Rolf Slotboom and Rob Hollinkor - Secrets of Short Handed Pot Limit Omaha

About the Authors

Before turning pro, Rolf Slotboom used to work in Concord Card Casino Vienna, at the time Europe’s biggest poker room. In January 1998, he quit his job to pursue his dream: becoming a professional player. Restricting himself to cash games only, he slowly moved up the ranks. Starting with low-limit seven-card stud, he gradually moved into middle-limit hold’em games, and around 2002 made a switch to the big pot-limit Omaha cash games in Amsterdam with minimum buy-ins of €500 and up. In the period from 2002 to 2005, Rolf played in these games daily. Using a — back then — rather unconventional method that included squeaky tight play, lots of check-raises and limp-reraises, often through his controversial and frowned upon shortstack approach, his excellent results were attributed to just luck by many of his opponents. By many of his opponents, but of course not by all — as fellow pros Ed de Haas and Rob Hollink gave Rolf credit for a — yes indeed very unpleasant, yet highly effective — tactic. Playing in the exact same cash game for many years, Rolf Slotboom and Rob Hollink respected each other’s games from the very start. But that didn’t mean they always liked each other’s presence! Quoted from Rob’s foreword for Rolf’s first PLO book Secrets of Professional Pot-Limit Omaha: I have discussed Rolf’s PLO game with numerous other players for years. The reason he was the center of our discussion so often, was because his irritating game was extremely hard to beat. Irritating. Yes, extremely irritating, that’s the way I always felt about his game. I am pretty sure that no one in the world was more sick about his game than I. In fact, because of Rob’s aggressive, attacking and rather open style of play, he was actually one of Rolf’s prime targets in case he was using his infamous shortstack approach, where Rolf would try to take advantage of Rob’s aggression early in the hand by check-raising or limp-reraising him. Of course, Rob was smart enough to realize this and started adjusting by not raising when Rolf was in, by cutting down on his bluff bets, and by taking the free cards that Rolf would give him. In other words, both their playing styles at that time were so drastically different, that it was obvious they would clash on many occasions — which is exactly what they did. And it was not just their styles of play that were different. Their views on poker in general also differed a lot. Rob was always willing to take on everyone who would play him, and who regarded even extremely tough tables as a “good learning experience”. Rolf on the other hand had much stricter views on table-and game-selection, claiming that a large part of his edge in the game came from avoiding expert opposition — and therefore, he would rarely if ever enter a game unless he saw a clear edge. Despite these opposing views and playing styles, Rob and Rolf took a genuine like into each other, where Rob would dismiss many of Rolf’s critics. In return, Rolf supported Rob ferociously when he won two major tournament titles: the EPT Grand Final in 2005, and the pot-limit hold’em championship event at the 2008 WSOP. Also, when Rolf was the Bureau Chief for CardPlayer Europe, he signed Rob as one of the lead columnists, and in addition they worked together as teachers for the Dutch video instruction site Nederpoker. When this book was written, Rolf was a sponsored pro for T-6 Poker, while Rob was a Full Tilt Team Pro. Because of their contracts, both played exclusively on their respective sites — both favoring the PLO games there, and both being among the top earners on the sites of their sponsors. Rolf’s edge came mostly from grinding out the relatively small games through volume play, while Rob regularly played in games as big as $200-$400. Rolf Slotboom’s major accomplishments ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠

Successful cash game pro since 1998 (online since 2004). Strategy analyst for many different sites, magazines and poker schools. Author of five poker books, including the groundbreaking Secrets of Professional Pot-Limit Omaha. TV commentator for Eurosport. First-ever Dutch champion and Pokercity’s Dutch Player of the Year 2008. Over $500,000 in live tournament earnings.

Rob Hollink’s major accomplishments ♠ Successful pro since 2001 (both cash and tournaments, live and online, full ring and shorthanded). Nowadays, Rob plays in the biggest online PLO games available. ♠ The first-ever European champion (2005). ♠ First-ever Dutch bracelet winner (2008). ♠ Teacher for the leading Dutch video instruction site Nederpoker. ♠ Full Tilt Team Pro. ♠ Over $3,000,000 in live tournament earnings.

First published in 2009 by D & B Publishing Copyright © 2009 Rolf Slotboom and Rob Hollink The right of Rolf Slotboom and Rob Hollink to be identified as the authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of the publisher. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: 978-1-904468-44-8 All sales enquiries should be directed to D&B Publishing: Tel: 01273 711443, e-mail: [email protected], Website: www.dandbpoker.com

Cover design by Horatio Monteverde. Printed and bound in the US by Versa Press.

Contents

Preface 1 Switching from full-ring to 6-max A step by step approach Changes Implications for me The step-by-step approach in detail 1 Stack Size and Bet Size Example hand 1: A-A-8-5ss Example hand 2: K-K-4-4ss Example hand 3: A-J-8-7ss (to the ace) Example hand 4: 8-7-6-4ds 3 Bet-sizing Beyond the Flop Successfully integrating preflop decisions and postflop play Postflop betting with a 20BB stack Postflop betting with a 40BB stack Postflop betting with a 120BB stack 4 Player-Specific Strategies Exploiting weaknesses; maintaining an edge Player 1: T-6 Andreas Player 2: T-6 Henrik Player 3: T-6 Anders Player 4: T-6 Mats Player 5: T-6 Anthony The other players 5 Advanced Plays, Tricks and Moves The delayed bluff/float Countering the short stacks Reraising in position versus flatcalling — and the consequences for postflop play Getting your opponent off a good but non-nut hand Representing big hands, and preparing river bluffs through flop and turn bets Playing the river Check-raising versus betting into the raiser Playing from out of position Balancing overaggression, bluffs and tricky moves with passive or straightforward play Counterstrategies against good, aggressive players: maintaining an edge versus the pros The psychology behind the various bet sizes, and how to trick your opponents into making mistakes Exploiting common betting patterns Heads-up tactics 6 Understanding high stakes PLO Hand 1: $200/$400 pot-limit Omaha Hand 2: $200/$400 pot-limit Omaha (heads up) Hand 3: $200/$400 pot-limit Omaha Hand 4: $200/$400 pot-limit Omaha Hand 5: $200/$400 pot-limit Omaha Hand 6: $3/$6 pot-limit Omaha Hand 7: $200/$400 pot-limit Omaha Hand 8: $50/$100 pot-limit Omaha Hand 9: $200/$400 pot-limit Omaha Hand 10: $200/$400 pot-limit Omaha Hand 11: $200/$400 pot-limit Omaha Hand 12: $200/$400 pot-limit Omaha Hand 13: $25/$50 pot-limit Omaha (heads up) Hand 14: $25/$50 pot-limit Omaha Hand 15: $25/$50 pot-limit Omaha (heads up) Hand 16: $25/$50 pot-limit Omaha

Hand 17: $25/$50 pot-limit Omaha (heads up) Hand 18: $25/$50 pot-limit Omaha (heads up) Hand 19: $25/$50 pot-limit Omaha (heads up) Hand 20: $50/$100 pot-limit Omaha Hand 21: $25/$50 pot-limit Omaha Hand 22: $200/$400 pot-limit Omaha Hand 23: $200/$400 pot-limit Omaha Hand 24: $25k heads-up PLO championship Hand 25: $25k heads-up PLO championship Hand 26: $200/$400 pot-limit Omaha Hand 27: $200/$400 pot-limit Omaha Hand 28: $200/$400 pot-limit Omaha Hand 29: $200/$400 pot-limit Omaha Hand 30: $200/$400 pot-limit Omaha Hand 31: $200/$400 pot-limit Omaha (heads up) Hand 32: €20/€40 Live pot-limit Omaha in Amsterdam Hand 33: G1,000 pot-limit Omaha tournament at the masterclassics of poker Appendix: Poker tracker stats

Preface

Should I do it or not? That was the question I was faced with in 2006 when asked to write a book about pot-limit Omaha. I knew that it would be an awful lot of work, and that it would probably take me months to complete things — time that I could probably put to better use in the online PLO games that were very juicy at the time. Also, I could not expect this book to be (financially) very rewarding, given that the PLO market was so small back then. And perhaps most importantly, I knew that if I were to take on this new project, I would give it my all, and I would hold back absolutely nothing. But by revealing my rather unconventional strategies, and by providing my readers with an extensive step by step approach that could be considered the “101 on shortstacking”, I knew I would make the online PLO games much tougher. In fact, I knew that if I would reveal everything I knew at the time, there was a good chance I would be killing my own bread-and-butter games. And indeed — this is exactly what happened. When I was still writing the script for Secrets of Professional Pot-Limit Omaha, I was a solid winner at Party, where I was multitabling/shortstacking the $10-$20 games. In fact, right after I had completed this script, I was able to step up to the $25-$50 games at Stars where I employed a similar system — and with similar (and thus, better) results. But within six months after the release of my book, there was hardly a game left at the stakes where I liked to play. My book had led to an influx of a whole bunch of shortstacking/ratholing “Little Rolfs” who would follow my ultra-tight shortstack approach religiously. It goes without saying that this did not exactly benefit the quality of the games. More and more often, the Action Men would be faced with four, five or even six shortstackers who were waiting to bag them. And while this of course made the shortstack system much less effective (with too many short stacks and too little loose money, the approach loses a lot of its value), it also meant that the Action Men stopped giving the excessive action that they used to give. The PLO games now being a lot less juicy and exciting than before, the Action Men started straying away from the full-ring games and began to focus on 6-max games — not in the last place to get rid of those pesky short stacks. Using an approach that was perfectly suited for full-ring games and that was almost inexploitable for the bigger stacks, I obviously did not like this development much. While I had already adopted my tactics in such a way that I was not only a superb shortstacker but also someone who could profitably employ a big-stack approach if the table composition dictated such, this was always from the framework of full-ring play. I was a lot less proficient at playing 6-max., where the blind pressure was much higher, where the rake had a bigger impact, and where the loose-aggressive action seemed to favor the gamblers — rather than the tight, disciplined nits like me. After all, because hand values run rather close in PLO, the loose-aggressive players (LAPs, from now on) would pick up more than their fair share of pots almost regardless of their cards. And for tight players like me, it was very hard to recoup these losses when we would finally pick up a big hand, simply because even in these cases our edge would usually not be all that big. It was quite clear to me that in this shorthanded constellation, my shortstack approach would not be very effective. And given that my big stack game was not yet good enough, the only alternative for these 6-max games was using the 30-40 big blinds medium-sized-buy-in approach that I touched upon in my previous book. While still sticking to the full-ring shortstack approach whenever I could find these games, I slowly started fine-tuning my six-handed strategies. And when in January 2008 I signed a deal to become a sponsored pro for T-6 Poker, a site that had just shorthanded games, I knew I had found a new challenge. Having agreed to log in many hours per month at this site, and playing a minimum of three tables, the only way this deal would be good to me was if I could become a winning shorthanded player at the decent-sized games. A new and difficult challenge — in other words, exactly the way I like it! The end result of all this is the book that you are reading now — Secrets of Shorthanded Pot-Limit Omaha. It discusses short games when playing deep stacks, medium stacks and short stacks. It explains my new approach to the game: full-stacked and fairly loose-aggressive, with — as before — some rather unconventional betting patterns. It shows the “Real Poker” that I am playing now, instead of just the “exploitation of badly structured games” that my shortstacked full-ring approach was based upon. But more than just me, this book has no other than Rob Hollink doing what he does best: analyze hands taken from high-stakes play. Through the combination of both our (often conflicting!) views, Secrets of Short-handed Pot-Limit Omaha should fill the gap that my previous book has left: a thorough discussion of six-handed and also heads up games. It is my genuine belief that the combination of my first and this second PLO book is basically everything you need to become a successful Omaha player for meaningful stakes. However, a few words of caution are needed. Just like my previous work, this new book does not provide a coherent game plan, and it isn’t written in a textbook manner. What you read is purely our views on how to tackle games — nothing more, nothing less. You are required to do a lot of thinking of your own, and it is up to the reader to put all the relevant information together in a correct manner. What’s more, the level of analysis is at times quite high, making the information not always easy to digest. There is almost no discussion on specific starting hand strategy (you can find more than enough about that in other books), and also we have left out much of the mathematics and statistics that accounted to such a prominent part of the previous PLO book. We don’t explain any of the terms and abbreviations that were already used in the first book, assuming this should be basic knowledge by now. And finally, the information we provide is far from an absolute truth. Quite the contrary: Rob and I differ on many issues, and some of the strange plays in this book obviously carry my signature, while some of the rather crazy plays from Rob’s high-stakes games would be definite money-burners in the much smaller games that I tend to play. In other words: If you expect an ABC type of book that starts with starting hands/preflop play all the way to the final chapter on playing the river, you have picked the wrong book. As before, I will be using my own development and experiences as the groundwork for this book — meaning I will again talk a lot about myself, my abilities and my shortcomings. The book basically begins where Secrets of Professional Pot-Limit Omaha left off — the step from medium-sized full-ring PLO games on the major sites to the relatively small six-handed games on my new site, where slowly but surely I am able to lift my game, plug my leaks, rise in limits and in the end also start focusing on heads-up play. All in all, this book is simply my story on how to focus on something entirely new (where through my usual step-by-step approach I show which adjustments are needed to keep getting better and better at shorthanded play), followed by the sometimes entirely different view of high-stakes pro Rob Hollink who analyzes specific hands. As I said, not a lot of “how to” information in the strictest sense of the word, and maybe not a lot of structured thinking either. Yet, I have little doubt that those who look for more than just quick and shallow answers will judge Secrets of Shorthanded Pot-Limit Omaha as interesting, thought-provoking and different. And perhaps most importantly: as very worthwhile. Rolf Slotboom Amsterdam, May 2009

Chapter One

Switching from Full Ring to 6-max

A step-by-step approach Those who have read my previous PLO book know that I have always excelled in full-ring cash games. Once 6-max started gaining ground at the expense of these full games at which I was so successful, I did something that I often do when a new — unwanted — phenomenon rears its head. I chose to just ignore it, thinking (or basically, hoping) that full-ring would continue to stay the norm. When I wrote Secrets of Professional Pot-Limit Omaha, I was doing very well playing the $10-$20 games at PartyPoker, more often than not relying on my infamous shortstack system. After I had completed the script and had delivered it to my publishers (say, about four or five months before the actual release of the book), I had even stepped up to the $25-$50 games at PokerStars. As I was able to maintain my win rate at about the same level as in the $10-$20 games and profiting from the fact that at peak hours there were almost always more than five full-ring games available, I made more money than ever before. Six days a week, people saw me hopping from table to table, and multitabling myself to excellent results with a minimum of stress, and hardly any downswings. I thought: “If this situation is going to remain, and if my opponents continue to not make the proper adjustments to my style, then I have the best job in the world, and I will be loaded in no time.” But of course, the situation didn’t remain. After I had handed over my script, the number of good online shortstackers increased significantly. In addition to the three or four good shortstackers and the three or four mediocre ones that were already there, there were now also my book publishers who played exactly in line with my recommendations. By logging in an awful lot of hours, they too were taking significant money out of the game. Slowly but surely, the average number of shortstackers in the full-ring games went up from just one or two to three, and sometimes even four. It still didn’t affect my win rate much — but it was nonetheless the start of what I call “the demise of shortstacking in full-ring”. After the release of my book the floodgates opened and a whole bunch of ultra-tight shortstackers started tackling the small games to build their bankrolls with relatively little risk — and slowly but surely they worked their way up to the middle limits. Now that I had pointed out in detail what it was that the shortstackers were doing, and where exactly we gained our edge, more and more people started complaining about those “pesky short stacks” that were “ruining the games”.

Changes Naturally players came up with countermeasures. The good, loose-aggressive players (LAPs) started realizing that it was exactly their overaggression with marginal hands that gave the shortstackers their edge. As a result, they began to play tighter and started betting — and raising — less often when tight shortstackers were also in the hand. Two very good adjustments, as shortstackers would often be lying in the bushes, waiting to check-raise or limpreraise these LAPs. These adjustments indeed started cutting into the win rates of these “Rolf-like” shortstackers, but at the same time it led to tighter and less exciting games than before — leading to even more complaints about the destructive effect of these shortstacking “ratholers” (people who always bought in for the minimum and then would leave right after doubling up/winning a good-sized pot, waiting for the moment when they were allowed back into the game with the same minimum buy-in from before). People started saying: “The minimum buy-ins should be raised, so that we can get rid of these shortstackers.” Contrary to what most people thought, this was an idea that I actually welcomed — as I had never truly enjoyed shortstacking. I just happened to use the approach because it was legal, profitable, very hard to defend against and an approach that led to just very few tough spots that would require expert judgment. I also used this approach because I didn’t want to give my opponents the chance to use it at my expense — if I would be playing full buy-ins they could take advantage of me by buying in short. But if we would all have to start out with a relatively big stack, or better if we could only buy in for one specific amount, the edge of stack size/buy-in amount would disappear and then our edge would simply come from actually playing better than the opposition. So, while I would actually have welcomed these kinds of changes, most sites weren’t all that enthusiastic about implementing them. After all, they knew that with all these multitabling shortstackers around who would log in a lot of hours, the sites were generating lots of rake. And if they raised the minimum buy-ins, this would lead to a situation where they might lose customers, as the shortstackers might quit playing, and they would have their games dry up much faster than before now that the good and winning players would take a big chunk of chips from the weaker players, rather than just the little chunks that the shortstackers would take. The sites realized that big-bet games with deep money are much more skilful than shallow-money games. Because these deep-money games also offer less short-term luck to the weaker players, and thus the fish get cleaned out at much more rapid pace, it was clear that if changes like this were incorporated, it could jeopardize the long-term health of the PLO games. (Recently, some sites have started listening to the requests of especially the good LAPs to raise the minimum buy-ins. And indeed, these games tend to favor the good players and offer the weak players less chance for even an occasional big score. Thus, most sites nowadays are not making any more money than they did one or two years ago — this despite the fact that PLO has become much more popular.) But the third change was the most important. The good LAPs and also the maniacs slowly but surely started shifting to 6-max games, knowing that their overaggression (which was sometimes a burden in full-ring games) would be much better suited for tables that had fewer players. An added benefit was that the “Rolf-like” shortstackers would not automatically join, as their style of play thrived on full-ring games. And even if they would join, their shortstack approach would be much less effective in a short-handed setting. This is because: ♠ The blinds naturally come around much faster in 6-max than in full ring play. ♠ As a result of this higher blind pressure you cannot afford to wait as patiently for a profitable move like a preflop reraise or a limp-reraise with a very strong holding. In other words: one of the main goals of the shortstack approach is to go all-in early in the hand as a significant money favorite — but in shorthanded play this is harder to pull off because you will either have lost more blinds in the process or, if you make your move earlier, you will be playing the big pots with a significantly slighter edge. ♠ In 6-max there is less dead money from people who have first limped/called a raise, and who now fold against your all-in reraise. ♠ There are fewer multiway pots than in full ring play, and as a result you don’t get protection as often. (Meaning the advantage of being all-in early in the hand is significantly reduced.) ♠ In PLO hand values run close, basically with A-A-x-x as the only exception. But because in 6-max you cannot afford to wait for these A-A hands as long as you can in full-ring, you will on average be a much slighter money favorite in the all-in pots than in full-ring. ♠ Of the rake situation (for more on this, see Secrets of Professional Pot-Limit Omaha, pp.89–90).

Implications for me With my “targets” (the overaggressive players) now playing in different types of games than yours truly, the number of good, full-ring $25-$50 and even $10-$20 games started dropping considerably — to such a degree that I often found myself playing in all full-ring games at every site available. But even then, the number of games that fitted my preference had dropped so much that I sometimes found myself in bad (too tight) games at much smaller stakes that I was accustomed to. So, I knew that this was probably the right moment to simply follow my targets into the 6-max games, and try to become as proficient there as I had always been in full-ring. It was at that exact time that I got an offer from the (now defunct) T-6 Poker site to become a sponsored pro. Their offer involved: ♠ Free entries into the big live tournaments in Europe, plus a large budget for the WSOP as well. Flights and accommodation were taken care of, and I could keep 70% of my winnings. ♠ In return, I would agree to log in a total of at least 80 hours at their site every month, playing a minimum of three tables. This was a great deal and, without doubt, one that I didn’t want to decline. However, there was one danger: T-6 Poker had no full-ring games whatsoever — there were only six-handed and heads up games at the site. Yet my main strength was still full-ring play. My 6-max experience at both PLO and NLH ring games was quite limited, and at heads up this experience was almost non-existent. Obviously, I accepted this deal. I figured that if I would merely break even at the site, this deal would already be very lucrative. Of course I hoped that I would continue to do what I had always done — win. But, if for whatever reason, I would not be able to beat the games, this seemingly great deal could actually prove to be very costly! With the pressure quite high, and with a new challenge lying ahead of me, I decided I would approach things exactly as I had always done when taking on something new or when heading into a new direction. I informed myself as well as possible by reading a great deal of literature on short-handed play and by watching 6-max material from video instruction sites — and then combining all this information with my own views on how to approach these games. Of course, I used the same type of step-by-step approach that I always do. Here was my initial plan to beat these games.

Step 1 Continue to use a tight shortstack strategy even in six-handed, selecting only the relatively soft games, and preferably for rather small stakes. Play no more than two games simultaneously. Try to get used to the different speed of shorthanded poker, try to get a feel on the general style of play, accumulate as many reads/tells as possible on specific players and try to keep initial losses limited. Stick to only “full” 6-max games, and quit directly any time a seat remains open.

Step 2 Once the results get better and I have analyzed specific weaknesses in my regular opponents, start taking advantage by buying in for a larger amount whenever they are in the game — of course only after having acquired good relative position. Slowly but surely get rid of the minimum 20 big blinds buy-in, and start using the 30–40 big blinds approach that I wrote about in my previous PLO book (pp.91–94).

Step 3 Once the results stay good and I start to feel more comfortable, it is time slowly but surely to approach the end goal: playing a high-quality big stack (max. buy-in) approach. Start adding a third and a fourth table when also in big-stack play.

Step 4 Slowly but surely move into the bigger games. Don’t quit games anymore once they have become three-or four-handed, but instead start opening up tables and creating new games — especially by inviting players that have specific or exploitable weaknesses.

Step 5 Also start playing the heads up games with big stacks. All of this leading to the ultimate goal: playing any player, at any table and for any stakes. In all honesty, I expected I would probably get no further than step 2. After all, I was not that experienced in shorthanded play, and on top of that T-6 didn’t support any of the poker software programs that I had always used (Poker Tracker Omaha and Poker Ace HUD). In other words: I would be playing “Real Poker” with no technical or statistical help, and I would probably be facing a whole bunch of other sponsored pros — in all likelihood, quality players who had also agreed to log in lots of hours. So, as I judged things, merely becoming this break-even player would already be tough enough for me. As it happened, I turned out to do much better than that. After a slow start where I used the shortstack approach for some time with no spectacular results, I worked my way to step 4 in just three or four months. As had always been the case with my full-ring approach at the various sites, I again became one of the site’s most consistent winners. Although I was almost never amongst the top three biggest winners of the day, I was nearly always amongst the top 10 biggest winners of the month. In fact, after just seven or eight months of play, I had even become quite proficient at the format that I had always avoided: heads-up play. I would start up tables against anyone except the two or three players who were still better than me heads up. And just as they had always done, people again started complaining about my alleged luck, and about my propensity to always win with aces — “always” of course in the eyes of my opponents.

The step-by-step approach in detail Here I outline the process which enabled me to take a methodical approach to the conversion to 6-max play.

Step 1: Sticking to shortstacking, even in 6-max When making a transition to a new game or structure, it is imperative to take sufficient measures to make this transition as smooth as possible. Sometimes it is worth starting out with a somewhat risk-averse and possibly not entirely optimal approach, provided this means relatively little chance of serious losses, and viewing this as a relatively cheap learning experience. This is especially true if the transition is a rather radical one — like from online to live, from tournaments to cash, from Hold’em to Omaha, or (as in this case) from full-ring to shorthanded games. Even though I was fully aware that the minimum buy-in approach isn’t optimal by any means in 6-max, I still decided to stick with it at least for the first one or two months of play. Not having any reads on my opponents just yet (the site being entirely new), and perhaps having less knowledge and experience in shorthanded play than my regular opponents, I simply held onto my old “play for my entire stack, or don’t play at all” shortstack approach from the full-ring games. The goal was to avoid any large initial losses, to gain experience, to accumulate reads and to analyze weaknesses in my opponents — all at relatively little cost. Please note that this approach was bad for my ego, as I was sometimes playing small-stakes games like €1-€2 and even €0.5-€1 while sitting down with the minimum buy-in. I can assure you: not something that gives an ego-maniac like me a feeling of accomplishment! Getting a bit unlucky in the majority of the crucial pots that I played, I was unable to win in my first month of play. But it was not just bad luck; I also had a few clear leaks in my 6-max shortstack approach that were detrimental to my overall results. They included: Limping too much with the intention of limp-reraising Once you are playing the same opposition daily and in a shorthanded setting, going for the same play time and again is simply bad poker. While in full-ring play, there are many more opponents who could fall into your trap (make the first raise on light values and then be confronted by your almost all-in limp-reraise), in six-handed play there are fewer opponents that you can fool. Furthermore, provided they are at least slightly observant, they will see that you have voluntarily entered the pot, possibly with the intention of going for that good old limp-reraise again. It took me a while to realize that successful limp-reraising is harder to pull off in 6-max, yet at the same time I knew that open raising with the minimum stack that I had was not good either. In other words, after a month or so, I knew that it was time to slowly but surely start buying in for a bigger amount. Overplaying naked kings on a structural basis Thinking that in six-handed play it is a lot less likely than in full ring that A-A-x-x is out there (the only hand that you truly fear when you have kings), I would sometimes commit with K-K-x-x even after a raise and a reraise. It took me a while to see that in 6-max with a minimum buy-in, raggedy kings and even K-K-A-x should still usually be mucked with two raises in front of me — and especially if I had no money invested yet. Slightly underestimating double-suited small one-gappers like 9–8–6-5ds and hands like A-7–6–4ds These are the types of hands that can have quite a bit of value all-in preflop in three-way pots. This is helped if both opponents are likely to be playing big cards and especially if both of them have significant money left. (As you may get protection — a concept thoroughly explained in the previous book.) Also, both these types of holdings (9–8–6-5ds and A-7–6–4ds) can be excellent reraise hands when playing a short stack, facing a late-position open raise. Assuming a 20 big blind stack and a three big blind open raise, you could reraise here to 10.5 big blinds, representing a robust made hand — most likely A-A, K-K or some other high pair/four big cards type of hand. Your opponent will often give up hands like A-J-7–3 or A-K-Q-4 there and then, allowing you to win 4.5 big blinds without a showdown, and also free of rake (meaning you will have added 22.5% to your stack while holding — in all likelihood — the worse hand). Yet, if your opponent has a big pair type of holding that he decides to commit with, then you will have a more than decent counter hand with your double-suited hand containing a lot of low cards. So, in addition to the many pots you will win uncontested, if you do get called you will almost always have at least 32% pot equity. And in the rare case of your opponent pushing a hand like K-Q-J-10ss or making a play with something like 7–6–5-4ds, you could even be a slight favorite with your A-7–6–4ds and 9–8–6-5ds, respectively. (Meaning that over the course of all hands, counting both the uncontested wins and the showdowns, you would have won money.) And finally, if your opponent has a hand like Q-J-10–8ns or 10–9–8-7ss, he will probably call the reraise to snap off your “obvious” big pair. But he will then usually just give up/check and fold on flops like 2–2–4 rainbow that have helped neither player. And in that case with your 9–8–6-5ds, your mere nine high would earn you a 22.5 big blinds pot, for 12 big blinds net profit (not counting the rake). It should be clear that you don’t need to win many pots like this to make this reraising in the right situations with non-premium double-suited-hands a profitable strategy — however, it took me a bit too long to figure this out.

Step 2: Buying in for slightly larger amounts Slowly but surely, I began to incorporate some changes to this minimum buy-in approach. Instead of the minimum 20 big blinds, I would now buy in for 30 or 40. I started paying extra attention to acquiring the best possible seat, trying to get either “weak-tight” players to my left (in which case I bought in for 40 big blinds) or else the overaggressive maniacs (in which case I opted for 30 big blinds). With the maniac(s) to my immediate left, I would of course be down to my old limp-reraise before the flop or check-raise after tactics, with the intention of getting the money in as early as possible and trying to trap players in the middle to create dead money. With the “weak-tight” player(s) to my left, I chose a larger buy-in amount in order to use the minraise-inposition as a weapon even with rather speculative holdings, as my stack would now be big enough so that I could profitably call even a pot-sized reraise from one of the blinds. (Or, to be more accurate: the money would then be deep enough that I could use my position postflop to get good implied odds, and also to make a meaningful enough steal/bluff bet if I needed to.) Also, because I still had an ultratight image from my “step 1” phase, I could even use the limp-behind-a-limper as a weapon. As my opponents knew that, so far, a very high percentage of my limps included hands like A-A-x-x or K-K-10–9, I could now safely limp in the cutoff or hijack behind one limper with hands as weak as A-10–7–5ss to the ace, knowing that the remaining players would be fearful to raise me with any hand other than specifically A-A-x-x (or possibly a double-suited medium rundown that could stand a limp-reraise). This provided me with an awful lot of information for those times that they actually did raise. Plus, perhaps just as importantly, it allowed me to steal a lot of pots on flops with an ace, a king or big cards. Unless they had the temporary nuts, they feared that I could very well have it. And this meant that (at least for some time, and as long as I didn’t get out of line too often) usually just a very small bet of half the pot or even less would earn me many more pots than I was entitled to according to the strength of my hand. The fact that I now played 40 big blinds was enough to induce folds in situations where with only 20 big blinds my opponents would have said “Ah, what the heck — let’s look him up.” Another benefit of the 40 big blinds buy-in is that (in combination with the tight, nitty image that I tried to cultivate) I could use the pot reraise and even the pot-sized limp-reraise as a weapon with hands like 9♠-8♥-7♥-5♠. Assuming I would not take it too far, say not more than just once every two hours or so,

my opponents would figure me for almost 100% pure aces. This meant that — unless of course they had aces themselves, or kings that they could not lay down — they would either fold the best hand, or call now with the intention of calling my obvious all-in bet on the flop only if they had sufficient equity against my “obvious” big pair. With just about one pot-sized bet left, I would win the pot on the flop on well over 60% of occasions — especially those pots with relatively dry boards like K-7–3 rainbow, A-4–2 rainbow or 6–3–3 rainbow. Yes, exactly those flops where I had absolutely nothing — zilch. Yet the times that my opponent would commit, were often exactly on those flops where I had hit big, like on flops with two or three small cards. Of course, every once in a while someone would spoil my plans — for instance by calling the reraise, and then betting into me on the flop. However, almost always these bets meant that someone had a good draw against aces, or could beat aces. And if I had absolutely nothing, I could simply fold and still save face — meaning I could still credibly claim that “my aces were obviously not good in this spot any more”, and thus I could continue to use this play in the future. Slowly moving from step 1 to step 2, I became a consistent winner. More and more, I started to play poker beyond the flop, making a move whenever appropriate, and even pulling off a successful river bluff from time to time. Basically, I would do this in just two situations: ♠ When my opponents had shown weakness by just calling my bets on the early streets and then the river had not changed a thing. ♠ When I had just called a bet on the flop or turn and then the river presented a new nuts that I could very well have. Using this 30–40 big blind buy-in tactic, I would never make the first pot raise. The only times when I would make pot-sized bets or raises were if they could put me all-in or close to it (after the flop), or if I could get more than 20% of my stack in before the flop in situations where I was either holding aces, or where I could credibly represent them.

Step 3: Moving into big-stack play Now that my results continued to be good, having found my rhythm and receiving respect from my opponents, it was time for the next step. I would now sometimes go after my opponents’ entire stacks, rather than just part of them. So, once I saw that a table had one or two weak or exploitable players with a full buy in or more, I decided to buy in for the maximum as well — especially if I could get a seat to their immediate left. With now a stack of 100 big blinds, it was time to finally start playing some Real Poker. Still profiting from my tight and somewhat nitty image, I incorporated some new things into my game — like the small reraise in position and other isolation plays. I still held onto my uniform preflop raise tactic under all circumstances — making it three big blinds to go regardless of the actual hand, my position or the number of limpers. By raising to just three big blinds all the time (never more, never less), my opponents could not get any kind of read about my hand other than that I considered it to be raise-worthy. (And that was not a lot of info, given that out of the 10 hands that I voluntarily played, more than eight would be raises, with less than two limps.) A few of the advantages of this approach are: ♠ You give away no information whatsoever, as you play A-A-x-x the same as you would play a medium rundown. ♠ You gain initiative at relatively little cost. ♠ You make pots a bit juicier, and lay the foundation for a big pot in case you catch a good flop. ♠ You cannot get reraised off your hand easily. Because your initial raise is quite small, the money is almost always deep enough to call the reraise and outplay your opponent postflop (especially if the reraise gives away a lot of information about the opponent’s hand — for example if he would only make a pot reraise with A-A-x-x). ♠ These uniform three big blind raises tend to promote multi-way action. I have always been fond of multiway pots where I can maneuver my opponents into making mistakes, get people caught in the middle, or represent hands at relatively little cost — meaning I am usually the main beneficiary from this extra meat in the pot. (There is more on this exact tactic later in this book.) Of course, there’s no such thing as a free lunch. The uniform raises tactic also has some clear disadvantages: ♠ You don’t always maximize your profits. If you face one player who would have called a pot raise in a situation where he shouldn’t, yet you stick to just your standard raise, you give up value. ♠ You are not always able to accomplish your goals. If a weak player has limped — someone who likes to see every flop and who can be easily outplayed, and you are in the cutoff with a decent holding — you would probably want to isolate this person while having position. The way to do this is obviously through a pot-sized raise, as this puts the maximum amount of pressure on others who may want to join the party. Yet if you just make your standard three big blinds total bet, this may entice the blinds or — even worse — the button to come in behind you, and who may spoil your plans/limit your amount of control over the situation. All these things come into play if you can make the first raise. But sometimes, someone else will open raise. If this person happens to be the weak player that I have labeled as my “target” and I have position on him, I would almost never flatcall in this stage 3 that I am in. I would almost always reraise small — say around 2.3 to 2.7 times my opponent’s bet, in other words much less than the size of the pot. If my opponent’s open raise was pot-sized, I would usually choose the smaller ratio, while against small open raises I would tend to choose the upper end of the scale — factor 2.6 or 2.7. This is almost always enough to shut out the field, as there is hardly a hand good enough to call a raise and a reraise in a situation where you do not close the betting, and where you could actually face a pot-sized four-bet. And at the same time, it puts the initial raiser in an awful spot. Even with a good starting hand, he will be out of position throughout the hand. If he calls the reraise, he will have given up initiative to me, and will often be forced to play check-and-fold after the flop. Only rarely will his hand be strong enough to reraise pot, and even if he does he will usually not be able to get more than 25% of his stack in — meaning he would be giving me considerable implied odds. And perhaps most importantly: Because I would make this same type of small reraise with hands like 8♠-7♥-6♠-4♣, 10–10–7–7, K♥-Q♥-J♣-9♦ as well as with A-A-x-x, it will be hard for my opponent to get a read on me — let alone outplay me from out of position. The most likely scenario, assuming that he is a relatively weak player, is that he will simply call the raise, and then will check-and-fold often to my standard 60% of pot bet after the flop. Some weak players have different patterns, as some like to be creative and bet into the preflop reraiser, and some check and call one time on the flop to then fold to a second barrel on the turn. But given that you have position with relatively deep money, you should be able to get the upper hand in the long run. In this stage 3 I was playing a big stack, so I moved into a more loose-aggressive type of play. Especially the first one or two months after this transition, I got away with this, as I got way too much respect from my opponents. This was because I had tried to change my game in a slow and subtle manner, and especially because at other tables I was still using my much tighter 30–40 big blinds shortstack approach, my opponents often wouldn’t realize what I was doing. My results still improving, I slowly started adding a fourth table, and moved up to the €3-€6 and €5-€10 games whenever I thought the line-up was fairly soft. Logging in an awful lot of hours every month, I was gaining shorthanded experience at rapid pace.

Step 4: Slowly moving into the bigger games It is always a good idea to start out playing small, and only move up once you feel that your game has matured to such a degree that there are only few — if any — exploitable leaks left. When T-6 opened up, we actually had quite a few high rollers at the site, meaning that €50-€100 PLO games were no exception, and at times there would even be a €200-€400 game. I am someone with a big ego, and I knew that people would laugh at me if they saw me plodding in €0.50-€1 or €1-€2 games while big games were going on simultaneously. But I still thought that, looking at things from a long-term perspective, I should do what would be the most beneficial for me over time — not what my ego dictated me to do. So, I kept on plodding so that I slowly but surely moved up to €2-€4, to €3-€6 and later also to €5-€10. On occasion, if I thought the games were really juicy, I jumped into the €10-€20, and I even had three or four sessions at €25-€50. But that was at a time when the site had already been running for six months, when most of the big players and high-stakes gamblers had already left. And given that I played every day, I knew that it would not be good for my mental fitness if I were to lose five or six maximum buy-ins in the €25-€50 games — only to find out that in the days that followed, there would be no bigger games available than just €2-€4. There are more important things than maximizing your short-term profit or not wanting to miss out on a rare-but-juicy big game. And selecting your games in such a way that you will be able to maintain a positive attitude over time by making risk-averse decisions is one of them — at least in my view it is. I won almost every day! I couldn’t believe it myself, but although the weaker players went broke and only very few new players signed up (meaning the games got increasingly tough), the biggest downswing I ever experienced was just five or six maximum buy-ins. My game had improved to such a degree that I had gotten enough confidence in my abilities to start up tables, rather than just jump into a game only as the fourth or fifth player (which had always been my practice).

Step 5: Playing the big stack at any table, and for any stakes The final step was then of course to start playing the big stack at any PLO game that the site had to offer and for any stakes that my opponents were willing to play. This is, of course, the goal for any professional player — yet obviously a stage that one can never truly reach. Even if (as I had done) you agree to play strictly at just one site, there are always players who are better than you in certain types of games and structures. At my site, I for instance avoided my fellow pro T-6 Andreas and two other players in heads-up play. While I would play these shorthanded specialists in six-, five-and even fourhanded play, I had to acknowledge that heads up they still had a clear edge on me — meaning that until I had improved my heads up skills significantly, I would simply refuse to play them. After all, I didn’t want to make the mistake that many good, winning poker players make: step up to bigger games or new structures all the time, until they finally find a game that they can not beat — and then stay there losing back all of their winnings (the well-known “level of incompetence” principle that rears its head in many businesses, not just in poker). Still, I had become one of the most consistent winners at the site. As I logged in many hours in the last two or three months of the site’s existence when there were just very few games going, I could basically be found at any game (mainly PLO but I was also playing NLH), any stakes (up to €10-€20, as the truly big games had gone), and any number of opponents. I had also improved into a remarkably decent heads-up player, of course always playing a maximum buy-in. Later in this book you will find a series of tips and overall strategies that have helped me a lot to become successful at heads up in relatively little time — tips that I am certain will be of benefit to you.

Some final words By thoroughly committing to this step-by-step approach, I had gone from an inexperienced 6-max player who had to rely on shortstack play for break-even results, to one of the most consistent and successful players at the site. The key ideas were (as so often when it involves me): Discipline, Patience, Dedication and the Willingness to Learn. This is where my personal story ends, my update on the developments that followed the release of my Secrets of Professional Pot-Limit Omaha book. From now on, Rob and I will start digging into the matters a little deeper, by analyzing in depth the specific strategies required for a successful shorthanded PLO game.

Chapter Two

Stack Size and Bet Size

As should be pretty clear from my first PLO book, I base almost all of my decisions — and in fact my entire game plan — on stack size. The amount of chips that I have in front of me (and also the amount of chips that my opponents have) will dictate my hand selection, my preflop raising percentage, the size of my bets and many other things. For full-ring play, it was — and is — my opinion that you should always try to have the biggest stack at the table (so you cover everyone — most importantly the weaker players) or the shortest stack. The merits of both these strategies and the required tactics have been described extensively in Secrets of Professional Pot-Limit Omaha, including the reasons why you would hardly ever want an in-between stack. In 6-max though, the situation is not so clear. The minimum buy-in approach, even though I see some very good players often use it in the $200-$400 games at Full Tilt, is not nearly as powerful shorthanded as it is in full-ring. It still has some merit, especially in highly aggressive games with loose open raisers and overactive players who might give you protection. But in general, a slightly bigger buy-in would be better — say in the range 30–40 big blinds — for these reasons: ♠ You can open raise a bit more loosely. On the button as the first one in, and sometimes also from the cutoff, you can now make the minimum raise I often use or the slightly more standard steal of about 2.5 times the big blinds — and you will often be successful. With only 20 big blinds, this raise would be a too large percentage of your stack when playing just a marginal hand and your opponents could easily punish you by reraising pot from the blinds. If they catch you with a mediocre holding, you will get raised off your hand, while on the other hand with a 35 or 40BB stack you could still make a profitable call, given the remaining money and your good position. So, quite clearly, with just a minimum buyin, you cannot profitably make minimum open raises on light values. But pot raises with marginal holdings are not recommended either, which leaves open limping on the button with a marginal holding as the only alternative — and obviously, this is not a very attractive one. In other words: With a minimum buy-in in 6-max, you will have to play very tight, and as a result you will not get the most out of one of the most profitable situations: in late position, as the first one in. ♠ Of course, this exact drawback was also there in full ring play — so why do I suddenly view this “bad stack size for profitable button play” as an important issue for 6-max, yet for full ring I hardly even mentioned it? Well, the answer is as follows. In full-ring play, the minimum buy-in approach has so many and such clear advantages, that this one slight disadvantage is not all that important. This is even more so the case because in full-ring play you will be on the button or in the cutoff only two times out of nine (instead of two out of six). Also, being in late position in full-ring play, you will be the first one in much less often than you would in 6-max play — as more opponents mean more players who could have raised or (especially) limped in front of you. The main advantage of the minimum buy-in in full-ring play is having time to wait for a profitable situation where you can get your entire stack into the middle early with a clear edge (something like 35% or more pot equity four-way, 45% or more three-way, and 55% or more heads up — percentages that could even be much higher in multiway pots if there was the possibility of getting protection from the still active players, while you are already all-in). However, in six max the blind pressure is higher (and thus the costs of folding are higher), there is less dead money, multiway pots occur less often, and consequently you will get protected much less often. The combination of all these factors means that in 6-max you won’t “make up” as much for the drawbacks to this strategy. ♠ Most importantly: the reason why you can have such a big edge playing minimum buy-in in full-ring PLO was because of just one hand — aces. Basically the entire minimum buy-in strategy was based on getting maximum value out of the only hand that will usually have a big edge in Omaha: A-A-x-x. Yes, you would sometimes make deceptive pot reraises with hands like J♠-10♥-9♠-7♣, knowing that these plays in themselves would not have a great expectation. They were done mostly to give the illusion of action, though, so that the next time you again reraise pot (this time with A-A-x-x, obviously), your opponent would not muck his K-K-x-x or four picture cards any more. In other words: you would get maximum value out of your A-A hands. But in 6-max, you just don’t get these aces often enough to keep waiting patiently for them. With higher blind pressure, you are forced to get into the action with more marginal holdings. And PLO being a game where hand values run close, you will now be more than a 58% or 60% favorite only on very rare occasions. In fact, in contrast to the full-ring games, you will now usually want or have to commit fully with potential trouble hands like K-K-x-x or four picture cards — meaning that now you could actually be a clear dog sometimes if it is your opponents who are lucky enough to pick up aces. ♠ Because hand values run close and you cannot keep waiting for aces too long, the high blind pressure in relation to your short stack simply forces you to get involved if you are using the minimum buy-in approach. As a result, you will often be merely representing aces in those cases where you reraise pot, rather than actually having them. However, even if your opponent believes you have A-A-x-x or K-K-x-x, he will still tend to call your reraises liberally thinking that he may get correct pot odds, or because he just wants to see the flop, or thinking “you don’t play that much money anyway”. And if in this situation you were making a play with hands like 10–9–8-6ds or A-8–7–5ss (very reasonable hands to reraise pot with, especially if you read the open raiser for being rather weak), of course you should still have enough money left to make a significant bluff or semi-bluff bet after the flop! But if you are playing just 20 big blinds, and have invested 12 big blinds before the flop by coming over the top of a pot-sized open raise, then there are 25.5 big blinds in the middle when the flop comes — and you will have only eight big blinds left. If you bet all-in, your opponent will get odds of 33.5-to-8 for his money, and he will call with any holding — even if he believes that you actually have a big pair. Now, this was of course exactly what you wanted in the full-ring setting where you would have A-A-x-x a very high percentage of the time, but not in a 6-max game where you will often be forced to make a move with holdings of much lower value. Had you been playing a 30 or 35 big blinds stack in this same situation where you read the open raiser as weak, you could have turned this situation into a much more profitable one. Let’s say you are in the small blind this time, facing a 3.5 big blinds open raise from the cutoff or button. You raise pot with this same 10–9–8-6ds or A-8–7–5ss, and again your opponent calls. Well, for him to just call and not reraise all-in with just about one pot-sized bet left, implies that he gives you credit for having the current best hand — meaning he will only continue after the flop if he feels he has caught enough help to try and beat your “announced” big pair. With 24 big blinds in the middle, you can then simply make a nice, potsized or slightly less than pot-sized all-in bet regardless of the flop, in a situation where your opponent will fold much more often than he would have had he had known your actual holding. An added benefit in this situation with your fairly short but not minimum stack is that your opponent will often fold on exactly those flops that may not have helped you at all (flops like K-Q-x or J-J-x), while giving you action of flops that seem to be bad for you, but that in fact have helped you (7–6–2 rainbow, 8–6–4ss). It is for this reason, that with stacks in 30–40 big blinds region, you would reraise pot with A-A-x-x and sometimes also with the 10–9–8-6ds/A-8–7–5ss that we have here, but not with naked kings or hands like A-K-Q-8ss. Say, the hands that may indeed be a decent favorite against your opponent’s open range, but that are usually in awful shape those times that your opponent decides to commit fully. Of course, given the type of game that you’re in (aggressive/passive), the caliber of the opposition and the size of your bankroll, you could still sometimes choose to buy in for the absolute minimum in 6-max games — for instance, in big games that you don’t play often, and against overaggressive players that don’t know you and thus may misjudge the hands that you choose to go all-in with. Even though (as you will see in the remainder of this book) I nowadays almost always buy in for the maximum,1 shorter buy-ins can definitely have a lot of merit in 6-max. Especially if you make the proper

adjustments to your strategy when it comes to hand selection, and when both the number and the size of your bets are in line with the size of your stack. Rather than analyze everything in a rather dry, analytical manner, I will simply use concrete hand examples to show how you can and should adjust for instance your bet size to the amount of chips that you have in front of you. I have selected four starting hands, and show the things that you should take into account based on your stack size and the action in front of you. In the next chapter, I will also do an extensive analysis of the proper postflop bet sizes in the situations that I describe. The four example hands: ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠

A-A-8–5ss K-K-4–4ss A-J-8–7ss 8–7–6-4ds

In three different situations: ♠ On the button, after one limper (situation A). ♠ From the small blind, facing a pot-sized open raise from the button (situation B). ♠ In the cutoff, facing an under the gun minraise, with a somewhat overaggressive button in my back (situation C). Played with three different stack sizes: ♠ 20 big blinds. ♠ 40 big blinds. ♠ 120 big blinds.

Example hand 1: A-A-8–5ss Situation A: On the button, after one limper (holding A-A-8–5ss) With 20BB This is the difficult situation I described earlier. If the blinds are quite aggressive, an interesting option is to just limp along, hoping that one of the blinds will raise. Best would be if the limper in the middle now calls again, but even if he doesn’t you obviously reraise pot (close to) all-in. A pot-sized open raise in this situation is not all that bad either. You can make it 4.5 big blinds to go this being 22.5% of your stack. If you get called in one place, there will be 10.5 to 11.5 big blinds in the middle, and you will have only 15.5 big blinds left, meaning you consider yourself almost 100% committed 2, albeit with somewhat negative implied odds. (As you can expect your opponent to only give you action if he has a hand that either has you beat already, or that has a decent enough chance to beat you on the turn or river.) A minraise after this one limper might only have value if the extra meat in the pot could induce someone to get frisky — say, if your minraise may convince the limper that you must be weak, and respond to this by going for the limp-reraise. Still these three options are not great, all suffering from drawbacks. Nevertheless, they are still inherently better than a “standard” raise to 3BB or 3.5BB. With the short stack you are playing, I consider this to be the worst possible option, especially given the framework of how you would play hands other than A-A-x-x in this spot.

With 40BB With a 40 big blind stack, my default strategy is always to minraise as the first one in, to choose between limping along or minraising after limpers, and never to open-raise for any larger amounts than this minraise. Quite simply, the goal is to not give away any information, and to play your A-A-x-x, your KQ-J-9, your 9–9–6–6 and your 10–9–8–6 all the same way — coming in for exactly 5% of your stack. If someone reraises you, your stack will often be big enough to call this reraise even with somewhat speculative holdings — for instance, in order to snap off a probable A-A-x-x with a single-suited medium rundown. And when you have A-A-x-x yourself and you get reraised (or when you have a nice double-suited hand like A♥-10♥-9♠-7♠ with one or two players in the middle who have called this reraise, and you feel that with all this potential dead money this could be a good spot to gamble), you can of course simply four-bet all-in or close to it. The thing that you should never do with a 40BB stack is (open) raise pot when you have A-A-x-x, yet make smaller raises with other types of holdings — this is a cardinal sin in PLO if you are in a non-committed situation. So, using this approach a case can be made for both options. Limping behind may be viewed as weak, and could induce the blinds to represent more strength than they actually have, or misinterpret the value of a K-K-x-x/Q-Q-x-x holding. But as I would minraise with a wide range of holdings in this spot, I would almost certainly do this here too, now that I have A-A-x-x. After all, if my opponents know that my minraising range could be quite wide, I could possibly induce someone to three-bet me, so I can move in. Minraising will also give the pot some more meat, plus even if no one reraises it might still give me the initiative postflop if they all check to me.3 And a final benefit of the minraise — as opposed to the limp-behind — is that through any four-bets on my part I can now get a significantly higher percentage of my stack into the pot than I could with the three-bet that would follow my limp and a raise from one of the blinds. So, in this spot I would probably give eight or 8.5 points to the minraise, some 6.5 or so to the limp-behind, and fewer than six points for all other options.

With 120BB With more than a full buy-in, I also use a rather “uniform preflop raises” type of strategy. In contrast with most players, I rarely if ever vary the size of my raises, and I also don’t adjust the size of my raises to the number of limpers in front of me. My tactics are almost always the same: ♠ By keeping the size of my preflop raises the same, I give away no information whatsoever about my hand — other than that I think it is playable and raiseworthy for this situation. ♠ By keeping the size of my preflop raises small, I gain initiative at relatively little cost. ♠ By keeping the size of my preflop raises small, I am keeping the money relatively deep and this should decrease the postflop luck factor and thus increase my edge or limit my swings. I am more likely to be making the correct decisions in the very big pots than if I had made larger preflop raises, for the simple reason that there are now more postflop bets required to actually make the pot this big. ♠ By keeping the size of my preflop raises small, I avoid the unpleasant situation of raising myself out of the pot. If I raise pot after a few limpers with a more than decent hand like K♣-Q♠-Q♥-8♣, one of the blinds calls and then one of the initial limpers reraises pot, I will usually have to lay down if I read my opponent for aces, as the total bet I am facing will probably be a bit more than 30BB, or a quarter of my stack. (The actual raise will be slightly smaller, probably about 24 or 25BB extra, and even in a three-way pot this is usually a bit too steep to try to outdraw aces. This is especially true if one or both of my opponents are playing with less than the 120BB that I have.) But by using my always-raise-the-sameamount approach with this stack — usually a three or 3.5BB total bet — any pot-sized reraise by one of my opponents will almost never be much more than just 10% or 12% of my total stack — meaning I can profitably call on the basis of my implied odds and/or bluffing rights. Given my good position and my nice holding that has the potential to actually flop a monster (for instance, if I hit my key card Q♠), not getting to see the flop would be quite awful — and possibly raising myself out of the pot in this situation because of a too large open raise could even be considered a disaster. In this situation, my decision is simple and automatic. I make my standard raise of three or 3.5 the big blinds here (3.5 if everybody is deep-stacked, three if any of the limpers has a significantly shorter stack than I have), the same as I would with any other hand that I judged playable and raiseworthy in that spot.

Situation B: From the small blind, facing a pot-sized open raise from the button (holding A-A-8–5ss) With 20BB

Well, quite obviously, this is an ideal reraise pot situation. You can make it 11.5 big blinds total, playing a 20BB stack. The best starting hand, and hardly any implied odds for your opponent if he decides to call your reraise — things can’t get much better than that.

With 40BB Here, the situation is more blurry. With 40BB, reraising pot will only get 28.75% of your stack into the middle, rather than the 57.5% from before. Still, part of the reason why I have advocated playing a 35 to 40BB stack instead of just 20BB for those who want to shortstack in 6-max, is that you will be reraising with a much wider range than just big pairs. This is to take advantage of the fact that (if your reraise gets called) you will win lots of pots uncontested if after the flop your opponent hasn’t caught enough help. In other words: your preflop reraise will have paved the way for a successful (semi)bluff bet on the flop. Because you will reraise pot a bit more liberally than in full-ring games, especially against late-position open raisers, this means you can reraise pot with A-A a bit more liberally as well — reraising pot also in situations where strictly speaking you do not get the required percentage of your stack into the middle. So, in this situation I would reraise pot close to 90% of the time, and if the open raiser is someone who knows I could be reraising with a wide range, I would even make this pot reraise almost 100% of the time. By the way: the only reasonable alternative to this pot reraise is flatcalling the raise. (In that case, you would probably try to induce bluffs by check-calling if a third ace would flop. Or, depending on the exact characteristics of the opponent and the texture of the board, you could check-raise with, for instance, an overpair + nut flush draw or overpair + open-ended straight draw. With scary boards, you should sometimes make the “weak-tight” play of check-folding and on boards like 2–2–7 rainbow you could even bet out on the flop, hoping that an opponent will have a pocket pair higher than sevens who might raise you thinking you can’t have a deuce — as “you would not call a pot raise out of position holding a deuce and, even if you had one, you would probably check-raise the flop rather than bet out”. But even if your opponent doesn’t raise you on the flop, you should still be able to get calls from 8–8-x-x to K-K-x-x holdings on at least two streets — not in the last place because he may view your donk bet on this non-scary board as quite suspicious.) This means that, at least in my view, reraising for an amount less than the pot is probably the worst possible option in this case — as you would be revealing your hand at a cheap price, while giving your opponent good odds to try and outdraw you.

With 120BB With deep money, aces out of position is not a nice hand to play against a raise. The best play may be to just flatcall the raise, with the following intentions: ♠ Try to win a small to medium-sized pot when you flop OK, say when the board comes with a small pair — yet be prepared to abandon ship if you run into more resistance than would seem reasonable for aces up. ♠ Check-fold on most flops that don’t help you. ♠ Bet into the preflop raiser around 30% of the time, making this a mix of big hands, good draws that you would reraise pot with if the opponent raises you, and hands where you have only A-A on a fairly scary board and where you would never be able to check-call a continuation bet. ♠ Check-call on drawheavy flops with your unimproved aces, with the intention of representing whatever draw gets completed on the turn. ♠ Be creative, and try to avoid the same betting patterns with similar holdings. Make sure that every time you play this small pot OOP with a marginal holding like an unimproved A-A, your bet outs, check-calls etc, will be random enough so that the opponent can never be entirely certain whether you are strong or weak. Always try to play these marginal situations with the mindset that you are paving the way for the one big pot when, in a similar situation, you have flopped a monster. For instance, if the playing history that you have with someone suggests that he may not respect donk bets much, and in fact has already caught you on a bluff/marginal holding that you decided to donk bet, you have paved the way for a successful donk bet next time that you flop top set or aces full. Don’t be surprised to see this opponent respond to your donk bet by a big flop raise, yes possibly even a three-barrel bluff. ♠ Most importantly, simply try to flop a well-disguised set of aces or aces full, in the hope that your opponent will have flopped a good hand of his own, or else will try to represent this top hand — thinking that because you didn’t reraise you are unlikely to have A-A while he could very well have it. (Good players would know that with these stack sizes you would only rarely reraise pot from out of position with A-A types of holdings. In other words: good players will realize that calling a raise from out of position and then giving action on an A-high flop is in fact consistent with an A-A-x-x holding.) So, it will be much easier to trap the weak players in this case, even more so because good players often have a tendency to slow down a bit on ace-high boards that also contain a pair or that in another way are not very drawheavy. Of course, against these better players you could try to use this knowledge against them, by representing A-A-A those times that you have flatcalled a raise OOP and an ace flops — while in fact you may, for instance, be on a stone cold bluff with a medium rundown. ♠ Just flatcalling with A-A-x-x in this spot can have an added advantage: it could induce the BB to try and squeeze the initial raiser (good for you, as you can now make a pot-sized four-bet when the action gets back to you, having executed a perfect second hand low), or to overestimate a big pair after the flop even if he doesn’t three-bet preflop. Reraising pot is definitely not recommended in this spot. You would get only about 10% of your stack into the pot and, by basically announcing your A-A here, you are giving your opponent considerable implied odds. (Of course, if your opponent has a fairly short stack, say about 45B or so, you are both playing effective stacks of 45BB and now reraising pot would be viable.) Reraising small would also be fine, but only if you regularly make this type of play with a very wide range of holdings — so that you could just as well have a hand like 10–10–8–8 or a rundown rather than specifically A-A-x-x. But as only very few players habitually reraise small from out of position, making this play with A-A could seem very suspicious to your opponent, who will definitely factor in A-A-x-x as a likely holding for you. As a result, he will probably not four-bet preflop with holdings like A♠-K♥-Q♣-10♥ or K♠-K♦-7♠-3♦, and also on flops with an ace he will take into account that you could have hit big — and this lessens the effectiveness of your play considerably.

Situation C: In the cutoff facing UTG minraise, with an overaggressive button (holding A-A-8–5ss) With 20BB Again, an easy decision with a stack this short. You simply reraise pot, as you can get a total of 7.5 big blinds into the middle, 37.5% of your stack. If you get called by someone, there will be 16.5 big blinds in the pot, and you will have 12.5 big blinds left — making postflop play a formality.

With 40BB This situation is almost as easy as the previous one. Taking into account that you have a somewhat overaggressive player in your back who will definitely pounce on perceived weakness, there is only one way to play this hand. You simply flatcall the raise, hoping that he will reraise and put everyone in the middle — so you can then reraise pot to (almost) all-in with the best starting hand and also quite a bit of dead money. Again, this is so clearly the best option given your stack size and the circumstances, that I won’t even mention the other options. Even if your leftside neighbor doesn’t reraise but just calls or even folds, you will still be in a pretty good situation: ♠ If he folds, you will be on the button with a well-disguised holding. ♠ If he calls, then the blinds may follow suit, and you will be in a juicy multiway pot where if you flop good, you could win a lot of money from people who won’t suspect you of having such a big hand. Given the nature of your hand with a lot of nut potential, you will almost never be in a tough spot where you could get your money in badly. Just make sure that you don’t overestimate an unimproved A-A. If you just flatcall before the flop and you end up in a multiway pot, you don’t need to make that one stab after the flop just because you have unimproved aces. Simply checkfolding is the percentage play and any bets you would make should be for other reasons than just because you need to defend your aces. Of course, if they all check to you and the board is such that your opponents are not likely to have hit and/or your aces are likely best, then of course you will probably bet. But don’t make the compounding error that many weak players make when they have A-A-x-x: failing to (re)raise before the flop in a situation where they could, and then trying to make up for that by being extremely aggressive after the flop and/or giving way too much action with unimproved aces.

