Plato's Account of the Diseases of the Soul in Timaeus 86B1–87B9 - Lautner

Plato’s Account of the Diseases of the Soul in Timaeus 86B1–87B91 PETER LAUTNER [email protected] Abstract The paper aims to show that ἄνοια is the general term for the diseases of the soul, and that μανία and ἀμαϑία are not necessarily two distinct species but two levels of the same disease: ignorance signifies the cognitive state, whereas madness indicates both a cognitive state and a specific phenomenal character. Plato’s other remarks on psychic ailments can be incorporated into this account. The result can also be accommodated to the general theory of the soul–body relationship in the dialogue. Incarnated souls cannot work without the corresponding activity of the body, even if this does not rule out the possibility for the soul to exist in a discarnate state. Keywords: Timaeus, diseases of the soul, thoughtlessness, madness, ignorance

After having examined the ailments of the body at length in 81E6–86A8, Plato turns to the disorders of the soul. It is striking to find that, compared to the discussion of bodily diseases, he settles this matter quite briefly. I believe that his account deserves more attention than it has received hitherto, if for no other reason than because, as a case study, it offers an excellent opportunity to examine the relation between body and soul. One can also see the result of the conception according to which the soul is intimately linked to spatial motions.2 An exploration of the causes

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The first version was presented on a colloquium on the Timaeus, held in Prague in June 2007. Thanks for comments and criticism to the audience, especially to István Bodnár, Philip Grgic, Pavel Gregoric and Karel Thein. The revised version has been read by Luc Brisson, whose remarks also helped me to improve the paper a great deal. Finally, I am also grateful for the remarks and corrections made by the anonymous referee. But all shortcomings are mine, needless to say. It may have started with the Phaedrus’ definition (245C–246A) according to which soul is a self-moving, and thus immortal, entity, which has also been noted by T. M. Robinson 2000, 37–55. The definition prevails in the Timaeus too, where rational soul has been constructed out of the revolutions of the Same and Different. This led

apeiron, vol. 44, pp. 22–39 © Walter de Gruyter 2011

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Plato’s Account of the Diseases of the Soul in Timaeus 86B1–87B9

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of psychic illness gives a fascinating demonstration of the application of a metaphysical theory to medical matters. My aim is to show that on this view psychic diseases are primarily cognitive failures. The difference between the two types of diseases lies, not so much in the presence of cognitive elements, but in their phenomenal character. Furthermore, I hope to show that this particular view can also be characterized in terms of a certain dualism, though quite unlike the one we know from Descartes. Plato starts with the claim that diseases of the soul originate in bodily states. Nowhere else does he mention any other source of mental disorder, which may suggest that he is going to make all sorts of psychic disorder dependent on the body. Diseases of the soul are called thoughtlessness (ἄνοια) and divided into two kinds, madness (μανία) and ignorance (ἀμαϑία). Excessive pleasure and pain are among the gravest of such diseases, which implies either that excessive pleasures and pains are all psychic states, or that there are excessive pleasures and pains that are psychic states, whereas others are not. As plants do not seem capable of suffering from excessive pleasures and pains, the first alternative may be the case. To argue that they are not to be equated with the specific objects of sense-perception, such as colours, sounds, etc., is not too implausible, perhaps.3 At any rate, excessive pleasures and pains render us unable to see or hear aright. As a consequence, they destroy our capacity to find our way in the world. Sometimes they drive us crazy (λυττᾷ, 86C2). Later on (87B1–B5) he adds that bad upbringing, evil forms of government allowing for vile speech both in public and private, and the lack of the possibility of proper education can also contribute to psychic disorder. At first sight, it is not quite clear whether we must rank these social factors among those mentioned earlier in the passage. In one important sense, they are clearly bodily, for they act on the soul through the senses. As Plato says in 43C4–7, when the soul is put in the stream of generation, the motions coming

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G. R. Carone to argue for the thesis that the soul is of a physical nature and cannot operate independently of a body: see her 2005a, 49–50, with a reference to the anticipation of this position in the Phaedrus. She also discusses the issue in her 2005b, 227–270. Her assumption has been criticized, effectively I believe, by Fronterotta 2007. Plants have this kind of affection, as we read in 77B3–C3, although they may not perceive in the way animals do, which in turn implies that they do not perceive colours, sounds, smells and other qualities peculiar to the particular senses. Furthermore, on describing the specific nature of pleasure and pain in 64D–65A, Plato does not claim that there is an intimate connection between pleasures and pains on the one hand and some of the particular senses on the other. Perception of pleasure and pain may thus accompany the activity of the particular senses, although it does it in a way not specified by Plato.

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from the physical world reach it as sense-perceptions. They perturb the revolutions of the soul. Sense-perception connects us to that realm, and everything we acquire through the senses may disturb the revolutions of the rational soul. Foul language and bad government affect us in just that way. Thus evil forms of government and harmful speech may not represent a wholly separate source of psychic illness, rather they form a subgroup of harm spreading by way of the body. In discussing bodily conditions Plato takes the sample of hypersexuality (86C4–9). When the seed in the marrow of men becomes copious with overflowing moisture the person is filled with throes from time to time and obtains many pleasures in his desires and their offspring.4 Another example is distress (λύπη, 86E4) which is also caused by bodily ingredients. When acid and salt phlegms and many bitter and bilious humours roam about the body, and in finding no exit are pent up within, commingle with the locomotion (ϕορά, 87A1) of the soul, and blend the vapours arising from them with it, they produce all sorts of diseases of the soul. In making their way to the three seats of the soul, depending on which of the seats they invade, they induce various types of discontent and ill-temper, of rashness and cowardice, and also of forgetfulness and slowness in learning. If, however, evil deeds are nothing but results of the bodily impacts that we cannot master, then, Plato concludes, no one does wrong willingly.5 These remarks have caused considerable controversy among interpreters. Just how the detail of the text spells out a well-marked position is debated and inescapably debatable; even the best readings are only possibly correct. Keeping this in mind, I should like to put forward two main theses, one of them divided into two.6 – 1,a. Plato discusses all sorts of psychic disease, considers them cognitive states, and distinguishes two levels there, ignorance and madness. Put in another way, there is no psychic disease that does not affect the cognitive state of the person. – 1,b. Thoughtlessness does not involve the failure of the divine reason to exercise due control over the other parts of the soul.

