XI.C XI.C MADR MADRIG IGAL AL TRANSP TRANSPOR ORT T V. LAP LAPANDA ANDAY Y HOLDINGS CORP., CORP., G.R. NO. 156067, AUGUST 11, 2004 MATA The special civil action action for certiorari and appeal appeal are two dierent dierent remedies that are mutually exclusive; exclusive; they are not alternative or successive. Where appeal is available,certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. Certio Certiora rari ri is not a substi substitut tute e for the the lapsed lapsed remedy of appeal. Fac!" On ebru ebruar ary y !, "!!# "!!#,, $etit etitio ione nerr %adr %adrig igal al Transport, Transport, &nc. '%adrigal( '%adrigal( )led a $etition $etition for *oluntary &nsolven &nsolvency cy before before the +egion +egional al Trial Court Court '+T '+TC( of %ani %anila la,, ran ranch ch -!. -!. ate ater, r, on ebru ebruar ary y /", /", "!!# "!!#,, petit petition ioner er )led )led a Compl Complain aintt for damag damages es again against st +espo espond nden ents ts apa apand nday ay 0old 0oldin ings gs Corp Corpor orat atio ion n 'apanday(, %acondray and Company, &nc. '%acondray(, and uis $. oren1o 2r. before the +TC of %anila, ranch 34. &n the latter action, %adrigal alleged that it had entered into a 5oint venture agreement with apanday for the primary purpose of operating vessels to service the shipping re6uirements of 7el %onte $hilippines, &nc however however,, despite despite demands, demands, apanda apanday y and oren1o oren1o had allegedly been unable to deliver those 7el %onte charter hire contracts. On ebruary ebruary /3, "!!#, "!!#, the insolven insolvency cy court court '+TC ranch -!( declared petitioner insolvent.On %arch 38, "!!# "!!# and 9pril 4, "!!#, "!!#, +espon +espondent dents s apanda apanday, y, oren1o and %acondray )led their respective %otions to 7ismiss on the complaint for damages )led by the $etitioner. On 7ecember "4, "!!#, ranch 34 granted the %otion, for failure of the Complaint to state a cause of action. 9pplying :ections 3/ and 33 of the &nsolvency aw, the trial court court opin opined ed that that upon upon the the )ling )ling by %adriga %adrigall of a $etition $etition for *oluntary oluntary &nsolvency &nsolvency,, the latte latterr lost lost the right right to instit institute ute the the Compl Complain aintt for 7amages. 7amages. The +TC ruled ruled that the exclus exclusive ive right right to prosecute the actions belonged to the courtappointed assignee. On 2anuary /4, "!!!, petitioner )led a %otion for +econsideration'%+(, but was denied by the said court court 2uly /4, "!!!. "!!!. :ubse6u :ubse6uentl ently, y, petition petitioner er )led a $etit etitio ion n for for Cert Certio iora rari ri with with the the Cour Courtt of 9ppe 9ppeal als, s, see
WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished) dismisse dismissed d for lac< of 5urisdic 5urisdiction tion because the issues issues raised by petitioner involved pure 6uestions 6uestions of law that should be brought to the :upreme Court, pursuant to :ection / of +ule =8 and :ection /'c( of +ule -" of the +ules of Court. 0ence, the petition. I!!#$" &s the petition for certiorari proper> R#%&'(" ?o. :uprem :upreme e Court Court held thatwhen thatwhen any tribuna tribunal, l, board board or o@cer o@cer exerc exercisin ising g 5udicia 5udiciall or 6uasi5u 6uasi5udic dicial ial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his 5urisdiction, 5urisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion discretion amounting to lac< or excess of its or his 5urisdiction, and and ther there e is no appea appeal, l, or any plain, plain, speedy speedy,, and ade6u ade6uate ate remed remedy y in the ordi ordinar nary y cour course se of law, law, a person aggrieved aggrieved thereby may )le a veri)ed petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and pray prayin ing g that that 5udg 5udgme ment nt be rend render ered ed annu annull llin ing g or modifyi modifying ng the procee proceedin dings gs of such tribunal, tribunal, board board or o@cer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and 5ustice may re6uire re6uire.. The petition shall be accompanied accompanied by a certi)ed true copy of the 5udgment, order or resolution sub5ect thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relev levant ant and and perti ertin nent ent the thereto, to, and and a swor worn certi)cation of nonforum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of :ection 3, +ule -4. urther, a writ of certiorari may be issued only for the corre correcti ction on of erro errors rs of 5uris 5urisdic dictio tion n or grave grave abuse abuse of discr discreti etion on amoun amountin ting g to lac< lac< or exces excess s of 5urisdiction. 5urisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any other purp purpose ose,, as its func functio tion n is limite limited d to