With 120BB Even with deep stacks, I will usually try to get myself in a huge pot preflop when I have aces, just as I would with a short stack. However, there are three problems here: ♠ In deep-money play, it is imperative that you do not give away the texture of your hand too early. For this reason, it is important to have a slightly loose-aggressive strategy with a big stack. Once your opponents know that you could be reraising light in order to play your position, to isolate a player or to bully the opposition, you can go on and also reraise with aces without being automatically labeled with them. ♠ If you go for the kill by making a third or fourth raise with A-A-x-x for a pot-sized amount, you should be able to get at least 30% of your stack in. While with a shortstack in 6-max I said that a bit less than 25% could also be enough on some occasions, when playing a big stack you need to hold onto the “never less than 30%” rule a bit more strictly. This is especially true when you have rather raggedy aces, when you fear that the opponent could have quality aces where he would have a decent freeroll on you if all the money went in now, yet if you just call you could actually outplay him postflop, and when the opponents are of decent quality, meaning that if they call your third or fourth raise, they will almost always have a good snap off hand like 9–8–6-5ds rather than a hand like A-K-K-x. ♠ If you get a lot of action from more than one player when you are holding A-A-x-x, this could mean that one player has the same A-A that you have, while the third player may have a double-suited medium rundown and actually be a clear money favorite in the hand. As an example, take the match-up of two random A-A hands against 9♥-8♥-6♦-5♦, all-in preflop. Simulations on www.propokertools.com show that both A-A hands have around 28.08 pot equity, while the medium rundown has a whopping 43.84%. And that is not all; if none of your aces are suited, or if your hand doesn’t have any nice blocker cards against potential medium rundowns, then you could be in even worse shape. Let’s say you have a crummy-looking A♠-A♥-K♣-3♦ in this exact same match-up — up against one guy with random aces and another with 9♥-8♥-6♦-5♦. In this case, your pot equity drops to 23.66% (down from 28.08), the other guy with the random A-A has 26.13% and with no less than 50.21% (up from 43.84%) the 9♥-8♥-6♦-5♦ has now even become the absolute favorite(!) rather than just a money favorite. Now, while this exact same scenario could also occasionally take place when you are playing either 20BB or 40BB, in both these situations you don’t worry about it too much as it happens so infrequently, and because with all the dead money and the relatively shallow money the damage will be limited. But in a deep-money situation where people know to only give action with either aces or quality rundowns and not the sucker hands K-K-x-x or four picture cards, this situation would be an awful one — and especially with rag A-A hands against significant multiway action, you may be better off not making this fourth raise that could totally commit you to the pot. Because with a big stack, I tend to reraise liberally from late position (always a rather standard amount, usually between 2.3 and 2.7 times the size of my opponent’s bet), I see no reason to deviate from this plan now that I have A-A. In all likelihood, the somewhat overaggressive player on the button will fold, and I will have position on the UTG player throughout the hand. But even if the overaggressive button will call rather than fold, all is not lost. After all, given the action up to this point (a minimum raise that doesn’t need to mean strength, a small reraise from a loose cannon in the cutoff and then a call from an even looser button), one of the other players may view this as an excellent spot to make a move, trying to grab all that money that is out there in a situation where no one needs to have a real hand. This is especially true if one of the blinds has a stack of less than 50 big blinds — he may view this as an excellent spot to gamble by coming over the top for all his chips. But also if the button calls and none of the blinds make a move, the UTG minraiser may now overvalue hands like K-K-x-x, A♠-Q♠-Q♥-J♦ or A♥-K♦-Q♥-J♠ and go for an aggressive four-bet — despite being a huge dog hot and cold against my A-A-8–5ss. Assuming the normal thing happens, everybody folds, and the UTG min-raiser calls your reraise), it is now usually just a matter of continuation betting and picking up the pot. There will be more on this postflop betting at the end of this chapter, right after the four example hands.

Example hand 2: K-K-4–4ss Situation A: On the button, after one limper (holding K-K-4–4ss) With 20BB In Secrets of Professional Pot-Limit Omaha, I described more than once that you cannot always get too aggressive with kings preflop — because if by chance you run into aces, you will be a big dog. This was of course from the context of a full-ring game, but also in 6-max these same words of caution apply — albeit to a slightly lesser degree. With K-K-4–4ss and playing just 20BB, I would limp rather than make a pot raise, a minraise or an in-between raise. If you limp with your strong holding and you end up playing in an unraised, four-way pot, this is not nearly as bad as it may seem. Being on the button, you will only put any more chips into the pot if you flop a king, a four or a flush draw — and in all cases, you will usually be willing to play for your entire stack. Also, if you limp along and thus represent weakness, one of the blinds could choose to raise. If the limper now calls again, this may be an excellent spot to reraise all-in or close to it. There is a good chance that no one has A-A-x-x and even if someone does, if both players call you could end up in a three-way pot where you should still have over 25% pot equity, meaning you will be in just a slightly-EV situation. (Simulating this K-K-4–4ss against A-A-x-x and a third random hand yields 27.18% for our kings, as opposed to 46.78% for the aces and just over 26% for the random hand.) Why do I prefer to limp here and not raise? Well, the first problem is of course the initial limper. If he has A-A, I will be falling right into his trap, and I will have turned a clearly +EV situation into a clearly-EV one. The same goes for one of the blinds — if I raise here and one of them wakes up with aces, I will get reraised and will probably be too committed to fold, especially given the slight chance my opponent has a non-A-A holding, and taking into account the money I have already put in. Again using the Omaha simulator from Pro Poker Tools, results show that heads up against A-A-x-x, my K-K-4–4ss has just 32.01%. (Out of a pot of, say, 42 big blinds this would mean getting back 13.44BB for a total loss of 6.56BB, and if with 45 big blinds this total pot is slightly bigger, I would be getting back 14.4BB, for a total loss of just 5.6BB.) In other words, if I count from the decision point when I have open-raised and thus have already invested a significant percentage of my stack, then it will be impossible to fold — especially if there is some chance my kings are still good. But clearly, I don’t like it if after my raise I am faced with a pot-sized reraise. Yet, if I just limp then I would actually welcome a raise. It could lead to a juicy heads up or three-way all-in pot where I actually go in with the best hand, rather than a situation where if I face action, I am probably beat. And two final advantages of just limping: If one of the blinds indeed raises and now the initial limper reraises, I can safely fold my kings, having (in all likelihood) dodged bullets at relatively little cost — just one limp. And if indeed the UTG limper has A-A and yet after my merely limp-with-kings play no one raises then, if I happen to flop a king or a four, I am still likely to double through. Why? Because a common weakness of those who have seen a limp-reraise play with A-A-x-x fail is that they have trouble releasing unimproved aces after the flop — and thus may convince themselves that my postflop actions may just be positional plays or a (semi)bluff.

With 40BB Here, I would make my standard minraise, as I cannot get reraised out of the pot — plus, I will sweeten the pot slightly and gain the initiative. Limping is still fine, though a bit too weak for my taste given that in this position and with this stack size I would minraise with a wide range, this K-K-4–4ss clearly being in the upper part of that range. A pot raise is not recommended. Following my system of uniform-raises-according-to-stack-size, I never make potsized raises with this kind of stack; I only make pot-sized reraises in specific situations. But even when not using my system, it is still a rather awful play to raise pot in this spot, as you are opening yourself up to get limp-reraised out of the pot if the limper had chosen to make an ABC-play with aces (meaning you will have turned a highly profitable situation into a highly unprofitable one, and will have rewarded one of the most obvious moves your opponent could have made). But even if no one reraises your pot raise, you have given your opponent(s) a good clue about the texture of your hand, and they will know that in all likelihood they will need to beat one premium pair. This gives you reverse implied odds. With the stack you are playing (too big to be committed already; too small to seriously threaten the opponent and force him off a marginal hand after the flop like bottom two pair that could be drawing dead if instead of just one pair you actually have a set), this is simply a bad play.

With 120BB With bigger stacks, you want to build large pots in position. The way to do this is simply by taking the initiative preflop and to sweeten the pot by raising. With a stack size between 90 and 130 big blinds, I usually hold onto my standard raise of three times the big blind4, regardless of the number of limpers. (Once my stack reaches 130 big blinds, I will usually start making 3.5BB raises.) No reason to deviate from this strategy here: I again make my standard raise of 3BB total, expecting to see the flop with probably one or two players and intending to continuation bet between 60% and 80% of the time if it gets checked to me, depending on the texture of the board, whether or not my opponents are habitual check-raisers and the size of their stacks. If they both have 120BB or more, I would continuation bet more often than if one of them had only about 40BB of 45BB left. Because that 40–45BB would be an ideal check-raise amount, whereas with >100BB stacks (in just a 7.5 to 10BB pot, and a continuation bet in the range of six or 7BB), check-raising would usually not be a very viable option. With 100BB+ stacks for the opposition in this situation, and being out of position, they would be much more inclined to either check-call or bet out with their big hands, good draws or bluffs rather than check-raise. This is especially true on drawheavy boards, where good players would rarely if ever make a pot-sized check-raise on the flop with a lot of money left to be played — simply because they could be creating major problems for themselves: ♠ They could face a big reraise on the flop, where I am representing either the current nuts, a premium draw or a combination of a good made hand + draw as back-up. In this situation, it will be hard for them to continue with made hands like top two pair/no extras that can never be more than just a marginal favorite, yet that could be a tremendous dog. Also hands like an overpair plus a non-nut flush draw will usually have to fold here — meaning they could very well have check-raised themselves off a live hand. For instance, even if I had the current nuts — top set, this overpair + flush draw would probably have around 10 outs twice to beat me, and in that situation a good player would not want to risk getting reraised off his hand by what could very well be a semi-bluff. ♠ If I flatcall this check-raise, I could then use my good position on the turn to cause my opponent a lot of trouble. Especially if the turn completes some of the draws that I could have. They would be in trouble being first to speak and not knowing whether or not I have just made the nuts. ♠ For these reasons, check-raising on drawheavy flops with 120BB effective stacks in a pot of 10BB or less will often lead to winning the small pots while losing the big ones. And especially when playing large stacks this is a situation that almost all players, good and bad alike, would try to avoid. What this means for me though is that once the money is deeper and I have position when being checked to, I can continuation bet much more liberally than I would have with more shallow money — not having to fear the dreaded check-raise as much.

So, all in all, just a standard preflop raise would be my preferred choice with this K-K-4–4ss. Any continuation bets after the flop would usually be around two-thirds of the pot. Sometimes a bit less, like if I want to represent an either/or situation, for instance when there are three hearts on the board. In that case, I will often bet significantly less than this two-thirds pot (regardless of whether I actually have the nut flush that I am trying to represent, or maybe just the bare A♥ or some other bluff or marginal hand), knowing that it will be very hard for my opponents to call me with anything less than a flush or a set. In this case, just a half-pot bet may have just as much success of inducing a fold than a standard continuation bet would have. However, if you were bluffing and it fails you would have saved yourself some money. Occasionally, I will continuation bet even less than half the pot on extremely scary flops like A-A-x or K-K-x, regardless of whether I have actually hit the whopper or am flat out bluffing. An in-depth analysis of these either/or bets will follow at the end of this chapter.

Situation B: From the small blind, facing a pot-sized open raise from the button (holding K-K-4–4ss) With 20BB Unless the button is a super rock, this is an automatic pot reraise — for obvious reasons.

With 40BB Even though with this 40BB stack size I tend to reraise liberally, I am still not very fond of it with K-K-x-x types of holdings. It’s a bit borderline, because I am basically risking my entire stack to win 5BB — and this is not good. Having said that, given the way the betting has gone, there is a rather good chance I will not only get action from A-A holdings that have me crushed, but from a wide range of lesser hands that will call my three-bet liberally. In fact, hands that are big dogs to me like K-Q-Q-Jss could even be tempted to play for my entire stack. This is a situation where with less than 35BB this would be an automatic reraise, with more than 50BB an automatic call and with this in-between stack I would probably reraise pot almost half the time, flatcall the other half, with some 2–5% chance of folding. (Mostly if the button is either a rock or a great player, or if there are some metagame aspects that make me feel I should not get involved.) I like calling as an option, with the intention to check-raise the button’s continuation bet on those flops that have either helped me or make it likely that even my unimproved K-K is still the best hand or allow me to credibly represent a much better hand than I actually have, so that I could possibly get my opponent off a better hand like bottom two pair or an unimproved A-A.

With 120BB With deep money, I tend to call very few raises from out of position. I tend to stick to just quality hands, hands with a lot of nut potential and — in order not to get too predictable — also a fair share of small and medium rundowns (preferably without any gaps, let alone at the top). Even though this K-K-4–4ss does have some nut potential and seems like the type of hand where after the flop you should “always know where you’re at”, I tend to view this type of holding as a bit of a problem hand. Unless I flop a third king, this is the type of holding that OOP could get me into quite a bit of trouble. Some potential trouble flops: 2–2–6 rainbow giving me a seemingly strong kings up, 8–7–4 rainbow that gives me bottom set, or all flops that give me a king-high flush draw plus an overpair. In these situations, you are likely to win almost all pots with less than 40BB in them and yet if the pot grows bigger you can expect your chips to go the other way. If you are up against a good player who knows that you have a hand that in all likelihood cannot stand action on all streets, you may be better off not playing the hand in the first place. This is especially true if you have not called many raises from out of position up to this point, and thus your K-K-x-x hand could be quite transparent. Still, unless I judge the button to be a very good player, I would call here, with the intention to bet into him on the flop some 30–40% of the time, usually for about two-thirds of the pot. I try to balance these bets among my marginal flops and my bluffs (where in both cases I would of course fold to a raise), my very big hits (like a set of kings, where I might just call a raise to then try to let my opponent hang himself on the turn) and my rather good made hands or combination hands (like a small sets or overpair + flush draw, hands that I would usually come over the top of a raise with in a heads up situation like this). The goal of this balancing act is of course that my opponent cannot automatically take the appropriate countermeasures: he should know that if he raises my donk bets too liberally, he will get punished at times with a loose reraise on my part that he cannot call. As I will also donk bet with big hands, I can represent hands a bit more credibly, and thus I might win more pots without a fight when we both don’t have much. In other words: in a deep-money situation like this, it is wrong to always check to the raiser. By donk-betting with a balanced range of holdings including a significant percentage of your top hands, you take the initiative away from your opponent. If you are not capable of doing this correctly, you should not flatcall many preflop raises from out of position — you should instead play squeaky tight in that spot, and focus only on those situations where you have good position.

Situation C: In the cutoff facing UTG minraise, with an overaggressive button (holding K-K-4–4ss) With 20BB Despite my “play for my entire stack, or don’t play at all” shortstack attitude, I think flatcalling the minraise for 10% of my stack is the best option here. This is, of course, with the intention of moving all-in once it gets reraised behind me. If no one reraises that is also OK, because I will now have decent or even good position in a multiway pot, where after the flop I should just about always know where I stand.

With 40BB Same play. This time the call accounts to just 5% of my stack, and obviously if I get too much action in my back, I will not commit fully and could even decide to muck. Basically, this is one of those classic situations that I also described in my full-ring PLO book, a situation where you would either want to play for a small percentage of your stack against as many opponents as possible (and where you will only continue postflop if you hit good), or for a very large percentage of your stack against as few opponents as possible (where you almost certainly have the best hand preflop, and consider yourself committed). Just flatcalling the minraise is the way to accomplish both goals.

With 120BB With deeper stacks, I don’t want someone in my back dictating the action — I want to be in charge myself. As I am in the cutoff, it is imperative that I will “buy the button” to secure myself of last action on all betting rounds. A small reraise to about five big blinds should be enough to get rid of the button most of the time, as a call by him wouldn’t close the action, and he could in fact get sandwiched despite his seemingly good position. Yet this reraise is not so big that if the UTG would make a pot-sized four-bet, I could not call anymore. Assuming the normal thing happens (everybody folds except for the open raiser who calls), I will continuation bet close to 90% of the time when checked to. This being a heads up situation where I have the power of position, my continuation bets tend to be significantly smaller than my OOP continuation bets in multiway pots would be. I usually bet just about 60% of the pot, and sometimes even less if this looks like a flop that will probably not have hit my opponent. Being up against just one player, this continuation bet has a high probability of success, for the following reasons: ♠ My preflop reraise has not narrowed down my hand all that much. I could just as easily have A-A-x-x, 5–5–4–4, K-Q-J-9, 9–8–7-5ss as the K-K4–4ss that I actually have. Therefore, my opponent cannot easily put pressure on me under the assumption that a specific flop “almost certainly cannot have helped me”. ♠ I was the last raiser preflop. Even though there are many exceptions, an opponent calling a reraise OOP is usually saying: “I think you have the better hand — I will only continue in the pot if I catch a decent enough flop.” Knowing that it is easier to miss a flop than to hit one, I should be able to take down the majority of the pots without a fight. ♠ Given that the money is deep and check-raising on the flop with deep money is usually not the smartest way to play a hand, it has now become even more likely that my opponent’s flop check simply means “I am ready to give up.” But what if the normal thing doesn’t happen, and the button in my back coldcalls my small reraise? Well, assuming that the open raiser then also calls, my game plan for after the flop looks like this: ♠ I will often check to the somewhat overaggressive button with the intention of check-raising. This is especially true if the button has slightly less chips than I have: a stack of around 80BB would seem perfect to check-raise him, given that there are now 16.5BB in the middle, and he will almost certainly bet between 10 and 16.5BB if I check to him. This is especially the case on semi-coordinated flops that give me an overpair + flush draw (say something like Q♣-8♥-5♣ where I have K-K + a king-high flush draw in clubs) I would be inclined to just check to induce the button to bet with a rather weak holding, and thereby putting the UTG in the middle. ♠ On flops like 2–2–6 rainbow, I will simply make a standard 60% of the pot continuation bet, representing the exact hand that I have: a big pair. If I get called or even raised, I will have to re-evaluate to see if this looks like a genuine hit, or a play from someone who is using this board to get me off my hand, thinking that even if I have the A-A or K-K that I am representing, I may not be willing to play those hands for stacks. ♠ On dangerous flops like A-x-x or 10–9–7 rainbow, I will not put a single chip into the pot. In this three-way pot, being the second out of three on a board that is likely to have hit either one of my opponents and that has missed me, I will just make the — in the eyes of some — “weak-tight” play of checking and folding. For all these reasons, I think a small reraise before the flop is the best option. However, merely calling isn’t all that bad either. Assuming there are no raises behind me, I will then simply play with the intention of flopping a set (preferably top set) or a completed flush — as with just a flush draw + overpair I would tend to proceed cautiously, given the depth of the money and the number of opponents. If the button behind me folds before the flop, I will have the best position, and this should allow me to pick up some small pots. Furthermore, if after my preflop flatcall the button will make a big reraise, this could be a good spot to just flatcall this reraise, with the intention of check-folding on most flops, yet check-raising on all flops that contain a king, a four or that give me a flush draw + overpair. For those interested in ratings: This would be a spot where I would give eight points to the small reraise, six to the flatcall, 4.5 to the pot-sized reraise (drawbacks should be obvious), and two to a fold.

Example hand 3: A-J-8–7ss (to the ace) Situation A: On the button, after one limper (holding A-J-8–7ss [to the ace]) With 20BB With a shortstack, I usually try to play for my entire stack or for a minimum amount. This means that the last thing I want is get 15–25% of my stack in before the flop in a situation where I don’t know exactly where I’m at. This means that the standard or even pot-sized raise that many players might want to make is not exactly my top choice. For those who don’t play according to my system, all options my seem viable: just limping, minraising or even a pot raise (if you judge the limper to be weak). However, given my system, I cannot get enough money into the pot to warrant a pot raise and a standard 3BB total raise would actually be the worst choice of all. A minraise is not all that bad given the texture of this hand, a hand that might even be able to call a limp-reraise or a reraise from one of the blinds. (This is especially true if you have some doubts that the raiser actually has the A-A-x-x that he is trying to represent. Because if in fact he does have A-A, then the ace in your hand is obviously a burden — against A-A, you would much rather have had a J-10–8–7 type of holding. Still, even then you have a very useful J-8–7 combo, and if by chance your opponent has K-K-x-x or some type of quality rundown, then your ace may be a weapon. So, even though you don’t know exactly where your outs are, this type of holding is rarely a very big dog heads up.) However, the best option is also a simple one: I would just limp. If one of the blinds raises and the limper folds, I call, with the intention of putting in the remainder of my stack if the flop gives just the slightest bit of help. (Even flops like 7–6–2, 9–7–6, J-5–3 or a bare ace-high flush draw would suffice, given the shallowness of the money and the small chance that my opponent actually has more than just one pair.) But if after a raise from one of the blinds the open limper now again calls, it’s now the proper situation to come up with my good-old pot-sized limp-reraise play, and I’ll commit fully with my fairly marginal holding. Although the raiser and the limper may both have real hands, I am in for one big blind already, and there are about 11 additional big blinds in the pot (one is dead money, and five are likely to become dead money, assuming the limper will not be able to call yet another time). And even if this limper is able to stand all this heat, then I should still easily have 30% pot equity three-way — making this limp-reraise a bit optimistic maybe, but still not losing any money because of it. In fact, I could win significantly, as the raiser could well become very aggressive with a hand like K-Q-J-10 or J-10–9– 7, where he will reraise once more to shut out the limper and just play the hand against me (the short stack) with some dead money in the pot. In this scenario, I could actually be a significant favorite — with the dead money in the middle as an added bonus.

With 40BB Given the strategies that I described earlier in this book with a stack of this size, my options are limited to limping and minraising. Minraising seems best, as it sweetens the pot, and it gives me initiative — plus, even if I get reraised, I can still make a profitable call and see the flop.

With 120BB Same arguments as above, only this time I would make my standard 3BB raise instead of the minraise. Of course, after the flop I would again continuation bet a significant percentage of the time when checked to, expecting to pick up the pot more often than not. The only times that I would not automatically continuation bet when checked to are: ♠ I have nothing, while it looks my opponent has hit. (Note that this only applies to three-way pots. Heads up, I would almost always fire even if I have missed entirely, simply because of the likelihood that my opponent has missed as well.) ♠ I have either a marginal made hand or a marginal draw — hands that are not good enough to stand a check-raise, yet still have some value. When I have a marginal hand that will have to give up against a check-raise from what could very well be a bluff or semi-bluff, it is often better to just check back on the flop and then let the turn card plus my opponent’s subsequent action decide my best course of action. And when I’ve got a marginal draw, even as weak as just a gutshot, just checking it back and trying to hit my draw for free could very well be worth it. This is especially true against overaggressive opponents, against habitual check-raisers or against people who play a significantly shorter stack than I do, and who are waiting for someone to bet on (too) light values. So, against these kinds of players, I would be more likely to check back the flop with a marginal made hand or draw, while against more straightforward players or stacks that are as big as mine, there is a lot of value in simply firing that two-to three-pot bet to pick up what’s already in the middle. ♠ I have the deck crippled. But with this A-J-8–7ss, this can almost never happen. Because even if I flop A-A-A for quads, I would still bet — hoping to find my opponent with a good enough hand to pay me off, or else hoping to induce a check-raise bluff. (Say, if my opponent is the type of player who wouldn’t believe I have the fourth ace if I bet — “because if Rolf would indeed have it, he would probably check”.)

Situation B: From the small blind, facing a pot-sized open raise from the button (holding A-J-8–7ss [to the ace]) With 20BB Against a loose open raiser, this hand seems good enough for a reraise pot. This is due to a combination of the following possibilities: ♠ I could make everyone fold at once, earning no less than five big blinds without a flop, free of rake. Against typical opponents, this will probably happen no more than just 20% of the time — but it is still significant. ♠ I could get called by an opponent who might fold to an 8BB bet postflop, in situations where if he had known I had just A-J-8–7, he would have called. In this sequence of events, there is a slight chance that not only will I make someone fold a worse hand than mine who would have had the correct odds to call; no, occasionally I might even make someone fold a slightly better hand than mine. (For instance, 5–5–4–4 on a flop KQ-6, or A-Q-7–6 on a flop 10–2–2.) Please note than in these situations the moves by my opponents were probably wrong (because if they call a reraise to 12BB total, they almost always need to also put in the remaining 8BB, either before or after the flop), but that is not relevant. What

is relevant is that it will happen often enough (against typical opponents, maybe even close to 25% of the times that they call my reraise) to take it into account. ♠ My reraise could make currently better hands fold, while inducing calls from weaker hands that think they are “live”. For instance, in this situation, facing a raise and a reraise, the big blind will definitely fold all non-premium A-K-x-x or A-Q-x-x holdings, yet the open raiser will probably make an easy call with hands like J-10–9–7 or 8–7–6–4 — hands that are a lot less live than he expects them to be. Keep in mind though that this A-J-8–7ss is a rather marginal holding. And this means that if the open raiser is tight rather than loose and given that the flatcall is not really an option (as this hand has too many holes to comfortably play from out of position), that there is nothing wrong with folding — even more so because there is hardly any dead money in the pot.

With 40BB A hand like this with (too) many gaps is not one that I like to use to call raises from OOP. However, it is exactly the type of holding that I sometimes like to reraise a loose open raiser with who doesn’t need to have a premium hand. He might still call me, sometimes even with a slightly better hand — but with the intention of folding after the flop unless he gets significant improvement. In this situation, I can expect to take down the pot something like 60% of the time and against weak players who are not very good at odds and percentages, one could expect even more folds. There are two advantages here: My stack size The reason why I recommend shortstacking with a stack in between 30 and 40 big blinds is exactly this: you can reraise fairly liberally, expecting to be called, but at the same time betting your opponent off his hand after the flop a significant percentage of the time. In all honesty, I would have preferred 35 big blinds rather than the 40 that I have in this specific situation. Why? Well, with a stack of 35 big blinds I would have an automatic all-in call if the opponent four-bets, whereas with a 40 big blinds this is a bit more borderline. Also, I would lose a bit more money in these situations where the opponent has a real hand so, from a risk/reward point of view, we should have slightly tighter reraise requirements with this 40BB stack than with “only” 35BB. In fact, this would be a reason why a buy-in of around 35BB may sometimes be a tiny bit better than 40BB. My position Being first to speak after the flop if my opponent calls the reraise may seem like a bad thing, but it is actually the thing I want with this type of holding and in this situation — as I will now have the “right to first bluff”. With just a bit more than one pot-sized bet left, this is a very important factor in a situation like this where preflop I have represented more strength than I actually have. Had I been in a seemingly better position, say on the button after a pot-sized open raise from the cutoff, I could face the danger of getting called by the raiser preflop, and then facing a pot-sized bet into me after the flop. (Possibly as a stop’n’go play, or because my opponent thinks: “Well, I am going to call anyway, so I might as well bet”, or “Well I don’t have a big hand, but who knows — I might be able to bet the reraiser off an unimproved big pair”.) This is of course a situation that I wouldn’t mind if I really had the A-A-x-x that I am trying to represent. But given that my hand is much weaker, and in a situation where having fold equity on my side is probably its main strength, I absolutely don’t want to face a bet into me on the flop — as I will often be unable to call. By the way in this situation where, after the flop, you will have just over one pot-sized bet left, I recommend you always bet an amount that shows that you are clearly committed — meaning the opponent should know that there is no fold equity anymore if he chooses to raise. It is my style to almost never bet full pot, yet in this situation I would usually bet 80–90% of the pot instead of my usual 60% or 65%. Say, with 25.5 big blinds in the pot and 28 behind, I would probably bet about 22 big blinds on the flop, regardless of whether I have hit big, marginally or not at all. Some people would underbet in this spot with their big hits, but I tend to always bet the same percentage in this spot in order not to give away too much information and, most of all, to make sure that my opponent knows that monster hands are also included in this “large, committed bet” range. Depending on the size of the game and whether or not I am using Auto Hot Keys, I would pick an odd number that I like, something like $69, $179, $299 or $555. On sites that don’t support Auto Hot Keys (like the T-6 site), I always type in my amounts rather than use the slider. And when doing this, I like to choose seemingly odd numbers when I bet or raise, yet I make sure that at all times these numbers are approximately the same size given the situation, the depth of the money and/or the texture of the board.

With 120BB Even though I am actually a fan of this type of holding (despite its obvious drawbacks), I especially like it when I’m in position as the aggressor. With deep money, and out of position, I usually try to avoid these holdings, and stick to more coordinated ones. So, unless the button is a truly weak player, I would probably fold more than 80% of the time in this spot and call about 10% or 12%. Only very rarely would I reraise pot with the stacks this deep, and my hand this weak. (Only when my image is really strong, or if my opponent is so weak that he thinks “a pot reraise with the money this deep must mean aces”. In that case, I could use his thoughts against him by picking up those pots where I don’t have much, especially flops with a small pair that look to him like I have aces up. Yet at the same time, I could get a lot of action on flops with middle cards that seem to be bad for me, when in fact I have hit — flops like 10–9–7 or 7–6–5.) Against people over whom I have good control, I occasionally make the funky play of the minimum reraise from out of position. If my opponent fears this and reads this small reraise for either A-A-x-x or sometimes a small or medium rundown, it could be worthwhile making this play with what seems like a typical calling hand. The key is, of course, that I am taking the initiative and if I have confused my opponent sufficiently, he can only four-bet me preflop with A-A-x-x, as four-betting with any other hand could have severe drawbacks for him. (For instance, he might now face a pot-sized reraise by me, with the aces that I could very well have.) By making this strange play preflop, I will often have created just enough fear that I can pick up many pots postflop. And, of course, if by chance this pot goes to a showdown and my opponent sees the type of hand that I have used to reraised him, I have then paved the way to make the exact same play with A-A-x-x in the future. If he remembers this A-J-8–7ss (and believe me — he will!), he will then probably not hold back anymore with K-K-x-x or A-K-Q-J types of holdings the next time we clash in a similar situation. And this is, of course, exactly what I want. Because if he makes the mistake of a pot-sized four-bet, I can then pot it once more, and given our history he will definitely not lay down anymore. This puts me in a perfect spot to double up with A-A-x-x in a rather tough situation: with deep money, and from out of position.

Situation C: In the cutoff facing UTG minraise, with an overaggressive button (holding A-J-8–7ss [to the ace]) With 20BB

As so often when playing a short stack, the best play here is quite simple and obvious. This is a good spot to go for the second-hand low: first flatcalling a raise, to then come over the top once a slightly overaggressive guy behind me has reraised. (Something he is likely to do, given his good position and the fact that before him there have just been one minraise and a flatcall.) Even though my hand is not overly strong, it is still a profitable play to make given that there may be callers in the middle, and because of my all-in advantage. Of course, if no one reraises, then there’s no harm done. Having invested 10% of my stack with a decent hand that has nut potential, in late position and in a multiway pot, I should be in OK shape.

With 40BB In this case, the situation is a bit more awkward. Had my hand been double-suited, I could have gone for the exact same play as above, only this time with a little more money behind. Single-suited, the situation is a bit more marginal. My hand is not really strong enough to reraise with — especially not with the somewhat overaggressive player behind me who creates the danger of getting sandwiched. And with also the blinds and the open raiser still in the pot who could all have/pick up a big hand, I would probably be investing too much money without seeing a flop if I three-bet and then face a pot-sized four-bet. (I say “without seeing a flop” because after my reraise, regardless of whether it’s a min-reraise, a standard reraise or a pot reraise, if I now face another pot raise I am definitely up against A-A-x-x — and I don’t want to call 32BB or even more against aces with an ace in my hand, getting less than 2 to 1 on my money.) My preferred play is just calling here, with the following game plan: ♠ If the LAP behind me folds, use my good position postflop to pick up or steal a lot of pots by representing hands that I don’t have. As there has been relatively little action, with a maximum of 8BB in the pot (and if both blinds fold, even just 5.5BB), it is quite likely that no one is really interested in this pot, let alone committed to it. I want to use that to my advantage those times when no one flops a really big hand. ♠ If the LAP behind me reraises and two players in the middle call, I come over the top. With so much (potentially dead) money in the pot, and with a hand that should perform quite well heads up against the button’s three-bet/call of four-bet range, it is worthwhile gambling a bit to create the illusion of action. The best result of all would be that everybody folds to my second-hand low play that must obviously be A-A. Even with one caller in the middle I might make this same play. With no callers in the middle and just me and the button left, I would fold approximately 60% of the time, reraise pot 15% of the time, and call about 25%. My intention after the flop in this last case is to donk-bet into him lightly or commit fully even on marginal flops and trap him on my really big flops where I can expect him to continuation bet close to 100% of the time.

With 120BB With deep money, this is not a hand that I like to play out of position against a loose-aggressive player. So, if I decide to play the hand, I would either flatcall or reraise small — but both with the intention to fold if the button raises pot in my back. My preferred choice is to reraise small to five or six big blinds, just as in the K-K-4–4 hand from before — and for the exact same reasons. “Jockeying for position” or “buying the button” are very important concepts when the money gets a bit deeper, and thus I will sometimes play a bit more aggressively in the cutoff or the hijack with hands that I might have played a bit more passively on the button. With 100BB + stacks, it is imperative to be on the button as often as possible, and be the last raiser before the flop as often as possible. If in this situation I judge my (indeed, fairly marginal) holding to be too weak to make this small reraise, just throwing away may not be such a bad option. (This is especially true if the button behind me is more than just somewhat overaggressive. However, in that case I should probably have avoided this seat in the first place, being to his immediate right in a deep-money situation.)

Example hand 4: 8–7–6-4ds Situation A: On the button, after one limper (holding 8–7–6-4ds) With 20BB In contrast to many players, I don’t usually get too funky with small or medium rundowns when I’m shortstacked. The only times when I play these hands for a raise (or, in fact, for my entire stack) are in multiway pots against likely big cards and with the potential of both a lot of dead money and/or protection. On the button after one limper, I would just call. The hand is probably too good for a fold, given my excellent position that should allow me to get action those times when I have hit big, and maybe pick up a few small pots here and there if on the flop it gets checked to me. Of course if, after my flatcall a whole bunch of players get involved (for instance, through a reraise by the button, a coldcall from one of the blinds and a call from the UTG, then I could make an all-in reraise — hoping that the overaggressive button will give me protection (a situation I have described many times in my previous PLO book). But given that I am in for just 1BB with 19BB behind and there will rarely be any more than just 10–15BB in dead money, this is not a very +EV situation. Mostly for deception or image purposes it could be OK, though, although there should be at least two callers between the raiser and me to make it worth the gamble. I don’t like the pot raise much in this spot as I could be giving up my positional advantage, and because there is not enough meat in the pot just yet. And I am also not fond of the minimum raise. Yes, it might give me the initiative at a cheap price, but it also reopens the betting for the UTG player. And if he reraises pot (something he might do with a wide range, given that my short stack poses no real threat to him), I may now be forced to call as an approximately 40–60% dog against his range, and will thus have wasted a potentially profitable situation. The little bit of implied odds that I have may still make it worth it, but a four-way limped pot with me on the button would have been more profitable.

With 40BB With 40BB, though, I would happily minraise. If someone would now pot it with a hand like A-A-x-x for instance, calling that reraise will almost never be for more than 15% or 20% of my stack and, given that I have good position and a rather ideal snap-off hand (where I could easily have up to 45% pot equity hot and cold), this situation is not so bad. Of course, in that scenario just a weak draw or a pair + gutshot would already be enough to play for all my money and I will especially call or raise liberally if the flop seems to be bad for the high cards/big pair types of holdings that my opponent will usually have. But, obviously I use this minraise for other goals than just to create a huge pot where I could snap off possible aces. The main goals of this minraise are: ♠ To gain the initiative. ♠ To misrepresent my hand and for surprise value. If my image is tight, some players will be more likely to read me for big cards or a high pair rather than this 8–7–6-4ds that I have. Especially if they know that with premium hands like A-A-x-x I would also minraise in this spot, I might be able to: a) Pick up a lot of pots postflop when it gets checked to me. On big card/paired flops like K-K-Q or 2–2–10, just a standard 50–60% pot bet should be enough to pick up the pot more often than not — although I have absolutely nothing. b) Win some huge pots when I actually hit the flop. On a flop with just small cards, my opponents might think that I could be overplaying an unimproved big pair and play back at me — when in fact I have flopped a monster.

With 120BB In this case, I would again make my standard raise, this time to 3BB. When the money is deep, I tend to make this standard raise with a very wide range when I am on the button after one limper — and this hand easily qualifies. Those who don’t use my uniform raises approach may find this a good spot to raise pot in order to (mis)represent a big pair and, given the depth of the money — assuming the UTG and the blinds are all playing 80BB + stacks, this is indeed a good play. After all, this pot raise will often lead to winning the pot there and then with just an eight-high. If the limper decides to make the OOP call, he will then quite often have to check-fold to the automatic continuation bet. And if by chance he decides to go for a big limp-reraise with what looks like a big pair, the money is still deep enough to make a profitable call, being in position with a rather ideal snap-off hand. Using my approach of uniform raises, it is important to realize that as my raise after one limper is relatively small, this limper will almost never fold. Given that this 8–7–6-4ds could get a lot of “trouble flops”, which require expert judgment (say, flops like Q-7–4 for bottom two + gutshot), it is important that with my good position and the money this deep, I should often play pot control. With these stacks and a relatively marginal flop, I should not let the size of the pot escalate. It is especially important to often check back on the turn (with combination hands, marginal made hands and weak draws) if I am facing a tricky, good or aggressive opponent who could use this board to check-raise me off my hand. All in all, with this type of small rundown, and playing it the way I do (for a small raise in position), my postflop goals are: ♠ Win many pots on the flop when I don’t have much, by using my position and the initiative I have gained through my preflop raise. ♠ Try to win an occasional huge pot if I actually flop the small cards that I want, and I can induce my opponent to play back at me. ♠ Try to win medium-sized pots with the in-between hands, and avoid losing a big pot with them. Take the example from above, my bottom two pair + gutshot on the Q-7–4 flop. If by chance I am facing an opponent with top set, I am obviously going to lose a significant amount of money, but I should almost never lose my entire stack. A good way to play this hand is by simply firing again after a fairly harmless turn against straightforward opponents (with the intention to just fold against any check-raise), yet by checking it back against the tricky, good and aggressive ones. Against them, I may get into a tough river spot because of my turn check. Often, I will have to call a big bet on the river that could be a big bet for value, yet that may just as well be a bluff from a busted draw. Definitely not an ideal situation — yet inherently better than either folding the best hand on the turn against an optimistic check-raise, or committing fully against this check-raise only to face a better made hand after all.

Situation B: From the small blind, facing a pot-sized open raise from the button (holding 8–7–6-4ds) With 20BB A rather easy fold. This is a hand that depends on implied odds, with just a short stack, out of position and with very little (potential) dead money. I would fold this hand some 85% of the time in this spot. Only very occasionally would I call, mostly with the intention to check-raise all-in on good flops or possibly to make some bluff or semi-bluff bets on scary-looking flops. About 10–12% of the time I would reraise pot, trying to win the pot there and then while probably still having between 32% and 45% pot equity if called/reraised. Basically, by reraising I am mostly making an image play, knowing that if this hand goes to showdown, I will get a lot more action in the future on my premium hands. Still, as people tend to give short stacks lots of action anyway, I would just fold here.

With 40BB I am not very fond of calling raises out of the small blind in PLO, especially not with small double-suited rundowns that perform much better in position. Still, with 40BB my stack is big enough that I cannot always play reraise-or-fold. Especially with hands like K-K-x-x or A-K-Q-Jss (hands that do well against the range of a late position open raiser, yet perform very badly against the most likely hand for the opponent to have if all the money goes in: A-A-x-x). I will sometimes have to flatcall out of position rather than reraise. To balance this — in order not to make my hand selection too obvious — I will sometimes have to call OOP also with small cards, say hands like this 8–7–6-4ds or 5–5–4–4. If I don’t, I will become too easy to read. So, with my 40BB stack in this situation, I would fold a bit more than 70% of the time, while calling or reraising pot the remaining (almost) 30% — both times using deception to compensate for my lack of real power.

With 120BB This is not the type of holding that I like to play OOP in a deep-money situation, not even against what could very well be a steal raise from a weak holding. On the button, against a pot-sized raise from the cutoff, I would happily have made my standard reraise — but in this situation, I have a clear fold. Calling or reraising should be true exceptions, only to be used in the following two situations: ♠ Against players that you know very well — so you can exploit their specific weaknesses, like paying off generously or not being capable of folding a marginal hand. ♠ When you have a very strong, tight or nitty image that you can exploit postflop — mostly by stealing some pots on flops that seem to be good for you, but to a lesser degree also to get paid off or induce bluffs on boards that seem to be bad for you when in reality they are not. One good thing about reraising: The money is usually deep enough that even if your opponent makes a pot-sized four-bet, you can still profitably call with your good snap-off hand, even when out of position. So, even with deep money this optimistic reraise play OOP has some merit. Bad thing though is that good players know that with A-A-x-x you would almost never have reraised pot in this spot, so if you reraise pot here and then call the over-the-top raise, they should be able to accurately pin down your holding to a rundown hand no smaller than 7–6–5–4, and no bigger than Q-J-10– 9. So, better to reserve this play only against people who may not read you so well, and who thus may automatically label you for a big pair if you make a pot-sized, OOP reraise.

Situation C: In the cutoff facing UTG minraise, with an overaggressive button (holding 8–7–6-4ds) With 20BB As this looks like it could be a multiway pot with a lot of value, it could be worthwhile to call and gamble. (For instance by flatcalling the minraise, with the intention of pushing all-in if, for example, the button reraises and there is at least one caller in the middle. If both opponents call, I will probably have 30–42% pot equity hot and cold and, taking into account that I might get “protected”, this is a pretty good spot to get the money in. (Another possibility of course is that the button comes over the top to shut out the UTG, meaning I will end up heads up while usually trailing just slightly, and being more than compensated for this by the dead money.) However, unless I am up against players that I know very well and/or I think it is time to be a bit creative, I would usually just fold. The main danger is getting the money into the middle in a situation where my hand is not very live, for example heads up against a slightly better rundown or something like A-A-8–6. Just because my 8–7–6-4ds performs pretty well against a hand like A-A-K-3 with a lot of dead money, doesn’t mean it is also a good hand three-way against one guy who has big cards in my suits, and a third guy who has 8– 7–6–5 or A-8–6–4.

With 40BB Calling the minraise accounts to just 5% of my stack and — being in the cutoff with a coordinated double-suited hand that could flop big — I would tend to call. As I would often flatcall in this spot with typical second hand low holdings (the most obvious one being A-A-x-x), it is good to balance this by also calling with the hand type 8–7–6-4ds. In fact, if I call here and then the button reraises, this could be an excellent spot to come over the top in order to represent a second hand low play with A-A. The plan would then be making the button lay down if he has a problem hand against my possible A-A-x-x or even K-K-x-x or, if called or reraised all-in, still not being in that bad a shape. However, this is the type of play that works better in full-ring play than in 6-max, as in 6-max people tend to just stand the heat with potentially-big-dog-when-up-against-A-A-holdings like kings or four picture cards. And especially because I have made a play that looks suspicious, people tend to just say “what the heck, let’s just go to the felt then,” in this situation. So, in order to make this play successful, it is important to pick an opponent who is at least capable of laying down a hand after a reraise if he thinks he is in trouble and who not just respects me but who also knows that I am capable of making this second hand low with a premium hand. In other words: a whole lot of conditions and requirements — to illustrate just how risky this play is. Occasionally, especially against a UTG player over whom I have good control, it could be worth it to make yet another minimum reraise. Especially if

on the site the minimum reraise is from 2BB to 3BB (in other words, 1BB extra) rather than a requirement of doubling the bet from 2BB to 4BB — this play could be worth it. I may put some pressure on the button to fold, now that he has to call 3BB instead of 2BB and, perhaps more importantly, because his relative position has deteriorated. (Rather than a raise and a call all in front of him, he now has a reraiser to his immediate right who might run into a check-raise from the UTG after the flop.) Plus, in this new situation I have reopened the betting for the initial raiser, meaning that if the button coldcalls the 3BB here, he could very well face yet another raise. Of course the reason that — with my 40BB stack — I would only make this play if the minimum reraise is the same size of the previous raise (1BB extra), is that I will now keep the money deep enough that I will usually be able to still profitably call a pot-sized four-bet. Especially if it’s the UTG four-betting me; I will have position, my call will almost always be for less than onethird of my stack and I will almost always have the perfect snap off hand against his likely A-A-x-x. Against random aces, this 8–7–6-4ds has 44.54% — and given the little bit of implied odds (my opponent will commit fully if I hit, but I can obviously fold on exactly those flops that have probably helped him) this is a clearly +EV situation. Of course, if no one four-bets me, then I will use my deceptive preflop move to pick up many pots after the flop. Still, as this min-reraise could also backfire and because it is quite risky, it should definitely be an exception. Something like call 55%, fold 25%, minreraise some 15% of the time and reraise pot 5% seems reasonable.

With 120BB With 120BB, I have even more leeway in choosing my actions, and now that the money is deeper I will become a bit more active. Even though I have a somewhat overaggressive player in my back, this doesn’t mean he is a fool or crazy. So, if I just make my standard reraise to 5BB or 6BB, he will fold a very large percentage of the time. After all, reraising yet another time will be very risky and if he just calls he will be in a tough spot — seated to the immediate left of a reraiser, not closing the betting and in a situation where after the flop he could get sandwiched between my automatic bet and the UTG player or even one of the blinds who will definitely go for the check-raise whenever they hit the flop. By reraising, there’s a good chance I can get rid of the button, and the blinds will only call with big hands-meaning that even if they call, they should be fairly easy to read and/or outplay after the flop. If they all fold and I end up heads up against the UTG, holding a well-disguised hand and having the initiative, then I have got into a rather ideal deep-stack situation. I can expect to pick up a lot of pots with just one standard continuation bet. And given that my opponent is out of position and likely to misread my hand, my opponent will probably win only some relatively small pots against me, while losing most of the big ones. On top of that, given the preflop situation, I will probably have excellent bluffing situations on most A-x-x and K-x-x flops, while I may get him to bluff at me on flops that have actually helped me. Note though that this is not a situation that was just there — it was a situation I had to create. Because if I had made the normal play of just calling the raise, I would have had neither initiative nor good position — as the button would have called or reraised with a very wide range, being in the best possible position and facing just two small bets. 1

One important factor to keep in mind when playing the full buy-in approach is the opponents) to your immediate left. Especially if one of them is a good and highly aggressive player with a stack of more than 200 big blinds, it may not be worth it to take the seat and then buy in for your usual full amount of 100BB. After all, the full amount that you usually play is from the perspective of wanting to play the big stack. But if to your immediate left there is a good player who will still cover you even after you have doubled up against someone else, and given that he will have position on you every hand except for the one time in six where you have the button and he is in the small blind — well, then you are just in an awful spot with your 100BB. Usually, your best option would then be to just let the open seat pass by and put yourself back at the bottom of the waiting list, hoping that the next time that you will get offered an open seat, you will have position on him. Or, if this player is actually a bit overaggressive, then you could choose the alternative of actually taking this seemingly bad seat, but instead buying in for a smaller amount (for instance the 30–40 big blinds that I just described), with the intention of limp-reraising/check-raising/ sandbagging him, and planning to leave the table right after you have doubled up (planning to leave the very first time that the big blind will get to you right after this double up). 2 While in full-ring PLO, I would want to have at least 30% of my stack in the middle for me to be raising the pot and basically exposing my aces, in 6-max I am a bit less strict — 25% of my stack is usually enough for me to (re)raise pot with A-A-x-x in shorthanded games, and often I even settle for a bit less than that. The reason is that you cannot wait as patiently for A-A in 6-max as you can in full-ring. Consequently, because your opponents know that you could be raising pot in this spot with a rather wide range of holdings, you are not labeled with A-A nearly as much as you would have been in a full-ring game. This means that you aren’t giving away implied odds as much as you seem to be — after all, your opponent cannot know for a fact that you have A-A-x-x here, because you could just as well be making a play with a double-suited medium rundown. Because of all this, you can afford to raise pot here with your A-A, even though the total amount of the raise accounts to a slightly lower percentage of your stack than you would have liked. 3 There is a description of how I would approach this hand from the flop onward, and which types of bets I would use at that stage, in chapter 3. 4 This “raise of three times the big blind” is the total bet. In other words: with blinds of €5-€10, my total bet would be €30, rather than an actual raise of €30 and thus a total bet of €40.

Chapter Three

Bet-sizing Beyond the Flop

Successfully integrating preflop decisions and postflop play What I have discussed in the four example hands from the previous chapter is mostly preflop betting. But this is not a separate thing. Those who are familiar with my works know that I firmly believe in a balanced overall strategy, where one’s postflop decisions should follow logically from the decisions that were made before the flop. In fact, I believe that preflop and postflop play should not be seen as two separate entities. Especially if you play the based-on-stack-size tactic that I recommend you do, your focus after the flop should not differ all that much from your preflop game plan. These are just a few aspects that are important here: ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠

Getting the maximum value out of your big hands. Losing the minimum if by chance your hand is not good, or if it has been outdrawn. Getting information about where you stand at limited cost. Trying to create a strategy where your smaller bets will get almost as much respect as your bigger bets, yet still a strategy that will allow you to get paid off for the maximum on your big hands. Always putting opponents to the test by keeping them under the maximum pressure. Trying to use betting tactics that give the opponents little room or make it tougher to come up with the appropriate countermeasures. Adjusting your bet size and aggression to your stack size, your position in the betting, the texture of the board, and taking advantage of specific weaknesses that your opponent(s) may have. Balancing overaggression, bluffs and tricky moves with passive or straightforward play. Misrepresenting hands in order to get paid off later in the deal. Squeezing or getting players caught in the middle, or putting a lot of pressure on the opponents without investing all that many chips. Trying to play in such a way that you always “know where you’re at”, and that as a result you won’t have to face all that many difficult decisions on the later streets, when the bets are at their biggest. Changing your tactics and bet size to the type of opponent you are facing: playing mostly ABC-poker against a weak player, while using deceptive plays and higher levels of thinking against the better players. Setting up plays for the future, by seeing how an opponent reacts to your strange or funny bets in small pots — so you can exploit this by using the same types of bets in the big pots, hoping he will make a mistake there because of this new-found knowledge. Always taking into account at what level the opponent is thinking, so you can think exactly one step higher to take advantage of that. Paying attention to game flow and to your opponent’s current state of mind. Taking advantage of the perception that your opponent has of you, and how he thinks you will respond to any good or bad fortune that you may have had.

That’s a lot of things to consider! But I can assure you: this list could have been much longer, as top players simply try to take into account everything that could be of influence to the proper way to play a hand. Time to analyze this into detail, I would say. As before, I have divided postflop play in three different sections: stacks of 20BB, 40BB and 120BB.

Postflop betting with a 20BB stack As I told earlier in this book, I am not the biggest fan of minimum buy-ins in shorthanded PLO. However, especially in ultra-aggressive high-stakes games like the $200-$400 at Full Tilt, you’ll see some players use this approach in a fairly successful manner. They seem to be taking advantage of the big egos of some of the stars, their overaggression and their contempt for what they view as “scared money”. Coupled with the fact that, unlike small games like $1-$2 or $2-$4, the rake is now no issue, it can be profitable to play 20BB, usually by employing some sort of hit and run system, or a system where you reload to a full stack or else change seats after you have doubled up. (After all, if your relative position makes a 20BB approach profitable, this same seat could still be quite OK also with 40BB, but almost certainly not with more than 100BB.) With the money this shallow, you will rarely be faced with many postflop decisions, let alone very difficult ones. Basically, there are just three options, as discussed below.

20BB play after the flop — Option 1 You have limped preflop for 5% of your stack and no one behind you has raised. If there are limpers behind you and you have caught a decent or even good flop, you should almost invariably go for the check-raise. Remember, you are using the shortstack approach to get maximum value out of your hand. And the best way to do this is by letting others make the first bet for you. If you are lucky, one or even two players will call in the middle, and then you come out of the bushes with a well-timed check-raise. As your stack is short, you will often get called by people who think they are committed, when in reality you may have a lock. This strategy is especially useful if people consider you a tightass. If in a pot with no meat to it you come out betting on the flop, often they will refuse to give you action. So, if another player (especially a loose cannon) does the betting after you have checked, they might give him action — and then when you finally enter the fray, they may think that they are in too deep to fold now. Also, if the bettor behind you is someone who doesn’t like to give tight shortstackers action, and there are no callers in the middle or just one weak caller, this could be a good time to go for a rare check-raise bluff. Good times to pull off this play are: ♠ If the bettor is prone to fold against nitty shortstackers like you. ♠ If the bettor appears to be pretty weak, or just seems to be making a standard stab at the pot because of his good position. ♠ If the board offers the possibility for a completed flush or even a full house. Assuming you read the opponent for a non-premium holding, even a check-raise of much less than the pot should be enough for a tight shortstacker like you to make the bettor fold even some decent made hands that he could have. If there aren’t any limpers in front or behind you, and you are playing against the blinds only, then you will usually be able to pick up the pot when checked to. While with a minimum stack, you shouldn’t make the first bet very often, this is one of the cases where with a standard half pot or twothirds pot bet you can expect to pick up the pot almost regardless of your cards, and whether or not you have received any kind of help from the board. Personally, I rarely if ever make these kinds of bets when playing a 20BB stack; the only open bets after the flop that I would make are minimum bets. (I will discuss the exact reasons later in this book.) And even this minimum bet will win the pot over 50% of the time against typical opponents — making it a more than excellent investment in this spot. While you shouldn’t do much bluffing playing shortstack in 6-max (because your opponents are used to moves and aggression; especially once they have already invested some money in the pot, they tend to be unwilling to give you credit for the hand that you are representing), there is one obvious bluffing spot that should be mentioned. It is in three-or four-way pots where you have open-limped, and no one has raised. If the flop now comes A-x-x or K-x-x rainbow and one of the blinds comes out betting less than the pot, you can often raise with any holding. Both their preflop passivity and the standard try-to-pick-up-the-pot-on-this-raggedy-board bet that has been made by this blind, strongly suggests that he does not have a great hand — while you, the very tight shortstacker, might have one. If you raise in this spot, many players would quickly fold hands as strong as top two pair of even bottom set without blinking. So, if you use this play prudently, you should be able to pick up this pot way over 80% of the time, almost regardless of your cards. And you won’t even need to bet pot to do it — just a slightly more than minimum raise should do the job, especially on ill-coordinated boards where in the eyes of your opponents you can only have one hand to be making this play: top set. This play is even stronger if your opponents realize that in this shortstack system of yours, you would tend to open-limp with all A-A-x-x and K-K-x-x holdings in order to go for the limp-reraise. Keep in mind though that this is a play that works against decent, thinking players. Against weaker players you may need to forget about this rare bluff, or if you make it you should make a bigger and clearly committed raise. They may not be good enough to read a small raise for strength or for a hand that begs for a call. Or, they may realize it, but they just don’t have the strength to fold a decent made hand like top two pair now that it is “so cheap to call”.

20BB play after the flop — Option 2 You have strayed away from my “either limp or reraise pot, but don’t open raise pot” advice, by making the first preflop (pot-sized) raise. In fact, this is not an unreasonable tactic in some cases. Let’s say that you are on the button with two limpers in front and you have either decent aces or a good double-suited hand like A♠-Q♥-j♥-8♠ or K♣-Q♦-10♦-9♣. If you raise pot, you can make it 5.5BB, and if you get called in one place, you will have just around one pot-sized bet left, even less if you get called in two places. Given that you either have a very robust holding (A-A-x-x) or a quality hand that hits the flop very often (a nice, double-suited hand full of big cards, furthermore in a situation where your opponent could read you for a big pair), you should bet all-in close to 100% of the time. Your opponent expects you to bet all-in here, and even if the flop comes rather bad, you should still stick it in if only to represent the A-A-x-x that you could very well have. By the way, to make these all-in bets credible, you should also bet pot when you have in fact flopped big — say, a straight, a flush or top set. Don’t fall into the temptation of giving discounts here, as it will limit your credibility those times when you don’t have much and bet full pot. Sometimes when you have raised pot on the button, you will find that after the flop the preflop caller will now bet into you. Don’t fold too liberally in spots like this. You have pot raised preflop because you wanted to commit fully. Your opponent knows that, and he knows that with just about one potsized bet left, you will bet nine times out of 10 when checked to. So, when someone bets into you, knowing that when checked to you would almost certainly have bet, it is highly unlikely that you are facing a good made hand. Almost always, your opponent will be pushing a draw or a relatively weak made hand that he “would have had to call with anyway, so why not bet it”. His goal: using this bet to bet you off a better hand than his, or a hand that would have called had you known his actual holding. This is a situation where you are getting about 2 to 1 on your money against one opponent (needing just 33.33% pot equity to make calling correct) or even better than that (say, if the pot is three-handed with about 18BB or 19BB in the pot, and having just 14.5BB behind). Therefore, you should be willing to call all-in on very light values. Even just one pair + kickers, or a mere gutshot plus some high cards and runner-runner flush potential, could be enough to make the call here. Remember that the bettor doesn’t need to have two pair or better. As I said, given the betting he is actually more likely to be pushing a marginal made hand or a draw, meaning that in all likelihood he may not

even have a pair. So, merely hitting one of your picture cards could be enough to take down the pot with just one pair, when you might leave your opponent fuming “how on earth you could make that call with nothing”. (Of course, if there is a bet and a call in front of you, this scenario changes rather drastically, as there is now a lot more strength shown because of the caller. Especially on boards where completed straights or flushes are possible, you may need to dump an unimproved A-A-x-x in this spot, despite getting 3 to 1 or even 4 to 1 on your money. While the bettor could very well be making a play, the caller will almost always have a completed hand here.) If you have made this pot raise from one of the blinds rather than from the button, then you know that if call you will be OOP after the flop. Still, with only one pot-sized bet left, this is not a disadvantage by any means, as it deprives your opponents of the chance to donk bet and make you call all-in rather than bet all-in.

20BB play after the flop — Option 3 The third option is that you have gotten even more than this 5.5BB into the pot — for instance, you have limp-reraised for 13BB or so, and one or more opponents has called. Here, there’s nothing to think about anymore: you always go all-in on the flop, regardless of the board, the number of players, and whether or not someone might have you drawing dead. This is a 100% committed situation — and it is important to treat it as such.

Postflop betting with a 40BB stack With 40 big blinds, my basic game plan is two-fold: ♠ Getting my entire stack into the middle preflop with A-A-x-x or some other premium hand. Or at least such a significant portion of my stack, that postflop play is automatic: all the money will go in, almost regardless of whether I will go all-in as the bettor or the caller. ♠ Getting a slightly smaller percentage of my stack in, either with this same A-A, or with a nice double-suited hand where I am representing A-A and try to use this to my advantage after the flop. Assuming they call my preflop reraise, I could pick up more than my fair share of pots by betting all-in or close to it on the flop, sometimes when I don’t even have the best hand at all. Because of this game plan, postflop play now depends on the following five aspects: ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠

How many pot-sized bets do I have left in my stack? What is my position in the betting? How many players am I up against and how do they view me? Have I made the last raise preflop, or (if not) could my opponents have been thinking I was trapping/making a limp-reraise attempt with a big hand? ♠ Can I use the texture of the board or my position in the betting to my advantage? The end goals: gaining maximum information at as little cost as possible, putting my opponents in an awkward spot, winning the maximum when I have flopped big, or even stealing a pot outright when I don’t have much but my opponents have reason to think otherwise.

How big is my stack in relation to the pot? This is always, let me repeat: always, the cornerstone of postflop play. In a reraised pot with a starting stack of only 40BB, you will usually have invested between nine and 18 big blinds preflop (and almost always you will be the last raiser preflop). This means that after the flop, you will have a stack of only 22BB to 31BB left — just about enough for one pot-sized bet. (Sometimes a little more, sometimes a little less.) In that situation, we don’t need to analyze all that much. Unless the board is extremely likely to have helped your opponent(s), or unless there is significant action in front of you and you have missed the flop, you will simply stick it in. I like to bet 80% pot in this situation (to save myself some leeway on the turn, and give my opponent the chance to fold on the turn if a scare card comes up that may not have helped me at all), but some feel more comfortable to just bet the pot. I would say that either way is fine. Of course, there are also situations where you have minraised preflop or where you have flatcalled a small raise with position and in that case the pot will probably be anywhere from 6BB to 12BB — while you will have about 36BB to 38BB left in your stack. Now, there’s actually some room to play poker — and to start taking all of the other aspects into the equation.

Creating an overall balanced postflop strategy Let’s say that there are between 7.5 and 10.5 big blinds in the pot, and I have 37 or 38 left. This is a situation where, if I was the initial minraiser with one or two players behind me, I would almost invariably go for the check-raise in the case of a decent flop — especially if the players behind me are fairly aggressive when checked to. If, in contrast, the overaggressive players were in the blinds — and they have already checked — I might choose to make a minimum bet in this situation. It’s a play that I sometimes make with stacks of this size to basically (re)open the betting, and in a situation where if I check there is the danger of things getting checked around. I will do it not just with relatively big hands like a set that hope to get checkraised by the overaggressive blinds, but also with total garbage or with hands that against an overaggressive player I might want to go all-in with such as an overpair + flush draw. By making this minbet I could induce someone to make a play with a marginal holding against my apparent weakness — so that when he check-raises, I can simply reraise pot and get maximum value out of my hand. I also avoid seeing a potentially ugly turn card that might kill my action if I have flopped big, or that could actually force me to lay down, for instance if I have this overpair + flush draw and then a straightening card comes on the turn.

