteleuthvkaton). He explains himself even more clearly in this regard when he says, “ pleasure, standing under the category of a[peiron, has neither beginning , middle, nor end of its own accord [aj f’ eJautou`]” (Philebus. 31a)—without doubt no beginning, precisely because, if it as sensation escalates from a weaker level to a stronger one, one could never find the weakest, rather each level can again be made still weaker—and no middle, no middle level, because anything selected as this can again be divided into still more miniscule parts, since every intensive magnitude is continuous, and so between every two there is always another that is thinkable—and no end , because each level that one would want to assume as the ultimate is again divisible, since between reality and a null point in sensation there lies an infinity of possible levels of sensation—finally, all of this cannot be of its own accord (natura sua, aj f’ eJautou`) precisely because this continuous hanging together of sensation is the necessary form of all sensation, and thus every level of sensation enclosed within boundaries contradicts the concept of sensation. One thus sees that Plato understands by a[peiron nothing more and nothing less than the category of reality, that he subsumes under this category all objects which occur in sensation and to the extent that they do. He himself says this i` faiv nhtai ma`llov n te kai; h|tton most clearly at Philebus 24e–25a: Opovs’a] n hJm n
gignovmenon, kai; to; sfovdra kai; hjrevma decovmenon, kai; to; livan, kai; o{sa toiau`ta pav nta eij~ to; tou` a[peiron gev no~ wJ~ eij~ e] n, die` pav nta tau`ta tiqev nai [we must put everything that comes to light for us as becoming more and less and receiving the extreme and the slight, the too much, and everything else of this kind, into the genus of the unlimited as if into one]. To be sure, the expression ma`llov n kai; h|tton is here indeterminate, since it can just as readily be related to quantity: Plato does, however, separate this, as something yet to determined, from the concept of the a[peiron; indeed, he separates namely the majus and minus of a sensation from the majus and minus in counting (Philebus 25a). Plato here understands by pevra~ that which is directly opposed to a[peiron. On the basis of what he had said before, namely that everything that is to have a level belongs under the category of a[peiron, he now asks: Oujkou` n ta; mh; de-
cov nema tau`ta (to; ma`llov n te kai; h|tton, kai; to; sfovdra kai; hjrevma, kai; to; livan kai; o{sa toiau`ta) touvtwn de; ta; ej nantiva pav nta decovmena, prw`ton me; n to; i[son kai; isovthta, meta; de; to; i[ son to; diplavsion, kai; pa` n o{tiper a]n prov~ aj riqmo; n ajriqmo;~, h} mevtron pro;~ mevtron, tau`ta xuvmpanta eij~ to; pevra~ ajpologizovmenoi kalw`~ a] n dokoi`men dra`n tou`to [Then the things that don’t receive them but do receive everything contrary to them—in the first place, the equal and equality, and after the equal the double, and anything that is related as number to number
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or measure to measure—if we reckon them all together into the limit, we would be thought to be doing beautifully] ( Philebus 25a–b). It is from this vantage point that the explanation that Pleßing gives of this passage allows itself to evaluated. He asserts (p. 53ff.) that Plato understands by a[peiron nothing other than those elements that move in a disorderly way, which are not yet unified and ordered according to the quantities that are determined by the ideas. As if such a concept of a[peiron were not much more universal , as if Plato did not also count objects among that which is determined through pevra~, and so already restricted through quantity, insofar as he took them to never lose their reality. Moreover, every object is indeed for him an a[peiron ti, bound to a pevra~, that is, a reality is determined through quantity . Plato thus does not name the still unordered original matter of the world a[peiron because it was not yet ordered, rather he does so because it was matter as such (whether ordered or not). 37 But that’s not all. Plato seeks the category under which the concept of pleasure can be subsumed. If what is at issue here concerns nothing less than original matter that moves without order, then Plato’s subsequent line of thinking would be—“What is pleasure?—under what concept does it belong?—Matter that moves in a disorderly way is the a[peiron, and the ideas are the pevra~. Pleasure belongs, according to this, under the a[peiron or (what according to Plato means the same thing) to the elements that move without order, those things which are not yet united and ordered by the idea of determinate quantity!!” Pleßing would have been right if he had said: Plato subsumed matter as such (not only matter without order) under the category of a[peiron. Instead, what Pleßing says is that Plato asserts that matter without order is the a[peiron. What Plato actually does is to say that under that wholly universal concept of a[peiron also stands matter (as reality). For this reason, Plato also says, to;n qeo; n to; me; n a[peiron dei`xai tw`n o[ ntwn to; de; pevra~ [We were saying doubtless that the god showed the unlimited of the beings, and the limit] ( Philebus, 23c). This means that God (the world architect) presented everything in the world as quality (reality) determined through quantity—that is, not that God brought forth the world from out a matter that moves without order and from out of the ideas of quantity, but rather (insofar as all reality is a[peiron ti) God composed the world according to its matter as such from out of the a[peiron and, according to its form, from out of the pevra~. To these two forms of all things (pevra~ and a[peiron) Plato now connects two more. to; koinov n, that is, that which arises through the binding together of the previous two,38 and to; th`~ aijtiva~ gev no~—the category of causality, through which both pevra~ and a[peiron are bound together in koinov n. Plato now considers these forms to be the forms of all existing things, and therefore also as the forms according to which the origin of the world is to be conceived. According to this, to; koinov n is for Plato not only the world in its presence, but rather it is a concept
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under which the world with respect to its matter and form must be subsumed. According to Plato, to; th`~ aijtiva~ gevno~ is not only divine causality as it at work in the ordering of the world, but is rather the concept of causality under which all causality in its particularity stands. In this respect the passage at Philebus 26d is sufficiently definitive: gev nesin (this is explained above on page 227) eij~ oujsiv an (gegov nenai) ejk tw` n meta; tou` mevtrou ajpeirgasmev nwn mevtrwn [the genesis into being that been produced along with the limit out of the measures]. Precisely for this reason, he regards each form as a form of the divine intellect. In order to show that these forms are not only forms of our understanding but rather universal concepts of the world, through which the existence of the whole world must be rendered explicable, he seeks by means of an analogy with the empirical world to present this in a way that seems likely. Thus, he concludes namely that the elements are not only present in the individual objects that appear to us, rather they are present in the universe as a whole, such that, moreover, these concepts must be universal world-concepts. Such a conclusion, as it moves from empirical objects to concepts that are pure and independent of experience, seems less out of place in Plato the more often he lets himself do this elsewhere and the more often he is able to do this with justification according to a philosophy in