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For a similar description of sexual desire in general, see 91B. This is an issue I am not going to discuss here. For a thorough discussion, see M. M. Mackenzie 1981, 174–178, R. F. Stalley 1996, 357–371, and C. Gill 2000, 59–84, esp. 61–64. It seems that Plato himself also criticizes the thesis in the subsequent section on restoring psychic health. The passage has been scrutinized by C. Gill (n. 4), 59–84. He explains the theory by using Galenic and Stoic readings of the text. In what follows, I shall be concentrating on the text of the Timaeus itself in order to explain the passage within the context of the dialogue.



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– 2. Plato’s account allows for a direct interaction between body and soul and explains it in physiological terms, but this is not to deny dualism altogether. 1,a The claim is that all diseases of the soul are primarily cognitive states, not just distorted feelings or emotional dispositions. In other words, all psychic diseases have two aspects, one purely cognitive and one cognitive with a particular phenomenal character, the latter being referred to by μανία. This is not to say that they are bound to occur simultaneously. Ignorance is nothing but a cognitive state, whereas madness implies ignorance plus a phenomenal feature characteristic to μανία. The passage begins with a statement according to which diseases of the soul are due to the perverted states of the body.7 The crucial text itself (86B2–4) can be understood in two ways. It says either that the disease of the soul is called thoughtlessness, and it has two kinds of thoughtlessness, madness and ignorance, or that the disease of the soul called thoughtlessness, has two kinds, madness and ignorance. The second version leaves open the possibility that there is another type of psychic illness as well. In what follows, I shall make some points in favour of the first possibility, and try to show that the other remarks on psychic diseases in the Timaeus can also be incorporated into that scheme.

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It runs as follows: νόσον μὲν δὴ ψυχῆς ἄνοιαν συγχωρητέον, δὐο δ’ ἀνοίας γένη, τὸ μὲν μανίαν, τὸ δὲ ἀμαθίαν. As for the version claiming that there other types of psychic diseases than thoughtlessness (and thus ignorance and madness), one might ask for an allusion to this type in the text, but it is quite unclear whether Plato alludes to it anywhere in the Timaeus. Given that the treatise seems to be fairly well arranged, one might expect that Plato should have found a place to discuss systematically those diseases that are not to be subsumed under ἄνοια. There is no such discussion. In his translation D. J. Zeyl 2000 goes for the second version (see also A. W. Price 1995, 86, Mackenzie (n. 4), 176–177, and Robinson (n. 1), 50). In conformity to his general tendency to emphasize a sharp dualism between body and soul, F. M. Cornford (n. 6), 346, favours this reading. All the evidence he lists for this thesis is taken from the Laws (782D), or from Euripides, but this might have a restricted relevance to the theory of the Timaeus. On the other hand, the first version has been adopted by A. J. Taylor 1928, ad loc., J. Pigeaud 1981 (20063), 52, see also L. Brisson 1992, Chr. Gill 2000 (n. 4), 60; 2006, 200, Tieleman 2003, 188 and G. E. R. Lloyd 2003, 155–156. Pigeaud refers to the end of the section that is supposed to prove that all psychic disorders are of physical origin, implying that ignorance also originates in the condition of the body. I do not think that we can rule out either of these two options on grammatical grounds. In what follows I aim to show that the reading I prefer gives us a coherent and unified picture of Plato’s theory of psychic diseases. On this reading, Plato does not give only a taxative list of the various diseases, but attempts to arrange them systematically.