Being last to speak If there are no players behind me on the flop and I am last to speak then if I choose to bet it will again quite often be a very small bet, sometimes even again this same minbet. Because I can also do this with a strong hand where I am looking to get all-in through the betting pattern “minbet by me, check-raise by another, reraise pot by me”, my opponents cannot check-raise me too liberally. This is especially the case on boards like Q-9–5 with a lot of straight potential. Now, when my opponents just check-call my late-position minbet, this means they almost always have a relatively weak holding. So, if an apparent blank comes on the turn, I now have enough information to know that I can expect to pick up the pot with a standard twothirds or three-quarters pot bet, regardless of whether I am strong or weak. By betting small on the flop, I have gained valuable information about the hand strength of the opposition at a very limited price. By the way: please note that to use this strategy in a profitable manner, you should also be willing to just minbet on the flop with hands like Q-Q for top set despite the many draws that are available on the board. Because if you only bet marginal made hands, good draws and your airballs here, yet suddenly bet big when you have a quality made hand that wants to charge the draws, you would become very easy to read and exploit. Of course, the consequence of just minbetting your top set in this spot with a stack of about four times the current pot, is that if you get called and a straight card comes on the turn, you will not suddenly start giving excessive action now that your top set may have been outdrawn. Your goal by playing the hand in this creative manner was to manipulate the pot size and try to induce a situation where you could get the hand all-in on the flop, so that you get maximum value from all the straight draws that would probably have given up if the board paired on the turn. But if you are in for just 3BB total with 37BB left in a situation where on the turn you may have just a maximum of 10 outs with your top set, then you will often have to fold on the turn against a standard bet. Don’t throw good money after bad now that things have turned sour and don’t suddenly try to make expensive turn calls now that your shrewd plan has turned out wrong. Always consider this Rolf Rule for Shortstacking: always play for a very small or very large percentage of your stack but avoid all the in-between situations. Even though you are not shortstacking here in the strictest sense of the word, this is

still a situation where you want to get things all-in on the flop with top set. What you don’t want is calling and possibly chasing with this same top set on the turn where, given the betting on flop and turn, it should be entirely clear to your opponents that you have a set, and that you want the board to pair on the river.

Reasons for using the minbet So, when the pot is less than 12 big blinds with over 35 behind, I try to refrain from making standard or big bets on the flop. If you play according to my system, your options are usually limited to checking or minbetting. (Heads up in position, this requirement is not that strict. In this case, there often is a lot of value in just taking down the pot there and then, especially because the sole opponent is likely to have missed the flop, yet might stick around or even get frisky if the price you are laying is just too good to refuse.) Please note that out of position, this minbet can not only gain valuable information at little cost, it can also work as a stop bet: it could allow you to see the turn almost for free whereas if you had checked, you would often have been forced to make a check-fold against a standard two-thirds pot bet. So, according to my system, having left more than three times the amount of money in the pot, you don’t want to make the first big bet on the flop, especially not in three-or four-way pots. According to my system, your options are to check or to minbet. The time for you to start making serious bets is on the turn, using the information that the action on the flop has provided you. Let’s say your opponent has just called your flop bet. Assuming it is not a paired board or a board with the possibility of a completed flush (boards that your opponent could easily have used to flatcall with a completed big hand), but a normal board with drawing possibilities, it is highly unlikely your opponent has a big hand like a set. Even with just two pair he would probably have raised on the flop to protect his hand rather than let you see the turn almost for free. In other words, once the turn is a safe card that doesn’t change much, this seems like a perfect spot for you to pick up the pot with a standard two-thirds or three-quarters pot bet. By playing this way, you avoid playing a big pot on the flop not knowing there you’re at and you especially avoid the situation of having your standard continuation bet getting (check-) raised by what could very well be someone who is pushing his draw. The scenario of you following up your preflop minraise with a standard continuation bet looks weak in the eyes of some players who will use this to check-raise you liberally5, and this is something you hate to see because if you fold now, you will have lost a significant percentage of your stack with a hand that could have had a lot of value.

Playing from the blinds With 40BB in either one of the blind positions in multiway pots, you should often use the minbet (especially when first to speak, to negate your bad position and for the other reasons given above) and the check-raise. Be especially inclined to check-raise the turn. For instance, if it has been checked around on the flop or you have come out minbetting and no one has raised, then after an apparent blank you should not necessarily come out betting the two-thirds pot that I described earlier to pick up what’s in the middle. Especially if you have a hand like top two pair with not many extras on a fairly drawheavy board and having a stack of (more than) three times the current pot size behind, there is a much better play available: just check. Especially if it’s a three-or four-way pot with at least one fairly aggressive player, it is better to make a check that says “I am ready to give up”. Let someone else try to pick up the pot, maybe you will even get one caller in the middle and then you check-raise all-in. An excellent hand to make this play with would be Q-9-x-x on a Q♥-9♦-5♥-3♠ board, as by check-raising you are depriving the draws of any implied odds. Given the drawheavy nature of the board and the — in the eyes of your opponents — “cheap” price of even a standard bet (remember, while this bet may be substantial to you, it may not be to your opponents who could be playing 100BB+ or even 200BB+ stacks), there’s the danger that they may even call your standard two-thirds pot bet on the turn while having position on you. And this leaves you in the awful spot of having exactly one pot-sized bet left, out of position, in a situation where almost any river card could have completed your opponent’s draw. Another good hand to make this play with, on this exact same board, would be A♥-J♥-10♦-3♠ for bottom pair + nut flush draw + open-ended straight draw. By first checking and then check-raising the pot all-in, you are trying to induce your opponents to: ♠ Bet in a situation where their hands don’t really warrant it, but where they feel that after your check and the weakness you have shown, the pot may be up for grabs. ♠ Then fold to your check-raise in a situation where, had they known you were merely holding a pair of threes with an ace kicker, they would easily have made the call. This is much better than coming out betting with a standard bet on the turn, in a situation where: ♠ If you get called, you are unlikely to make any more money with your Q-9-x-x for top two pair if it is still good. I mean: rarely if ever would you value bet with that hand if the river completes any kind of draw — the only times when this hand would make you money on the river is by using it as a bluff catcher by check-calling. However, if you are willing to check-call on the river after a scare card with this queens up, then you would also be paying off with the losing hand often. ♠ If this standard turn bet gets called, your opponent can use the drawheavy board to his advantage. Assuming he is smart enough to realize that you view this as an either/or situation (either he has hit his draw or he is bluffing), he should be able to manipulate you into either paying off when you should have folded (when the river card looked a bit harmless, yet it still completed his hand) or folding when you should have called. For instance, when the river card looked very scary like the 10♥ that completed all big straight and flush draws, yet he was playing the 7–6–4-x bottom wrap, and thus is now betting as a bluff.

Postflop betting with a 120BB stack While in both the minimum buy-in and also (albeit to a slightly lesser extent) the 40BB tactic the concept of “play for your entire stack or don’t play at all” applies, this is not the case when buying in for the maximum 100 big blinds. Assuming that most of your opponents are also playing fairly deep money, your objective should be: ♠ Pick up more than your fair share of small and medium-sized pots, by using your chips as a weapon. ♠ Work towards the climax of this one big pot where you will almost always have a big hand. In other words, the goal should be to steal a lot of small pots with nothing or not much, and then when someone is fed up and decides to play back in a huge pot, you will have the goods. Sounds easy enough in theory — now let’s put it into practice.

No pot bets or raises — not even when playing 120BB While many big-stack players make a large part of their preflop raises pot-sized and also make pot-sized bets on the flop, I don’t do this — for the following reasons: ♠ I think it is too expensive. More often than not, a smaller bet will have just as much chance of taking down the pot as a full pot bet. And as the goal of your maximum buy-in approach (100BB usually; I talk about 120BB here assuming that you have been playing a while and maybe winning one or two small pots) is to win more than your fair share of small pots, it becomes imperative to steal those pots at the cheapest possible price. Or, better: at the price that gives you the best possible risk-reward ratio. ♠ It lacks subtlety. ♠ It makes it easier for the weaker players to play against you. As the money becomes shallower once you make bigger bets, it will take fewer betting rounds and fewer decisions for them to get it all-in. And thus your actual edge decreases and your swings increase now that you will be forced into a showdown more often. By using a smaller-bet strategy, you will be more likely to make the best possible decisions once the real money goes in, simply because you have more information and more betting rounds on which to base your decisions. ♠ It is a protection against the shortstackers that may also be in the game. Shortstackers love LAPs who frequently make pot-sized bets and raises and when you tend to make them on light values, the shortstackers will love it even more — as they will have ideal check-raise or limp-reraise stations to get it all-in. But if your bets and raises are smaller, it will be harder for them to get a significant enough percentage of their stacks into the middle through a pot-sized (re)raise. Of course, this doesn’t mean that a strategy which involves nearly always making pot-sized bets and raises is in itself bad. After all, it does have some clear advantages: ♠ If you hold on to the “always bet pot” strategy, you avoid giving away information about your hand, as your bets are always the same size. ♠ You give your opponents the worst possible odds to try and draw out on you, or make it expensive to get involved with a relatively marginal holding. After all, by betting the pot you threaten a would-be caller that on the turn you could again bet pot, and then once more on the river. As I described in my previous book: while you make just one pot-sized bet, your opponent may feel that if he calls now, he might be faced with two additional big bets and be forced to play for stacks. I called this concept “the threat is more important than the execution” — and by betting pot early in the hand you tend to maximize this threat. Still, it is my view that also with smaller bets one can accomplish the same things. By always betting less than the pot, yet by always betting about the same size given the circumstances (texture of the board, number of opponents and position), my opponents still won’t get all that much information other than that I have a hand that I think is worth betting. And even though my opponents may feel that they have a slight discount, and indeed this could induce them to get involved with either a marginal hand (preflop) or a relatively weak draw (postflop), with deep money these are not exactly the type of things that I want to discourage them from doing. After all, even if they do call me on the flop a bit more often with hands that they would have folded against full-pot bets, this is not something that I necessarily see as a problem. If I read the player in question correctly for making a call with a relatively weak hand because it is cheap, then firing the second barrel on the turn (again about two-thirds pot, usually) will be enough to take it down more often than not. Remember, with stacks of over 100BB, hands that are worth calling a two-thirds pot bet on the flop but not a full-pot bet, are hardly ever good enough to withstand additional bets on turn or river. So, by making him call now when against a full-pot bet he would have released, I am actually making extra money. Of course, if the call is made with a relatively weak hand like an open-ended straight draw with no extras, for eight nut outs, then this turn card could actually turn out to be quite costly. However, if you are good at hand reading you will know that people tend to call two-thirds pot bets with openenders, will fold gutshots for that price, and will tend to raise with wraps. So, the straight should be pretty easy to see. In some cases you could actually have a real hand of your own like the same nut straight + redraw, meaning you could be freerolling. This is especially the case where you are betting a big draw on the flop. Then you usually don’t mind getting called by a weaker draw. And if the less than full pot bets tend to accomplish this, I actually see it as an advantage, rather than as a disadvantage. After all, if in fact I have a premium hand or draw and my opponent has a hand of slightly lesser quality, there’s a good chance that if he hits what he is hoping to hit, he will still be trailing significantly. Let’s say that I have the rather premium draw A♥-J♠-10♥-9♠ on a flop 8♥-7♠-2♥. I want an opponent with a marginal draw like a queen-high flush draw + gutshot to stay in the hand with me, knowing that this might be the perfect situation to take his entire stack (as I said, especially if he hits what he is hoping to hit). Had I raised this opponent out of the pot either before or on the flop by using an always-bet-pot approach, this kind of scenario would occur significantly less often.

The less-than-pot-bet strategy in detail So, what I do is always raise to a total of three times the big blind preflop (four times if my stack is more than 150 big blinds or so — especially if there are not a lot of short stacks in the game). And whenever I choose to continuation bet after the flop, it is almost always less than pot — rarely if ever more than 80% of the pot, and sometimes as little as just 20% of the pot. The following aspects are of influence when picking the proper bet size: The number of players in the pot

Up against just one opponent, I will often bet just 45–65% of the pot, especially if by doing so I can represent an even bigger hand than I have (as I seem to be providing my opponent a discount, and he could take this as a sign of strength rather than weakness). Against multiple opponents, I will usually bet two-thirds or three-quarters of the pot though simply because there are now significantly more possible hands out there that could be good enough to call me. My position In position, I tend to make significantly smaller bets than out of position. Whenever I bet in position on a drawheavy flop, I don’t usually think, “Gee, this board is so drawheavy, I have to charge my opponents enough to make calling unattractive.” I only think like this when I am out of position. When it is my opponent who is out of position, I don’t mind him calling my flop bet, because even if what looks like a scare card comes he will still have to act in front of me. Furthermore, as I will often make these standard bets in position with 100BB+ stack sizes, he can never be sure what I have. I mean, I could be betting a very wide range including sets, two pair hands, total air, the nut flush draw or a pair + straight draw and a whole bunch of other hands. So, for him to make the correct play is very dangerous in this spot, as on the turn I could very well have made the exact holding that my opponent is trying to represent. Given that I have position and my opponent will have to act in front of me on both the turn and the river, it is OK that the flop bets are smaller in size once I have position. Even more so because it prevents an opponent from making the pot-sized check-raise powerplay to negate for his bad position. He can still try it on the flop, of course. But as he can only make it a smaller percentage of his stack with more money left to be played on the next two streets, and because he will be risking a lot to win less money now, these slightly smaller bets in position tend to protect me somewhat against optimistic check-raisers. And because my opponent can never be certain whether or not I may have the nuts on the turn, he is liable to make the following mistakes throughout the hand: ♠ Not making any additional money after a good turn or river. ♠ Making an ill-timed move or bluff those times when I have actually hit. ♠ Trying to represent a hand through turn or river bets or check-raises, but where I can deduce correctly that he would never have played his hand this way if he really had what he is representing. For instance, if I am up against someone who would almost always check-raise pot on the flop with the nut-flush draw, but who has now just checkcalled the flop and then come out betting after a flush card on the turn. Well, then you know almost for a fact that he either has a non-nut flush or is bluffing with the bare ace. In that case, with a king-high flush of your own, you would be in a perfect position to snap off the bare ace bluff by just flatcalling, and if you judge it likely that your opponent might have a non-nut flush, it could be a good strategy to just flatcall his turn bet and then raise his river bet — even when you don’t have anything. Given that you play your hand exactly how you would have played the nut flush, he will almost certainly fold there, thinking that if you were bluffing with this bare ace for instance, you would probably have done so on the turn, and not on the river. The texture of the board If I am heads up as the preflop raiser, and the board presents an either/or situation where if I have what I am representing my opponent could be drawing dead, I will often bet a very small amount, regardless of whether I actually have this big hand or not. For instance, heads up as the preflop raiser on boards like K-Q-J rainbow and especially K-K-8 or A-A-Q, you will often see me bet just 25% or 30% of the pot, regardless of whether I actually have the nuts, a marginal hand or even a total bluff. Provided I have the image of a good and dangerous player, I have noticed that my opponents tend to check-fold against these small bets just as often as they would against an (almost) full-pot bet that they may view as suspicious. It’s basically the principle that I explained in detail in Secrets of Professional Pot-Limit Omaha: on scary boards with a pair or three cards of one suit betting small is often much better than betting big. This is especially true because I will lose less money if my opponent is trapping and because by making the bets smaller the money will be deeper — and thus I will give my opponent more room to make mistakes. The game flow If I have been making lots of small or strange (say, $199) bets recently where I have been forced to lay down against a raise, I will often make this exact same type of bet the next time that I have a big hand looking for action — even if this bet would be a slightly different percentage of the pot than I would find ideal in this situation. Note that this is what I would do against not very sophisticated players who may think: “I have seen this guy make these kinds of bets with nothing a few times already, so let’s just raise him here — bet that he will again be trying it on.” Against better players who I know tend to be quite perceptive, I will instead use these exact same types of bets with again weak hands or bluffs. This because they might reason: “Rolf has been caught bluffing recently after making this $199 bet. So, I am pretty sure that as he is now making this same bet again, he is doing this with the intention to appear much weaker than he is, in order to induce calls and raises from the opposition. So, I am not giving him the action that he wants here — I’ll fold.” By using reverse psychology, and by correctly analyzing how both the better and the weaker players may be thinking, I can use bet size and bet amounts to my advantage, in order to get action on my monsters and at the same time pave the way for relatively cheap bluffs. The size of my opponents’ stacks If there are some shortstackers in the pot, this could be a reason for me to make slightly bigger or smaller bets than I usually would (or even refrain from betting my marginal made hands or weak draws, if I think the shortstackers could use this bet to check-raise all-in and bet me off my hand). Let’s say that there is $190 in the pot, and my standard bet for the J♥-8♦-5♣ board would be around $130 or $140. Well, if the player to my immediate right, who has already checked, has exactly $220 left and there are two players in the betting between him and me, I might choose to bet $110 instead of the $130/$140 that I had planned. This because the players in the middle will have to fear that if they call, the shortstacked player could use these tremendous odds that he is getting to go all-in for $220 with a very wide range, expecting me to reraise again and shut out the field.6 Had I bet $130 or $140 instead, then despite this larger bet the players in the middle could have called more easily, given that the player to my right cannot reopen the betting by going all-in. (Assuming that this site or casino requires a full raise to reopen the betting, rather than just the “raise of more than half the initial bet” rule that is quite common, or even the “half the bet or more”. This shows the importance of knowing the exact rules of this site or casino, so you will know how the pot can be influenced by any shortstackers that can or cannot reopen the betting for you.) I always look for situations where I can put players in the middle, and use my bet size as a weapon or potential threat. In fact, the goal is almost always the same: try to put as much pressure as possible on the opposition, while risking as few chips as possible doing this. There is not a single player who likes to be in a situation where his call doesn’t close the betting; he will not be able to calculate his odds properly. And he will especially dislike first calling a bet only to then be forced off his hand — forfeiting his investments without even getting to see the turn. And yet, this is the exact threat that you are posing to him — making this $110 a slightly small but excellent bet.

Combining all this postflop information with the only three options you have preflop (fold, call or raise 3BB total), you can expect to be in significantly more multiway pots than players who often or even always make pot-sized raises. After the flop, you should continuation bet well over 60% when checked to, and even if you haven’t raised preflop then you should still be willing to fire liberally on the flop. In late position you can bet fairly often as with deep money your opponents cannot check-raise you easily unless they have the current nuts or a premium draw to the nuts. And even in these cases, they may not like check-raising much, as you have the option to just flatcall with position and then get them into trouble on the turn if their draw hasn’t materialized, or their current nuts has gotten into trouble now that the turn presents a new nuts that you could very well have. By putting together all the information from the previous streets, you should now have a pretty good grasp exactly “where you’re at”. If your flop bet on a dangerous board like K-Q-j rainbow gets check-called, you should know with a large amount of certainty whether this means: ♠ Your opponent is bagging a monster hoping you will bet again. ♠ Your opponent has a decent, but non-nut hand. As he is fearing that you may have that nut hand, firing one more bullet or even two (if he also calls your turn bet) could be the proper play to make him fold the better hand.

Playing the turn with a big stack The turn is the first time where I will sometimes let the strength or potential vulnerability of my holding be a deciding factor in the bet size that I choose. Preflop and on the flop, I want to provide my opponents with as little information as possible. After all, given that my opponents and I will tangle so often in preflop and flop situations, I should avoid any kind of patterns in my play that could give away the content of my hand. Obviously, on the turn I still try to do this — I still try to make standard-sized bets as often as I can, using the same type of thinking as I did for flop play using the five aspects from above. But given that we are now getting closer to decision time, a few additional factors start coming into play: Do I want my opponent to stay in, or go out? Is my hand strong enough to withstand action, or do I want to fire big to make my opponent fold either a better made hand or a good draw that has implied odds? In the first case, this might mean just a 50% or 60% pot bet might suffice, especially if I have position, while in the second case I might choose to bet 70–85%. Of course, I need to make sure that my opponent will not start noticing this pattern, or else I would basically be playing my hand face up. Things are usually not that blatantly obvious, as I tend to vary my bets anyway because of all the things I already mentioned. But if I feel that a specific opponent might think that the upper range of my bet size could indicate weaker/more vulnerable holdings, I need to reverse this pattern if I am in a pot against him — betting bigger when I want action, and betting smaller when I want a fold. And if I feel that more than one opponent might have noticed my potential giveaway, I need to make notes for the future on who might have noticed this pattern, so I can reverse it, and at least for this specific session or table start making standard two-thirds pot bets on the turn rather than the adjusted bets that I like to make. How deep is the money? If there is room for just a little over one pot-sized bet, any bet I will make will probably be (close to) pot-sized, as I want to take away almost all of my opponent’s implied odds and bluffing rights. However, if the pot is $900 and my opponent has $3,000 left, and we have a very drawheavy board, the standard $600–900 bet is one of the worst bets I can make — assuming I have a solid made hand like top two pair or a small set. If he calls me, my opponent will have exactly one pot-sized bet left on the river. And if he correctly reads me for a decent but not great made hand on a board where almost every river card is dangerous, this would be a perfect spot for the opponent with the drawing hand, both with regards to getting paid off or finding a profitable bluffing spot. There are two plays in this situation that I sometimes prefer. The first is simply checking it back on the turn, so that I am representing a drawing hand that is happy to take a free card. Then, if what seems like a blank appears on the river, I can often snap off a bluff. Or, if my opponent checks on the river after a card that (from his perspective) won’t have completed all that many draws for me, this could be a perfect spot to make a big, thin valuebet of about 75–85% of the pot. This being a “bet out of nowhere”, my opponent will be deeply suspicious, and given that he has checked the river, it seems likely he has done so with a marginal made hand in order to snap off a bluff. (If he would have a busted draw himself, he would probably have made a bluff bet, especially given the likelihood that I could have a busted draw too.) So, in this situation I like to give him the chance to make his hero call. And for this reason, I shouldn’t milk him for just a 30% or 40% pot bet — in this situation, he is just as likely to pay off my big bet that screams “bluff”. (The downside of this “check back the turn” play should be obvious: sometimes I will not only give my opponent a free chance to beat me in a situation where he might possibly have folded to a bet; no he might even get an extra reward of me paying him off on the river with a losing hand. So, you should only check back in this spot if you have a strong enough read that this opponent has a very strong draw that won’t fold easily, and not just that — he should also be a very good player who knows where your weakness lies if you make that awkward big turn bet with exactly one pot-sized bet left.) The second play that I like to make in this spot is an even more dangerous one, yet I have used it with tremendous success both in my full-ring PLO years and my recent 6-max PLO experience. It is what I like to call the “small-reopen-the-betting-bet”. If I bet slightly less than would be normal given the drawheavy nature of the board, or even a ridiculously low bet that screams weakness and that could be perceived as a bet to assure myself of a “free showdown”, my opponent could be induced to go for a check-raise with either a marginal made hand of even a semi-bluff check-raise with a decent draw. And this is exactly the play he shouldn’t make! Instead of flatcalling and putting me in a tough spot on the river, I can now simply reraise all-in with the best hand, and given that it is about a pot-sized raise all-in or close to it, my opponent may in fact have raised himself out of the pot with his decent draw — as in all likelihood, he is not getting the correct odds to call anymore, not even with a hand that could have more than 10 nut outs. And if he decides to call with this decent draw or — even better for me — with a worse made hand (because he may suspect a big semi-bluff on my part), then I will have created a much, much bigger pot than would seem normal for the types of hands that we hold. And I have won it because of just one thing — having the courage to play this hand in a daring, dangerous and unorthodox manner. My favorite way to make this play is make the turn bet exactly the same size as my flop bet, as this will almost always be perceived as weakness given that the pot has now grown much bigger because of the flop action. And if the money is just slightly shallower, I will even use the good old minbet to induce this check-raise. If in a $10-$20 blinds pot and with $500 in the pot already and $1,500 effective stacks I bet $20 in position on a very drawheavy board, most players’ egos cannot stand it to just check-call such a ridiculous bet. And once they have then made this check-raise and get reraised all-in, they often feel fooled in such a way that the loss of this extra “throwing good money after bad” call doesn’t cause them as much pain as the prudent fold would. In other words: it’s the perfect trap bet, for more than one reason. (Keep in mind though that in order to make this play profitably, you have to know your opponent well, while he must be unaware that this type of play is in your arsenal. Also, once people have seen you make this play once or twice with top two pair or small set type of holdings, make sure that the next time you are using it, you are doing this when you have a drawing hand — thereby paving the way for a successful river bluff against those who are smart enough to realize what you are doing.). It is also important to consider the following factors: Is my opponent a good player or not? If he is, I will usually try to avoid a situation where I vary my bets also according to the strength or vulnerability of my hand — this could

simply provide him with too much information, and as a good player he might then pick the correct countermeasures. If he seems like someone who is playing scared, I will not get tricky at all. I will not make the tricky “in-position-turn-check-back”, and I will definitely not use the “small-reopen-the-betting-bet” either. Let’s say that I judge him to be a player who is too scared to check-call two big bets OOP with a drawing hand, and who even if he does make this second check-call will almost certainly not have the courage to face me with a big river bluff. Well, in that case I will simply make the standard two-thirds or three-quarters pot bet on the turn, simply because my opponent fails to take advantage of the inherent weaknesses of this play. Has the turn card changed things? If it hasn’t, and I think my opponent has check-called the flop with a rather standard draw or a relatively weak made hand like top/bottom pair, I will probably make a bet in the upper region (70–80% of the pot) to bet him off his hand — assuming that I have no bonecrusher either. Of course, as discussed, if I have a big hand I might decide to bet slightly smaller to keep him in the pot. This is something that may not raise much suspicion, as also on the flop I often make relatively small bets in position with a very wide range of hands — so this play on the turn may not automatically be analyzed as what it is: providing a discount because I have a big hand. If the turn card has changed things and a new nuts has been created, the key is how likely my opponent thinks it is that I have this nuts, and whether or not the draw that my opponent may have is to a higher hand than my current nuts. Let’s take the most likely scenario: my opponent has checkcalled the flop on a Q♥-7♦-4♥ flop, and now the turn is the 2♥. If I think there’s a good chance that my opponent doesn’t have a flush, let alone a big one, and might think there’s a good chance that I have been semi-bluffing the flop with an ace-high flush draw, I will often bet significantly less when I am bluffing than whenever I have hit. Provided that I am up against someone who respects small bets in a situation where he could be drawing dead, I will often use the flush card on the turn to pick up the pot with a very small bet (anywhere from 40% down to just 25% of the pot), expecting my opponent to read this bet as strength and folding all wraps or two-pair hands — knowing they could be faced with another (this time probably big) bet on the river. Yet, if I have actually made the nut flush, there is not all that much value in making this small bet, because if I have analyzed this situation correctly, my opponent will almost always fold unless he has a flush of his own. Yet, in that case he could be willing to go off for the big bucks! So then I will probably bet 60%-80% of the pot if the money is deep enough that, when called, there will be enough room for one more significant river bet. It will be hard for my opponent to lay down a non-nut flush in that spot, especially as he has checked it — and probably has done so with the intention of check-calling. After all, it is rare to find a player who first check-calls on the flop with a draw, to then check-fold on the turn once he makes it. And if in that situation you bet small when you have the goods, you may not be maximizing your value. Again, a few downsides and dangers to this play. First of all, when betting big after the flush card, your opponent will often fold, and you may feel like you have done something wrong. You haven’t — it is just a play where often you will make nothing, yet some 15% of the time you may stack your opponent. Don’t think that in this situation, as your opponent is so likely to fold, you should thus check it back on the turn to maybe induce a river bluff or at least try to secure a payoff. This is indeed a good way to play the hand some 20–25% of the time in this spot. But it should be a variation from your usual play; it should not become the default play. Because if it does, you start running the risk of becoming someone who checks back his nut hands, and whose bets in that spot thus start getting less and less respect (as they are often bluffs and non-nut hands). Also, once people have seen you make this “bet big with a flush, bet small with a bluff” play, you will have to reverse it the next time that you play them in a similar situation. That’s why you should always keep notes as to which of your opponents may have witnessed some of your more remarkable plays — so that the next time the two of you are in a pot, you can use this knowledge against him.

Out of position on the turn All of these situations were playing the turn when having position on the opponents. But sometimes you will be out of position. In chapter 5, “Some advanced plays, tricks and moves”, I analyze in depth the best ways to negate for your bad position through some strange and tricky moves. So, I will leave the extensive analysis for that chapter. What’s very important in how to play the turn OOP is the psychology of the hand up to that point. I usually like to discern two fundamentally different situations.

Situation 1: Out of position in the blinds in an unraised pot This is a spot where you should focus on small-pot poker only. Bet out frequently on the flop for either a minimum or (better) a standard bet. As no one has shown strength yet, they are not likely to play sheriff in this nothing pot. However, abandon ship quickly if you run into resistance. Sometimes check-call on the flop with a marginal hand, to represent on the turn whatever draw gets completed by betting out for 60% of the pot — don’t put any more chips into the pot or make a hero move whenever someone plays back. Rarely if ever check-raise. Take your fair share of small pots with one flat bet and some by betting on two streets — but unless you have an absolute monster, don’t escalate the pot.

Situation 2: Out of position in the blinds in a raised pot First of all, make sure that you defend only with hands that tend to play easy after the flop — hands with nut potential, where you rarely have any of those tough in between situations where you don’t know exactly where you are at. If you do call a raise in a 100BB + situation, the stacks are too big to play check-raise on the flop very often for three reasons: ♠ If you happen to do this with a marginal holding like top two pair no extras, you will face a lot of troubles if you get reraised. But also if you get called, turn play will be awful in a situation where you have check-raised on the flop with a made hand of moderate strength. ♠ If you happen to do this as a semi-bluff with a draw and you get called, you will again face troubles on the turn. If the turn completed your draw, being first to speak with the strength you have already shown, you may not get a lot of action. And if the turn is a blank, you may feel compelled to continue your semi-bluff. But if your opponent realizes that, or in fact has a made hand like a set or top two that was waiting for a blank to make a move, you will now get raised, and you will either have to fold or call with a drawing hand with just one more card to come. ♠ If you check-raise the flop with a top hand like top set and your opponent folds to your raise, you will not have gotten the most out of this situation. The key point from the flop onward is that you don’t automatically check. In heads up or three-way pots, I tend to come out betting into the raiser between 25% and 35% of the time with a range that consists of garbage, marginal hands, good draws and quality made hands alike. Maybe just about 15% of these hands would be good enough to come over the top if raised on the flop, but most opponents won’t raise liberally on the flop. They

will often just give up this small pot, or call one time to see if you have the balls to fire again. After a standard two-thirds pot donk bet on the flop, assuming I get one caller, I will usually fire a second barrel of 60–70% of the pot, and “usually” means slightly more than half the time. If I read my opponent for a strong hand, I check and fold, and about 10–15% of the time I check-call. I don’t check-raise often in this spot with marginal holdings and 100BB + effective stacks, because being just the big blind I probably don’t get all that much respect heads up7. With my good hands, I usually just fire a standard second barrel; even though at times I will check-raise with good hands like two pair + flush draw that would be good enough to also call an over-the-top raise. But this check-raise move is not optimal with these kinds of stacks in a single-raised pot and only moderate flop action. It should be in one’s arsenal only to avoid the situation that your opponent could bet very liberally after your turn check, as he won’t have to fear a check-raise — and thus could never be betting himself out of the pot.

Situation 3: Out of position as preflop raiser, with a caller behind you In this situation, or in the situation of you being the preflop raiser from the big blind in a three-or four-way unraised pot for example, I use the turn check-raise a lot more frequently than in situation 2, also with marginal holdings, semi-bluffs and even pure bluffs. I do this because of the “continuation bet on the flop, then go for the check-raise on the turn” line that I use quite often in this spot. As the preflop raiser, you will often continuation bet, in the hope that especially the player(s) behind you will fold — so you will have gained last position on the later streets. However, if you just continue to bet every time someone calls, not only will your continuation bets start getting less respect, but your follow-up bets on the turn will be seen as just standard, not necessarily a sign of strength. Your opponents will start calling and especially raising you often, knowing that most of the time you will have a weak hand that won’t be able to stand the heat. So, to compensate for this, you will need to check some 40% of the time if your flop bet gets called. But this check should not be a sign that says to your opponent “OK my friend, the pot is yours”. So, especially on boards where there is a lot of drawing potential, and where your check could induce a bet on relatively light values, this is a spot where you should check-raise fairly often, especially with combination hands like bottom two pair + weak flush draw or overpair + openended straight draw in situations where your opponent could be just as weak as you. Frankly, the money is a bit too deep to check-raise, but especially with decent draws this could actually work in your favor. The best situation for your semi-bluffing hand is this: that the money is just shallow enough that after your check-raise you can still call all-in against a reraise, yet it is exactly deep enough that if your opponent calls on the turn and because of a blank on the river you now decide to bluff bet, this bet is still substantial enough to induce a fold.

Situation 4: Out of position, with a (re)raiser in your back This is a situation where you will be trying to get a check-raise in at some point in the hand. Especially the situation of you raising and then getting reraised by someone with position calls for this. I almost always use the turn to check-raise, both with my big hands or good draws. Let’s say that I have 10♠-9♥-9♦-8♠ have open-raised to 3BB from the cutoff, and then the button has reraised pot to 10.5BB with what look like almost 100% pure aces — given that he does not reraise pot very lightly. Having 109.5BB behind, you call. Let’s say the flop is 9♠-4♣-2♦. It can’t get much better than that — especially as your opponent feels this flop may be fairly harmless. Still, I would probably bet into him for 10BB or so, to give him the chance to make it 40BB or so and I can move in. And if he just calls my turn bet, then I will probably just check on the turn or bet the same “stop-bet-like”10BB so he can then bet or raise and I can (check-)raise or reraise him all-in. On flops like 7♠-6♥-4♣ or 7♠-5♠-2♣ (typical semi-bluffing boards), I would bet out with the 7–6–4, hoping he will raise and so I can reraise to just represent a set or a straight — and even if I get called I will probably be a favorite with my 10♠-9♥-9♦-8♠. But if my opponent just calls and the turn is a Q♦ or so, this could be a good spot to check — hoping he will bet, and so that I can now check-raise all-in. Given that there are no flush draws and thus your opponent cannot have A-A + flush draw, this should be a spot with lots of fold equity, as in the eyes of your opponent you are representing a strong made hand rather than a draw. Regarding the 7♠-5♠-2♣ flop: also here would I definitely try to get the check-raise in on the turn, or bet all-in on the turn if the money is shallow because of a pot-sized flop bet by my opponent. This would be a spot where I would almost certainly just check-call the flop. Assuming a standard 15BB flop bet, I would check-call. Any eight and especially any four could serve as nice scare cards, and I will try to use them by check-raising the turn for a pot-sized bet to win the pot there and then. Hard for my opponent to call in that spot with just one pair! If I make a flush on the turn, the action will often go check/check, and I might be able to get a little value on the river if my hand is good. This is a spot though where I would never put money in on the turn and river, because even if my opponent has A-A with the bare A♠ this is not a spot where it looks like he could bluff out a small flush — meaning that if on the river he is still active, my 10-high flush will never be good. And if I make the nut straight on the turn with a non-spade six, I will mix it up between betting out small, betting pot to represent a bluff or a blocker play and simply checking with the intention to raise. However, because the six seems like the ultimate straightening card, I expect my opponent to check back often in this spot, yet call my bets fairly liberally. After all, he could view the line “check-call flop and then bet out on the turn after a scare card” as quite suspicious, given that he knows that I think he probably just has a pair of aces, and thus I might not want to bet with a big hand and risk losing him now that he could be drawing dead. One last turn play that I didn’t discuss, but that is very important, is this one. Let’s say that you are in the BB with A♥-6♣-5♣-4♦ with 120BB effective stacks. A weak player has limped on the button, and after the SB has folded, you decide to make your standard 3BB total bet with this bad holding to gain initiative, and to misrepresent your hand. The button calls and now the flop comes Q♥-7♠-3♠. In the 6.5BB total pot, you continuation bet 5BB with your inside wrap, and your opponent calls. Now the turn comes 10♥. Trying to push your opponent off a better hand, you bet 12BB into the 16.5BB pot, only to see your opponent raise to 36BB. Something you don’t like, obviously, as it seems the opponent has a rather big hand, most likely something like 7–7 for a set, but also possible is Q-10-x-x for top two, a big draw being possible though fairly unlikely given his open-limp on the button. Even though you should rarely call turn raises from OOP, you should have a tendency to do this when: ♠ Your opponent thinks you have a different kind of holding than you actually have. (In this case, if you call the raise, he will probably figure you for something like A-K-K-J or a pair + nut flush draw, but not for the 6–5–4 inside wrap with no additional help.) This should allow you to get paid off once your “innocent” card hits. ♠ You have some specific key cards in your hand that make it unlikely that the opponent is pushing a specific draw (in this case, the A♥ meaning he can’t be pushing an ace-high flush draw with some extras), and that could allow you to credibly bluff on the river. So, with these stacks, I would definitely call. But this is not a decision that stands on its own. You should immediately know your game plan for one the river, and recognize profitable situations to either bluff successfully or get paid off when you have the goods. Given the situation after my call (89BB in the pot while having 76BB behind, on this drawheavy board Q♥-7♠-3♠-10♥), this is an excellent situation for me to use the following game plan on the river:

As you can see — lots of analysis and psychology comes into play on the turn, and you will always have to know in advance how your decision on the turn is going to influence your play on the river. (In the example from above, you could see that calling on the turn could be profitable even OOP, and almost strictly on the basis of bluffing rights — as the vast majority of my river bets in this example were hands where I had nothing, and was simply stealing the pot.) The biggest decisions in 6-max play with stacks of 100BB + often take place on the turn, and to a lesser extent the river. (Even though after the decisions on the turn, river play is sometimes automatic — even when there’s still significant money to be played.) A mistake on the turn can cost the entire stack, and therefore it is imperative to get into the opponent’s head and be very creative. If you are good at this, and you can confuse him often enough, you might induce fatal errors in the truly big pots — like make him fold when he should call, and call when he should fold. Just one mistake he may make could be the difference between a winning session or a losing session for either one of you — just showing the importance of correct turn play in shorthanded PLO.

Playing the river As can be seen from the extensive example hand from above, river play should be a logical consequence from the decisions earlier in the hand. I always try to think in advance how much I will value-bet, how much I will bluff-bet (against some players, I will keep these two bets the same size, but against people who tend to pay off big bets I will value bet bigger yet make my bluff bets smaller), and with which river cards I would check or bet. Against most players, I will bet the same size and use the same time to make my decisions, in order not to give away any timing tells. But against players that I know very well I will make it a mental game. I will use our past history and try to get inside their heads to see: ♠ What kinds of bets they tend to view as suspicious (allowing me to get paid off bigger than usual if I have a good made hand). ♠ What types of bets would seem natural in their eyes (allowing me to pull off a successful bluff by using that type of bet). ♠ What kind of timing tells they might look for. (Some players tend to respect pot-sized insta-bets or big, funny bets like $777 into a $915 pot. Others view them as weak or suspicious, and instead tend to give so much more respect to slow, smaller and even-numbered bets like $400 or $500 that scream “I am value-betting”.) Of course, the same kind of reasoning applies when it is your opponent who bets. Play on the river is a psychological battle. You have to know how he is thinking, so you can use this against him. What is your present history? What has been the pattern of his bluffs in the past — were these bets bigger and faster than usual, or was there no difference? Is he the type of player to value bet with marginal hands, or is he more likely to just check them in order to induce a bluff? If my opponent makes what looks like a stop bet, will be always fold to a big raise or will he sometimes look you up? What has his play up to now suggested, and is therefore any river bet by him believable now that a draw has been completed? Would he have played the hand this way if he really had what he is representing? These are some of the most important things for you to take into account on the river. As play is so personal and circumstantial factors play such a role, you will have to be extremely alert and very creative to see your options quickly, your possibilities and also the downsides of some plays. With the following four general rules as your guideline: ♠ Beware of making bets that will only get called if they lose. ♠ Give enough room to your opponent to make a bluff, but don’t always fall into the pattern of “checking when you have a marginal made hand, while betting with only big hands or bluffs”. Especially being first to speak, an excellent way to play a hand like top two pair on the river is by making a small bet of, say, 15–25% of the pot that screams “stop bet”, and that actually could induce a bluff raise from someone who would not have gone for it had you checked (as in that case, the bluff would have been too obvious). ♠ Try to distinguish the player who “fears big bets, yet tends to call small bets liberally” from the one who “doesn’t like being milked and thus tends to fold against small bets, while being highly suspicious of big bets that he often sees as busted draws”. Of course, after analyzing to which category a player belongs, it should be obvious how to exploit him. ♠ Tend to make standard-sized bets against good players (so they cannot exploit you very easily), while actually varying the size of your bets and raises plus the speed of your actions against the weaker players who could interpret them in the wrong manner or could be lured into making the wrong decisions.

Anyway, that’s about it for this extensive chapter on postflop play. One thing to keep in mind is that in contrast to the full-ring play from my previous book, 6-max play tends to be much more loose-aggressive. While in full-ring play, a lot of nut peddling was going on and thus the bettor would often get respect for having the hand that he was trying to represent, this is not the case in 6-max — at least, not to the same degree. Here, you will find many overaggressive players who are constantly making moves and trying to push you off a hand. As you will be doing the same, pots often get much bigger than one would expect, looking at the quality of the hands. Keep in mind that bluffs are more likely to get called, and that typical “sucker hands” in full-ring play like the king-or queen-high flush go way up in value. Because people tend to call you much more liberally, you can often start valuebetting relatively marginal hands on the river like the queen high flush, the third nut straight or even top two pair, and expect to get called by people who are eager to snap off your bluffs and catch you with the bare ace or the blockers.

Some final tips If you play the way I recommend, then you will almost always come from behind when playing a short stack (waiting for a bet or raise by another player before revealing your strength), while in big-stack play you will usually have the initiative throughout the hand. When you are in control of the betting, it is imperative to analyze properly the response by your opponents. A few quick, but important pointers: A quick call on a rather ill-coordinated flop Often an indication of someone trying to represent a bigger hand than he has. More often than not, these quick calls are indicative of someone floating a weak or marginal hand, hoping that you will check on the turn so that he can take away the pot from you. (With big hands like a set, many players will be doing a bit of “Hollywooding” before making the call, trying to feign weakness.) At the highest stakes and among top players, this tell is often reversed: the suspicious quick call turning out to be an actual monster. A slow call (using up almost the entire time bank) on a rather drawheavy flop Often an indication of someone who has a made hand that he thinks is best, yet that on this drawheavy board doesn’t necessarily want to play a big pot on the flop. However, what he does want is that if you have a draw or a weaker made hand, you will bet again after a blank on the turn, so he can then raise you and protect his (probably vulnerable) made hand with just one card to come rather than two. So, the pause on the flop was intended to give the bettor the feeling of being very close to a fold, in order to give the bettor a false sense of security and pave the way for the scenario above. Note that players who make this slow call will usually have a good made hand like top two pair or a small set, but not a weak made hand — and not a great one either. With a really strong one like top set, they would probably have just raised on this drawheavy flop, while with weak made hands like top/bottom pair or even bottom two, they would probably have called more quickly to represent strength — preferring to play just a small or medium-sized pot with this marginal holding, and definitely not wanting his opponent to bet again on the turn. A quick, pot-sized raise on a drawheavy flop This is almost always a premium hand. Especially in multiway pots, this tends to be an indication of someone who is willing to play for his entire stack. Very often, you will face top set here, or a premium draw like nut flush draw plus straight draw. With a hand like bottom set or top two no extras on a flop like Q♥-8♦-5♦, I would usually expect to be either about even money with two cards to come, or a huge dog. Given the exact characteristics of the opponents, the psychology of the situation and the depth of the money, I would often fold, or flatcall with the intention of only continuing any further in the hand after a blank on the turn. Only on very rare occasions would I be willing to play for stacks on the flop with just bottom set, facing this quick pot raise. In fact, if I were seated behind this betting sequence “serious earlyposition bet/quick pot-sized raise from the leftside neighbor”, with nothing invested I would almost always fold a set of fives on this flop. And even with a set of eights I would seriously consider mucking, given that this will almost certainly be a hand that I will need to play for stacks, and taking into consideration that I am up against not one, but two players who have shown significant interest in the pot. A minimum check-raise on the flop or turn, followed by a pot-sized bet on a later street (especially the river) This is the classic betting pattern of a weak player who has caught a big flop, and who doesn’t know how to get the most out of his hand. This tell is especially reliable when the board is paired, meaning your opponent may think he has a “lock”. Let’s say that I have made my standard preflop raise with A-A-x-x or K-K-x-x, and in a three-way pot I now get check-raised for the absolute minimum on a flop J-7–7. This is generally the sign of a huge hand, three sevens being the absolute minimum. (Only at the higher stakes and among the better players will you find players who are creative enough to just represent a big hand with this betting pattern.) Especially when this minimum check-raise is followed by a large bet on the next street, this is about always the sign of someone who first tried to lure you into the pot calmly through a minimum raise, yet who now has gotten too greedy and pulls the trigger too soon or too obviously. Expect them to be in there with specifically J-J, or else J-7. Players who fit this description are likely to slowplay quad sevens in that spot by checking-and-calling, and with just one seven in their hand, they would have been more likely to go for a pot-sized check-raise rather than a minimum one. In other words: you should use this obvious betting pattern that especially weak players portray by losing the minimum when you’re clearly beat. (Meaning you will simply fold on the flop, or if you do call the minimum check-raise, at least you should not put any more money in the pot unless you specifically make top full.) And if you know your opponent really well, you could even use this betting pattern of his one step further. Any time he now pot raises you on this flop J-7–7, you will know that you are usually not facing a completed full house — and you could use this to your advantage in a very risky manner. If this weak player truly respects you, you could take this situation to represent top full of your own (through either a flop reraise or, better, by flatcalling the raise and then delaying your actions until the turn or river). The big danger of course is that the weak player will overestimate his holding here, and simply won’t be capable of folding a hand like three sevens no matter how much you bet. So, use this last play sparingly, and only against the right opponents. Type of bets/buttons that are being used Whether your opponent is always simply using the “bet pot” button, or if his betting amount is one that he must have deliberately chosen, is highly relevant in trying to ascertain his strength. Pay special attention to someone who consistently, yet very quickly, bets amounts that are not exactly full pot or half pot, and that almost certainly cannot come from clicking any of the betting tabs that the site offers. This would be an indication of someone using Auto Hot Keys 8, a program that makes it very easy to for instance always bet two-thirds or threequarters of the pot — exactly the types of bets that offer a good risk-reward ratio to pick up pots. Players who use this program have a tendency to bet or raise on light values, and in general are trickier than those who don’t bother to use it. So, you should tend to give players who use auto hot keys considerably more action that you would against a normal player who has made a similar-sized less than pot bet. Also, if you are playing at a site that has both pot-bet and half-pot-bet buttons and you are up against someone who regularly uses them, you should know that if he doesn’t use them this time, he will probably have what we call a polarized range. If he takes his time to find the

proper betting amount rather than the simple one-click (half) pot bet that he normally makes, this means that almost certainly he will either have a monster looking for action or is flat out bluffing — and feels that his betting size needs to portray more strength than for instance a half-pot bet would. (In other words: he will rarely have an in-between hand.) If in this case your opponent would bet a flat $80 or $100 into a $134 pot, expect him to show you a monster. However, if instead he would bet an odd amount like $109 or $115 (especially bet amounts with high number at the ends, rather than the fairly harmless $111), expect him to be bluffing a significant percentage of the time.

5 Some may think that by making a minbet from late position, I am significantly increasing the chance of getting check-raised as opposed to a situation where I would make a more normal bet. But this is not necessarily the case. After all, my opponent knows that if I bet the minimum, his check-raises account to a much smaller percentage of my stack, meaning that I could call more liberally, I would get better implied odds given the depth of the money and my position, and he could thus face a lot of unpleasant situations on the turn. So, with a hand like top/bottom pair on a drawheavy board, he could actually be inclined to check-raise more frequently to a standard bet (where he could simply check-raise enough to make turn play a formality) than to a minimum bet — even though conventional wisdom would suggest otherwise. 6 From the perspective of the shortstacked player: he would be investing $220 to win a pot that already contained $190 from preflop action, that will probably have two times $110 dead money, plus also the $220 from me that will go into the pot after I have come over the top and the others have folded. To sum up: he will be investing $220 in a total pot of $850 (or, in mathematically correct terms, risk $220 in order to win $630), and in that situation he would need only 25.88% pot equity to break even on the hand. Clearly, in this situaion where I could be betting and reraising lightly and could even be pushing a draw, the short- stacked player can make this play in a profitable manner with a very wide range, including mediocre made hands, marginal draws and especially seemingly weak combination hands like one pair + gutshot + two backdoor flushes. In that spot, the shortstacker will probably make a bit of money in the long run, and you will make a lot — both at the expense of the two callers in the middle and the large amounts of dead money. 7 With effective stacks of less than 100BB, I would often go for the combo “donk bet flop and then check-raise turn” in single-raised pots, as it could take away all of my opponent’s implied odds, positional advantage etc. And just as importantly, if you make this check-raise all-in on the turn as a semi-bluff sometimes — pushing a draw — you should often succeed in making your opponent fold the current best hand. (Of course, especially his marginal made hands.) 8 Tracker, Poker Ace HUD or the AHK program, simply because they were not supported by the site of my sponsor. (And thus, I was unable to use them for the shorthanded game that I was rather new at.) Of course, as has clearly been shown by both Secrets of Professional Pot-Limit Omaha and Hold’em on the Come, which I have co-written, I am very fond of math and statistics. It is my intention to make a third and (probably) last book on PLO book that is strictly about this subject: math, statistics, calculations and recommendations for the correct use of software programs like Poker Tracker + Poker Ace HUD or Omaha Manager which was released just after the script for this book was completed. I want to do this together with someone who is an absolute math geek and who loves analyzing stats and programs in depth. Those who feel that they have interesting ideas, or (better) a completed script for optimal stats-driven PLO, can contact me through my site www.rolfslotboom.com — and who knows, you may find yourself on the cover as co-author of Secrets of Statistics in Pot-Limit Omaha.

Chapter Four

Player-specific Strategies

Exploiting weaknesses; maintaining an edge In my first PLO book, a significant portion of my advice dealt with how to play my own hand. Especially in my shortstack approach, the only real exploitation of weaknesses in my opponents was taking advantage of some of their (too) loose-aggressive tendencies. For the rest, most of my edge was gained by the short stack that I had, the dead money in the pot, the possibility of protection, and the most basic thing of all, the quality of my starting hand. Of course, in deep-money play and especially in shorthanded deep-money play, the key to success is recognizing patterns in the opposition, and taking advantage of specific weaknesses that they may have. In the last section of the previous chapter, I analyzed a few common betting patterns your opponents may exhibit, and that could give away whether they are strong or not — and as a result, whether they can be bluffed, whether one can make a successful value bet against them, and so on. The key to analyzing weaknesses is to take a close look at the specific characteristics of every individual player. For instance, in the eight or nine months that I played exclusively at T-6, one of the regular players had some clear giveaways that I could exploit. Every time he would bet the pot at an all-suited flop (say, a flop with three hearts), he would be in there with the bare ace. Yet with an ace-high flush in that same spot, he would bet significantly smaller to not lose his market, and with a non-nut flush he had a tendency to just check in order to induce a bluff or to get value out of the hand on the later streets. But with the bare ace, he would come out swinging with pot-sized bets and raises — a betting pattern that he maintained until the very last day of the site’s existence. This was a tell “as pure as the driven snow”, as T.J. Cloutier would call it, and playing a big stack it was one that could pay huge dividends. While most players who find out a giveaway like this want to exploit it at every opportunity, when it’s one of my regular opponents whom I face daily, I tend to take advantage of tells this blatant only in the very big pots. Especially if I had a non-nut flush in an unraised pot with people still to act after me, I would often fold against his pot bet — sometimes after some deliberation or using the “Time” button, so I could give my opponent the feeling that he had fooled me. Also with other tells that I had witnessed in some players, I sometimes let them get away with it in pots that were small, where the tell was not 100% clear-cut, or where there were players behind me still to act. By letting my opponents feel that their giveaway had gone unnoticed, I might give them the positive reinforcement — at least against me — to continue to use their obvious pattern of play. Heck, in small pots I would even make a small payoff occasionally with what I knew was probably the worse hand, and even by folding a what looked probable winner in a small heads-up pot, in order to: ♠ Continue to make them play in highly predictable patterns. ♠ Use my advantage in the most crucial pots. Yet, because I still would be wrong on occasions, my opponents would not get suspicious and/or start plugging their leak. As I was playing at the site every day, a site with a small core base of regular players, it was imperative that I would not use all my reads on them to the full. Especially in the heads-up games, I knew I had to take my foot of the gas at times. After all, in heads up you rarely find a player who will willingly play you daily if he is clearly lacking in ability. So, especially after a big pot or a very good read, it was important for me not to push things too far — better to lose back a little money in what seems like an almost even game, than to outplay someone so clearly that he will never return. This was especially important for me, as there were at least two and possibly three better heads-up players than me who also played day in, day out — and I needed to make sure that I would not lose the customers that I had an edge over. Because then, I would have needed to fulfill the obligations from my contract playing heads up against better opponents — and this didn’t exactly look like the prospect I had in mind. In this chapter, I will describe the overall playing patterns of a few opponents that I faced every day at the site. Assuming that you have never played there (and most readers won’t, as the site didn’t allow any Americans), the actual names of the players won’t ring a bell. The fact is — they are not important. What I am trying to show here is simply how I had analyzed the situation, playing shorthanded PLO that was a relatively new game to me at the time, and trying to find exploitable mistakes in the opposition9. It may not be directly helpful to your game — but I believe that for some readers there will be a lot of value in seeing how I have held my own under the circumstances described. So, consider this no more than just a mere example of how one could do things — it is my no means intended to as some kind of definitive set of rules on exploiting weaknesses.

Player 1: T-6 Andreas A key aspect to my game has always been to identify specific weaknesses in every player, and if by chance I couldn’t identify or exploit any, I would try to avoid this player as much as possible. T-6 Andreas fitted into that profile, or to be more accurate, he fitted into that profile for the very short games, and especially heads up. Being a somewhat overaggressive player with a decent hand-reading ability, he definitely had a slight edge over me when the games got really short. Especially the first few months on the site, he was simply a much better heads-up player than me. In five-or six-handed games, I liked being up against him though, as his play had some unusual yet exploitable patterns: ♠ His pot bets were almost always a sign of strength, and often were top set or a premium draw, in contrast to the two-thirds pot bets that were done with a slightly wider range. Especially his quick pot-sized raises were top set much more often than one would expect from a slightly overaggressive player. ♠ He had the strange betting pattern of playing top full and even quads incredibly fast. One time, he even bet full pot into me (the flop raiser) when the turn had given him quad 10s! I happened to have made a straight flush on that hand and would have gotten his stack regardless of how he played it. But calling a raise OOP on a flop J♦-10♥-8♦ with 10–10, to then bet full pot into this flop raiser after the turn 10♦… well, that is a quite remarkable way to play quads. ♠ Lots of marginal check-raises on the flop, especially against continuation bets from preflop raisers. ♠ Even in six-handed play, he would sometimes call three barrels with a non-nut flush, almost regardless of the size of the bets. Having analyzed these patterns, it was now time for me to try to exploit them. I did this by making the following adjustments: ♠ Refuse to play him heads up, unless to start up a new six-handed table. ♠ Be less scared of his check on paired boards — as with a full house or even quads, he had a tendency to come out firing. In other words: paired boards in position after a check by him tended to be excellent bluffing opportunities — where a bet of just half the pot or even less would usually be enough to pick up the pot. ♠ Because of his tendency to check-raise marginal holdings against any continuation bets in three-or four-way pots, I started checking back many hands on the flop that would have to fold against a check-raise, yet that could still have quite a bit of showdown value. For instance, hands like an open-ended straight draw on a board with two of a suit (six nut outs), or hands like middle pair + kickers + gutshot straight draw. Especially by checking back decent draws, I could expect to get excessive action on the turn once I would have hit my draw, as people don’t expect a preflop raiser to check back an open-ended straight draw in position. Of course, in heads-up play where the pots are smaller and thus I wouldn’t automatically need to lay down against a check-raise, I would still continuation bet a significant percentage of the time, even with the types of hands mentioned. ♠ On all-suited boards, my general strategy had always been to be aggressive on the flop with either the nut flush, the bare ace, a set or an occasional bluff — while playing my K-and Q-high flushes a lot less aggressively. This meant that a relatively high number of flop bets by me on these types of flops would be bluffs or semi-bluffs. (Like when I would be betting my set, hoping to make small flushes fold yet still having outs if called. Especially if accompanied by the bare ace, I tended to play these hands extra aggressively, as I would now know for a fact that no one could be in there with the current nuts.) In other words: only a relatively small percentage of my bets and raises on these flops would be the hand that I was trying to represent: the nut flush. And although other players had not yet noticed this, as Andreas and I played each other almost daily, he had noticed this, and thus started to call me down with non-nut flushes — sometimes even on all three streets. Of course, once I had seen the changes in his play, it was time for me to start making some adjustments: ♠a) Once he would call me on the flop when I had the bare ace, just give up — no more bets would go in. ♠b) Once he would call me on the flop when I had a set, I would check back on the turn in order to make my full house on the river and maybe get paid off. (When out of position, I would tend to make a relatively small stop bet on the turn, to avoid facing a bigger bet by Andreas that I could not call. Given that with non-nut flushes he liked to call rather than raise, this was a play that I could sometimes get away with.) However, those times when I had a set and the bare ace, I would still continue with a rather big bet on the turn, say around 60–70% of the pot. This served two purposes. First, it would give Andreas the positive reinforcement to keep calling me down with non-nut flushes, knowing I could still be betting the bare ace. (Even though obviously, I would simply check back on the river with a set + the bare ace, and would only fire a big bet with a full house or better. However, those times when I did not improve, he would see my bare ace and think: “See, I had him again with his naked ace — my turn call was good.”) And the second purpose was perhaps even more important: my 60–70% pot bet on the turn would make the pot 2.2 to 2.4 times as large, meaning that if would make my full on the river, I could now value-bet much bigger than I would if I had simply checked back the turn. ♠c) Once he would call me on the flop when I in fact did have the nut flush, I would continue to make substantial bets on the turn and river, usually about two-thirds of the pot. Say, the same kind of bets that I might make against other players if I was bluffing with the bare ace.

