UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS COLLEGE OF LAW BAGUIO CITY QUESTIONS & ANSWERS IN REMEDIAL LAW JULY 16, 2014 By: REYNALDO U. AGRANZAMENDEZ Dean, College of Law UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS Baguio City
CIVIL PROCEDURE 1. Spouses Manuel and Lolita signed a promissory note binding themselves to pay solidarily to Boston the sum of P1,400,000. As the debt already became due, Boston filed against Manuel and Lolita a complaint for collection. In her amended answer, Lolita alleged that Manuel had already died two years before the filing of the complaint. On Boston’s motion, Lolita submitted the names of the heirs of Manuel. Whereupon, Boston moved for substitution, praying that Manuel be substituted by his heirs. The court granted the substitution. Later, Lolita filed a motion to dismiss, alleging among other grounds, that the estate of Manuel should be impleaded as an indispensable party. She also alleged that plaintiff’s claim should be presented as a money claim in the probate proceedings of the estate of Manuel. Questions: a) Is the court correct in ordering the substitution of Manuel by his heirs? b) Is the estate of Manuel an indispensable party? c) What is the remedy of Boston as creditor – to file a claim against estate of Manuel (the deceased spouse) or to file an action for collection against Lolita (the surviving spouse)?
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In Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and Lolita G. Toledo, G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013, the Supreme Court held that: a) The court is not correct in ordering the substitution of Manuel by his heirs. Substitution is proper only if the party to be substituted died during the pendency of the case as expressly provided for in Sec. 16, Rule 3. The Supreme Court said that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel since there was no valid service of summons upon him, precisely because he was already dead even before the complaint against him and his wife was filed in the trial court. b) The estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to the collection case because the obligation of Manuel and his wife is solidary. Art. 1216 of the Civil Code provides: “The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. …” Boston may therefore collect the entire amount of the obligation from Lolita only. In other words, the collection case can proceed against Lolita. c) Being a creditor in a solidary obligation, Boston has the option whether to file or not to file a claim against the estate of Manuel. This is so because Art. 1216 of the Civil Code gives to the creditor the right to proceed against one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. In case of death of one of the solidary debtors, the creditor may, if he chooses, proceed against the surviving solidary debtor without necessity of filing a claim in the estate of the deceased solidary debtor. 2. Plaintiff filed an action for cancellation of defendant’s certificate of title over a real property. The complaint alleges that defendant was issued a certificate of title on the basis of a deed of sale bearing the forged signature of the plaintiff. Is this a real action? Yes, this is a real action. As held in Padlan v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013, if plaintiff’s ultimate objective is to obtain title to real property, the action is a real action although plaintiff is demanding the cancellation of defendant’s certificate of title. An action involving title to real property is a real action. “Involving title to real property” means that the plaintiff’s cause of action is based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has the legal rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, and
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disposition of the real property. “Title” is the legal link between the owner and the property. On the other hand, “certificate of title” is the document of ownership under the Torrens system of registration issued by the government through the Register of Deeds. While title is the claim, right, or interest in real property, a certificate of title is the evidence of such claim. In the problem presented, the issue of who between plaintiff and defendant has the valid title to the subject real property must first be determined before a determination of who between them is legally entitled to the certificate of title covering the real property involved. 3. There is a judgment against X. The judgment became final, and a writ of execution was issued. The sheriff levied on X’s house. The house was later sold to Y in an execution sale. X’s certificate of title was cancelled and a new one was issued to Y, the purchaser of the house at the execution sale. Four years later, X filed an action for the cancellation of Y’s certificate of title. In his complaint against Y, X alleged that the house is a family home and therefore exempt from execution. May the action prosper? No, the action may not prosper. Although the house is a family home and therefore exempt from execution, X should have claimed the exemption from execution before its sale on execution. The right to exemption is a personal privilege granted to the judgment obligor, and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff but by the judgment obligor. It is not sufficient that the judgment obligor claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. He must set up his claim and prove to the sheriff the exemption of the subject property before its sale on execution. (Oliva-de Mesa v. Acero et al., G.R. No. 185064, Jan. 16, 2012) 4. X filed with the regional trial court a complaint for collection of a sum of money. In his complaint, he prayed that Y be ordered to pay the principal obligation with interest thereon at 12% per annum. For failing to file his answer despite being granted an extension, Y was declared in default on motion of X. The trial court rendered judgment ordering defendant Y to pay the principal obligation with interest thereon at – surprisingly – 5% monthly interest (or 60% interest per annum). Defendant’s counsel received a copy of the judgment, but allowed it to become final without even questioning the award of 5% monthly interest. Y filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the petition. X now claims that the Court of
