Remedies Rules Outline

REMEDIES RULES OUTLINE RULE

AUTHORITY

INTERPRETATION/APPLICATION INTRO TO REMEDIES

General Approach to Crafting a Remedy

Private v. Public Law Litigation

Steps to Crafting a Remedy some harm to the plaintiff. 1. Is there liability? Must determine whether the defendant is legally responsible for some 2. Identify the relevant remedial goals . a. Pl’s Rightful Position b. Def’s Rightful Position c. Punishment (i.e. disgorgement) d. Enforcement e. Declare rights 3. Determine the appropriate type of remedy. a. Specific Remedies (Future Harm) -Injunctive Relief  -Specific Performance: Contract remedy for breach. -Writs of Mandamus: Order to a public/corp. officer to perform a duty ( Marbury) -Writs of Prohibition: An order to a judge to refrain from unwarranted conduct. -Writ of Habas Corpus: Order to justify detention of prisoner. -Ejectment: Order to eject possessors from property owned by someone else. -Replevin: Order to put plaintiff in possession of chattels. -Declaratory Judgment: A declaration of liability or non-liability. -Statutory Remedies for Illegal Admin. Action b. Substitutionary Remedies (Future Harm) c. Substitutionary Remedies (Past Harm) 4. How to implement the remedy. a. i.e. What is the “rightful position” or “adequate substitute” 5. How to enforce the remedy. 1. Private Law Litigation (Traditional) A lawsuit initiated by one party against another to determine if a set of events occurred and what the consequences are. Logical remedy approach. 2. Public Law Litigation (Modern) A lawsuit initiated by a class of people to vindicate a Constitutional/Statutory right. Judges are more active in the lawsuit. Requires the use of equitable relief (injunctions) with a decree modifying future behavior being the main remedy sought. 

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THOUGH THERE IS A RIGHT THERE MAY NOT BE A REMEDY Bivens

Bive Bi vens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of F ed Bure Bureau of Narcotics Narcotics (SCT 1971) Facts 1. Man’s house is searched unconstitutionally; never charged with anything so there is no remedy b/c 42 USC 1983 exclusionary rule does not apply. 2. Individual capacity suit in order to avoid sovereign immunity Holding Fed cts can imply a cause of action and damage remedy for a 4th A violation despite lack of a controlling fed statute. Known subsequently as a Bivens Action. Analysis Courts must have power to allow for remedies for the violation of rights when (1) there is no alternate remedy and (2) Congress has not specifically spoken on a subject. “The present case involves no special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.” Must prove that violation was of clearly established const. law in order to obtain damages from the govt. Key to Bivens may really be that no other remedy is available Harlan Concurrence Damages are the only remedy. Injunction is useless b/c it looks to the future not to the past. Dissent (Black) Existence of 42 USC 1983 demonstrates that congress has considered issue and declined to provide comp damages under the circumstances. Dissent (Burger) 1. Wants to re-evaluate the remedies for a 4th Amendment violation. 2. Exclusionary rule is bad b/c it lets bad guys go free and refuses to use good evidence 3. Bivens action is inadequate. a. Juries will be reluctant to find against officers. b. Difficult to locate individual accts. 

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Constitutional Torts: Bivens Legacy

4. Better to sue state under doctrine of respondeat superior and have a tribunal to determine monetary remedy for violation of 4 t Amendment.  Nobody has questioned that court has the p ower to issue Bush v. v. L ucas ucas (SCT 1983) Holding: Court cannot imply remedy when other meaningful  prospective looking injunc tive relief for constitutiona l relief is available. violations. The question is can they imply a money damages remedy. 1. Federal employees can’t  bring Bivens claims against their  employer. Bivens Claim Analysis ( Katzberg): allows for $ damages on a  No private action for emotional distre ss and atty 2. st const claim against federal or state officials fees for 1 A violation perpetrated against federal Is a const’l right at stake? 1. employee fired for making public statements critical of his Is there evidence from which we may find or infer, within 2. agency where legislation provides for (1) reinstatement (2) the constitutional provision at issue, an affirmative intent retroactive seniority (3) retroactive back pay either to authorize or to withhold a damages action to remedy a violation. If not is there a basis basis “for concluding Chappel v. Wallace (SCT 1983) (no private action for  that a damages remedy was intended to be foreclosed.” military personnel who are injured due to uncost’l actions of  3. If no affirmative intent either to authorize or to withhold a superiors) damages remedy is found, undertake the “constitutional tort” analysis adopted by Bivens. Schweiker v. Chilicky (SCT 1988) a. Has Congress spoken: Is there a meaningful and Facts: adequate statutory remedy in existence. Congress reforms Continuing Disability Review Program b. consider the extent to which a constitutional tort action (CDR) by which SSD disability claims are reviewed. would change established tort law Provides for more careful review before denial and c. consider the nature and significance of the constitutional retroactive benefits if.  provision. Procedure  Bivens factors favor recognizing a constitutional tort, also 4. If  Bivens Suit for mental and emotional distress for adopting consider “the existence of any special factors counseling unconstitutional illegal policies that terminated benefits in hesitation in recognizing a damages action” violation of PDP rights. deference to legislative judgment Holding/Analysis avoidance of adverse policy consequences 1. Court cannot imply remedy when other meaningful relief  considerations of government fiscal policy is available. Does not matter if relief is incomplete.  practical issues of proof  2. Cong has considered this situation and provided competence of courts to assess particular types of  meaningful remedies. Must show deference to Cong. damages (ie ct is more competent in social welfare than 3. Like the plaintiff in Bush they were reinstated, given military situations) retroactive benefits and there is nothing analogous to seniority. Wilkie Two Factor Bivens Action Test * Chilicky had the statute not already been modified 1. Is there a meaningful statutory remedy in existence? injunctive relief would clearly be appropriate 2. If not, undertake a remedial determination that is Dissent appropriate for a common-law tribunal carefully The new SSD Benefit Reform Act of 1984 does not benefit considering special factors counseling hesitation these individuals. Cong. does not have special expertise in *With the current ct the likelihood of implying a Bivens the area of social welfare unlike Chappel and Bush. damages remedy for constitutional torts is virtually dead in the     

Wilkie Wilkie v. Robbins Robbins (SCT 2007) (no private cause of action against fed agents for extortionate attempts to obtain land easement in absence of statutory remedy. Line drawing here counseled against creating a judicial remedy.) Katzberg v. Regents of University of California (CAL 2002) (no PDP Bivens action for Prof who is demoted in absence of  name clearing hearing where traditional injunction/declaratory relief is available and appropriate i.e. defamation, writ of mandate which would allow damages under CA R. of Civ. Pro.) Gonzaga Uni v. Doe (SCT 2002) (Rhenquist) (no private 42 USC 1983 right of action for student harmed when school wrongly disclosed records b/c cong intended Fam Ed Rights and Privacy Act, which does not provide private right of  action, to be the exclusive remedy)

water. ( see  see Wilkie v. Robbins ) 42 USC 1983: Allows damages action against federal or state officials for violation of any federal right. Under 42 USC 1983 plaintiff must only show that a statute confers a right then 1983 will supply the remedy. Pl does not have to show a cong intent to create a  private remedy. Easier to prove 1983 suit than very high burden to obtain damages in individual capacity suit. Must show violation of clearly established con law. Where suing in individual capacity would subject pl to even worse treatment 1983 suit is preferable 

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PRELIMINARY RELIERF

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Interlocutory Appeal

Interlocutory appeal of TRO or Prelim Injunction is available (can be expedited) Circuit Split: Whether appeal of prelim injunction is a automatic stay or does it remains in place unless you obtain a stay Appellate standard of review : abuse of Discretion: as long as dct got the law right it will not be reversed b/c app ct would have applied law to the facts differently

Temporary Restraining Orders (TRO)

Carroll v. President of Princess Anne (SCT 1968) (KKK 

Prelim Injunction

case)  No place within the area of basic freed oms guaranteed by First Amendment for such orders (ex parte TRO) where no showing is made that it is impossible to serve or notify opposing parties and to give them opportunity to participate. Mandatory Binding Authority (Lovell) Hates language in rule which makes it seem like ex parte TRO should be routine when it should be an exceptional  practice that should only be used in li mited circumstances where def is operating in bad faith and they will abscond if  you notify them. Ex parte prelim orders set the stage for   poor negotiations with fixed position s. See Fed Labor Relations Act: due to abuse of ex parte TRO  process Cong. largely barred fed cts from issuing injuncti ons in Labor cases. LA Coliseumv. NF L (9 Cir 1986) Attempt by Coliseum to enjoin the NFL managers from enforcing its rule of an affirmative vote before a team could transfer location. Monetary harm is not irreparable harm  can be compensated

Dataphase v. CL Systems (8th Cir. 1981) A competing company alleges violation of anti-trust law and obtained injunction which is vacated on appeal. Holding: When determining if there is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits the court does not have to establish 51% if the other factors are strongly supported. *Lovell argued in DSM case that reordering of factors suggested an emphasis on irrep harm. Governator Case (9th Cir. 2003) (denying prelim injunction in Bush v. Gore type claim over outdated punch ballots. One of few cases to actually consider the public interest factor.) Winter v. NRDC (SCT 2008) (Nat’l Security Case) Despite DCT and CAP finding of near certainty of  irreparable harm to the environment SCT denies preliminary relief b/c of nat’l security under public interest factor. Lovell says this limits or even modifies sliding scale in  Dataphase but says heightened public interest is probably only for nat’l security. Shows that this conservative SCT would probably follow Planned Parenthood . Most recent SCT case to talk about prelim injs.

Planned Parenthood v. Rounds (8th Cir. 2008) (came down before Winter decision) (Abortion provider brought action to enjoin amendments to state’s informed consent law) (success on merits must be likely (50%+) when statutes are challenged. Statutes are based on the “presumptively reasoned democratic process”) Adopts the phrase likely to prevail on the merits See fn6: Same test for enforcement of statutes. City leg gets less deference. Heightened test might also apply to challenged admin agency action.  