Player 2: T-6 Henrik Another winning regular at the site was T-6 Henrik. However, in contrast to Andreas, he was more the prototype of the “typical grinder”. He would rarely be playing a big pot without a big hand, and would surrender in the small-and medium-sized pot much earlier than most other players. Combined with the fact that he respected my play a lot, I made the following adjustments: ♠ As Henrik showed a willingness to quickly give up, playing a strategy that closely resembled “fit or fold”, I could pick up lots of small pots on the flop with just moderate-sized bets. While against most players, I would usually bet two-thirds or three-quarters of the pot, when I was heads up with Henrik I would usually bet just half pot. In fact, against scary boards and either/or boards like A-A-Q or K-K-7, I would often bet much smaller that that, and with success. Assuming that I also checked back to give up a pot every now and then, I could steal more than my fair share of pots for a minimal investment — as he would check-raise only when he really had the goods. ♠ Of course, if Henrik would just show any kind of interest on no-draws flops like A-A-Q by betting, check-calling or check-raising, I would instantly give up. However, as time progressed, Henrik started (check-)calling on the flop a bit more liberally, having noticed I seemed to be picking up a bit more pots than I was entitled to. This meant that slowly but surely, the key of our pots together would be the play on the turn. If my half-pot (or a bit less than that) flop bet would get called, I would still just give up on the turn a fairly large percentage of the time. But maybe just 35% or 40% of the time, I would now fire a second half-pot barrel on those either/or boards, even with total air sometimes. Perhaps even more importantly, on drawheavy boards where on the turn the draw had not yet been completed, I would almost always fire a no-frills, two-thirds or three-quarters pot bet. I could profitably make this play even with drawing hands of my own, as Henrik was not the type of player to use the turn to make a move, like raising with a draw to represent a made hand. In other words: there was not much danger that by being a bit too aggressive on the turn I could bet myself out of the pot, and as he would often give up even his rather decent draws at this stage, there was a lot of value in taking an aggressive posture. Let’s say I had A-A-9–7, heads up and in position on a flop J8–4 rainbow. (In a situation where I have raised preflop, and have had Henrik check-call my standard 50% pot bet on the flop.) Now, let’s say that the turn was an offsuit king — a card that did not help me at all, yet that could easily have helped me in the eyes of my opponent. (Given my preflop raise, it could easily have given me top two pair or even top set.) Against tricky or highly aggressive players, this would be a situation where I might check back on the turn, given that I had a combination of a relatively weak made hand and a relatively weak draw, and even more so because of the likelihood of getting check-raised off my hand by what could very well be just a semi-bluff. But against Henrik, this king was actually an excellent card to fire again. With a hand like 10–9-x-x or even 10–9–7-x, he would hate this king as some of his straight outs were now not nut cards anymore, and could actually cost him his entire stack if he would hit. And with a hand as strong as J-8-x-x, this king on the turn had started to make this top two pair from the flop look a little bit bleak. He could very well be drawing very thin now (against K-J-x-x) or even entirely dead (against K-K-x-x) — and all of this is assuming that on the flop, his top two pair was actually the best hand. All in all, this would be a situation where a player like Henrik could often be induced to check-fold either the current best hand or a very live draw, not wanting to play a big pot OOP with a non-nut and potential trouble hand. ♠ While against most players I was quite reluctant to play pots from out of position, against Henrik I didn’t mind so much. Even first in as the small blind I had a tendency to raise him liberally, in contrast to the very tight folds I would make in this spot against good LAPs. The reason was simple: Henrik would not reraise or take over the initiative very often, meaning I could pick up the vast majority of the pots either on the flop or turn, without a showdown and almost regardless of my cards. In fact, given that Henrik indeed check-raised only rarely yet had the nasty habit to bet into me on the flop a bit more than I liked, being out of position against him actually gave me “the right to first bluff”. ♠ Not only did I take advantage of him folding too often on the flop or turn, another advantage was that in those rare cases where he had called both the flop and the turn, he would almost never fold on the river anymore, regardless of how big the bet was (unless of course he had a busted draw). So, in addition to stealing all those small pots, I could also secure myself of a huge payday those rare times that we would be on the river together, and I happened to have a really big hand. While against other players, both my bluffs my value bets would be rather standard, something like 60–70% of the pot and sometimes even significantly less, against Henrik the value-bets with my big hands would almost always be close to pot-sized. In addition, of course I rarely if ever bluffed on the river against him, except if there was a slight chance that he might have a busted draw (in which case I might make a small 30% bet or so if I couldn’t even beat these acehigh/one-pair busted draws). But on boards that had a pair or the possibility for completed straights or flushes, where the river card had not changed a thing, well in that spot I obviously never bluffed — simply because I knew he would reason “If I call twice, I will also have to make the third call”. ♠ And one of the most important characteristics for many players, also happened to count for Henrik: he would usually start out his sessions very tight, but after losing two or three decent-sized pots, his game would open up considerably. Especially after losing a big pot against me, he would start becoming a lot more aggressive — in which case I would instantly quit all of my strategies from above. In contrast to what was my standard game plan against him, I would now start to check my big draws to him, hoping he would bet on marginal values so I could make him fold to my check-raise. And with a really big hand, I would simply bet into him for bigger amounts than I usually would, even if he was the preflop raiser. In contrast to his usual behavior, he would now call and even raise these bets liberally, and he would especially start to overplay big overpairs with not much extras on flops where in his view I could be semi-bluffing. While under normal circumstances I would happily fold hands like bottom set if he would make just one single flop raise, in this situation where my opponent could overplay holdings as weak as top two pair or even top/bottom pair, bottom set now became a reraising hand. So, even though Henrik was a winning player who would steam just a very small percentage of the time, whenever he did I immediately switched my game to take maximum advantage of it.

Player 3: T-6 Anders T-6 Anders is another one of the sponsored players, and someone who — just like me — is often labeled “very tight” and sometimes even “weaktight”. As is the case with me, this label is not always correct, because Anders does have a little gamble to him. However, when playing at a crazy table, he was one of the few players to realize that playing a bit of a waiting game is not so bad, knowing he would get excessive action on his big hands anyway. When the site had just started up, there would always be multiple games with lots of action, and almost always at full tables — “full” obviously meaning six-handed (as the site had only 6-max and heads up games). In this situation, we didn’t tangle much. I didn’t have to use any special tactics against him because we would both be waiting for big hands mostly. I would usually fold all marginal hands after the flop whenever he showed any interest, and he would do the same whenever I got involved — simple as that. However, as time progressed, six-handed play was not so automatic anymore; more often than not, play would be five-or even four-handed. In other words: both of us slowly started opening up our games, where Anders became a bit more active preflop and on the flop, and I even started working towards a truly loose-aggressive approach. When he started playing heads up and three-handed regularly, I finally saw two exploitable weaknesses in what I viewed as an otherwise strong game. The first was a rather obvious one: he would give away A-A-x-x a bit too early in the hand, with a lot of money behind. Slowly but surely, he indeed started adding hands to his three-or four-bet range to make the aces less obvious, but rather than adding double-suited small and medium rundowns, he added hands like K-K-x-x and four big cards to this range. In other words: it now became profitable for me to sometimes come over the top (four-or five-bet) with double-suited small and medium rundowns, knowing he would often lay down hands like A-K-Q-J or A-K-Q-Q, especially if they had no suits to it or just one suit. And his only real through ticket to play for all his chips, A-A-x-x… well, against that hand I would be just a tiny underdog, and would hardly lose any money by making the risky play that I did. I also identified another leak: in shorthanded pots with 100BB + stacks, he would check-raise the preflop raiser (usually me) often with hands like bottom set with no back-up, top two pair and even top/bottom pair with not a lot of extras — and if he would then get reraised, he would almost always be willing to play for his entire stack (probably thinking that he was already in too deep to fold now, or because he thought the opponent might be pushing a draw). In the beginning, Anders won quite a few huge pots against me when in this spot I decided to come over the top with a drawing hand — in order to represent a better made hand than the one that I read him for. Also, I lost too many small pots where I continuation bet too liberally with a marginal made hand, a marginal draw or a combination of the two, only to see myself get check-raised off hands that could either be the best hand right now, or else become the best hand on a later street. So, I started making the following adjustments when I was facing Anders: ♠ Not come over the top anymore with a draw in the situation I described — because if my read of him having a good-but-not-great made hand, he would not lay it down. As there was almost no fold equity in that spot, better options could be to fold (when I had a weak draw) or call (with the intention of maybe semi-bluffing the turn or river after a scare card, or getting paid off once I would hit, yet save myself money if the board would pair.) ♠ Check back on the flop more often, and especially avoid continuation bets with marginal hands that could have some value, but that could not stand a check-raise. Obviously, I would still bet out both my big hands and my bluffs. ♠ After I had checked back the flop, sometimes call the turn liberally or even bluff raise if Anders would bet this turn. Just like his fellow countryman T-6 Mats (who will follow next), Anders developed a tendency to automatically bet the pot on the turn after the preflop raiser checked back the flop. I would tend to call these bets lightly. Especially when in position, I could then use the river to gauge more information about my opponent’s strength. I could sometimes use a scary river to bluff, and if the river card wouldn’t change much I would often be able to snap off a bluff, sometimes with hands as weak as bottom two pair or an unimproved overpair. Especially with a hand like an unimproved A-A-x-x, I would sometimes check back on raggedy flops heads up especially against Mats and Anders. This way, they couldn’t check-raise me off my hand, but just as importantly they would almost certainly respond to my flop check by betting the pot into me on the turn — almost regardless of whether they had me crushed or were (semi-)bluffing. Especially after a blank on the river and no real completed draw, I would sometimes call with an unimproved A-A in this spot. After all, given the betting I assumed a highly polarized range here, consisting of many bluffs, a fair amount of rather big hands, but not a lot of exactly those hands that I feared the most: those pesky two-pair hands. Given that I had not shown any strength up to that point, my opponent could very well read me for a drawing hand where he might use a blank on the river to check his marginal made hands in order to induce a bluff from a busted hand. Or, if he would value-bet these two-pair hands, it would almost always be relatively small bets, as it seemed unlikely to him that I would have a hand strong enough to call a big bet, yet still weak enough to be worse than his measly two pair. In other words: when my A-A was losing, I would often get discounts or even a free showdown, and when my A-A was good, I would often get the bonus of a large river (bluff) bet. By sometimes (which is far from always!) playing my hand in this supposedly “weak-tight” manner, I yielded much better results than through the automatic play of simply continuation betting the flop — where I would often have to fold against a check-raise, and could not make any more money from lesser hands or bluffs. Once I had incorporated these changes into my game and won a few very big pots, Anders suddenly started viewing me as a lucky player, and would sit out if we were the only two players left in a game. This is contrast to previous months where I would always sit out if we remained heads up — simply because I had not identified any exploitable weaknesses in his game yet, and thus rated myself to be the underdog.

Player 4: T-6 Mats Another good, winning — and sponsored — player at the site was T-6 Mats. Someone that especially in the first couple of months I would avoid. Clearly, he was much more comfortable playing high-stakes shorthanded and heads up than I was. He made enough preflop raises to label him aggressive, yet he would not raise such a high percentage of the time that I could exploit it by limp-reraising. And because he would make pot-sized continuation bet a high percentage of the time but would still check back 20–30% of the time, and especially on flops that could have hit me, he was also not that easy to exploit postflop. Or at least, that’s what I thought back then. Because in time, I was able to recognize some clear patterns: ♠ He would always raise make pot-sized bets and raises both preflop and after the flop, even in situations where because of the texture of the board or the size of his opponents’ stacks, a smaller bet would make sense. ♠ He would bet pot on the turn close to 100% of the time in heads up situations where the preflop raiser had checked back on the flop. (My adjustments: see the section about T-6 Anders.) All in all, not a lot of possible exploitation — as so often when you are facing good players. (They usually have only few exploitable leaks, and even if they have one or two, they are usually quick enough to analyze them as leaks and plug them.) I knew that the key was simply to avoid playing pots against him from out of position. In the first one or two months, I liked having him around because with my short stack he I could exploit his aggressive tendencies. But once I had shifted to my full 100BB buy-ins, he was much harder to beat, and especially OOP the money was a bit too deep to exploit his overaggression by check-raising the flop for instance. If I would do this, I would be risking too much in order to win too little, would risk winning the small pots but losing the big ones, and with lots of money behind I might get outplayed often in this spot. So, I knew that I needed to play from OOP against him on just rare occasions, only with premium hands and/or hands that were coordinated enough to play “fit or fold”. For the rest, I would play against him only in position, and especially for him I incorporated a new tactic into my game: the less than pot-sized reraise with position. As Mats had a tendency to open raise pot on light values from both the cutoff and the hijack, I would often reraise him about 2.4 or 2.5 the size of his initial bet those times that I was seated behind him. Once all others would get out of the way, he would then be in the bad situation of being out of position, against a good player, and having lost the initiative. Quite different from the situation he had probably wanted: raise pot to buy the button, and play in position against one of the weaker players, while having position. Against Mats, this small reraise in position worked remarkably well, for two reasons: ♠ He would rarely come over the top. Had he used a strategy of about 25–30% pot-sized four-bets, with a balanced range that included all AA-x-x hands and also hands like Q-Q-10–10 and big/medium/small double-suited rundown hands, I could never have made this reraise-inposition as profitably and as liberally as I did. ♠ He would tend to play fit-or-fold after the flop in this situation. And this meant that my half-pot to 60% pot bets took down the pot well over 70% of the time — regardless of whether I actually had the best hand. Of course, a key aspect was that in previous months I had always played very tight — and as always when changing styles, it takes your regular opponents a while to adapt. Perhaps just as importantly, Mats knew that I would also make this type of reraise with A-A. If I would try to get tricky in this spot for instance by flatcalling the raise with A-A to go for a second hand low, or if I would get greedy and reraise pot with them, then this would shatter the foundation under this reraise-small-in-position play. Because I had A-A-x-x included in this range, and because this range was balanced enough that it also had enough 9♠-8♥-7♠-5♥ types of holdings in it (that tended to perform well against Mats’ four-bet range that would consist of many A-A-x-x holdings), I could profitably make this play against him. Especially tough for Mats in this spot were hands like K♠-K♣-8♣-3♦ or A♠-K♥Q♥-10♦ not good enough to reraise pot with (considering the depth of the money and my range of hands), yet too strong too meekly call and then play fit-or-fold after the flop. Of course, if you were Mats in this spot, facing someone who would liberally three-bet small in position, then your best decisions could be: ♠ Open raise tighter from the cutoff or hijack — say, those times when I would have good position and thus could be expected to enter pots liberally. Especially fold problem hands like K♦-J♠-8♦-6♦ that tend to perform very badly out of position with the money deep against either a reraise or even just a flatcall. Those times when you do open raise these holdings and face a 2.4 or 2.5 times reraise in your back, just folding may be the best decision rather than call in a situation that has reverse implied odds (because of your bad position and your problem hand, which is unlikely to hit the flop hard). ♠ Tend to flatcall those three-bets when you have a coordinated hand that should be fairly easy to play after the flop, even if it’s just a very low coordinated hand like 6♦-5♣-4♣-3♠. ♠ Tend to reraise pot about 20–30% of the time, depending how liberally your opponent likes to three-bet here. Don’t just reraise with all of your A-A-x-x holdings, but also with lots of double-suited hands, even if they are as weak as J-10–8–6ds, 9–7–6-4ds and A-9–7–6ds. This way, you could force him off a lot of hands (A-A-x-x being just about the only hand he can comfortably play here, but exactly against this holding you will be in fairly decent shape rather often). And if he calls your four-bet when you were over-representing your hand, you should still be OK. Your four-bet could have paved the way for a successful (semi-) bluff on the flop — as your opponent will probably assume that you have a big pair, and thus may fold many hands after the flop where he would have called or raised if he knew what you had. ♠ Those times that you flatcall the three-bet, don’t automatically play fit-or-fold, and don’t automatically check to the raiser either. Try to use tactics that will negate your positional disadvantage to some extent, and that will allow you to pick up some default pots instead of having your opponent pick them up. Good examples could be betting small into your opponent (and if you sense weakness follow this up with a more substantial bet on the turn), and making standard two-thirds pot bets into him with your big hands, your marginal hands and your draws alike (so that you will take the initiative away from him). Some other good examples: occasionally go for the check-raise with both your big hands and your pure bluffs (especially on boards that contain a small pair), or check-call with non-nut made hands that cannot improve easily in situations where the board is not all that drawheavy. And a final play that aggressors dislike a lot: check-call on the flop and then bet into him on the turn, especially on boards that offer the chance of a completed straight. If you find the proper balance here, your opponent will dislike playing with you, and will not use the small-reraise-in-position as liberally as I used it against Mats. And that would obviously good to you, as your opponent could now either fold (giving you position) or just call (giving you the initiative). And both these options are much better than having to deal with this not-easy-to-defend-against small three-bet in position.

Player 5: T-6 Anthony In addition to the four sponsored pros who I already mentioned, there was also a fifth one who would regularly frequent the site. It was T-6 Anthony, someone with a remarkable playing style — especially in cash games. Despite my preflop tightness especially the first couple of months at the site, he would face me with pot-sized three-bets an amazing number of times. The first few times that he reraised me, I still gave him credit for a big hand, but once I noticed that he just loved to reraise, it was time to make some adjustments. I would open a bit tighter when he was still to act, and I would four-bet not just with A-A-x-x but also with all other top 10% hands like all premium pairs or four big cards that figured to be a decent favorite over his three-bet range. It took me a while to figure out that these adjustments of mine were not the correct ones! Having analyzed the many big pots we had played, I found out that his three-bets had a very interesting pattern. His range consisted for a small part of A-A-x-x and some other premium holdings, plus a whole bunch of double-suited small or garbage cards. In other words, his three-bet range consisted of just very few Q-Q-x-x or J-J-x-x hands, nor did it have many A-Q-J-10 or K-Q-J-9 holdings — it was either premium pairs, or double-suited garbage. And against this range, my adjustments from before had clearly been wrong. By adding big pairs and high cards to my range, I would often be in a situation where I was a relatively slight favorite (about 55–60% over his double-suited hands that would almost never include a pair), but sometimes would actually be a tremendous dog (when he had aces, or sometimes even when he had kings). In fact, by making the adjustments I had made, I had in fact made it profitable for him to play the way he did, as even while holding double-suited garbage most of the time, he would almost never be more than just a 40–60% dog against my A♦-K♥K♣-Q♥ types of holdings — while having a bit of implied odds going for him. And including the dead money in these pots, taking into account that he would win many pots uncontested, and knowing he would almost always face a big pair if he got four-bet, his strange strategy wasn’t necessarily a losing one. Once I realized what my opponent was doing, I changed my tactics once more. I would skip many of the A-K-K-x no suits, K-Q-Q-J no suits and A-QQ-2ss hands out of my four-bet range, in favor of double-suited hands like A♥-J♣-8♠-7♣, A♦-9♦-8♣-5♣ and even Q♠-10♥-8♥-7♠ at times. These hands were almost never dominated by Anthony; no they actually dominated his double-suited hands often. Plus, because by four-betting I was basically representing A-A or premium high cards, I would also win quite a few pots after my flop bet when my opponent hadn’t caught sufficient help to outdraw my “announced” big pair. Having about one pot-sized bet left after my four-bet, this was a very good scenario from a risk/reward point of view. Once I incorporated all these changes, I was playing a high-risk game, often putting my 100BB + stack at risk with not more than just a marginal holding. But against his rather peculiar three-bet range, my holdings were almost always a 55%, 60% or even 65% favorite, and I was an underdog on only rare occasions. And those times I was unlucky enough to run into A-A-x-x types of holdings, I would usually still have decent equity because of the suits and the live, middling cards. (The A♥-J♣-8♠-7♣ and A♦-9♦-8♣-5♣ both score just over 38% against random aces, while the Q♠-10♥-8♥-7♠ even has 43.57%.) And given that I would be a 55–70% favorite the vast majority of the time even if my four-bet would get called, this was an excellent way to exploit the overaggression of Anthony, and avoid the postflop problems I would face if I would merely flatcall his three-bets and let him have the initiative — with good position on top of that. That way, he would be able to pick up many pots uncontested with relative garbage. And to prevent that from happening, I had to fight fire with fire, even though it meant playing a risky and highly volatile game. In addition to his overaggression preflop, Anthony also had some interesting postflop characteristics. More than other LAPs, he would tend to respect and fear paired boards. (Meaning that with just a standard half pot of two-thirds pot bet, I could pick up many pots uncontested, and if in fact he was the last raiser before the flop, he would often check back in this spot after the flop, even when heads up. While with most players I would find this check deeply suspicious, with Anthony it usually meant that he just didn’t have much and thus would fold to a bluff bet by me on the turn.) And a final characteristic of his postflop game was that he would almost never fold queen-or jack-high flushes, not even when the money was pretty deep in relation to the pot. If he would call the first barrel, he would almost never release against a second or third one. So, by simply making suspiciouslooking two-thirds or three-quarters pot bets on all streets those times I had the nut flush, I would have an excellent payoff station — someone who expected the nut flush to always be tricky, rather than to make straightforward value bets.

The other players Among the other players at the site, I noticed exploitable weaknesses that were usually even easier to exploit than the relatively few leaks of the pros. These are three of the most pronounced errors: ♠ A bad combination of limping too often, then calling raises too liberally despite being out of position, and finally not check-raising or betting into the raiser often enough after the flop to negate for this bad position. Of course, these are ideal opponents! Against players like this, you should raise or isolate very liberally when in position and be able to pick up many pots. Opponents like this are the bread and butter for every serious deepstacked, shorthanded pro. If you can find players this weak, exploit them relentlessly by isolating them when in position and then pick up pots through much less than pot-sized bets. ♠ Preflop raises that give away the strength of a holding. At the site, there was one player in particular who had the clear giveaway of raising full pot with A-A-x-x and usually also his quality kings, yet raising only the minimum with his more speculative and less robust holdings. Of course, against someone who gives away this much information, you should be willing to call these pot raises liberally, especially when in position with typical snap-off hands like small and medium rundowns, preferably with suits. (For an extensive discussion, see many passages in my previous PLO book.) At the same time, you should be willing to reraise liberally against his minraises. Oftentimes, you will pick up the pot there and then. And if not, you know that after the flop he will probably continue only if his rather speculative hand has received help. Also, especially flops with an ace or a king could be great bluffing opportunities for you, as you could credibly represent the current nuts on flops that are unlikely to have helped the opponent more than just moderately. Obviously, against this type of player you should never reraise his pot raises when you have hands like K-K-x-x or A-K-Q-Q — not once, not ever. What you could do in this spot, provided the money is very deep, is make a small or even minimum reraise in position with hands like J♣-10♦-8♣-7♦ or 9♠-8♥-7♥-5♠ in order to what I call “expose his aces”. If in this spot he has A-A-x-x, he will reraise pot, and being in position with a good snap-off hand and enough money to be played, you’ve got quite a bit of implied odds. And if he doesn’t reraise, you know he doesn’t have aces and you may have paved the way for a successful steal on the flop or turn, especially on flops with an A. (Please note that against strong players, you could not have reached this conclusion, as they are more likely to be trapping, plus they may know what you’re doing and possibly even expect a rundown in this spot.) ♠ Calling one time on the flop, to then fold against a second barrel. One of the keys to successful shorthanded big stack play is to know when to fire a second or third barrel, and when to give up. Many weak players will call one bet with a hand like top pair + gutshot straight draw to then fold against a turn bet unless they improve. Others are stubborn enough to keep calling additional bets with marginal values even on the turn as well, thereby possibly compounding their (too?) loose flop call. It is up to you to analyze for every individual player how likely he is to fold on a later street given his playing tendencies, the texture of the flop, your image, and whether or not the turn card could have improved his hand. It is just as important to analyze if this is a player who could be pushed off a hand through bigger bets, or if he is the type to say: “I am not going to let $20 or $40 extra turn a call into a fold.” Analyze your weak opponents into depth, to see which mistakes they are most likely to make. And as a result, you will have a much better success rate at following through (with a good hand to get paid off from a weaker one, or with a weak hand in order to make a better one fold) versus checking and just giving up.

9

Many of you will want to use software programs like Poker Tracker + Poker Ace HUD for this purpose. I would have done this had the site supported PT/PAHUD. But as this was not the case, I had to do things the old-fashioned way. Regardless of whether you are using software programs, the key to searching exploitable weaknesses is finding deviations from the norm. Not only between players (a higher VP$IP than most, meaning we will voluntarily enter more pots than the opposition, and will simply play “looser”), but also within the overall tendencies of one specific player. (For instance, a higher “Went to Showdown” percentage than one would expect, based on his tightness preflop. This could indicate someone who is strict in starting hand requirements, but who then has trouble releasing his quality hands once they have turned sour.) While these software programs are extremely useful, it is important that every player can directly, and on purpose, manipulate his own stats whenever he wants to. Take for instance my own shortstack strategy where I would rarely if ever make the first bet — computer stats show a much lower aggression factor than the style of my game would suggest, simply because of the formula that is used to calculate this aggression factor. In contrast, the strategy that I use with the larger stack, where I will often make minbets on all streets make my aggression factor much higher — even though given the depth of the money and the size of the pot, these small bets can be considered checks in disguise. So, when using PT/PAHUD, use them as a guideline only, and stay focused on every players’ individual characteristics or weaknesses that may not always get portrayed fully in the stats. (A thorough explanation of the most important PT stats can be found in the appendix of this book.)

Chapter Five

Advanced Plays, Tricks and Moves

One of the key aspects to successful shorthanded play is to avoid playing in predictable and exploitable patterns. In this chapter, I will discuss a few measures to ensure that you cannot be exploited that easily by the better players. Most of this analysis is done from the framework of my own play, including the inherent weaknesses that stem from the strategies that I am using. So, by no means do I expect that these same countermeasures or advanced plays are needed in your game too — as your game’s weaknesses may lie elsewhere.

The delayed bluff/float If you play according to my big stack shorthanded approach, you will try to be in control of the betting at all times. However, as your opponents will probably be trying to achieve the same, there are a large number of situations where you have to respond to your opponent’s actions. Let’s say that two of you are heads up. You are on the button, having flat-called a preflop raise by the under the gun player, with 100BB effective stacks. The flop comes 8–4–4 rainbow, and you have 7–6–5–3 single-suited (a hand that with deep money and position I would definitely have reraised with, but let’s say for the purposes of this example that you have just called). Your opponent fires a two-thirds pot bet, with what very much looks like a big pair (J-J-A-A), with a decent chance of a standard continuation bet with even less than that (say, just ace-high) and a slight chance of an absolute monster like 8–8-x-x. (Slight, because with top full not many players would come out making such a big bet with a hand that’s clearly looking for action.) In this spot, many players would automatically raise with their inside wrap to bet the preflop raiser off his holding, while usually still having up to nine outs if called. However, this is not always the best option — in fact, it is rarely the best option. What you should do here is look at your hand through the eyes of your opponent and how in his view you would have played the hand if you really had the big hand that you are now representing. Your opponent knows that if on this board you’ve got a hand better than kings up or aces up, you are probably not all that worried about getting outdrawn. Your opponent knows that you know that in all likelihood he has not raised UTG with a four in his hand, and that a more likely hand for him to have is just a big pocket pair that he is trying to protect. In other words, he knows that if you have him beat, he probably has two outs only — and thus you may not be all that eager to take the initiative away from him or try to make him fold. He knows that most opponents with 4–4 for quads or 8–8/8–4 for a full house would be happy to just call here, hoping that he will fire at least one more time — or, if he checks, will still call at least one more bet. What’s more, he also knows that even with hands like 7–6–6–4 (three fours/no kicker) or even A4-x-x (three fours/top kicker) you now have a very high probability of being best, you still might not want to build a huge pot on the flop. Given the depth of the money, you realize that if all the money goes in, you are almost certainly trailing, whereas if you raise here you will often induce folds from exactly those hands that you want to keep in. So, as your opponent knows that on this type of board you would often flatcall with three fours of better, and given that you can actually have hit this three fours or better just a rather small percentage of the time, he might view a flop raise with suspicion. There’s a good chance that he might plan to go all the way with just K-K or A-A here, simply because he “just doesn’t buy it”. In fact, if your opponent is a good player, he could three-bet here even with total air, knowing that given the betting it is unlikely that you have a hand that can comfortably play for stacks. And this means that a semibluff raise with your (probably) nine-outer may have some clear drawbacks. Therefore, you should usually not raise in this spot; I would prefer a call most of the time. Given this board that looks perfect for slowplaying a big hand, your opponent will definitely fear a call those times when he only has a big wired pair like queens, kings or aces — and if he has a weaker hand than that he will like this call even less. What he may do on the turn

Option 1 Fire a second barrel to show that he is serious about winning this pot. This way, he may get rid of the marginal hands like medium pairs or draws (say, the hand that you have) that were good enough to call one barrel, but not two. Betting a second time will allow him to get a better feel as to where he’s at — or at least, that’s what he might think. Almost certainly will he fold any of his marginal hands if you choose to raise here, simply because he would expect you to possibly bluff or semi-bluff on the flop — rather than on the turn, after two bets by him.

Option 2 Simply check, to see what you will do. This is usually done with hands of medium strength like the A-A/K-K/Q-Q mentioned. The goals: make you bet a lesser hand, give room for a possible float, avoid losing too much when his big pair is no good. The intention: check-calling any moderate-sized bets on the turn, to then re-evaluate on the river. Assuming that this is the way your opponent thinks, it is imperative that you use this logic against him! These are some good ways to counter or exploit his thinking.

Response to option 1 Assuming a card arrives on the turn that is unlikely to have given him a full house (yet that also hasn’t helped you), this may seem like a good spot to raise him — as he will fold often here. However, the problem is that it is very expensive if it fails and, especially, if your opponent has made a hand on the turn like overpair plus flush draw or overpair plus open-ender, he may say: “Ah well, what the hell, let’s gamble and stick it in. If he has me beat, he has me beat — so be it, I will still have outs.” Yet if he makes this play he will have raised you off a hand that could have had up to nine outs to improve! Plus, the size of your raise on the turn may give away tremendous information. Three times his bet may look too scared, and just doubling his bet may entice him to stay in because of the good price. (If I would raise in this spot as a semi-bluff, it would probably be around 2.3 or 2.4 times the initial bet.) An option that I like a bit better is simply flatcall one more time on the turn. Especially if the turn card hasn’t produced a flush draw and thus you are unlikely to have picked up any additional outs in case you were drawing, this second call will definitely ring alarm bells in your opponent’s head. After all, assuming he sees you as a good player, two flatcalls on a paired board with no apparent draws will make him think there’s a very good chance that you are holding a very big hand, perhaps with an outside chance that you have taken a passive line with A-A-x-x or K-K-x-x. Assuming he doesn’t have a four and doesn’t get any help on the river, he will probably check, and expect you to simply check back any big pairs that you might have — hands that are good as a bluff catcher, but definitely not ones to value-bet with. This means that if you do bet now, all from your opponent’s assumption that you would probably have dumped a draw against his turn bet, there is basically no way you can be bluffing and thus must be betting for value here. A few things that are important here. First, at the most basic level, it could seem that with a big pair, your opponent would have a good bluff-catcher on the river. Assuming that the river is a blank that has not completed any apparent draws, a typical way to play a marginal hand like kings or aces up would be to check-call on the river to snap off a bluff. However, as this opponent is thinking on a higher level, he knows that you are unlikely to chase a draw on both the flop and turn when the board is paired — even more so because 7–6–5-x happens to be the only draw available. Basically, what his bet on the turn suggested (assuming the read of him having a big pair was right) was a last attempt to take down the pot, where in case of a call he would only put any more chips into the pot if he would actually improve to top full. In other words: an ideal situation for you to go for the delayed bluff — where if a blank comes on the river you will make a standard 50–60% pot bet to take it down. (And if you are really creative, maybe make an even smaller bet if you have actually improved to a straight on the river. If you make a bet between one-fifth and one-third of the pot, then this may definitely look like a milking bet to him, and he will

know that given the board there is hardly a hand he can still beat. But the bet being so small, and check-folding to such a small bet looking not just weak but also being bad for the ego, it could very well work. He may rationalize this bad call by thinking or even saying: “Well, if I am going to start check-folding decent hands to even these tiny bets, in the future people will start to take all kinds of shots at me. And I cannot let that happen, so I must simply call here.”)

Response to option 2 The reason why the delayed bluff from above may work is the type of holding that your opponent probably has. With just a big pair on a paired board, your opponent may feel that this is typically the type of hand that will win small to decent-sized pots when there’s betting and calling on one street, sometimes also when there is betting and calling on two streets (usually when the big pair would work as a bluff catcher, and the check as a bluffinducer), but that will lose almost all the big pots when his opponent will put money in the pot on all three streets. After all, on a 4–4-x-x-x board with no apparent draws, he may judge it as highly unlikely that his big pair can still be good if after all the flop and turn action his opponent will still bet the river. And while this view is of course a good and logical one — it may allow you to use this thinking against him by pulling off a bluff in a situation where a bluff seems highly unlikely. Given the way your opponent thinks, he will rarely play check-fold on the turn, assuming this is not a seven, six or five. Any check-folds by him will tend to take place on the river with this hand, not on the turn. The psychology is this. As he has fired just one time (on the flop), you could have called rather lightly with a smaller pocket pair, the 7–6–5-x draw or even a float, in addition to of course all the three of a kind or better hands that you might have. If, in this situation, he would often play check-fold on the turn, he would be inviting people to float him. So, if he really has a big pair, you can expect that any checks by him on the turn will almost always be followed by a call, rather than by a fold. Of course, after his check-call on the turn you may still have a decent bluffing opportunity on the river. However, the pot has now grown big, and you will therefore have to bet big. Plus, you may still get called rather frequently, as your opponent may feel that he could have lured you into semi-bluffing or bluffing because he surrendered the initiative to you on the turn. In other words: the chances of you bluffing successfully on the river are substantially higher after you have called his turn bet, than after he has check-called your turn bet. Strange, in the eyes of some — but undoubtedly true. What all of this means is that in this situation, you should almost always respond to a check by him after a blank on the turn by simply checking it back, rather than try to pick up the pot after this weakness that he has shown10a 10. You should simply take the free card that you are given. However, in contrast to your response to option 1, this time you would not go for the river bluff. Say that the river is another blank, and your opponent checks — this time it is highly likely that he is using his big pair as a bluff catcher. (After all, with so little betting of any significance up to this point, a “bet out of nowhere” by a busted draw or a weak holding may be just as likely in the eyes of your opponent as a slowplayed monster.) So, in this situation, you would not make any kind of bluffs on the river. You would only bet the river for value if you have actually made your straight. And this time, in contrast to situation 1, you would not make a very small bet with your straight like the one thirds or even one fifths of the pot from before. No, this time you would simply make a standard bet in the range of 60–70% of the pot. And because your opponent may view that this could very well be a bluff, and given that he will have played the hand according the simple rule of thumb “bets on two streets may mean my hand is still good, bets on all streets smells trouble”, you can expect to get called by a losing hand a significant percentage of the time.

Another example of the delayed bluff Another time when the delayed bluff may work fairly well is if the board is full of high cards, especially high cards with a pair, in a situation where you have been the preflop raiser. Let’s say that a middle-position player has open raised from the cutoff, and you have made your standard less than pot reraise in order to isolate with position. You have a marginal hand without any big cards. The middle-position payer calls this raise, and now bets into you for about two-thirds of the pot on a flop A-A-K. This is the type of bet that could mean two things: ♠ A very big hand that is looking for action, and is making this suspicious-looking donk bet to trigger you into giving excessive action. ♠ A marginal hand or even a bluff that is making a one-shot attempt at the pot or that is looking to “find out where he stands”, and that will tend to give up at the first sign of resistance. (Note that even a hand like A-x-x-x could be considered a bit marginal here, in the sense that if this donk bet is followed by a call, the A-x-x-x can almost never be good. However, this relatively marginal A-x-x-x would almost never bet out here, as it would not want to risk missing out on the automatic continuation bet that the preflop reraiser would almost certainly make here.) In the past, I used only to call and raise in this spot if I really had a big hand, at least three aces or a decent kicker. However, by doing so I gave my opponents way too much leeway and too much room to bluff me. So, I knew I had to make adjustments. However, the proper adjustment is not to raise more liberally on the flop with hands that could be in trouble when called or reraised. No, the proper adjustment is to call more liberally, using the strength that the flatcall on this type of board portrays, especially if you are also the preflop three-bettor. So, this is a situation where you could call with marginal holdings, yes even floats at times, expecting to be able to pick up the pot on a later street (especially if your opponent had been donk betting on the flop with a hand like K-x-x-x to gain information or find out where he stands, this turn bet of yours should pick up the pot very often). However, if your opponent is a savvy player, the best time to pick up the pot may not necessarily be on the turn — it could be better to simply delay this action until the river. There are two reasons for this: ♠ Your opponent knows after your flop call that slowplayed monsters like K-K, A-K and A-A are a definite part of your range. If you really had these holdings, especially A-A-x-x and A-K-x-x, you know that there is a good chance that you have the deck crippled, and that your opponent can almost never have enough of a hand to check-call you on the turn. So, your opponent knows that if you really had a monster, you would like to keep your opponent in the hand to give him the chance to make a decent second-best hand on the river that he could pay you off with, or even to give him enough room to bluff at you on the river. The way to do this is by checking back in position on the turn, not by making a bet that is very likely to make him fold. ♠ If your opponent by chance has a hand like A-J-10-x or just A-x-x-x, he may stubbornly hold onto it on the turn, in the hope maybe of hitting one of his kickers on the river to make aces full. Definitely not a good play in this situation — but many PLO players will make it, simply not having the strength to fold an ace with two aces on the board. Yet it is a situation that you obviously dislike in this spot, given that you may now need to make an additional bluff on the river — one that would obviously need to be significantly larger than your bluff bet on the turn. And this is not what you want, as your plan on the flop was to steal a small to medium-sized pot on the turn, not getting involved in a massive pot with nothing. Also, once the pot gets bigger and you have not just faced a donk bet on the flop but also a check-call on the turn on a board with no draws, the chances of you facing at least a decent ace or possibly even a full house go up — and as a result, also the likelihood of your river bluff getting called. Yet, you may still feel forced to go for it because you have absolutely nothing, and because you assume that if your opponent has been check-calling on the turn with A-x-x-x, he would now almost certainly have to fold. (Unless he

improves to a full, of course — yet he may have just a maximum of 10 outs to pull that off, whereas 34 or more river cards would not give him a full.) So, for these reasons it is often better to just delay your bet/bluff until the river, especially when you are up against players who are capable of folding a decent hand in an only moderate-sized pot and/or who like to sniff out slowplays and don’t want to fall for the obvious trap. The betting sequence flatcall flop/check back turn/bet on river screams like a slowplayed big hand, especially considering the texture of the board and the preflop betting. So, if you can sell this picture credibly, it could allow you to steal a pot with limited risk, and at relatively little cost.

Some final words So, by using this delayed bluff properly, you should be able to win some moderate-sized pots that you weren’t entitled to, without the unfortunate drawback of losing an awful lot of chips if someone decides to make a stand. Also, once people start to realize that this delayed bluff has become a part of your poker arsenal, this could lead to you getting paid off more often in similar situations. Of course, don’t forget these very important factors or requirements to make the delayed bluff a success: ♠ Your opponent is a thinking player who respects or fears you. ♠ The texture of the board should present a possible slowplay as a likely course of action. ♠ You are in position11. ♠ The money should be deep enough for (the threat of) betting on all streets. Especially if, after your opponent’s flop bet, there would be room for just one pot-sized bet left or even less that that, calling on the flop with a marginal hand and especially floating would be the equivalent of just burning money. No use in going for an advanced “delayed bluff” play, if your opponent will probably just respond to your flop call by simply closing his eyes and move all-in.

Countering the short stacks Although in full-ring PLO good shortstackers can make an awful lot of money, in 6-max and especially in shorter games this strategy is a lot less effective. But because it is still possible to gain a slight edge, you will often be faced with shortstackers in shorthanded play. So, from the perspective of the big stack player, how should one adjust? First of all it is important to know whether you are facing a good shortstacker or a bad/mediocre one. The last category includes a lot of people: ♠ Those shortstackers who want to gamble without it costing too much. Against them, you should be willing to give considerable action. You should often isolate them by blasting out other players, sometimes with just marginal hands — but knowing their holding is likely to be even more marginal. ♠ People who play for higher stakes than they are accustomed to and therefore want to minimize their swings. Against them, it is good strategy to make many small raises preflop and many small bets after the flop, knowing they will often steer away from all marginal holdings, while at the same time not pushing their edge enough when they are in a profitable situation. Yet if they finally make a stand or play back at you, you should continue only with the very best hands. And then there are of course the good shortstackers, the ones that I will focus on here. They look for opportunities to get their money early with an edge — and this is not limited to just premium holdings, but also with relatively marginal hands when they get great odds or where they feel the opponent is not very strong either. In order not to let them get away with this exploitive strategy too much, you need to make the following adjustments: ♠ Don’t give them too much loose action when your hand doesn’t really warrant it. This goes for all shortstackers, good and bad alike: you don’t want to reward their destructive behavior and their one-dimensional approach by rewarding them in situations where this can be avoided. ♠ Before you make a decision, always look first if a good shortstacker has entered the pot voluntarily, or if a shortstacker behind you is still to act. Especially if a good shortstacker has limped from early position, you should realize that you cannot raise as liberally as you would normally, knowing that you could easily face a pot-sized limp-reraise. So, if you still raise, it should be because: a) You think that you have a better hand than the one that the shortstacker may be trying to limp-reraise you with. b) There are lots of players in the pot, and you have a nice double-suited hand that does well multiway — and that would even do well hot and cold against the A-A-x-x/A-K-Q-J types of holdings that the shortstacker would be limp-reraising with. c) Your target is also in the pot — the weak player with (just like you) a very large stack, and someone on whom you have position. As your main goal in the game is trying to break this weak player, you don’t mind so much about the little bit of equity that you may give up in the (relatively small) main pot to which the shortstacker has a claim. In that case, it could be worth it to sweeten the pot through a small raise, and actually welcome the shortstacker’s pot reraise. Assuming that your target is loose enough to call this reraise, he will now be nicely sandwiched between the almost all-in shortstacker and you, with quite a few chips in the middle already — yet for the two of you still a lot of money behind. This is not just a good situation postflop (you being seated behind both the shortstacker’s automatic all-in bet and your target who has no clue whether or not you may have a big hand), it could also be worth it to already push your edge preflop. Let’s say that you have K♠-K♥-Q♥-J♦ or A♥-Q♦-10♦-8♥ and think there is a decent chance the shortstacker could have aces. This is still a good spot to make a pot-sized four-bet, assuming of course that you know for certain the target cannot be slowplaying a big hand here. By four-betting, you might make your target fold, and in that case you would be getting about 2 to 1 on your money against just the shortstacker. And even if in fact he does have A-A-x-x (which is far from likely — most good shortstackers limp with a much wider range), then you should still not be that far from the required 33.33% to break even. Perhaps more importantly, your target could choose to also call this four-bet following the adage “in for a penny, in for a pound”, and this benefits you as you will almost always be a decent favorite for the side pot — plus, you will now be in perfect position to break him after the flop. One word of caution though: many good big-stack players make this type of play much too liberally. One should realize that by making this play with a suboptimal holding, you are basically doing exactly what the shortstacker wants you to. So, save these plays just for the situation that I described: holding a robust hand (preferably double-suited, and definitely not much weaker than the two hands mentioned here), having position on your target who is not likely to fold to the shortstacker’s three-bet, and with stacks of at least five times the amount that the shortstacker has. ♠ Open-raise tighter whenever the shortstack is behind you, still to act. ♠ Adjust your hand selection, especially when it comes to your (potential) three-betting hands. Let’s say you are in the big blind, there’s a middle position open limper, and now the shortstacker in the cutoff raises to 3BB with a total stack of 22BB. With a hand like K♥-K♦-5♦-4♠ don’t be too quick to reraise him here. This is because you don’t have to think just how well your hand would match up against the shortstacker; there is also the limper who does have a normal stack. And if you reraise pot here, you could get into a world of hurt if this open-limper indeed has A-A-x-x. He could now go for a successful second-hand low play where he flatcalls your three-bet, waits for the shortstacker to go all-in and then for the obvious over-the-top raise by you. In other words: never allow yourself to get trapped for your entire stack by a big stack, just because you have been focusing too much on pushing a small edge against a shortstacker! Also, you shouldn’t just think just about the shortstacker’s open raise here. No, perhaps more importantly you have to also factor in how well this K-K-5–4ss would rate against the range of hands that the shortstacker would choose to go all-in with. And this range would probably consist of a lot of double-suited medium rundowns, double-suited hands with an ace, and even some hands where he had the dreaded A-A-x-x. Of course, there may also be the occasional Q-Q-x-x that decides to commit fully, but in general his all-in range will contain of many holdings that are trailing only very slightly to your somewhat raggedy K-K-5–4ss, plus the occasional hands that have you crushed: A-A-x-x and better K-K-xx holdings. So, just flatcalling the raise and make this a simple three-way pot where you still allow yourself a bit of room to outplay the shortstacker, may be a better choice than the obvious three-bet. ♠ Adjust the size of your preflop raise. Quite simply: in a situation where you would normally make a three or even 4BB total raise, it could be smart to just limp if a 20BB stack has limped, or just make a minimum raise rather than your standard raise after a 40BB stack has limped. This way, he cannot commit a significant enough percentage of his stack by limp-reraising, and also you will not have raised yourself out of the pot as you could profitably call now if he would still opt for this reraise. ♠ In blind versus blind confrontations, you should attack the 20BB shorties quite liberally from the small blind, as they usually don’t want to be involved in pots where there is no dead money, and thus the rake will have a big impact on the pots that they might play. But against shorties that have between 25BB and 35BB, it may not be worth it to attack them with marginal holdings, as their stacks are now big enough to either call with position, or reraise you when they really have a hand. (If you are willing to play for stacks with a marginal hand against a 30BB shortstacker just because you are so eager to take his 1BB, obviously you are benefiting the shortstacker!) From the big blind, you should not raise very liberally if a 20BB shortstacker has limped from the small blind, as he will often be in there with a fairly big hand trying to limp-reraise you. (After all, a good 20BB shortstacker will give you a walk here more often than not.) The only times when you might give a shortstacker action with a marginal hand is from the big blind, facing an open raise from the small blind. Given that a good

shortstacker will almost always have a pretty good hand like a big pair or high cards with suits here, you can profitably call with a wide range, risking 2BB extra in order to take the opponent’s 20BB, 30BB or 40BB if the flop comes raggedy or with small cards. Of course, you should then also raise his automatic continuation bet rather liberally, especially if you think that there may still be some fold equity. ♠ Expose them early. Let’s say that you are in the big blind in an unraised pot, with an UTG shortstack limper and two loose late-position players who often like to bet in LP when checked to. When flopping a hand of decent value, you might often use these LP loose flop bets to go for the check-raise or check-call, but you should not do it this time — as it would be a perfect spot for the shortstacker to get maximum value out of his hand. (And even more so, because with a decent flop he would definitely go for the check-raise, given the tendencies of the players behind him. Assuming that he is a good shortstacker, he will often be bagging his good hands here, trying to check-raise a light bettor with the added benefit of getting others — you! — caught in the middle.) Much better to just bet small into the field to see if the shortstacker is interested in the pot. This small bet may not mean much to you, but for the shortstacker it is a substantial percentage of his stack, meaning that you will take the check-raise play away from him. He cannot call liberally because he may fear the action behind him, yet he can also not count on a raise behind him. This means that if he has a decent hand he will be forced to raise now, not wanting to give you or the players behind him a cheap turn. By putting him in the middle through just a tiny bet, you are depriving him of the opportunity to win a big multiway pot where you are caught in the middle. So, you wait to do your gambling with the two LP players until after you have gotten rid of the tight shortstacker. ♠ Sometimes tight shortstackers can also be exploited after the flop, by betting them off their hands anytime the board seems to develop in a manner than cannot be good to them, yet that might be good to you. The ideal time to bet tight shortstackers off their hands: on the turn, when the shortstacker has around one pot-sized bet left, when the turn has created a possible straight (preferably a straight with small cards), in a situation where the shortstacker is likely to have big cards, one big pair or a big flush draw with not much extras. You shouldn’t overdo this, but sometimes shortstackers basically expose on the flop through their betting that they have one big pair. Especially when out of position, it could be worth it to call this bet rather liberally especially on drawheavy boards like 10♥-7♦-4♥, with the intention to just bet pot with any nine, eight, six, five or three — and possibly even with all the hearts (even though they tend to be slightly more dangerous cards, given the likelihood that the shortstacker could have been betting an overpair + flush draw). Another time to put pressure on them is after the flop, on boards with three small cards that create a possible straight. Assuming that the money is not too shallow, you can donk bet into the shortstacker or check-raise him with a wide range, knowing that he is not yet committed and thus there may be sufficient fold equity (even more so because those times that he does make a stand with an overpair, he may not even be favorite, let alone a big one). Of course, the problem with shortstackers is that as the big stack you are focusing on bigger goals than just a strategy that makes it hard for the shorties to employ their system in a profitable manner. So, there will be times when the short stacks can take advantage of your loose-aggressive big stack play. This is inevitable. However, especially if you are not in too deep yet, it is important sometimes just to fold and take your losses after having open-raised, rather than compound your error by four-betting with a marginal holding. (This is something that for instance Darwinism was prone to do in the full-ring $10-$20 and $25-$50 games online, and it was clearly of benefit to me, the shortstacked player there. In shorthanded games, this tendency benefits the shortstackers a bit less, as in contrast to full-ring play shortstackers in 6-max don’t always need to have a big hand whenever they three-bet. Still, giving good shortstackers too much action with marginal hands is a cardinal sin, even in shorthanded play.) A very important thing: being a big stack, try to create an atmosphere at the table where the big stacks view each other as the good guys, and that therefore you are not going to give protection to the bad guys (the shortstackers) unless it is absolutely necessary. Make sure you create the type of atmosphere that in three-way pots where the shortstacker is all-in, you and your opponent who both still have chips don’t go semi-bluffing or betting marginal hands on the flop. Just as in tournament play, it is imperative that you don’t give the shortstackers protection in those situations where no one has a completed or big hand yet. Are there any adjustments you should make when playing bad shortstackers? Well, yes certainly there are: ♠ If they gamble too much, you can gamble along with them, and push your double-suited or big cards much harder than you normally would. Be careful though that a third player is not waiting with an A-A-x-x type of holding to take advantage of your isolation play with a hand that fares well against the shortstacker’s range, but that would be a big dog against A-A. In other words: tend to reserve this gambling of yours just for the times when it is just you and the shortstacker — for instance, as the big blind against a late-position open raise from the shortstacker with no other players in. ♠ Some shortstackers have no clue that they need to maximize their winnings, or that they need to employ a system where flatcalling a raise should be a real exception (as it should be reraise-pot or fold in most cases). Against shortstackers like this, you can still open raise the same as you normally would, without all the adjustments from above that you would make against good shortstackers. Just keep in mind that when these passive shortstackers do make pot-sized reraises, they will almost always have A-A — meaning you could occasionally make a loose call with a medium or small double-suited hand, but tend to fold offsuited big cards and raggedy K-K-x-x or Q-Q-x-x holdings. ♠ Those shortstackers who are playing on scared money should be bullied! With hands as weak as Q♠-10♦-8♦-7♠ you should happily raise if they have limped, or reraise if they have made a small open raise from late position. Shortstackers on scared money are excellent bully targets, especially if you restrict this bullying for exactly the types of holdings that do well against the only hands that the scared-money players would feel comfortable committing fully with (A-A-x-x, K-K-x-x and double-suited big cards maybe). So, if you are in the blind against a 2.5BB open raise from a 22BB shortstacker in what you know is a (to him) big game, don’t hesitate to just reraise pot with hands as weak as 9♥-7♥-6♠-4♦ You will win the pot there and then often (fold equity), if you get called you will win the pot on the flop often (for more fold equity, and this time in a much larger pot), and even those times that he reraises all-in you should still win the pot close to 40% of the time. Of course, with hands like raggedy or not double-suited K-K and Q-Q hands you should just call a small raise from the short stack so that you won’t give him the chance to go all-in those times that he has aces. By always keeping an eye on what the shortstackers are doing, which shortstackers are in the hand, and by avoiding exactly those plays that you know could benefit them, you will not necessarily benefit from the shortstackers, but you may be able to keep the damage that they cause to your game as limited as possible. And given that the adjustments from you and — hopefully — also the others will limit their power tremendously, this should help in keeping the number of shortstackers in your game as low as possible.

Reraising in position versus flatcalling — and the consequences for postflop play With a big stack in position you can — and often should — use the less than pot-sized reraise-in-position that I described earlier in this book. However, there are times when I think a flatcall is in order. They include: ♠

When you have a decent but not premium hand, and the open raiser has a relatively short stack. By reraising, you could give him the opportunity to come over the top for (almost) all of his chips, and you will have given away your positional advantage. ♠ When there’s a raise and a call in front of you. In this situation, just calling has the advantage that the preflop raiser may be continuation betting into the field, with the second guy caught in the middle. Especially when you have a hand that has the potential to flop big, it could be very useful if someone in front of you has the initiative. This will provide you with tremendous information about the strength of your opponent’s hand. And despite the smaller pot preflop, you still have the potential to win a big one, assuming that: a) The preflop raiser may continuation bet on light values. b) He could get called liberally by the guy in the middle. c) The continuation bettor may expect you to raise on light values, especially considering your good position. These factors could lead to a much bigger pot than could be expected based on sheer hand values in relation to the preflop pot size. And of course, if your opponent(s) won’t expect you to be raising lightly, then your good position combined with the relatively deep money may provide you with a good stealing or (semi-) bluffing opportunity. The reasons why against two opponents I use the reraise-in-position less often, are: ♠ Two opponents who have voluntarily entered the pot means there’s a higher chance one of them has aces — or may use this juicy threeway pot to represent aces. With more money in the pot that in a heads up situation, a four-bet by either one of them would account to a significantly higher percentage of the effective stacks, thus negating your positional advantage. ♠ If you have been the last raiser preflop because of your three-bet, then you are vulnerable to check-raises postflop. Let’s say the open raiser has made it 3BB total, one caller, and then you have reraised to 9BB or so. If they both call, there will be 28.5BB in the pot, which means that after the flop a standard continuation bet by you would probably be in the range 15–25BB. With effective stacks of about 100BB, this is a rather ideal check-raise situation for both your opponent — meaning your continuation bet is much less likely to succeed than in a heads up situation. But checking back the flop against two opponents is not recommended either, as you are basically saying “just bet and take it on the turn, I don’t have enough of a hand to play for stacks”. In other words, in this situation, three-way in position with these stack sizes, being the last aggressor preflop is not necessarily an advantage anymore. ♠ Three-way, I like “playing from behind”, as I tend to call it. Especially in the preflop scenario raise or call in front of me, I like to call along and let the open raiser keep the initiative. This is important from a minimizing losses point of view, and as I already said, it still offers the chance for a great payday. Please note that with the preflop scenario open limp and a raise in front of me, I would almost always have reraised or folded. In this situation, a flatcall is much more dangerous than in the previous situation, because you now have one more player still to act who has voluntarily entered the pot, and thus could three-bet here. (Meaning you cannot be as certain about the price you are getting to see the flop.) But also, you run a much greater risk of getting sandwiched on the flop. Assuming you flatcall the preflop raise and the open limper calls as well, you face the danger of the open limper trying to sandbag the preflop raiser. If indeed the preflop raiser makes his expected continuation bet here, this puts you in the middle — despite your seemingly great position. So, you should have avoided this entire scenario in the first place by either three-betting or folding preflop, not flatcalling. ♠ When you have a hand that plays easy after the flop — a hand that has either hit (giving you a through ticket) or not (meaning you will give up), but that will rarely have an in-between flop that will require expert judgment. So, with a hand like 9♠-8♠-7♥-7♦ I would often be inclined to just flatcall a raise in position, as I will almost always have an easy decision after the flop. I can play the classic “fit or fold” when faced with bets by others, losing only a small amount if I don’t hit. And when I do hit (either by hitting a third seven, preferably the 7♠, or else by flopping a wrap), I will of course welcome this bet in front of me. Compare this easy-to-play 9♠-8♠-7♥-7♦ with a hand like A♠-J♥-8♠-5♥ a nice double-suited hand but with the drawback of way too many gaps — limiting the potential for a big flop. This is the type of holding that could flop a lot of in-between hands, crummy draws etc. So, this is a hand where you don’t want your opponents to have the initiative after the flop. This is the type of hand where you want to be the aggressor, so you could pick up the majority of the pots where no one flops a big enough hand. So for this reason, the double-suited too many gaps hands usually fare better through a standard three-bet in position, while the more coordinated hands like this 9♠-8♠-7♥-7♦ and also two-pair hands like J-J-8–8 or Q-Q-6–6 tend to do better through a simple flatcall.

Getting your opponent off a good but non-nut hand You have open raised from the cutoff with A♦-Q♦-Q♠-4♣ as the first one in. The button behind you has called, and both blinds have folded. The flop comes J♦-10♠-9♦. Not the best of boards to bet into with just a pair of queens, of course. But because you also have the nut flush draw plus a gutshot straight draw, you have two blocker cards to the nut straight, you simply want to keep initiative, and your opponent might fear the scary board just as much as you do, you decide to make a standard 60–70% pot bet. If your opponent raises you here, you plan to reraise big in order to represent K-Q for the current nuts. If your opponent finds this believable, he might fold hands like 8–7-x-x, Q-J-10-x or even Q-8-x-x for the second nut straight. And if your opponent still does not fold, usually you will not be that far behind. (You could have up to nine flush outs twice, plus three straight outs and maybe even some remote runner-runner full house potential. In fact, if your opponent has a combination hand like two pair + small flush draw + gutshot straight draw, a mere running pair could also earn you the pot.) However, your opponent doesn’t raise you, and he doesn’t fold either. He does what you least want him to do: he flatcalls with position.

So, the simple question is: what now? Heads up and you being the preflop raiser, it is clear that your opponent thinks you could be continuation betting on this flop with a wide range of hands, ranging from the nut straight to a set to total air. In fact, this is a situation where, if a blank comes on the turn, your opponent may still not believe you if you fire a second time. Assuming that you both have started the hand with effective stacks of 80BB, you can expect to get called rather liberally after this non-threatening turn card12. In that situation, you may feel forced to go for the big bluff on the river with your unimproved queens, in a situation where your opponent will realize that you could still be playing the blockers or may have missed your flush draw. After all, heads up the scenario of someone firing three barrels as a bluff or semi-bluff seems just as likely as (or perhaps, even more likely than) someone value-betting his nut hand on all streets. To avoid this scenario where your opponent may feel comfortable just calling you down on all streets (say, if he has a hand like a set or especially a non-nut straight), it could be worth it to try and change the course of the hand a little. A tactic that I often use in this spot is to face my opponent with an unpleasant situation by simply checking to him on the turn. If my read on this person is correct (he does indeed have a good but non-nut holding that beats my bluffs and my marginal bets, but that would be way behind if I really had the nut straight), then he will not like the scenario much where after any turn bet by him there could be a lot of action. In fact, he may very well choose to check back the turn, thinking that I could be trapping him, and at the same time feeling that if he now checks and then a blank comes on the river, he may have a very nice bluff catcher. (Also, from his perspective: if I check the river, he would now have an excellent and suspicious-looking value bet situation, where he could expect to get paid off liberally by a worse hand.) Yet, if he decides to take a stab at the pot and indeed bets the turn, he probably does so with the intention of picking up a medium-sized pot. The last thing he wants is to get check-raised here by a hand that could have him drawing dead, in a situation where it doesn’t look all that likely that I am semi-bluffing or making a move with a weaker hand than the obvious nut straight. Of course, this check-raise on the turn is highly dangerous. You should avoid it if the money is so deep that if your opponent reraises, you will have to fold. In other words: you should only do it if your check-raise will get 60% or more of the effective stacks into the pot (so that even if your opponent decides to commit fully, you will now have the correct odds to call the remaining 40% of your stack in order to chase your approximately eight to 12 outs, depending on your opponent’s exact holding). You should be fully aware that if you check-raise here, this move should look believable — as it needs to succeed a very large percentage of the time to make it profitable. (After all, if you get played with, you now have only one more card to improve, rather than two cards if you had made some kind of semi-bluff move on the flop.) However, given that your check on the turn could also have the benefit of gaining you a free card if your opponent is scared to bet, this highly risky move could still be a good play. All of this assumes that you have read your opponent’s hand correctly, and also that the analysis is accurate that he wouldn’t fold easily if you just keep firing on the turn and river, yet would be inclined to give you credit for a big hand if you check-raise. Clearly, if the turn goes check/check, you should not bluff bet after a blank on the river, as it looks just too suspicious — meaning you can expect to get called by hands as weak as top two pair. Of course, if after a check/check on the turn you do improve, it is a good time for a decent-sized valuebet. If a king comes that gives you the nut straight, you should even make a very large bet of at least 75% pot, as lower straights will tend to call you lightly. Your opponent is rather likely to hold exactly a queen plus one other straight card for the second nut straight that will pay off even a large bet. (Against some overaggressive players you could even choose to go for the check-raise, if there is at least some chance that he would not only bet a non-nut straight, but even call your check-raise with it. If he would indeed bet but then tend to fold to a raise, it would make more sense for you to simply bet out, as going for the check-raise would only make any extra money if it could induce a — given the situation, rather unlikely — bluff.) And, if you make the nut flush on the river, then it is usually also best to just bet out, as your opponent could have made a small flush or still have this non-nut straight with which he would pay off, but that he might judge as not strong enough to value-bet.

Slight change of scenario The reason why in the situation above firing again on the turn could be risky, is that in a heads-up situation these bets could be viewed with suspicion. After all, big hands don’t grow on trees, and someone who has a raiseworthy hand preflop, and then is lucky enough to find the nuts on the flop heads up and as a result just keeps firing away rather than try to trick his opponent into the pot… well it is of course possible, but just not all that likely. And especially the very coordinated nature of the board makes it likely that the person who calls the flop will have a made hand rather than a draw, it could be worth it to try and find an alternative for the automatic second barrel that many players would fire. However, what happens if we change the scenario slightly, by adding a third player to the pot? Let’s say that the pot is now three-way with not just you (the preflop raiser) and the button, but also the big blind. And let’s say that on the flop your continuation bet has not just been called by the button — as in the previous situation — but this time also by the big blind who has closed the betting by check-calling. How does this change the situation for the turn (assuming that the big blind again checks)? Well, for the button it has now become much more difficult to call your turn bet with a marginal or non-nut holding. After all, he will not only have to fear that you have him beat, but there’s also the risk of the big blind who could very well have a straight of his own — maybe even the K-Q for the nut straight, planning to check-raise with it if the turn card is a blank. Now, what are the benefits for you here? You could use this threat of the third player in the hand to sandwich the button, and also to give more credibility to your semi-bluff now that you are actually betting into two players who have voluntarily called on the flop, rather than just one. At the same time, your read on the big blind doesn’t necessarily need to be the same one that the button has. From your perspective, it may be much more likely that he has a non-nut holding and that he will check-fold to a second barrel, rather than a nut straight that he is trying to check-raise you with on the turn. (Most players would not have the guts and patience to do this, and the fact that you hold two queens makes it a bit less likely that he can have specifically K-Q here.) However, this read on the big blind is very important — because if he does have K-Q, by betting the turn you will be betting yourself out of the pot with a hand that would have a lot of outs even against a completed straight. If indeed you think the big blind might be planning a check-raise on the turn, then you should often just check the turn and expect to see the river for free rather often. (As in this three-way situation, the

button would probably bet with K-Q and Q-8 after your checks, but probably not with any weaker hands than that. Of course, if he would bet any weaker hands that that… this would again open up the possibility of using the semi-bluff check-raise on the turn in a profitable manner.)