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Appeals erred in granting the petition, arguing that the only grounds for annulment of judgment under Sec. 2, Rule 47 are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Is X correct? No, X is not correct. In Diona v. Balangue et al., G.R. No. 173559, Jan. 7, 2013, the Supreme Court held that while under Sec. 2, Rule 47 annulment of judgment may be based only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. Here, the award of 5% monthly interest violated Y’s right to due process; hence, it may be set aside in a petition for annulment of judgment filed under Rule 47. In Diona, the Supreme Court also ruled that amendment to conform to the evidence is not feasible when the defendant is declared in default because Sec. 3(d), Rule 9 limits the relief that may be granted by the courts to what has been prayed for in the complaint. Sec. 3(d), Rule 9 states that a judgment rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for. Also in Diona, defendant’s counsel was found to have been grossly negligent in handling the case. He filed a motion for extension of time to file answer, yet he allowed the extension to pass without filing an answer. He did not question the award of 5% monthly interest, although a simple reading of the dispositive portion of the decision readily shows that the court awarded exorbitant rate of interest. He allowed the decision to become final by not filing an appeal. Ordinarily, the Supreme Court said, the mistake, negligence or lack of competence of counsel binds his client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of hi general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. A recognized exception to the rule is when the lawyers were grossly negligent in their duty to maintain their client’s cause and such amounted to a deprivation of their client’s property without due process of law. In such a situation, the client does not lose the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or annulment of judgment. 5. The appellant files his notice of appeal within the time for perfecting an appeal, but the trial court issues an order denying the notice of appeal. May appellant still question the order after 15 days from his receipt of a copy thereof?
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No more. While the denial of appellant’s notice of appeal is erroneous, the order denying it has already attained finality after fifteen days from his receipt of the order. Such order cannot anymore be amended or modified. As the Supreme Court has said: “The doctrine of finality of judgment dictates that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments or orders must become final at some point in time.” (Bihag et al. v. Heirs of Nicasio Bathan, G.R. No. 181949, April 23, 2014) 6. Is a writ of execution that does not conform to the dispositive portion of the decision valid? No. An order of execution (and a writ of execution) that varies the tenor of the judgment, or for that matter, exceeds the terms thereof is void. (Golez v. Navarro, G.R. No. 192532, Jan. 30, 2013) 7. In execution pending appeal, the court must state in a special order the good reason for execution pending appeal. If the court’s special order does not state the good reason for execution pending appeal, is the execution pending appeal valid? No. In Carpio v. CA et al., G.R. No. 183102, Feb. 27, 2013, the Supreme Court teaches that the statement of a good reason in a special order is strictly required by the Rules of Court, because execution before a judgment has become final and executory is the exception rather than the rule. If the writ of execution is void, all actions and proceedings conducted pursuant to it are also void. 8. May an appeal be taken from an order denying a motion for reconsideration? Mendiola v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 159746, July 18, 2012, teaches: An order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order dismissing a complaint is a final order, not an interlocutory order, as it puts an end to the particular matter resolved (which is the dismissal of the complaint), or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, and nothing is left for the trial court to do other than to execute the order. Hence, an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order dismissing a complaint is appealable. But an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is not appealable.
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9. Whose duty is it to have the case set for pretrial? If the case has not been set for pretrial for a long period of time, may the case be dismissed for failure to prosecute? Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that it is the duty of the plaintiff, after the last pleading has been served and filed, to promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pretrial. A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, which took effect on August 16, 2004, provides, however, that: “Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Branch Clerk of Court shall issue a notice of pretrial.” In Eloisa Merchandising, Inc. et al. v. Banco de Oro Universal Bank et al., G.R. No. 192716, June 13, 2012, the Supreme Court said: “While under the present Rules, it is now the duty of the clerk of court to set the case for pre-trial if the plaintiff fails to do so within the prescribed period, this does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case diligently.” (RUA is of the opinion that where the clerk of court fails to set the case for pretrial, and the plaintiff likewise fails, within a reasonable time, to move that his case be set for pretrial, the court may dismiss the case for failure to prosecute.) 10. May an amendment substantially alter the cause of action or defense? Yes. Whether made as a matter of right or with leave of court, an amendment may now substantially alter the cause of action or defense as stated in Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. (Lisam Enterprises, Inc. et al. v. Banco de Oro Unibank et al., G.R. No. 143264, April 23, 2012) In Lisam Enterprises, Inc., the Supreme Court explained: “The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment was made before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.”