Temporary Retraining Order FRCP 65 Test: immediate and irreparable injury , loss, or damage requires immediate order to maintain the status quo Shown through affidavits. About 1. Can be done ex parte but requires attempts to give notice or  demonstration of why such attempts should not be req’d 2. Requires bond 3. Duration: 10 days with one renewal regardless of notice. 4. Notice must be given while TRO is in effect so prelim injunction hearing can be set. 5. Adverse party can file motion to dissolve TRO on 2 days notice to other party (sooner w/ leave) 6. Interlocutory appeal available (can be expedited)

Status quo v. Mandatory Prelim Injunction Must consider whether prelim injunction is maintaining status quo or whether it is a mandatory prelim injunction. Mandatory  prelim injunction: reqs affirmative ac tion requires heightened showing (i.e. hire instead of stop hiring in equal emp case). Circuit Split Dataphase Sliding Scale Test for Prelim Injunction th th th th (9 Cir; 8 Cir. Unlike 9 Cir. the 8 Cir. applies Winter in cases challenging state statutes) 1. Probable threat of irreparable damage (Dataphase said “possible” but after Winter should be “probable”) 2. Fair chance of success (not necessarily above 50% -- but less probability means more need for certain irreparable damage) 3. Balance of equities: the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties litigant 4. Public interest 5. Sliding scale part: Only substantial and not mathematical  probability of success required if  “the balance of other  factors tips decidedly toward movant” and the “movant has raised questions so serious and difficult as to call for more deliberate investigation.” (look at context)

Winter Fixed Threshold Test for Prelim Injunction th

(11 Circuit) 1. Likelihood of irreparable harm (must be more than a mere  possibility) 2. Likelihood of success on the merits (50%+) 3. Balance of equities (discuss rightful place and undue  burden) 4. In the public interest (higher standard then perm injunction is justified) Pointers 1. Notice required 2. Court has ability to consolidate the hearing for Preliminary Injunction into a trial on the merits.

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Master Builders of I owa v. F ort Madison Prison (has not

Motion for a TRO in Moore

K Suits Against the State: strong irreparable harm argument  b/c sovereign immunity prevents K suits against stat es. True in most municipal bond cases.

occurred yet but pl’s wisely sought TRO to prevent state from signing K) Moore v. City of Des Moines (S.D.IA 1984) (Lovell used Dataphase standard but maybe Planned Parenthood would apply since government action is being challenged) 1. Irreparable Harm: Focus on class based nature of the relief: w/out injunction it will take at least one year until the next hiring to pursue rightful place  Layoffs may mean that there will be no jobs next year (weakest factor here) a. Measures such as hiring ratios cannot be taken if there are no vacancies to fill b. Ct will almost never remove hired applicant to give pl a job c.  No rightful place remedy 2. Liklihood of success on the merits: inexonerable zero. Huge disparate impact. 3. Balancing the Equities. No undue burden  Virtually full fire dept. Even a temp delay will not endanger public. 4. Public interest: Diversity is a legitimate public interest. Potential Damages: 1. Backpay to sept 82 and retroactive seniority 2. Front pay remedy req’ing city to pay fire fighters salary until he gets a job minus mitigation 3. Perhaps other consequential damages (i.e.e foreclosure) 4. Reasonable atty fees were recovered Consent decree was negotiated. THE NATURE, AVAILABILITY, AND SCOPE OF INJUNCTIONS Prerequisites for Injunctive Relief 

Injunctions Generally

Injunction 1. An EQUITABLE REMEDY, in the form of a COURT ORDER that directs a person to act or refrain from acting (prohibits or  compels/restrains or enjoins) in a specific way. 2. Enforcement: Coercive remedy enforced by power of contempt. a. Compensatory civil contempt: If injunction/order is violated court may award monetary compensation to plaintiff: The contemnor has no right to a jury trial and court will typically award pl atty fees (exception to the American rule) b. Coercive civil contempt = jail or fine  does not affect pl’s rightful position c. Criminal contempt = for willful violation of an injunction a sentence can be issued Types of Injunctions: 1. Preventive: Injunctions, which prevents wrongs from occurring again. 2. Reparative: Injunctions issued to eliminate the effects of past wrongs. i.e. Requiring the building of recreation area for prisoners in Newman. 

Notes Injunction drafting should be a joint effort; if cooperation is not possible then plaintiff will typically draft it. Plaintiff wields  power of the first draft. Reach of injunction can be expanded beyond named defendant to other entities/persons in concert with defendant When def. practices are voluntarily changed retain jurisdiction for further review as in  Aikens. The usual standard of appellate review with an injunction is “Abuse of Discretion” o Case will be moot if “there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.” o Case is not ripe if there are no violations and no showing of future violations. 

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Cir. 1988): injunction on abortion protestors challenged as being vague  because it didn’t specify decible level. Court says they’ll only set aside an injunction if it is VERY vague –  more vague than this apparently. **Prof Lovell Preferred Permanent Injunction Factors** TIBP 1. Threat of legal harm necessitating Court action a. likely to continue or mere aberration? 2. Irreparable injury b/c damages are inadequate a. Money won’t fix i.e. ct treats real estate/property as unique ie new river cannot be bough t b. Would damages fully and adequately make the pl whole? If so this injury is not irreparable in the eyes of the law. 3. Balancing of hardships: indicates that remedy in equity is warranted a. Will granting the injunction impose undue hardship or unfairness to defendant  Portland Feminist Women’s Health Center  (9

Black Letter

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4. Public interest will not be disserved by permanent injunction a. Do not have to prove furtherance of public interest. (will not, by itself, typically operate to deny relief entirely but see  Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge) b. Practicality of Enforcement: No overwhelming monitoring/enforcement burden on the court. Is it worth it from an administration of justice standpoint

Black Letter Cases

Monsanto: Reestablishes Four-Factor Analysis IIBP 1. irreparable injury (threat of legal harm necessitating Court action) 2. remedies available at law are inadequate 3. balancing of hardships/equities indicates that remedy in equity is warranted (should come first if there is a statute as in  Hecht or TVA but statute has to be damn clear) 4. public interest will not be disserved by permanent injunction (furtherance of public interest) (will not, by itself, typically operate to deny relief entirely but see Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge ) Ebay v. Mercexchange (SCT 2006) Majority (Thomas) 1. Four factor test for injunctive relief applies to the Patent Act. Must use flexible equitable discretion doctrine and not rigid  presumption that “ injunction shall issue upon showing of patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.” 2. historically injunctions have applied to patents and no intention to depart from tradition is evident 3. patents act declares that patents have attributes of personal property Concurrence (Kennedy): Must be aware of new phenomenon where patent is only for licensing and injunction is just a  bargaining chip to get bigger licen sing fees.

Monsanto v. Geerston (SCT 2010) (Injunction is drastic and extraordinary remedy and is not issued to absolutely prohibit USDA from deregulating GMO seeds. Here partial dereg is appropriate. However, they should conduct a EIS) Prerequisites for Injunctive Relief  Prerequisites for Injunctive Relief: Balancing The Equities Balancing the Equities (proportionality)

Black letter 1. Court must (almost) always balance the equities when issuing an injunction. 2. Injunction should be balanced and match scope of harm threatened. Before issuing permanent specific relief court must consider: 1. Whether the relief would impose hardship on def AND 2. whether that hardship is substantially disproportionate to the disadvantage to plaintiff of receiving only substitutionary relief  3. In balancing those interests ct should consider relative fault of both parties If P doesn’t act to stop the harm when he should have, that balances away from his favor (Staso is example of P who DOES act on time)  – Laches Doctrine 4. Also can be formulated to state that court should balance advantage to plaintiff receiving specific rather than substitutionary relief against burden on defendant. Prerequisites for Injunctive Relief: Balancing The Equities: Plaintiff’s Rightful Place Mt Healthy School Dist Bd of Ed v. Doyle (SCT 1977) Procedure 42 USC 1983 damages suit for alleged retaliatory refusal to renew K in violation of 1 st and 14th Facts: Pl is non-tenured teacher whose K is not renewed. Engaged in string of unsavory conduct including 1st A protected speech on radio station. Holding Plaintiffs will be denied recovery for wrongful termination based on exercising a protected conduct if employer would have reached same decision in absence of protected conduct. Analysis If he would have been terminated despite const’l violation then reinstatement with backpay would put pl in b etter than rightful  position. Mt Healthy Mixed Motive Test (use for non-discrimination wrongful termination cases) 1. Pl must carry burden of showing protected conduct was a substantial factor in decision not to rehire then… 2. The burden shifts to def to show by the preponderance of the evidence that they would not have rehired him even in the absence of the protected conduct. Note: Backpay is considered an injunctive remedy. SCT has taken the position that Cong gets to decide what type of remedy  backpay is. Differs from statute to statute. 

Rightful Place in Mixed Motives Wrongful Termination Cases

Civil Rights Act of 1991 42 USC sec 2000e-2(m) (use for wrongful termination discrimination cases) Alters Hopkins v.  Price Waterhouse Unlawful to use race, color, religion, sex, or national origin as a motivating factor in any employment practice even though other factors also motivated the practice. (lowers pl’s burden of proof) Even if employer can prove they would not have rehired anyway it is only a partial defense in this case. If this is shown it 

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limits remedy to injunctive and declaratory relief and atty fees/costs. Remedy is basically atty fees and statement don’t do it again. Note that cong. has the power to alter remedies for const’l violations

DeBoom v. Raining Rose (IA) (woman is fired, apparently because of pregnancy. Unclear whether IA allows full recovery where discrimination is merely a motivating factor) Mckennon v. Nashville Banner Pub Co. (SCT 1995) (After acquired evidence case) Facts Woman steals files that prove she will be fired for age discrim’y purpose Holding When employer is attempting to justify termination, they are limited by the knowledge they had at the time of termination. Analysis Where employee illegally takes home confidential documents to demonstrate she was improperly terminated this after  acquired evidence, unknown to the employer at the time of termination does not provide supervening legal reason for  termination.  No reinstatement since she can be terminated up on discovery of after acquired evidence . Proper remedy is back pay from date of termination to date after acquired evidence (of theft) was discovered. 