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It seems that ignorance and madness have a prominent position in the discussion of the diseases of the soul. In the passage just referred to we do not find any detailed examination, but later on (87E5–88B5) Plato is more specific on the conditions of their arousal. He claims ignorance is due to the upset of balance between body and soul. When a large body is joined with a petty and feeble mind (διάνοια) then the motions of the stronger part will predominate. The interest of the body will be served abundantly, whereas the soul is relegated into the background, which renders it dull, forgetful and slow to learn. The final result is ignorance, the gravest disease of the soul. It can also happen the other way round, with the balance being upset by the excessive dominance of the soul. But that alone may not produce psychic illness. Overexercise of the soul at the expense of the body corrupts the body, but it is not clear whether it corrupts the soul as well. If, by chance, the soul is more powerful than the body, it gets excited and churns the whole being. As a consequence, the body will be worn out. Again, when the soul is engulfed with teaching lessons and verbal skirmishes, both in public and private, the quarrels cause it to fire the body up and rock it back and forth. All these movements seem to hurt the body, but it is far from obvious that they harm the soul too. They might make the conduct of the soul uncontrolled by the body, but that may not indicate a perverted state of the soul, though it certainly indicates disruption in the proper relation between body and soul. But that does not suffice to produce psychic illness. At least, the expression (περιθύμως ἴσχῃ, 88A1) used by Plato in this context does not support such a suggestion since both θύμος and ἐπιθυμία refer to the parts of the soul, not to a distorted state. The best way to explain it may be to say that the disease of the body caused by the soul may not be equated with a distorted state of the soul. Disease of the former is caused by the imbalance between the two constituents, body and soul, while disease of the latter is due to the disorder in the revolutions of the Same and the Other in the soul, which is caused by bodily movements. Yet, that evidence alone is not enough to show that psychic illness is a predominantly cognitional state. Some light may be thrown on this question by considering certain peculiarities of Plato’s usage. The general term for the disease of the soul is ἄνοια, and it is very likely that Plato uses it to refer to all kinds of disorder in the revolutions of the rational soul. To prove this, we have to take a look at the passage about the consequences of incarnation (43A6–44D2). When the infant is set into the stream of generation he proceeds without order and reason. He is capable of moving into six directions, which renders his motions random. Here Plato gives us a vivid description of a new-born baby who flings his arms about and tries to wander every way in all directions. The trouble gets more serious when influences from without reach the soul. They do it in the form of senseperceptions, and cause such disorder in the state of the soul that the revoBrought to you by | Pontificia Universidad (Pontificia Universidad) Authenticated | 172.16.1.226 Download Date | 6/28/12 11:15 PM


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lution of the Same gets completely blocked and falls out of control, while the revolutions of the Different will be twisted, thereby resulting in fractures and disruptions of all possible forms. The consequences of the disorder are false judgements and thoughtlessness (ἀνοήτος, 44A3). The conduct of such a soul is fully erratic (43B4). Whenever the revolutions get in touch with an external object, they claim it to be the same as something or other than something, but they do it falsely. It turns out that it is because of all these affections that the soul comes to be thoughtless (ἄνους) for the first time (44A8). In sum, psychic disorder is the immediate result of incarnation and a cognitive state. This is the psychic condition we are born with. To get rid of this gravest of all diseases (44C1–2) one has to be nourished and educated properly in order that the revolutions calm down and pursue their normal course. When the revolutions attain the correct shape, the soul becomes intelligent (44B7). A person with such a soul makes right judgments and leads a life that imitates the only perfect motion around us, the revolution of the stars (90C8–D1). That leads to a virtuous life, which is also the proper care for the soul (90C6). The principal form of caring about the soul is to follow the thinking and revolutions of the All that are akin to the motions in us.8 If the person does not care about that, however, he is doomed to live a maimed life and returns to Hades with an imperfect and thoughtless (ἀνοήτος) soul (44C3). Furthermore, the passage in 43A6–44D2 seems to support the thesis that ἄνοια is the general term for all the diseases of the soul. Before entering a human body the soul is healthy insofar as its revolutions are undisturbed. When it is plunged into the stream of generation, however, the revolutions get blocked or twisted.9 Thus the motions of the soul become perturbed, and it is the disordered state that Plato calls disease and refers to it by the term ἄνοια. He does not make mention of any other type of

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See 90C7–D1: τῷ δ’ ἐν ἡμῖν θείῳ συγγενεῖς εἰσιν κινήσεις αἱ τοῦ πάντος διανοήσεις καὶ περιϕοραί. For simplicity, I follow the literal interpretation of the text, shared by both ancient (Atticus, Plutarch of Chaeronea) and modern commentators, according to which Plato did intend to say that the Demiurge formed the cosmos out of a pre-existing stuff, and the narrative is not only a dramatization of eternally existing relations between the Demiurge, the cosmos and the ideas. At this point, however, not much hinges on which of the interpretive modes we accept. In endorsing the eternalist view one still might say that it does not belong to the true nature of the human soul to inhabit the body, for the revolutions of the rational soul are prior to, and thus independent of, the body. The literature on this question abounds. For further information it will suffice to refer to M. Baltes 1976–1978. For a convincing case for the eternalist reading, see M. Baltes 1996, 76–96.


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disease.10 Besides this, he also makes it clear that thoughtlessness is a cognitive state. He seems to give two reasons for that. First, the disease consists in the disorder of the revolutions of the Same and Different, which implies that it is nothing but a distorted condition of the rational soul. Second and relatedly, it is linked to false judgements (44A3). In making judgement about something, the person claims it to be the same as something or other than something, but whatever judgement he may make, it is false. This last point turns up again in 86B4–C3, although in a somewhat different form. Here Plato notes that any affection related to madness or ignorance is to be called disease. They affect the veridical status of sense-perception and deprive us of our reasoning capacity (λόγισμος, 86C3). We can see, then, that madness is one type of thoughtlessness. That may mean that madness also involves cognitive disorder. But how does it differ from ignorance? The question is further complicated by a list of diseases in 87A4–7, where Plato speaks about psychic disorders caused by acid and salt phlegms or bilious humours. In making their way to the three seats of the soul, they beget diseases proper to that particular part of the soul. Thus, in hitting the region around the liver they produce ill-temper and discontent, their invasion of the heart leads to rashness and cowardice, whereas turmoil in the brain gives rise to forgetfulness and slowness to learn. How can all these diseases be subsumed under the categories of madness and ignorance? My suggestion is that while both forgetfulness and slowness to learn can be characterized as types of ignorance, the four other types might seem to represent madness. Such a suggestion, however, runs the risk of completely separating madness and ignorance. Do they exist without any inner connection? Does Plato think that, to mention one example, cowardice does not involve a failure to sum up the situation properly? If it does involve this, we must wonder whether cowardice depends on ignorance as well. The first part of the answer, I believe, relies on considering three sections of the text. To begin with, we have to look at passage 86B5–C4. There Plato claims that both madness and ignorance originate in excessive pleasure or pain. If someone is carried away by excessive joy or sorrow, he does his best to grasp the object of pleasure, that is, to maximize pleasure, or to get rid of the object of pain, regardless of what price he has to pay.