which the sensible and supersensible are both subsumed under the form of a single and most complete unity. “All living bodies,” he says (Philebus 29a),“can be returned to four principles, fire, water, air, and earth. As these elements appear to us and among us, 39 they are faint and weak; they do not appear in the purity, perfection, and strength that is in accord with their nature. However weak and impure ( smikrov n, ajsqene;~, fau`lon) these may appear to us, they nonetheless have an infinite fullness, beauty and strength—for example, not the fire that is in individual objects but the fire that is in the whole universe (plhvqei te qaumasto; n kai; kavllei, kai; pavsh dunavmei th` peri; to; pu`r ou[sh [That fire in the whole is amazing in its vastness, beauty, and every power that pertains to fire] ( Philebus 29c)). This fire is neither nourished nor ruled by the fire that is ours and that appears in us or in any individual living being as such. Rather, it is more so the case that this fire nourishes and rules over each individual fire. If we gather all the elements together into a unity, what emerges is a body. Likewise, one can regard the all as one great body that contains all individuals, and that nourishes our bodies, imparting to them everything that they possess. A soul (that is, an original force of movement) grants life to our body, and hence the body is to have this soul, just as from out of its fullness the universe contains all that we possess, only in a way that is more pure, greater and more excellent.” 40 (Everywhere here one notices the escalation—the progression from lower to higher, from the subordinate to the dominant. This observation will now thus make to transition to the following conclusion that much easier: “And should the four forms, quantity ( pevra~), quality (to; a[peiron), that which
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arises from the combination of both (to; koinov n), and causality, which everywhere makes up the fourth, now be found merely in us? Are we to believe, for example, that causality—insofar41 as we discover it only in ourselves, inasmuch as it provides for us a soul and a material body, 42 and inasmuch as it teaches physicians to ready themselves for the sick body and otherwise orders and makes possible the reproduction of those who are wise in a myriad of ways—makes up the entire concept of causality, and comprises all possible wisdom (all possible understanding as the power of causality). Moreover, since we have to assume that these forms of things are contained purely and excellently in the heavens as a whole (world whole) and its great (and small) parts, how could we believe that everything that is beautiful and glorious (what is present to us) is not brought forth through these forms.43 Consequently, must we not accept that the universe contains a great abundance of reality determined through quantity,44 and that a great power over this has to present that has divided up the years, seasons and months and has rightly earned the name of wisdom and understanding. However, since without soul wisdom and understanding are not thinkable,45 we then have to accept that what is demanded for the nature of the highest is a regal soul and, on account of the power of its causality, a regal wisdom. Accordingly, understanding stands as a kind under the concept of the genus of universal causality, which we counted as one of the four universals forms.” On account of this passage, there are now primarily two questions to be answered. (1) What does Plato mean to say by asserting that all elements in the universe are present in a way that is more pure and more perfect than in individual objects? Pleßing clarifies his position in the following way: “Plato asserts in the Philebus that the existence of all things in the universe is imparted to them through the communication and causation of such natures that are more perfect and excellent than they are and he speaks about this in the following way” (§16, p. 51, vol. 1). He now introduces precisely the passage we have cited. Thus, according to Pleßing (in comparison to the expression employed by him on page 53 concerning the communication of the ideas of the pevra~ and so on), what is at issue here is the intelligible, substantial archetypes of the elements in their appearance. Against this I wish to point out that nowhere in this entire passage does one find even the slightest hint that Plato is speaking of the intelligible archetypes of substances. Moreover, nowhere in this passage does he employ the word nohtov~ by itself. What is being dealt with here can in no way be the intelligible substances of elements, for Plato states explicitly that the elements emerged only through the application of the form of the understanding upon formless matter, such that therefore the idea of fire can lie singularly and solely in the pure form of the understanding. For example, in this passage Plato does not oppose the fire that appears to the fire that is intelligible , but rather he opposes the fire that appears in individual objects
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within the realm of what is visible to us to the fire that is present in the universe as a whole, the great one mass of fire that spreads throughout the universe, nourishing the individual fire. Furthermore, one sees explicitly that he only opposes the majus and the minus of empirical materialities by the fact that he, for example, opposes our empirical bodies to the body of the world that is nonetheless empirical, not to the intelligible archetypes of the world. The second question to be answered is: (2) What is Plato’s view concerning the four forms of things, pevra~, a[peiron, koinov n, aijtiva? From the preceding it has already become clear that Plato wants to assert that these four forms are to be considered as concepts under which all existence in the world can be subsumed, in short, as concepts of the world , to be related not to particular objects but only to the universe as a whole. For this reason, he says that the two forms pevra~ and a[peiron are concepts under which the world is to be subsumed according to its form and matter—and with regard to what would bind these two forms together, one has to conceive of a cause in relation to the world that has ordered all things according to those forms, just as readily as we are compelled to conceive everywhere of a cause of individual effects. Under these forms one is compelled also to conceive of the existence and origin of that which most beautiful and most glorious (that is, the world or, if one considers the expression employed above regarding the elements, the elements in their complete purity and excellence as they exist in the universe as a whole). The explanation that Pleßing gives of this passage is already negated through the more philologically rigorous translation given above. He understands, namely, the kallivstoi~ kai; timiwtavtoi~ through the ideas. However, this explanation stands and falls with his translation of this passage and, in part, with his explanation of a[peiron, which has already been refuted above. At the same time, however, this passage can serve to shed some light on the meaning of the Platonic doctrine of the ideas. It seems that Plato understands the four frequently mentioned forms as concepts under which the existence of all things in the world could be subsumed, in short, he takes them as ideas. Assuming that Plato would have believed that all ideas are present as substances in the intelligible world, what does this passage yield?—It is apparent that the two forms of pevra~ and a[peiron are only separated from one another through the power of representation, because outside this power both exist only in being bound together. As a result, Plato either must speak here also of forms that exist in separately merely in the power of representation (also in divine understanding, but only in these), or he must accept in the intelligible world the existence of (1) a substance of pevra~, (2) a substance of a[peiron and (3) a substance of the koinov n, that is, a substance of a third that binds the first two together.—But this would be a nonsensical 46 philosophy! Moreover, how would a substance of a[peiron existing in the intelligible world be reconciled with the