Representing big hands, and preparing river bluffs through flop and turn bets The easiest boards to represent big hands are those that offer the possibility for a completed full house, flush or straight — in that particular order. Paired boards are especially good candidates to represent more strength than you have, because unless your opponent has top full or better, he should always take into account the (OK, maybe slight) possibility that you might have it. Even with hands as strong as A-4-x-x or even 9–4-x-x on a board 9–4–4, your opponent will be scared that his hand might not be good when a strong/tight player like you shows a lot of interest after he has shown his. (With 99 on that same board, he might still fear quads a bit if very deep stacks go into the pot, but there is probably no way back for him anyway, and there is certainly no way he can ever fold.) The key about representing big hands is this: if indeed you do have what you are representing, your opponent will be drawing dead, or at least quite thin. On paired boards, when playing against unknown or relatively weak opponents, I tend to play quite differently to most players. Given that many weak players have a tendency to slowplay big hands on paired boards and thus expect you to do the same, I usually bet and raise those times that I flop top full — say, 10–10 on a flop 10–7–7 — and expect to get action from hands as weak as just one seven/no kicker. The key to representing on paired boards is mimicking how weak players would play a big hand. Their pattern of play is usually something like this: ♠ Flop: check-and-call, or just flatcall a bet. ♠ Turn: again check, usually followed by a check from the lead bettor who smells a rat. ♠ River: finally some action from the slowplayed hand — either through a small milking bet or raise, or else though a full, pot-sized bet in a final attempt to get some real value out of the hand. In other words: you will rarely see a weak player bet or raise on an early street with a flopped full house or better. And it is these exact characteristics that I try to use to my advantage those times that I am facing unknowns. In addition to the come out firing approach when I have a big hand, I will also represent a big hand sometimes by making a play that I rarely use: the float or even out-of-position float. These are the keys to pulling this off successfully: ♠ My opponent needs to have a hand of not more than just moderate strength. ♠ My opponent needs to be good enough to recognize a slowplay. ♠ My opponent needs to be weak enough or have too little knowledge about my game to not realize that if I really had what I am trying to represent, I would have played my hand in a quite different manner. ♠ My opponent needs to be good enough or to fear me enough that he is capable of folding marginal hands on the river against just a moderate-sized bet by me. Because that’s the bluff I will make on the river: a bet between one third and two-thirds of the pot that seems to be begging for a call, one that would appear to invite hands like three of a kind or even one big pair to pay off.

Example hand 1 Let’s put all this into an example hand. You hold 9♥-8♠-7♥-5♦ in the small blind. A tight player has open-raised pot from the cutoff. He is not all that creative, and you expect him to have a big pair more often than not. You call, the big blind folds and the two of you see a flop 10♥-6♠-6♣. You check, and now your opponent bets pot. Your read on him: almost certainly not more than just a big pair, definitely no full house, at best something like A-A6-x for trip sixes/ace kicker. Even though it’s a cardinal sin in PLO to be drawing to a straight or flush when the board is paired, in this case it may be worth it. The board, even though it is paired, is not very scary at all given the read on your opponent — and even more so because if by chance he had 10–10-x-x for top full, 6–6 for quads or 10–6 for an unlikely full house, he would definitely have bet less than the pot on the flop now that he’s got the deck crippled. So, in this case you can be fairly certain that if you hit one of your nine straight outs on the turn, you will have the current best hand. Of course, that is not the main reason to check-call here! The main reason to check-call is that — in the eyes of your opponent — you show all the signs of someone who has flopped something huge, or at the very least has a premium pair like K-K or A-A. After all, someone check-calling a potsized bet on a paired, dry board — it is more often than not the sign of someone slowplaying a big hand. This assumption that your opponent might make provides you with the following advantages: ♠ You will usually get to see the river card for free, as the action on the turn will often go check/check. ♠ In that case, you could make your straight at (almost) no additional cost — heck, if you are smart enough when it comes to bet sizing, you might even be able to secure a small payoff. ♠ Even if you don’t hit, there’s a good chance that a standard river bet with your busted draw might earn you the pot. This is especially true if the river has completed a backdoor flush, if a second 10 has come on the river, or if the river card was an overcard to your opponent’s pocket pair. ♠ If your opponent doesn’t check back on the turn but instead bets, this may be an excellent spot to go for a less than pot-sized check-raise semi-bluff on the turn. This play looks much stronger and much more credible than a check-raise on the flop would, given that 10–6–6 rainbow boards are often the type of boards that players use to get frisky, representing trips that they don’t have. However, check-calling on the flop and then check-raising the turn or, even better, also check-calling the turn and then betting out on the river, are much better ways to represent big hands. (The latter is an excellent option against the somewhat better players, an option with the added benefit of being a bit cheaper than the check-raise semi-bluff on the turn. This is because if your turn check-raise gets called and the river is a blank, you may feel forced to go for a river bluff that will often fail. Also, if you check-raise on the turn and get reraised, you will have to fold a hand that could have some outs — like when your opponent indeed has something like A-A-6-x and decides to commit fully.) Keep in mind that your image needs to be very strong to pull off one of the plays I have mentioned here. If your opponent has seen you bluff or float a few too many times, you should refrain from using it, and simply check-fold the flop or check-call the flop with the intention of getting paid off when you hit — not as a float with the intention of bluff-betting the river.

Example hand 2

A highly advanced, but also much more dangerous move is making this same type of play on a paired board after a bet and a call. Let’s say the flop is A-4–4 rainbow, with a bet and a call in front of you, and you have something like 6–5–5–3. If you have the read that the bettor is stronger than the caller (if it looks like the caller has something like A-K-x-x or A-Q-x-x rather than a slowplayed big hand), then this might be a good spot to try and pick up the pot, even when you don’t have much. Assuming the lead bettor is a thinking player who respects you, he will reason: “Gee, if on this board I get action from not one but two players, at least one of them must be in there with a big hand.” In this situation, some players might even fold hands as strong as A-4 against just a moderate-sized raise, thinking that given the action one player must have aces full. While not many players are capable of folding hands this good, even bad players would be quick to fold three fours or a decent kicker if on this board they face not only a call but then also a small (check-) raise. So, in this spot it could be worth it to make a play for the pot if people respect you, and your read is strong enough that no one has a monster. An advanced variation of this play is just calling along after this bet and a call — it often looks even scarier than a raise. Many players will immediately give up all less than aces full hands in this spot, being 100% certain that the second caller (you) must be slowplaying a big hand. The problem with just calling on the flop is the guy in the middle — if he is a weak player, and if he happens to make a full on the turn, he might not fold anymore now whereas he would have folded to a flop raise with only three fours. Of course, it’s incorrect reasoning on his part — but you always have to base your decisions not on how people should think, but how they do think. Anyway, if you decide to delay your move on the turn or even the river, you could even stumble into the winning hand by catching a deuce (for a wheel) or a five (for fives full). This is why I would recommend this play with a hand like this 6–5–5–3 that may still have some outs if someone stubbornly holds on to just one four, rather than make it with complete air. Keep in mind that this play is highly dangerous. Your reads need to be very accurate, and you may not want to push your luck if after either a flop raise or turn bet you still have not won the pot — because this may mean your opponent has a hand with which he is willing to go all the way. Because your reads need to be spot on, I like to reserve this play only for live play where I know my opponents’ tendencies well where paired boards are concerned, and where I have some clear tells of weakness on them. And if they see me as a nitty nutpeddler who is rarely out of line, well so much the better. But because in online 6-max my image is usually more active, this play should be used very sparingly — even though never using it would also be bad, as you would never get action anymore the next time that you have A-A-x-x in this same spot.

Representing a big hand when the board isn’t paired So far, we have discussed how to represent a big hand when the board is paired. Trying it when the board is not paired is much more difficult to pull off, for the following reasons: ♠ When the board is not paired, the hand strength isn’t “defined” just yet. Especially if there are any kind of draws on the board, any bets or raises that you make will be used with suspicion, as your opponent knows you could be pushing a draw. ♠ If you don’t bet or raise, but instead call on these types of boards, your opponent’s first reaction will be to put you on a draw. While a call on a paired board could be interpreted as a sign of strength and as a possible slowplay, on non-paired boards that contain some draws your opponent would expect you to raise with your good made hands — not just to get more money into the pot, but also to protect your hand from getting outdrawn. ♠ The more drawheavy the non-paired board, the more likely it is that people will start playing back at you. Not just with good made hands — no they could also be pushing a draw, or have a relatively marginal combination hands like two pair + non-nut flush draw. And if you are trying to represent more strength than you actually have, the last thing you want is having your opponent play back at you with a marginal hand of his own — as you will usually get pushed off your hand as a result. For these reasons, the best boards to represent a big hand are ill-coordinated boards, boards that offer relatively few drawing opportunities. Plus, it helps if your opponent knows that you are not the type of player who will automatically pull the trigger with their big hands on the flop or turn through large bets and raises. It pays if they know that you have the courage to just call bets on the flop and turn with quality made hands, to then make relatively thin and moderate-sized value bets on the river with hands like a set or even top two. Against them, a call can represent strength rather than weakness — and this is what you want when trying to steal pots for the smallest possible investment. The worst image to have here is that of someone who would only bet the river with either his big hands or his total bluffs. Especially on boards that have a lot of drawing possibilities, you will get called very often if the river is a blank and you haven’t raised your opponent on the turn. (Something most players would usually do with decent made hands, to protect them against getting outdrawn.) So, if you just call here and then suddenly fire after a blank on the river, your opponent will know that given the way you play, there are hardly any hands that you can suddenly value-bet with, and thus a large percentage of your bets must be bluffs. But if he knows that you will sometimes just flatcall with decent made hands on the flop and the turn to snap off bluffs on the river or to make thin value bets when checked to, then these bets out of nowhere may suddenly get a lot more respect. One of my favorite plays in six-handed play with effective stacks of 100BB or more is delaying my actions to the turn, and making my moves there (rather than on the flop). For instance, up against a preflop raiser, I will often call or check-call his continuation bets. I will then either try to take away the pot on the turn by betting into him, by betting after his “I give up” check, or by simply (check-)raising his second barrel. These are a few benefits of waiting until the turn: ♠ It tends to show a bit more strength than a flop raise would; the raise of a continuation bet in particular is something that in the eyes of your opponent can be done with a fairly wide range. Or, to be a bit more accurate: delaying your raise until the turn doesn’t necessarily represent more strength in itself, but it shows that you probably have a good made hand rather than a good draw (as most players would rather semi-bluff on the flop with two cards to come, rather than on the turn with just one). ♠ Assuming your opponent has made the last raise preflop, by playing like this you are using the continuation bet against him. In the aggressive shorthanded games following up a preflop (re)raise with a continuation bet is automatic, and following up this continuation bet with a second barrel on the turn — well this is also common. (Assuming that this player is out of position, this second barrel is often done with a wide range, because checking the turn could seem like he would be giving up the pot. And assuming that this player is in position, he will often fire that second barrel with marginal hands, in the hopes of maintaining the initiative and maybe getting a free showdown.) By playing back at him on the turn, you may have induced him to fire two times, to then not even let him reach the river — for instance when you make him fold a good draw or even the current best hand. ♠ If your opponent has a hand like a pair plus wrap or an overpair plus nut flush draw, he will often respond to any flop raise you make by simply coming over the top — knowing that with two cards to come he will almost always get the correct odds to play, in addition of course to the fold equity he may have. But if you push on the turn after two serious bets by him, there will in all likelihood be no more fold equity if he now chooses to reraise. (Given that the money is now too shallow and that you are already in too deep, folding is probably not a serious option for you.) In other words: he will now be put to the test for (almost) all his chips. And I can assure you: this same pair + draw that may have looked so good to him on the flop, will now start to look quite bleak: faced with a big raise on the turn, having just one more card to improve, with little implied odds and almost no fold equity.

By using the notion that the combo flatcall flop and then raise on the turn is usually a sign of strength, and especially the sign of a more than decent made hand, you can take advantage of this and steal or semi-bluff a large number of medium-sized pots on the turn. However, it is important to keep in mind that you will usually be risking a very large part of your stack to do so. Therefore you should restrict these plays for the times when it looks as if your opponent could be weak — like in a situation where he was the preflop raiser, and now could very well be firing continuation bets and second barrels with only mediocre or unimproved holdings. Also, try to use this tactic against good LAPs who like to fire until they run into resistance — but who then have the discipline to fold there and then (as opposed to those who don’t have the strength to release even marginal hands like an overpair + gutshot in the face of a turn raise. Against them, you obviously shouldn’t be using this “represent more strength by waiting until the turn” tactic at all.) When you do take all this into account, the many medium-sized pots you pick up should more than compensate for the few times when you actually run into a monster and lose a chunk of your stack.

When you are the aggressor Of course, most of the time you should try to be in charge. Playing a shorthanded game with relatively deep stacks, you are usually the preflop raiser and/or the flop bettor. Your opponents will often raise or check-raise your continuation bets with relatively weak hands, expecting you to be betting on light values as well. (For this reason, when I flop a big hand like top set, I tend not to slowplay.) Given that people will often try to fight your aggression by raising you with marginal hands/draws, it is often a good counterstrategy to just flatcall these raises on the flop with both your decent made hands and good draws, anticipating his automatic turn bet and raising him there. If you flatcall a check-raise on the flop, you can count on your opponent betting the turn a very high percentage of the time. Especially because he cannot be certain if you have a made hand, a flush draw or a straight draw, he will usually just close his eyes and bet the turn, hoping it has not helped you — and often pretending that it has in fact helped him. With 100BB stacks, it is nice to wait one more betting round to commit fully, and the benefit of raising here as opposed to reraising on the flop is that there’s now one extra bet in the pot. This means the rewards could be much higher: if indeed your turn raise secures you the pot, you could have earned a (close to) double-sized pot compared with a situation where you would have taken the pot on the flop. Plus, delaying your action until the turn will induce a lot of folds from hands that may have been committed to go all the way, had you made a three-bet on the flop. Say, hands like K♥-K♣-J♥-10♦ may decide to commit fully on the flop 9♥-7♣-3♥. Yet, if they fire again after the turn 5♦ and you then raise, they will definitely fold — and with hands like A♥-10♥-9♠-6♦ you would have pulled off an excellent semi-bluff. Or, with hands like 9–7-x-x for top two/no extras in this same situation, you would actually have played the hand like you were supposed to: delaying the action until the turn by waiting for a safe card, and by betting an opponent off a hand that he would not have folded if he knew that you had just top two with no back-up. So, by delaying your action you may get an extra bet in the pot, you can wait until a safe card for you or a scary card for the opponent comes up to make your move, and you will often win the pot without a showdown even with marginal holdings simply because you have played the hand as if you had a decent made hand that wanted to see one safe card before committing. Plus, you will send the message to your opponents that if you flatcall a flop (check-)raise, this doesn’t automatically mean that you are willing to give up against any turn bets — but that quite the contrary, you may use this turn bet to go all-in! This factor alone may make your opponents less apt to play back at you on the flop. And, as a result, you will succeed in picking up significantly more pots uncontested, you will be getting raised off your hand less often, and you will stay in charge of the betting more often.

Playing the river Despite all these “representing more strength than you actually have” tactics from previous sections, sometimes your flop or turn bets will get called, and you reach the river with a hand that is not as strong as you had portrayed it to be. Many weak players would bet big in this spot with their bad hands or missed draws to represent a monster, and to make the opponent lay down the better hand. With their mediocre made hands like two pair, they would tend to check to induce a bluff bet from an opponent who might have a busted draw. Of course, as usual, I tend to do things differently.

With a busted draw or weak hand Assuming I have been lead-betting all the way, and the possible draws don’t seem to have gotten there, I am not that fond of the “betting big” option that many players will use. “Why is that?” you may ask. Well, it’s because in this situation, these same players will often bet much less or try to sell their hand if they really have a big hand, while betting big if they are bluffing. For that reason, I like to turn this pattern around, especially against players who expect you to bluff big if you miss yet milk a little if you really have a hand. To them, a small, even-sized bet of about one-quarter or onethird of the pot will often look like a milking bet: many good players would fold their one-pair and even two-pair holdings in that spot, not wanting to reward your obvious value bet. So, against players like this, a relatively small bet may get almost as many folds as a big bet would — with this difference, that you now lose a lot less money if your bluff attempt fails. However, you don’t want to bet too small, as your opponent may be induced to start bluff-raising you, or just get curious to see what you have now that calling is so cheap.

With a marginal hand or decent showdown value, first to speak For most players, this would look like a spot where the obvious play is to check the river and then usually call to snap off a possible bluff. The problem is that this play is usually too obvious. If I see an opponent bet the flop and turn, yet check to me on the river once the draws don’t seem to have gotten there, I know that he is probably checking a hand with decent showdown value to induce a bluff. After all, if he would have a busted draw himself, he would almost certainly not have checked, knowing that — given that he has been the aggressor all along, and thus his opponent is probably drawing as well — a bluff bet would have a high chance of success. So, I would not fall for this “induce a bluff” trap very often, and neither would most of my opponents. They are simply too sophisticated to fall for such an obvious trap, and would usually respond by checking it back and give up, rather than investing money on an — in all likelihood — futile bluff. A much better play in this spot, being first to speak on the river with a rather marginal hand, is not to check, but rather to make a bet that looks like a blocking/stop bet. If you make a bet of about one-fifth or one-sixth of the pot, your opponent may read you for exactly the type of hand that you are holding: a marginal made hand. He may reason: “This guy has a hand that he thinks could be good, however almost certainly not a hand that can stand a lot of heat. His bet suggests that he doesn’t want to face a large bet by me, and for this reason he will almost certainly not be able to call any raise that I make.” And of course, if indeed your opponent raises you here, you should usually call, having set up a very advanced play of inducing a bluff through betting rather than through checking.

With a marginal hand or decent showdown value, last to speak, when checked to (following a blank on the river) This situation is slightly more complicated. Because your opponent has checked to you, there is some chance that he may actually have a slightly better made hand than you, say a bigger two pair, again making the play from before of checking the river to induce a bluff. However, given that you have been in charge of the betting all along, it is also possible (or, maybe even more probable) that your opponent has a busted draw, and simply gives you credit for having the best hand. From his perspective, suddenly betting into you (the lead bettor) after a blank on the river could scream too much “look, I am making a desperation bluff with a busted draw”. Given that this is the situation, just checking back your marginal holding is usually the best option — as if you get called, you will usually be beat. However, at times and against certain players, the same play from above (making a very small bet to induce a bluff raise) could work here too. This play could especially be worth it if you have a slightly better made hand like top two pair where you also could get called by a weaker two pair, in addition to the (OK, somewhat improbable, but still far from impossible) check-raise bluff. Especially against an overaggressive opponent or someone with a big ego who couldn’t stand folding to such a tiny bet, reopening the betting with a small bet could be worth it. However, as in this case (being last to speak) this bet can never be perceived as a blocking bet, you will have to know your opponent’s tendencies really well. So, especially with a very marginal made hand that could easily lose when the small bet gets check-called, I would tend to just make the obvious choice: checking back, and see who wins.

With a big hand, first to speak Let’s say that you have been betting on the flop and turn with a big hand like top set on a drawheavy board, and lo and behold the river is a blank — meaning your top set is still the nuts. Now what? Well, most players would opt for a value bet of about 40–60% of the pot, thinking their opponent probably doesn’t hold much and thus should be offered a slight discount on a call. Some would even check, thinking their opponent was drawing, and again hoping to induce a bluff. Both plays are not my favorites though. Depending on the characteristics of my opponent, I would either: ♠ Make the same blocking bet from before — and also with the same objectives as before. ♠ Bet very big, say close to a full-pot bet, to make my bet seem like a bluff from a busted draw. Especially against a good or tricky player who is suspicious of large bets in situations where the draws have not gotten there, betting big may win you a lot more money than the milking bet that many players would make. Of course, your opponent will fold often as he may not even have a pair — but in this spot this largerthan-usual bet could occasionally trigger a hero call from hands as weak as just one pair.

With a big hand, being last to speak Again, I would usually choose between the very large bet (good chance of getting paid off if the opponent has a marginal made hand that he might have checked to induce a bluff) or a very small bet designed to induce a bluff check-raise. Occasionally, in order to not get too predictable, just a

standard 40–60% of pot value bet could also be useful — especially against opponents who are not tricky enough to go for the farfetched checkraise bluff and/or who are a little curious by nature. In other words: against calling stations who fear big bets but who tend to call standard bets, you should not make too many high-level plays on the river when you have a big hand. Against them, just a simple, standard bet would yield enough calls to make it the best option.

Check-raising versus betting into the raiser Those of you who have read my first PLO book (which was full of limp-reraising and check-raising) may wonder: “What has happened to this goodold sandbagging Rolf — I haven’t heard a thing about check-raising in this new book.” The reason is simple: in six-handed play with effective stacks of 100 big blinds or even more, check-raising should not be done very often. Or, better: it should rarely be done on the flop in single-raised pots. In three-bet pots (or in single-raised pots on the turn; I will focus on this in the next section) the check-raise can still be a tremendous weapon. I’ll illustrate this with an example. PLO $5-$10, effective stacks $1,300. Preflop: one limper, villain raises to $40, you call from the BB with Q♥-Q♦-J♦-8♣, the limper also calls. Flop: (pot size $125) J♥-8♣-4♣, you check, villain continuation bets $100, and you check-raise pot to $425 with your top two. Seems standard, right? Well, no — not really. There are a few problems here. The most pronounced one is the limper, who might very well have checked to the raiser with a big hand. If he has a set, a pair + nut flush draw or a flush draw + wrap, he will almost certainly three-bet all-in. And a bare top two pair on a drawheavy board doesn’t look all that hot once your pot-sized check-raise gets check-reraised. But even if the limper will simply fold (as he will the vast majority of the time), check-raising is still not a very favorable option. Even against just the preflop raiser/continuation bettor, you need to realize that you are risking $425 to win $225 (actually, $222 after rake) in a situation where you are out of position. Perhaps even worse is the texture of your hand: top two pair with only very moderate extras: two blocker cards to the straight in case your opponent has 10–9 as part of his hand, Q-Q for two killer outs in case your opponent has a set or the same top two pair that you have. Given the stack sizes, if your opponent comes over the top, it will be $835 more for you to win $1,810. In this situation, you will probably estimate that you have an about 30–40% chance that you are drawing extremely thin (against a set, or against the same top two pair plus a quality redraw), while between 60% and 70% of the time you will be about even money or a tiny dog (against any kind of good draws or combination hands). Given the prize that you are getting and the good chance that your opponent is semi-bluffing, almost impossible to lay down top two in this spot — even more so because in a three-way pot like this, you cannot give your opponent too much credit for having a set, let alone top set. But what it means that in essence you are risking your entire $1,260 stack in order to win $222 — and in the long run, this is just not a good ratio with your mere top two pair. Given the depth of the money (>100BB) you should check-raise in just a few selected situations in single-raised pots: ♠ With a big hand (nuts). ♠ With a premium draw that is good enough to stand a reraise (so you can’t check-raise yourself out of the pot). ♠ With a weak hand/air (especially on dry boards, so that you can represent a specific hand and your opponent can only reraise you with either a rebluff or a big hand, but not as a semi-bluff). It should be clear that these situations don’t occur very often. In single-raised pots, it is not all that common that your draw is so big that after a checkraise you can profitably call the remainder of your stack because of pot odds. In addition, big hands don’t grow on trees, and with weak hands/air the check-raise is of course a highly dangerous (expensive!) one to take. What about hands like K♠-K♣-8♦-7♣ on this same J♥-8♣-4♣ flop? In this case, you’ve got a nice combination hand: middle pair + overpair + kinghigh flush draw — a seemingly ideal check-raise hand against someone who could be continuation betting lightly. However, it is again the depth of the money that makes check-raising not the best of options. Given the drawheavy board, you will not only have to fear the pot-sized reraise that we just discussed (for the hands we mentioned before, or maybe even the worst-case scenario A-A-8-x with the ace-high flush draw), but just as importantly you will also have to fear a simple call. Why? Well, because on this board you can expect lots of ugly turn cards — in fact, only the A♣ and the two remaining kings would be cards that give you a monster. While you have a nice hand for a simple all-in coup on the flop with two cards to come, your hand will look a lot less hot after the 7♥ or the 9♠ on the turn. In fact, even a club could be bad news for you, as you may only get action when you are beat. And a blank on the turn may also not be good for you, in case your opponent was simply flatcalling on the flop with two pair, waiting for a safe card before committing fully. These potential problems are intensified by the fact that on the turn with about one pot-sized bet left you will be first to act. And not knowing whether or not a turn card could have helped your opponent, you face the risk of: ♠ Betting all-in or close to it into a completed straight/a better hand than yours, while you may have just nine flush outs as redraws on the river. ♠ Betting all-in or close to it in a situation where you may only get action from better hands. For example, if you make your king-high flush, and the only logical hand that your opponent might give you action with would be the nut flush. ♠ In case you don’t consider yourself committed just yet: running the risk of check-folding or even bet small/then folding to a raise when the scare card on the turn hasn’t helped your opponent at all. If you check or bet small after the 7♥ or 9♠ from before, if your opponent reads you correctly, this could be a great spot to push you off the current best hand with semi-bluffs like a pair + straight draw + nut-flush draw. To avoid all these problems, I don’t check-raise very often in single-raised pots with stacks of more than 100BB. I would check-raise often with the same 130BB effective stacks from before in reraised pots, like in situations where I had open raised, and then been reraised by the button. In this situation, I would be in an ideal spot to check and await my opponent’s automatic continuation bet, so I can check-raise all-in with a wide range of holdings including premium hands, good draws or the combination hands from the examples above. These are all hands that will probably be a favorite not just against my opponent’s betting range, but perhaps even more importantly, also against the (much narrower) range of hands that he could have if he decides to commit fully. What about aces + nut flush draw at this same J♥-8♣-4♣ board? Well, assuming that I have just flatcalled preflop from out of position rather than made the reraise that could give my hand away, I like to lead with this hand into the preflop raiser. Especially if we are just heads up, I like to lead into preflop raisers with slightly smaller than the norm bets, say some 35–55% of the pot — let’s call them “weak leads”. Given that we are heads up and the preflop raiser often likes to maintain initiative, I expect him to raise me a large percentage of the time — even more so because these small donk bets don’t tend to get a lot of respect heads up. And once he raises me here, my donk bet has made the money shallow enough that I can now profitably reraise pot with my combination of a decent made hand and nut draw, and be entirely committed with a hand that is almost never a big dog with two cards to come. Of course, if my opponent would just call (indicating weakness, especially given the drawheavy nature of the flop), and the turn is a blank then this would be an ideal spot to go for the check-raise on the turn. My opponent knows that if I donk bet the flop and then check back the turn, this is often a sign that I am willing to give up. So, he will probably respond to my check on the turn by betting liberally, and especially semi-bluff his draws liberally. This is what I want him to do! By check-raising on the turn with my combination of a marginal made hand + a good draw, I have gotten the most of my hand. Yes, sometimes I will find myself up against a better made hand, but in that case I will probably still have between 10 and 17 outs. But just as often, or perhaps even more often, I will have gotten a bet out of someone who would simply have folded to a standard turn bet by me, or I will even

have made a live draw bet himself out of the pot! Say, a decent draw that could have caused me an awful lot of trouble by either checking back the turn, or by simply calling my turn bet if I had bet in a situation where many river cards would be awful to me — and thus provide him with lots of profitable bluffing or value-betting spots. This donk bet on the flop, then check-raise the turn, is not a very common line to take. But heads up, out of position in a single-raised pot it is one that I tend to use quite frequently, with a fairly wide range of hands — not in the last place to give room to play my favorite hand (A-A + nut flush draw) in a profitable manner.

Playing from out of position As should be clear by now, I value the importance of good position very highly, and one should avoid playing from out of position as much as possible. Of course, sometimes it just cannot be avoided, and it is imperative to have sufficient plays and tricks in your arsenal to negate at least somewhat for your bad position. Here are a few of them.

Making small bets into the preflop raiser One of my favorite plays. Rather than check-raise, check-fold or check-call, and also rather than betting big into the preflop raiser, I like to use this small donk-betting tactic as it has a tendency to confuse and surprise the opponent. Rather than making his automatic two-thirds pot continuation bet, he now faces a small bet into him, and he will thus have to re-evaluate. In online games in particular, he will have to do this quickly. As you have changed the “automatic” course of the hand, it is up to him to decide whether you do this with a hand that is good enough to play against a big raise, if maybe you could be inviting him to raise big when you have a monster, if any calls or raises on his part will actually make his hand transparent or not, and if indeed he chooses to raise, what amount would be best to accomplish his goals. Almost certainly, your opponent will give away some information in this thought process, and you could benefit in the following ways: ♠

You may win a few pots there and then, having invested just little money, and possibly with hands that would have been forced to fold against an opponent’s automatic continuation bet. ♠ The time he needs to complete his action may give away considerable information about the strength of his hand. A quick call often indicates weakness, especially as your bet could be judged as just a “weak stab”, meaning your opponent might have raised you quite liberally here. Quick flatcalls on drawheavy boards are indicative of a weak holding that is not good enough to raise, but that feels it “just cannot fold against a bet this small that doesn’t represent anything”. So, by now following up your small flop bet with a more significant or standard bet on the turn, you can expect to take down the pot more often than not, regardless of whether you are actually strong or weak.

♠ If your opponent chooses to raise, the time he needs to complete this raise and also the size of his raise13 can provide you with much more information than just checking and facing your opponent’s automatic continuation bet would. ♠ You will have gained information at relatively little cost. Had you made a large donk-bet, you could also have gotten this information — but at a much higher cost. Sure, you would probably have taken down a few more pots through this larger bet. But you would still get played back at quite often — as your opponent might expect you to simply go for the check-raise when you hit big, rather than take away the initiative from him and risk losing his “automatic” continuation bet.

Check-calling the flop and then betting out 50–80% of the pot after a blank on the turn This is a play that most players would only make with a decent hand without much back-up. Say, a hand like top two pair no extras on a fairly drawheavy board. I am not overly fond of the play, as it shows a lot of inherent weakness — it usually implies that you have a hand that is not good enough to commit fully on the flop, and that also is scared to give a free card on the turn. So, most opponents would judge this line to be fairly weak, and assuming the money is deep enough, they will tend to call or even raise on the turn on relatively light values. (Call to get paid off if they hit their draw on the river, combined with possible bluffing rights. And raise if they think that you probably cannot stand the heat with your in all likelihood marginal made hand.) Still, as this “check-call flop and then bet out on turn” line signifies such a relatively narrow range of hands (basically just the hand type mentioned), I like to mimic this play with different types of hands: ♠ Weak hands that would have check-folded against a second barrel (and that also here, would simply fold when faced with a raise). ♠ Big hands like middle or even top set. By making this strange play in a situation where I have underrepresented my hand, my opponent may be unwilling to give me credit for a big hand. This betting into the flop bettor after a safe turn card looks a little weak, is often judged as weak, and to avoid getting raised off my hand all the time in this spot, I know I will also need to include top hands in this range that are willing to go all the way. So, especially against overaggressive players who don’t respect this turn bet much, and who will often raise to make the likely two-pair hand fold, I will sometimes use this line. Some clear advantages include getting excessive action from either a drawing hand with just one card to come or even better — as the opponent would have even less outs — a worse made hand like top two pair or a smaller set that just “knows” I cannot have a better hand. (In fact, my opponent may not just raise with a worse made hand, no he will in all likelihood also call my reraise because of my misrepresentation of the hand.) And another advantage is holding a set against a possible drawing hand, the money would go in with just one card to come, rather than two if I would have made my move on the flop. ♠ Combination hands like overpair + flush draw or pair + wrap, or even just a naked draw. By playing these hands exactly like most people would play a hand like top two pair/no extras, I may be able to get my opponent to make the wrong decision on the river if he calls the turn. Assuming I am up against a normal player who would not raise me all that lightly, the river could present me with lots of profitable spots to get paid off if I hit, or to make a better hand fold if I don’t. The problem I have with betting the naked draw in this spot, is that against a raise I might be forced to lay down, meaning I might have bet myself out of the pot. (Therefore, I would not make this play often with a naked draw.) But with my combination hands, this would be a spot where I might commit fully, by coming over the top of a turn raise to represent a made hand of minimum top two pair, and expecting to have sufficient fold equity to make it a + EV play. This is especially true because I will almost always have more than 10 outs to improve to a winner even if my reraise gets called, and sometimes even much more than these 10 outs. Heck, on my lucky days I could catch my opponent raising me with a draw of his own, meaning that even if my reraise gets called, my mere overpair could actually be the current best hand.

Check-calling the flop and then check-raising the turn with just a draw One of the most dangerous plays to make, but especially against good, highly aggressive players it is one that you should sometimes use. Why? ♠

Because highly aggressive players will often have the courage to fire a second time, even with relatively weak hands. Especially if the board is fairly drawheavy, they will often push mediocre hands like an overpair + gutshot, yes sometimes even just a bare overpair, in

order to win the pot there and then. But against a pot-sized check-raise, they will never be able to call! 14 So, you will often win the pot there and then, and even if you get called you will usually have between nine and 17 outs to still win. By check-raising the turn rather than the flop, you will have secured one extra — usually close to pot-sized — bet in the pot to make the semi-bluff more worthwhile. So even though you will often be risking your entire stack with a hand that is not all that strong, drawing to a hand with just one card to come, the combined chances of your opponent folding the best hand and you completing your draw on the river in case of a call, may still make this play worthwhile. As said, only against loose cannons who are quick to fire chips, yet who also know how to fold decent hands when they run into resistance. ♠ This checking twice with a drawing hand has an added benefit. If your opponent doesn’t fire a second barrel on the turn, you will get to see the river for free. This may provide you with an opportunity to make money either by getting paid off when you hit, or by bluffing successfully when you miss. Important here to take into account the characteristics of your opponent: is he the type who has checked the turn because he has basically given up on his hand, or is he the type who would check with what could very well be the best hand, and with the intention of often paying off on the river to snap off bluffs. Because obviously, against type 1 you would go for the river bluff often, while against type 2 you would refrain from bluffing, yet value-bet relentlessly if you complete your draw. The keys to this play: ♠ Your check on the turn will often be followed by a check, meaning you could hit your draw for free. ♠ Those times when a slightly overaggressive player fires a second barrel, he will have a relatively weak hand much more often than a real hand, and as a result he won’t be able to call your check-raise very often. ♠ Especially because you have played in a manner that suggests you have a made hand, rather than a draw. So yes, it’s a risky play for sure. But in shorthanded play with effective stacks of 100BB it is a crucial one to have in your poker weapons arsenal. Because if you would only check-raise the turn with big hands, your opponent could fire especially his marginal made hands with impunity, as he could never get faced with a difficult decision: those rare times that you check-raise, he could simply fold every time, as he would always be beat. And in shorthanded play, you never want to give your opponent that much leeway.

Using the check-call to represent hands on the later streets and to prepare bluffs Two of the key aspects to successful shorthanded play with 100BB or more are try to play in position only, and try to improve your out-of-position skills as much as possible. You don’t get the button all that often, obviously — and even on the button your relative position isn’t always great because of the danger of getting sandwiched between a loose continuation bettor and a sandbagger in one of the blinds. So, even though you like to avoid playing from OOP, obviously you cannot fold to any bet or raise just because your position is bad. Obviously, hands like A-A-x-x, quality kings or big rundowns are hands you’re not going to fold against a single raise. However, because you will give away way too much information if you only call or reraise from OOP with these big pairs/quality high cards, you will also have to play some small or medium rundowns and two-pair hands in order to not get too predictable. But that’s just part of the story — and the most obvious part on top of that. The real key to profitably play of these cards is not just having the proper hand selection, but more importantly making the proper decisions throughout the hand — especially beyond the flop. Obviously, you cannot always play reraise or fold in the blinds when facing a late-position open raise. You would be building too many big pots from out of position, and your opponent could easily exploit you. (He could do this, for instance, by four-betting with his premium hands and have you pay off, by four-betting with relatively weak hands if he knows that you will often fold in this spot, or simply by using his good position for the later streets by making you bluff at pots when he has a big hand, or by bluffing you out when the turn or river cards are unlikely to be good for you.) So, at times you will be forced to flatcall raises from OOP (or reraises, if you open-raise and get reraised by a late-position player), and you will need to have a plan for the way you are going to play beyond the flop. What you should realize is that your OOP call range will consist of a relatively high number of premium, big pair or high card hands that given the depth of the money or for surprise value, you have just flatcalled. But because there should still be enough other hands in your range (7–6–5-3ds, Q-J10–8ss, J-J-2–2 and so on), you will have enough leeway to represent holdings on the later streets, and disguise the hand that you actually have. I will illustrate this with an example. You are in the $5 small blind with K♥-K♦-Q♥-10♠. $1,000 effective stacks. The button open raises to $30, you just call and the big blind folds. The flop comes J♦-7♠-4♥. You check, and your opponent bets $50. Now what? Assuming that you are facing a decent, moderately aggressive player, you know absolutely nothing about his hand. Some players open raise very loosely on the button, and usually they will follow up their preflop raise with a standard continuation bet. He could have just about anything — but, in the eyes of your opponent, so could you. Against this semi-coordinated board, I would estimate that your kings are currently best well over 50% of the time, heck perhaps even over 60% of the time. Oftentimes, you would have chosen to simply lead/donk bet into the raiser, but in this case you decide to make the obvious check. (After all, if you always bet into a preflop raiser on flops like this, he will start calling, floating or raising you very liberally.) But a check-raise in this spot isn’t very advisable either, not even in the situation that we have here, where we expect our kings to be good more often than not. The reason is simple: you are opening yourself up to a reraise that you cannot call, not just from better hands than yours, but just as well from semi-bluffing hands like a pair plus flush draw, or the 8–6–5-x or 10–9–8 (inside) wraps. In other words: you are risking an awful lot of money in a situation where your check-raise doesn’t necessarily look all that strong, and in a situation where your opponent also has the option to flatcall and use a scare card on the turn to bet you off your hand (assuming that indeed he reads you for a decent or even good made hand). In this spot, you should sometimes check-call with the intention of betting out on the turn. While some players would make this play if the turn is a blank (in order to represent a made hand like two pair that waited for a safe turn card to invest extra chips), I don’t like this play much. It looks very weak, and could invite your opponent to either bluff-raise you on the turn or just call and then use a scary river to (bluff-)bet you out. No, I like to lead out on the turn in situations where the board has actually changed, and where I am representing a specific nut hand. For instance, if the turn is the 3♣ or the 8♣ and I bet out two-thirds pot, my bet says: “I have a straight.” And as it is quite unlikely that my opponent has a straight, heck in all likelihood he doesn’t have better than just one big pair or a small two pair, it is quite likely that this turn bet will simply buy you the pot. “But wait”, you might say. “If indeed this bet will buy me the pot, it is almost certainly in a situation where I actually had the best hand. In this situation, I cannot make my opponent fold all that many better hands — so what looks like a bluff bet that buys the pot is often just a bet that will take away the bluff from my opponent. Right?” Well, again — not really. Assuming my opponent has a moderate-sized hand on the turn (either slightly better or slightly worse than our hand), he will

usually just take the free card and check it back. If he has a slightly worse hand than we have, our turn check has now given him a free card to outdraw our kings. But perhaps just as importantly, if our opponent bets the turn after our check, there is no way we can call or even raise here — as we could very well be drawing dead. But obviously, a significant percentage of our opponent’s bet could easily be bluffs! So, this is one of those spots where taking over the lead betting after a dangerous turn card could earn us pots where we would have been forced to check/fold against a bet. Plus, we will often still be able to make slightly better hands fold because we represented more strength than we actually had. I am thinking about hands like A-A-x-x or relatively weak two pair hands like J-4-x-x that may simply give up here, rather than call and get themselves involved in a marginal spot where they may also get faced with a large river bet. The key is to make these types of plays in relatively “protected” spots — spots where it is unlikely your opponent can or will make a big bluff or semibluff raise. In this situation, the board doesn’t offer that many draws other than straight draws, and your play is consistent with how you would have played an inside wrap (in case of the 8♣), or a small wrap like 8–6–5-x when there’s a higher straight draw on the board (in case of the 3♣), In addition, the opponent is unlikely to have the nuts himself, and he cannot easily have a big enough draw to represent the nuts in order to bully you out of the pot. For instance had the turn been the 3♠, the 3♥ or the 3♦ instead of the 3♣, there would have been a flush draw on the board. And with a big draw like 10–9–8-x + flush draw, or a combination hand like two pair plus nut flush draw, this could have been a spot for your opponent to think: “Well, this guy could indeed very well have the straight that he is representing. But with so many outs even in this worst case scenario, there is a lot of value in just trying to blast him out of the pot, to make him fold the current best hand. Yet even if I do get action, I will still have a bunch of outs to get lucky and win the pot.”

Balancing overaggression, bluffs and tricky moves with passive or straightforward play This is one of the keys to successful shorthanded play. Some players are just too tricky for their own good, or have just one gear: the ever-bluffing and bullying LAP. It is important to also change gears every once in a while by giving your opponents a break sometimes, by slowing down a little bit, or by playing a hand in a straightforward and obvious manner rather than the tricky manner that people might expect from you. By slowing down from time to time, you want to make sure that your bets and raises stay credible enough to warrant respect. And this is important: you want to steal more than your fair share of pots, but if you go after almost every pot you play people will start using this pattern of play against you. The key is to always analyze the current state of mind that your opponent (s) may have. Probably, you will be multitabling and face some of your opponents in multiple games. So, you should have a good clue as to how they are running, and whether or not they may be on the verge of tilt. (For this reason, you should always try to keep open as many tables as possible, especially bigger games than yours that one of your opponents may be playing in. If he loses a big pot in the bigger game, good chance that he will suddenly get more active in your game — meaning you should try to steal less, bluff less and (check-)call more to induce bluffs.) Just as important is balancing your tricky moves with straightforward play. I will illustrate this with an example. You hold A♥-5♠-4♠-3♦ in the big blind in a three-way pot. After it got checked around on the flop K♥-6♦-2♠, you have taken a stab at the pot after the turn 10♥, betting two-thirds of the pot. The button, who has been the preflop minraiser, now raises you full pot. You know this player pretty well, and he is not particularly tricky. So, you know that this 10♥ had definitely helped him, his most logical hands being: ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠

A set of 10s. Top two pair, possibly with a straight draw or a non-nut flush draw to go with it. (Less likely) a slowplayed set of kings. (Less likely) a semi-bluff with a A-Q-J-x wrap, possibly with a flush draw to go with it. (Less likely) a combination hand like A-A-Q-9 for an overpair + gutshot, that wants to bet you off a better hand and/or secure himself of a free showdown.

Having played against this opponent many times, you decide to make a tricky play. The money being quite deep with room for exactly one pot-sized bet after you call, you decide that calling this raise could indeed be worth it because of an interesting combination of getting paid off when you hit, and the possibility for successful bluffs if you don’t. All in all, your plan for the river looks like this: With any non-pairing heart except the 5♥, 4♥ and 3♥ Bluffing pot or close to it (in case of an all-in) with the bare A♥. Assuming your opponent respects your play, he will realize that for you to call a pot-sized raise OOP with just one card to come, you need to have a premium draw — the nut flush draw almost certainly being part of it. So, even if he would also have made a queen-or jack-high flush on the river, he could still fold a decent percentage of the time (assuming of course that your read on his play and on the respect that he has for your play is correct). With the 5♥, 4♥ and 3♥ Bet small, say between 30% and 40% of the pot, with your straight. The goals are hoping to induce a call from two pair or a set because of this discount, while at the same time trying to save money if the opponent has a non-nut flush that he will not lay down (that also would not have folded against a full-pot bet). With any non-heart 5, 4 or 3 Again betting pot or close to it, this time for value. These cards will look like relative blanks to your opponent, and your big bet has all the signs of a busted straight or flush draw. So, with hands like K-10-x-x or better you can expect him to pay you off, and he might even make a hero call with the A-A-Q-9, as he won’t expect you to call a pot-sized raise OOP with low straight cards when higher straight draws are available. He may fear the combo nut flush draw + small straight cards once you bet on the river, but given the high amount of uncertainty and high number of possible busted draws, you can expect to get called liberally — even by a guy who respects you. With any non-heart 8 or 7 Bluff about 60% of the time, representing the 9–8–7-x combo, the other times just check and fold. With any non-heart A, Q, J or 9 Bluff slightly less often, ranging from 40% of the time for the nine to about 20% of the time for the A. (As this ace is a card that could actually have helped his hand not just through the Q-J combo, but also through the A-A-x-x combos and even the A-K-10-x combo — all likely holdings, given your opponent’s preflop and flop actions. Taking into account that players tend to fear straights less than flushes, your opponent will also tend to make a stand with a set here, meaning that basically the only hands that will almost always fold against this river bluff would be K-10-x-x or worse.) With all cards that pair the board Simply check and fold. So, you have decided to make your loose OOP call because of the combination of the likelihood of getting paid off handsomely if you hit, mostly because of the surprise value of your hidden draw, and the many excellent bluffing cards on the river that seem to have hit when in reality they have not. But in order to stay credible and believable, and to avoid that your playing pattern “call raise OOP on turn/then bet river once the nuts changes” doesn’t contain too many bluffs, you should also play your hands straightforwardly in similar situations. Because if your opponent knows that you will only call from out of position in this spot with a lot of bluffing rights and with draws that have surprise value, he will start respecting your bluff bets less from the more “obvious” draws like the large straight draws and the flush draws that could have materialized. In other words: he might start calling your pot bet with hands as weak as just top two pair if he realizes that the bare A♥ will account to a large percentage of your river bets. In order to avoid this, you should sometimes just play your big draws straightforwardly. Let’s say that in this exact same spot, with the same K♥-6♦2♠-10♥ board, the same opponent and the same betting sequence, your hand is A♥-Q♥-J♥-3♦ this time, rather than the A♥-5♠-4♠-3♦ from before. In other words: this time you do actually have the nut flush draw, with a powerful wrap to go with it. All in all, a premium draw, but unfortunately not a very hidden one. If you call this raise from OOP and then complete your draw on the river, your opponent may read you for the exact hand you have — and thus you may not get paid off very often if you hit. Still, to balance your play it is important to also play your hands in a straightforward and obvious manner at times. While usually with a draw this big, I would have a tendency to just reraise pot on the turn as a semi-bluff (thinking that even if I get called, I may still have around 40% equity even with just

one card to come), in this situation it may not be correct. Given the premium draw that I have (including the crucial A♥, Q♥ and J♥), it has become even less likely than before that my opponent is pushing a draw here. So, the chances of him having K-10-x-x with some extras or even 10–10-x-x go up even further — and heads up on the turn, after no action on the flop, there is just no way these hands can be folded, not even against a player who demands respect. So, in this case, it can be worth it sometimes to make a meek call on the turn, and then simply go for the obvious river bet if I hit and just give up if I don’t. Looking at just this one hand, this is of course a clearly + EV play, because of the many outs that I have, and given that I still have at least a little bit of implied odds — especially the non-heart Q, J and 9 should still get paid off rather frequently. But perhaps more importantly — looking at the broader picture — sometimes playing exactly in line with my hand strength is a good way to balance my play, and to avoid too much trickiness. What’s more, if my timing is good I will make sure that I first bluff out my opponent with the tricky play from before, and that once my opponent becomes a bit suspicious I make the seemingly exact same play by playing my premium draw straightforwardly and passively. This second time, he might then pay me off because of this suspicion — only to get shown my obvious draw that has materialized. So, quite clearly you should make the plays in this order, not in the reverse order. Because if you make the obvious play the first time against someone who respects you, he will in all likelihood fold whenever you have hit. But if you then start making the tricky play later on, say after he has already folded once or twice in similar situations and thus may start to get a bit suspicious — you may get called exactly the times when you are bluffing. This is exactly the pattern that happens to weak players: at first, they are scared to make a play or go for a bluff, and thus wait patiently for the nuts. Then, once they have made this nuts two or three times in a row to receive no action, they start thinking: “Geez, this is so easy, and I get so much respect. I might start trying this with nothing, as a bluff.” But they forget that their opponents who have seen them win a few pots with out a fight, will start to get a bit suspicious about this picking up pots uncontested — and thus are likely to start calling exactly once the weak player decides to go for his smart move. Needless to say, this is the exact opposite of how one should be balancing bluffs and value bets. The plays were made in the wrong order, without taking into account how the opponents would assess these patterns of play — two cardinal sins in shorthanded play.

Counterstrategies against good, aggressive players: maintaining an edge versus the pros One of the most difficult things there is. What do you do when you are at a table with just winning players? The most obvious answer is of course: find yourself another game. But what if the first two players on the waiting list are very weak players. Do you voluntarily give up your seat to let them sit down, so you can get behind them on the waiting list? The answer is: of course not. Because if you do, by the time that you get your seat again, the fishes will already be cleaned out. In other words: if you play in a bad game, or you get a seat in a game with just good players, you will simply have to hold your own — and yes, this includes minimizing your losses until the weak players will enter. Here are some things that I would tend to do: ♠

Sit out more often than I usually would, or stall the action a bit more often and a bit longer than would seem necessary. Once the game becomes a bit too tedious or slow that it may lead to one of my fellow pros leaving the game, I can kill two birds with one stone: get rid of the pro, and have him replaced by a fish. Obviously, these sit out or stalling tactics are not exactly sportsmanlike, so you should not use them very often. Only when you are pretty sure that at the current table you just don’t have an edge, yet your prospects for the future are good. ♠ Once I get a seat in a bad game but with some weak players behind me on the list again, this might be a good time to start using my goodold shortstacking tactic. After all, good and winning regulars in 6-max often share one characteristic: they play a very loose-aggressive game where they make lots of bets and raises with hands that don’t really warrant it. And because they almost always play maximum buyins, this could be a perfect time for you to start using the 30–40BB tactic from this book, or even the minimum 20BB buy-in if you think this would be better (for instance, if your opponents make lots of minraises and small bets rather than full pot raises). Of course, once one of the fishes would enter the game with 100BB, you also instantly reload to 100BB. This is especially true when you have position on him, and the best time to reload is when you are on the button. ♠ Of course, sometimes you enter a good game with a full stack, only to find out that the table has slowly but surely turned sour. The way to still gain an edge would be to take advantage of specific stats, or of the way your opponents view you. Assuming you use Poker Tracker and Poker Ace HUD 15, it could be worth it to start analyzing your opponents really well, and look for any out of the ordinary stats that could give you an edge. Given that your opponents are winning regulars who have often played with you and who in all likelihood also have lots of stats or notes on you, it is now time to start playing in an entirely different way than you normally would. Especially if your opponents see you as a good and aggressive — but not overaggressive — player who usually has the goods, it may now be the time to start bluffing more often, reraise in position even more often than you normally would, and deviate from your usual standard 60–80% pot bets that almost all good players use, and instead start betting either the minimum or full pot (often through simple randomizing, rather than use the texture of the board as a guideline). Anything that will get them out of their comfort zone is good, especially if you analyze in depth their aggression factors for the later streets, their went to showdown percentages, or any other stats that imply tighter or looser play than the norm. Of course, you make all these adjustments while using a much tighter hand selection than usual and only entering pots in position — as the last thing you want is get involved with marginal holdings or problem hands, out of position against good players. Also, those times that you have a really big hand, don’t be afraid to play it straightforwardly — as good players expect a fellow good player like you to be trapping often and use tricky plays in order to outthink them. Especially pot-betting all the way with the nut flush could be a good way to convince the weak players that you must have the bare ace — as normally, you would almost never bet the pot, let alone on boards that offer the possibility of a completed hand.

Still, as game selection is so important, you should never play in a bad game for too long, not even when future prospects may be good. If your strength is in line with my strength — exploiting average, below-average and somewhat predictable players — there’s no shame in stepping away from a game simply because you don’t have any kind of edge. This is something that I have always done, and one cannot say that it has been bad for me16.

The psychology underlying bet sizes; how to trick your opponents into making mistakes This is one of my pet peeves — and one of the main reasons why I have always gotten so many “gifts” from my opponents. For years, people have criticized me for being “not much of a player”, yet someone who “could only do well because his opponents just kept handing me money”. Of course, I did not just “get” this money; I had to work very hard for it. One of the keys: my unusual betting patterns. In contrast to the “correct” view of always betting the same size, I tend to vary the size of my best often, but perhaps just as importantly I have a large arsenal of seemingly strange bets. Almost always are my goals the same: ♠ Try to trick the one weak or exploitable player who is in the hand with me, by making him do something that he wouldn’t have done if I had bet the standard way. ♠ Avoid making these strange bets in some kind of pattern — make sure that a specific bet doesn’t always mean I am strong or I am weak. ♠ Make sure that in future pots against good players, I remember exactly which strange plays I have made against the weak players over the course of this session, so I can use this to my advantage the next time I am playing the strong player. For instance, if he has seen me make a small raise from $90 to $199 on a paired board with what turned out to be a monster hand that wanted action from the weak player, I try to mimic this exact same play in a similar situation the next time that I face the strong player. Of course, you need to be fairly certain that the good player has in fact noticed your previous actions. But if you play according to strange betting patterns, you can expect this to be the case17. And even if the good player has missed the actual hand, he will probably have taken a look at the hand history — if only to see how you have taken this serious dent out of the weak player’s stack. In my first PLO book that was mostly about full-ring play, I already discussed the flop minbet into the field, and the reasoning behind it. Other seemingly odd plays for full-ring include my minraises preflop, my minbets in late position to induce check-raises, and all strange or unusual bets, which have made me a lot of money over the years because people would not take the correct countermeasures. In shorthanded PLO, I tend to play with fewer frills through. As I face fewer opponents, and am involved with them in many more hands, it is imperative that I don’t provide them with too much information about the strength of my holding through my betting patterns. I have already explained my lessthan-pot-sized open raises that are always the same size, all stemming from my goal to provide as little information as possible to my opponents before the flop. And also on the flop, assuming I am in a three-or four-way pot, my betting is rather standard. Even though I vary my bets, this varying usually does not involve the strength of my hand. The reasons are usually the texture of the board, whether my opponents are likely to have hit, or whether in their view I am likely to have hit. In this situation, any flop betting I will do usually looks like this.

Basic betting pattern from the flop onward Fairly drawheavy boards 70–85% of pot, usually betting around 70% when in position and 75–85% when I have at least one player behind me. Relatively dry boards 50–65% of pot, choosing the lower end when the psychology makes it likely that I could have a big hand and/or that my opponents have missed. Boards that offer the possibility of a completed flush When there are three cards of the same suit, I tend to bet small, usually around 55% of the pot four-way down to just 40% or 45% threeway, regardless of whether I have the nut flush, a non-nut flush, a set, the bare ace, two pair, or just a plain bluff. Most of the time, I can expect to get action only from a completed flush (usually by calling, even though the ace-high flush will sometimes raise), the bare ace (usually by raising, only occasionally through the tricky play of delaying the bluff), and sometimes from a set or two pair. And because on this type of board, the only types of hands that can feel comfortably raising me are hands that contain the ace of trump (either the bare ace or the actual nut flush), this is an excellent way to pick up many pots at relatively little cost. The times that I face a raise it is almost always back to my reads on how to continue from then on, where the speed of someone’s raise, the size of the raise and whether or not he is trying to blast players out or keep them in could be indications whether or not I am facing a bare ace play. Of course, if I suspect a naked ace and I have a non-nut flush, I will almost always take a passive line, as the “I might as well go all-in myself as I will have to call anyway” play is obviously the worst possible option in this spot. (Tip: expect more bare ace plays from players in late position and from the blinds, and especially in pots where there has been relatively little preflop action. Expect to see the nuts or a king-high flush from relatively tight earlyposition players, simply because they would rarely enter pots voluntarily with hands that contain an offsuit ace. It is still possible, but simply less likely.) Also, if my standard flop bet on these all-suited board gets called, I can still get paid off handsomely if I indeed have the nuts, adjust my betting in such a manner that I may bluff out completed flushes, or if I have a set, adjust my betting in such a manner that I will reach the river where if I hit, I could get a big payoff from a completed flush. When out of position, I would often fire a smaller-than-usual second barrel that it is basically just a stop bet, and in position it is usually best to check back. The key here: assuming the caller is a weak player with a completed flush, he will probably be “committed to calling no matter what”, and he is just as unlikely to raise this stop bet on the turn as he is to lay down his hand against larger bets. Obviously, this is one of the situations where your value bets on the river would be much larger than usual, for instance, if your set improves to a full house or quads on the river, or if you have had the nut flush all along and now are trying to figure out how you can extract the maximum from your hand. Of course, it is important to realize that this is how you would play against a weak player that you read for a non-nut flush. But don’t automatically copy these playing patterns (the stop bet on the turn with a set, the much-larger-than-usual value bet on the river) against good players who will notice these patterns, and adjust accordingly. Paired boards Bet quite small, usually between 35–50% of the pot, or in a heads-up situation with the pair consisting of two big cards, sometimes even smaller than that. The key: small bets tend to represent as much strength as bigger bets would, while costing less if they fail or if your opponent has a good enough hand to stand the heat. Boards that offer a completed straight, say flops like 10–9–8 rainbow or 9♠-8♠-6♠ I tend to bet bigger in this spot, from 65% of the pot three-way and in position, to about 85% of the pot four-way and out of position. These bigger bets have a few advantages: a) They help clearing the field, and make it easier to see where the strength lies (if any). b) Smaller bets tend to induce calls from full house, flush and higher straight draws. This is especially true on the drawheavy 9♠-8♦-6♠ flop. With so many turn cards that can change the current nuts (regardless of whether you are actually betting with the current nuts), it is

better to limit the field to just one player or even win the pot outright. c) Assuming that in fact you have the current nuts (Q-J) on this 10–9–8 rainbow flop, betting big may have the benefit of getting out players who are drawing live. Hands as strong as 9–9 for middle set or 8–8 for bottom set will definitely not feel comfortably calling here, as they will fear not just a completed straight but perhaps more importantly a bigger set. At the same time, you may keep in those hands that could be drawing very thin or even dead to your holding: players who will stubbornly hold onto smaller straights like J-7 or even 7–6 that have absolutely no way of improving. That is my basic strategy on the flop, usually from the perspective of the (common) scenario where I have voluntarily have entered the pot, usually through my standard raise. But especially against weak or exploitable players, or in situations where I am out of position or have not made the last preflop raise, I will sometimes deviate from this pattern — and rely on what I will call special bets.