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This is why he fails to mention ‘psychogenic mental illness’, the silence about which has been noted critically by N. E. Ostenfeld 1987, 81, n. 32. The answer is that in discarnate state the soul is healthy. The cause of illness is the incarnation whereby the soul is exposed to bodily influences. Properly speaking, there is no psychogenic mental illness. This has also been noted by C. Joubaud 1992, 179, stressing too that thoughtlessness is the first manifestation of human evil (180).



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The effort ends up in madness and ignorance.11 That may indicate that they not only belong to the same genus, but also have a common basis, which is the overwhelming intensity of pleasure or pain. They also occur simultaneously. But where do pleasure and pain come from? Plato devotes a short section (64C8–65B5) to the explanation of pleasure and pain. Animals feel pain when suffering violent and unnatural change, and pleasure when getting back to their normal condition.12 There is no specific account of the pleasures and pains peculiar to the rational soul. In fact, it seems that when Plato speaks about them he states that they must reach reason in order that the animal can experience them (64B5–6). The account recalls the thesis in the Philebus. To feel pleasure or pain is to be aware of the respective bodily changes, and awareness is an activity of the rational part of the soul. This may involve that we feel appropriate pains insofar as they do not disturb the revolutions of the rational soul, or they disturb them in a moderate extent only. The second passage comes from section 86E7–87A7. Here we are told that diseases are due not only to affections produced by external objects, but to humours of a certain type as well. Acid and salt phlegms and bitter and bilious humours roam about the body, and in finding no exit they are pent up within, commingle with the locomotion of the soul and blend the vapours arising from them within it. The interaction gives rise to various types of disease. Plato does not talk about affections in this passage. The reason might well be that affections arise when influences from without reach the body. As he describes the motion of humours in the body, affections may arise when their stream touches the soul. In this case, therefore, the various types of disease result from the motions of the humours. Interestingly enough, Plato does not specify what types of humours cause ignorance and what cause madness. These are, then, the two main sources of the diseases of the soul. In addition to that, finally, bad forms of government, lack of proper education, and foul language may also prevent such diseases being cured. They are definitely responsible for ἀμαϑία insofar as they can activate bad possibilities, and suppress good ones. Diseases arise because of a certain condition of the body, as the first sentence of the text makes it clear. Bad education and government, however, are not really a separate source of psychic disease but only come into play when there is already a psychoso11

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The term (ἀμαϑία) may not mean ‘mental retardation’ as P. Lain Entralgo thinks (1958, 190, n. 43) since it does not necessarily refer to a chronic illness, whereas mental retardation seems to be a lingering condition. It may well be that ἀμαϑία can also refer to a short time lapse, or to false judgement that is due to the perturbations on the revolutions of the Same and the Different. We have to see that this account does not support the thesis that pleasure can be harmful unconditionally. It is also striking that, on this view, pleasure arises when the body, or a part of it, returns to its natural state, not when it is in a natural state.


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matic problem. It would seem to be only the meaning of bad arguments rather than the impact of the disparate words that could be at issue here, and this seems to relate directly to the rational part of the soul. The revolutions of the soul would already have to be deranged to accept bad education or government as pleasant.13 The second part of the answer draws on certain general considerations about the nature of the non-rational faculties of the soul. If, on Plato’s account, ignorance and madness are not based on different conditions of the body, the difference between them cannot be due to different bodily states. We cannot interpret the Timaeus theory as relegating ignorance to one bodily state and madness to another. Consequently, we cannot say that they form two entirely separate subclasses of psychic illness.14 My suggestion is that they differ in that ignorance gives the cognitive basis of the disease, whereas the various types of madness constitute the phenomenal level of the same disease. To put it another way, the same disease has both a cognitive element and a phenomenal character. Both depend on the same bodily conditions, although in a different way. Madness involves a phenomenal component that is a result of the extent of the bodily disruption. The suggestion may be further supported by the use of the terms λυττᾷ and ἐμμανής in the dialogue. On discussing the effects of pleasures and pains Plato mentions various possibilities. One is frenzy (86C2). If someone is carried away by such feelings he is in frenzy and at the same time his capacity for reasoning is lower. Moreover, it also turns out that abundance of the seed in the marrow leads not only to intemperate sexual desire, but to pleasure and pain as well. It is like a tree overladen with fruit. Those who experience intense pleasures and pains are maddened by them for most of their life (86C7). Now, in all likelihood, the words λυττᾷ and ἐμμανής signify the same condition.15 Hence, one might say that ignorance accompanies frenzy and madness alike. It forms the cognitive basis of madness. This all suggests that pleasure and pain underlie both ignorance and madness. Strangely enough, Plato does not specify which pleasure or pain underlies ignorance and which madness. There is, then, no reason to make any difference between the factors that underlie the two kinds of psychic disease. For this reason, it seems that all psychic dis13 14 15

I owe this point to the anonymous referee. Price (n. 6) suggests that they are aspects, not kinds, of thoughtlessness. In what follows, I am trying to elaborate this point. Thus Pigeaud (n. 6), 53. We must also be clear that by this time μανία refers to a wide range of mental illnesses, and the definition given in the pseudo-Galenic Definitiones medicales (ἔκστασις τῆς διανοίας, XIX K 416) reflects earlier conceptions, see J. Pigeaud 1987, 67–69. If madness is a deviation of reason, then we have evidence that Plato could get external support for his view that psychic diseases are perverted states of the rational soul.