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Plato’s assertions elsewhere? There is a pure form of the a[peiron, as such, in the understanding (the form of reality), but the a[peiron itself taken as a physically existing substance is something viewed by Plato as wholly contradictory to all the ideas (to the pevra~ which includes within itself the whole pure form of the world). Plato conceives of the form of the intelligible world as the form of the most perfect and regular order and unity—How is a physically existing substance of a[peiron in the intelligible world, that is, a substance of unruliness and boundlessness, to be harmonized with the form of the intelligible world? One sees clearly that Plato speaks of nothing but subjective forms under which the world is represented, and that he understands by pevra~ and a[peiron nothing other than merely formal concepts of the world, and by aijtiva nothing other than a concept of the understanding under which, according to his objective philosophy, one has to conceive of the binding together of these two in the koinov n. Pleßing finds himself in a bit of a predicament when he wants to show how the imitation (to; mivmhma) of an existing substance within the intelligible realm is to be found in the a[peiron. He can in fact rescue himself in no other way than by saying: an imitation of the ideas is found in the a[peiron to the extent that it is bound together with the pevra~.47 However, if Pleßing had explained the passage correctly, he would have to show how the imitation of ideas is to be found not in the a[peiron being bound together with pevra~, but rather in the a[peiron as such. For here a[peiron and pevra~ are equated—and in this regard at the very least he wants to show how an imitation of an idea is to be found in the a[peiron as such? But why should the a[peiron ever be made an exception? It is evident that the Mr. Pleßing felt at ease asserting that these two forms can only be conceived as separated in the power of representation—yet, according to his system, he must, if he wants to be consistent, also be able to think them as objectively separated outside of this (in the intelligible world). As a consequence it is also probable that the principle gets put forward on page 57 that the a[peiron first emerges through the communication of the pevra~. Fine! If what is at issue here is empirical existence, then in that case both are only present in their being bound together. However, Plato speaks of a[peiron to the extent that it separated from pevra~ and says, when the passage is translated correctly, that the imitations of that which is most beautiful and most glorious, that is, the ideas, must also be found in the a[peiron as such. * * *
According to the previously cited passage [cited on page 228], Plato assumes that matter does not properly consist of fire, water, earth, and air, but rather that it first becomes fiery, watery, and so on—or that it has taken on imitations of fire, water, earth, and air. This was already explained by him in the passage cited above ( Tim. 51a), namely, that matter became fiery and so on because it came to partake of
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the intelligible form ( metavlabousa tou` nouvtou), that is, because it was ordered through divine understanding according to a pure and necessarily determinate regularity. Accordingly, he counts the elements as the form of the world and asserts correctly that we are not able to say how matter had been arranged before the creation of the world, since we are not able to conceive of matter without the form that it first receives in that creation. Through this form matter was thus first determined such that the elements became visible and, to the extent that the elements emerged through the intelligible forms or, expressed otherwise, to the extent that they are imitations, copies of the intelligible form, they present the intelligible form. Plato speaks about this more extensively at Tim. 51b–c. He asks whether or not there are intelligible forms of the elements: a\r’ e[sti ti pu`r aujro; ej f’ eJautou`, kai; pav nta, peri; w| n aj ei; levgomen, ou{tw~ aujta; kaq’ auJta; e[kasta, hJ tau`ta a{per
kai; blevpomen o[sa te a[lla dia; tou` swvmato~ aijsqanovmeqa mov na e[sti toiauvthn e[ conta ajlhvqeian, a[lla de; oujk e[sti para’ (praeter) tau`ta oujdamh` oujdamw`~ ajlla; mavthv eJkavstote ei\ nai tiv famen ei\do~ eJkavstou nohtov n, to; de; oujde; n a\r’ h\ n, plh; n lovgo~; [Is there, then, some Fire Itself on its own, and are there all those things we always speak of in this way, as individuals “themselves all by themselves” that are; or are those very things we in fact look at—and the rest that we sense through the body—the only things that are in possession of that sort of truth; and besides them nothing else anywhere in any way is, but in vain do we affirm on each occasion that some intelligible form of each thing is, whereas such a form was, after all, nothing but a word?] Plato responds to the question as follows, by the mere datum that is present in the human power of knowing, namely, that both ways of knowing—experience and pure knowledge independent of experience—are so divergent that one is unable to explain this fact in no way except by assuming wholly different objects of knowing. Experience according to Plato is dovxa (consider what was said at the very beginning of this essay about Platonic philosophy) and dovxa ajlhqhv~, precisely because there is a further distinction that differentiates between perceptions, some of which (as the mere semblance of intuition) make no contribution to experience defined more precisely. Pure knowing, which he elsewhere also calls ejpisthvmh, is here named nou`~. The former [experience, dovxa] yields nothing but persuasion (peviqw), whereas the latter yields conviction (theory, didachv). The one lacks solid grounds, the other proceed precisely from them. The one is changeable, the other is unchangeable. Every human participates in the one, while the other is only available to the god and to those few humans whom Plato otherwise calls the beloved of the gods. According to this there must be objects48 that always remain the same, that do not emerge (empirically), just as little as they are destructible, objects that receive in themselves nothing that is other and become nothing that is other (that is, in their distinctive nature are altered through nothing), objects that
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are thoroughly invisible and utterly cannot be objects of sensible intuition—the mere objects of intellectual power of knowing. 49 (Plato asserts that these objects are unchangeable according to their nature and concept —something that cannot possibly be said of physically existing objects.) It now becomes clear, however, the extent to which Plato is speaking of intelligible elements. Here he proceeds namely immediately from the visible elements to the ideas as such. According to this, by the intelligible elements he understands not the particular physically existing intelligible substances of fire, water, and so on, but rather the ideas as such, the pure form of the understanding through which the world is ordered. Prior to the creation of the world according to Plato’s teaching there were namely no elements visible, because our power of knowing was not yet imparted to them. The original matter (the elements ) moved in a way that was disorderly and unruly. The elements first acquired a determinate form through an understanding that gives order and thereby appeared as visible elements of the world. The elements as they are present now are accordingly not matter itself, but rather mere forms of matter or matter insofar as it has received a form from outside itself—an empirical form which is the imitation ( mivmhma) of an intelligible form. One thus sees clearly the extent to which Plato is speaking of intelligible archetypes of every individual object, namely, not insofar as he believed that every individual object has its particular individual archetype, but rather insofar as each individual object stands under the universal form of all existence. * * *