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&n this case, the +TC did not rendered a decision that is in in excess of its 5urisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac< or excess of its 5urisdiction when it dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was no cause of action as per supported by the facts of the case. :ince, it was the order of dismissal that was 6uestioned, a certiorari is improper because it can be cured through an appeal. There are exceptional circumstances that the :upreme Court may grant certiorari despite the availability of appeal however, in this case, $etitioner did not show that the court, order constitutes a despotic, capricious, or whimsical exercise of power, but it availed certiorari because the "=day period within which to )le an appeal had already lapsed. $etition is denied. #&c- &($!" 9C Transport )led $etition for *oluntary &nsolvencyin an insolvency court. ater on, it )led a complaint for damages against 7 Corporation for failure to comply the agreement in their contract in another court. The insolvency case was granted. 7 Corporation )led a motion to dismiss on the ground that there was no cause of action because the complaint for damages must be )led at the insolvency court where 9C Transport )led its insolvency case as provided by the &nsolvency aw. The +TC order dismissal to the Complaint for damages for lac< of cause of action. 9C Transport then )led a petition for certiorari to the Court of 9ppeals over the order of dismissal of the +TC. 9s a 5udge, will you grant the petition for certiorari> ?o. :upreme Court held that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. +emedies of appeal, including petitions for review, and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if oneBs own negligence or error in ones choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. When an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished) &n this case, the order of dismissal rendered by the +TC is a )nal order in which it can avail appeal within its given period. 0owever, 9C Transport failed to )le an appeal within its re6uired period. ?either had it appeared that there was an excess of 5urisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac< or excess of 5urisdiction that was exercised by the +TC. Therefore, the petition for certiorari was improper. S&$ N*$!" D&!c#!!&*' */ $ &$$'c$ 3$$$' a$a% a' c$&*a&. A! * $ P#*!$. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of 5urisdiction, not errors of 5udgment. ven if the )ndings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has 5urisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. On the other hand, where the error is not one of 5urisdiction, but of an error of law or fact a mista
The following re6uisites must concur for certiorari to prosperA '"( the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any o@cer exercising 5udicial or 6uasi5udicial functions; '/( such tribunal, board or o@cer has acted without or in excess of 5urisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac< or excess of 5urisdiction; and '3( there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and ade6uate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A! * $ P$&* */ F&%&'( . Ordinary appeals should be )led within )fteen days from the notice of 5udgment or )nal order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is re6uired, the appellant must )le a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said notice of 5udgment or )nal order. 9 petition for review should be )led and served within )fteen days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the petitioners timely )led motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. &n an appeal bycertiorari, the petition should be )led also within )fteen days from the notice of 5udgment or )nal order, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be )led not later than sixty days from the notice of 5udgment, order, or resolution. &f a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely )led, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
9n order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a )nal order. &t is not interlocutory because the proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by the lower court. Therefore the remedy of the plainti is to appeal the order.
A! * $ N$$ /* a M*&*' /* R$c*'!&$a&*' . 9 motion for reconsideration is generally re6uired prior to the )ling of a petition for certiorari, in order to aord the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors.