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Right Place in Reconsideration Relief Cases Rightful Place in Pattern Practice Cases

Rightful Position as Reconsideration or Remand to Agency in Administrative Law Reconsideration Relief: A remedy available to the plaintiff to have an administrative body reconsider a prior holding. Rightful place is error free decision. Does not meant Plaintiff necessarily gets what he wants. Rizzo v. Goode (SCT 1976) Rarely will an injunction issue against unlawful and uncost. police action b/c the issues are very delicate. Facts High police officials are sued for pervasive pattern of illegal and unconstitutional mistreatment by police officers under the theory of official indifference to police misconduct and the likelihood that it would reoccur. Holdings 1. Injunctions must be tailored so that they are limited to forcing those adjudged to h ave violated plaintiff’s rights to restor e them to their rightful position. (def must be liable or there is no remedy against that defendant) 2. Injunctions will not issue if there is not threat of future harm. 3. An injunction should only issue in order to vindicate rights. Analysis 1.  Nonfeasance as to high police officials in th is case. No policy of ignoring poli ce abuse. Malfeasant misconduct was by low level officers not the high level officers being sued. 2. Typically injunctive relief does not run against individual officers 3. Do not read to broadly. Misfeasance by high police officials would have allowed for injunction. SeeHaguev. C.I .O. (case allowing injunction against mayor and chief of police for active misfeasance) 42 U.S.C. 14141: Gives U.S. Dept. of Justice authority to bring pattern and practice litigation to enjoin police misconduct.

Rightful Place in Election Cases

New Jersey Consent Decree: DOJ obtained injunction eliminated use of race in police activities. This is allowed, post- Rizzo,  because it was the U.S. (not individuals) suing NJ. Congress modified Riz zo with 42 USC 14141 allowing for DOJ suits. Marks v. Stinson (3d Cir. 1994) (if pl loses election due to flawed vote counting new election will not be ordered unless he demonstrates that more votes were affected than the margin of victory) BUT SEE MORE THAN RIGHTFUL PLACE

ELECTION CASES Bell v. Southwell (5th Cir. 1967) (where candidate is black and black voters are excluded she can get a new election even though blacks excluded from voting was less than margin of victory. Presumption that racially charged environment caused whites not to vote for her). McCarthey v. Briscoe (5th Cir. 1977) (allowing presidential candidate to be put on ballot where unconst’l statute prevented him Rightful Place in Structural Injunction Cases

from obtaining statutorily req’s no minating procedure) Aikens v. Lash (***Lovell Case***) (N.D. Ind. 1974) Procedure: Prison reform cases seeking structural injunction (requires a variety systemic changes in the way an institution operates) Facts 1. Segregation cells unfit for animals 2. First time fed ct ever closed cells in max security prison Holding/Analysis 1. Cruel and unusual punishment is found when it offends contemporary concepts of decency and human dignity and precepts of  civilization which we profess to possess. 2. Courts of equity have broad discretion to issue injunctions for preventative and reparative relief. 3. Deference shown to give prison admin and leg the benefit of the doubt. Ct cannot take over prison and recognizes that they

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are understaffed. 4. During lawsuit prison policy was changed to allow for hearing. Lovell successfully argued prior hearing was req’d prior to segregation under  Morrissey grievous loss standard. Morissey v. Brewer (IA SCT). a. req’s adequate procedural hearings including advocate for all inmates in IDU unit within 10 days. b. retains jurisdiction to ensure new already approved hearing procedures are implemented 5. Ct holds against pls on challenge re IDU seclusion unit. but retains jurisdiction to give leg a chance to pass bill under  consideration that would provide for renovation, more guards (less than rightful place remedy at time of issuance). 6. Prison staff was opening atty correspondence. This violated right to counsel under 6th, and 14th Amds. Ct holds that it can only be opened in front of inmate, if there is suspicion of contraband. 7. Ct ordered D.O. unit closed within 20 days. a. Long term confinement in D.O. seg is not u ncost. but periodic 30 day review hearings with adversary setting is req’d b. One year later D.O. seclusion unit had been converted into prison library with skylights, windows.

Rightful Place in PDP Prisoner Cases

Less than Rightful Place

*Note: Aikens was a prison reform structural/reparative injunction. In 1995 Gingrich and PLRA limits relief. Morrissey v. Brewer (IA SCT 1972) (Parole is a liberty interest to which due process attaches) Grievous Loss Standard If there is potential for grievous loss the following are req’d 1. adequate and timely written notice of the charge 2. a fair opportunity to explain and to request that witnesses be called or interviewed 3. impartial decision maker. **Note: The same is req’d for revocaiton of  statutory good time.

Gagnon v. Scarpelli (SCT 1973) (probation is a liberty interest to which due process attaches) Smith v. Staso Milling (2d Cir. 1927) (balancing appropriate even though it is unclear whether it is permitted under VT law) Majority (Hand) Facts Milling plant starts up less than a mile from pl’s vacation home. Causes air and water pollution as well as air pollution. Pl expressed concern before building began. Def provided assurances that water  pollution would not take place. Holding 1. Water pollution absolutely enjoined b/c of prior promise. (laches). 2. Air pollution injunction also stands but w/ leave for def. to request modification upon further showing that there is no better  technology, impossible to further reduce the dust, injunction will result in closing down. Analysis 1. Def attempting to limit harm to least possible extent and there is a large public interest at stake that must be balanced against  pls rights. 2. Failure to balance would result in a means of extortion since biz is worth millions and house is worth $40,000 3. State of the art technology is preventing all but 1% of air pollution

Brown v. Bd of Ed (Brown II SCT 1955) 1. First structural injunction transforming law of remedies 2. Ct supervision of local action: responsibility of local officials come up with solutions and adopt/implement plans; responsibility of court to determine if strategy meets law. (public interest) 3. All deliberate speed: Court has responsibility of determining if actions are a “good faith implementation” of the law. 4. Practicalities of enforcement weigh heavily resulting in less than rightful place remedy Except in context of contract law, this practicality of enforcement rarely comes into play as it does here Remedial Delay: Rightful position can be delayed if only attainable with remedial steps. *It took a decade before any real desegregation began to occur b/c political branches finally came on bd with Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson  TVA v. Hill (SCT 1978): enjoining dam construction that endangered snail darters in violation of endangered species act Holding: Endangered Species Act was a rare occasion where statute was damn clear that injunction would issue for violation and ct did not have usual equitable discretion. (Power of Congress to take away judicial discretion in regards to injunctions) 

Rightful Place Balancing in Statutory Cases

Three possible interpretations 1. equitable discretion may never be used to allow a statutory violation to continue 2. *equitable discretion may in general be so used, but the ESA prohibited balancing in cases arising under it* 3. equitable discretion may be so used and the Act does not forbid balancing, but the balancing in this case came out in favor of  the snail darters

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo (SCT 1982)  Navy found to be violating statute du ring training exercises by discharging ordnan ce into water in PR w/out obtaining permit. Under FWPCA balancing was allowed b/c military could obtain a permit. Lack of enviro harm contributed to less than rightful  place remedy.

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Balancing: More Than Rightful Place Remedy

Times when a more than rightful place remedy is appropriate. 1. Ct is dealing with obstructionist or recalcitrant defendant 2. Prophylaxis and Impossibility: It is very difficult to fashion a precise rightful place remedy but bright line more than rightful  place remedy is easily enforceable

Women Prisoners v. DC Evidence of abuse results in hotline, grievance procedure, staff training, reporting mechanism, employee sanctions, expert consult, staff training. Hutto v. F inney(SCT 1978) Facts: Horrible Prison Conditions (1) Trustees  prisoner guards with guns (2) 8 real guards for 1000 prisoners, 2 at night (3) Disease infested mattresses (4) No window in cell, up to 10 ppl per 8x10 cell (5) Rampant rape and attacks at night (6) 17 stabbings in eighteen months (7) prison ran for profit, prisoners driven like slaves, beaten with leather strap: forced to do up to 12 hrs hard labor in clothing inappropriate for weather (8) Less than 1000 calories per day (9) Electric shock punishment Procedure: History of Recalcitrance 1969: Initial hearings ordered prison to correct the conditions when funds were available: (1) Defer to “expert” authorities like in Brown II (2) File reports on progress 1971: court issued guidelines, identifying four areas of change that would cure the worst evils: (1) improving conditions in the isolation cells (2) increasing inmate safety (3) eliminating the barracks sleeping arrangements (4) putting an end to the trusty system. 1973: dct terminated injunction and ct which appeals reversed this decision in 1974. 1976: dct holds additional hearings and finds conditions had worsened: (1) grue diet continued (2) worse overcrowding (3) vandalism (4) isolation for months at a time 8th Cir. ordered atty fees based on bad faith of state and counsel for going back to worse conditions once supervision was withdrawn Holding More than 30 day isolation is not necessarily uncons’l but und er these circumstances the isolation violates the 8 th amendment. This is a more than rightful place remedy. Analysis (1) Injunction can go beyond the plaintiff’s rightful position given history of noncompliance. (2) Injunctions can go beyond the  plaintiff’s rightful position if evidence that defendant would not comply with a narrow order. (3) Seeking to bring an ongoing violation to an immediate halt. (4) FN 11: Due to noncompliance in order to accomplish remedy bright line is needed that goes  beyond rightful place Dissent (Rehnquist) Defer to local govt in managing its own affairs Disagrees with position that state was recalcitrant *Note: If state will not appropriate funding for certain areas, like prisons, the court can put a cap on the number of prisoner per  guards in the prison. Balancing The Equities: School Desegregation Cases Green v. School Bd. (SCT 1968) (freedom of choice remedy violates desegregation order b/c burden of desegregation falls on school bd not kids and families)

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd of Ed (SCT 1971) (Perhaps the most successful deseg case) Holding: School can engage in temporary gerrymandering of districts and bussing to eliminate segregation. Analysis (racial balancing approach) 1. Interdistrict violation 2. Court has broad remedial power to repair denial of const’l right 3. One race schools  req heightened scrutiny with the burden lying on authorities to show that discrim is not taking place 4. Redrawing attendance zones is within the courts broad remedial power. Ct ordered quotas to attain racial proportionality are allowedoverruled in Parents Involved v. Seattle School District #1 (2009) 5. Ct ordered bussing allowed if it does not risk health of children, impinge on the ed. process, and the children are not very young. average bus ride before deseg remedy was 15 mi for 1 hr. Under deseg decree avg bus ride was 7 mi. and 35 mins. 