According to Plato’s division as it was already introduced (Tim. 50b), which he also repeats at 51e, there is thus: (1) A pure unchangeable form of all existing things. (2) This form appears in appearances inasmuch as they change, because only in change is form encountered. (He expresses himself at Tim 52a in this way: to; d’oJmwnumon, o{moiov n te ejkeiv nw/ (tw`/ nohtwv /), aijsqhtov n, genhtov n peforhmev non aj eiv. / nohtwv / because the He calls this change of appearances oJmwv numon and o{moiov n tw` change bears in itself the form of the ideas, because every imitation of the pure form of the understanding only properly becomes visible in change.) (3) Something that perdures grounds this change ( to; ajisqhtov n gignovmenon te e[n tini tovpw/ kai; pavlin ejkei`qen ajpolluvmenov n), a substance which is not sub ject to change ( fqora; n ouj prosdecovmenon), but in which all that changes exists ( e{dran parev con o{ sa e[cei gev nesin pa`s in).51 He says of this substance that it is met’ aj naisqhsiva~ aJpto; n, it can be felt without sense (intuition)—but he does not derive this concept of understanding from experience. And, at the very least, he expresses quite naturally the phenomenon that for so long had put philosophy
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in a quandary—the feeling of a substance that is at the ground of all change— without philosophy being able to penetrate to this ground itself because it is namely the mere of understanding that we place into appearances. But he did not derive these from this, but rather describes the whole of knowledge therefrom, as logismw` / tini; novqw/ movgi~ pistov n, as a kind of dream ( pro;~ oJ oj neiropolou`men blevponte~) that we cannot possibly do away with. All that we think as existing we must think of as somewhere, and something that is present in no place, we are not ever able to represent to ourselves as present. Lastly, he says, however, that if we do not accept that everything exists in a certain place, we would not be able to distinguish anything from anything else, rather everything would be as variable as it possibly could be and everything would then have to collapse together in our representation (Tim. 52a). * * *
Plato pulls everything together in this statement: o[ n te kai; cwvran kai; gev nesin ei\ nai, triva trich`, kai; pri; n oujranon genevsqai [Being and Space and becoming, three in a threefold way, are before the birth of heaven] ( Tim. 52d–e). The intelligible—which is clear in itself—that which perdures, matter—but change in what perdures, for Plato himself says in other passages that the elements before the creation of the world were in some kind of disorderly movement (Tim. 53a).
Th;n de; genevsew~ tiqhv nhn, uJgrainwmev nhn kai; puroumev nhn kai; ta;~ gh`~ te kai; aj evro~ morfa;~ decomev nhn, kai; o{sa touvtoi~ pavqh xunevpetai pavscousan, pantodaph; n me; n ijdei` n faiv nesqai [and that wet-nurse of becoming, being liquefied and ignited and receiving the shapes of earth and air, and suffering all the other affections that follow along with these, appear in all sorts of ways to our sight] (Tim. 52d–e). This has been sufficiently elucidated through the above. 52 But it was not enough that matter had received the form of the elements. These elements had to be determined, also through the determinate forms of quantity, in order not be continual conflict with each other ( pevra~ in the Philebus [25a], or as it is called in the Timaeus [53b], ei[desi kai; ajriqmoi`~). The further elaboration of the mechanical production and the physical connection of the elements does not belong here. NOTES
1. 2.
Trans.—At times Schelling does cite the Greek passages in their entirety. For the sake of consistency, we have supplemented the Greek as it appears in the Loeb Library. Trans.—Schelling’s numerous footnotes will appear as footnotes in this translation as well. All footnotes inserted by the translators will be clearly marked. The translations of the Greek from the Timaeus are taken from Peter Kalkavage’s translation
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3.
4. 5.
F. W. J. Schelling (Newburyport: Focus Publishing, R. Pullins Co., 2001,) with Stephanus numbers listed and are designated by square brackets. pivsti~ seems to be analogous to dovxa elsewhere in Plato. oJ tiv per pro;~ gevnesin oujsiva, tou`to pro;~ tivstin ajlhvqeia (29c). This means: gevnesi~ relates to oujsiva as pivsti~ relates to ajlhvqeia. But earlier in the text, gevnesi~ is mentioned as something only dovxh perilhpta; [grasped by belief]; oujsiv a, however, is lovgw/ kai; fponhvsei perilhpto;n [grasped by reason and prudence]. But ajlhvqeia is what he calls ejpisthvmh, for example, in the Meno and the Gorgias (gevnesi~: oujsiva = dovxa: ejpisthvmh). This is, in fact, omitted in the Zweibrücker edition, even though it is necessarily demanded by the meaning. Ficino does translate it. Note. One will throughout the Timaeus discover sufficient indications of the idea of a singular maker of the world. This passage also points to this. Plato always only speaks of a dhmiurgo;~ and never of demiurgoi;~. It is easy to grasp why he expresses himself so guardedly, vaguely and ambiguously. With what anxiety does he seek to protect himself, and not only by way of the dark pronouncements he puts forward at 29c. He speaks directly in the tone that still has to be assumed by the suppressed friend of truth. e]an ou\n, he says, polla; pollw`n [ eijpovntwn] pevri qew`n kai; th`~ tou` panto;~
genevsew~ mh; dunatoi; gignwvmeqa pavnth pavntw~ aujtou;~ auJtoi`~ oJmologoumevnou~ lovgou~ kai; ajphkribwmevnou~ ajpodou`nai, mh; qaumavsh~ ajll’ ejan; a[ra mhdeno;~ h|tton parecwvmeqa eijkovta~, ajgapa` /n crhv (This is sufficient only if we have likelihoods inferior to none), memnhmevnon, wJ~ oJ levgwn, uJmei`~ te oiJ kritai; fuvsin ajnqrwpivnhn e[ comen w{ste peri; touvtwn to;n eijkovta mu`qon ajpodecomevnou~, prevpei mhde;n e[ti pevra zhtei`n [If, in saying many things on many topics concerning gods and the birth of the all, we become incapable of rendering speeches that are always and in all respects in agreement with themselves and drawn with precision, don’t wonder. But if we provide likelihoods inferior to none, one should be well pleased with them, remembering that I who speak as well as you my judges have a human nature, so that it is fitting for us to receive the likely story about these things and not to search further for anything beyond it] (29c–d). Plato speaks of the daimons (divinities) with the same timidity at 40d–e: Peri; de; tw`n-daimovnwn eijpei`n kai; gnw`nai th;n gevnesin, mei`zon h] kaq’ hJma`~, perstevon de;