Deviating from the standard approach: using strange, unusual and special bets to accomplish goals The quick minbet from out of position One of my favorite — and also least understood — plays in a situation where (given the stack sizes and the preflop betting) my relative position is bad and I would often be forced to check-fold against an automatic continuation bet. As a defense, I will often make a super-fast minbet on the flop — before I had even had the time to see whether or not this flop has actually been good to me. The surprise value of this minbet will usually require some thinking on the part of my opponent(s), and as a result he will sometimes just call now rather than the continuation bet that he was planning to make. In case of a call, I will then make this exact same ultra-fast bet on the turn, and (if called again) also on the river. This is a play that I introduced in the full-ring live games, mostly as a slight and cheap deviation from my sandbagging tactics, but they are even more useful in shorthanded play. Especially if I have a hand that is decent but that has too many gaps (something like A♠-j♥-8♠-7♥), this strange tactic can help in keeping me out of tough spots. Some advantages: ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠

♠

♠

♠

♠

You get to the turn and river much more often than you would after a simple check. At almost minimal cost, as the minimum bet is just the size of the big blind — not just on the flop, but also on the turn or river. You get initiative, and that is always good. Once your opponent has noticed your playing pattern, and knows that on the turn or river you will make the same bets as on the flop (and that thus a flatcall on the flop may not get punished by you with larger bets to take advantage of the weakness that his call has implied), he may accept your play as a cheap way to go to the showdown to see who has the best hand. While this may seem good to him, it is especially good to you. Because if your opponent doesn’t raise you at any stage in the hand, you will have reached the showdown for an investment of almost always less than just 30% of the total pot. There is not a single hand that would have less than 30% pot equity, plus given that you are out of position this end result is even better. A very strange thing, but nonetheless true: in this betting scenario, your opponent will tend to fold on the river a significant percentage of the time! Because I strictly hold onto also minbetting on the river regardless of whether I have a strong hand, a decent hand or a busted draw, I sometimes win pots with absolutely nothing and for just a minimum bet. Often, my opponent will just be too embarrassed to call on the river with ace high or even a small pair, although they could get well over 15 to 1 on their money. If suddenly, at one point in the hand, my opponent decides to raise me, this can give away tremendous information about his hand. It is important to realize that once my opponent just calls my OOP minbet on a flop like J♥-8♠-5♠, that he can almost never have a quality made hand or a premium draw — as he would never want to let this basically non-bet succeed in getting me to the turn. Now, if after a Q♦ on the turn I again minbet and my opponent now raises, or better if the turn is a blank and my opponent calls, only to raise big after a Q♦ on the river, it is highly unlikely that my opponent has the nuts here. After all, assuming that indeed he is the preflop raiser, and assuming that indeed he has 10–9 for the nut straight, it is almost unthinkable that his other two cards won’t match with the board cards at least to some degree. And in that case, he would definitely have raised much earlier in the hand — no question about that. So, if my opponent now suddenly raises on the river, this may be a perfect spot for me to reraise, even — and especially — if I don’t have anything. My opponent’s river range in this spot contains a whole lot of pure bluffs, some 10–10-x-x and 9–9-x-x blocker plays, and a few Q-Q-x-x or Q-J-x-x hands that he is raising for value, but almost no 10–9-x-x hands for the current nuts. So, this may be a perfect time for me to represent it, especially against players who know that according to my minbetting system, I will also minbet on the river with the nuts. (Rather than what most players would do, get a little greedy and suddenly bet bigger after all.) This is the reason why I always make these minbets at super-fast pace: to make it clear to my opponent that I have done so regardless of the river, and that thus I would also make this minbet with the nuts. And this is the reason why on both the turn and the river, I can credibly represent the nuts by three-betting, in situations where it is highly unlikely that my opponent has it. And if indeed he doesn’t have the nuts when I reraise, the pot should be mine nine times out of 10 — even more so because if my read is right, the vast majority of his raises were bluffs and weak holdings, compared to just a small percentage of raises for value. Of course, if I have a marginal hand rather than a bluff, this would be a great spot to simply call that raise — and expect to catch my opponent bluffing a significant percentage of the time. In other words, I could make this profitable call and win a pot I would not have won otherwise simply because of the information that my opponent provided by not raising my “meaningless” minbets earlier in the hand.

Funny-sized bets When up against players who can be manipulated, irritated or tricked into making wrong decisions, I often make funny-sized bets. (I do this very often anyway, especially on sites that do not support the use of Auto Hot Keys.) As can be seen from my betting and raising tactics, I tend to make much smaller bets than most players do, and I almost never bet the size of the pot. (Even though I do sometimes raise or reraise the pot, especially in situations where there are lots of draws on the board and this pot-sized reraise would commit me fully to the pot.) On those sites where I have to type in the amounts that I want to bet (I rarely use the slider options that sites offer, as I think they suffer from too many drawbacks), I like to use amounts that are quick-to-type and strange at the same time. The more I can disguise which percentage of the pot I am actually betting or raising, the better it is. For instance, bets like $77 into a $175 pot may look like half-pot bets, may be perceived as half-pot bets — yet in reality I am risking considerably less than that. Another one of my favorites: use the possibility to bet dollar-cents. You may not fool a good player, but you may fool a lesser-skilled player who cannot calculate his pot odds as easily, or who may look for all kinds of irrelevant reasons why

you would choose this specific amount. One of my favorite betting patterns against weak players who have trouble calculating their odds could look like this: come out betting $69 into a $140 pot with a decent draw, then this same $69 on the turn when I have not completed my draw (obviously, as a stop bet), and then a final bet of $269 on the river once I have hit. As my opponent sees the same 69 number every time, and has gotten into the habit of calling this bet, he will now be tempted to just continue this pattern — this although this river bet is almost four times as large as the previous ones! Had I chosen to bet an even amount of $200 or $300 for a clear deviation of my previous pattern, he could have viewed these bets differently, and might have responded differently — not in the last place because he may find all of his calculations easier with this even number. Of course, all of this is not real strategy — it is a bit of a ploy that won’t work often against good players who can see what you are doing. But even against them it could be worth it to use similar psychology — or even reverse psychology. (For instance, if I want to keep weak players to continue their calling patterns, I will often use the same numbers on the river to not get them out of their current state of mind/play. If good players know that this is one of my tactics, it could be worth it to turn this around whenever I am playing against them, by continuing the same odd numbers from before when I want a fold, or by making a sudden shift to an even-numbered amount when I actually want a call.) An important thing though: always write down in your notes which one of your opponents have either been victim of one of these plays, or have seen you use it against others. Once you know how they may view your bets, you can use this thinking against them the next time the two of you play a pot. Here is an example from a recent game I played. Against one of my regular opponents, I raised his $60 river bet to $199 with a full house. He called and I won. About half an hour later, he bet $90 on (again) a paired board, this time on the turn. I had nothing, but raised him to again this same amount, $199. It was basically a cheap bluff (barely more than double his bet), but because I knew my opponent would remember our previous pot and be weak enough to not realize I would almost never bet my big hands the same way against him in such a short period of time, I was able to get away with it. Had I been using standard bets like $60, $100 or $200, I could never have included bet sizing psychology to take advantage of my opponent’s wrong reasoning.

Exploiting common betting patterns One of the most obvious patterns that weak players portray when they have a big hand is this: a minimum (check-) raise on the flop, followed by a big, usually pot-sized bet on the turn. An example is the minraise on a fairly dry board — more often than not the indication of an absolute monster like top or middle set. This minraise is in itself not such a bad play, but you will see lots of players make them only when they have a really big hand — making their cards quite transparent for those who pay attention. Therefore, when facing such a minimum (check-) raise, it is imperative to analyze the skill level of this specific player. Only some deep-level thinkers are capable of mimicking this play when they actually are not very strong, and a few action players would use this play to either gamble it up or just gain initiative — but against the vast majority of players you should be willing to fold even some rather strong holdings even for this cheap price. (Unless of course you have a draw. Even when it’s a weak draw like just an open-ender, it could be worth it to call the minraise, as you can expect to take your opponent’s entire stack if you hit. The best play here would be the check-raise pot on the turn if it could get you all-in or close to it. An alternative, if you are very certain that you face specifically top set, could be to wait to pull the trigger until a blank comes on the river. However, I tend to just push my edge when I have one, and delaying my action only to see a scare card on the river freeze the action or kill my market is something that I usually try to avoid.) Another common betting pattern from weak players who have bet the flop is this: bet pot on the turn once the board has paired and they have a full house, but just check (back) if on the flop they had just been semi-bluffing with a draw. Obviously, as I discussed in my previous book, this is an awful way to play, but some players display it nonetheless and therefore you should take advantage of it. But also some good players have clear giveaways in this situation. Those who (just like me) almost never bet full pot, tend to bet slightly bigger on the turn with a paired board when they are bluffing than when they have a real hand. Those who don’t look well enough may not notice it, but I know even some very good players who tend to bet just over half the pot when they are bluffing or are not overly strong, and just under half the pot when they have a good hand that is looking for a call. Weak players are usually the easiest to take advantage of. But also good or very good players sometimes give away their hands, simply because in a certain situation, they would only bet this way with a very limited range of hands. A few examples: ♠ When a good player bets full pot in a multiway pot on a flop like A-A-K or A-A-Q, he almost always has a very big hand that just wants to make his hand look suspicious, in order to get action from someone with a lone A. He knows that most players would slowplay in this spot, so if he bets big on the flop and especially if he also follows this up with a big bet on the turn, this is almost never a bluff. As he would almost never have an ace with some random kickers in this spot (he would probably have tried to play a small pot with them), and would tend to give up all bluffs once his huge flop bet got called, expect his minimum hands to be either K-K or Q-Q for the underfull, or just as often simply A-K or A-Q for the stone cold nuts. Some LAPs even bet extra quick in this spot to make their play look even more suspicious, but in this case they almost always display a “strong means strong” tell — meaning you should fold everything but the nuts. Note that if on boards like this the good, aggressive player is bluffing or testing the waters, he will often take a stab of 40–80% of the pot. Bets in the upper range like 70–80% of the pot on A-A-x boards tend to be one-shot affairs with hands like K-K or Q-Q that want to know where they stand. Bets of 40–60% of the pot are often A-x-x-x hands, the x-x-x not being very strong, or even flat out steals. But the big, potsized bets on these A-A-x and especially ace-ace-big boards are almost always the sign of a big hand — at least, once you see it is a good LAP who is making them. ♠ If in a situation where a good player who has raised preflop would usually make a standard continuation bet of 60–80% of the pot, now takes more time than usual and then bets a slightly smaller amount than he normally would, this is almost always a massive hand looking for action. Expect to see hands like top set or aces + nut flush draw more often than not — hands that hope to induce a check-raise from a significantly weaker holding. ♠ Again, a good player in a three-or four-way pot; this time he is on the button. If the flop is checked around, and then on the turn the good player bets full pot after another round of checks, this is almost always a weak holding. As the other players probably don’t hold much and the good player has position, it is fair to assume that if he really had a big hand or if maybe the turn has given him the nut straight or so, he would have bet slightly less than the pot to not lose his market. And if the turn card was a blank, this bet is even more suspicious, as there are very few hands that are not worth a bet on the flop in the best possible position once it gets checked around, but that on the turn are suddenly worth the maximum possible amount. This giveaway is especially reliable on Full Tilt, where pot-sized bets after the flop are usually more than the actual pot (because the rake has already been taken out of the pot, yet pot-sized bets are counted as if the rake is still part of the pot).

Heads-up tactics The most important piece of advice for those who want to play PLO heads-up cash games is also the simplest: don’t play against people who are better than you, unless you have specific reasons to do so (like eagerness to learn or improve, or because you are a sponsored pro who needs to show off a little to maintain credibility). I have been playing heads up for just a year now, and have held on to this simple rule in a rather strict manner. Even as a sponsored pro, I would not play someone if I knew I would take too much the worst of it. And after just one year of heads up experience, I cannot say I am one of the very best heads-up players around — I am still learning, and would get creamed if I played regularly against experienced high-stakes heads up pros. However, during my time at T-6, I have been able to make decent money at heads up, even with what I view to be fairly limited skills and experience. So, here’s my story with some tidbits of advice — mostly things that have worked for me, but that may not necessarily work for you. As I wrote in the beginning of this book, becoming a sponsored pro at a site with just shorthanded play was a big step for me. After all, I had always specialized in full-ring games, and had actually been avoiding short-handed play until I signed this deal. From then, I quickly learned to become a more than decent 6-max player. I needed to, as I had agreed to log in 80 hours per month, minimum three tables — so if I was not good enough, this could turn out to be a very expensive deal rather than a lucrative one. Slowly but surely, I was also good enough to continue playing once the games would become four- or three-handed, until I finally would register for all games, even if that meant starting up games heads up. (I agreed to play everyone, except for two heads up specialists at the site who would quit once the games would get full, and two sponsored pros who simply had too much of an edge heads up.) In the beginning, I would play no bigger than €0.5-€1, but slowly I worked my way up and would play everyone at stakes €1-€2, €2-€4 and €3-€6, except for the four players mentioned. I quickly recognized a few key errors in the play of some of my regular opponents. They included: ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠

Giving away information through different-sized preflop raises. Too frequently making pot-sized check-raises on the flop in single-raised pots, with stacks 100B+. Defending the big blind too frequently with trouble hands. Not enough donk betting or other surprise moves later in the hand. Making different-sized bets on the river with bluffs or weak holdings than with big or value-betting hands. Giving away timing tells, the most obvious one being the quick, pot-sized bet that is a bluff. Losing self control after losing the first buy-in. Playing too predictably. Not adjusting well enough to the opponent’s specific weaknesses. Only reraise pot from the big blind with A-A-x-x, and maybe occasionally also with quality kings or double-suited high cards — but almost never with any other (smaller) type of hand.

Recognizing these weaknesses in others didn’t mean that I played flawless. Quite the contrary: I basically learned and improved while on the job. At first, I tried to limit myself to only play big pots in position, meaning that I never reraised OOP, not even with aces. But as my opponents started realizing this, they became increasingly active from the small blind/button (SBB) knowing that they never had to fear a reraise. So, slowly but surely I started adding the reraise pot from OOP into my game. I started reraising about 12–18% of my opponent’s preflop raises; reraising more liberally once the SBB would open raise light. I quickly realized that in order to use this play profitably, I needed to have a rather balanced three-bet range. So, rather than just the premium hands and big cards that most people would choose, in my case about 60–70% of all reraising hands would consist of double-suited small and medium cards, or other what people might call “speculative holdings”. The reasons: Surprise value As long as my opponents hadn’t seen these types of holdings in a showdown very often, they would expect me to reraise pot with big cards — especially because I wasn’t that overaggressive to begin with and would fold quite often when OOP. In other words: assuming my opponent would call the three-bet, I could expect to pick up a large percentage of the pots when the flop had not helped me at all, while occasionally winning a huge pot when the flop would seem to be bad for me. Protection against a four-bet If I would reraise with hands like K♠-Q♥-Q♣-9♦ and my opponent would come over the top, I would have to lay down my hand if I would read him for a premium holding; say something like 75% + aces. Assuming that indeed I was playing someone who would not four-bet very liberally, I would be much better off reraising with hands like 9♠-8♥-6♠-5♥, as I would never be reraising myself out of the pot. Playing a very live hand, knowing the type of hand I would need to beat, and even having over 40% pot equity hot and cold against his range, I could profitably call this four-bet even from OOP, knowing I would have sufficient implied odds. Usually meaning that any time the board would not have given him direct help like a pair on the board or even a third ace, I could bet into him either as a semi-bluff or because I really had flopped two pair or so, while check-folding on the flops that seemed to have helped him. So, by usually just flatcalling with unsuited big cards/high pairs that tended to do well against my opponent’s open range but not against his four-bet range, I would almost never reraise myself out of the pot, while at the same time disguising my hands well. A very important aspect here is that as heads-up play is so much about aggression, you would hate to lay down a hand after having made a three-bet — this is one of the true confidence boosters for the opponent. So, choosing your hand selection in such a way that this will rarely happen, will deter your opponent from making any kind of moves or light four-bets, knowing that “once Rolf has committed himself through a reraise, he will not go out easily”. And heads up, this is an image that you would like — as it allows you to keep the initiative. Plus it means that in the big pots, your opponent is likely to have the exact hand that he is representing — making it easier for you to take the correct countermeasures. (Of course, if my opponent would play significantly less than 100BB, I would switch to the more common practice of only reraising with my power hands, while playing the crummy double-suited hands a lot less aggressively.) One of the keys aspects in heads-up play is initiative, and for that reason I always try to be the last aggressor before the flop just a tiny bit more often than my opponent. That is the only given in my play — for the rest, I simply try to adapt as much as possible to any specific weaknesses in my opponent that I can exploit. At the site, there was one player who had a tendency to minraise with speculative holdings, while raising full pot with his premium hands. So against him, I would three-bet relentlessly against his minbets, knowing he would not have enough of a hand to four-bet, and to pave the way for picking up the vast majority of the pots when we both wouldn’t flop much. Yet, I would proceed carefully even with hands as good as A-K-Q-Q or K-K-x-x those (rare) times when he would raise full pot. One other player had the common pattern of calling or check-calling early in the hand, to then fire out a pot-sized bet at the first sign of weakness from me (a check). At first, this player caused me a lot of problems, as I would play my usual role of the aggressor preflop, and followed up my preflop

raise with a continuation bet on the flop at least 85% of the time, to then shut down on the turn if I really didn’t have much or if the board got scary. Of course, this allowed my opponent to see a lot of cheap rivers, and also to bluff or bet me out on the turn or river those times when I had made an “I give up” check. So, against him I slowly shifted to a pattern of play that included less preflop raises with marginal hands, in favor of just limping on the SBB with my speculative holdings in order to play a small pot in position. Also, I started making fewer continuation bets, yet started calling him down and even raising him more frequently on the turn and river, after he had responded to a check by me with his automatic pot bet on the next street. There was also another player who caused me quite a bit of trouble at first, because he would check-raise my continuation bets very often, especially on moderately coordinated and drawheavy boards like J♥-8♠-4♥. It took me a while to realize that it was my extremely high continuation betting percentage that got me into trouble here. So, I adjusted by still continuation betting with my good hands and pure bluffs, yet by often checking back my marginal made hands and relatively weak draws that I would have to fold against a check-raise. Even though the bad part of this adjustment was that I of course gave up initiative rather often, I made up for this because I wouldn’t get check-raised off the possibly best hand anymore, and I could snap off lots of bluff bets on the turn and river by using my position and my good reading ability. Plus, occasionally I would get lucky by making the nuts on the turn in a situation where my opponent was planning to check-raise me off my hand on the flop — and in that situation, having made the nuts on the turn, I would sometimes get excessive action as my opponent might not believe I would check back a hand with nut potential on the flop as the preflop raiser. It was my game plan from the start to always make the maximum 3BB total raise from the SBB, in order to push my edge preflop and to make sure I would play bigger pots in position than OOP (an important concept in heads-up play). However, some overaggressive players would start to reraise pot OOP quite often, reraising my open raises some 20 to even 25% of the time. With effective stacks of 100BB, this meant that 9BB each would be in the pot in case of a raise, reraise or call, and with 18BB in the middle and 91BB left, I would basically have just slightly more than one pot-sized bet left after my opponent’s automatic pot-sized bet on the flop. And if I would flatcall on the flop, on the turn he could profitably bet again, thinking (correctly) that there would be fewer hands in my range that were good enough to call or raise all-in here than hands that would require a prudent fold. In other words: I didn’t like this spot much against overaggressive guys who would not slow down. So, I decided that against them I would switch to just raising 2.5 times the BB to make the stacks a bit deeper, and I also started limping on the SBB more often to give my opponent the opportunity to take initiative from out of position — leading to him winning a large percentage of the small pots, yet losing a large percentage of the bigger ones. What I would especially avoid against them was playing a big pot when I had a trouble hand, knowing that they would not allow me to pick up medium-sized pots without a fight, but rather would do whatever they could to put the pressure on me. So, by slowing down in the marginal spots, I tried to avoid losing a lot, while at the same time give them the opportunity to hang themselves. Against weak, overaggressive players I had a sufficient edge because of these adjustments, because I would make an occasional semi-bluff (re)raise on the flop or turn when the opponent was likely to be weak/fear my hand, and because I would usually get paid off on my winners in the really big pots. But against good, overaggressive players I would simply refuse to play — just like most regulars who would refuse to play me, seeing that I seemed to be holding more than my own in the one on one games. A few of my edges: ♠ Constant adjustments in my strategy to the perception that my opponent has of me. ♠ Sell stories in the small pots to set up situations and profit from that later in big pots. ♠ Against unknown players: open the session with a few funny-sized bets, open limps and folds on the SBB to see if and how the opponent would respond and adjust. ♠ Make sure that my first reraise from OOP in a heads up session was never A-A-x-x, but almost always one of my funky hands. ♠ Once a rather weak opponent had won a few pots against me or had gained a bit of momentum, I would start to change the pace of the game a bit by stalling my actions, by folding more often, and by making some changes to my existing patterns of play. So, I would try to break my opponent’s rhythm; however, I would never sit out in this spot — as weak players will often use this as an excuse to make a hit and run play. ♠ Against regular hit and runners: either refuse to play them, or if they are really weak simply avoid playing big pots unless I really have the goods. Grind them down, and especially exploit them whenever they are on a downswing. ♠ If the opponent is really weak: never kill him completely. If I have won some massive pots or when the opponent seems ready to give up or recognize that I am just too good, I tend to slow down and let him win a few pots. Once I am lucky enough to find someone who is much weaker than I am, yet who still wants to play me regularly, it is important to never beat him more than some 65% of the time. If I beat him more often than that, I will have shot myself in the foot, because I will have lost a “customer”. ♠ Because I am not yet the best of heads-up players, I tend to only start heads-up games against unknowns at six-handed tables rather than at heads up tables. This way, if he proves to be better than me heads up, I could take advantage of the table filling up soon, or else take a break and use the excuse that I “want to wait for players”. Of course, if the opponent proves to be very weak, I can change my story to “Why are we seated at a six-handed table anyway. Let’s just open up a real heads up game.” ♠ Always remember my previous playing history with a regular opponent: know how he views me at this very point, and take advantage of the perception that he has of me right now. A few examples: value-bet larger and more often if he has caught me bluffing recently; start betting the dry ace more often if I have previously made some successful value bets with a flush; start using the line bet flop or go for the check-raise more often after I have had to make one or two check-folds on the turn; or fire a second or third barrel as a bluff if previously I have given up in similar spots by checking or giving up the initiative. Some people like to call this “metagame”, but I like to call it “knowing what they know/how they feel, and take advantage of that”. The key to my successful introduction in heads-up play — despite my far from perfect game, and the many leaks that it still contains.

10

Please note that had the flop action been multiway, this would have been a good spot to pick up the pot. Because now, from the perspective of your opponent, the “only hands that can call me on the flop must be hands that have me beat” — making your turn bet much more credible. But heads up, he will realize that he will get called much lighter, and that you may make a flop call in position simply to try to take away the pot on the turn. 11 Occasionally, you can also make this play profitably from out of position. Let’s say that on a paired board with no draws, a late-position bettor or the preflop raiser now bets big, and you are fairly certain he has no part of this flop at all, and may at best have a big pocket pair — perhaps not even that. If you check-call this bet, alarm bells may go off in his head that you must have at least three of a kind here. As a result, the action will almost certainly freeze on the turn, and after the check/check there, just a simple 50% or 60% pot bet on the river- that screams like a value bet from a slowplayed hand — should be enough to pick up the pot. This is a pattern of play that you will see so often in PLO (a spot where opponents will liberally fold hands like K-K or A-A just knowing that you have at least three of a kind here) that it is worth mimicking this play when you have nothing. Please note that in order to make this play credible, your flop call needs to be done in a three- or four-way pot with at least one player still too act. Because if your call closes the action, or if the action was just heads up to begin with, it becomes too obvious — meaning your opponent will not fold his hand all that easily anymore. 12 In fact, you can expect to get raised quite liberally as well, not just by truly big hands but also by weaker hands that use this J-10–9-x board

to represent a monster, knowing that if you do not have specifically K-Q, the pot could be up for grabs. 13 More on this later in this chapter, in the sub-section “The psychology behind the various bet sizes, and how to trick your opponents into making mistakes”. 14 Provided of course that the money is deep enough. The best stack size for you would be if the check-raise pot would be just about enough to put you (or the opponent) all-in. A little bit of money behind is also not so bad (in fact, it could help you bluff if by chance your opponent has a better draw than you but neither one of you improves). But the money should definitely not be that much deeper as it makes the play too expensive for too little gain, and because you may now be faced with another reraise that you may not be able to call. And it should not be that much shallower either, as your opponent may now be forced to call with some marginal holdings because of the excellent odds, meaning you might not have enough fold equity to make the play + EV. 15 In the appendix, you can find a thorough discussion on PokerTracker stats by two mutual friends of Rob and me. It is my goal to expand on this in my third book on PLO that would be exclusively about stats, percentages, and the use of specific software programs. Any help from true math wizards and experts on Poker Tracker Omaha heads up, 6-max and full-ring (but also on programs like Pro Poker Tools, Auto Hot Keys etc.) is more than welcome. 16 Please note that my co-writer Rob Hollink has always done the exact opposite. Playing in very tough games against expert players has always been judged by him as a “good learning experience”, and “the only way one can develop from a decent player to a top player”. And obviously, this attitude has paid huge dividends for him, as he is now holding more than his own in some of the biggest PLO games in the world. 17 To take maximum advantage, you should always check the chat right after you have won or lost a pot where you had a remarkable hand or used some strange betting patterns. This way, you will know which players could be exploited in future pots because of their (mis)interpretation of what they have just seen.

Chapter Six

Understanding High-Stakes PLO (Rob Hollink)

So far in this book, we have discussed strategies for low-or medium-sized shorthanded PLO games. At the high stakes, a whole different mindset is required. The game is much more aggressive, and opponents are much more knowledgeable. Deep-level thinking is the norm rather than the exception, and for this reason you will see many plays that in the eyes of those who don’t look well enough can be considered ‘crazy’. In this chapter, I will discuss a few of the most interesting hands that I have played in recent times. Most plays stem from the $200-$400 game at Full Tilt, where some of the best and most talented PLO players are gathered. I have collected hands that are interesting and insightful, even when in some of them I have made some crazy decisions or stupid mistakes. So by no means is this chapter intended to show how one should play. But it should contain enough interesting material and advanced moves to help one think at a higher level.

Hand 1: $200-$400 Pot-Limit Omaha The first hand I am going to discuss in this chapter is a three-way action hand on Full Tilt Poker. I am on the button, only 40BB deep, against highstakes regulars applsgirl and CHUFTY. Seat 1: Rob Hollink ($16,796) | plays the button Seat 2: Gus Hansen ($97,098) | is sitting out Seat 4: applsgirl ($133,070) | posts the SB of $200 Seat 5: CHUFTY ($23,661) | posts the BB of $400 Rob Hollink: A♠-2♦-5♣-Q♠

Preflop (pot = $600/three players) Rob Hollink (A♠-2♦-5♣-Q♠)raises to $800 applsgirl calls $600 CHUFTY folds I raise to $800 as my hand, on the button, justifies this in a three-way game. Applsgirl calls from the small blind and CHUFTY mucks. The reason I just make it $800 instead of $1,400 is that I think I can now more or less profitably call a reraise here, which I wouldn’t be able to do if I had raised to $1,400 preflop.

Flop J♦-10♠-Q♣ (pot = $2,000/two players) applsgirl checks Rob Hollink (A♠-2♦-5♣-Q♠) bets $1,600 applsgirl calls $1,600 Whether to bet the flop or not is an important decision in this hand. When I don’t bet this flop, I am actually giving up. Against a lot of players, not betting this flop will lead to a turn bet from them. Calling a turn bet would be tough already and thinking about the possibility that he will fire again on the river makes this call even tougher. So I like my bet here as it will give me a lot of information. He could easily fold when he has more or less the same hand as I have which, of course, is very nice. Furthermore, I know that when he calls me, he probably has the better hand. When he raises, I don’t have any problem releasing my hand. In this situation he is mostly way ahead and when he would raise me here on a bare bluff, it’s also fine with me, because in the long run such plays will cost him some money.

Turn J♦-10♠-Q♣-Q♥ (pot = $5,200/two players) applsgirl checks Rob Hollink (A♠-2♦-5♣-Q♠) checks On the turn we see the Q♥ and applsgirl checks. Let’s examine this situation. The pot is $5,200 and I have $14,400 left. My initial hunch here is to bet again and call when raised. But is this really the best plan? Let’s try to figure out his possible holdings and our optimal play against them. He could have any of A-K-x-x, K-9-x-x, 9-8-x-x, Q-Q-x-x, J-J-x-x, 10-10-x-x, Q-J-x-x, Q-10-x-x, J-10-x-x, and a couple of one-pair-hands with a king or a nine, like K-Q-x-x or Q-9-x-x. When I bet the pot here, which is $5,200, and he raises me all-in, I am pretty sure he beats me (except maybe K-Q-x-x or Q-9-x-x). To find out if I can call here, I have to do a little mathematics. I have to pay $9,200 to call his raise in order to win $24,800, which is a bit better than 2.5 to 1. Against all straights and J-J-x-x and 10-10-x-x, I will have 10 outs and against hands like Q-J-x-x and Q-10-x-x, I have only three outs. So I cannot call a check-raise from him on the turn where I get only 2.5 to 1, unless there is a reasonable chance he is bluffing, but this is not so likely. So the only reason to bet the turn is trying to make him fold K-9 or 9-8. I think there is a good chance my opponent has one of these two hands, but I don’t see him mucking to a turn bet. In shorthanded games most players will try to check-raise the turn with the non-nut straight. Playing a second or third straight this way is probably the optimal play when the hand started with 40 or 50BBs. You let your opponent put in a lot of money and then check-raise on the turn — hoping your hand is good. This would be a good strategy especially against an aggressive player. I hope I have explained clearly why I don’t like to bet the turn here and instead go for a free river card.

River J♦-10♠-Q♣-10♦ (pot = $5,200/two players) applsgirl checks Rob Hollink A♠-2♦-5♣-Q♠ checks

Summary (pot = $5,200/two players) Rob Hollink shows A♠-2♦-5♣-Q♠ and plays three of a kind, queens applsgirl shows 8♥-Q♦-9♠-9♥ and plays a straight, queen high, winning the pot Rob Hollink mucked at the showdown and lost $2,400 Applsgirl won the pot at the showdown and gained $2,800 CHUFTY folded before the flop and lost $400 The 10♦ is our river card. Applsgirl checks as do I. My reasons for a check are that the chance I am losing is pretty big and I will not be able to kick out a better hand. Furthermore I can’t make a worse hand pay much money. So there is no reason to bet at all.

What about his check on the river, was it good or not? I like his river-check. From his point of view it’s also unclear if he is winning or not; I could have a better straight but I also could have nothing. Betting will cost money against better hands, which might check behind him (the better straights) and he will not be able to make a better hand fold. A check from his side is also better when I have nothing. Of course I assume then that he will call a big percentage of the river bets I would make here.

Hand 2: $200-$400 pot-limit Omaha We are going to look at a $200-$400 heads-up hand between Urindanger and me. I am interested in this hand because it’s unclear to me if I played this hand well or if my play was really a bit too risky. Maybe the PLO-community will tell me after this book is published. I am on the small blind/button and the smallest stack (Urindanger) is $20k which is 50BBs. Seat 2: Rob Hollink ($31,002.50) | posts the SB of $200 and plays the button Seat 4: Urindanger ($20,370.50) | posts the BB of $400 Rob Hollink: 5♦-4♥-A♥-j♦

Preflop (pot = $600/two players) Rob Hollink (5♦-4♥-A♥-j♦) raises to $1,200 Urindanger calls $800 On the button I raise to $1,200 with A-J-5-4 double suited and Urindanger calls. I see no better preflop action than raising here. However because he is only 50BB deep, a smaller raise might have been better.

Flop 6♠-2♦-7♣ (pot = $2,400/two players) Urindanger checks Rob Hollink (5♦-4♥-A♥-j♦) checks After Urindanger checks I think I’ve got two valid options. The important thing for making the right decision here is having a lot of knowledge about my opponent’s flop-play. Because I am more a player than a student, I don’t have it. The only thing I know about Urindanger is that I heard a lot of young internet kids talk with a lot of respect about this guy. I guess he is a young kid as well and good young internet players often play a very aggressive game. When I bet this flop and he raises, I have to lay down my hand. I cannot call here with the donkey-end of the straight-draw. I have only four nutouts and that is not enough. So, I decided to check the flop, partly because he is only 50BBs deep and because of this stack size, the chance for a check-raise from him is greater. Let’s have a look from his perspective. Putting myself in his seat, he knows I will bet my good hands and total misses. So my check on the flop must give him the idea that I got a little something but not too much.

Turn 6♠-2♦-7♣-0♠ (pot = $2,400/two players) Urindanger bets $1,800 Rob Hollink (5♦-4♥-A♥-J♦) calls $1,800 With the arrival of the Q♠ there are now two spades on the board. Urindanger bets $1,800 and I call. I visualize him betting here with a really wide range of hands; all of them good (say two pair or better) but I also see him betting more than half of his straight-and his flush-draws, with a good chance he will fire again on the river. Furthermore he will bet a percentage of hands that totally missed, but maybe not a very high percentage if he puts me on an overpair — which is a very likely hand for me to have since I checked the flop. So his bet can mean a lot of different things. Normally, I have no reason at all to call his turn bet and, to be honest, my call is probably not good. However, there are some small points as to why a call here is a possibility. When I call, he must think there is a good chance that I have spades. So when he gives me spades and a one-pair hand, I got him where I want him His idea of my hand is wrong. Readers must understand that this is one of the most important things in poker. When you can get your opponent to think totally incorrectly about your hand, then it’s tough for him to make good decisions. So, now I am calling in the hope of hitting the nut straight and I might also win if the river is an ace, a jack or an eight. In some of these situations I might have a difficult decision to make when he makes a river bet. And of course I might win the river by bluffing if a spade pops up. Calling the turn here, without the intention of bluffing the river pretty often, would be a mistake.

River 6♠-2♦-7♣-Q♠-10♠ (pot = $6,000/two players) Urindanger bets $3,200 Rob Hollink (5♦-4♥-A♥-j♦) raises to $9,400 Urindanger folds

Summary (total pot = $12,400) Urindanger folded on the river and lost $6,200 Rob Hollink won the pot on the river and gained $6,200 Let’s consider the river action. Urindanger bets $3,200 in the $4,800 pot. Now I must try to find a range of hands that he will bet here. When he thinks there is a good chance I have spades, he might want to check this river with a holding of two pair or a set. When the 10 completed his straight, he would also like to check the river. When he has a flush, but not the nuts he might again check the river. So, with a lot of good hands, he is not betting. Now let’s look at the hands he is betting. Actually this group is pretty limited. He might bet the nuts, but that’s about the only real hand he will want to bet here. So a big percentage of his betting range is just air. With all these missed draws he could have he wants to give himself 1.5 to 1 odds (risking $3,200 for $4,800) to pick up the pot anyway. I would play his hand this way. So with $8,000 in the middle now and a really big chance that my opponent has nothing at all, it’s quite easy for me to raise his bet. Even if he is betting a real hand but not the nuts or second nuts, something I really don’t expect, there is still a reasonable chance that he won’t call my raise. So, I raised and got the result I was hoping for — he folded. Of

course, we cannot continue to play like this once an opponent has found out what we are doing. He would quickly start bet-calling his mediocre hands, something we really don’t want. It might be interesting to look at a couple other potential river situations. Let’s say a spade comes on the river and he doesn’t bet. Now the situation is a lot tougher, because he probably has a hand. This is a spot where it is really up to your reads. You know he probably has a hand and you know he probably puts you on spades. To make the right decision here, you need a lot of information about your opponent. Bluffing the tighter players and checking against the brave ones is a good strategy. When there is an ace or a jack on the river and he bets, it will be tough for us. A good read on your opponent’s game would be very welcome at that point. As I said in the introduction, I think it is an interesting hand, especially my raise on the river. Hopefully someone can explain to me in what situations it is good and when it is bad.

Hand 3: $200-$400 pot-limit Omaha We are playing a full 6-max table with two small stacks. To be honest, I hate these small stacks. Rolf tortured the game in Amsterdam for years with his shortstacked strategy. What I learned from it is that good shortstackers are hard to beat. They like to go all-in preflop with hands that are favorite against the opening range of a typical loose-aggressive big-stacker. So, against these guys, we better tighten up a bit. But on the other hand it is also costing you money when you don’t raise with hands that are worthy of the play. So, all in all, a shortstack complicates the game a lot. Seat 1: regista8 ($4,900) | posts the BB of $400 Seat 2: Rob Hollink ($130,511) Seat 3: ICallSoWhat ($26,390) Seat 4: Urindanger ($33,648) Seat 5: Genius28 ($7,695) | plays the button Seat 6: THEDONKEYNO1 ($42,925) | posts the SB of $200 Rob Hollink: A♠-Q♦-J♠-4♦

Preflop (pot = $600/six players) Rob Hollink (A♠-Q♦-J♠-4♦) raises to $900 ICallSoWhat folds Urindanger calls $900 Genius28 folds THEDONKEYNO1 folds regista8 calls $500 Preflop, I make it $900, thinking that if one of the small stacks reraises I will play with him. A reason why I don’t raise the max is because I am out of position against most of the players and I don’t like to pump up the pot when I am out of position and the money is deep. And of course pumping it up with a drawing hand is mostly not so good. Calling preflop would also be fine. Urindanger calls behind me and regista8 calls in the BB.

Flop K♦-10♦-8♥ (pot = $3,l00/two players) regista8 bets $2,900 Rob Hollink (A♠-Q♦-J♠-4♦) calls $2,900 Urindanger raises to $14,500 regista8 calls $1,100, and is all-in Rob Hollink calls $11,600 When Regista8 bets $2,900 he has only $1,100 left. I flopped a 13-card straight draw combined with a second-nut flush draw. The main question is now whether to raise or just call. We can forget about regista8, as he is all-in and we don’t care so much about his hand any more. The question is do I want to have Urindanger in or out. At this point, the pot is not very big, but he has still $33,000 left. When I raise here, I will only get action if he has a pretty good hand. And of course I also want to get action from the weaker hands. I am favorite against two-pair hands, and against some smaller flush draws combined with some straight possibilities I could be way ahead if he doesn’t have a pair. So for me this flop decision is easy: I am going to invite my opponent to play aggressively. I am hoping that he is going to try to kick me out, after I call the flop. So, I only call and indeed Urindanger kicks it up to $14,500. Now, I am facing two possibilities, reraise all-in or just call. Again, this decision is not so difficult. If I raise here all-in, he will call, so my action won’t have any fold-equity. If I decide to call, the pot will be $35,900 and he has $18,248 left. This is a situation where I am so committed that I will never fold the turn, not even when the board pairs. So, I would rather try to use a pair on the turn to bet this last $18,000 or so. There is always a chance that my opponent will lay down a small draw with a small pair, gaining me a huge side pot with the worse hand.

Turn K♦-10♦-8♥-5♥ (main pot = $15,100/three players; side pot = $23,200/two players) Rob Hollink (A♠-Q♦-J♠-4♦) bets $35,900 Urindanger calls $18,248, and is all-in Uncalled bet of $17,652 returned to Rob Hollink On the turn we see the 5♥ and I bet the pot, Urindanger calls and shows 8♣-10♠-Q♠-9♥ Regista8 shows A♦-Q♣-5♦-2♣

River K♦-10♦-8♥-5♥-9♦ (main pot = $15,100/three players; side pot = $59.696/two players) Rob Hollink shows A♠-Q♦-J♠-4♦ and plays a flush, king high, winning the side pot Urindanger shows 8♣-10♠-Q♠-9♥ and plays two pair, 10♠ and nines regista8 shows A♦-Q♣-5♦-2♣ and plays a flush, ace high, winning the main pot

Summary Rob Hollink won the side pot at the showdown and gained $24,948 Urindanger mucked at the showdown and lost $34,748 THEDONKEYNO1 folded before the flop and lost $200

regista8 won the main pot at the showdown and gained $10,000 The river is the 9♦ and I am lucky to hit the flush. Regista8 has the nut flush and wins the main pot, I win the side pot.

Conclusion Let’s see what actually happened. By calling the flop, I made it very difficult for Urindanger. With bottom-two and a gutshot, he had a real problem. He had no idea in what kind of shape he was against me. Actually, he had almost 45% against my hand, but it also could have been a lot more or a lot less. That’s what poker is all about; trying to make it as difficult as possible for your opponent — and as easy as possible for yourself. He decided to go for it on the flop, a decision I can understand. A fold on the flop looks too nitty. What about calling my bet and seeing the turn? This was another option. Looking from his perspective, he knows that his hand is probably in the lead against me, but he is extremely vulnerable on this board. So, if he doesn’t raise here, then a lot of turn cards might complicate the situation for him. Having thought it over, I still cannot figure out what I would prefer to do in his position. So I really start to like my call on the flop…

Hand 4: $200-$400 pot-limit Omaha We are playing six-handed now. Four of us are more than 60BBs deep and there are two small stacks. Seat 1: regista8 ($6,600) Seat 2: Rob Hollink ($118,714) Seat 3: ICallSoWhat ($26,390) Seat 4: Urindanger ($31,848) | plays the button Seat 5: Genius28 ($9,548) | posts the SB of $200 Seat 6: THEDONKEYNO1 ($52,978) | posts the BB of $400 Rob Hollink: 4♠-J♦-J♠-Q♥

Preflop (pot = $600/six players) regista8 folds Rob Hollink (4♠-J♦-J♠-Q♥) calls $400 ICallSoWhat folds Urindanger folds Genius28 calls $200 THEDONKEYNO1 raises to $1,600 Rob Hollink calls $1,200 Genius28 folds Pre-flop I call from the hijack with a mediocre hand, hoping to see the flop cheaply and hit a jack. Many players will criticize this call and I have to agree — it’s pretty bad. When one of the small stacks raises and nobody else calls, I have to lay down preflop. And even when I get action from another big stack, my hand is still very poor. Let’s see what happens. There are two folds behind me (good news), and then a call from the small blind. Now THEDONKEYNO1 raises the pot to $1,600, I call and the small blind folds. This outcome is not so bad. I can play a pot heads-up in position, with fairly deep money. Before I continue, I would like to address the issue of playing PLO, out of position. In my PLO career I have made many attempts to reraise out of position with all kinds of different hands. After doing this for a couple of years it is still unclear to me if this can be profitable. There are a couple of really good high-stakes pros that don’t even do it at all. Reraising out of position with a big pair, for instance aces, can cause a lot of problems. When you don’t hit, and the money is deep, you are extremely vulnerable because you never know where you’re at. So, what we see in aggressive high stakes games concerning reraising out of position is that it’s also done a lot with doublesuited high rundowns or something that looks like that. These hands will hit a lot of flops, so the postflop problems are reduced. A hand I do like to reraise out of position is a two-pair hand.

Flop 5♣-8♦-7♥ (pot = $3,600/two players) THEDONKEYNO1 bets $2,800 Rob Hollink (4♠-J♦-J♠-Q♥) calls $2,800. THEDONKEYNO1 bets $2,800. Most players will continuation bet this flop more often than not, so his bet doesn’t really surprise me. I guess he will bet almost all rundowns here. When he has a big pair he will bet this flop a lot less than if he has a rundown. With a big pair he might consider a check-call or a check-fold on this flop. Of course all players vary their play against different opponents, but we have to figure out some kind of a guideline. Knowing that players like to play high rundowns more than low rundowns and they continuation bet more with the rundowns than with the big pairs, you probably understand why I am calling here.

Turn 5♣-8♦-7♥-8♥ (pot = $9,200/two players) THEDONKEYNO1 bets $7,600 Rob Hollink (4♠-J♦-J♠-Q♥) calls $7,600 On the turn we see the 8♥. The THEDONKEYNO1 bets $7,600 and, by doing so, is putting me to the test. This is why THEDONKEYNO1 is such a good player. He really knows how to put maximum pressure on his opponents. Now, I have to evaluate how probable all his holdings are. It’s my feeling that the chances of him having a high pair are really quite slim. The money is so deep; the only chance that he would play a big pair this way is if we were only 15k deep. But in this actual hand, I don’t believe he has a high pair which is actually very nice for me. So, I give him some kind of rundown. If he has a full house he would bet for sure and if he flopped a straight, then the turn is not so nice for him. He could still bet, but a check is also a valid option. If he had a big rundown, i.e. nothing at all on this board, he might give it up. However, on the other hand, he is also capable of firing another barrel. Mainly because preflop-reraise-ranges have so many high rundowns combined with the fact that I know my opponent isn’t scared to fire out a stone-cold bluff, I decide to call his bet.

River 5♣-8♦-7♥-8♥-9♣ (pot = $24,400/two players) THEDONKEYNO1 checks Rob Hollink (4♠-J♦-J♠-Q♥) checks

Showdown (pot = $24,400/two players)

THEDONKEYNO1 shows 3♥-A♥-Q♦-J♣ and plays a pair of eights Rob Hollink shows 4♠-J♦-J♠-Q♥ and plays two pair, jacks and eights, winning the pot

Summary Rob Hollink won the pot at the showdown and gained $12,400 Genius28 folded before the flop and lost $400 THEDONKEYNO1 mucked at the showdown and lost $12,000 The river is 9♣ We both check and he shows the missed rundown I was hoping for. To be honest, I was lucky that he has not fired again. In all likelihood, I would not have had the guts to call a third barrel. As I mentioned before, I really don’t like my preflop play. But, if you don’t want an opponent to run over you pre-and postflop, you must be prepared to go along with your reads, especially if you don’t hit. Just calling and planning to go on after hitting a set can only be profitable against a guy who never stops betting. So, although my postflop play might look a little bit too brave, I think I had good reasons to make the calls I did.

Hand 5: $200-$400 pot-limit Omaha We are five-handed this time and I am in the SB. From my opponents I am familiar with CHUFTY, who is a big winner in this game, and in addition we have my friend howisitfeellike; the day when he is going to beat the big game is coming closer. Regarding the other two players, unfortunately I don’t know much. The reason that I included this hand in the book is that I like to emphasize that all actions, even checks, give away information. Seat 1: howisitfeellike ($17,293) | plays the button Seat 2: Rob Hollink ($36,579) | posts the SB of $200 Seat 3: ByTheBy ($9,998) | posts the BB of $400 Seat 4: bballer88 ($91,132) Seat 5: CHUFTY ($47,198) Rob Hollink: K♦-K♥-5♥-6♠

Preflop (pot = $600/five players) Bballer88 folds CHUFTY raises to $1,400 howisitfeellike calls $1,400 Rob Hollink (K♦-K♥-5♥-6♠) calls $1,200 ByTheBy folds My preflop call with kings single suited is pretty normal, I guess.

Flop Q♥-7♣-J♥ (pot = $4,600/three players) Rob Hollink (K♦-K♥-5♥-6♠) checks CHUFTY checks howisitfeellike bets $4,600 Rob Hollink raises to $18,400 CHUFTY folds howisitfeellike calls $11,293, and is all-in Uncalled bet of $2,507 returned to Rob Hollink We see a Q♥-7♣-J♥ flop. I have flopped an overpair and a king high flush draw. The pot is $4,600 and our remaining stacks are $35,000 for me, $46,000 for CHUFTY and $16,000 for howisitfeellike. I am first to speak. Playing this hand for stacks against CHUFTY is something that I don’t like at all. When we go all-in on this flop, I am sure I will have the worst of it. The hand I am really afraid about is, naturally, A-A with the nut flush draw. So when I bet out here and CHUFTY raises, then I am in deep trouble. The best action is a check, to gather some information by watching how my opponents act. CHUFTY decides to check as well. I think His check gives away a lot of information. Now, in my opinion, his hand cannot be too strong. He would for sure bet a hand he was willing to play for stacks. A hand like A-A-x-x, A-K-x-x, A-Q-x-x or A-10-x-x, with the nut flush draw, is a hand he should bet 18 or a hand he might check the flop would be A-A without hearts. CHUFTY checks, so it looks as if he could have nothing at all and doesn’t like to bet this flop, which is very logical, or he has half a hand (for instance A-A-x-x, without hearts) and wants to keep it cheap. Howisitfeellike is an excellent player and I am sure he knows that CHUFTY is not very strong. About me, he doesn’t know much. His stack is under $16,000 now and there is already $4,600 in the middle. How much does he have to have in this hand to bet the pot? I think not so much. Two pair, a pair and a flush draw, a pair and a straight draw — all these hands should be enough for him to bet the pot, because there is a reasonable chance that we are both folding. Howisitfeellike does indeed bet the pot and, as explained, I give him a pretty wide range. Now it’s up to me. Actually the situation is what I had hoped for. It would have been just a bit more optimal when howisitfeellike would have had just a couple of thousand more, so that there would be a small chance that he would fold to my check-raise. With 11k behind he is clearly committed. But, of course, I still like it, as I am pretty sure that CHUFTY cannot call anymore when I check-raise and my hand will not be behind against the range of howisitfeellike. So, I raise, CHUFTY folds and howisitfeellike calls. When I see his hand, I am really disappointed.

Turn Q♥-7♣-J♥-8♠ (pot = $36,386/two players) No action left, we are all-in. The turn-card is the 8♠.

River Q♥-7♣-J♥-8♠-9♠ (pot = $36,386/two players) The last card on the table is the 9♠.

Showdown (pot = $36,386/two players) howisitfeellike shows Q♣-J♣-Q♦-K♣ and plays three of a kind queens Rob Hollink shows K♦-5♥-6♠-K♥ and plays a straight, nine high, winning the pot

Summary howisitfeellike mucked at the showdown and lost $17,293 Rob Hollink won the pot at the showdown and gained $19,093

CHUFTY folded on the flop and lost $1,400 ByTheBy folded before the flop and lost $400

Conclusion Although I was behind on the flop, I think I made the right move. Luck was on my side — an additional backdoor straight draw can be very nice sometimes.

Hand 6: $3-$6 pot-limit Omaha Recognizing bluffs is one of the important assets you need to have as a poker player. To prevent your own bluffs being recognized, you always have to be sure that your bets make sense — your opponent must be convinced that you are holding some kind of a good hand. In this hand, I am trying to make clear that having implied odds can be quite different from what most players think. We are playing $3-$6; I am making a video for our poker instruction site www.nederpoker.nl. In the series I am making I am playing very loosely and aggressively, with the intention of creating a lot of interesting situations. Let’s see what happens. Seat 1: LLegris ($1,118.70) | plays the button Seat 2: patek3970 ($1,304.65) | posts the SB of $3 Seat 3: Rob Hollink ($1,359) | posts the BB of $6 Seat 4: robtherobber2 ($602.80) Seat 5: Mayo22 ($273) Seat 6: MayhoodXXX ($939.50) Rob Hollink: 6♣-10♥-A♦-3♣

Preflop (pot = $9/six players) robtherobber2 folds Mayo22 calls $6 MayhoodXXX folds LLegris folds patek3970 calls $3 Rob Hollink (6♣-10♥-A♦-3♣) checks Being on the BB, I get a free flop with 6♣-10♥-A♦-3♣

Flop K♣-5♣-9♠ (pot = $18/three players) patek3970 Rob Hollink (6♣-10♥-A♦-3♣) checks Mayo22 checks The three of us see a flop that is K♣-5♣-9♠ It’s clear that my hand is bad and I also missed completely. But, we all check.

Turn K♣-5♣-9♠-3♥ (pot = $18/three players) patek3970 checks Rob Hollink (6♣-10♥-A♦-3♣) bets $12 Mayo22 raises to $24 patek3970 folds Rob Hollink calls $12

River K♣-5♣-9♠-3♥-Q♦ (pot = $66/two players) Rob Hollink 6♣-10♥-A♦-3♣ checks Mayo22 bets $66 Rob Hollink calls $66

Showdown (pot = $198/two players) Mayo22 shows 7♦-8♦-6♠-4♣ and plays king queen high Rob Hollink shows 6♣-10♥-A♦-3♣ and plays a pair of threes, winning the pot

Summary patek3970 folded on the Turn and lost $6 Rob Hollink won the pot at the showdown and gained $102 Mayo22 mucked at the showdown and lost $96 The next card is the 3♥. Yes!! Finally I got something — a pair of threes. Patek3970 checks again and after it was checked around on the flop, I cannot control myself anymore — I need to bet. Although I have a pair, of course, I see this bet as some kind of a bluff. My hand is probably not the best, but when I bet $12 here in an $18 pot, I am giving myself 1.5 to 1 odds. This means that my bet will be profitable if I get two folds more than 40% of the time. In the long run, I think this will be the case.

So, I bet $12 and to my total surprise my opponent behinds me doubles the bet. The small blind folds and I call. Now it’s time to investigate this situation. His raise here can hardly be strong, in my opinion. A set or two pair is not so probable and he would have bet the flop with most of these hands. There might be a small chance that he has a couple of low cards and made bottom two pair on the turn. When I was playing this hand and videotaping it for Nederpoker and doing the commentary at the same time, I remember that I said that most probably he had 7-6-4, but I also said that 8-7-6-4 was not so probable because he might have bet the flop with this hand. So, A-7-6-4 could easily be his hand. Another possibility would be a hand consisting of A-4-2-x or 6-4-2-x. Maybe even the main reason to put him on a draw is the minraise. With a made hand he would have been more inclined to raise the pot. All in all, I estimated the percentages for my opponent to have the following hands like this: 1 A set, kings up or nines up 5% 2 Two pair fives and threes 5% 3 A straight draw with a nine or a five 30% 4 A straight draw without a pair 60% I present these percentages here to give you an idea of my view, not to use them for calculations. This is because calculating the right solution with all these possible holdings combined with all the different rivers will be pretty complicated. And, as I said before, this hand is mainly about having good implied odds with a very bad hand. This is the reverse of the “standard” situation where the implied odds are on the draw’s side. By raising the turn my opponent thinks he can maybe take it away from me and that he has implied odds. Let me explain why this is wrong. In order to do this we have to look at the different river cards and see what his actions will be and my answers to his actions. Knowing my own cards and the board, we have 44 cards left. The clue of this hand is his betting pattern on the river. Let’s put the possible rivers in a couple of groups: A 2, 4, 6, 7 or 8 19 cards B 3, 5, 9 or K 11 cards C 10, J, Q or A 14 cards When the river comes from group A, we will, of course, not call anymore. When the river comes from group B, we call. He will bet groups 1 and 2 almost only when he hits, further will he probably check group 3 mostly and on the other side he will bet group 4 for sure most of the time. A group B card on the river will make him bet something like 75% of the time, where 50% of this 75% is done by the missed straight draw. This is where the implied odds come from. When the river is from group C, he will be less inclined to bet the river with hands of groups 1, 2 and 3 and again he will bet group 4 very often. So there is just the same result as when we saw a group 2 card: we are having the same attractive implied odds on the river again. All in all, I hope to have illustrated with this hand that the concept of implied odds does not necessarily have to apply to the drawing hand. Finally we see the Q♦ on the river. It goes: check, bet, call and I am happy to see the missed draw in his hands — for what many people will consider a crazy call on my part.

Hand 7: $200-$400 pot-limit Omaha Another $200-$400 hand on a full 6-max table. LokoIsBack is short stacked with only $6,400, but all other players are more than 90BBs deep. This is a really aggressive game with top players like durrrr, Urindanger and OMGClayAiken. Seat 1: LokoIsBack ($6,400) Seat 2: Rob Hollink ($73,347) Seat 3: theASHMAN103 ($37,726) | plays the button Seat 4: durrrr ($200,082) | posts the SB of $200 Seat 5: Urindanger ($75,431) | posts the BB of $400 Seat 6: OMGClayAiken ($46,275) Rob Hollink: J♠-6♠-4♦-5♦

Preflop (pot = $600/six players) OMGClayAiken raises to $1,400 LokoIsBack folds Rob Hollink (J♠-6♠-4♦-5♦) raises to $3,100 theASHMAN103 folds durrrr folds Urindanger folds OMGClayAiken calls $1,700 From under the gun, we have OMGClayAiken kicking it up to $1,400; the shortstack folds and I make it $3,100 to go. All other players fold and OMGClayAiken calls. First, I like to have a look at my preflop action. Why reraise — and if so, why not reraise the maximum? A reason to reraise is that there is not so much wrong in playing a big pot in position, when the money is still deep after the reraise. The reason I don’t raise the max is because my opponent then has the option to make it $15,000 preflop. So he would be able to put in 32% of his stack preflop. Just in case he has aces, this is what he would do and probably I wouldn’t be able to play this hand profitably any more. But of course my preflop action is overdone; OMGClayAiken is too strong a player to make mistakes such as selling his aces too cheaply. I am really a bit out of line here. The jack doesn’t fit with the other cards and I am not even on the button. Being on the button with these stacks, I think reraising with hands like Q-10-8-6 or K-J-10-8 double suited is fine, especially against players who are able to sell their aces too cheap. So much for my preflop mistakes. Let’s see what happens.

Flop 7♠-Q♣-6♥ (pot = $6,800/two players) OMGClayAiken checks Rob Hollink J♠-6♠-4♦-5♦ checks The flop is 7♠-Q♣-6♥ He checks and I check as well. The flop brought me second pair, an up and down straight draw on the bottom side and one backdoor flush draw. Why didn’t I bet? Normally this is a flop that he could have easily missed. So, because of that, I have a reason to bet. When I have missed completely here I would have bet for sure. The reason for my check is because of the possibility that he will check-raise. The fact that — from his point of view — I also didn’t hit that much probably could be a reason for him to check-raise this flop on very light values. Calling a checkraise in this spot is something I don’t want, so I decided to check the flop. I guess that my check tells him that I got a little something but not too much.

Turn 7♠-Q♣-6♥-A♠ (pot = $6,800/two players) OMGClayAiken checks Rob Hollink (J♠-6♠-4♦-5♦) bets $5,200 OMGClayAiken calls $5,200 On the turn, I hit a perfect card, the A♠ The ace could be a scare card for him after my preflop reraise and it did bring me a flush draw. He checks and, of course, I am using this ace to try to pick it up here and now. There is a very good chance that he is going to lay down a better hand here, say a pair of kings or queens. If he reraises me now, I have a difficult decision whether or not I want to call with some non-nut outs — but even with aces up he might only call and not check-raise. If he check-raises me here on the turn with a flush-and a straight-draw, he would be in great shape if I call. This is because I am going to make a lot of bad decisions on the river, just because I put him on the wrong hand. Yeah, a check-raise from him is something I really don’t want to see. So I bet $5,200 and he calls. It could be worse and it could be better. What does this mean? Well this is very simple: he probably has me beat. The only real draw that might be worth calling is 10-9-8 or 9-8-5 with spades, or some kind of one pair plus gutshot and small flush draw. To put it in percentages, I would say 85% of the time he has me beat and 15% of the time he is drawing. The chance that he has a really big hand like a set is small, in my opinion. Now that I know I am behind some 85% of the time, I can refrain from betting or bluffing the river, unless I hit something. When the river is a blank and he checks, I still have a bit of showdown value. So the positive thing is that the situation looks clear to me, and the chance that I am going to make a bad decision at the river is not great. Now let’s look at the hand from his point of view. When he has an ace, he smells that I am probably bluffing and he will call a river bet as well when it is a blank. When he is drawing and doesn’t hit, then he checks the river and I could win with a pair of sixes. When there is a spade at the river I have to be careful. When he bets, I call of course, but when he checks, I will go for a free showdown. My turn bet could easily mean I’ve got spades. I don’t see him paying me off a lot. Another reason not to bet is the simple fact that I am in real trouble when he check-raises.

River 7♠-Q♣-6♥-A♠-6♦ (pot = $17,200/two players) OMGClayAiken checks

Rob Hollink (J♠-6♠-4♦-5♦) bets $17,200 OMGClayAiken calls $17,200

Showdown (pot = $51,600/two players) Rob Hollink shows J♠-6♠-4♦-5♦ and plays three of a kind, sixes, winning the pot OMGClayAiken mucks

Summary Rob Hollink won the pot at the showdown and gained $26,100 OMGClayAiken mucked at the showdown and lost $25,500 durrrr folded before the flop and lost $200 Urindanger folded before the flop and lost $400 On the river we see another six, which is fantastic for me. If he had a set on the flop and was too afraid to check-raise me on the turn then he will still have that same fear now. So, thinking that I have an easy fold whenever he check-raises me, I really like to bet the full pot here. I hope that he has an ace and thinks that the chances of me bluffing are too high here to fold his hand. After thinking for a long time, he indeed calls and I win.

Hand 8: $50-$100 pot-limit Omaha This is a heads-up hand against a player with the nick MrJones707. I don’t know what his real name is and I also think we didn’t play much against each other. The hand was played two years before I wrote this book and to be honest, I have no read on him at all. However, because I think the read on an opponent isn’t that important in this particular case, I decided to discuss this hand. Tight players might see my action on the flop as overaggressive and I just want to give myself a chance to defend my play. Seat 1: MrJones707 ($12,348) | posts the SB of $50 and plays the button Seat 2: Rob Hollink ($39,707) | posts the BB of $100 Rob Hollink: K♦-K♣-5♦-5♦

Preflop (pot = $150/two players) MrJones707 raises to $300 Rob Hollink (K♦-K♣-5♦-5♠) raises to $900 MrJones707 calls $600 I am playing $50-$100 PLO and the smallest stack has over $12,000. My hand is K♦-K♣-5♦-5♠ and I reraised out of position to $900. As I mentioned often in this book, two-pair hands are reraising hands for me. There are a couple of reasons why I play this way. My preflop reraise range contains aces and the good (mostly high-) rundowns. Isn’t it nice to add couple of random pairs to this range, to make it more difficult for my opponent to put me on a hand? So, when I hit, I might win a really big pot. Another reason is that two pair hands really lose value when played passively. Why? Two reasons: you cannot win postflop by betting and we are playing more or less face-up — passively until we got the nuts and then aggressively. We all know that this is not the way the game should be played.