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eases are derived from bodily states, and there is one common genus for all of them: thoughtlessness. 1,b One may also doubt if thoughtlessness means the inability of the divine reason to gain control over the non-rational faculties of the soul.16 First of all, we have to see that, as far as the diseases are concerned, the main burden falls upon our rational faculties. Disorder may not only be due to the lack of control over appetite or spirit. As a matter of fact, the primary form of disease affects reason and is due to incarnation. On speaking about disease of the soul, Plato is inclined to emphasise either that reason is exposed to external influences via perceptions, as it is in the case of pleasure and pain produced by affections, or that certain bodily conditions give rise to psychic phenomena that affect or even destroy our reasoning capacity. Among these conditions are the quantity of the seed in the marrow, the porousness of the bones, and the preponderance of certain humours. These are material constituents, and not psychic forces. Furthermore, Plato does not allude to spirit and appetite as distinct parts of the soul. What we find instead is a remark on the three seats of the soul (87A3–4), which does not exactly amount to saying that the soul consists of three parts that are functionally independent. It seems, however, that disorders of the rational faculties derive from three sources. They may be due to external influences that cause excessive pleasure or pain which belong to the gravest diseases of the soul. In this way, they are linked to sense-perceptions (64A1 ff.), insofar as they accompany them, although not confined to a particular type of sensation. Disorders in the revolutions of the rational soul may also arise when abundance of the seed results in sexual intemperance. As a habit or attitude, intemperance in sexual matters is also accompanied with intense pleasure and pain, and they may divert reason from right thinking. One must realise here that Plato does not say that intemperance itself is responsible for any disease of the rational faculty. He does not claim that it disturbs any of the revolutions there. Rather, we may be entitled to infer that the turbulence is due to the presence of intense pleasures or pains, which, in turn, is due to the abundance of the seed. It does disturb the motions of the rational faculty, whereas intemperance is the result or perhaps sign of the disturbance.17 One consequence of the damage is the formation of incorrect ethical beliefs, which is due to πάθη. This is why unbridled persons are called bad. They are unable to master their passions. Although on Plato’s view such persons are unwillingly bad, it shows that the problem has a

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As has been stated by F. M. Cornford 1938, 346, and P.-M. Schuhl 19682, 116. Unbridled attitude (ἀκολασία) in general is one of those diseases that were foreseen by the gods. To weaken its effects, they made long entrails and coiled them around the abdomen to keep the consumed food within for a longer period, see 72E3–73A5.


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clear ethical relevance, and that the rational faculties are very much involved in this process too. Their failure is not intentional, however. They are under the influence of excessive pleasures and pains. Interestingly enough, Plato does not credit intemperance with any causal efficiency in this matter. The third source of disorder is the preponderance of certain humours. What kind of humours are they? It seems that for the most part they consist of phlegm and bile. They are not entirely different, for a certain type of phlegm is the result of the combination of black and acid bile with a saline quality in the presence of the heat (83C5–7). At any rate, bile gathers around the liver, thus with easy access to one of the seats of the soul (71B7–8). A mixture of white phlegm and black bile can spread over the revolutions in the head and disturb them, which leads to epilepsy (85A5–B2). Although there is no doubt that their most precious target is the head, phlegm and bile can invade the other two seats of the soul as well. The impact may be the same, but it causes different types of diseases depending on which of the seats they hit. On hitting the region around the liver they cause discontent and ill-temper, which is melancholy.18 Invasion of the heart gives rise to rashness or cowardice, while intrusion into the head results in forgetfulness and slowness to learn (not to mention the sacred disease). The description of hysteria in 91C–D is a peculiar case. If the womb remains infertile long beyond the due season, it is vexed and wanders all over the body, blocking up the passages of the breath. This causes all sorts of other diseases as well. But it is far from clear whether hysteria is considered a psychic or a somatic disease. Plato does not mention any of the specific results that characterise psychic phenomena, while its causes are bodily.19 He does not connect it to other diseases of the soul either. What is also clear in all these descriptions is that on Plato’s view there is no direct causal interaction between the various states of the soul, although there is an interaction between the rectilinear motions of the body and revolutions of the soul. Arising in the region around the liver, discontent does not exert any influence on thinking, nor does it cause rashness. Plato seems to suggest that the relation between diseases of the appetite and forgetfulness is not a direct causal link. What his account suggests is rather that both share a causal origin in some bodily condition. Nothing rules out, of course, that slowness in learning and ill-temper may coincide, but their concurrence is due to the same underlying bodily factor, the presence of a large amount of bile in the region around the liver

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Plato does not state it explicitly, but this is how melancholy is described in the Hippocratic Aphorisms VI, § 23, IV L 568 ἢν ϕόβος ἢ δυσθυμίη πολὺν χρόνον διατελῇ, μελαγχολικὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον. See Joubaud (n. 10), 182.