toi`~ eijrhkovsin e[mprosqen, ejkgovnoi~ me;n qew`n ou\sin. wJ~ e[fasan, safw`~ div pou touv~ auJtw`~ progovnou~ eijdovsin. ajduvnaton ou\n qew`n paisi;n ajpistei`n, kaivper a[neu te eijkovtwn kai; ajnagkaivwn ajpodeixewn levgousin, ajll’, wJ~ (quia) oijkei`a favskousin ajpsggevllein, eJpomevnou~ tw` / novmw/ pisteutevon [Now as for other divinities, to declare and come to know their birth is beyond our power, and one must be persuaded by those who have declared it in earlier times since they were offspring of gods(so they claimed), and presumably they, if anyone, had sure knowledge of their own ancestors. It’s impossible, then, to distrust sons of gods, even if they do speak without either likelihoods or necessary demonstrations; but since they profess to be reporting family matters, we must follow custom and trust them]. C’est tout comme chez nous. How similar is the language of truth in all times!—On account of this I have previously noted why one so often believes to be coming to the aid of revelation (something that could more readily be deemed a poorly carried out form of flattery), either when one seeks as much as possible to deny to all philosophers of antiquit y any
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knowledge of a singular god, or, when one can’t do this, one repeats the old prattle of the Church Fathers that the ancients were creative on the basis of revelation. However, one will find neither opinion corroborated in the Platonic dialogues. Moreover, this entire method is nothing other than the elevation of revelation at the cost of reason, which can never be to the advantage of either. Such narrow mindedness does not conduct itself with the rigor of an impartial historical researcher, and is completely oblivious to what it sees on a daily basis, namely how frequently there is persuasion not through genuine proofs but through political supremacy that merely privileges a particular opinion, and that forces dissenting voices to silence, or at the very least to a quiet, barely audible speech. Such narrow mindedness isn’t any better than the triumphant mockery of privileged teachers directed against those who think differently, against those who have no other power on their side except that of the truth or of mere persuasion, and whose spirit has already been . . . too much, by virtue of having to witness on a daily basis the dominance of principles that are false precisely according their own most steadfast convictions, as if one felt the need to soil the spirit as a spiteful act of defiance against those who are privileged. How would history look if this method were to be universalized? How unjust would it be, for example, to maintain that no one prior to Luther had had so great a vision (or an even greater vision) as he, simply because prior to him no one had dared to throw off the yoke of political hierarchy? And how would posterity have to judge our age according to such a presupposition? [The ellipsis in the text indicates a corruption of three to five words according to the German editor, Hartmut Buchner—Trans.] 6. It would be clearer if it read, oujde;n anohto;n tou` noun ej conto~ oJlou oJlon kallivo[~] esesqai. But Plato loves metatheses like this one. Ficino, from his translation, does not seem to have understood this sentence. 7. Trans.—At Philebus 30c, Socrates says, “there are—it’s what we have often said—an extensive unlimited in the whole and a satisfactory limit, and no inferior and shallow cause is presiding over them, ordering and arranging years, seasons, and months and it is to be spoken of most justly as wisdom and mind.” Protarchus responds: “You said it, most justly,” to which Socrates adds, “Yet wisdom and mind would never come to be without soul?” Seth Benardete, The Tragedy and Comedy of Life: Plato’s Philebus (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). The translations of the Philebus that we have inserted into Schelling’s commentary are all taken from Benardete’s text. 8. Trans.—We learn the following regarding the figure of Pleßing, who plays such a significant role in Schelling’s essay, from the editor of the German edition, Hartmut Buchner: “A significant source for Schelling’s engagement with Plato in his Timaeus lecture is the two volume Versuche zur Aufklärung der Philosophie des ältesten Altherthums (Leipzig 1788–1790) by Friedrich Victor Lebrecht Pleßing (1749–1806). The first volume of this substantial work deals with ‘Plato’s Metaphysical Philosophy’ and thereby works through the Timaeus.” According to Buchner’s interpretation—which can in large part be gathered from Schelling’s essay—Pleßing maintained a belief that the Ideas were constituted as an intelligible substance, whereas “Schelling turned against this view with vehemence in that he interpreted Plato’s ideas from the perspective of the Kantian-Reinholdian critical philosophy as concepts or ideas of
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10.
11. 12. 13.
14.
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reason which had been domesticated by the power of representation” (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Fromman-Holzboog, 1994), 10. Translator’s Note—This is in reference to Gottlieb Tennemann, who published an essay entitled,“Über den göttlichen Verstand aus der Platonischen Philosophie ( nou`~, lovgo~)” (On the Divine Intellect in Platonic Philosophy) in the first volume of Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus’s journal “ Memorabilien” in 1791. Tivni tw`n zwvwn aujto;n (tovnde to;n kovsmon) eij~ oJmoiovthta oJ xunista;~ xonevsthse; tw`n me;n ou\n ejn mevrou~ ei[dei pefukovtwn mhdeni; kataxiwvswmen. sjtelei` ga;ra ejoiko;~ oujdevn pot’ a]n gevnoito kalovn. ou\ d’ e[sti ta\lla zw`a kaq’ e}n kai; kata; gevnh movria, touvtw/ pavntwn oJmoiovtaton aujto;n ei\nai tiqw`men. ta; ga;r dh; nohta; zw`a pavnta ejkei`no ejn eJautw` / perilabo;n e[ cei, kaqavper o{de oJ kovsmo~, hJma`~, o{sa te a[lla qrevmmata xinevsthken oJratav. tw` / ga;r tw`n nooumevnwn kallivstw kai; kata; pavnta televw / mavlist’ aujto;n qeo;~ oJmoiw`sai boulhqei;~, zw`on e]n oJratovn, pavnq’ o{sa kata; fuvsin aujtou` xuggenh` zw`a ejnto;~ e[con eJautou` xunevsthse [Now we shall not count as worthy any of those that by nature have the form of part—for nothing that’s like the incomplete would ever become beautiful—but let us set down the following about the cosmos. Among all animals, it’s the one most similar to that of which the others, individually and according to kind, are parts. For that one, having embraced all the intelligible animals, holds them within itself, just as this cosmos holds and embraces us and all the other nurslings constructed as visible. For since the god wanted to make it as similar as possible to the most beautiful things intellected and in all ways complete, he constructed it as an animal visible and one, holding within itself all those animals that are akin to it according to nature] ( Tim. 30d–31a). See Kant’s Critique of Judgment , paragraph 65. Ibid. Trans.—We have translated here what Schelling presents from the Philebus in German. For comparison, here is Benardete’s translation of the passage: “We surely assert that the same thing, in becoming one and many by speeches, runs around on every side on the occasion of whatever is said, no less in the past than now. And this will never stop, and it did not start up now, but this kind of thing is, as it appears to me, a deathless and ageless experience of speeches themselves in us; and on each occasion when one of the young first gets a taste of it, he takes pleasure in it as if he had found some treasure trove of wisdom, and pleasure puts a god in him, and he gladly leaves no argument unturned, sometimes rolling it to one side and kneading it into one, and then at other times unrolling it once more and dividing it up into parts” (15d–e). Precisely this is the central issue. Throughout all of our empirical and logical investigations we have to presupposed an ultimate idea that already grounds all objects such that it becomes possible to look into them. This means, according to Plato, we have to presuppose that in divine understanding such an idea is present in such a way that it grounds the bringing forth of the individual objects. Trans.—For comparison again, the Benardete translation: “Well, it’s a gift of the gods to human beings, as it appears to me; it was thrown by the gods from somewhere or other along with some most brilliant fire through some Prometheus; and the an-