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XI.F TOPACIO V. ONG, G.R. NO. D+C+M8+R 1, 200 CA8U+NAS CL+A
175,
Principle: The title to a public oce may not be contested except directly, by a quo warranto proceedings, and it cannot be assailed collaterally, even through mandamus or a motion to annul or set aside order !n "acionalista #arty v $e %era, the Court ruled that prohibition does not lie to inquire into the validity of the appointment of a public ocer FACTS" $etitioner via the present petition for certiorari and prohibition see
WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished) deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply because the aected party disagrees with it. The :olicitor General is the counsel of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its o@cials or agents. &n the discharge of its tas<, the :olicitor General must see to it that the best interest of the government is upheld within the limits set by law. /.
Hes. While denominated as a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the petition parta
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Whether the O:G committed grave abuse of discretion in deferring the )ling of a petition for 6uo warranto.
ven if the Court treats the case as one for 6uo warranto, the petition is, 5ust the same, dismissible.
/.
Whether the petition for certiorari and prohibition )led by petitioner parta
9 6uo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public o@ce and to oust the holder from its en5oyment. &t is brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public o@ce, and may be commenced by the :olicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public o@ce or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.
H+LD" ". ?o. The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion, much less, a grave one, on the part of the O:G in deferring action on the )ling of a 6uo warranto case until after the +TC case has been terminated with )nality. 9 decision is not
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?othing is more settled than the principle, which goes bac< to the "!8= case of 9costa v. lor, reiterated in the recent /88# case of eliciano v. *illasin, that /* a 9#* aa'* $&&*' * 3$ !#cc$!!/#%, $ &:a$ $!*' !#&'( ;#! !* a c%$a &( * $ c*'$!$ *
SHORT DIG+ST" M )led a petition for certiorari and prohibition against 2ustice H from further exercising the powers, duties and responsibilities of a :andiganbayan 9ssociate 2ustice. M contends that Ong should immediately desist from holding the position of 9ssociate 2ustice of the :andiganbayan since he is dis6uali)ed on the basis of citi1enship. 'H alleged to be a Chinese citi1en(. &::NA Whether the petition for certiorari and prohibition )led by petitioner parta
WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished) :olicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public o@ce or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. XI.G MORA8+ V. 8RO=N, G.R. NO. L>601, MAY ?1, 154 CAN+T+ FRANCIS PRINCIPL+" EThe action of the petitioner is not an action of in&unction but one of mandamus, because it see's the performance of a legal duty, the reinstatement of #ablo Afuang The writ 'nown as preliminary mandatory in&unction is also a mandamus, though merely provisional in character FACTS" +espondent William rown had dismissed his employee, $ablo :. 9fuang, because he was one of the complainants in an investigation conducted by the petitioner miliano %orabe, 9cting Chief, Wage 9dministration :ervice,of charges against the respondent that the latter paid his employees beyond the time )xed in +epublic 9ct ?o. 48/. 9n original petition )led by the petitioner in the Court of irst &nstance of %anila praying that the respondent be ordered to reinstate $ablo :. 9fuang, and that a writ of preliminary mandatory in5unction issue for his reinstatement.The court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory in5unction. The respondent presented a petition as
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&n the case at bar, $ablo :. 9fuang was entitled to continue in the service of respondent, because his act is expressly provided to be no ground or reason for an employeeJs dismissal. :ection "3 of +epublic 9ct ?o. 48/ states that Iit shall be unlawful for any person to discharge or in any other manner to discriminate against any employee because such employee has )led any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this 9ct. $ablo :. 9fuang was, therefore, unlawfully deprived of his right or privilege to continue in the service of the respondent, because his dismissal was unlawful or illegal. 0aving been deprived of such right or privilege, it is within the competence of courts to compel the respondent to admit him bac< to his service.
WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished) &t is evident that the court a quo erred in considering that mandatory in5unction is preventive in nature, and may not be granted by the Court of irst &nstance once the act complained of has been carried out. The action of the petitioner is not an action of in5unction but one of mandamus, because it see
XI. H+RR+RA V. 8ARR+TTO, 25 PHIL. 245 TRIXI+ S++ XI.P
&n *anila +lectric Co vs $el osario and -ose,the lower court ordered the %anila lectric Co. to furnish electric current to 2ose, the electric company having cut the current to 2oseJs house because it suspected him of stealing electricity by the use of a 5umper. This Court held that the action was not one of in5unction but of mandamus, as it compelled the electric company to furnish 2ose with electric service. &n the case at bar, the court can also order the respondent to reinstate $ablo :. 9fuang. Were we to hold that 9fuang may not be reinstated because he has already been dismissed; there would not be any remedy against the in5ustice done him, or for him to return to the position or employment from which he was unlawfully discharged.
#&!&c&*'
+E$c&!$ #&!&c&*'
2urisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause
Where there is 5urisdiction of the person and sub5ect matter, as we have said before, the decision of all other 6uestions arising in the case is but an exercise of that 5urisdiction.
the right to act in a case. :ince it is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions made.
The 5udgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and the respondent William rown is hereby ordered to reinstate $ablo :. 9fuang to the position he held prior to his dismissal.
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UIC DIG+ST" FACTS" $etitioner %orabe )led the original petitionin the C& of %anila praying that the respondent be ordered to reinstate $ablo :. 9fuang and a writ of preliminary mandatory in5unction issue for his reinstatement. The latter was dismissed by the respondent on the ground that he was one of the complainants in an investigation conducted by the petitionerof charges against the respondent that the latter paid his employees beyond the time )xed in +epublic 9ct ?o. 48/. The C& rendered 5udgment )nding that the dismissal from the service of $ablo :. 9fuang is unlawful and violates section "3 of the %inimum Wage aw. The court, however, refused to grant an order for the reinstatement of said $ablo :. 9fuang on the ground that this remedy, which it considers as an in5unction, is available only against acts about to be committed or actually being committed, and not against past acts. ISSU+"WO? the C& erred in not ordering the respondent to reinstate $ablo :. 9fuang in the service. H+LD" H:.
The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what ma
Fac!A The case at bar involves a motion for certiorari by the petitioner against 2udge arretto for allegedly acting without 5urisdiction on the case involving the coc
=
I!!#$A WO? a writ of certiorari the proper action on the case at bar. R#%&'(A ?o. 9 writ for certiorari is not issued unless it is established whether or not the court to which it is directed acted without or in excess of 5urisdiction. Once the court has 5urisdiction over the sub5ect matter and parties in a case all decisions exercised within its 5urisdiction, however erroneous or irregular, cannot be corrected by certiorari. The court held that the C& has the 5urisdiction over the present case to resolve all matters arising in 6uestion.Court held that #&!&c&*' is the authority to hear and determine a cause the right to act in a case. :ince it is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions made. 2urisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of 5urisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what ma