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11. May an action for quieting of title (which is a special civil action governed by Rule 63) and for declaration of nullity of title (which is an ordinary civil action) be dismissed on ground of improper joinder of causes of action? No. While Section 5, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules, Section 6 of the same Rule provides that misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately. (Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Fernando, Pampanga v. Soriano et al., G.R. No. 153829, Aug. 17, 2011) In Ada, et al. v. Baylon, G.R. No. 182435, Aug. 13, 2012, the Supreme Court said that a cause of action for partition and a cause of action for rescission cannot be joined in a single complaint because partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69, while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action. But if these two causes of action are joined in one complaint, and the misjoined cause of action is not severed, the court may render judgment on all these causes of action. The aforecited case of Ada, et al. v. Baylon has reiterated the rule that misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. The Supreme Court went on to explain that courts have the power, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or sua sponte, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action to be proceeded with separately. However, if there is no objection to the improper joinder or the court did not motu proprio direct a severance, then there exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication of all the erroneously joined causes of action. The High Tribunal, however, emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying the case has jurisdiction over all the causes of action therein notwithstanding the misjoinder of the same. If the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of action, then such misjoined cause of action has to be severed from the other causes of action, and if not so severed, any adjudication rendered by the court with respect to the same would be a nullity. 12. The complaint for the recovery of possession of real property did not allege the assessed value thereof. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction, but the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Is the trial court correct in denying the motion to dismiss?
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No, the trial court is not correct. A complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. Where the plaintiff fails to allege in his complaint the assessed value of the subject property, the trial court seriously errs in denying a motion to dismiss. (Quinagoran v. CA, G.R. No. 155179, Aug. 24, 2007) 13. If a complaint involving an intracorporate controversy is filed with the regional trial court (which has not been designated as a special commercial court), may it transfer the case to the regional trial court designated as a special commercial court? No. In Calleja, et al. v. Panday, et al., G.R. No. 168696, Feb. 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 680, the RTC Branch 58, San Jose, Camarines Norte, upon noticing that it did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, issued an Order transferring the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The issue brought to the Supreme Court was: WHETHER A BRANCH OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH HAS NO JURISDICTION TO TRY AND DECIDE A CASE HAS AUTHORITY TO REMAND THE SAME TO ANOTHER CO-EQUAL COURT IN ORDER TO CURE THE DEFECTS ON VENUE AND JURISDICTION. The Supreme Court resolved the issue in this wise: “Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over respondents’ petition for quo warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one involving an intra-corporate dispute. The trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the aforementioned administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC. Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. In HLC Construction and Development Corp. v. Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners’ Association, the Court held that the trial court, having no jurisdiction
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over the subject matter of the complaint, should dismiss the same so the issues therein could be expeditiously heard and resolved by the tribunal which was clothed with jurisdiction.” The same issue was presented to the Supreme Court in Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-II Builders, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 192649, March 9, 2011, 645 SCRA 219. The Supreme Court summarized the proceedings had in the court below, as follows: “The record shows that R-II Builders’ original complaint dated 23 August 2005 was initially docketed as Civil Case No. 05-113407 before Branch 24 of the Manila, a designated Special Commercial Court. With HGC’s filing of a motion for a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses asserted in its answer and R-II Builders’ filing of its Amended and Supplemental Complaint dated 31 July 2007, said court issued an order dated 2 January 2008 ordering the re-raffle of the case upon the finding that the same is not an intracorporate dispute. Relying on its ruling in Calleja, the Supreme Court resolved the issue in these words: “We find that, having squarely raised the matter in its Rule 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 111153, HGC correctly faults the CA for not finding that Branch 24 of the Manila RTC had no authority to order the transfer of the case to respondent RTC. Being outside the jurisdiction of Special Commercial Courts, the rule is settled that cases which are civil in nature, like the one commenced by R-II Builders, should be threshed out in a regular court. With its acknowledged lack of jurisdiction over the case, Branch 24 of the Manila RTC should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint, since a court without subject matter jurisdiction cannot transfer the case to another court. Instead, it should have simply ordered the dismissal of the complaint, considering that the affirmative defenses for which HGC sought hearing included its lack of jurisdiction over the case. Calleja v. Panday, while on facts the other way around, i.e., a branch of the RTC exercising jurisdiction over a subject matter within the Special Commercial Court’s authority, dealt squarely with the issue:
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Whether a branch of the Regional Trial Court which has no jurisdiction to try and decide a case has authority to remand the same to another co-equal Court in order to cure the defects on venue and jurisdiction. Calleja ruled on the issue, thus: Such being the case, RTC Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.” 14. On what date is an amended complaint deemed filed? The rule expressed in Sec. 5, Rule 1 is that a civil action is commenced by the filing of the original complaint in court. But as held in Dionisio v. Linsangan, G.R. No. 178159, March 2, 2011, an amended complaint that changes the plaintiff’s cause of action is technically a new complaint. Consequently, the action is deemed filed on the date of the filing of such amended complaint, not on the date of the filing of the original complaint. Thus, the statute of limitation resumes its run until it is arrested by the filing of the amended complaint. However, an amendment which does not alter the cause of action but merely supplements or amplifies the facts previously alleged, does not affect the reckoning date of filing based on the original complaint. The cause of action, unchanged, is not barred by the statute of limitations that expired after the filing of the original complaint. 15. In dela Cruz v. Andres, G.R. No. 161864, April 27, 2007, the Supreme Court explained that a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy. It may be availed of only after a judgment, final order, or other proceeding was taken against petitioner in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Is petition for relief from judgment available as a remedy in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court? No. A petition for relief from judgment is not available as a remedy in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court. Although Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party in any court may file a petition for relief from judgment, Rule
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56, which enumerates the cases originally cognizable by the Supreme Court, does not include it. The phrase “any court” in Rule 38 refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court. There is no provision in the Rules of Court making the petition for relief applicable in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court. (Pucson Jr. v. MRM Philippines, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 182718, Sept. 26, 2008). 16. It was held in Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte. Ltd. V. Dakila Trading Corp., G.R. No. 172242, Aug. 14, 2007 that extraterritorial service of summons upon a non-resident defendant who is not in the Philippines applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem, but not if an action is in personam. What about if the defendant is a resident defendant but his whereabouts are unknown, may summons be served upon him by publication where the action is in personam, as when the complaint is one for collection of a sum of money? Yes. Section 14, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: “In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may order.” The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable. The present rule, however, states that it applies in any action, and the phrase “in any action” means just that – any action, whether in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. (Santos Jr. v. PNOC Exploration Corp., G.R. No. 170943, Sept. 23, 2008) 17. What are the requisites for valid substitution of public officer who has sued or has been sued in his official capacity? What is the effect of failure to make the substitution? Requisites for valid substitution of public officer who has sued or has been sued in his official capacity are: (1) satisfactory proof by any party that there is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining the action; (2) the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the acts of his predecessor;
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(3) the substitution must be effected within 30 days after the successor assumes office or within the time granted by the court; and, (4) reasonable notice of the application for the substitution shall be given to the other party or officer affected and accorded an opportunity to be heard. Failure to make the substitution pursuant to Sec. 17, Rule 3 is a ground for the dismissal of the action. (Rodriguez, et al. v. Jardin, G.R. No. 141834, July 30, 2007) 18. May a party file a petition for habeas corpus despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari that questions the validity of the order granting bail, which order is precisely the very basis of the petition for habeas corpus? No. Where a party files a petition for habeas corpus despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari that questions the validity of the order granting bail, which order is precisely the very basis of the petition for habeas corpus, he is guilty of forum shopping. (Pulido v. Abu, G.R. No. 170924, July 4, 2007) 19. Mistakes of attorneys generally bind their clients. Errors of the defense counsel in the conduct of the trial is neither an error of law nor an irregularity upon which a motion for new trial may be presented. Are there exceptions? Yes, and these exceptions are the following: (1) the counsel’s mistake is so great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his day in court, or (2) the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the client’s deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. In these two instances, the client is not bound by his counsel’s mistakes, and a new trial may be conducted. (CenizaManantan v. People, G.R. No. 156248, Aug. 22, 2007) 20. A complaint asserting a common cause of action was filed against several defendants. Some of these defendants filed an answer, but the others did not. On motion of the plaintiff, the defendants who did not file an answer were declared in default. Is it correct for the trial court to first hear the case ex parte as against the defaulted defendants and render a default judgment against them,