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cients, being superior to us and dwelling nearer to the gods passed it on as a report, “Whatever are the things that are said to be, they are out of one and many, and they have in themselves an innate limit and unlimitedness.” It intimates, then, that we must, since these things have been arranged in this kind of order, always set down on each occasion a single look about anything and go on to search for it. . . . Now the gods passed it on to us, as I said, that it was in this way that we were to examine and learn and teach one another” ( Philebus, 16c–e), Schelling leaves out a large number of lines—the majority of 16d–e—we have chosen to exclude these here as well. 16. Plato says at Philebus 15b: Prw`ton me;n skepteon ei[ tina~ dei` toiauvta~ ei\nai
monavda~ ujpolambavnein, ajlhqw`~ ou[sa~ ei\ta tw`~ au\ tauvta~, mivan eJkavsthn, ou\san aj ei; th;n aujth;n, kai; mh;te gevnesin, mhvte o[leqron prosdecomevnhn o{mw~ ei\nai bebaiovthta mivan tauvthn [In the first place, whether one must suppose there truly are
17. 18. 19. 20.
21.
22.
some monads of this kind; next, how these [monads], in turn, although each one is always the same and admits neither generation nor corruption, all the same [each] is most securely this one [monad]]. Everywhere Plato places these pure monads in divine understanding alone, as these must be present there originally and prior to all objects. But to the human understanding he assigns merely the general form of such logical differentiation, while he has the general concept emerge (see the above passage at 16e) in an empirical way (through learning and teaching). (See also 16c: pavnta, o{sa tev cnh~ ej covmena a]n Jejreqh` pwvpote, dia; tauvth~ (o{dou) fanera; gevgone.) In general, throughout the whole inquiry into Plato’s doctrine of the ideas one must always keep in view that Plato always speaks of the ideas of a divine intellect, which would only become possible through the intellectual community of humans with the origin of all beings in this divine understanding. Trans.—This seems to be a translation of nou`~ ejnouvsa~ ijdeva~ tw` / o} e[stin zw` /on. See Kant’s Critique of Judgment . See Meno 81c–d. [Midway between the Being that is non-partitioned and always self-same, and in turn the Being that is partitioned and comes to be in the realm of bodies, he blended out of both a third form of Being; and doing the same thing with the nature of the Same and the nature of the Other, he constructed in the middle a blend of their non-partitioned form and the partitioned form that applies to bodies; and since they were three, he took hold of them and blended them into one entire look; and since the nature of the Other was loath to mix, he joined it to Same with force.] “Ideo forte bis haec philosophus putauit miscenda, quod material copulari sese materiae simplici, nisi accuratissime misceatus et proportio adhibeatur optima, non patitur.” Tiedemann, Argumenta Platonis, 315. (Translator’s Note—Dietrich Tiedemann published a text called Dialogorum Platonis Argumenta exposita et illustrata in 1786 in conjunction with a collected edition of Platonic dialogues referred to as the Bipontina edition or the Zweibrücker edition, which included Ficino’s translations. This was also the edition of the Timaeus and the Philebus Schelling is working with in this essay.) lovgo~ de;, oJ kata; t’auto;n ajlhqh;~ gignovmeno~, periv te qavteron w]n kai; peri; to; taujtovn, ejn tw` / kinoumevnw uJ f’ auJtou` ferovmeno~ a[neu fqovggou kai; hj ch`~, o{tan me;n
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peri; to; aisqhto;n givgnhtai kai; oJ tou` qatevrou kuvklo~ oJrqo;~ ijwn; , eij~ pa`san aujtou` th;n yuch;n diaggeivlh, dovxai kai; pivstei~ givgnontai bevbaioi kai; aJlhqei`~, o{tan de; au\ peri; to; logistikovn h\ kai; oJ tou` taujtou` kuvkloS eu[troco~ w]n auj ta; mhnuvsh, nou`~ ejpisthvmh te ejx ahnavgkh ajpotelei`tai [The account that arises is similarly true whether it has to do with either the Other or the Same; and this is wept along within the self-moved without sound and noise. And whenever the account becomes concerned with what’s sensed, and the circle of the Other, correct in its going, sends it message to all in its soul, then opinions and beliefs arise which are firm and true; while in turn, whenever her account concerns what is rational, and the circle of the Same, wheeling smoothly, makes its disclosure, then intellection and knowledge are of necessity brought to perfection] (37b). One has to admit, moreover, that this entire passage is one of the most obscure. 23. Trans.—This sentence is in quotation marks in the German, although there is no indication from where the text is being cited. 24. doxavzetai de ujpo; tw`n pleivstwn ouj xunaivtia ajll’ ai[tia ei\nai tw`n pavntwn yuv conta
kai; o{sa toiau`ta ajpergazovmena. lovgon de; oujdevna oujde; nou`n eij~ oujde;n dunata; e[cein ejsti. tw`n ga;r o[ntwn /w| nou`n movnw/ kta`sqai proshvkei, lektevon yuchvn. tou`to de; ajovraton, pu`r de; kai; u{dwr kai; gh` ka; aj h;r swvmata pavnta oJrata gevgone. to;n de; nou` kai; ejpirthvmh~ ejrasth;n ajnavgkh ta;~ th`~ e[mfrono~ fuvsew~ aijtiva~ prwvta~ metadiwvkein, o{sai de; uJp ’ a[llwn me;n kinoumevnwn, e{tera d’ ejx ajnagkh~ kinouvntwn givgnontai, deutevra~ poihtevon [But the opinion held by most people is that they are not assistant causes but causes of all things, by cooling and heating, coalescing and dissolving, and by fashioning all such effects. But none of them is capable of having reason nor any intellect for any purpose at all. For it must be said that the only one of the beings suited to acquire intellect is soul; and this is something invisible, while fire and water and earth and air have all been born visible bodies. And it’s a necessity that the lover of intellect and knowledge pursue first the causes that have to do with the thoughtful nature, and second all such things that are moved by others and come to be movers of other things only out of necessity. Now this is just what we must do as well] (46d–e). 25. Moreover, this formulation of the text is doubtful. The Zweibrüker edition reads: i{na ta;~ ejn oujranw` / tou` nou` katidovnto~ periovdo~ crhsaivmeqa (47c). Here tou` nou` is connected to human understanding. But Ficino seems to have read katidovnte~. 26. Or better, logismouv. 27. Nou` de; aj navgkh~ a[rconto~, tw` / peivqein aujth;n tw`n gignomevnwn ta; plei`sta ijpi; to;
bevltiston a[gein, tauvth kata; tau`tav te di; ajnavgkh~ uJpo; peiqou`~ e[mfrono~, ou{tw kat’ ajrca;~ xunivstato tovde to; pa`n [As intellect was ruling over necessity by persuading her to lead most of what comes to be toward what’s best, in this way accordingly was this all constructed at the beginning: through necessity worsted by thoughtful persuasion] (Tim. 48a). 28. Precisely by emphasizing this constant cycle Plato gives us to understand that in the ground of these visible elements, inasmuch as they cycle through one another, there lies discrete materials that are actually different from each other but are thereby always still empirical , and that assume different forms. For if no such materials were present,
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Plato would not be able to say that the elements are in a constant cycle. Otherwise all would be only—One Element. 29. Kuvklon te ou{tw diadidovnta eij~ a[llhla, wJ~ faivnetai, th;n gevnesin (ta; stoiceia.)