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and in the head. Ill-temper does not produce slowness in learning. There is no direct causal connection between the two psychic phenomena. To conclude, both the passage about sexual intemperance and the section on the role of humours in the formation of certain attitudes indicate that the lower faculties are not in ‘a position to exert any influence on the revolutions of reason. Conversely, any control reason can exert on such lower order psychic phenomena as ill-temper and cowardice has to be exercised on the bodily processes that underlie them. But, in order to do this efficiently, it has to be in proper condition. As a consequence, psychic therapy should also draw on the right understanding of the relation between body and soul (90A–D). All sorts of cures are described in physical terms. In the introductory sentences of the passage under investigation, we do not find much detail as to how such disease occurs. Although there are plenty of allusions in the dialogue to the way body and soul interact, here we do not find any detailed explanation of this particular type of interaction. As Plato tells us in 90C–D, cure is based on sense-perception. We have to care for our reason by studying planetary motions and recognizing their proportionate nature. As the revolutions of the All are akin to the revolutions of the human rational soul, the latter can be corrected if the person attends to the motions of heavenly bodies.20 Listening to music is also beneficial, as we learn from 47C4–E2. Like the circulations of the planets, the motions of harmony are akin to the revolutions of our soul. Music is given to those who can make intelligent use of the gifts of the Muses. Only they know how to use it best. When the revolutions have lost their proportion and harmony, music helps us to restore them to order and concord. Rhythm has been bestowed upon us for the same purposes.21 Looking at the stars and listening to music with proper harmonies contribute to the restoration of the revolutions in the head, which cures not only madness but also helps us to get rid of ignorance.22 By virtue of its healthy state, then, reason can exercise control over the other activities because the revolutions impinge on other motions to make them more regular. This point leads me over to the problem of how Plato accounts for the interaction between bodily ingredients and the soul. 2. The second principal thesis I am arguing for is that on Plato’s account of the diseases of the soul, the relation of the soul to the body 20 21 22

Plato stresses the benefit of the sense of sight in this respect in 47A3–4. For a reference to the therapeutical side of music, see Schuhl (n. 6), 119. For the problem of how the imbalance between body and soul is related to ignorance, see F. Stok 1996, 2282–2409, esp. 2357. One might answer that, as learning is the business of the rational soul, balance keeps its revolutions sound, which is the basic condition of learning (see also 90A–D). Stok (at 2357) refers to Cicero, Tusc. 3. 10 for a tacit recognition of that problem.


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cannot be discussed in terms of a Cartesian distinction. This is far from being an original claim, though I hope I can add a new emphasis, and show what kind of dualism we are dealing with here.23 The main reason I am discussing it is that the result – the activity of the incarnate soul is necessarily accompanied by an activity of the body – contributes to the claim that psychic diseases arise from bodily impacts. There is a division of opinion among interpreters of the Timaeus about what kind of relation between body and soul Plato is proposing here. The passage which rules out Cartesian dualism is 86E5–87A2. Phlegms and bilious humours are said to roam about the body and get in touch with the locomotions of the soul in various ways. They emit vapours and blend them with the motions of the soul. The vapours are of a physical nature. They must be connected to the soul in a physical way, otherwise we need an additional explanation of the way they affect it.24 However, Plato seems to content himself with the remark he actually makes. There is no allusion in this part of the Timaeus to an alternative explanation. Vapours thus may be taken to be capable of distorting both the motions characteristic to the non-rational faculties and the revolutions of the rational soul. Furthermore, the humours exert considerable influence on the soul not only by emitting vapours; Plato says that they are also mixed up with the rational soul directly. The key term by which he describes the process is συμμείξαντες. In the dialogue, as in many other texts in Plato, the term signifies a physical interaction.25 Therefore, it is most likely that it plays the same role in this passage too. This means not only that we have affections caused by some object within or outside the body: what Plato emphasises here seems to be that the soul is directly hit by certain components of the body, which involves physical interaction. The thesis gets further support from the general claim in 88B6–C1 that the soul cannot be moved without moving the body, nor the body without the soul, so that each may be balanced by the other and so be sound.26 This means that the incarnate soul cannot be active without the activity of some part of the body. Even if it induces a motion constituting psychic activities, arousal of a certain kind of bodily 23

24

25 26

The relation between body and soul has been explained in terms of a certain type of dualism by L. Brisson 1999, 147–176. For a criticism of Brisson’s approach, see D. Miller 1999, 177–195, esp. 192, and T. Johansen 2000, 87–111, at 92. The physical interaction between body and soul has been argued for by Carone (n. 1, 2005), 49–50, and her paper 2005b, esp. 239. Thus the revolutions of the soul may also be conceived as being material in some way, as has been shown by Carone 2005b, esp. 239, but it is very far from being clear that the activity of the rational soul can be described in terms of material processes. 57D4, 83C7, see also Laws 678C8. μήτε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνεῦ σώματος κινεῖν μήτε σῶμα ἀνεῦ ψυχῆς, ἵνα ἀμυνομένω γίγνησθον ἰσορρόπω καὶ ὑγιῆ.