T$ &!&'c&*' &! c%$a" A $&&*' /* c$&*a& !$$-! * c*$c $*! */ #&!&c&*' &%$ a $&&*' /* $:&$ !$$-! * c*$c $*! */ #(;$' c*;;&$ 3@ $ c*#. +*! */ #(;$' &'c%#$ $*! */ *c$#$ * ;&!a-$! &' $ c*#! '&'(!. =$$ a c*# a! #&!&c&*' *:$ $ $!*' a' !#3$c ;a$, $ $c&!&*' *' a%% *$ 9#$!&*'! a&!&'( &' $ ca!$ &! a' $E$c&!$ */ a #&!&c&*'. C*'!$9#$'%@, a%% $*! c*;;&$ &' $ $E$c&!$ */ !#c #&!&c&*' a$ ;$$%@ $*! */ #(;$'. 9CT:A The case involves %&C+O:OT CO+$O+9T&O? )ghting to protect its intellectual property rights through )ling a complaint for &n5unction and 7amages with x $arte
WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished) 9pplication for Temporary +estraining Order and the $rovisional %easure of $reservation of vidence against est 7eal Computer Center Corporation, $erfect 7eal Corporation and %arcos C. Huen doing business as $erfect yte Computer Center alleging that defendants without authority or license copied, reproduced, distributed, installed andFor loaded software programs owned by %icrosoft into computer units sold by them to their customers. urthermore, it prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary in5unction to restrain and en5oin defendants from illegally reproducing, selling and distributing unlicensed software programs and also applied for the issuance of an ex parte order for the sei1ure and impounding of relevant evidence that can be or may be found at defendantsJ business premises. The as $inas trial court set petitionerJs prayer for a temporary restraining order for hearing but at the same time denied its application for an ex parte order ratiocinating that the &ntellectual $roperty Code does not expressly allow its issuance and that, in any case, the T+&$: 'Trade+elated 9spects of &ntellectual $roperty +ights( 9G+%?T cannot prevail over it, and that petitionerJs application partoo< of a search and sei1ure order available only in criminal cases. &n the instant petition for certiorari under +ule 4= of the +evised +ules of Court petitioner submits that the court a 6uo gravely abused its discretion amounting to lac< or excess of 5urisdiction when it ruled that the law does not allow an ex parte provisional remedy of sei1ure and impounding of infringing evidence. &t maintains that :ec. /"4./, $art &*, of +9 #/!3 authori1es such order. &t concedes though that while +9 #/!3 does not expressly mention the provisional and ex parte nature of the remedy, nonetheless, 9rt. =8 of the T+&$: 9greement amply supplies the de)ciency. &t allegedly resorted to the instant recourse because it had no appeal or any plain, speedy and ade6uate remedy in the ordinary course of law. &t automatically invo
I)! '* a PROVR+M 2015
4
/. Whether acts complained of by the petitioner constitutes error of 5udgement or error of 5urisdiction. 0eldA ". ?egative. C$&*a& #'$ R#%$ 65 &! a $;$@ $!&('$ /* $ c*$c&*' */ $*! */ #&!&c&*' a' '* $*! */ #(;$'. The sole o@ce of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of 5urisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac< of 5urisdiction, and does not include correction of public respondentJs evaluation of the evidence and factual )ndings thereon. The petition for certiorari must be based on 5urisdictional grounds because as long as the respondent acted with 5urisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of 5udgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. ven an abuse of discretion is not su@cient by itself to 5ustify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. /. 9cts complained of constitutes error of 5udgement :ection "!, par. '#(, $ lg. "/!, as amended, provides that +egional Trial Courts in %etro %anila shall have exclusive original 5urisdiction in all cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished) $$;$ a! a' $* */ #(;$' a ca''* 3$ $;$&$ 3@ c$&*a&. A! %*'( a! $ $!*'$' ac$ & #&!&c&*', a'@ $* c*;;&$ 3@ &; * & &' $ $E$c&!$ $$*/ &%% a;*#' * '*&'( ;*$ a' a' $* */ #(;$' &c ;a@ 3$ $:&$$ * c*$c$ *'%@ 3@ a$a%. T$ &!&'c&*' &! c%$a" A $&&*' /* c$&*a& !$$-! * c*$c $*! */ #&!&c&*' &%$ a $&&*' /* $:&$ !$$-! * c*$c $*! */ #(;$' c*;;&$ 3@ $ c*#. +*! */ #(;$' &'c%#$ $*! */ *c$#$ * ;&!a-$! &' $ c*#! '&'(!. =$$ a c*# a! #&!