ou{tw dh; touvtwn oujdevpote tw`n aujtw`n eJkaxstwn fantazomevnwn oujk aijsconei`taiv ti~ eJautovn; oujk a[llo pagivw~ diiscurizovmeno~, oujk aijsconei`taiv ti~ ejautovn; oujk e[stin, ajll’ ajsfalevstaton macrw` / peri; touvtwn tiqemevno~, w|de levgein. ajei; o} kaqorw`men, a[llote a[llh/ gignovmenon, wJ~ pu`t, mh; tou`to, ajllav to; toiou`ton eJkavstote prosagmreuv ein pu`r, mhdev u{dwr tou`to, ajlla; to; toiou`ton aj eiv, mhde; a[llo pote; mhde;n, w{~ tin’ e[ con bebaiovthta, o{sa deiknuvnte~ tw` / rJ hvmati, tw` / tovde kai; tou`to proscrwvmenoi, dhlou`n hJgouvmeqav ti. feuvgei ga;r ouj c uJpomevnon th;n tou` tovde kai; tou`to kai; th;n tw/de, kai; pa`san o{sh movnima wJ~ o[nta aujta; ejndeivknutai favsi~. ajlla; tau`ta me;n e{kasta mh; levgein, to; de; toiou`ton aj ei; periferomevnwn, o{moion, eJkavstou pevri; kai; xumpavntwn ou{tw kalei`n kai; kh; kai; pu`r to; dia; panto;~ toiou`ton, kai; a{pan o{sonper a]n e[ ch/ gevnesin [Since each of these individually never shows itself as the same, which of them can anyone firmly insist is any one thing and not another without putting himself to shame? There isn’t any, but on the contrary, the safest course by far in positing anything about these things is to speak as follows: to address whatever we observe as always coming to now here, then there (like fire), not as “this”—say, “fire”—but as “of this sort on each occasion,” and never to address any other thing as though it had any stability, that is, any of the things we point to with the term “this” or that,” believing that by using such a term, we’re making plain a something. For it flees and doesn’t abide “this” and “that” and “with respect to this” and every expression that indicts them of being abiding. On the contrary, it’s safest not to say these things of any of them individually, but “of this sort” as it always courses around similarly—to call them that, concerning each individually and all of them together, and in particular, to call fire “what is continually of this sort” and everything else whatsoever that has birth] (49c–e). 30. Trans.—Here, again, Schelling presents a passage from the Timaeus translated into German. For the sake of clarity, we include here Kalkavage’s translation of the same passage: “If someone, having molded all figures out of gold, should in no way stop remolding each figure into all the others, then if someone pointed out one of them and asked “Whatever is it?”—by far the safest thing to say in point of truth is “Gold.” But as for the triangle and whatever other figures were being born in it, one must never, ever say that these things are, since they shift right in the middle of our positing them” (Tim. 50a–b). 31. That is, the forms, namely, that change in the substance that is their substrate. 32. Trans.—Again, we include Kalkavage’s translation of the same passage: “At present one should keep in mind three kinds: that which comes to be, that in which it comes to be, and that from which what comes to be sprouts as something copied” (50c–d) 33. o{moion ga;r o}n tw`n ejpeisiovntwn tini; ta; th`~ ejnantiva~ ta; te th`~ to; paravpan a[llh~ fuvsew~, oJpovt’ e[lqoi, decovmenon, kakw`~ a]n aj fomoioi` th;n auJtou` paremfai`nwn o[ yin.
dio; kai; pavntwn ejkto~ eijdw`n ei\nai crew;n to; ta; pavnta ejkdexovmenon ejn auJt /w` gevnh [For if it should be similar to any of the things that come on the scene, on receiving what was contrary to itself or of an altogether different nature, whenever these things
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arrive, it would copy them badly by projecting its own visage alongside the thing copied] (50d–e). 34. Tiedemann says quite correctly: “unde fit ut material Platoni dicatur informis, si abstracte, i.e. secundum naturam suam consideretur; concrete vero sumta, i.e., ut re vera existit, aliquam semper farmam habet” ( Argumenta Platonis, 328). 35. Tim. 50e. 36. One of the clearest passages concerning this is at Timaeus 69b–c: tau’ta ajtavktw~
e[conta oJ qeo;~ ejn eJkavstw/ te aujt /w` pro;~ auJto; kai; pro;~ a[llhla summetriva~ ejnepoiv hsen, o{sa~ te kai; o{ph dunato;n h\n ajnavloga kai; suvmmetra ei\nai, tovte ga;r ou[te touvtwn, o{son mh; tuv ch/, ti metei` cen, ou[te to; paravpan ojnomavsai tw`n nu`n ohnomazomevnwn ajxiovlogou h\n oujdevn, oi|on pu`r kai; u{dwr iai; ei[ ti tw`n a[llwn. ajlla; pavnta tau`ta prw`ton diekovsmhsen, e[perta ejk touvtwn pa`n tovde xunesthvsato, zw`on e}n zw`a e[xon ta; pavnta ejn auJt /w` qnhta; te ajqavnatav [So just as was said also at the beginning,
37.