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motion is inevitable. The practical conclusion is that body and soul must be given an equal share in exercise. This is not to say, however, that Plato’s account of psychic diseases rules out dualism altogether. At the level of human beings at least, Plato admits that the rational individual soul existed before being thrown into the stream of the body (43A4–6).27 This means that the rational individual soul and the body are separable. Nevertheless, dualism can be maintained with two restrictions only. First, it is clearly not a Cartesian type of distinction between two radically different entities. Consisting of circular motions, the rational soul must be extended. There is no fundamental difference between body and soul since they are capable of acting on one another, which implies that they share a common nature. The rational soul consists of revolutions, exposing it to the influence of other types of motions, the first of which hit it in the moment of incarnation. In the case of disease, the harmful effects come from the body. Their ultimate origin is either the upset of balance between body and soul, or the impact of bodily motions on the revolutions of reason at incarnation. Because diseases of the soul are cognitive states, they involve errors in judgement. We judge sights, sounds, and the other qualities we perceive, and this is why Plato says that those who suffer from psychic illness cannot see or hear aright.28 Of course, judgements can be made on other matters too, but the point here may be to stress that, because of their cognitive nature, diseases affect our judgemental capacity. If disease comes from the body, then our judgemental capacity can also be changed, for better or worse, by means of bodily alterations. Second, in humans, perception in the full sense involves the activity of reason. The main problem in this respect is whether the appetitive faculty (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) can have perception in the full sense. To be sure, it has no share in reason but is guided by images and phantasms (71A5–6). Given the Sophist’s conception of ϕαντασία συμμείξις ἀιοθήσεως καὶ δόξης in 264B2, ϕαντασία cannot provide an epistemic resource that is independent of δόξα. Since Timaeus denies δόξα to the appetite (70E5–71B5, 77B3–C5), this faculty cannot possess ϕαντασία either. Moreover, it is not clear that the appetite is responding to the images on the liver as images; this would require that it possess quasi-perceptual capacities. Rather, it seems to respond to pleasure and pain due to the painting of the images that causes the liver to relax or contract. At any

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28

On the difference between World-Soul and individual human souls, see the much disputed passage of 41D4–7. If we endorse the view that we are dealing with eternal structures, dramatized in a certain way, we can say that the rational human soul is ontologically prior to human body. It depends on the Demiurge for its existence, while body depends on the younger gods. See Stalley (n. 4), 366.


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rate, it might be absurd to say that appetite sees the images on the liver.29 It has been shown that Plato employs the term αἴσθησις to allude to a wide range of activities, to include cases of awareness involving the body, or to constitute awareness of something corporeal.30 But that does not rule out that on occasion he is ready to specify its meaning. Human sense-perception is an activity that involves the interference of the cognizant (τὸ ϕρονιμόν, 64B4–5).31 By contrast, plants can also perceive pleasure and pain (77B3–C3) but this does not involve their seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting or touching. Their way of perceiving things is thus more primitive than human sense-perception, which necessarily involves awareness. In addition, the non-rational capacities may be nothing but certain states or movements of bodily tissues that are well-disposed to receive and transmit the circular movements of the rational soul. Their impulses are structured in conformity with the nature and needs of the body (70D7–8). Plato underlines the difference between reason and the two non-rational parts by saying that the latter were created by the younger gods, the Sun, Moon, and other heavenly beings responsible for the cycles of generation in the physical world. The non-rational parts of the soul are the result of embodiment, and they perish at death. However, they can also act upon the revolutions of reason.32 What reason is there to think, after all, that Timaeus advocates a dualistic position that allows for an actual separation between body and soul? In brief, does he admit that the soul can exist without the body? Once incarnated, the human soul cannot move without there being a respective movement in the body (88B6–C1). Neither can the body move without some activity of the soul. It might seem that soul is bound to the body in a certain manner, although not for its existence. It is definitely bound to it for its activities in the incarnate state. Its diseases are due to the harmful impacts arising in, or arriving through the body. It seems, however, that all these conditions obtain only when the soul is in the body. Once incar-

29 30 31

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As far as the spirited faculty is concerned, we do not face similar problems, for Plato says that reason can communicate with it by the aid of motions, not images. See M. Frede 1987, 3–8, at 4; and A. Silvermann 1990, 148–175, esp. 148. I have argued for this point in detail in 2005. In 43C6 the term αἴσθησις may cover all sorts of effects that reach the body, not the sensory processes alone. It refers not only to the apprehension of the five kinds of perceptual qualities, but also to grasping pleasure and pain, which Plato does not equate with any of the peculiar objects of the particular senses. This is mostly the marrow where the revolutions of the rational soul contact the rectilinear motions of the body. I cannot argue for this case here, but for a detailed discussion with ample bibliography, see J. F. Pradeau 1998, 489–518, F. Karfík 2005, 235–255, and F. Fronterotta 2006, 146–148 with an explanation of the physiological processes between reason and the mortal parts of the soul.



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nated, it depends on the body insofar as it cannot do so without the cooperation of bodily parts. Nevertheless, there is no compelling reason to treat the soul as an entity indwelling a single particular body. On the Timaeus account, the construction of the rational human soul precedes the construction of the human body, or, to put it another way, it is ontologically prior to the body. This is the dilemma which we have to decide about, and the decision depends on which of the two main trends of the interpretation of the κοσμοποιία-myth we are going to join. But whichever of the options we may take, we are bound to accept the priority of the soul over the body. In a discarnate state the soul is healthy, and disease arises as an inevitable result of incarnation (43C4–7). The revolutions do not require a specific organ of the human body. As Plato says at the end of the dialogue (90E6–92C3), at death the soul of men leaves the body and may transmigrate into other kinds of bodies, depending on what they fail to do in this life. The human soul can reside in land animals, fishes and birds alike. Consequently, the human soul may not be tied to a particular type of body, even if one may insist that it has to reside in a bodily part with a similar structure. But Plato has nothing to say about this possibility except that the skulls of land animals are not spherical but elongated, as their revolutions have been distorted by misuse (91E6–92A2). To sum up, Plato seems to account for the psychic diseases in terms of physical impacts on the revolutions of the rational soul. All sorts of disease are due to such influences. Although one is perfectly entitled to claim that in the Timaeus Plato considers psychic disorders as psychosomatic disorders, one has to see clearly that the soul can have no other sort of disease. It is impossible to describe psychic diseases without reference to the disorder in the revolutions, which is caused by the intrusion of rectilinear movements from the physical world. Plato’s account has its roots in his overall description of the generation and incarnation of the soul. If the rational soul consists of revolutions that are spatial and exposed to external influences, and embodiment is responsible for the initial disturbance of the revolutions, then we are left with the option of explaining diseases of the soul in terms of an interaction between the revolutions themselves and the external impacts. These revolutions constitute the core of the soul, while the mortal parts are additions due to embodiment.33 The distinction between an incarnate and a discarnate existence of the human soul explains not only the appearance of different impulses that link us to bodies, but also the occurrence of psychic diseases in general.