Milliken v. Bradley I (SCT 1974) (“with no showing of significant violation by the 53 outlying school districts and no evidence of any interdistrict violation” the district court’s remedy was “ wholly impermissible”)

Milliken v. Bradley II (SCT 1977) (magnet schools okay where they are implemented for quality of education purposes and the state of Michigan can be ordered to pay for them) MO v. J enkins III (SCT 1995) (voluntary approach)

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Holding: The court cannot remedy an intradistrict problem by ordering a remedy with an interdistrict purpose. KC magnet program is an interdistrict remedy which is beyond the scope of the intradistrict const’l violation therefore DCT “has devised a remedy to accomplish indirectly what it admittedly lacks the remedial authority to mandate directly: the interdistrict transfer of students” Analysis 1. Unlike Swann no interdistrict violation only intradistrict violation 2. DCT ordered that all schools in KC district become magnet schools: Goal was to attract white student that left the district to return. 3. Scope of the remedy was broader than Milliken: Cannot support intradistrict remedy with unlimited expenditure and unlimited duration in the name of desegregative attractiveness. 4. Relies on 3-Part Milliken Framework. Ct does not mention traditional 4 factor test. a. the nature of the desegregation remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation b. the decree must indeed be remedial in nature, that is, it must be designed as nearly as possible `to restore the victims of  discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct. c. the federal courts in devising a remedy must take into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs Concurring (Thomas): Rejects idea of structural injunction. Ct should issue injunction and be done. Dissent (Lovell) 1. Remedy was not overly intrusive 2. Segregation caused white flight 3. Intradistrict violation with interdistrict effects can justify intradistrict remedy with intended interdistrict effects as long as it does not require gov action by districts not in violation Begins from the time application is made. Teamsters provides that at the remedies stage non -applicants can make a claim for  Retroactive individual relief but it is a very difficult burden: must prove that they would have applied (ie letter of inquiry). Also in class Seniority action it is difficult to identify non-applicants. The Other Prerequisites for Injunctive Relief  Threat of  Hecht Co. v. Bowles (SCT 1944) Irreparable Facts 1. Gov’t sought injunction to keep store from violating Emergency Price Control Act. Harm 2. Statute provided that fed agency may apply for injunction and it  shall issue. 3. The dist. court dismissed case due to adequate corrective action taken by company. Holding: In a case in which a statute is sought to be enforced the court is not required to issue an injunction when there is no threat of harm unless that statute is damn clear that language in statute is strong enough to override trad’l/ historical  presumption that courts have power to ba lance equities. Injunctions are meant to deter not to puni sh.

Inadequate Remedy at Law

But seeCBS v. E choStar (11th Cir. 2001) (permanent injunction language in Satellite Home Viewer Act req’s ct to issue injunction for violation) Traditional Rule: Courts cannot grant an equitable remedy if the problem can be remedied at law (with money). Traditional Situations in Which Remedies at Law are in Adequate JID-R-MMF 1. Defendant is judgment proof . 2. Defendant is immune from damages. a. i.e. Govt officials 3. Damages are very difficult to estimate: violation of const’l right a. lost profits in new biz  b. pl value of property is higher than market value i.e. hei rloom 4. Plaintiff cannot be put in rightful place with damages – no market for loss. 5. Complete recovery would require multiplicity of lawsuits a. Ongoing nuisance  b. NJ Toxic Torts case debating whether past and future damages can be o btained in one law suit. 6. Allowing injury to take place would be morally repugnant i.e. intentional/deliberate injury to property 7. Where the lawsuit doesn’t allow for future damages. Prof Laycock: as a practical matter this maxim is obsolete However cts still use this language. Real rule of Inadequate Remedy at Law Pro-legal rationale 1. Equity will not act if there is an adequate remedy at law 2. Adequate Remedy means a remedy as complete, practical and efficient as the equitable remedy OR  Tiebreaker rationale 1. This means that if a legal and an equitable remedy are equally complete, practical and efficient the legal remedy shall be used 2. This means that the plaintiff is entitled in all cases to the most complete practical and efficient remedy

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Const’l Variations of Inadequacy Req 1. 5th A: by permitting taking of property for public use the 5th A denies owner injunctive relief  see Kelo v. City of New London (damages remedy mandated) 2. 1st A: Prohibition on prior restraint makes it much easier to collect damages than enjoin speech. Must wait until after harm and file action ie defamation.

The Contempt Power

Statutory Variations of Inadequacy Req 1. Tax Injunction Act: no fed injunctions for tax over assessment where state law provides a remedy. 2. Statute may proscribe or prescribe adequate remedy rule a. EPA clean up cannot be challenged until after the fact to prevent delays and expense in clean up b. PLRA reqs administrative exhaustion even where process does not permit damages ENFORCING THE INJUNCTION Compensatory Civil Contempt: Award of civil damages for  Hicks v. Feiock (SCT 1988) Man can’t pay child su pport (claims “impossibility”) violating injunction paid to the plaintiff. Held in contempt which shifts the burden to D to show that  payment is impossible. Claims this violates PDP. Coercive Civil Contempt: Holding: Contempt for failure to pay child support may Coerces D into compliance: Fining and jailing defendant constitutionally be civil contempt where probation ends upon as long as disobedience continues (generally punishment full payment. This is coercive and designed to benefit pl. goes away after behavior is modified).  Bagwell . Compensates the complainant for losses sustained: UMW v. Bagwell (SCT 1994): Complex injunction arising Generally fines go to the plaintiff. Bagwell . out of labor law dispute. Defendant has “keys to the jailhouse door” Holding: Disobedience to complex injunctions require Defendant can usually purge the fine/sentence factfinding – criminal protections are necessary and Burden is “clear and convincing” appropriate. Judge warned that he would charge fixed amount fines for  Criminal Contempt: Guilty of crime and court imposes fine or  noncompliance ahead of time  previously delineated sentence for a fixed period of time.  penalties look criminal. No opportunit y to purge. Fines were Willful or repeated violation of court order.  payable to state not pl. Involved indirect contempt that ct did Criminal PDP Pr otections Req’d: proof “beyond a not observe. reasonable doubt”; trial by jury Sentence/fine cannot be purged and is for a definite fixed Merrimack v. City of Clay Center (SCT 1911)  period City cuts down telephone poles while appeal is pending Probation is generally sufficient to make it a criminal Holding: inherent power of SCT to issue contempt for   procedure but see Hicks conduct calculated to remove the subject-matter of the appeal  beyond its control. Civil or Criminal Contempt Test Hicks 1. Substance of the Proceeding Griffin v. County School Bd of PrinceEdward County 2. Character of the Relief that the Proceeding will Afford (SCT 1966) (Getting Tricky with the Court) If contempt is remedial and benefits plaintiff it is o Where school board closed public schools and gave vouchers generally civil contempt to whites to go to private schools. Ct asks county for  If contempt is punitive and vindicates state it is o stipulation that no grants will issue until he can hear case; criminal county says no, and stays up all night distributing vouchers which are cashed the same day. Extraordinary factual Indirect Contempt: Out of court contempt that the court does situation demonstrating deviousness and egregious bad faith not observe. More likely to be criminal contempt. supports contempt without violation of actual court order. Holding: Typically you need some type of order to prevail in Direct Contempt: in court, is generally civil. contempt hearing. But when extremely obstructionist D takes away the very subject of the proposed injunction, they are in Reasons contempt is useful contempt. Individual liability gets their attention Lovell says Ps in this case should have sought stay Potential liability for attorneys fees. Famous language: allowing courts to use the “power that is Demoralization. Connotation of guilt. theirs”  this is quoted in Jenkins II and Yonkers. 

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Personal liability of Govt. Officials: Can only be held  personally liable for civil co ntempt for willfully violating clearly established constitutional right. Spallone Collateral Bar Rule

Cobbledick v. US (SCT 1940) Motion to quash subpoena duces tecum is not a final order so there is no interlocutory appeal. SCT ruled that when a motion to quash subpoena duces tecum is denied movant may violate it and if cited for  contempt may properly contest its validity in the contempt

Issues in a Contempt Hearing for violating Court Order Injunction 1. Are you the addressee, did you receive notice 2. Did you violate TRO. 3. Was the order transparently invalid (clearly unconst’l)

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 proceeding.

Walker v. City of Birmingham (SCT 1967) (Still Good Law) (MLK and others enjoined (ex parte TRO) from holding demonstration on Good Friday. They did so anyway. Cited with contempt which is upheld under collateral bar  rule.) Dissent: Ordinance provided for criminal sanctions and city could have prosecuted for misdemeanor. Ct usurped function of jury. Unfair in prior restraint case b/c if you are  prosecuted for a crime but def has const’l challenge to a statute this is an absolute defense. Defendant’s were repeatedly denied permit. Ex parte TRO, lack of  representation is manifestly unfair. Broad TRO with language of parade ordinance. Less than 24 hrs to modify or  dissolve TRO with no attys available. BUT SEE . . .