38.
39. 40. 41. 42.
43.
since these things were in a condition of disorder, the god introduced proportions in them, making each thing proportional both to itself and to others, that is, to whatever extent and in whatever way it was possible for them to be commensurable and proportional. For at that time, things partook of none of this, except insofar as it happened by chance, nor was there anything at all whatsoever that was worthy of the names we now use to name things, such as “fire” or “water” or any of the others; but all these things he first put in array and only afterwards constructed out of them this all—one animal that holds within itself all animals both mortal and immortal]. Pleßing will probably not appeal to the following passage, where Plato says: to; pevra~ ouj decetai to; a[peiron and, on the contrary, ta; mh; decovmena to; ma`llon te kai; hJtton-eij~ to; pevra~ ajpologizovmenoi kalw`~ a]n drwmen. For Plato says clearly enough that each is opposed to the other only in the concept—quantity is that which takes on the opposite of quality, that is, not a in concreto given quantum, but rather, quantum as such, insofar as it is quantum. See the passage cited from Philebus 31a–b. [Then let’s remember this too about them both, that mind was akin to cause and pretty nearly of this genus, but pleasure in itself is unlimited and of the genus in and of itself that does not have and never will have a beginning, middle, or end.] Pleßing (p. 53) correctly understands by this: “the generated that emerges through the uniting of the pevra~ with the a[peiron.” However, according to Pleßing himself, a[peiron, which is the category of matter as such (or still more generally, all reality) would not be identical with matter that moves in a disorderly manner. par’ hJmi`n, within the realm of what is visible to us and in individual objects, is something to be clarified in its opposition to ejn tw` / pantiv (Philebus, 29b). Trans.—this passage seems to be an interpretation of what is said at 29a–30b of the Philebus. This is, without doubt, how this clause must be translated. This is how I believe soma skivan ejmpoiou`n has to be translated. Plato doubtless chose this expression because through it a causality that is visible in us is also expressed. The quantity and quality of the body is expressed in the shadows. In the original this passage reads: Ouj ga;r pou dokou`mevn ge, w\ Prwvtarce, ta; tevttara
ejkei`na, pevra~ kai; a[peiron, kai; koino;n kai; to; th`~ aijtiva~ gevno~, ehn a{pasi tevtar-
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ton ejnovn tou`to, ejn me;n toi`~ par’ hJmi`n yuchvn te parev con, kai; swmaokivan ejmpoiou`n kai; ptaivsanto~ swvmato~ ijatrikh;n, kai; ejn a[lloi~ a[lla suntiqe;n kai; ajkouvmenon pa`san kai; pantoivan sofivan ejpikalei`sqai, tw`n d’ aujtw`n touvtwn o[ntwn ejn o{lw/ te oujranw` / kai; kata; megavla mevrh, kai; prosevti kalw`n kai; . . . timiwtavtwn fuvsin [That’s
44.
45. 46. 47. 48.
49.
because, Protarchus, we surely don’t think that the four—limit, unlimited, common, and the genus of cause, which is the fourth among all—that this, in supplying soul in the things among us and implanting corporeal exercise and, if and when the body stumbles, medicine, and in putting together different things and curing them, gets called by the name of omnifarious wisdom in its entirety but although these same things are in the whole sky and throughout its big parts, and are besides beautiful and untainted, then it has not contrived in them the nature of the most beautiful and most honorable things] (Philebus, 30a–b). Following Ficino, Pleßing translates these last words in an entirely incorrect manner: “that in these genera of things, the nature of which is to be most beautiful and glorious, is not to be found.” (1) I do not know this meaning of memhcanh`sqai (reperiri , as Ficino has it). (2) According to the translation given above, I see a way to make a much improved connection with what follows, where indeed what is evidently at issue is the ordering of the world through divine understanding, for which the word mhcanh`sqai is entirely appropriate.—What is to be understood by “most glorious and most beautiful,” which emerged through those forms, will soon be made clear. It is worth noting that this passage reads a[peiron ejn tw` / panti; poluv, not to; a[peiron ejn tw` / panti;, or to; pa;n to; a[peiron ei\nai (Philebus, 30c), which Ficino translates as “infinitum prorsus in hoc universo consistere.” [Benardete: “an extensive unlimited in the whole.”] That is, understanding is not thinkable without activity and activity is not thinkable without an original and active force of movement ( yuchv). See Pleßing, pg. 124. Pleßing, §17. The stubbornness with which many learned and clever men assert the substantiality of the ideas may be quite reliably be explained by the fact that they did not see how Plato was able to speak of pure representations which have intelligible objects, precisely because they did not distinguish between representations of ideas and the ideas themselves (between the form of our power of representation and the object of each representation). eij me;n ov u`~ kai; dovxa ajlhqhv~ ejston duvo gevnh, pantavpasin ei\nai kaq’ auJta; tau`ta ta; ajnaivsqhta uJf’ hJmw`n, ei[dh noouvmena movnon eij d’ w{~ tisi faivnetai, dovxa ajlhqh;~
nou` diafevriei to; mhdevn, pavnq oJpovsa su\ dia; tou` swvmato~ aijsqanovmeqa, qetevon bebaiovtata. duvo dh; lektevon ejkeivnw, diovti cwri;~ gegovnaton (But this is only possible in representation. We are able to conceive of no concept that exists outside of representation, which he do not at once connect to a physically existing object) . . . ajnomoivw~ te e[ ceton. to; me;n ga;r aujtw`n dia; didach`~, to; d ’ uJpo; peiqou`~ hJmi`n, ejg-
givgnetai. kai; to; me;n aj ei; meta; ajlhqou`~ lovgou, to; de;, a[logon, kai; to; me;n, ajkivnhton peiqoi`, to; de;, merapeistovn kai; tou` me;n pavnta a[ndra metev cein fatevon, nou` de; qeouv~, ahnqtwvpwn de; gevno~ bracuv ti; touvtwn de; ou{tw~ ej covntwn, oJmologhtevon e}n