Flop 3♠-3♦-4♦ (pot = $1,800/two players) Rob Hollink K♦-K♣-5♦-5♠ bets $1,400 MrJones707 raises to $6,000 Rob Hollink raises to $19,800 MrJones calls $11,448, and is all-in Uncalled bet of $8,352 is returned to Rob Hollink This is the spot where all the action happens and the whole postflop story is told here. The flop is 3♠-3♦-4♦ I flopped a king high flush draw and I still have an overpair that was leading preflop. The pot is $1,800 and my opponent has $11,400 left. The main question I have to ask myself is: “Do I want to play for stacks here?” We have to find out what hands will give me action. First, all the hands that have me beat, the hands that look like 4-4-x-x and 3-x-x-x. Further, I might get action from pairs like Q-Q-x-x and so on, with or without two diamonds. I could get action from 7-6-5-x and from flush draws with a gutshot or from the nut flush draw. Firstly we need to consider the question of whether or not to bet the flop. If I check the flop, I guess that my opponent puts me on an overpair (probably without the flush draw) and he will check behind when I have him beat. After all, wouldn’t it be very reasonable for me to bet the flop, when I had something like four high cards, without a pair? So, the problem with checking is that probably I only get action when I am behind — and that’s no fun. Let’s now look what happens when I bet. Betting this kind of flop is something that is choice number one, I would say. So my flop bet wouldn’t say much about my hand. I could have hit, but I could have missed as well. Now, let’s put myself in his seat. If I were in his spot facing a bet on this flop, I would raise for sure with a lot of my drawing hands without a pair, hoping to kick out other no pair hands with better high cards. I would also be ready to call all the way with hands like Q-Q-x-x, J-J-x-x or 10-10-x-x combined with a flush draw. On the other hand, I might check these hands behind on the flop, after it was checked to me. So, I guess, you got the point already. Betting will lead to a lot of action. Sometimes I am ahead and sometimes I am behind. Checking the flop will lead to a situation where I am waiting for my opponent’s to decide the play. Would you like it that way? So, I bet, he raises and we go all-in. Of course I was not really hoping for a raise from him; I would rather see him call here. But as I said, I see him doing this with enough hands that I beat, so I go all-in. Don’t forget that I always have outs when I am beat right now on the flop. He shows 2♣-7♠-3♣2♥ and I am a bit behind. But I still got almost 42%.

Turn 3♠-3♦-4♦-6♠ (pot = $24,696/two players) River 3♠-3♦-4♦-6♠-6♦ (pot = $17,200/two players) Showdown (pot = $51,600/two players) Rob Hollink shows K♦-K♣-5♦-5♠ and plays a flush, king high, winning the pot MrJones707 shows 2♣-7♠-3♣-2♥ and plays three of a kind, threes

Summary Rob Hollink won the pot at the showdown and gained $12,348 MrJones707 mucked at the showdown and lost $12,348

No action left, we are all-in. The turn-card is the 6♠ The river-card is the 6♦ giving me my flush. On the river I made my flush and he didn’t fill up. I was the lucky one in this hand. I don’t have to add a lot about my opinion on my own play. About his play, I would say that I don’t like his preflop raise much. Playing a hand with a small pair for big money is really dangerous heads up. When you hit a small set heads up it’s almost impossible to lay it down. Many times you will get stacked by a higher set. This time he didn’t lose his money this way, but it is something to remember.

Hand 9: $200-$400 pot-limit Omaha Another high-stakes hand on Full Tilt Poker. We are five-handed and the smallest stack has 80BBs. Seat 1: Rob Hollink ($31,998) | plays the button Seat 3: Gus Hansen ($89,592.50) | posts the SB of $200 Seat 4: applsgirl ($126,814) | posts the BB of $400 Seat 5: present ($34,174) Seat 6: OnTheRize ($108,091) Rob Hollink: Q♦-2♣-A♦-3♠

Preflop (pot = $600/five players) present folds OnTheRize folds Rob Hollink (Q♦-2♣-A♦-3♠) raises to $800 Gus Hansen folds applsgirl raises to $2,600 Rob Hollink calls $1,800 From the button, I make a minraise to $800 and applsgirl raises the pot to $2,600. I make the call. Let’s take a look at these preflop actions. First of all my opening raise on the button. My hand, Q♦-2♣-A♦-3♠ is a raise for sure; it’s a decent hand and absolutely worth a raise in position. Applsgirl kicks it up with A-K-J-3 double suited, which is also pretty normal. He could of course have called, but raising is also fine. And of course I have to call, although my A-Q-x-x doesn’t play very well against a preflop reraise-range (A-A-x-x and A-K-x-x).

Flop J♠-Q♣-4♣ (pot = $5,400/two players) applsgirl bets $3,400 Rob Hollink (Q♦-2♣-A♦-3♠) calls $3,400 Applsgirl makes a continuation bet of $3,400. This flop has given me top pair but that’s just about all. My first thought is to call his bet, but lacking some kind of redraw I am not too happy with the situation. Looking at his possible range, there is a chance that he has A-K-x-x and missed. And when he has A-A-x-x, I might get a free card on the turn as well. These possibilities give me hope, so I convinced myself to call his flop bet. Let’s look at the situation from my opponent’s point of view. He is looking at a $5,400 pot, and an opponent who has $29,000 left. On the flop he has hit second pair, top kicker and a gutshot, but there is also a two-flush that he doesn’t have. His opponent could easily have a queen. So the flop situation is pretty bad for him. Actually, he has to choose between the following options. Firstly, he could check and fold when I bet, but in my opinion this would be too nitty and tight. Secondly, he could play check-call on the flop. And his third option would be to bet the pot and fold to a raise. Then as a fourth option, he could bet the pot and go all-in when raised. He chose to bet $3,400 on the flop. What he would have done if I had raised him on the flop we will never know, because I just called. In his place I would probably have opted for the check-call option, but on the other hand, not betting here might be a bit too weak.

Turn J♠-Q♣-4♣-5♠ (pot = $12.200/two players) applsgirl bets $12,200 Rob Hollink (Q♦-2♣-A♦-3♠) raises to $24,400 applsgirl raises to $36,600 Rob Hollink calls $1,598, and is all-in Uncalled bet of $10,602 returned to applsgirl The pot is now $12,200. The turn card is the 5♠ Let’s first put ourselves in his seat again. He did bet the flop and his opponent called. A call from his opponent on the flop will most likely mean that he had a little something. Probably some kind of a straight draw, maybe together with one pair. So, on the turn now, with $12,200 in the middle and an opponent with $26,000 left, he has to make a decision. He has to decide if it is worth investing another $26,000 to defend this $12,200 or is it better to give up? I don’t blame him for making the bet here. Of course he knows that his hand is very weak, but check-folding with $12,200 in the middle, when you’re not sure you’re beat, is also an unattractive option. Now I have to call another $12,200 after having hit a pretty good turn card. I just picked up a 13-card straight draw. For me it’s most probable that I am behind, although there is still a decent chance that my opponent has the wrap around the Q-J combination. Calling is no option, because I might be ahead, so I have to decide whether to fold or to raise all-in. Maybe we have to add a little bit of mathematics to get a better view about this situation. I will try to calculate the percentages in a credible way. Suppose the chance I am behind is 70% and if so I have, on average, a 12-card redraw. Then I will be leading 30% of the time, and he will probably have a 10-card redraw. This seems like a fair estimate of the situation to me. My chances of winning are (0.7 * 12/40) + (0.3 * 30/40) = 0.435. Thus there is a 43.5% chance to win $38,800 and 56.5% chance to lose $26,000 Overall: (0.435 * $38,800) + (0.565 * -$26,000) = $2,188 Going all-in has a positive expectation of $2,188 whereas folding has an expectation of 0. These figures indicate that I should go all-in here. And this is what I did. So, I like my play on the turn. For the record, I just doubled his bet and he put me all-in on the turn, but my minraise is of course more or less the same as going all-in, although it’s a bit sloppy.

River J♠-Q♣-4♣-5♠-8♥ (pot = $64,196/two players)

Showdown (pot = $64,196/two players) applsgirl shows 3♥-A♥-K♦-J♦ and plays a pair of jacks Rob Hollink shows Q♦-2♣-A♦-3♠ and plays a pair of queens, winning the pot

Summary Rob Hollink won the pot at the showdown and gained $32,198 applsgirl mucked at the showdown and lost $31,998 Gus Hansen folded before the flop and lost $200 There is no action left on the river. The river card was an innocent 8♥. I was happy to find out, he indeed was behind on the turn, and he only had five cards to win and three to tie. Altogether it was an interesting hand played very loosely and aggressively from both sides.

Hand 10: $200-$400 pot-limit Omaha The short stack is sitting out. Five players are left; CHUFTY has 40BBs and I have 70. All my opponents are big winners in PLO. It’s a tough table. Seat 1: Rob Hollink ($28,328) Seat 2: ICallSoWhat ($53,262) | plays the button Seat 3: THEDONKEYNO1 ($86,809) | posts the SB of $200 Seat 4: OnTheRize ($42,398) | posts the BB of $400 Seat 5: CHUFTY ($16,990) Seat 6: buck99 ($8,000) | is sitting out Rob Hollink: 4♦-2♥-9♠-A♦

Preflop (pot = $600/five players) CHUFTY folds Rob Hollink (4♦-2♥-9♠-A♦) calls $400 ICallSoWhat folds THEDONKEYNO1 folds OnTheRize raises to $1,400 Rob Hollink calls $1,000 Before the flop, I am trying to get in cheaply with a hand that is probably too weak to play. I limp from the cutoff with 4♦-2♥-9♠-A♦ Of course, I am very happy to see the button fold. OnTheRize from the small blind raises to $1,400, the BB folds and I call. Raising out of the blinds is mostly done with AA-x-x or A-K-x-x. Sometimes players add hands like nice rundowns and two-pair hands to this (re)raise-range. Although my hand doesn’t play so well against his, I decide to call because of my position and the fact that we are pretty deep. So the minimum you have to do is never invest too big a percentage of your stack preflop. Right now it cost me $1,400 and I have left another $27,000, which is okay.

Flop K♦-2♣-7♦ (pot = $3,000/two players) OnTheRize bets $2,400 Rob Hollink (4♦-2♥-9♠-A♦) raises to $8,400 OnTheRize raises to $28,200 Rob Hollink calls $18,528, and is all-in Uncalled bet of $1,272 returned to OnTheRize There is $3,200 in the middle and the flop is K♦-2♣-7♦ I flopped the nut flush draw and bottom pair. OnTheRize bets $2,400. It’s up to me. This is a very important moment. First of all, I must try to have a clear view of my opponent’s possible holdings. This is a scheme I made of his possible holdings and the worth of my hand against his hand: His hand Value of my hand on this flop 30% A-A-x-x around 55% 15% A-K-x-x around 50% 25% A-x-x-x, no pair >75% 5% A-7-x-x >50% 5% 7-x-x-x >57% 15% x-x-x-x, no pair (rundown) >75% 3% K-7-x-x >42% 2% 7-7-x-x >22% The most interesting thing to notice here is that the nut flush draw with a pair of deuces — the hand that I have — is very strong. Most of the time I am favorite to win the hand. Only in the 7-7-x-x situation do we have a real problem, but this only happens 2% of the time; 60% of the time we are behind on the flop, but because of our flush draw and our pair, our chances are always very good to win the hand. This hand has to be played really aggressively. Our opponent almost never has a really good hand and when we raise him on the flop he will have a very tough decision to make. He will surely lay down a lot of holdings that still beat us on the flop. So, I raised on the flop to $8,400. OnTheRize now raises to $28,200. Of course, I would have been happier with a fold from his side; there is nothing wrong with picking up a pot of $5,600 with only a pair of deuces. But he raised and I had to call my last $18,000. Until now, we just studied the hand from my side and we found that this hand is very easy to play (when you put your opponent on this range). Let’s sit down in his seat. He raised out of the SB with 10♣-A♠-J♣-K♠ which is fine. Then on a pretty dry flop (K♦-2♣-7♦) he decided to continuation bet. Having a king in his hand, he is very sure he has the best hand. Chances that I have much on such a flop are very low. So he makes the bet and to his surprise he sees me raising. At this moment, he himself bets $2,400 in a $3,200 pot and now his opponent made it $8,200, leaving him $18,000 behind. Just as I did on the flop, he now also has to figure out how probable it is for me to have certain holdings. He knows the chances that he is up against a set are pretty small. He must put me on a flush draw, with or without something else. From that point of view, his best option is to stick it allin.

Turn K♦-2♣-7♦-9♣ (pot = $56,856/two players)

River K♦-2♣-7♦-9♣-7♠ (pot = $56,856/two players) Showdown (pot = $56,856/two players) OnTheRize shows 10♣-A♠-J♣-K♠ and plays two pair, kings and sevens, winning the pot Rob Hollink shows 4♦-2♥-9♠-A♦ and plays two pair, nines and sevens

Summary Rob Hollink mucked at the showdown and lost $28,328 OnTheRize won the pot on at the showdown and gained $28,528 THEDONKEYNO1 folded before the flop and lost $200 No betting left on the turn and river. The turn and river cards were the 9♣ and the 7♠ OnTheRize wins the pot ($56,854) with two pair, kings and sevens. Like many hands I have discussed this was again a hand that was played pretty aggressively from both sides. Nevertheless, I think we both did the right thing.

Hand 11: $200-$400 pot-limit Omaha Again, a high stakes hand played at the $200-$400 game at Full Tilt Poker. These style in these games is loose and aggressive. This is a good example of a hand that some players are likely not to understand very well, so I am going to talk about it. I don’t like my play so much in this hand. Seat 1: OMGClayAiken ($33,800) | has the button Seat 2: Urindanger ($90,554) | posts the SB of $200 Seat 3: theASHMAN103 ($101,931) | posts the BB of $400 Seat 4: durrrr ($40,000) Seat 5: Rob Hollink ($66,099) Seat 6: LokoIsBack ($6,400) Rob Hollink: 9♣-J♠-8♣-6♠

Preflop (pot = $600/six players) durrrr raises to $1,150 Rob Hollink (9♣-J♠-8♣-6♠) raises to $2,600 durrrr raises to $8,400 Rob Hollink calls $5,800 All six seats are taken. Besides the shortstack, LokoIsBack, everybody is playing over 80BBs. Durrrr raises from first position to $1,150. I am right behind him with 9♣-J♠-8♣-6♠ and reraise to $2,600. All other players fold, durrrr makes it $8,400 and I call. Let’s try to analyze all preflop actions, first of all durrrr raising with Q♣-A♦-J♣-K♦ from first position. This action doesn’t need any explanation. My reraise is on the loose and risky side, though. The main problem is not durrrr, but the other four guys. There is a reasonable chance that one of the other players wakes up with a real hand that will lead to more preflop-raising before the action is back to me. I wouldn’t like this. Also, when there is another caller and no further raising, it is going to be a three-way pot, so my hand is very vulnerable. Because of these possibilities, I would call my preflop reraise a bit out of line. The final result is the one that I am hoping for: a heads-up pot in position. A reason to raise these kind of doublesuited hands is because they play pretty well against hands like aces. Actually, when you reraise with these kind of hands you are hoping that your opponent raises again, especially with aces. This is another reason why I played the hand incorrectly, because durrrr is not a bad player who will bet this hand always and only with aces. Before I start to dislike my play too much, we will quickly go on and see what happened.

Flop 6♦-4♥-J♥ (pot = $17,400/two players) durrrr bets $17,400 Rob Hollink (9♣-J♠-8♣-6♠) raises to $34,800 durrrr calls $14,200, and is all-in Uncalled bet of $3,200 returned to Rob Hollink The flop is 6♦-4♥-J♥ and durrrr bets the pot, which is $17,400, and I put him all-in. With $17,400 in the middle, he has no way out. He has to bet this flop and call a reraise. I flopped two pair and my action is also obvious.

Turn 6♦-4♥-J♥-5♠ (pot = $80,600/two players) River 6♦-4♥-J♥-5♠-8♦ (pot = $80,600/two players) Showdown (pot = $80,600/two players) Rob Hollink shows 9♣-J♠-8♣-6♠ and plays two pair, jacks and eights, winning the pot durrrr shows Q♣-A♦-J♣-K♦ and plays a pair of jacks

Summary Urindanger folded before the flop and lost $200 theASHMAN103 folded before the flop and lost $400 durrrr mucked at the showdown and lost $40,000 Rob Hollink won the pot at the showdown and gained $40,600 All the money went in on the flop. There is no action on the turn and river. My two pair held up and I was so lucky to win this $80,597 pot. What lesson can we learn from this hand? Well, first of all don’t reraise with these hands in early position — it is not a good play. Secondly, make a reraise with these kinds of hands particularly against mediocre players who are prone to sell their aces cheaply. Third lesson: when doing this against good players who are capable of coming over the top again, reraise with a range that is well composed. Try to put enough aces in the range, so you can punish him pretty often when he comes over the top again, with hands like A-K-x-x.

Hand 12: $200-$400 pot-limit Omaha Again we have a very interesting hand. At first sight, you might think that THEDONKEYNO1 played the hand too aggressively and that I played it too cautiously. But is this really so? Let’s try to find out. Seat 1: Gus Hansen ($65,105) Seat 2: Rob Hollink ($48,271) | plays the button Seat 3: ICallSoWhat ($34,097) | is sitting out Seat 4: Urindanger ($32,805) | posts the SB of $200 Seat 5: Genius28 ($16,696) | posts the BB of $400 Seat 6: THEDONKEYNO1 ($62,746) Rob Hollink: (5♠-7♣-6♦-3♥)

Preflop (pot = $600/five players) THEDONKEYNO1 raises to $1,400 Gus Hansen raises to $3,100 Rob Hollink (5♠-7♣-6♦-3♥) calls $3,100 Urindanger folds Genius28 folds THEDONKEYNO1 calls $1,700 Five players in the hand; ICallSoWhat is sitting out. THEDONKEYNO1 starts the action with a raise to $1,400 from first position. Right behind him, Gus Hansen makes a small reraise to $3,100. Now it’s up to me; I got 7-6-5-3 rainbow, an easy fold of course, unless you’re some kind of a sick gambler. With everybody more than $48,000 deep and me on the button, I decided to see a flop, mostly hoping that the prize would remain at $3,100. We got two players folding and THEDONKEYNO1 just calls. I got lucky there was no further raising.

Flop 8♠-5♣-9♠ (pot = $9,900/three players) THEDONKEYNO1 bets $9,900 Gus Hansen folds Rob Hollink (5♠-7♠-6♦-3♥) calls $9,900 The pot is already $9,900, which is pretty big, and the remaining stacks are between $45,000 and $62,000. The flop is 8♠-5♣-9♠ and I just hit the nuts. Life is good. THEDONKEYNO1 bets $9,900. Gus folds and I just call. This is a good moment to evaluate what happened so far. What about THE-DONKEYNO1’s bet on the flop? The question he probably asked himself is: “Is there a chance that I am laying down this hand on the flop with 10k already in the middle?” It looks like the answer was no. So he decided to bet the flop himself to give him the best chance to pick up the pot uncontested. To figure out if this was the right decision, it might be interesting to evaluate the range of hands that would give him action. Here is a list of hands that are going to give THEDONKEYNO1 action. The percentages behind the hands tell us how much the THEDONKEYNO1’s hand (6♥-A♠-2♠-K♥) is worth against these holdings: Straight +/-34% Two pair +/-36% Set +/-27% K-Q-J-10ss 58% K-Q-J-10s 68% Q-J-10-9ss 40% Q-J-10-9s 49% All together this doesn’t look so bad. Only against a set, he is doing bad business. Against a straight or two pair, he has minus EV as well, but with the $9,900 that is already in the pot, this minus EV is pretty low. Against the other holdings, he is fine. Furthermore, there is still a possibility that the action is going to be three-way, and that is quite good for his hand. Altogether his odds are not too bad against the hands that give him action. Combined with the chance of picking up the pot uncontested, his decision to bet the flop is reasonable. How about my call on the flop? To find out whether it’s better to call or to raise, I have to do a bit more study. I have to estimate how often my opponent will bet the flop with all different possible holdings. Here is a list with percentages (35% of his flop bets are done by the nut flush draw, 10% is done by the straight with a flush-redraw, etc): A The nut flush draw 35% B Straight with spades 10% C Straight without spades 10% D Two pair 10% E Set 5% F Straight draw with spades 20% G Straight draw without spades 10% The only thing we have to do now is to find out what is the best answer in every different situation and then add up the figures. It’s clear that he will never bet-fold in this situation, so it’s up to me to decide whether to go all-in now or not. The first option is raise on the flop and go all-in. The second

option is call on the flop. After a call on the flop, we will have the following possibilities on the turn: Blank and he bets This situation occurs the most. I think he will bet every blank and we will raise all-in. So there is the same result as all-in on the flop. The flush comes and he bets In this case, I would like to give him credit for a flush. When he bets here, chances are too high that he has a flush. So just calling on the flop will give me better EV when this turn takes place. The flush comes and he checks In this case, we have two possibilities. We could decide to give him credit for a flush and save money or we could use this flush card to try to bet a straight, a straight draw or a set or two pair out of the pot. My option will be to check; I will save money when he has a flush. Depending on the river card, I will decide if I am calling a bet. Also here I think I am saving money by not raising the flop. The board pairs and he bets Then I go all-in. It’s not likely enough that he has me beat, so I prefer to put it all-in. We probably have the same result as all-in on the flop, with a small chance that he might lay down the same straight. The board pairs and he checks Then I bet, and call an all-in. In this case, I have a very small chance that I bet the same straight out of the pot. Also, could he lay down a draw here? It looks as if just calling on the flop could give me better value.

Turn 8♠-5♣-9♠-2♦ (pot = $29,700/two players) THEDONKEYNO1 bets $29,700 Rob Hollink (5♠-7♣-6♦-3♥) raises to $35,271, and is all-in THEDONKEYNO1 calls $5,571 There is 30k in the middle and the remaining effective stack-size is 35k. For my opponent it is unclear what I am holding. He has a pair of deuces now, must think that he is probably behind, but has a minimum of seven outs and probably a lot more to win the pot on the river. This situation makes his turn bet very logical. He bets the pot, I go all-in and obviously he calls.

River 8♠-5♣-9♠-2♦-Q♦ (pot = $100,242/two players)

Showdown (pot = $100,242/two players) Rob Hollink shows (5♠-7♣-6♦-3♥) and plays a straight, nine high, winning the pot THEDONKEYNO1 shows 6♥-A♠-2♠-K♥ and plays a pair of twos The poker gods are on my side. The last card is the Q♦ and I win a 100k

Summary Gus Hansen folded on the flop and lost $3,100 Rob Hollink won the pot at the showdown and gained $51,971 Urindanger folded before the flop and lost $200 Genius28 folded before the flop and lost $400 THEDONKEYNO1 mucked at the showdown and lost $48,271 At first glance, his play might have looked too aggressive and mine a bit too passive. Further analysis made clear that we both did the right thing.

Hand 13: $25-$50 pot-limit Omaha (heads up) Until now I never discussed aces and I haven’t talked much about heads-up situations either. Hand 13 is out of a session against gordo16. We played a lot of $25-$50 on Pokerstars. The games were very aggressive. This hand is not that interesting, but the whole background story about aggressive heads up PLO, combined with how to play the aces, is something I like to discuss. The heads up matches can be played in different ways, but both of us liked to play really aggressively. Lots of hands were raised and reraised before the flop. A raise, reraise and again a reraise would make it maximum $1,350 preflop. We always had stacks over $5,000 and many times more than $10,000. When it was raised to $1,350 preflop and you would make that play only with aces, then I think you are playing the hand with a disadvantage. The money that is still behind will make your opponent the eventual winner. In another hand I described, we saw what solution durrrr came up with for this problem. He just added the A-K-Q-x kind of hands to the group that he would four-bet with. Let me explain why this is good. It was normal for us to three-bet out of the big blind or out of position (the SB always has the button heads-up) with some kind of reasonable rundown. Durrrr used to pick as a minimum requirement for four-betting not only aces, but something like A-K-x-x single suited, and sometimes even less. The A-K-x-x would be alright when his opponent didn’t have aces or kings. Let’s have a more mathematical view on this situation. Imagine you raise with A-K-x-x and your have statistics for your opponent that indicate he reraises 30% of the time. With an A-K in your hand the chances of him having aces or kings are cut in half, as only three possible A-A-x-x combos or K-K-x-x are left instead of six. So, the chance that he has aces is now only 1.25% and it’s the same for kings. Let’s assume that his regular reraise percentage of 30% goes down to 25% because we are holding an A-K-x-x in our hand. When he reraises out of the big blind now, we are up against aces or kings 2.5%/25% * 100% = 10% of the time. So, 10% of the time we are in bad shape. In all other situations we are fine; it’s possible we dominate our opponent and we have the advantage of being “first to speak” on the flop. No further explanation is needed that the A-K-x-x should be a four-bet when the games are as aggressive as this. So far, this extra story is about aggressive heads-up play. Let’s go back to the hand. I am the smallest stack with $5,800. Gordo16 raises on the button and I reraise with 10♠-A♦-A♣-4♣ and he calls with 2♠-6♥-Q♠-4♥ I would say we both did what we had to do. Seat 4: Rob Hollink ($8,926) | posts the BB of $50 Seat 6: gordo16 ($5,814) | posts the SB of $25 and plays the button Rob Hollink: 10♠-A♦-A♣-4♣

Preflop (pot = $75/two players) gordo16 raises $100-$150 Rob Hollink 10♠-A♦-A♣-4♣ raises to $450 gordo16: calls $300

Flop 10♣-4♠-10♦ (pot = $900/two players) Rob Hollink 10♠-A♦-A♣-4♣ checks gordo16 bets $650 Rob Hollink calls $650 The flop was a very dry one: 10♣-4♠-10♦ I just flopped the absolute nuts. I checked and gordo16 couldn’t resist testing the waters by betting $650. Is checking the best I can do here? Isn’t it too obvious? Could I also check a hand like A-K-Q-J here? If I could there is nothing wrong with checking the nuts as well. If I would never check a missed flop here, then I also cannot check the nuts here. Is checking a missed flop a possible play in this particular situation? It’s very hard to give a good answer to this question. With an opponent as aggressive as gordo16 it could go like this. Imagine, I have A-K-Q-J and I bet the flop. He could easily call without a hand and put pressure on me on the turn or river. The more aggressive my opponent, the higher the chance that he will not give up after my flop bet. So, against an aggressive opponent, betting might make it difficult for me, assuming I will have to give up at some point in the hand. If I would check the flop, he might also try to bluff me. Then again, if he has a little something he could check behind and go for the free card. This would be very nice when I have A-K-Q-J. In conclusion, against an aggressive opponent I would like to check the flop with A-K-Q-J. Always betting could become expensive in the long run. So, when I check here with the nuts, it shouldn’t be that suspicious. What about his bet? As I said, it’s hard to stand all the heat without a 10. Looking at it from his point of view, my check could mean that I missed my high rundown or I am playing the passive line with A-A-x-x. Knowing that I might be able to lay down a big pair somewhere in the hand if he bets all the way made him decide to go for it and start a three-barrel bluff. The pot is $900 and I have $5,400 left. Note that he cannot bet the pot that big on the flop, otherwise he won’t have three bets. Because I think many players will not like the way he played this hand, I decided to explain my opinion about his play. I don’t say he should play the hand this way, but I hope I explained that it is a reasonable option. Because I know that he is a good player, I am sure he will fire again on the turn. So I just call his $650 bet on the flop.

Turn 10♣-4♣-10♦-3♣ (pot = $2,200/two players) Rob Hollink (10♠-A♦-A♣-4♣) checks gordo16 bets $1,550 Rob Hollink calls $1,550 We see a 3♣ on the turn. Not much to say anymore, I explained all above. I check, he bets and I only call.

River 10♣-4♠-10♦-3♣-3♠ (pot = $5,300/two players) Rob Hollink 10♠-A♦-A♣-4♣ checks gordo16 bets $3,164 and is all-in

Rob Hollink calls $3,164 The river is the 3♠. I check again, hoping he completes his three-barrel bluff. And this is indeed what happens.

Showdown (pot = $11,628/two players) gordo16 shows 2♠-6♥-Q♠-4♥ and plays two pair, 10♠ and fours Rob Hollink shows 10♠-A♦-A♣-4♣ and plays a full house, 104 full of fours, winning the pot

Summary Rob Hollink won the pot at the showdown and gained $5,814 gordo16 mucked at the showdown lost $5,814 As I explained above, although some players might see it as a bit smelly, it is better to check this kind of flop. From his point of view, facing a check from your opponent after a preflop reraise, there are two ways to play: totally passively — not betting until you beat aces or go for the three-barrel bluff.

Hand 14: $25-$50 pot-limit Omaha A five-handed $25-$50 hand on Stars. Calamitas and Lystig are a bit short. So we have to be careful preflop. Seat 1: UngeEnga ($3,171.50) Seat 3: Rob Hollink ($3,566.10) Seat 4: Lystig ($1,709) | plays the button Seat 5: calamitas ($625) | posts the SB of $25 Seat 6: sl22795 ($3,000) | posts the BB of $50 Rob Hollink (A♦-5♥-9♦-5♣)

Preflop (pot = $75/five players) UngeEnga raises $50-100 Rob Hollink (A♦-5♥-9♦-5♣) calls $100 Lystig calls $100 calamitas folds sl22795 calls $50 With a hand of A♦-5♥-9♦-5♣ my preflop call looks reasonable.

Flop 2♦-J♣-8♦ (pot = $425/four players) sl22795 checks UngeEnga bets $423 Rob Hollink (A♦-5♥-9♦-5♣) calls $423 Lystig calls $423 sl22795 raises $2,115 to $2,538 UngeEnga raises $533.50-3071.50 and is all-in Rob Hollink calls $2,648.50 Lystig calls $1,186 and is all-in sl22795 calls $362 and is all-in After a check from the BB, it is up to UngeEnga again and he bets $423 into the other three players. I call, as does Lystig and we see sl22795 raising to $2,538. Now UngeEnga raises $533.50-3,071.50 and is all-in. I call again and so does Lystig. Time to evaluate. First, what about me? Well, I flop the nut flush draw. But without anything to go with it, like a pair or a gutshot, my hand isn’t that strong. So, I just called. Was there a better option? With folding not coming into consideration, we only have to check if raising would be better. With a preflop raiser betting into his three opponents on a 2♦-J♣-8♥ flop, I see no value in raising at all. His flop bet into three players means a real hand for sure. There is no chance he is laying down when I raise and the chances for me having the best hand right now are pretty slim. So, I did the right thing by inviting the other players as well. Don’t forget my hand plays very well multiway. When it comes back to me the pot is four-handed and it looks as if it’s going to be a four-way all-in. I know the chances for me winning the pot will not be much over 25%, but with four people all-in, it’s fine. I like it this way. Even as it turns out that I am up against a set and that my opponents are having four diamonds between them, I still have a 23% chance to win this hand. So with $100 + $423 of my money already in the middle, I can never make a mistake here. Now, what about my opponents’ actions? Obviously, UngeEnga continuation bets here with top two and a gutshot. After my call, Lystig calls behind me with 7♠-J♠-5♦-6♦ This is a call I really don’t like. He has no made hand, and a flush draw that can almost never be good. Now it comes back to the BB, who is really excited. He has second set and a jack in his hand and raises the max — what else could he do? It’s UngeEnga’s turn now. His flop bet is called in two places and the third opponent even raised it up. He cannot be too happy now. For the moment he probably beats the two callers, but the BB could beat him although this is not certain. The BB could have the nut flush draw with a gutshot as well or maybe the wrap with a flush draw or maybe the same top two. I would say it’s about 50-50 now for UngeEnga if he is beat or that his opponent is drawing. Not a nice perspective. As it turns out, his chances on the flop were 13%. If the BB had had a draw, his chances would probably have been around 40%. With $523 in the middle he didn’t need much more than 20% on this flop to make a legitimate call all-in. So, if the BB had had a draw 30% of the time, he had a call already — because (0.3 * 40) + (0.7 * 0.13) = 21.1 — in other words more than the 20% he needed. I think, it’s clear that UngeEnga made the right decision. My call was easy and Lystig compounded his bad call on the flop with another call of $1,186, which again was not very good. His chances of winning on the flop were only 7%. There is no action left, analyzing is done; the cards will bring the outcome of this hand.

Turn 2♦-J♣-8♦-Q♣ (main pot = $6,861/four players, side pot 1 = $3,873/three players, side pot 2 = $343/two players)

River 2♦-J♣-8♦-Q♣-6♠ (main pot = $6,861/four players, side pot 1 = $3,873/three players, side pot 2 = $343/two players)

Showdown (main pot = $6,861/four players, side pot 1 = $3,873/three players, side pot 2 = $343/two players) UngeEnga shows 7♣-7♥-8♠-9♥ and plays two pair, jacks and eights, winning side pot 2 Rob Hollink shows A♦-5♥-9♦-10♣ and plays a pair of fives

sl22795 shows 8♥-J♦-8♣-10♦ and plays three of a kind, eights, winning side pot 1 and the main pot Lystig shows 7♠-J♠-5♦-6♦ and plays two pair, jacks and sixes

Summary UngeEnga won side pot 2 at the showdown and lost $2,828.50 Rob Hollink mucked at the showdown and lost $3,171.50 Lystig mucked at the showdown and lost $1,709 calamitas folded before the flop and lost $25 sl22795 won side pot 1 and the main pot at the showdown and gained $7,734 The turn and river are the Q♣ and the 6♠. Middle set held up, and won a nice pot.

Hand 15: $25-$50 pot-limit Omaha (heads up) During the same period that I was playing Gordo16 I also played aba20 (Brian Townsend) a couple of times heads up. From these sessions, I choose this hand, because there are a lot of interesting poker aspects here. Seat 3: Rob Hollink ($7,850.50) | posts the SB of $25 and plays the button Seat 4: aba20 ($6,039) | posts the BB of $50 Rob Hollink: (7♦-6♦-A♦-3♠)

Preflop (pot = $75/two players) Rob Hollink (7♦-6♦-A♦-3♠) raises $100-$150 aba20 raises $300-$450 Rob Hollink calls $300 We are starting this hand with aba20 being the shortest stack and 120BBs deep. On the SB/button I raise to $150, aba20 makes it $450 and I call. My hand, 7♦-6♦-A♦-3♠ is for sure good enough to raise in position. Aba20 reraised with K♣-8♠-9♠-K♦. It’s a good starting hand but has a small problem compared to a rundown hand. The chances of hitting a nice flop are reduced, because the hand contains a pair. So, I would say, you can reraise with this hand if you like, but you have to be aware of the fact that it might be difficult to play this hand postflop. I prefer to reraise with the big pairs only when they are really nice, which this isn’t. Of course, I call his reraise.

Flop 5♣-A♣-A♥ (pot = $900/two players) aba20 checks Rob Hollink (7♦-6♦-A♦-3♠) checks We see a 5♣-A♣-A♥ flop. I hit my ace. Aba20 checks and I check as well. Let’s first look to aba20’s action — he checked. In what situation is he now? With an ace, or as we see here two aces on the board, the outcome of the hand is more or less decided. From my opponent’s point of view, when I have an ace, his chances are small, but I don’t have ace, he can hardly lose anymore with K-K-x-x in his hand and a flush draw. So this is a clear example of a flop where his best bet is to check. How about my check? Do I have a reason to bet here? From my point of view the same scenario holds. Preflop reraises are done a lot with hands that have an ace in them. When my opponent indeed has an ace, then I am behind and a check would be great. On the other hand, if he doesn’t have an ace or 5-5, I am clearly in the lead and he probably has only two outs (a pair) or six to eight outs (a flush draw). I have to choose between protecting my stack against a better ace and protecting the pot against a maximum eight-card draw, possibly 10 if he also has a pocket pair that could improve to a full. On average his draw will be something like three cards, I guess. What is important now is how big the chance still is that he has an ace, although he checked the flop. And could a check on the flop from me make him bluff the turn? The chances of him having an ace are pretty small. I don’t see him checking an ace. How about inducing a bluff, when I check the flop? This is also not probable, because he would have bluffed the flop right away when he missed. So actually my check on the flop is pretty bad, a safety-play that is overdone.

Turn 5♣-A♣-A♥-Q♣ (pot = $900/two players) aba20 bets $650 Rob Hollink (7♦-6♦-A♦-3♠) calls $650 The fourth card on the board is Q♣ Aba20 bets $650 and I call. He made the nut flush. After my check on the flop, he knows that the chances of me having an ace have diminished substantially. He knows that in all likelihood he is in the lead and his turn-bet is good. How about my call? Let’s first see what I think of his check on the flop. I think he would bet most of his missed rundowns. So his flop-check tells me that he had a little something, but probably not an ace. Now on the turn when the flush arrives he wants to value-bet his flush. Not really afraid that he has a full house, I call, When I make a full house on the river, I beat him with a hand he is not expecting. So my chances for getting paid off are a bit better than normal.

River 5♣-A♣-A♥-Q♣-5♥ (pot = $2,200/two players) aba20 bets $1,950 Rob Hollink (7♦-6♦-A♦-3♠) calls $1,950 A 5♥ on the river and aba20 bets $1,950. His bet is alright — nothing changed, and he knows he is the favorite to be the winner if called. On the other hand, my own call is horrible. I have labeled him with a little something on the turn and river — and these little somethings will normally be played quite passively in PLO. So, if suddenly it seems worth it for my opponent to bet the hand two times, this little something must have been changed into a little bit more than just something.

Showdown (pot = $6,100/two players) aba20: shows K♣-8♠-9♠-K♦ and plays a flush, ace high, winning the pot Rob Hollink shows 7♦-6♦-A♦-3♣ and plays three of a kind, aces

Summary Rob Hollink mucked at the showdown and lost $3,050 aba20 won the pot at the showdown and gained $3,050

Hand 16: $25-$50 pot-limit Omaha On Pokerstars we have a nice five-handed game with everybody more than 100BBs deep. Seat 1: Crafty Rat ($5,348) | posts the SB of $25 Seat 2: azn_baller3 ($7,003) | posts the BB of $50 Seat 3: moumouth ($5,000) Seat 4: samh133 ($25,956) Seat 5: Rob Hollink ($10,157) | plays the button Rob Hollink: (6♠-5♥-4♥-A♠)

Preflop (pot = $75/five players) moumouth raises $100-$150 samh133 folds Rob Hollink (6♠-5♥-4♥-A♠) calls $150 Crafty Rat calls $125 azn_baller3 calls $100 From first position moumouth raises $100-$150 and he gets three callers.

Flop 7♠-3♥-10♠ (pot = $600/four players) Crafty Rat checks azn baller3 checks moumouth bets $150 Rob Hollink (6♠-5♥-4♥-A♠) raises $600-$750 Crafty Rat raises $2,248 to $2,998 aznballer3 folds moumouth folds Rob Hollink calls $2,248 We see the flop 7♠-3♥-10♠ The blinds check and moumouth bets just $150 into the $600 pot. I raise to $750 and Crafty Rat raises to $2,998. Moumouth folds and I call. Investigation time. Do I have to raise on the flop? I think so. With the nut flush draw and a four, five or six for a straight, I really like my hand and want to play a big pot. Crafty Rat has 4♠-7♣-K♠-7♦ for middle set and second nut flush draw. He has a great flop and wants only one thing: to play a big pot. Against me he is out of position, so to prevent a possible check-check on the turn, he reraises here right away. Now it’s back to me and I call with my big draw.

Turn 7♠-3♥-10♠-Q♣ (pot = $6,746/two players) Crafty Rat bets $2,200 and is all-in Rob Hollink (64-5v-4v-A4) calls $2,200 The Q♣ on the turn. This is a blank; his bet and my call are obvious.

River 7♠-3♥-10♠-Q♣-6♦ (pot = $6,746/two players)

Showdown (pot = $11,146/two players) Crafty Rat shows 4♠-7♣-K♠-7♦ and plays three of a kind, sevens Rob Hollink shows 6♠-5♥-4♥-A♠ and plays a straight, three to seven, winning the pot

Summary Crafty Rat mucked at the showdown and lost $5,348 azn_baller3 folded on the flop and lost $150 moumouth folded on the flop and lost $300 Rob Hollink won the pot at the showdown and gained $5,798 No action left. The 6♦ on the river makes my straight and gives me the pot. Both of us had a great flop and raised. Calling his reraise on the flop and not going all-in was obvious. I like the way I played it. Regarding his play: as I said, with these stacks it was OK. But imagine if we were all a lot deeper and the pot wasn’t that big compared to the stacks. I mean, even with second set and the second nut flush draw it is a borderline case for committing all your chips. Probably it has to be really deep before one would like to play such a hand a bit more carefully, but there are situations where it would be better. Imagine if moumouth had a hand like 10♣-10♦-7♥-4♦ for top set with a blocker seven, and in addition I would have my

premium draw that included the nut flush. So Crafty Rat would then have had second set and second nut flush draw in this three-way constellation. Any idea what our chances would be like on this flop? 6♠-5♥-4♥-A♠ = 49.70 % 10♣-10♦-7♥-4♥ = 49.52% 4♠-7♣-K♠-7♦ = 0.76%

Hand 17: $25-$50 pot-limit Omaha (heads up) Another heads up hand against gordo16. Again, we are playing $25-$50 on Pokerstars. Our stacks are over 200BBs deep. Seat 3: Rob Hollink ($10,683.75) | posts the SB of $25 and plays the button Seat 4: gordo16 ($10,737) | posts the BB of $50 Rob Hollink: (K♥-K♣-5♣-5♥)

Preflop (pot = $75/two players) Rob Hollink (K♥-K♣-5♣-5♥) raises $100-$150 gordo16 raises $300-$450 Rob Hollink calls $300 With K♥-K♣-5♣-5♥ in the BB, I raise to $150 and gordo16 reraises to $450. Although I probably have the best hand, I don’t like to raise again, facing the possibility that he will make it $4,050 with aces. When I just call here I will save money against aces and in case I am up against some kind of rundown it’s also not bad to keep it cheap. His reraise to $450 with 9-8-7-6 single suited is pretty normal.

Flop 7♦-7♣-5♦ (pot = $900/two players) gordo16 bets $550 Rob Hollink (K♥-K♣-5♣-5♥) raises $1,000-1,550 gordo16 raises $3,950-5,500 Rob Hollink raises $4,733.75 to $10,233.75 and is all-in gordo16 calls $4,733.75 We both hit the flop, which is 7♦-7♣-5♦ Gordo16 bets $550 and I raise to $1,550. Now he makes it $5,500 and I go all-in. A lot of action and quite obvious since both players have hit the flop big time. But does it always has to be like this? Let’s first look at his flop bet. What different hands can he have? A big pair, for instance A-A-x-x He missed the flop; the pot is $900 and the remaining stacks are $10,000. In case he doesn’t have the flush draw to go with his big pair, I would prefer a check-call if I was I in his seat. But with the flush draw, I would bet the flop. Summary: check-call or bet-call. High rundown that missed Three possibilities: bet-fold, check-fold or check-call. The check-fold is a bit too weak for me. Check-calling this flop and giving your opponent the chance to do the betting is also not so nice when you can barely beat a bluff. So mostly, I would go for a bet-fold. High rundown with a flush draw Bet-raise is what plops up in my mind. By betting, I might kick better hands out of the pot. Whenever he raises me, I prefer to raise again, because it’s not sure he has a seven or a full house. So again, I think, I might be able to make a better hand fold; calling a raise on this flop and then leaving the pilot seat to your opponent is not a very nice option. Low rundown around the seven, with a straight wrap, say 10-9-8-6 This situation is more or less the same as “high rundown with the flush draw”. We have a draw, but don’t have much yet. Same story, betraise, is what I like. Low rundown with a seven Of course I bet. When my opponent raises me, I have to put him on a full house, a set, flush draw, a straight draw or a bluff. No value in raising a full house or a set or a bluff. When he has a draw, it’s a bit more complicated whether it is the right move. What is optimal in this case also depends on his aggressiveness on the turn. A bet-call is my preferred play. A hand with a seven and an ace kicker or a full house Bet-raise of course. All in all, putting myself in his seat, I always bet the flop, except when I have a big pair without the flush draw. At first sight, I like it that the betting range is very wide. But it might be weak that the check-range contains only one kind of hand: the big pair without the flush draw. This might be a bit too face-up. So, I’d better check the nuts every once in a while in this spot. Now, I am going to look at my own play. How about my raise on the flop? Let’s take my opinions from above as a standard for playing the flop after reraising out of position. Against an opponent who bets the flop, almost all the time, my hand is a clear raise. We are getting a call from an overpair with a flush draw. We are getting a reraise from almost all sevens and all draws. Isn’t it nice? My raise on the flop is of course the best play. So, my conclusion is that I like his flop bet and my raise. Whether or not he has to reraise on the flop or just call my raise is more complicated, and largely opponent-dependent. Overlooking my discussion about the flop play when being the reraiser out of position, you must see that I don’t give my opponent much reason to reraise-bluff me on the flop. He will only be successful when I have the missed rundown and in that situation he might even beat me. So, when playing against an aggressive reraiser out of position like me, it’s best to play the flop straightforwardly: fold if you miss, call with a little something and raise when strong. I also played opponents like Ilari Sahamies who check a lot of flops after having reraised out of position. Tom Dwan and Gus Hansen on the other hand, two preflop-reraise-kings, almost always bet the flop. I would love to hear their ideas on this subject. Maybe one day, one of these guys will come up with a PLO book.

Turn 7♦-7♣-5♦-10♠ (pot = $21,367.50/two players)

River 7♦-7♣-5♦-10♠-J♠ (pot = $21,367.50/two players) Showdown (pot = $21,367.50/two players) gordo16 shows 8♥-9♦-7♠-6♠ and plays a straight, seven to jack Rob Hollink shows K♥-K♣-5♣-5♥ and plays a full house, fives full of sevens, winning the pot

Summary Rob Hollink won the pot at the showdown and gained $10,683.75 gordo16 mucked at the showdown and lost $10,683.75 Nothing to say anymore, or maybe just that it is time for me to change my play a bit in these situations…

Hand 18: $25-$50 pot-limit Omaha (heads up) Gordo16, again. I hope I am going to make him famous, because this must mean the book has sold well. Just kidding, we all know that a book about PLO cannot make someone rich. For me, the main reason to write is the study aspect. Knowing that I am a really bad student who only likes to play, I thought that it was a good idea to oblige myself to think more about the hands I played. This hand was played on Pokerstars and we were 170BBs deep. Seat 4: gordo16 ($8,528) | posts the BB of $50 Seat 5: Rob Hollink ($9,433) | posts the SB of $25 and plays the button Rob Hollink: (J♠-10♣-8♣-6♦)

Preflop (pot = $75/two players) Rob Hollink (J♠-10♣-8♣-6♦) raises $100-$150 gordo16 raises $300-$450 Rob Hollink calls $300 My hand is J♠-10♣-8♣-6♦ and I raise on the SB/button to $150. Gordo16, having Q♥-6♠-J♦-9♠ prefers to make it $450 and I call. What shall I say? This is the way we played, I can imagine some people like to play tighter. We didn’t.

Flop 5♥-6♣-Q♣ (pot = $900/two players) gordo16 bets $600 Rob Hollink (J♠-10♣-8♣-6♦) calls $600 On the flop we are looking to a 5♥-6♣-Q♣ board. Gordo16 bets $600 and I call. He flopped top two and of course he bet. For me the flop brought middle pair and a 10-high flush-draw. I would say this is just a little bit too much to lay down.

Turn 5♥-6♣-Q♣-10♥ (pot = $2,100/two players) gordo16 bets $2,050 Rob Hollink (J♠-10♣-8♣-6♦) raises $6,199 to $8,249 gordo16 calls $5,428 and is all-in uncalled bet of $771 returned to Rob Hollink The 10♥ is our turn-card. Gordo16 bets $2,050, I raise all-in to $8,249, and he calls. On the turn, it’s decision time for gordo16. His two pair is probably in the lead and he has an up and down as well. I agree with him, that he has to go for it. Actually he must be happy that I raised him, as there are not many blank river cards left. Is my raise on the turn OK? Well, for me the situation is very unclear. Am I leading or not with my two pair? I think I like my chances on a Q-10-6-5 board. Having a flush draw as well makes my hand a bit stronger. Actually I am in the same situation as he is. We both have a hand that could easily be in the lead and the board is so draw heavy that many river cards will cause a problem. Good poker is also avoiding difficult situations. So just like for him, it’s also decision time for me. Taking into consideration the aggressive way we played, I still like my decision. With so many draws out there, I don’t feel as if I’m an underdog on the turn. And even now — when I have got my money in badly — I still have a lot of outs.

River 5♥-6♣-Q♣-10♥-3♠ (pot = $21,367.50/two players) On the river we got the 3♠. There is no action left and his better two pair wins the pot.

Showdown (pot = $21,367.50/two players) gordo16 shows Q♥-6♠-J♦-9♠ and plays two pair, queens and sixes, winning the pot Rob Hollink shows J♠-10♣-8♣-6♦ and plays two pair, 10♠ and sixes

Summary gordo16 won the pot at the showdown and gained $8,528 Rob Hollink mucked at the showdown and lost $8,528 Again we had a hand that was played really loose and aggressive from both sides. All decisions should be seen in the flow of the game. Keeping that in my mind, we weren’t that crazy, were we?

Hand 19: $25-$50 pot-limit Omaha (heads up) We are looking at another heads-up match. This time I am playing against Brian Townsend, a player who is famous for value-betting pretty light. It’s $25-$50 on Pokerstars with 180BBs deep. Seat 3: Rob Hollink ($13,001) | posts the BB of $50 Seat 4: aba20 ($8,927) | posts the SB of $25 and plays the button Rob Hollink: (5♥-4♥-2♣-4♦)

Preflop (pot = $75/two players) aba20 raises $100-$150 Rob Hollink (5♥-4♥-2♣-4♦) calls $100 Aba20 raises on the SB/button to $150 and I call. His raise is normal and my call is a bit loose.

Flop 2♠-5♦-6♣ (pot = $300/two players) Rob Hollink (5♥-4♥-2♣-4♦) checks aba20 bets $250 Rob Hollink calls $250 The flop is 2♠-5♦-6♣. Aba20 bets $250 and I call. We can’t blame him for continuation betting middle set (he holds 5♠-9♥-7♥-5♣). My call is also fine. Actually, I expect myself to be in the lead something like 80-90% of the time. No reason to raise, though; this would be a big mistake with the money so deep.

Turn 2♠-5♦-6♣-J♥ (pot = $800/two players) Rob Hollink (5♥-4♥-2♣-4♦) checks aba20 bets $750 Rob Hollink calls $750 The J♥ is our turn-card. In you are hoping that this card will combine with the flop then we can call it a blank. I check, aba20 bets $750 and I call again. To find out if we can justify my call here, we better try to figure out his turn-betting range. What about a high pair? No way is he betting that hand on the flop and the turn. Would he bet a high rundown two times? Well I probably wouldn’t do it, but it could be possible. So what’s left? What’s left are the made hands, let’s say two pair and better, and the straight draws like 9-8-7-6. The likelihood that he did flop a straight with me having the blockers is not great. So, with only these two holdings left and me having two pair, the chances of him having the straight draw are greater. On the other hand, I expect him to bet every made hand, but he might occasionally check his draws. Altogether, it’s pretty close whether he has a draw or a made hand. When he has a made hand, I still have the treys as outs. Getting just over 2 to 1, I have to call, I think.

River 2♠-5♦-6♣-J♥-Q♦ (pot = $2,300/two players) Rob Hollink (5♥-4♥-2♣-4♦) checks aba20 bets $2,150 Rob Hollink calls $2,150 The Q♦ on the river. I check, he bets almost the pot and I call. How likely is it that he will continue to bet the missed draw? Well, Brian is known for his very thin value-bets on the river. So I guess that a guy who plays like that will have a problem with just giving up on the river whenever he has missed his draw. So, it’s obvious that I decided to call.

Showdown (pot = $6,600/two players) aba20 shows 5♠-9♥-7♥-5♣ and plays three of a kind, fives, winning the pot Rob Hollink shows 5♥-4♥-2♣-4♦ and plays two pair, fives and twos

Summary Rob Hollink mucked at the showdown and lost 3,300 aba20 won the pot at the showdown and gained $3,300 We saw a hand that was very simple and very nice for Brian. After I made a loose call preflop, I ended up in a hand where I couldn’t find enough reasons to throw my cards away.

Hand 20: $50-$100 pot-limit Omaha This time we have a five-handed $50-$100 game. All players are playing over 100BBs. I chose this hand because, until now, we didn’t have that many paired flops and this is a feature that is always interesting. Seat 2: Rob Hollink ($10,295) Seat 3: Iarattor123 ($10,626)|plays the buttom Seat 4; CHUFTY ($12,710)|posts the SB of $50 Seat 5: Erick Lindgren ($43,569.50) | posts the BB of $100 Seat 6: Boosted J ($10,173) Rob Hollink: (K♠-A♥-3♥-K♠

Preflop (pot = $150/five players) Rob Hollink (K♠-A♥-3♥-K♣) raises to $350 laratto123 calls $350 CHUFTY calls $300 Erick Lindgren calls $250 I am in the cutoff with K♠-A♥-3♥-K♣ and open with a raise to $350; laratto123 calls $350 on the button and so do CHUFTY and Erick Lindgren from the blinds.

Flop 4♣-3♠-3♦ (pot = $1,400/four players) CHUFTY checks Erick Lindgren checks Rob Hollink (K♠-A♥-3♥-K♣) bets $1,200 laratto123 raises to $2,400 CHUFTY folds Erick Lindgren folds Rob Hollink calls $1,200 Four players see the flop, which is 4♣-3♠-3♦. Check, check and it’s up to me. I bet $1,200 into the $1,400 pot. Laratto123, just behind me on the button, minraises to $2,400. CHUFTY and Erick both fold, and I decided to call. Whether it’s a call or reraise on the flop from his and my side is something I will discuss in the conclusion.

Turn 4♣-3♠-3♦-J♣ (pot = $6,200/two players) Rob Hollink K♠-A♥-3♥-K♣) checks laratto123 bets $6,200 Rob Hollink raises to $7,545, and is all-in laratto123 calls $1,345 The next card is the J♣. I check, he bets $6,200 and I go all-in for just a little bit more. The river card is the 10♣

River 4♣-3♠-3♦-J♣-10♣ (pot = $21,290/two players) Showdown (pot $21,290/two players) Rob Hollink shows K♠-A♥-3♥-K♣ and plays three of a kind, threes laratto123 shows 4♥-4♦-6♦-Q♦ and plays a full house, fours full of threes, winning the pot

Summary Rob Hollink mucked at the showdown and lost $10,295 laratto123 won the pot at the showdown and gained $10,995 CHUFTY folded on the flop and lost $350 Erick Lindgren folded on the flop and lost $350 Let’s first look at my actions and, in particular, calling his minraise. On the flop we have $1,400 in the middle with $10,000 behind. I flopped the third nuts and am losing only to 4-4 and 4-3. Of course I bet. Laratto123 doubles the bet, the other guys fold and I call. To find out what is better, a call or a

reraise, we have to figure out with what range he would minraise here. First of all, we have to pay attention to the fact that he has two players in his back, which almost certainly excludes a bare bluff. So, what other hands besides 4-4 and 4-3 could he have? I would say that he could play like this with any three and very rarely will we see players doing this with 7-6-5-x. My conclusion is that he has a made hand 80-90% of the time, and 10-20% of the time he’s got something like 7-6-5-x. Against this made hand I could be winning, but I also could be drawing to only a king. What is important here is that I will never fold my hand, because it looks as if I am in the lead often enough to proceed. The money is not deep enough to consider laying down. So when I lose, it will always be for my entire stack. In those cases where my hand is good or where I win, I have to try to win the maximum as well. Let’s look at the situation when I am in the lead on the flop against a made hand. Usually, he will have a three with worse kickers. To avoid the checkcheck possibility on the turn because I am out of position, I had better reraise on the flop right away. Also against the 7-6-5-x hand, it is much better to kick it up on the flop. So, I guess I have two reasons to be unhappy about this hand: the outcome and the way I played it.

Hand 21: $25-$50 pot-limit Omaha Seat 1: bmm77 ($875) | is sitting out Seat 2: Yuudaii ($3,544) | posts the SB of $25 Seat 3: Beyond Thoughts ($3,719) | posts the BB of $50 Seat 4: La Key U ($8,035) Seat 5: Mark Vos ($8,250.05) Seat 6: Rob Hollink ($6,222) | plays the button Rob Hollink: (8♣-10♣-10♦-Q♥) On Full Tilt Poker, a six-handed $25-$50 game. One guy, bmm77, has only $875 but he is sitting out, all the other players are more than 70BBs deep.

Preflop (pot = $75/five players) La Key U folds Mark Vos folds Rob Hollink (8♣-10♣-10♦-Q♥) raises to $175 Yuudaii folds Beyond Thoughts calls $125 La Key U and Mark Vos fold. I make it $175 on the button and Beyond Thoughts calls from the BB. Raising with Q-10-10-8ss on the button is good of course, and calling with A-K-10-4, with the king suited, is also what most players would do.

Flop 9♦-10♥-A♥ (pot = $375/two players) Beyond Thoughts checks Rob Hollink (8♣-10♣-10♦-Q♥) bets $375 Beyond Thoughts raises to $1,500 Rob Hollink raises to $4,875 Beyond Thoughts calls $2,044, and is all-in

Turn 9♦-10♥-A♥-6♥ (pot = $7,463/two players) River 9♦-10♥-A♥-6♥-4♠ (pot $7,463/two players) Showdown (pot $7,463/two players) Rob Hollink shows 8♣-10♣-10♦-Q♥ and plays three of a kind, 10♠, winning the pot Beyond Thoughts shows K♠-4♦-10♠-A♣ and plays two pair, aces and 10♠

Summary Yuudaii folded before the flop and lost $25 Beyond Thoughts mucked at the showdown and lost $3,719 Rob Hollink won the pot at the showdown and gained $3,744 The flop is 9♦-10♥-A♥. Beyond Thoughts checks and I bet $375; he raises to $1,500 and I put him all-in for the $2,044 that he has left and he calls. A lot of action. After his check, I made the continuation bet with middle set, no further explanation needed. Now he raises to $1,500. Is this good or not? He flopped top two without any redraw or backdoor potential. The pot was $375 and that was my bet as well. Beyond Thoughts has $3,600 left. Let’s put ourselves in his position, to find out how to play his hand. What is better: the passive line of a check-call, or the aggressive check-raise? My possible holdings can be put into three groups:

Weak hand This hand has only a couple of outs against the top two, and not worth calling a check-raise. In this case the check-raise is better than giving a free turn-card.

Good drawing hand, say 12-16 outs

First the check-raise on the flop. The draw will probably call. On the turn the following cards will look very dangerous to Beyond Thoughts: any king, queen, jack, eight, seven or six and the 9v, 5v, 4v, 3v or 2v. Considering only Beyond Thoughts his own hand and the flop, this will be a total of 28 scare cards out of 45 turn cards. After a check-raise on the flop the pot will be $3,375 and the remaining chips are $2,200. This is not a situation you want to be in. You don’t know what to do; betting could as well be good or bad and the same is true for checkingfolding. Check-calling this flop and re-evaluating on the turn is a lot less dangerous. I know it’s not nice to let your opponent be in the pilotseat, but it’s a lot safer with these stacks and this flop-texture. When the turn is a bad card for the top two, he could play a safe check-fold. When the turn is a blank then the top two could consider a check-raise. In his seat, I would prefer the passive line against a good draw.

A good made hand; a set Against a set the top-two has zero, two or four outs. Do you really want me to calculate what is better against a set: check-call or checkraise? Of course there are more hands like the same top-two or top and bottom. Against another top two the action doesn’t matter so much. For me it’s clear; check-raising this kind of flop-texture with this stack is not the right play. With a stack of at least $1,000 less than this $3,719, the check-raise on the flop might be the right play, but not now. The 6y on the turn would have saved him a lot of money if he had check-called the flop. The river card was the 44 and didn’t change the outcome.