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Similar suggestions have been made, on different grounds, most recently by M. F. Burnyeat 2006, and H. Lorenz 2006.


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Bibliography Baltes, M., Die Weltentstehung des Platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten. Vol. I, Vol. II. Leiden: Brill 1976, 1978. Id., ‘Γέγονεν (Platon, Tim. 28B7). Ist die Welt real entstanden oder nicht?’, in K. A. Algra, P. W. van der Horst and D. T. Runia (edd.), Polyhistor. Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy, Presented to J. Mansfeld on His Sixtieth Birthday (Leiden: Brill 1996) 76–96. Brisson, L., Platon: Timée-Critias. Paris: GF Flammarion 1992. Id., ‘Plato’s theory of sense perception in the Timaeus: How it works and what it means?’ BACAPh 13 (1999) 147–176. Burnyeat, M. F., ‘The truth of tripartition’, PAS 56 (2006) 1–22. Carone, G. R., Plato’s Cosmology and Its Ethical Dimensions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005 (a). Ead., ‘Mind and body in late Plato’, AGPh 87 (2005) 227–270 (b). Cornford, F. M., Plato’s Cosmology. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1938. Frede, M., ‘Observations on perception in Plato’s later dialogues’ in id., Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1987) 3–8. Fronterotta, F., ‘Anima e corpo: immortalità, organicismo e psico-fisiologia nel Timeo platonico’, Études Platoniciennes 2 (2006) 141–154. Id., ‘Carone on the mind–body problem in late Plato’, AGPh 89 (2007) 231–237. Gill, C., ‘The body’s fault? Plato’s Timaeus on psychic illness’, in M. R. Wright (ed.), Reason and Necessity in Plato’s Timaeus (London: Duckworth 2000) 59–84. Id., The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006. Johansen, T., ‘Body, soul and tripartition in Plato’s Timaeus’, OSAP 19 (2000) 87–111. Joubaud, C., Le corps humain dans la philosophie platonicienne. Étude à partir du Timée. Paris: J. Vrin 1992. Karfík, F., ‘What the mortal parts of the soul really are’, Rhizai. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 2 (2005) 235–255. Lain Entralgo, P., La curacion por la palabra en la antigüedad clasica. Madrid: Gredos 1958. Lautner, P., ‘The Timaeus on sounds and hearing with some implications for Plato‘s general theory of sense-perception’, Rhizai. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 2 (2005), 235–253. Lloyd, G. E. R., In the Grip of Disease. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003. Lorenz, H., ‘The analysis of the soul in Plato’s Republic’, in G. Santas (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Plato’s Republic (Malden-Oxford-Victoria: Blackwell 2006) 146–176. Mackenzie, M. M., Plato on Punishment. Berkeley-L.A.: University of California Press 1981. Miller, D., ‘Reply to Brisson’, BACAPh 13 (1999) 177–195. Ostenfeld, N. E., Ancient Greek Psychology and the Modern Mind-Body Debate Aarhus: Aarhus University Press 1987. Pigeaud, J., L maladie de l’âme. Étude sur la relation de l’âme et du corps dans la tradition médico-philosophique antique. Paris: Les Belles Lettres 1981, 20063.



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Ead., Folie et cures de la folie chez les médecins de l’antiquité gréco-romaine. La manie. Paris: Les Belles Lettres 1987. Pradeau, J. F., ‘L’ âme et la moelle. Les conditions psychiques et physiologiques de l’ anthropologie dans le Timée de Platon’, Archives de Philosophie 61 (1998) 489–518. Price, A. W., Mental Conflict. London: Routledge 1995. Robinson, T. M., ‘Mind-body dualism in Plato’, in J. P. Wright and P. Potter (edd.), Psyche and Soma. Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind–Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000) 37–55. Schuhl, P.-M., ‘La pathologie mentale selon Platon dans la Timée’, in id., La fabulation platonicienne (Paris: PUF 19682) 45–63. Silvermann, A., ‘Plato on perception and “commons”’, CQ 40 (1990) 148–175. Stok, F., ‘Follia e malattie mentali nella medicina dell’ età romana’, ANRW II 37.3 (1996) 2282–2409. Stalley, R. F., ‘Punishment and the physiology of the Timaeus’, CQ 46 (1996) 357–371. Taylor, A. J., A Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1928. Tieleman, T., Chrysippus’ On Affections. Leiden – Boston: Brill 2003. Zeyl, D. J., Plato, Timaeus. Indianapolis: Hackett 2000.


Plato's Account of the Diseases of the Soul in Timaeus 86B1–87B9 - Lautner

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