&c&*' *:$ $ $!*' a' !#3$c ;a$, $ $c&!&*' *' a%% *$ 9#$!&*'! a&!&'( &' $ ca!$ &! a' $E$c&!$ */ a #&!&c&*'. C*'!$9#$'%@, a%% $*! c*;;&$ &' $ $E$c&!$ */ !#c #&!&c&*' a$ ;$$%@ $*! */ #(;$'. C$&*a& #'$ R#%$ 65 &! a $;$@ $!&('$ /* $ c*$c&*' */ $*! */ #&!&c&*' a' '* $*! */ #(;$'. #&c- D&($! */ Fac!" > The case involves %&C+O:OT CO+$O+9T&O? )ghting to protect its intellectual property rights through )ling a complaint for &n5unction and 7amages with x $arte 9pplication for Temporary +estraining Order and the $rovisional %easure of $reservation of vidence against est 7eal Computer Center Corporation, $erfect 7eal Corporation and %arcos C. Huen doing business as $erfect yte Computer Center alleging that defendants without authority or license copied, reproduced, distributed, installed andFor loaded software programs owned by %icrosoft into computer units sold by them to their customers with prayer of issuance of a writ of preliminary in5unction to restrain and en5oin defendants from illegally reproducing, selling and distributing unlicensed software programs and an application for the issuance of an ex parte order for the sei1ure and impounding of relevant evidence that can be or may be found at defendantsJ business premises. ut the trial court denied its application for an ex parte order. >A petition for certiorari under +ule 4= was )led submitting that the court a 6uo gravely abused its discretion amounting to lac< or excess of 5urisdiction when it ruled that the law does not allow an ex parte provisional remedy of sei1ure and impounding of infringing evidence. XI.M CAMPOS V. =ISLI+NUS, ?5 PHIL. ?7? F+RNAND+ PRINCIPL+" The general rule is that, where the #&!&c&*' */ $ c*# $$'! #*' $ $E&!$'c$ */ /ac!, c*# #&c&a%%@ c*'!&$! a' and the I)! '* a PROVR+M 2015
P
a#&ca$! $ 9#$!&*' */ &! #&!&c&*', a' $c&$! a $ /ac $E&! which are necessary to give it 5urisdiction of the case, the '&'( &! c*'c%#!&:$ a' ca''* 3$ c*'*:$$ &' a c*%%a$a% *c$$&'(. FACTS" This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to be directed to the Court of irst &nstance of the $rovince of Cebu re6uiring it to forward to this court the proceedings had in a certain election contest between the petitioner ?emesio Campos and the respondent Teodoro 9ldanse, to the end that such proceeding may be revised by this court and certain steps ta
WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished) su@cient to 5ustify the issuance of the writ, and the 6uestion before us arises on that demurrer. The court saidA ?o proof whatever as to who is I&. 9ldaneseI has been presented. &t does not appear who was the person who signed and under what authority he signed, not even whether he resides in the house of the respondent. The court, in the absence of proof, )nds that the notice was insu@cient. urthermore, said notice was not made within the period )xed by law. While the petition has annexed to it as an exhibit an a@davit of service of the notice of protest on the respondent Teodoro 9ldanese which shows that the notice was served in the manner re6uired by law, that a@davit of service was not made or presented to the court until after the order had been made dismissing the proceedings. &t was )rst presented to the court as a part of the moving papers on the motion for a reconsideration of the order dismissing the proceedings. The order of dismissal was made on the "!th of 2uly, "!"4, at which time the only evidence before the court as to the service of the notice was that stated in the order of the court above6uoted. The a@davit of service was made on the /8th of 2uly on which date the motion for reconsideration was presented. ISSU+" Whether the courtBs )nding as to 5urisdiction is conclusive and cannot be controverted in a collateral proceeding.. SC RULING" Y$!. The general rule is that, where the #&!&c&*' */ $ c*# $$'! #*' $ $E&!$'c$ */ /ac!, c*# #&c&a%%@ c*'!&$! a' and the a#&ca$! $ 9#$!&*' */ &! #&!&c&*', a' $c&$! a $ /ac $E&! which are necessary to give it 5urisdiction of the case, the '&'( &! c*'c%#!