Hand 22: $200-$400 pot-limit Omaha The $200-$400 table at FTP. This game stars high-stakes pros like Niki Jedlicka, sunra18 and Urindanger. Four of the six players are pretty deep. Seat 1: Urindanger ($73,695) Seat 2: sunra18 ($29,297) Seat 3: Rob Hollink ($102,643) | plays the button Seat 4: The_Houdini ($9,016.50) | posts the SB of $200 Seat 5: guaranteed376 ($90,913) | posts the BB of $400 Seat 6: Niki Jedlicka ($141,010) Rob Hollink: (4♠-3♠-5♥-3♣)

Preflop (pot = $600/six players) Niki Jedlicka raises to $900 Urindanger raises to $3,300 sunra18 folds Rob Hollink (4♠-3♠-5♥-3♣) calls $3,300 The_Houdini folds guaranteed376 folds Niki Jedlicka calls $2,400 Niki raises from first position to $900 where Urindanger, right behind him, pumps it up to $3,300. Sunra18 folds and I call on the button. The_Houdini folds, guaranteed376 folds and Niki Jedlicka calls $2,400. Time to investigate. Niki’s hand is not known. Urindanger reraises with 6♣-A♥-9♣-8♥. This is not the kind of hand with which I like to reraise. It’s a very good hand, but it is a drawing hand that has good value when played cheap preflop. A big problem arises when you reraise with this kind of a hand and it’s reraised again. 6♣-A♥-9♣-8♥ plays pretty badly against a hand that made the four-bet. What speaks in favor of Urindanger’s reraise is the effective huge stack size of $73,695. What about my call? About my hand, I have something interesting to say. One thing I really don’t like in pot-limit Omaha is playing small pairs multiway when the money is very deep. So, I describe my call here as an extremely risky play — probably bad, as it’s a three-way pot with very deep money.

Flop 3♥-54♠-8♦ (pot = $10,500/three players) Niki Jedlicka checks Urindanger checks Rob Hollink (4♠-3♠-5♥-3♣) bets $8,400 Niki Jedlicka folds Urindanger calls $8,400 The three of us see the flop 3♥-5♠-8♦. Urindanger started the hand with 73k, and Niki and I cover him. They both check it to me. I have flopped bottom set. As back-up, I got a five as well and a backdoor flush draw. The pot is $10k and at this point I make the decision that I will go for it. When I am beat by a higher set, so be it. I bet $8,400, Niki folds and Urindanger calls. Urindanger checked the flop planning to call a bet. I would have done the same with his hand. When he bets this hand on this flop and gets raised, he probably had to lay it down. As this raise could be done with a 9-7-6 straight wrap you have to prevent this situation. So, I like the way he played the flop.

Turn 3♥-5♠-8♦-10♥ (pot = $27,300/two players) Urindanger checks Rob Hollink (4♠-3♠-5♥-3♣) bets $20,400 Urindanger raises to $61,995, and is all-in Rob Hollink calls $41,595 The 10♥ on the turn. He checks and I bet $20,400 into the $27,000 pot. He raises me all-in and I call. Urindanger shows 6♣-A♥-9♣-8♥; he picked up the nut flush draw. Do we like his push? At first sight, it looks pretty aggressive to put in 61k with only a pair of eights, a gutshot and a nut flush draw with just one card to come. How are the figures? His hand is doing roughly 28% against a set and 50% against a pair. Against straight wraps his percentage goes from 35% to 75%, so he only has a real problem when I have a set. But the chance that I have a set is very small. First of all, not many players call a reraise in Omaha with a low pair in their hand, and my flop and turn bet after it was checked to me don’t mean all that much, as I could do this with a lot of weak hands. It could even be a big bluff. So there is only one conclusion: he played the turn just the way he had to.

River 3♥-5♠-8♦-10♥-2♦ (pot = $151,300/two players) No action left. I am happy to see the 2♦ and scoop a huge pot.

Showdown (pot = $151,300/two players) Urindanger shows 6♣-A♥-9♣-8♥ and plays a pair of eights

Rob Hollink shows 4♠-3♠-5♥-3♣ and plays three of a kind, threes, winning the pot

Summary Urindanger mucked at the showdown and lost $73,695 Rob Hollink won the pot at the showdown and gained $77,595 The_Houdini folded before the flop and lost $200 guaranteed376 folded before the flop and lost $400 Niki Jedlicka folded on the flop and lost $3,300 As I said, the risks were taken preflop. After that we didn’t do so much wrong.

Hand 23: $200-$400 pot-limit Omaha In a $200-$400 game on Full Tilt Poker we are playing five-handed. John Juanda and theASHMAN103 are really short. I am playing almost 80BBs and the other two players are deeper. Seat 2: durrrr ($144,401) | posts the BB of $400 Seat 3: theASHMAN103 ($5,800) Seat 4: David Benyamine ($70,936) Seat 5: Rob Hollink ($31,149) | plays the button Seat 6: John Juanda ($8,000) | posts the SB of $200 Rob Hollink: (7♥-Q♣-9♠-J♣)

Preflop (pot = $600/ five players) theASHMAN103 folds David Benyamine folds Rob Hollink (7♥-Q♣-9♠-J♣) raises to $1,400 John Juanda folds durrrr calls $1,000 It is checked to me and I am on the button with 7♥-Q♣-9♠-J♣. This is a raising hand for sure. The only little problem is that John Juanda is playing only $8,000 in the SB. He will reraise with A-K-x-x or better, I guess. So then I probably have to play for $4,600. A minraise or a call from me would have been better. Well, I raised pot, John Juanda folded and durrrr called with A♠-6♠-4♦-10♦.

Flop 5♣-Q♠-7♠ (pot = $3,000/two players) durrrr checks Rob Hollink (7♥-Q♣-9♠-J♣) bets $2,400 durrrr raises to $9,100 Rob Hollink raises to $29,749, and is all-in durrrr calls $20,649 On the flop it’s heads-up between durrrr and me. The flop is 5♣-Q♠-7♠. The pot is $3,000 and I’ve got $29,000 left. I just hit top two pair and a backdoor flush draw in clubs. Before I start betting the flop I always try give myself an answer to the question — what do I do if he raises me? Do I want to reraise again and go all-in on this flop against this opponent or is it better to call and reevaluate on the turn? (Or will he be so strong that a fold might be optimal?) First of all, of course, I like to bet this flop and I will not lay down when he raises. So, I bet $2,400 and he raises to $9,100. Folding being no option, I have to decide now whether I reraise or just call and reevaluate on the turn. The board is pretty drawy with two clubs and the 5-7 combination. Most probably I am up against some kind of draw. The money is not that deep, so I don’t have any problem playing for stacks here. But do I have reasons to call his raise and look what the turn brings? No, I don’t think so. Not knowing exactly what kind of hand he has can only make it difficult for me on the turn. And in difficult situations people make mistakes. On the other hand, if I reraise on the flop I will also let him pay when I have the best of it. So, simply because I don’t have an exact idea of his hand, I prefer the all-in reraise on the flop. Sometimes in poker, situations occur where you are almost a 100% sure about the hand of your opponent. In these situations you might prefer to look at the turn card first before putting in all of your chips. Let’s look at this particular situation. If I had known his exact hand, I would much rather have flatcalled the flop. That way, if he had made his draw on the turn, I would have lost only $2,400 on the flop. And if he had missed the turn, of course I would have bet the pot and we might have played for a big pot, with me as a 2-to-1 favorite with just one card to come.

Turn 5♣-Q♠-7♠-5♥ (pot = $62,498/two players) River 5♣-Q♠-7♠-5♥-K♣ (pot = $62,498/two players) Showdown (pot = $62,498/two players) Rob Hollink shows 7♥-Q♣-9♠-J♣ and plays two pair, queens and sevens, winning the pot durrrr shows A♠-6♠-4♦-10♦ and plays a pair of fives

Summary durrrr mucked at the showdown and lost $31,149 Rob Hollink won the pot at the showdown and gained $31,349 John Juanda folded before the flop and lost $200

No action left on turn and river. He missed two times and I am happy to cash the money. My conclusion on this hand is that if the flop is dealt and it’s up to you, think about all possible action on the flop before you act.

Hand 24: $25k heads-up PLO championship Following the successful 25k heads-up matches in no limit hold’em, Full Tilt Poker also organized a 25k pot-limit Omaha event. And, of course, it was a big success too, although not for me. I was happy to have drawn a player I never heard of. But, I did almost everything wrong that I could have. Instead of trying to figure out if I could win this game easily by keeping the pots small preflop, I played way too aggressively, with the result that it became nothing less than one big gamble instead of a poker game. So, I got what I deserved and lost the match. Seat 1: Rob Hollink (4,010) | posts the SB of 25 and plays the button Seat 2: CosasDeLaVida (7,990) | posts the BB of 50 Rob Hollink: (5♠-8♥-10♥-3♣)

Preflop (pot = 75/two players) Rob Hollink (5♠-8♥-10♥-3♣) calls 25 CosasDeLaVida checks On the SB/button, I decided to call with 10-8-5-3ss. Of course it’s a weak hand but it is still too good to fold. CosasDeLaVida checks and we see the flop.

Flop 104-104-A4 (pot = 100/two players) CosasDeLaVida bets 100 Rob Hollink (5♠-8♥-10♥-3♣) calls 100 A-10-10 with two spades on the board. I made trips with the 10♠, so it’s not so bad. CosasDeLaVida bets $100. This is a good moment to take some time to study the situation. So, there is a 100 in the middle; we have an opponent who bets 100 into me. My stack is 4,000; I just hit an underset, and I don’t have a good kicker. Just as I described in the last hand this a good moment to look at the whole situation. First, I wonder if I will be ahead if we go all-in on this flop? For me the answer is easy, a player who has a worse hand than me will never be prepared to put it all-in. This means that I’d be better off by playing my hand carefully. When someone bets into me on this flop, he has me beat or is bluffing. A hand consisting of an ace is not the hand one should bet here. So taking into account that, in all likelihood, my opponent is either very strong or has nothing, it’s the best strategy for me just to call. Never discourage a bluffer and never pump it up when behind.

Turn 10♣-10♠-A♠-K♥ (pot = 300/two players) CosasDeLaVida checks Rob Hollink (5♠-8♥-10♥-3♣) checks The K♥ on the turn, and my opponent checks. Considering that I am up against a really strong hand or a very weak hand, I still don’t see much reason to bet. Before betting the turn I should ask myself whether to call when he reraises. My answer is no. Especially not when taking into account a possible river-bet behind, I don’t like to call here when being check-raised. Therefore I guess it’s better just to check here and give any draw a free card.

River 10♣-10♠-A♠-K♥-Q♥ (pot = 300/two players) CosasDeLaVida checks Rob Hollink (5♠-8♥-10♥-3♣) checks On the river we see the Q♥. CosasDeLaVida checks. Now there are four cards to a straight on the board. Chances of getting called by a weaker hand have diminished strongly. Now, for a different reason than before, I still don’t see much value in betting.

Showdown (pot 300/two players) CosasDeLaVida shows 4♦-5♣-J♣-10♦ and plays a straight, ace high, winning the pot Rob Hollink shows 5♠-8♥-10♥-3♣ and plays three of a kind

Summary Rob Hollink mucked at the showdown and lost 150 CosasDeLaVida won the pot at the showdown and gained 150 A bit surprised, I see him having a hand of about the same strength as mine. I lost the minimum in this hand by playing carefully. How about his play, do I like that as well? Of course his situation is rather similar to mine, especially concerning the question: do I want to play for stacks on this flop? The

answer for him should also be: “No”. For that reason, I would prefer a check on the flop in his seat. When it is checked behind he could have made the turn and the river bet and would have made more money. In case I would have bet the flop after his check, he should call. After a most probable check-check on the turn, he should have bet the river and would have made the same or more money, depending whether I call or fold to his river-bet.

Hand 25: $25k heads-up PLO championship This hand followed directly after the previous tournament hand. I wanted to use this example because I have not shown many hands in this book where pot control was important. Actually the hand isn’t spectacular at all, but I hope to give you a wider view on my ideas concerning pot control. Seat 1: Rob Hollink (3,810) | posts the SB of 25 and plays the button Seat 2: CosasDeLaVida (8,190) | posts the BB of 50 Rob Hollink: (9♠-10♣-8♥-A♥)

Preflop (pot = 75/two players) Rob Hollink (9♠-10♣-8♥-A♥) raises to 150 CosasDeLaVida calls 100 The blinds are 25-50 and I have 3,800 chips and he has the rest. On the button I raise with A-10-9-8, ace suited. What else should I do with this hand? CosasDeLaVida calls 100 and we see a flop.

Flop K♣-10♥-3♦ (pot = 300/two players) CosasDeLaVida checks Rob Hollink (9♠-10♣-8♥ A♥) checks The flop is a rainbow: K♣-10♥-3♦ He checks, the pot is 300 and I have 3,650 left. As I said before, I like to overview all possible flop actions, including of course my opponent’s responses. One of the key factors is what kind of opponent you are up against. Is he a player who check-raises a lot on the flop or is he maybe a player who never does this? After playing some hands against this guy, I saw him as a player who liked to bet and raise, maybe because I was doing the same myself or maybe because it was his nature. So, with middle pair and not much of a draw I preferred to check this flop. Mostly, I check flops that I hit just a little. I don’t see much reason to pump it up or to give my opponent a chance to raise me out of the pot with some kind of draw that is underdog against my hand.

Turn K♣-10♥-3♦-7♣ (pot = 300/two players) CosasDeLaVida bets 300 Rob Hollink (9♠-10♣-8♥-A♥) calls 300 The 7♣ on the turn. My opponent bets 300. My hand has just improved — I have picked up an open-ended straight draw. Facing an opponent who I see as willing to bet, I have an easy call here. It’s pretty unclear whether I am in the lead or not — it feels like 50-50. Please note that raising here would be a mistake. It would discourage him from bluffing, and I would make it expensive if in fact I was beat. If he had checked the turn, I probably would have checked behind. I can’t make a better hand fold by betting only the turn, and I am not really prepared to barrel two times in this situation if I miss the river.

River K♣-10♥-3♦-7♣-7♠ (pot = 900/two players) CosasDeLaVida bets 900 Rob Hollink (9♠-10♣-8♥-A♥) calls 900

Showdown (pot = 2,700/two players) CosasDeLaVida shows 4♠-3♣-5♥-6♦ and plays two pair, sevens and threes Rob Hollink shows 9♠-10♣-8♥-A♥ and plays two pair, 10♠ and sevens, winning the pot

Summary Rob Hollink won the pot at the showdown and gained 1,350 CosasDeLaVida mucked at the showdown and lost 1,350 The 7♠ hits the green felt on the river. CosasDeLaVida bets 900. All draws missed and as I said on the turn, it feels 50-50 as if I am ahead, so it’s an easy call for me now. He showed 3-4-5-6 for bottom pair and a nine-card straight draw on the turn.

Hand 26: $200-$400 pot-limit Omaha Another six-handed game on the $200-$400 table at Full Tilt Poker. We have two shorties: pr1nnyraid with only $3,600 and hppyurhere playing $12,324.50. Seat 1: SteveSung ($37,100) | posts the BB of $400 Seat 2: pr1nnyraid ($3,600) Seat 3: Rob Hollink ($106,989) Seat 4: GrindMode ($22,755) Seat 5: hppyurhere ($12,324.50) | plays the button Seat 6: sunra18 ($123,562.50) | posts the SB of $200 Rob Hollink: (2♥-10♣-J♥-K♣)

Preflop (pot = $600/six players) pr1nnyraid folds Rob Hollink (2♥-10♣-J♥-K♣) raises to $900 GrindMode calls $900 hppyurhere folds sunra18 folds SteveSung calls $500 From the hijack I make a small raise to $900 with K-J-10-2ds. I get one caller behind me and a very aggressive player in the big blind, Steve Sung, calls as well. Raising this hand, two off the button, is an option. With stacks of $12k and $22k in my back and the big stack in the small blind, there is a case to make a small raise. If one of the stacks behind me reraises, it’s still deep enough for me to call that reraise.

Flop K♠-2♦-4♠ (pot = $2,900/three players) SteveSung checks Rob Hollink (2♥-10♣-J♥-K♣) checks GrindMode bets $2,000 SteveSung folds Rob Hollink raises to $5,500 GrindMode calls $3,500 The first three cards on the board are K♠-2♦-4♠. SteveSung checks and it’s up to me. I have flopped top and bottom, but I don’t have spades. There is $2,900 in the middle and my opponents have $22k and $36k left. The main question is: do I call a reraise after I make the bet here on the flop? To be honest, I don’t like it. Top and bottom without spades doesn’t have enough going for it. So, because I don’t like to lay down my hand when getting reraised, I’d rather check in this spot. Getting check-raised out of the pot is something I want to avoid. Another reason to check is that I might induce a bet from the button with a rather weak hand. I can promise you that I would bet the button in this situation pretty often, with all kinds of rubbish. So, I check and the button indeed bets $2,000. SteveSung folds and now we have a much better situation. We lost the biggest stack, which is nice (because our hand isn’t that strong), and we got a bet from the button with a range that is probably very wide. Now, I am a bit more prepared to play. I decide to make a small check-raise. I see three reasons to do this. First of all, I like to give my opponent the chance to put it all-in right now, because I am not folding any more as long as I don’t see a spade. The second reason to raise small is to give myself the chance to make a pot-size bet on the turn when there isn’t a spade. The third reason for raising is that it’s horrible to play this hand passively from out of position. GrindMode calls $3,500 and we go to the turn.

Turn K♠-2♦-4♠-10♦ (pot = $13,900/two players) Rob Hollink (2♥-10♣-J♥-K♣) bets $13,900 GrindMode raises to $16,355, and is all-in Rob Hollink calls $2,455 A very nice 10♦ is our turn card. It looks like a total blank and I made a better two pair. Of course I bet the pot and to my surprise I see GrindMode going all-in for 3k more. I call and have to face a K-K-x-x, which means I am drawing dead. Hmmm…

River K♠-2♦-4♠-10♦-0♥ (pot = $46,610/two players) Showdown (pot = $46,610/two players) GrindMode shows K♥-6♦-K♦-4♦ and plays three of a kind, kings, winning the pot Rob Hollink shows 2♥-10♣-J♥-K♣ and plays two pair, kings and tens

Summary SteveSung folded on the flop and lost $900 Rob Hollink mucked at the showdown and lost $22,755 GrindMode won the pot at the showdown and gained $23,855 sunra18 folded before the flop and lost $200 Putting in $16k drawing dead is not so nice. Where did I go wrong? Well that’s very easy to say: I didn’t go wrong at all. I still believe I couldn’t play the hand better than I did. Actually, if I were in my opponent’s shoes, I would rather have put it all-in on the flop. The way he played it now, a spade on the turn could have brought him trouble.

Hand 27: $200-$400 pot-limit Omaha In this battle between the blinds, I am up against one of the best online players in Omaha and Hold’em. Seat 1: halfdozen999 ($16,000) | is sitting out Seat 2: IAmSoSo ($8,997) | plays the button Seat 3: Rob Hollink ($59,869) | posts the SB of $200 Seat 4: OnTheRize ($26,776) | posts the BB of $400 Seat 5: OMGClayAiken ($45,787.50) Seat 6: The_Houdini ($79,276.50) Rob Hollink: (6♥-3♥-A♦-3♦)

Preflop (pot = $600/six players) OMGClayAiken folds The_Houdini folds IAmSoSo folds Rob Hollink (6♥-3♥-A♦-3♦) calls $200 OnTheRize raises to $1,200 Rob Hollink calls $800 In the small blind, I pay $200 more with A-6-3-3ds. OnTheRize raises to $1,200 and I call. Nothing special from both sides; I also would raise Q-6-54ds in his position.

Flop 2♠-4♥-5♣ (pot = $2,400/two players) Rob Hollink (6♥-3♥-A♦-3♦) checks OnTheRize bets $1,600 Rob Hollink raises to $4,000 OnTheRize calls $2,400 We see a dream-flop for me: 2♠-4♥-5♣. I have just flopped the nuts. I check to the preflop raiser and he bets $1,600. First of all, let’s analyze my situation. There are two important things: I have flopped the nuts and I don’t have position. For those reasons, I had better make a small raise to take the initiative. I make it $4,000 and he calls which is very nice. At this moment I have to give him some kind of a made hand or a draw, like 8-7-6-x. Actually, I think that the weaker made hand is more probable, because a lot of players would reraise again with 8-7-6-x, trying to win it right here with eight-high.

Turn 2♠-4♥-♣-10♥ (pot = $10,400/two players) Rob Hollink (6♥-3♥-A♦-3♦) bets $4,400 OnTheRize raises to $21,576, and is all-in Rob Hollink calls $17,176 The 10♥ on the turn is a very nice blank. The question now is how much do I bet? There is $10k in the middle and he has $21k left. First of all let’s look at a situation where I bet the pot on the turn. When I bet the pot, I might lose the weaker made hands like two pair and maybe even A-3, although I don’t see many players mucking A-3 here. But still, it’s not nice to lose them. When he has 8-7-6-x, he is probably calling if I bet the pot. And this means that, besides the $10k that is already in, I will win another $10k from him if he doesn’t hit the river, while he might win $21k from me when he does hit the river, because I would be calling his last bet. So, betting the full pot isn’t really fantastic against the 8-7-6-x. All together betting the pot doesn’t look so strong. How about a smaller bet, like I made — a bet of $4,400? After my small check-raise on the flop this $4,400 makes it really difficult for him to put me on the right hand now, and that is just what I want. With the weaker made hands, he has to make a decision, all-in or not. Even with a hand like 8-7-6-x, he might consider raising the turn. The only time when betting soft on the turn is not so good is when he just calls here with 8-7-6-x. In all other situations, I prefer the smaller bet on the turn. Well, we know what happened: he had a difficult decision on the turn and made the wrong choice. Having picked up a flush draw to go with his two pair, and having treys as escape hatches for a split pot against my nut straight, his turn raise is a logical choice. Still, there’s a good chance that even if he hadn’t picked up these extra outs, he would still have raised there, having just few outs to improve.

River 2♠-4♥-5♣-10♥-10♣(pot = $53,552/two players) Showdown (pot = $53,552/two players) OnTheRize shows Q♥-6♦-5♥-4♦ and plays two pair, 10♠ and fives Rob Hollink shows 6♥-3♥-A♦-3♦ and plays a straight, six high, winning the pot

Summary Rob Hollink won the pot at the showdown and gained $26,776 OnTheRize mucked at the showdown and lost $26,776 He missed all of his outs and I won a decent pot. It’s always difficult to judge the plays of great players, but I guess you want to know what I think about the way he played. Like I said, everything is normal preflop. The interesting thing about his play is whether he should check or bet the flop. When you raise preflop with some small cards and you hit, it’s always tempting to bet the flop. You consider your hand and play to be deceptive. OnTheRize did hit the flop, but his problem was that he didn’t hit well enough. He only hit the sixth nuts. Wasn’t checking a valid option? Let’s see what happens if he checks behind on the flop. We are not talking about the cards that came on turn and river, but we look at the situation in general. If he had checked behind, then I would have given him some kind of a half-hand — too strong to play bet-fold, and too weak to play bet-call. Thinking of him this way, I might try to go for a double-barrel bluff on turn and river, in case I cannot beat a half-hand. Pay attention that I say double barrel: I would never bluff only the turn here, because with his half hand he will always call minimum of once. If I missed the river, I would always fire again. He could call my double barrel twice and catch a bluff. So when you are prepared to lose your stack with the type of hand that he had, it’s better to play a pot that may on average be a bit smaller, if you are in a situation where your opponent’s range could be a bit wider — especially with a few more bluffs.

Hand 28: $200-$400 pot-limit Omaha On Full Tilt Poker we have six-way action, with everyone playing over 50BBs. I am on the button with 9-8-7-6ss, a nice rundown. Seat 1: halfdozen999 ($34,382) Seat 2: IAmSoSo ($20,191) Seat 3: Rob Hollink ($64,662.50) | plays the button Seat 4: Macrocephalic ($31,497) | posts the SB of $200 Seat 5: OMGClayAiken ($48,397) | posts the BB of $400 Seat 6: The_Houdini ($98,134) Rob Hollink: (9♦-6♦-8♣-7♠)

Preflop (pot = $600/six players) The_Houdini folds halfdozen999 raises to $800 IAmSoSo folds Rob Hollink 9♦-6♦-8♣-7♠) raises to $1,200 Macrocephalic folds OMGClayAiken folds halfdozen999 calls $400 Halfdozen999 opens to $800 and I min-reraise on the button to $1,200. The blinds fold and halfdozen999 calls another $400. Reraising to $1,200 with this hand in position with still a lot of money left looks like a good strategy to me. My hand is good, maybe surprising, so I am ready to play a big pot.

Flop 2♦-5♣-4♥ (pot = $3,000/two players) halfdozen999 checks Rob Hollink (9♦-6♦-8♣-7♠) bets $2,000 halfdozen999 raises to $9,000 Rob Hollink calls $7,000 We see a rather innocuous 5-4-2 rainbow flop. Actually, this is a flop that I really like. I have flopped a 13-card straight draw and a backdoor flush as well. Halfdozen 999 checks and I make a bet. I bet $2,000, he check-raises to $9,000 and I call another $7,000. Time to do a little bit of analyzing. Is my call on the flop the right play or would it have been better to reraise? In other words: what are my options?

Fold Having 13 nut outs and a backdoor flush as well, folding can never be an option with still more than a pot-sized bet behind.

Call Calling is a reasonable option. As I said before, almost 2-to-1 to hit the nuts and a lot of money behind is more than enough to justify a call.

Raise When can raising be better than calling? Very simple, raising will be better when there is a good chance that our opponent will not call a big percentage of the time when we raise. Let’s define the group of hands that check-raises us on this flop. Then we see the 6-3, the A-3, and a lot of sets and two-pair hands. Our 9-8-7-6 is roughly 60-40 underdog against these hands. To find an opponent that doesn’t call our reraise, he must have a check-raise range that also has a lot of bluffs in it. Let’s first try to find the break-even point where raising has zero expectation. So, we are trying to calculate how big a percentage of times our opponent has to fold to our reraise to make raising profitable. This is interesting to know because when you expect your opponent to fold less often than the number we calculate here, raising will have a negative expectation. After his check-raise there is already $3,000 + $2,000 + $9,000 = $14,000 in the middle and his remaining stack is $24,000. We make the assumption here that if I reraise $21,000 more and he doesn’t fold, he will then put in his last $3,000 as well. It is from this point on we are going to calculate. If we raise here, we have to put in $31,000 ($7,000 + $21,000) to win $38,000 ($14,000 + $24,000).

Assumptions X = chance he calls my reraise Y = 1 — X = chance he folds to my reraise

To find the break-even point where raising has 0 value, the following has to be true X (0.4 * $38,000 + 0.6 *-$31,000) + Y (1.0 * $14,000) = 0 X (0.4 * $38,000 + 0.6 *-$31,000) + (1 — X) * (1.0 * $14,000) = 0 X (-$3,400) + $14,000 — X * $14,000 = 0 $14,000 = X * $17,400 X = 14,000/17,400 = 0.80 Well that is a nice round figure. To make raising profitable our opponent must lay down more than 20% of the time. I guess not many guys I play against will fold that often, so I have to agree with my preflop call. When you are playing an overaggressive player who you expect to bluff-raise these flops a lot, and you expect him to lay down let’s say 30% of the time, then it is still unclear if raising is better than calling. It’s difficult to calculate the exact value of our call. The main thing is: will we get paid on the turn when we hit? Because this will be different depending on our opponent’s nature and hand, it’s very difficult to calculate. Another interesting thing is that after we just called the check-raise on the flop, we will have to fold to a pot-sized bet on the turn if we don’t hit and the turn card is a nondiamond. In this case, our odds aren’t good enough with just one card to come, and there is almost zero percent chance that we have the best hand, because we are only beating 9-8-7-3.

Turn 2♦-5♣-4♥-8♥ (pot = $21,000/two players) halfdozen999 bets $21,000 Rob Hollink (9♦-6♦-8♣-7♠) raises to $42,000 halfdozen999 calls $3,182, and is all-in Uncalled bet of $17,818 returned to Rob Hollink The 8♥ on the turn. I hit my straight. He bets $21,000, I raise and he calls his last $3,000 drawing dead. I don’t think the action on the turn is really strange. Of course he will be scared that I might have the nuts, but with a lot of other possible hands in my range he can hardly ever fold, so he might be better off just betting himself.

River 2♦-5♣-4♥-8♥-7♥ (pot = $69,364/two players) Showdown (pot = $69,364/two players) Rob Hollink shows 9♦-6♦-8♣-7♠ and plays a straight, nine high, winning the pot halfdozen999 shows 8♦-A♣-6♣-3♥ and plays a straight, eight high

Summary halfdozen999 mucked at the showdown and lost $34,382 Rob Hollink won the pot at the showdown and gained $34,982 Macrocephalic folded before the flop and lost $200 OMGClayAiken folded before the flop and lost $400 The 7♥ did him give a better straight than he had, but it made my straight better as well. I won with a straight to the nine. The lesson from this hand: pushing on the flop will almost never be good in situations like this.

Hand 29: $200-$400 pot-limit Omaha A full six-handed $200-$400 game on Full Tilt. This really interesting hand is eventually between Patrik Antonius and me, with both of us more than 140BBs deep. Seat 1: The_Houdini ($33,492) Seat 2: sunra18 ($75,237.50) Seat 3: im2tight ($16,400) | plays the button Seat 4: Patrik Antonius ($56,577.50) | posts the SB of $200 Seat 5: Rob Hollink ($127,904) | posts the BB of $400 Seat 6: David Benyamine ($20,000) | is sitting out Rob Hollink: (4♠-10♥-J♥-6♥)

Preflop (pot = $600/five players) The_Houdini folds sunra18 folds im2tight folds Patrik Antonius calls $200 Rob Hollink (44-10v-Jv-6v) checks We get four folds and Patrik puts in $200 more from the small blind and I don’t raise.

Flop J♠-4♥-4♣ (pot = $800/two players) Patrik Antonius bets $800 Rob Hollink (4♠-10♥-J♥-6♥) raises to $2,200 Patrik Antonius raises to $5,600 Rob Hollink calls $3,400 The flop is J♠-4♥-4♣ and Patrik bets $800. I raise to $2,200 and Patrik makes it $5,600, after which I decide to call. Time to figure out what is right and what is wrong? Like I said many times before — the question that I always ask myself in these situations is: if I raise again here and it leads to an all-in situation, will I be in the lead? Or more simply: will Patrik be willing to play for stacks here with A-4 or worse, in a situation where we started the flop with only $800 in the pot and it goes bet-raise-raise-raise-raise on the flop? Well, I don’t think so. For this reason, I just called after the bet-raisereraise. Pretty sure that a worse hand won’t pay much more, I am trying to keep my losses smaller in case he has J-J-x-x and I am also trying to keep A-4 and especially three fours or weak kickers in the hand to extract some money later.

Turn J♠-4♥-4♣-9♣ (pot = $12,000/two players) Patrik Antonius checks Rob Hollink (44-10y-Jy-6y) checks The 9♣ hits the table and we both check. Patrik’s check is very logical. After all this action on the flop with the third nuts, it’s also time for him to become a bit more careful. My check on the turn is explained already in the section above where I talked about the flop. I don’t see him paying off both on the turn and river with a worse hand than mine, so this is the right moment for a little pot control. Don’t forget that from my point of view there is still a small chance that he has J-J-x-x, and the money is deep.

River J♠-4♥-9♣-9♣-8♠ (pot = $12,000/two players) Patrik Antonius checks Rob Hollink (4♠-10♥-J♥-6♥) bets $12,000 Patrik Antonius calls $12,000 The 8♠ on the river. Patrik checks, I bet the pot, which is $12,000 and he calls. My bet is very normal. I have represented a much weaker hand then I really had on both the flop and especially the turn. So there was a good chance to get paid off now by a hand just a little bit weaker than mine: A-4, 94 or 8-4. What about Patrik’s call? Actually his hand has changed into a bluffcatcher. There are no made hands worse than his hand that I would bet the pot with on the river. So to figure out if I could be bluffing we have to go back to the situation on the flop. Betting a paired flop as a bluff is something that happens a lot in high-stakes pot-limit Omaha — simply because your opponent has, in all likelihood, missed the flop. As a response, a lot of opponents will raise this flop bet with nothing and might even call the reraise as a bluff, hoping to take the pot later in the hand. So for this reason I could be bluffing and bluffcalling the flop. But on the other hand, I probably would have bet the turn in that situation. The fact that I didn’t bet the turn makes the chance of a bluff from my side pretty small. For that reason, Patrik had a tough call here.

Showdown (pot = $36,000/two players)

Rob Hollink shows 4♠-10♥-J♥-6♥ and plays a full house, fours full of jacks, winning the pot Patrik Antonius shows A♥-4♦-10♣-6♣ and plays three of a kind, fours

Summary Patrik Antonius mucked at the showdown and lost $18,000 Rob Hollink won the pot at the showdown and gained $18,000

Hand 30: $200-$400 pot-limit Omaha A four-handed game, actually three-handed because OneUponAStar is playing only $6k. All others are more than 120BBs deep. Seat 1: OneUponAStar ($6,598) Seat 3: Rob Hollink ($51,192.50) | plays the button Seat 4: OMGClayAiken ($63,780.50) | posts the SB of $200 Seat 6: Ziigmund ($47,998) | posts the BB of $400 Rob Hollink: (A♦-Q♥-J♥-Q♠)

Preflop (pot = $600/four players) OneUponAStar raises to $900 Rob Hollink (A♦-Q♥-J♥-Q♠) raises to $3,300 OMGClayAiken folds Ziigmund raises to $11,000 OneUponAStar folds Rob Hollink calls $7,700 OneUponAStar raises to $900 and I reraise on the button to $3,300. The SB folds and Ziigmund reraises to $11,000. The short stack folds and I call another $7,700. A lot of action. First of all, my raise to $3,300. This is a move that indicates that I am willing to play for stacks against OneUponAStar with my A♥-Q♥-J♥-Q♠. What to say about Ziigmund’s reraise to $11,000? First of all I have to say that I like Ziigmund’s game very much. He is one of the toughest opponents to play, especially heads-up. I still remember the first time we played live against each other, in St Petersburg, Russia, in 2002. Ilari might have been 20 years old back then, I am not sure, but he didn’t look much older than about 17. I had never seen such an aggressive player before. He was bluffing like hell in that game. OK, what about his reraise to $11k, with 8♣-A♠-J♠-10♦? Well, this is a big gamble by him. If I pump it up again, his hand will play badly against the range of hands that I am holding. I would reraise him with every A-A-x-x and also A-K-Q-x or A-K-J-x with the ace suited. So for that reason it is pretty risky. In case I just call, he did the right thing. He is still in the lead to bet the pot, which is a big advantage. How about my call? I don’t like it much — the main strength of my hand being the pair of queens. The ace is not so good after being reraised. So, I would like to qualify my call as pretty bad. I probably called because I know that Ziigmund is capable of making these moves, but even then my hand isn’t suitable for calling.

Flop K♦-4♥-5♦(pot = $23,100/two players) Ziigmund checks Rob Hollink (A♦-Q♥-J♥-Q♠) checks On the flop we see K-5-4 with two diamonds. He checked. Ziigmund is a player who very often checks the flop after having reraised out of position. With $23k in the middle and $37k behind, I expected him to bet the flop very often. Not sure if he was check-folding or check-raising and, having a bit of showdown-value, I decided to check behind. It’s also hard for me to make a decision on this flop. When I am beat, I don’t have many outs, and I guess a check is fine with me.

Turn K♦-4♥-5♦-Q♣ (pot = $23,100/two players) Ziigmund bets $23,100 Rob Hollink (A♦-Q♥-J♥-Q♠) raises to $40,192.50, and is all-in Ziigmund calls $13,898, and is all-in Uncalled bet of $3,194.50 returned to Rob Hollink

River K♦-4♥-5♦-Q♣-7♣ (pot = $97,096/two players) Showdown (pot = $97,096/two players) Rob Hollink shows A♥-Q♥-J♥Q♠ and plays three of a kind, queens, winning the pot Ziigmund shows 8♣-A♠-J♠-10♦ and plays ace king high

Summary OneUponAStar folded before the flop and lost $900 Rob Hollink won the pot at the showdown and gained $49,098

OMGClayAiken folded before the flop and lost $200 Ziigmund mucked at the showdown and lost $47,998 The Q♣ on the turn. He bets the pot and I raise all-in now with the second nuts. He calls almost another $14,000 and shows 8♣-A♠-J♠-10♦, a 13-card straight draw. Assuming my play is normal, this is a moment to look at Ziigmund’s action. We can note that, after missing the flop, the only thing that could strengthen his hand a bit is a queen on the turn. He would make his wrap — yet I would hit my set. The funny thing is that this is just what happened. It’s obvious that he bets the pot on the turn, knowing that he probably has the worse hand, but with a pretty good chance to take the pot right here, given my check on the flop. So, I like his full pot-bet on the turn. But it is more interesting to look at the situation in general, starting with the flop. Ziigmund has a couple of options as to how to play this hand. He can go for a flop bet of let’s say $11,000, and fold to a raise, or he can check-fold the flop. In case I check behind, he could go for a small turn-bet followed by a bet on the river. Or another option is just giving it up when the turn isn’t a queen or an ace. It’s hard to say what strategy is the best, but I think that for his style (where he checks the flop often) it’s also better to check the flop here than to play bet-fold. If I check the flop behind, two bets on the turn and river might very often do the job. The end result: a lovely 7♣ on the river. My hand stands up and I win a nice pot. We saw a typical Ziigmund hand, very aggressive preflop and taking a lot of risks, and me making a call with the wrong kind of hand. I got lucky on the turn to hit the joker that brought all the action, and I was lucky again on the river by not getting outdrawn.

Hand 31: $200-$400 pot-limit Omaha (HU) Heads up against OMGClayAiken. I am the short stack with $31,000 chips. We are playing $200-$400; I am in the big blind and out of position. Seat 3: Rob Hollink ($31,383) | posts the BB of $400 Seat 4: OMGClayAiken ($82,584) | posts the SB of $200 Rob Hollink: (K♣-5♣-10♠-J♠)

Preflop (pot = $600/two players) OMGClayAiken raises to $1,200 Rob Hollink (K♣-5♣-10♠-J♠) raises to $3,600 OMGClayAiken calls $2,400 OMGClayAiken raises to $1,200 and I reraise to $3,600 with K-J-10-5ds. He calls. I have been unsure about reraising out of position for a long time. At the moment, I increasingly get the feeling that one can do it profitably, although it will always be a risky business and bad for your nerves. The reason I am more confident with it nowadays is probably because I have developed a better feeling for the postflop play. So at the moment I think I can reraise a lot of hands out of position in a profitable manner, because my postflop game has become better. Maybe next year my thoughts on this will be totally different.

Flop 6♦-Q♥-K♥ (pot = $7,200/two players) Rob Hollink (K♣-5♣-10♠-J♠) checks OMGClayAiken bets $4,800 Rob Hollink raises to $21,600 OMGClayAiken folds Uncalled bet of $16,800 returned to Rob Hollink

Summary Rob Hollink won the pot on the flop and gained $8,400 OMGClayAiken folded on the flop and lost $8,400

Flop, turn, river and conclusion K-Q-6 with two hearts is the flop. I check, he bets and I raise to $21,600. He thinks for some time and gives up. Many of you will say, “OK, so?” I agree there isn’t much action, but it is still interesting to compare the possible ways to play this flop. There is $7,200 in the middle and I have $28,000 left, the exact amount for a check-raise. Before I start, I like to say that check-folding is not an option for me in this hand. I don’t like the hearts, but nevertheless, I am not check-folding. Further, I would like to say that our calculations will start on the flop situation with the $7,200 in the middle that belongs to nobody. So, my options are bet-fold, bet-call and check-raise. Let’s try to find out which of three ways of playing is the best. I think the right way to look at this situation is to have an idea of how our opponent will play all different holdings. First of all, we can say that our opponent’s hand on the flop can be divided into the following groups: A B C D

The total miss The half hit, worse than our hand The half hit better than ours Full hit

It’s time to look at the different situations.

A.1 He totally missed, and he would check behind In this case a flop bet from us would have been fine. A flop bet will have a result of +$7,200. How do we reward the flop-check? A checkcheck on the flop will make thingsmore difficult on the turn. A turn-bet will mostly do the job, a check on the turn could make things even more difficult. Because the situation now starts to get unclear and looks worse than the flop bet, I simply have to reward the check-check on the flop worse than the $7,200. I give it a value of $5,000.

A. 2 He totally missed but decides to bluff, after we checked Here a check-raise from our side would be optimal, and he of course would never call because he was just bluffing. Assuming he will bet $5,000 after we checked, we have to reward the check-raise with $12,200. Again a flop bet will give us $7,200.

B. 1 He did hit half, just a bit worse than we did and he would check behind For instance A-Q-J-10 or K-10-9-8. Whenever he checks behind, I assume that he would never have raised our flop bet. So I assume that he would have folded 25% to our flop bet and would have called 75%. Now we have to try to give value to a flop bet. Well, 25% of the time he folds, so that brings: 0.25 * $7,200 = $1,800 value. Whenever he calls it’s very unclear who is favorite, so it looks obvious to award this situation with a value of $3,600 (50% of what was in the pot on the flop). So, 0.75 * $3,600 = $2,700. We see that the flop bet is worth $1,800 + $2,700 = $4,500. A check on the flop from both sides will again result in a situation where it is difficult to say who is favorite. With us having the better hand, I value this as $4,500. So, if he had checked behind and wouldn’t have raised a flop bet, then betting would have been as good as checking.

B. 2 He did hit half, a bit worse than we did and he would bet the flop after a check from us For instance, his hand could be A-Q-J-10 or K-10-9-8. Also we assume here that he would have raised in the case where we did bet the flop. I have to make another important assumption: how often do I call, when reraised? Getting odds of 2-to-1, we have to figure out if my hand is worth 33% against the range that he is raising here. I think this might be pretty close. So I would like to assume that I call the raise 75% and fold then the other 25% of the time. I also like to assume that my hand is worth 60%. When I fold my value is -$5,000 (my turn-bet). When I call, we can roughly say that I can win $35,200 and that I can lose $28,000. The total picture for betting and getting raised is then: 0.25 * -$5,000 + 0.75 * (0.60 * $35,200 + 0.40 * -$28,000) = $6,190. We take a look at the check-raise here. Again we are going to calculate assuming that he will make a $5,000 bet. Our opponent is facing the 2-to-1 odds, even with a hand a little bit worse than ours. I let him fold 30% and I give him a 70% call percentage. Again our hand against his hand has 60% worth. So, the math says, our check-raise result will be: 0.3 * $12,200 + 0.7 * (0.6 * $35,200 + 0.4 * -$28,000) = $10,604. In this situation the check on the flop is a lot better than the bet.

C. 1 He did hit half, just a bit better than we did and checks behind Let’s say his hand was A-K-10-8 or K-8-7-6. A check-check on the flop I like to reward as 40% of what is already in the pot. Our opponent is checking and trying to keep the pot small, which is good for us. We are 60/40 behind, so 40% of what is in the middle already, which is about $2,900, looks like a reasonable estimate. Now we have to look at the situation where I bet the pot. I assume that he will call our flop bet 50% of the time and raise the other half of the time. Whenever he calls our flop bet, it’s clear we are an underdog. We just put in $5,000 and the total pot is now $17,200. Most of the time, all the money will go in on the turn, except when a heart comes; in that case, it looks as if we have to check-fold the turn. So let’s assume I will check-fold 25% on the turn and in the other 75% I will go all-in being 60-40 behind. Assuming a raise from his side on the flop, we again call 75% of the time and now our hand is also 60-40 underdog. It looks as if the result will be the same when he calls or raises our flop bet. We fold 25% and call the other 75%, being 60-40 behind. So betting in this spot is worth: 0.25 * — $5,000 + 0.75 * (0.4 * $35,200 + 0.6 * -$28,000) = -$3,970. We got a clear answer again: checking is a lot stronger than betting.

C.2 He did hit half, just a bit better than we did and bet after we checked Say A-K-10-8 or K-8-7-6 could be his hand. So if we would bet the flop, he would raise and we have to decide whether to call or not. Just like under C.1, we calculate with us calling the raise 75% and folding the other 25%. The math says: 0.25 * -$5,000 + 0.75 * (0.4 * $35,200 + 0.6 * -$28,000) = -$3,970. When we check-raise the flop, I see him calling a 100%. This makes check-raising worth 0.4 * $35,200 + 0.6 * -$28,000 = -$2,720. Again the check scores a bit better: -$2,720 versus -$3,970.

D He hit the flop really well, let’s say top two or better; so actually he will always bet if we check, and he will always raise if we bet Against these hands we will be roughly 75/25 underdog. Check-raising brings us: 0.25 * $35,200 + 0.75 * -$28,000 = -$12,200. Betting and calling the raise 75%: 0.25 * -$5,000 + 0.75 * (0.25 * $35,200 + 0.75 * -$28,000) = -$10,400. Now the bet makes the better result.

Summary We gave our opponent four different possible holdings, and three out of four with two ways to play these hands. All our opponent’s flop-actions can be found in these seven groups. In each of the seven different situations we tried to make reasonable assumptions that would lead to exact and useful figures. Now we have to try to add probabilities to all the groups, the total being 100%. These are the probabilities as I see them. I made these calculations with the bet in the first column and the check in the second column.

First of all, I am happy that betting and check-raising both have positive results. As I said before, the check-fold was no option for me (note that check-fold has result 0), and these figures suggest I was right. Furthermore, I am also glad that my other feeling, preferring check-raising over betting, was also correct. Some people will argue about my assumptions and of course they can never be a 100% correct. But the results differ so much that check-raising is very likely to be the best option.

Hand 32: €20-€40 Live pot-limit Omaha in Amsterdam This is a hand I played live in Amsterdam some time ago. I have A♦-A♥-J♦-6♠ in a nine-handed €20-€40 pot-limit Omaha game. Behind me, all players are playing between 40 and 60BBs. I start the hand with €5,000, 125BBs. The button has €2,400, the SB has €1,700 and the BB plays €2,000. It is folded to me and from the cutoff I minraise to €90. Everyone folds and Peter raises to €290 from the BB. I reraise to €890 and he calls with K♥-K♠-5♠-5♦. The outcome of the hand is totally irrelevant. I choose this hand to emphasize a mistake that many novice players make, and it is reraising the wrong amount. At the end of the hand, I will explain my ideas. Rob Hollink (€5,000) Player 1 (BU) (€2,400) | plays the button Player 2 (SB) (€1,700) | posts the SB of €20 Player 3 (BB) (€2,000) | posts the BB of €40 Other seats: unknown Rob Hollink: (A♦-A♥-J♦-6♠)

Preflop (pot = €60/seven players) All unknown players fold Rob Hollink (A♦-A♥-J♦-6♠) raises to €90 Player 1 (BU) folds Player 2 (SB) folds Player 3 (BB) raises to €290 Rob Hollink raises to €890 Player 3 (BB) calls € 700

Flop J♥-7♣-3♣ (pot = €1,800/two players) Player 3 (BB) bets $1,110 an is all-in Rob Hollink (A♦-A♥-J♦-6♠) calls $1,110

Turn J♥-7♠-3♠-3♥ (pot = €4,020/three players) River J♥-7♠-3♠-3♥-K♣ (pot = €4,020/two players) Showdown (pot = €4,020/two players) Player 3 (BB) shows K♥-K♠-5♠-5♦ and plays a full house, kings full of threes, winning the pot Rob Hollink shows A♦-A♥-J♦-6♠ and plays two pair, aces and threes

Summary Player 3 (BB) won the pot at the showdown and gained €2,020 Rob Hollink mucked at the showdown and lost €2,020 Player 2 (SB) folded preflop and lost €20 The flop is J♥-7♣-3♣; my opponent goes all-in on the flop and I call. As I said above, the point to discuss is your opponent’s reraise. In case you reraise with a nice hand, for instance a rundown or a two-pair hand, the main thing you have to think about is how much your opponent can make after your reraise. Different articles and my own experience suggest that it’s important to get about a third of your stack in the middle preflop, to play A-A-x-x successfully and with commitment. On the other hand, does this imply that you can play a nice rundown profitably (if you have a good feeling how to play postflop) against A-A-x-x, when you both put in 25% preflop? This means that you should reraise to a maximum 7% of the effective stack with these rundowns and certainly not more than that, so that the aces cannot get close to the 25% or 30% that they want in the middle. For two-pair hands, I prefer an even smaller reraise because my hitting chances are a lot worse than with the rundown. To give myself better odds, I prefer to reraise with these two-pair hands to just 5% of the effective stack. These are just my general guidelines — of course you have to mix it up a bit. Looking back at this hand. We see my opponent making several mistakes. First, he reraises pot to 14.5% of the effective stacks, and then he compounds this error by calling with his kings. And then finally he sees a lot of money in the middle and decides to stick in the rest as well, although he knows he is probably beat. In his place, I would never have reraised, because the raise in front of me was already 4.5% of the effective stack. Hopefully this guideline concerning reraising can help you a bit.

Hand 33: €1,000 pot-limit Omaha tournament at the masterclassics of poker First of all my excuses for the hand history that is not fully filled in. It was a live hand, where I forgot some unimportant details. This time we are looking at a hand that was played during a live tournament. It was the €1,000 PLO event of the Master Classics of Poker in Amsterdam. I played the hand in the cutoff against another Dutch poker player, Dennis Schrijvers. The blinds were 100-200 and all remaining players had over 10k. My hand was 10-9-6-5ds diamonds and spades. Rob Hollink (15,000) Dennis Schrijvers (13,000) | posts the SB of 100 Remaining Seats: unknown Rob Hollink: (10♦-9♠-6♦-5♠)

Preflop (pot = 300/eight players) Rob Hollink (10♦-9♠-6♦-5♠) raises to 400 Dennis Schrijvers calls 300 big blind calls 200 Everyone folds to me and from the cutoff I minraise to 400. Dennis calls in the small blind and the big blind calls as well.

Flop K♦-8♦-4♥ (pot = 1,200/three players) Dennis Schrijvers checks big blind checks Rob Hollink (10♦-9♠-6♦-5♠) checks We see a K♦-8♦-4♥ flop with two diamonds and one heart. I have flopped a gutshot and a small flush draw. It gets checked to me. Without a flushdraw, I would bet a K-8-4 flop into two people more often than not. But with the small flush draw and a gutshot, I don’t want to take the risk of being check-raised out of the pot. So, I check as well.

Turn K♦-8♦-4♥-3♥ (pot = 1,200/three players) Dennis Schrijvers bets 700 big blind folds Rob Hollink (10♦-9♣-6♦-5♠) calls 700 The 3♥ on the turn. Dennis bets 700, the big blind folds and I call. Let me try to explain why I see much value in this call. First of all, I have 15 cards to make a straight or a flush. Just this alone isn’t that bad, and there is still the possibility to make a bet on the river. But more important, my opponent’s idea about my hand is probably wrong. Putting me on another hand instead of the hand that I really have will often result in him making a mistake on the river — and this will benefit me. The fact that I didn’t bet the flop will probably give him the impression that I got a little bit, mostly K-x-x-x, A-A-x-x or Q-Q-x-x; and as I called his bet on the turn he will have the idea that I might very well have hearts as well, or he might put me on 7-6-5-x. The conclusions I am going to make here are without putting him on some kind of hand, because his range is simply too wide. So how can I still benefit from this situation? Well, because he might make an incorrect river-bet or river-check, simply because he expects me to have a different hand than I actually have. In case there is a blank and he checks the river, I have to check behind because this isn’t the right spot to bluff. But if he checks and there is a heart, a five or a six on the river, this is an excellent card for me to make a successful bluff. And if he checks after a diamond on the river, I have a good spot to get paid off, because he would rather expect hearts in my hand than diamonds. All in all, I hope this is sufficient proof of why deception plays such a big role in PLO.

River K♦-8♦-4♥-3♥-9♦ (pot = 2,600/two players) Dennis Schrijvers checks Rob Hollink (10♦-9♠-6♦-5♠) bets 2,000 Dennis Schrijvers calls 2,000

Showdown (pot = 6,600/two players) Rob Hollink shows 10♦-9♠-6♦-5♠ and play a flush, 10 high, winning the pot Dennis Schrijvers shows his hand and plays a lower flush

Summary

Rob Hollink won the pot at the showdown and gained 3,500 Dennis Schrijvers mucked at the showdown and lost 3,100 big blind folded on the turn and lost 400 The 9♦ on the river. Dennis checks and I bet 2,000 with my 10 high flush. Dennis calls, shows a lower flush and I win a nice pot. What about the river action? Well, first of all Dennis’s check. When I put myself in his spot, I would think I had a certain winner. So to decide whether to check-call or bet, he has to find out how often I will be bluffing after his check — compared with how often I would pay off with a worse hand. I think both ways of playing don’t differ too much in value. And second, what about my bet, after he checked? Of course I bet here, as I explained under “Turn”, although there is definitely some risk attached to this bet. It’s important that I am aware that many players would bet the flop with the nut flush draw. So, my opponent sees a guy value-betting the river and he might be aware that this person almost certainly isn’t having the nuts. What I am trying to say is that I should not be surprised if I got checkraised on the river. In case this would happen, I have to go by my feelings. Is this guy capable of bluff-raising the river? To find the right answer we have to go through a couple of thinking levels. First, is he able to analyze that I probably cannot have the nuts? If yes, then I have to ask myself: “Does he have the guts to check-raise me here knowing that I don’t have the nuts?” And if the answer is yes again, I have to ask myself how often he would go for the check-raise and how big his raise would be. He will not expect diamonds that often, so I could easily be bluffing. To rebluff, just doubling my river-bet, would be enough. But he might as well opt for a full pot-sized check-raise to make me lay down a small flush as well. So, comparing the bluff probabilities with the chance that he really has the nut-flush is what I have to do in this spot to find the right answer. Situations like these are the things that make poker both complicated and interesting. 18 Note from Rolf: I have discussed this hand a few times with Rob. And even though he is 100% correct in his arguments why he (in CHUFTY′s spot) would always continuation bet here with A-A + nut flush draw in order to play a big pot, I still would play it differently. If I were in CHUFTY′s shoes, I would probably check with A-A + nut flush draw here rather than bet. Given the short stack that howisitfeellike is playing, and given that he would be on the button after two checks including a preflop raiser who has shut down, my guess is that he would bet lightly in this spot - and CHUFTY could use this to his advantage by check-raising him all-in. Plus, in this case, CHUFTY would have Rob caught in the middle, whereas Rob′s relative position would be much better after a continuation bet from CHUFTY. In that case, Rob would be able to close the betting, whereas after a bet by howisitfeellike, Rob still has to worry about CHUFTY who is still to act, and who could well use this spot to bag both howisitfeellike and Rob.

Appendix

Poker Tracker Stats

Here is a short analysis of the meaning of the statistical data from Poker Tracker Omaha (in combination with poker ace HUD), with an introduction to “good” and “bad” stats, written and compiled by two mutual friends of Rob and me: Yoel Shenkman and Dennis de Ruiter.

VPIP — voluntarily put money in pot In Omaha there are different combinations of VPIP/PFR that can win, so we cannot say what is right — just what we consider low or high. 20 very tight 20-30 solid 30-40 loose but still solid 40-50 loose >50 very loose

PFR — preflop raising percentage All numbers here are relative to position and mean more or less depending on position. 5 very passive 6-12 solid raises 12-18 solid loose >18 loose

VPIP and PFR put together In contrast to no-limit hold’em where there seem to be “optimal” stats, winning big-stack players in PLO have stats that seem to differ quite a bit. In our regular game, one of the biggest winners is Jessica88 (Pepe Klinger) despite a big gap between his VPIP and PFR; at the time of this writing, we’ve got him at 30-6. Stats from the big winners in the $200-$400 five-or six-handed are: David Benyamine 48-19 (sample: 11,000 hands) Patrik Antonius 43-21 (8,000 hands) Phil Ivey 52-18* Phil Galfond (OMGClayAiken) 26-14 (26,000 hands) *only 1,300 hands so not very reliab le

One would expect that strictly based on optimal stats, the gap between the two is a bit too wide with Benyamine and Ivey, and that thus they would be playing too loose — this in contrast to the stats from Galfond that look optimal to us (tight enough to have an edge with regards to hand selection, yet also enough isolation raises to get the most out of these hands, especially in position). However, based on results it seems all four of them do very well, giving room to the theory that because hand values run so close in PLO, great postflop players could get away with playing a little loose-passive preflop.

AF — aggression frequency 25 super passive never bets or raises 40 passive 40-50 normal >50 aggressive >65 extra aggressive

♠ This number has to be taken in consideration with VPIP. If VPIP is low, this number tends to be higher, as the person is on average playing better hands, and thus tends to have a hand worth betting more often. That said, if AF is high and VPIP is high then this person must be super

♠

aggressive and need not have much to bet. We use this number for all streets, but when we look at the numbers of turn and river, we like to see extremes and how the numbers are changing. For instance, if someone is inconsistent and tends to wait for the turn or not to make his action.

W$S — won at showdown Anything above 45 starts to get high, and can mean several things. The main one is that this person probably doesn’t like to go far without a really good hand — and this might make him more bluffable.

FB — fold big blind to steal This should be used in combination with the FS number from below that we use often to determine the likelihood of the small and big blind folding and their hand range when they call. Certain players play a lot looser from their blinds and others much tighter. If you compare this to their VPIP, you can see how they treat their blinds. >70 high 50-70 normal 30-50 loose 30 no chance he folds any marginal hands

FS — fold small blind to steal This number is always a little higher than the FB figure — which makes sense because of the positional disadvantage, the slightly higher costs of calling, and because the SB cannot close the betting whereas the BB can. Here we also like to look for extremes; some people are very loose calling from the big blind but very tight from the small blind. All figures here should be about 10-15 points higher than the FB.

AS — attempted steal Again, here’s the relationship or combination of two numbers that is the key. Certain usually good players have a very tight VPIP but very high steal numbers. This means they raise in position much looser then their numbers indicate, increasing the wideness of their range significantly (this may be more important than the actual number). With other players this is not the case, so then you know that these people just play their cards, which says something of their game.

FF — fold to flop bet >65 easy to bluff 45-65 standard 45 not likely to fold

CR — check-raise This is a number we use on all streets. We especially like to see how the streets relate to each other. Certain guys always CR the flop, while others almost always wait for the turn. This can be used in many types of analysis, such as if you want to bet your draw in position, if you want to follow through, and so on. >7 high 3-7 medium 3 low

A lot of players really have like 0 or 1 on certain and sometimes even on all streets — and obviously, against them you can bet much more liberally when in position. Against players who have low CR stats on the river (1 or even 0; keep in mind though that you will require a very large sample for this stat to become accurate), you can make much thinner value bets. At the time of this writing, some of the stats we compiled in the $200-$400 game (flop-turn-river) look like: OMGClayAiken Urindanger

5-3-1 4-2-1

howisitfeellike 8-3-0 SteveSung 9-7-1 David Benyamine 4-2-1 *Refael Amit; high CR flop because he tends to starts out with short stack

CB — continuation bet >65 high 50-65 medium 50 low

CBT — continuation bet turn (this is when someone bets turn after bet flop after PFR) Here we look also at the relationship to CB. Certain players have a fairly standard CB number, say 60, and then their CBT number goes to 90 or in the opposite direction — sometimes to just 20. This in combination with CR numbers can give you some idea of the kind of things you can do and of the opponent’s hand, ability to float, and so on. For instance, there are some aggressive players like Darwinism who have not just a very high CB, but also a very high CBT. Against them, you would often check-call a set on the flop to go for the check-raise on the turn, whereas against someone with a much lower CBT you have to make your move on the flop.

FCB — folds to continuation bet This number is a recent addition for us. We use it after our PFR to see whether or not we can continuation bet lightly. Look at the numbers of the FF for what we consider high or low. If a player has a high FCB in combination with tight play in general but a relatively large number of late-position (steal) raises, this is an ideal opponent to three-bet preflop, especially when we have position on him.

BR — bet river A figure that we like to use often, an indication of someone’s bluffing frequency. Of course, in combination with VPIP, CB and CBT — the higher these figures, the looser we should call on the river with marginal hands. doesn’t bluff a lot (or, also possible, does bluff frequently but rarely value-bets thin) 20-30 average >30 bets a wide range on river 20

VPIP/PFR for heads up A few data we collected (SBB meaning small blind/button):

As before, we’ve got not enough hands to say that this is Ivey’s average. Again, it seems he likes to call rather liberally from the big blind, thinking he has a decent edge postflop. Benyamine looks like the only one who regularly flatcalls on the SBB, something that — at least at the time of this writing — Antonius and Ziigmund seems to be doing only on very rare occasions. As Rob already discussed in his chapter, Ziigmund is by a very wide margin the most aggressive reraiser OOP. He also has the smallest gap between VPIP and PFR, indicating that he likes to avoid playing OOP as a caller — in contrast to the large gaps that Ivey and Benyamine portray. Please note that especially those players with a reputation of being hyperaggressive (Antonius, Ziigmund, Durrrr) tend to fold an awful pot when they are not on the button — OMGClayAiken even folding almost three hands out of four in that spot. At the lower limits, we have seen some players perform well with stats like 40-22 from the BB, taking advantage of the fact that their opponents

played too passively postflop. Another player that used to do very well with remarkable stats was Rory Mafews. He used to do very well playing the 50-100 game at UB with 30-3 stats in the BB, meaning he almost never reraised out of position.