Carroll v. President of Princess Anne (SCT 1968) KKK Rally is enjoined. In First A prior restraint case a TRO issuing a prior restraint is transparently invalid if no showing is made that it is impossible to serve or notify opposing  parties and to give them opportunity to p articipate. In re Providence J ournal Co (1st Cir. 1987) Paper has 3-day TRO put on it not to run story about mafia king death. Violates TRO, which subsequently is found to be unconst. under 1st amendment. Per curiam: Publishers must, in good faith, seek exhaustion of appellate remedies: expedited appeal must be sought.  this is an institutional defendant with counsel on demand. Maybe distinguish on these grounds in a case involving comm’y defendant like in Walker . Indicates that ct will be more cautious in pure speech case with no apparent a risk of  violence. th

11 Amendment Immunity

Collateral Bar Rule: A defendant violating a court order   before challenging it in cou rt, cannot challenge the underlying substantive law in a contempt hearing. Exceptions to CBR  A defendant violating a court order before challenging it in court, can challenge the underlying substantive law in a contempt hearing if . . . 1. order was transparently invalid, has only a frivolous pretense to validity 2. they are given the run around on appeal 3. SM or Personal jurisdiction is lacking. 4. CBR may not apply to non-appealable orders? See Cobbledick  Pointers: When a TRO/Prelim injunction is issued the defending party should file a motion to dissolve/quash or an expedited interlocutory appeal. Especially if TRO was obtained ex parte. Rationale: Rests on interest in rule of law  enforcing validity of courts decision. Also safety and public order. Preserving civil liberties through preserving public order.

ENFORCEMENT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT Chisholm v. Georgia (SCT 1795) (ruling that citizens can The Eleventh A mendment sue states in fed ct under diversity jurisdiction. Leads to 11 th The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed A) to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or   prosecuted against one of the United St ates by Citizens of  another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State Hans v. Louisiana (SCT 1890) (11th A bars suits by citizens against states in diversity and fed question cases) Athough11th A is not a jurisdictional issue it can be raised at th any point in litigation. VA v. WVA (SCT 1918) ( No 11 A immunity in a suit btw states. SCT indicates that the ct could require WVA to levy a tax to pay the judgment. However, they allow WVA to take Stripping Doctrine Young: If the act which the state [official] action in good faith which they do.) seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that Ex Parte Young (1908): Lochner era. Facts/Procedure: RRs challenged MN statute regulating RR  case stripped of his official or representative character and is rates as confiscatory violation of SDP. Fed ct issued subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual injunction prohibiting new rates and enjoined MN Atty Gen conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity Young from taking action to enforce the law. Young files from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United mandamus action seeking to compel compliance by RRs. So States.  pls go back to fed ct and argue that Young is in contempt. Holding: State officials can be sued in their individual Application of Stripping Doctrine capacity under the stripping doctrine 1.  Never sue the state. Always name individual official and name them in their official capacity. This is called “suing Analysis th them individually in their official capacity.” Injunctive 1. P&I clause in 14 A runs against the state conflicting with interpretation of 11th A in Hans. relief runs against officer in his official capacity and will run against successor. Legal fiction  yeah it makes no 2. To reconcile the two the ct invented the stripping doctrine. sense. 3. Best way to understand this is that 14th A came after 11th 2. If official is sued in individual capacity this is individual

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A and is specifically intended to limit sovereign immunity of the state.

damage liabilities. Other qualified immunity doctrines generally protect individuals from this unless they clearly violate well-established const’l law.

Castle Rock v. Gonzales (SCT 2005) (town and its police department could not be sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for  failing to enforce a restraining order, which had led to the murder of a woman’s three children by her estranged husband)

Prospective vs Retrospective Relief From State

Statutes Authorizing Atty Fees Against State

Atty Fees in Cases Against the State

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Exceptions to 11 A immunity SDLAWS 1. Does not apply in suits btw states 2. 11th A has no application if DOJ brings the suit. 3. Local government entities are not protected by 11th A ie city, school bd etc 4. Congress has power under sec 5 of 14 th A to abrogate 11th A immunity. a. Title 7 Gender Discrimination. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer . b. Civil Rights Act of 1976.  Hutto v. Finney. 5. State can waive immunity  strictly construed a. “by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction” Edelman v. J ordan. 6. State officials can be stripped and sued in their individual capacity for damages. State may or may not indemnify the individual official. Black letter: only prospective fiscal costs can be imposed on states. 11t A bars retroactive relief. Atty fees are considered prospective relief. Hutto v. F inney 

Edelman v. J ordan (SCT 1974) (The Edelman Divide) Illinois was taking too long to provide relief to blind and disabled in violation of fed welfare program. Holding: Ct. ruled that prospective injunction was okay against state officials, but by 5-4 ruled that retrospective relief was not  possible. Dissent: Equitable restitution rationale. Senseless distinction btw retro and prospective relief since both require state to spend money. Plus in this case the damages are not unpredictable at all. State knows exactly how much is owed and is being unjustly enriched. Note** Edleman heightens the importance of prelim injunctions under irreparable harm prong b/c if it turns out the pl was wrongfully denied they will be unable to obtain retroactive benefits Atty Fees Under Civil Rights Act of 19 76 1. Cong has plenary power to abrogate 11th A immunity. 2. Virtually every substantive const’l right covered  EQP, SDP, PDP 3. Provides for atty fees for prevailing party Title 7: Provides for atty fees for prevailing party Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer (SCT 1974) (title 7 abrogates 11t A immunity and provides for backpay against states and other public employers)

Hutto v. F inney(SCT 2004) Holding: Ct cites Ex parte young and Edelman in awarding atty fees against the govt. Analysis 1. Securing the cost of compliance to an injunction is considered prospective relief. Atty fees are incurred after litigation  begins and are necessary to obtain prospect ive injunctive relief autho rized under  Edelman. This is ancillary to prospective relief and therefore on prospective side of  Edelman divide. Does not compensate for past harm. 2. This is compensatory in a sense but operates prospectively to bring def in compliance. Second atty fee award came under  Civil Rights Act of 1976 and Cong. has plenary power to abrogate 11 th A immunity. 3. Also historically fed ct have imposed costs on govt just like they were any other party and statute authorizes award of atty fees as cost.

Consent Decrees in Cases Against the State

Farrar v. Hobby (SCT 1992) (In vast majority of cases no fees allowed in cases for nominal damages) TEST: In order to get attorney’s fees for nominal damages you have to consider  1. Difference between the judgment recovered and judgment sought 2. Significance of the legal issue on which plaintiff prevailed 3. Public Purpose served. Frew v. Hawkins (SCT 2004) Facts: consent decree negotiated in child welfare case in TX. State violated it and when pls sought compliance claimed 11th A immunity. Holding: Consent decrees are binding on the state even without a showing of violation of fed law. Successors in Office are

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Tools for Forcing State Compliance

Forcing State Compliance Cases

 bound by decree. Possible Tools to Secure State C ompliance PCSOI 1. Postpone responding to violation in hopes that legislature will grant authority, parties will settle, or Congress will act. (Welsch ) 2. Contempt: State could always make an impossibility defense. ( Spallone) (Griffin) 3. Strike down state law ( Jenkins II) 4. Order official to disregard state law (Welsch ) 5. Indirect means  negative order  Welsch v. Likins (8 Cir. 1977) Institution for mentally retarded people needs funds. Ct orders state to disregard statute that says they can’t give money to institution without an appropriations bill. But Ct waits for legislature and governor to take action, rather than holding them in contempt.

MO v. J enkins II (1990): Facts: KC district and state of MO found to be  jointly and severally liable. Statute limited ability of school bd to raise taxes without referendum by public. Public rejected the referendum so there was no money to institute magnet school remedy. Holding: court cannot order an increased of property and income tax to pay for segregation plan in this case. Proper remedy is to enjoin enforcement of existing tax statute. Analysis 1. Statute require public referendum was older than ct order so it was not enacted in order to circumvent court order to integrate. 2. Federalism/Sep of powers requires the ct to use as little power as possible in fashioning relief. Here the ct should have enjoined the enforcement of the statute and give the city an opportunity to comply. 3. Indicates that court levied tax may be appropriate in extreme circumstances if it is the only alternative to remedy const’l violation. VA v. WVA Notes: Judge Lay thinks the court should pose the balance of the bill on the state under joint and several liability doctrine. CWA anticipates dilemma and has solution similar to Judge Lay. Provides that in suit brought by fed govt. against municipality states shall be joined.

Griffin v. County School Bd of PrinceEdward County (ct orders state to exercise the power to tax which is theirs. Also this is a case of a recalcitrant defendant.)

Contempt Against the Gov’t

Van Hoffman (City issued bonds and state imposed statutory limit on cities ability to tax. The ct held that the statute was a violation of the contracts clause. Therefore ct did not actually order or strike down a tax. Here the statute as in NC  bussing case the statute was passed to obstruct enforcement of a decree.) Spallone v. US (SCT 1990) Title 8 of fair housing act case alleging Yonkers segregation of public/subsidized housing. City violated consent decree and ct ordered them to vote a certain way. They refuse. Ct imposed huge contempt fines and individual contempt liability on the grounds that council members could not invoke sovereign immunity since they agreed to the consent decree. Holding: Ct can order council members to vote a certain way in order to effectuate consent decree to which they agreed. City can be held them in contempt for not voting but individual contempt liability should be avoided. Analysis While sovereign immunity does not apply b/c city is bound by consent decree in this case individual contempt liability is not warranted. Individual liability could make legislators put policy considerations on the backburner. Dissent Maj decision will encourage recalcitrant defendants to test the remedial authority of the courts RIGHT TO DAMAGES

Damages Generally

Damages Three kinds: o  Nominal damages Compensatory damage o  Rightful place  the value of deterrence Punitive damages o Damages are awarded by jury Lawyer should be sure to consider damages from day one of the case Remitturer  – federal courts do not allow additur  

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Presumed damages: when plaintiff seeks compensation for an injury that is likely to have occurred but difficult to establish. Rationale based on hard to quantify and broad consensus that actual injury takes place. If liability is proven pl can go to the jury without proof of injury. (defamation, assault and battery)

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Quantification of Damages

Equitable v. Legal Relief 

Memphis v. Stachtura (SCT 1986) Facts: Teacher seeks compensatory and punitive damages for violation of sec 1983 rights (1 st A and 14th A SDP). Suspended with pay but k not renewed. Holding: Damages based on the abstract “value” or “importance” of  constitutional rights are not a permissible element of  compensatory damages in 1983 cases. Analysis: To vague and authorizes arbitrary awards. Malice is req’d for punitive damages. Since 1983 authorizes compensatory damages presumed damages cannot be available here. Mertens v. Hewitt Associates (denies comp damages in Legal v. Equitable ERISA cases since the section of the statute in question Right to jury trial is civil cases is determined by whether  specifically authorizes only equitable relief) relief will be equitable or legal, however there are times when equity cts routinely award money damages (ie breach  Teamsters v. Terry of trust). Labor law case in issue of whether union had breached its Cts have found backpay or frontpay are legal remedies. duty of fair representation to some members. Under Title VII backpay and frontpay are characterized as Hybrid action: part breach of K and breach of fiduciary duty equitable relief under the statute. Ct will allow cong to Ct looked at the nature of the remedy/relief  and found that classify backpay as a legal or equitable remedy.  Teamsters here it was controlling. Backpay and benefits are equivalent v. Terry to comp damages. Therefore, right to jury trial. 