&:$ a' ca''* 3$ c*'*:$$ &' a c*%%a$a% *c$$&'(. The rule applies to a case where the proper service of notice on the candidates voted for was challenged and the court determined upon the facts presented, after hearing the allegations of the parties and their arguments based thereon, that service had not been made as re6uired by law. :uch a determination involves a mixed 6uestion of law and fact; and it is a rule, as stated in the case cited, that, where the 5urisdiction of the court depends upon the determination of a 6uestion of fact and that 6uestion has been determined by the court after a hearing, that determination is conclusive and cannot be I)! '* a PROVR+M 2015
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attac
WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished) prayed for the dismissal of the petition since service was not properly done, thus the court did not ac6uire 5urisdiction over the case. The court, after hearing the parties with regard to the service of the notice of protest on the T9 no service of the protest had been made on T9 in the manner re6uired by law therefore, the court ac6uired no 5urisdiction of the proceedings and accordingly dismissed the protest. ISSU+" Whether the courtBs )nding as to 5urisdiction is conclusive and cannot be controverted in a collateral proceeding.. Y$!. The general rule is that, where the #&!&c&*' */ $ c*# $$'! #*' $ $E&!$'c$ */ /ac!, c*# #&c&a%%@ c*'!&$! a' and the a#&ca$! $ 9#$!&*' */ &! #&!&c&*', a' $c&$! a $ /ac $E&! which are necessary to give it 5urisdiction of the case, the '&'( &! c*'c%#!&:$ a' ca''* 3$ c*'*:$$ &' a c*%%a$a% *c$$&'(. The rule applies to a case where the proper service of notice on the candidates voted for was challenged and the court determined upon the facts presented, after hearing the allegations of the parties and their arguments based thereon, that service had not been made as re6uired by law. :uch a determination involves a mixed 6uestion of law and fact; and it is a rule, as stated in the case cited, that, where the 5urisdiction of the court depends upon the determination of a 6uestion of fact and that 6uestion has been determined by the court after a hearing, that determination is conclusive and cannot be attac
!
WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished) XI.O A8AD SANTOS V. PROVINC+ OF TARLAC, 67 PHIL. 40 DY ".
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C+T&O+9+&; CO?T+O O CON+T O*+ 2N7G%?T T09T 09: ?OT CO% &?9; 2N7G%?T N$O? 9 CO%$+O%&:. &t is not claimed that the 5udgment in 6uestion has become )nal. &n fact, it cannot be so claimed because the )scalJs motion for reconsideration thereof was presented )ve days after its rendition. ?ot having become )nal, the lower court has plenary control over it and can modify or set it aside as law and 5ustice re6uire. '9rnedo vs. lorente and iongson, "# $hil., /4P; 7e iesta vs. lorente and %anila +ailroad Co., /= $hil., ==-, =4".( 9nd the fact that the decision was rendered upon a compromise, gives it no greater validity than if it had been rendered after a trial. &t stands on the same footing as that of an ordinary 5udgment which may be opened or vacated on ade6uate grounds, such as fraud, mista
L*'( D&($! Fac!" The $rovince of Tarlac instituted action for the condemnation of certain parcels of land for the construction of the Capas%urcia 7iversion road against herein petitioners 9bad. 9 compromise agreement was entered into between said province and the petitioners for the payment to the latter of the agreed value of their lands. The respondent 5udge approved the compromise in a partial decision rendered by himand ordered the parties to comply with the conditions therein set forth. :ubse6uently, the provincial )scal, in behalf of the $rovince of Tarlac, moved for the reconsideration of the decision on the ground that in giving his assent to the compromise, he acted under the mista