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Tort Damages

Ayers v. J ackson Township (NJ 1987) Facts: Toxic tort contaminated water case Damages for annoyance and inconvenience allowed. Medical surveillance allowed: allows for early care, mitigation and serves deterrence. Emotional distress damages not allowed  barred by NJ Tort statute. Enhanced risk damages not allowed because not reasonably certain or easily quantifiable. Court supervised fund would be preferable but was not raised  below. Special Court Supervised Fund Generally the court will want to create a fund to insure that this money is still there when people need it AND this limits unnecessary expenditure for defendant. Pros: makes sure money is spent on surveillance, some of  liability may be offset by payment from collateral sources Cons: Admin costs, burden on ct May raise problems with atty fees which are usually obtained on contingent basis in this type of case. However, I think a special fund is a common fund. Under  American system atty fees allowed when authorized by specific statute, for bad faith litigation, or common fund  

Measuring Comp Damages and Remittur

Requirements for Tort Damages FRM 1. Foreseeability 2. Reasonable Certainty 3. Mitigation: no damages for harm that could have been mitigated. 4. Collateral Source Rule – D can’t benefit from P’s other  sources of benefit Enhanced Risk Damages Generally the court will deny compensation for an enhanced risk of harm because there is no way of knowing whether this harm will arise. Medical Surveillance Damages Generally the court will allow compensation for medical surveillance because it is an easily quantifiable sum that will have to be spent and it is a cost that arose from harm. Proving Med Surveillance Damages 1. Significance and the extent of exposure to chemicals. 2. Toxicity of chemicals 3. Seriousness of the diseases for which individuals are at risk  4. Relative increase in the change of onset of disease in those exposed 5. The value of early diagnosis 6. That such surveillance to monitor effect of exposure to toxic chemicals is reasonable and necessary.

 Tullis v. Townley (7 Cir. 2001) Tullis injures his back and asks for workers comp; fired; sues for retaliation. Holding: (1) psychological suffering claim for damages can be based soley on plaintiff’s testimony (friends and family testimony is way better  makes the case) (2) his damages were comparable to other cases like his. *Note: In retaliation case you do not have to prevail on underlying claims. Here he does not have to show he injured his back   but rather he was firing for claiming he did. Tullis Three Part Test to Review a Comp Damages award MRC 1. Monstrously excessive 2. Whether there is no rational connection between award and evidence 3. Whether awards is roughly comparable to award in similar cases In comparing awards must account for inflation and adjust award 

McCabe v. Parker (8th Cir. 2010) Protestors at RNC rally. When they refused to leave they were ordered arrested, taken to jail, and subjected to strip search. 1. district court abused its discretion in remitting damages award from $750,000 to $75,000. 2. DCT cannot reduce jury award below maximum amount jury could reasonably find or it would violate 7th A right to trial by  jury.

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Arpin v. US (7th Cir. 2008) Facts: Med mal diversity bench trial granted $7M award granted for loss of consortium Holding: Loss of consortium damages should be a proportional ratio to compensatory damages (suggests 1:5 ratio). Idea is to avoid major disparities btw different pls. Also suggests consideration of avg ratio in other wrongful death cases any facts that may warrant departure from the average. Factors That May Warrant Departure from Average Award in Other Loss of Consortium Cases NCM 1.  Number of children (4 here indicates upward) 2. Closeness of relationship (close here indicates upward) 3. Minor/adults (adults here indicates downward) Note: Typically unmarried cohabitants can make a loss of consortium claim. Growing tort reform development limits pain and suffering damages

Measuring Punitive Damages and Remittur

Walker v. Ritchie (8th Cir.) (established that a gender neutral formula should be used to calculate damages) Note: Contemporary courts will virtually universally employ gender neutral or male statistics for women i.e. 9/11 fund used male earning statistics to compensate men and women Exxon Shipping Co v. Baker (SCT 2008) Facts: Exxon knew that navigator was an alchoholic who had dropped out of AA. He got really drunk and crashed the boat. Total comp damages of $507m and punitives of $500b which is remitted by 9 th Cir to $2.5b. Holding: maritime law allow judge-made remedies when Congress has not authorized them Circuit split remains: 4-4 Ruling on question of whether Exxon can be held vicariously liable here.  No const’l due process question b/c this is maritime common law case Exxon Approaches to Avoiding Outlier Awards (2 quantitative 1 verbal) 1. Verbal approach (jury instructions): analogous to fed sentencing guidelines 2. Maximum cap (quantitative): Congress does not always adequately adjust for inflation 3. Ratio (quantitative) (Employed here) 3:1 ratio is only appropriate for egregious or intentional conduct calculated to increase defendants profit. average in cases where there was no int’l or malicious conduct or bad behavior driven for gain is about 2/3rds of comp damages. However 1:1 ratio is appropriate here. Dissent The ratios are too rigid. This is not a major problem and when it does occur outlier awards are obvious and can be fixed.

Arbino v. J ohnson (OH 2007) (Punitive damages may be limited further if def is a individual or a\ small employer (not more than 100 full time employees or for manf. enterprise 500 full time employees) State Farm v Campbell (SCT 2003) SCT applies Gore factors in reducing $145m punitive damage award to $9m where comp damages are $1m Standard is De novo review Holding: Cannot exceed 9:1 ratio btw punitive and comp damages. Utah cannot punish out of state misconduct (which was mostly lawful when it occurred) Factors for Assessing Punitive Damages RDC 1. the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct PRVRT a. harm caused was physical or economic  b. tortious conduct w/ indifference to or reckless disregard for health or safety of others c. the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability d. the conduct involved repeated action or was an isolated incident e. harm was result of intentional trickery or was a mere accident the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages 2. a. single digit ratio  b. larger comp award lower punitives should be. 3. difference between punitives awarded by the jury and civil/criminal penalties authorized in comparable cases a. loss of license  b. disgorgement c.  possible imprisonment

Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc. (7th Cir. 2003) Facts: Plaintiffs are bitten by bedbugs at Red Roof Inn. Evidence that they knew about the problem and failed to address it. Holding: Proportionality is modified when probability of detection is very low or the misconduct is potentially lucrative. Note: Antitrust cases allow for treble damages but this is designed to give incentive for private attys to bring cases when DOJ lacks resources to pursue it (sometimes also provide for atty fees) Title 7 rule: sex harassment by supervisor is not automatic basis for punitives and employer can put on defense that they have

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taken appropriate steps and made good faith efforts to enforce them as a defense to punitives. ATTORNEY’S FEES Under American system each party typically pays their own MO v. J enkins (SCT 1990) MO atty argued that Ps should only get 20% of requested atty fees because they atty. However, fee-shifting typically allowed for public hadn’t prevailed on getting suburbs into the su it. interest litigation, when authorized by specific statute, for  Lovell used the credibility approach to obtain award in which only 3 of his hours are  bad faith litigation, or common fund c ases cut. Showed voluntary cuts, additional cuts, and disputed cuts on each page Lovell made front page of Wall Street Journal for fees in Jenkins. $4.1 m with post Hensley Partially-Prevailing Plaintiff Test  judgment interest of S800k. Still biggest civil rights fee affirmed by SCT. Lead to 1. If non-prevailing claim was unrelated to prevailing  publication of ct awarded fees book for ABA. claim  no atty fees 2. If non-prevailing claim was related, and prevailing Lessons claim was substantial  atty fees for both Should get interest for delay in payment (prospective) 3. If non-prevailing claim and prevailing claim were Can get pre-judgment interest (interest on the money that you earned before the related, but prevailing claim was NOT substantial (only  judgment) limited success)  fees in relation to the degree of  Can get post-judgment interest (for the interest accruing from the date that you are success entitled to attorney fees – date you win the case – until the time you actually get 4. Full lodestar amount is appropriate in cases that achieve attorney fees) “excellent results” even if no d amages or injunction Post judgment interest can start at two points th obtained. o Fees Entitlement –  When you are entitled to fees. Lovell got 8 Cir. to adopt  

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this standard. SCT denied cert so circuits are still split. Fees Qualification – When all the numbers are set. Can not get fees for experts Probably cannot get risk enhancement award in fed ct for now. Paralegal and law clerk time is compensated. Lovell prevailed on law and economics efficiency argument picking up all votes except Rhenquist. o

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Hensley v. Eckerhart (SCT 1983) (controls partially-prevailing plaintiff cases and establishes Lodestar formula)

 TX v. Garland (SCT 1989) (fees allowed even when pl does not prevail on central issue in case. Check to see if case altered legal relationship btw P and D) Maher v. Gagne (SCT 1980) (Can get attorney fees for a consent decree) Buckhannon Board v. WV (SCT 2001) Facts/Procedure: Nursing home residents sue under ADA to not have house closed down because of state “self - preservation” law. Self -preservation law is changed  before suit ends, so case dismissed. Holding: Catalyst theory does not get your atty fees absent judgment on the merits or  a court-ordered consent decree. No atty fees. Analysis Majority decision based on Black’s Law Dictionary d efinition of “prevailing party”.