The respondent 5udge acceded to this motion and, setting aside its decision, ordered the reopening of the case and authori1ed the substitution of the Commonwealth of the $hilippines for the $rovince of Tarlac as party plainti, in accordance with the petition of the :olicitorGeneral to that eect. 0ence, this petition. The petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the respondent 5udge was without power to set aside his partial decision which was founded upon a compromise duly approved by him. &t is not claimed that the 5udgment in 6uestion has become )nal. I!!#$" WO? the respondent 5udge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he set aside his partial decision based on the compromise agreement entered into by the parties> R#%&'(" ?O. ?ot having become )nal, the lower court has plenary control over it and can modify or set it aside as law and 5ustice re6uire. 9nd the fact that the decision was rendered upon a compromise, gives it no greater validity than if it had been rendered after a trial. &t stands on the same footing as that of an ordinary 5udgment which may be opened or vacated on ade6uate grounds, such as fraud, mista
R#%&'(" ?o. ?ot having become )nal, the lower court has plenary control over it and can modify or set it aside as law and 5ustice re6uire. Grave abuse of
I)! '* a PROVR+M 2015
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discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of 5udgment as is e6uivalent to lac< of 5urisdiction. 1. XI.P L+UNG 8+N V. O)8RI+N, ? PHIL 12 VAL+NCIA 2. H+RR+RA JSUPRAK TRIXI+ ?. XI.R. NAPA V. =+ISS+NHAG+N, 2 PHIL. 12 VILLAGANAS PRINCIPL+" T$ & */ certiorari &' !* /a a! & a! a ;$* 3@ &c ;$$ $*! */ a' &'/$&* c*# c*#% 3$ c*$c$ '* %*'($ $E&!!. I! %ac$ &! '* a-$' 3@ $ a$a%. S* %*'( a! $ &'/$&* c*# ;a&'a&'! #&!&c&*', &! $*! ca' 3$ c*$c$ *'%@ 3@ a ;$* JAPP+ALK. FACTS" 9n action for the summary recovery of the possession of land was )led by 2ulian arong and 0ermenegildoayla against 9gapito ?apa. The court ruled in favor of the plainti 'respondent herein( and ordered delivery of possession.The decision was rendered on the "-th of 9pril, "!"3, and appeal was ta
WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished) have also held that if a court had 5urisdiction of the sub5ect matter and of the person, decision upon all 6uestion pertinent to the cause are decisions which its 5urisdiction and however irregular or erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari. A C*# */ F&! I'!a'c$ a! #&!&c&*' * &!;&!! a' a$a% a-$' * & /*; a #(;$' */ a #!&c$! c*# a', $$/*$, a #&!&c&*' * $c&$ $:$@ 9#$!&*' $a&'&'( $$*. T&! 3$&'( $ ca!$, $ c*'!&$a&*' */ $ ;*&*' a' $ &!;&!!a% */ $ a$a% a! a c*'!$9#$'c$ $$*/ a$ '* ac! &' $Ec$!! */ #&!&c&*'. &t may be stated as a general rule that the decision by a court of one of the fundamental 6uestion before it does not, except perhaps in cases involving a constitutional 6uestion, deprive it of 5urisdiction whichever way it may decide. T$ & */ certiorari &' !* /a a! & a! a ;$* 3@ &c ;$$ $*! */ a' &'/$&* c*# c*#% 3$ c*$c$ '* %*'($ $E&!!. I! %ac$ &! '* a-$' 3@ $ a$a%. S* %*'( a! $ &'/$&* c*# ;a&'a&'! #&!&c&*', &! $*! ca' 3$ c*$c$ *'%@ 3@ a ;$*. T$ & &' &! c*#'@ a! 3$$' c*''$ * $ c*$c&*' */ $/$c! */ #&!&c&*' !*%$%@ a' ca''* 3$ %$(a%%@ #!$ /* a'@ *$ #*!$. '&d.( I/ $ #(;$' */ $ #!&c$! c*# a! :*&, & a! '$:$$%$!! a$a%a3%$, a%*#( $ %*!&'( a@ ;&( a:$ 3$$' a3%$ * & &;!$%/ */ & 3@ *$ ;$a'!. 0aving been appealed, it stands upon substantially the same footing in the appellate court, so far as the appeal itself is concerned, as any other 5udgment of a 5usticeJs court and the 5urisdiction of the appellate court in that appeal is as full and complete as it is in any other.
The purpose of this proceeding is to obtain a writ of certiorari for the revision of the record of the court below, the revocation of the 5udgment entered upon the order granting the motion to dismiss the appeal, and to set aside the whole proceeding to the ground that the court lac
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