Farrar v. Hobby (SCT 1992) (in vast majority cases no fees allowed in cases for  nominal damages. If case was all about comp damages and you only got nominal damages reasonable fee is no fee at all) Sole v. Wyner (SCT 2007) (winning a prelim inj but losing on merits does not merit atty fees) Bernhard (CO SCt 1996) (can’t get atty fees for bad faith insurance action. Exceptions to American Rule are very narrow) Blum v. Stenson (SCT 1984): (1) in complex civil rights litigation prevailing legal aid atty must be paid reasonable market rates in order to encourage attys to take cases that vindicate fed rights (2) also held that public service orgs on case are entitled to recover market rates Riverside v. Rivera (SCT 1986) (fee award can exceed the amount of damages. Rejected direct proportionality btw damages and fees. Never been overruled but in reality some proportionality principles will go into cts analysis)

Lodestar Amount=Reasonable Hours MULTIPLIED by Reasonable Attorneys Fees Both parties submit fee suggestionand judge decides what is a reasonable fee that does not result in windfall. Lodestar formula actual hours worked MINUS billing judgment OR  reasonable number of hours billable MULTIPLIED BY reasonable hourly rate based on expertise/experience. Market rate: current reasonable rate in local jurisdiction for  atty of similar experience handling similar case. Done by affadavits, surveys, bar rates. Exception to market rate: no competent counsel within  jurisdiction or case is too notorious for loc al competent atty. Calculating a Reasonable Fee 1. Some Judges are nitpicky some just cut a percentage. Strategically pl counsel must determine whether to take Lovell credibility approach to fee cuts in Jenkins I or  throw in the kitchen sink. May depend on Judge. 2. In Jenkins I defendants: made coded categories  providing reasons for cuts and applied them to every  page of fees. 3. Show the court each element of the calculation with specificity. 4. Duplicate Billing: Must show why 2(+) ppl are needed. 5. Two parts are interrelated. If you are an expert then it should take less hours to do the things. 6.  Not paid to educate yourself unless it is req uired research. 7. Lawyer should demonstrate and show ct where they have exercised billing judgment to eliminate inefficiencies and duplications. Danger of overreaching: huge court cuts, kill the goose that laid the golden egg  congress reduces availability of atty fees, or get embarrassed in opinion. Pub interest lawyers  probably held to a higher standard. Rule: You can always argue that you as an attorney should  be compensated for interest on money that you earned b ut didn’t collect until later.

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City of Burlington v. Dague (SCT 1992) (ct probably will not embrace risk  enhancement. Seems to be a matter for the leg) Evans v. J eff D. (SCT 1986) (atty fees act does not prevent party from waiving eligibility for atty fees in consent decree)

Block Billing = Bad practice. Good practice to do itemized billing even when not seeking atty fees. Catalyst Theory Buckhannon: idea that you won if you got defendant to change their behavior. Must be a change in the legal relationship.

Blanchard v. Bergeron (SCT 1989) (atty fees are not limited by contingency K) Venegas v. Mitchell (SCT 1990) (Attorney fee is not limited by contingency contract and attorney can only collect on private K w/ pl as well) Gratz v. Bollinger (SCT 2005) Michigan affirmative action in undergraduate schools. Quota system failed EQP analysis b/c it was not narrowly tailored. So Court found Gratz system unconst, but the Ps also did NOT fully prevail, because they didn’t prove that there should b e NO system  just not THAT system. Court finds P prevailing party because public benefitted, but then cuts fees in half. Lovell says under Garland they should have got full fees b/c they prevailed on central claim. Gordy says they should have got nothing b/c uni voluntarily changed policy, neither   pl got admitted, and no judicially enforced j udgement to benefit pl s.

Consent Decrees Generally

TEST: In order to get attorney’s fees for nominal damages you have to show 1. Difference between the judgment recovered and  judgment sought 2. Degree of success: significance of the legal issue on which plaintiff prevailed 3. Public Purpose served. Risk Enhancement: Risk associated with not getting paid unless you prevail at end of litigation. Not allowed in feds. Some states have statutes that permit it. Can argue for it in IA.

INTERPRETATION AND MODIFICATION OF A DECREE Advantages of consent decree Quicker  Lower cost of litigation Def can deny liability and bargain for position instead of being at the mercy of a ct Fairness and Adequacy Hearing: Prior to consent decree approval by court hearing is held where public may be heard. Must make sure that interest of class have been adequately protected and represented by class and counsel.   

Federal courts may not order States or local governments, over their objection, to undertake a course of conduct not tailored to curing a constitutional violation that has been adjudicated. But we have no doubt that, to “save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation,” petitioners could settle the dispute over the proper remedy for the constitutional violat ions that had been found by undertaking to do more than the Constitution itself requires. Rufo.

Standard for Modification of  Consent Decree

Modification of  Consent Decree: Moving Party Plaintiff in Institutional

Evans v. J eff D. (atty fees act does not prevent party from waiving eligibility for atty fees in consent decree) Swift (1932): Cardozo: If the defendant moves to modify an FRCP 60(b)(5) Relieving a Party from a Final Judg ment injunction it will only take place if there is a “clear showing Allows more flexible standard than Swift  of  grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen Modification may be warranted when changed factual conditions” conditions make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous, when the decree proves to be unworkable because of  unforeseen obstacles, or when enforcement of the decree United Shoe (1968): Sup ct holds that “grevious wrong” standard does not apply to Pls. Only applies to modifications without modification would be detrimental to the public interest requested by defendant seeking to avoid responsibilities under the imposed order. Standard for modification of a consent decree differs depending on which party is seeking modification. Swift : Strict standard for defendants not involved in Frew v. Hawkins (SCT 2004): Successors in Office are However, under Rufo change of  institutional reform. bound by decree. executive administration weighs in favor of modificaiton. Shoe: – Lenient standard for plaintiff’s not involved in Successor was not a party to original decree and may have institutional reform. new insights and solutions. Rufo: If defendant in institutional reform case shows unforeseeable but not actually anticipated change in law or fact that called for later modification flexible standard applies. Stotts: Heavy burden for plaintiff in institutional reform case that could foresee the conditions that called for later  modification. General Rule: The scope of a consent decree must be discerned Firefighters Local Union v. Stotts (SCT 1984) Consent decree in firefighter case in which Plaintiff did not within its four corners, not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it or by what might have obtain retroactive seniority provision and black firefighter’s were laid off pursuant to seniority system during budget  been written had the party establi shed his factual claims and crises. Ct did not allow modification since lack of  legal theories in litigation.

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Reform Litig

Modification of  Consent Decree in Institutional Reform Litig

retroactive seniority was part of consideration for consent decree. Key: Title 7 703H allows for bona fide nondiscrim’y seniority system. Modifications cannot violate fed law. BUT SEE . . .

 Teamsters Case (bargaining unit seniority can be challenged under Title 7 when it operates as seniority suicide) Rufo v. Inmates (SCT 1992) Facts/Procedure: Sheriff seeks to modify a prior consent decree to allow for double bunking of male detainees even though consent decree was specifically entered into to  prevent this. Holding: Modification Granted. Swift grievous wrong standard does not apply to institutional reform litig. Anlalysis 1. If modification of one term under FRCP 60(b) defeats the  purpose then modification would be impossible. Dissent: single cell occupancy is not a trivial term  put fundamental purpose of decree 2. New flexible standard. Is this just for institutional reform litig? 3. Change in law showed that double bunking was not unconst’l Dissent (Stevens) 1. It took def 14 years after finding of liability w/ serious const’l violations to start construction. History of noncompliance weighs heavily. 2. A change in law does not work here b/c Bell was in 1979  prior to first modification in 1985 3. Double bunking not just one term but remedial goal of  decree 4. Lacks finality Encourages frequent requests for modifications Makes ppl less likely to enter decrees Unfair to force pl to relitigate after years of  negotiation 5. Stricter standard should apply where modification requests undermine central purpose of a consent decree.   

Relief from an Order/Judgment in Institutional Reform Litig

General Rule: You cannot modify a consent decree when that modification will violate constitution or statute

Rufo Flexible Modification Standard (for institutional reform litigation) 1. Moving party carries burden of establishing change in fact or law warrants modification makes compliance substantially more onerous. White. no unforseeability req however generally should not be granted when movant relies upon events that were actually anticipated at the time of decree unless the party satisfies the heavy burden of  convincing the court that it agreed to the decree in good faith. Must be modified if one or more of the obligations placed upon parties has become impermissible under fed law. If (a) decree puts obligations that are now illegal or (b) law is changed so that what the decree enjoined is now permissible then this is a basis for modification. White. o A decision that merely clarifies the law could constitute a change supporting modification if the  parties had based their agreement on a misunderstanding of the governing law. 2. Proposed modification must be suitably tailored to changed circumstance Modification must not create/perpetuate constitutional violation. Stotts. Modification shouldn’t strive to rewrite consent decree so that it conforms to constitutional floor. Defer to local authorities. Financial constraints are legit concerns but may not be used to justify constitutional violations.  J enkins.  

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White Consent decree banned union shops and then leg was passed that allowed union shops. This was basis for modification. Horne v. Flores (SCT 2009) (reversing and remanding order denying AZ schools relief from judgments) Analysis 1. Rule 60(b)(5) allowing modification if “a significant change either in factual conditions or in law” renders continued enforcement “detrimental to the public interest,” serves a p articularly important function in “institutional reform litigation. 2. Must apply flexible standard in Rufo. DCT failed to consider four changed circumstances may warrant relief. (i) the impact of a new ELL learning program, (ii) the impact of No Child Left Behind, (iii) the impact of structural and managerial changes in its school system, and (iv) the impact of an increased state general education fund. 3. Modification should be granted unless there is an ongoing EEOA violation 4. Although the EEOA requires a State to take “appropriate action,” it entrusts state and local authorities with choosing how to meet this obligation (may not require more funds) 5. Castaneda v. Pickard: guidelines for assessing bilingual program under EEOA a. The bilingual education program must be “based on sound educational theory.” b. The program must be “implemented effectively with resources for personnel, instructional materials, and space.” c. After a trial period, the program must be proven effective in overcoming language barriers/handicaps. 6. The state attorney general’s concern that a “Nogales only” remedy would run afoul of the Arizona Constitution’s equalfunding requirement did not provide a valid basis for a statewide  federal injunction, for it raises a state-law question to be determined by state authorities. Unless the District Court concludes that Arizona is violating the EEOA statewide, it should vacate the injunction insofar as it extends beyond Nogales. Dissent

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Terminating a Case

Legislative Direction to Termination Jurisdiction

The DCT properly considered the changed circumstances and under Castaneda v. Pickard the EEOA standard is “necessary funding.” The prospect of a Nogales only remedy was not raised by either party. RETAINING AND TERMINATING AN INJUNCTION Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60: Court can relive party Rule for Termination of School Deseg Injunction Dowell from final judgment if it is “no longer equitable that the 1. Did the district comply in good faith with desegregation  judgment should have prospective application.” decree 2. Have vestiges of past discrimination been eliminated to the extent practicable. OK v. Dowell (US 1991): Desegregation plan. Judicial termination of injunction. Cannot use Swift doctrine when the decree is for desegregation because the injunction does not live on forever. Lovell says ct declared a false victory.

Freeman v. Pitts (US 1992): In desegregation cases the court can relinquish its judicial supervision over a consent decree in phases releasing parts of district that have been remedies. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1994 : Congress can limit injunctions through statutes. Limits prospective relief available in a  prison reform case. PLRA says that D can move to terminate prison reform injuncti ons every year and this will act ivate automatic stay of injunction. Ct must terminate them unless they find they are 1. Prospective relief is still needed to correct a “current or ongoing” violation of a federal right. 2. The relief extends no further than necessary to correct the violation 3. The relief is narrowly drawn 4. The relief is the least intrusive means of rectifying the violation. Miller v. French (SCT 2000) Def move to terminate injunction under PRLA this activates automatic stay provision of PLRA. Prisoners respond with a motion for TRO/Prelim Injuction to enjoin the automatic stay. Holding: PLRA constitutionally restricts equitable discretion of ct to enjoin automatic stay. Counterarg Automatic stay violates sep of powers b/c it mandates a TRO prior to judicial finding of whether PLRA standards are met Dissent This statute should be construed to avoid const’l issues. Under  Hecht language is not clear enough to restrict equitable discretion.

Wheeling bridge (SCT 1850 ) (where underlying law is changed by congress injunctive relief may become unenforceable) Congress can pass laws which invalidate a court decision when it has to do with prospective relief but not a damages decision for past harm.

CASE NAMES

Biven Con Tort Givings Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of F ed Bureau of  Narcotics (SCT 1971) No Emotional Bush Bush v. L ucas (SCT 1983) Mili-CHAPPEL Bivens Babble Chappel v. Wallace (SCT 1983) No Bivens SSD in Chilicky Schweiker v. Chilicky (SCT 1988) Wilkie Bivens 2 Factory Wilkie v. Robbins (SCT 2007)

Katzberg v. Regents of  University of California (CAL 2002)

ROUNDly Reasoned Democratic Process

Planned Parenthood v. Rounds Gonzaga Uni Disclosure Puny Gonzaga Uni v. Doe (SCT 2002)

Master Builders of I owa v. Fort Madison Prison

KK-CARROL Carroll v. President of Princess Anne (SCT 1968)

LA Coliseumv. NF L (9th Cir

Dataphase Sliding Ways

MOORE Lovell in Action th

1986)

Dataphase v. CL Systems (8

Moore v. City of Des Moines

Cir. 1981)

(S.D.IA 1984)

Governator Case (9th Cir. 2003)

Portland Says its not Vague  Portland Feminist Women’s

Katzberg Bivens Act Words

Get a Winter Fix Winter v. NRDC (SCT 2008)

Health Center (9th Cir. 1988)

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FlexEBAY

Navy Sound WEINBERGalancing allowed

Collate-Rules Walker Lose

Ebay v. Mercexchange (SCT 2006)

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo

(SCT 1967)

Walker v. City of Birmingham

(SCT 1982) MONSANTanordinary Four Monsanto v. Geerston (SCT 2010)

KK-Carroll Bar Exception MORE THAN RIGHTFUL PLACE

Carroll v. President of Princess Anne (SCT 1968)

Mt Healthy Schools Mixed Motive Rules

Women Prisoners v. DC

PriOVIDENCE Restraint but Appeals are Great

Mt Healthy School Dist Bd of  Ed v. Doyle (SCT 1977)

More than Rightful ProphylHUTTO Hutto v. F inney (SCT 1978)

In re ProvidenceJ ournal Co

After Acquired McKevidence

Mckennon v. Nashville Banner Pub Co. (SCT 1995)

Enjoining nonfeasant po pos no GOODE in RIZZO Rizzo v. Goode (SCT 1976)

Greendom of Choice Green v. School Bd. (SCT 1968)

Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd of Ed (SCT 1971) IntraMILLIKEN

Hague v. C.I .O.

Milliken v. Bradley I (SCT

MARKSin of Victory Marks v. Stinson (3d Cir. 1994)

1974)

More than Rightful MCCARTHEYlection McCarthey v. Briscoe (5th Cir. 1977) Lovell was born AIKEN for prison reform Aikens v. Lash (***Lovell Case***) Grievous LossORRISEY Morrissey v. Brewer (IA SCT 1972) ProGAGNON Liberty Gagnon v. Scarpelli (SCT 1973) Staso Less than Lasso

Smith v. Staso Milling (2d Cir. 1927)

3 Part JENKilliken MO v. J enkins III (SCT 1995) No Threat Unclear Hecht Hecht Co. v. Bowles (SCT 1944) EchoStar Damn Clear Law But seeCBS v. EchoStar (11th Cir. 2001) 5 KELO mandates C-Notes

Young Strippers Ex Parte Young (1908) Castle Rock Immuni-Rock  Castle Rock v. Gonzales (SCT 2005) The Edelman Divide Edelman v. J ordan (SCT 1974) Title 7 Fitzpatrick ImmuniVanish Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer (SCT 1974) Hutto Pays Attorney Wage Hutto v. F inney (SCT 2004) No Money for Nominal Hobby Farrar v. Hobby (SCT 1992) Consent DeFREW State must Lose Frewv. Hawkins (SCT 2004)

Kelo v. City of New London Civil Coerce-HICKS Support Hicks v. Feiock (SCT 1988) Complex Bagwell Criminal as well UMW v. Bagwell (SCT 1994) Contempt Appeals to Merrimack 

Merrimack v. City of Clay Center (SCT 1911)

PractiBROWNities of  Enforcement Brown v. Bd of Ed (Brown II SCT 1955)

Appeal to Trickin’ Contempt in Griffin

Damn Clear HILL

CollaterOBBLEDICK  Exception Cobbledick v. US (SCT 1940)

 TVA v. Hill (SCT 1978)

VA Immunity No Way VA v. WVA (SCT 1918)

InterSWANN

Enjoin-a-Hauge Misfeasant Ways

The Racist BELLection Bell v. Southwell (5th Cir. 1967)

st

(1 Cir. 1987)

Griffin v. County School Bd of  Prince Edward County

PostpoWELCH Welch v. Likins (8th Cir. 1977) In-JENK-tion of the Statute MO v. J enkins II (1990) Van Hoffman Contracts Clausin Spallone-Yonkers Contempt is Bonkers Spallone v. US (SCT 1990) No Vague ConSTACHTURA Damages Memphis v. Stachtura (SCT 1986) ERISA Hurtin Mertens

Mertens v. Hewitt Associates

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Look at the Nature of the RemeTERRY

 Teamsters v. Terry Medical SurvAYERS

Ayers v. J ackson Township (NJ 1987) Three Part Tullis Award

 Tullis v. Townley (7th Cir. 2001)

Fees When you lose the Centra-GARLAND Issue  TX v. Garland (SCT 1989)

Ill Take the K Please and VENE-fees Venegas v. Mitchell (SCT 1990)

Fees for Consent GAGNEcrees Maher v. Gagne (SCT 1980)

Gratz Fee Logic Solomonic Gratz v. Bollinger (SCT 2005)

Catalyst Slammin in Buckhannon

Grievous Swift Swift (1932)

Buckhannon Board v. WV Reasonable MCAB-onsetary Reductions McCabe v. Parker (8th Cir. 2010)

(SCT 2001)

Loss of ConsARPIN Ratio Arpin v. US (7th Cir. 2008)

Prelim SOLE-y gets you No Fee Sole v. Wyner (SCT 2007)

GendeRITCHIE Neutral Walker v. Ritchie (8th Cir.)

No Money for Nominal Hobby Farrar v. Hobby (SCT 1992)

Bernhard Faith Insurance Bernhard (CO SCt 1996)

Exxon Puni-SHIPPING

Exxon Shipping Co v. Baker (SCT 2008) Arbino Biz Small Punitives Arbino v. J ohnson (OH 2007) State Puni-FARM Factors State Farm v Campbell (SCT 2003)

Market Funds for EveryBLUM Blum v. Stenson (SCT 1984) Fees Can Outsize Damages on the Riverside Riversidev. Rivera (SCT 1986) No Risk EnDAGUE-ment

City of Burlington v. Dague Punitive Pr-ACCOR-tionality Modification

(SCT 1992)

Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc. (7th Cir. 2003)

Consent Jeff D can Waive the Fee Evans v. J eff D. (SCT 1986)

Partia-HENSLEY Prevailing Hensley v. Eckerhart (SCT 1983)

K doesn’t limit the BLANCHaward Blanchard v. Bergeron (SCT 1989)

Ps Don’t Use Grievous SHOEs United Shoe (1968) Successors Too Consent DeFREW Frewv. Hawkins (SCT 2004) Stotts Modification Stops

Firefighters Local Union v. Stotts (SCT 1984) Institution-O Flexi-BO ModifiRUFO Rufo v. Inmates (SCT 1992) HORNE-y for Relief from Reformy Horne v. Flores (SCT 2009) Dowell Seg Swift is Dead OK v. Dowell (US 1991) Free-men in Phases Freeman v. Pitts (US 1992) French Pris-Miller Says TRO Stays Miller v. French (SCT 2000) Change in UnderWHEELING law Wheeling bridge (SCT 1850 )

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