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then proceed to hear the case as to the non-defaulted defendants? No. In the problem presented, the trial court shall try the case against all the defendants upon the answer thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented. It is not within the authority of the trial court to divide the case by first hearing it ex parte as against the defaulted defendants and rendering a judgment by default against them, then proceed to hear the case as to the non-defaulted defendants. (Heirs of Mamerto Manguiat, et al. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 150768, Aug. 20, 2008, and its companion case) 21. State the modes of service of summons upon foreign juridical entity (like a foreign corporation). The Supreme Court has adopted the use of electronic means to serve summons on foreign juridical entities who are being sued in the Philippines but has no resident agent or not registered to do business in the country. Thus, as amendment to Section 12, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, A.M. No. 11-3-6 New Rule on Service of Summons on Foreign Juridical Entities provides: “SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. — When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines. If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in the Philippines or has no resident agent, service may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines through any of the following means: a) By personal service coursed through the appropriate court in the foreign country with the assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs; b) By publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the country where the defendant may be found and by serving a copy of the summons and the court order by-registered mail at the last known address of the defendant; c) By facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could generate proof of service; or d) By such other means as the court may in its discretion direct.”
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As a result of such amendment, summons can now be served on the foreign private juridical entity through the afore-quoted means, provided leave of court is first obtained. Although the Supreme Court did not specify the other forms of electronic means, it is submitted that the use of e-mail is sufficient as long as it can be proven in court that the defendant has received the summon. 22. If the last day for filing of a pleading (or motion) falls on a Saturday, when may the pleading (or motion) be filed? In Leynes v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 154462, Jan. 19, 2011, the tenday period for Spouses Leynes (defendants in the case for forcible entry before the MTC) to file their Answer expired on May 20, 2000 (a Saturday). They filed their answer on May 22, 2000. The MTC declared Spouses Leynes in default and rendered its Judgment on May 29, 2000, because, according to the MTC, they had only up to May 20, 2000 to file their Answer, and although May 20, 2000 was a Saturday, the court was open and court personnel were present at that time to receive cases and motions filed with the court. Held: The MTC should not have rendered an ex-parte judgment against them. Section 1, Rule 22 states: “In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.” Thus, Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are excluded from the counting of the period only when the last day of the period falls on such days. SC Adm. Circular No. 2-99, which took effect on February 1, 1999, requires certain trial court judges and employees to be present on Saturdays “primarily to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters.” An answer cannot be considered as among such urgent matters. 23. What are the sanctions that the court may impose upon a party who fails to attend the mediation proceedings notwithstanding due notice to him? In Linda M. Chan Kent v. Spouses Alvaro E. Micarez and Paz Micarez, et al., G.R. No. 185758, March 9, 2011, the RTC dismissed the civil case because of the failure of plaintiff’s duly authorized representative and her counsel to attend the mediation proceedings. The Supreme Court, however, found the dismissal too severe a
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sanction because the records of the case is devoid of evidence of willful or flagrant disregard of the rules on mediation proceedings. A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA dated Oct. 16, 2001 (Second Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Mediation Proceedings) regards mediation as part of pretrial, and the parties must personally attend the proceedings. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only when the representative, who appears in his behalf, is duly authorized to enter into amicable settlement or to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution. The sanctions that the court may impose upon a party who fails to attend the proceedings are censure, reprimand, contempt, and even dismissal of the action in relation to Sec. 5, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. Unless the conduct of the party is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as to justify dismissal of the action, the court should consider lesser sanctions. 24. May pretrial be conducted although no notices of pretrial were sent to the parties? No. In PNB v. Perez, G.R. No. 187640, June 15, 2011, it was held that the absence of notice of pretrial renders the pretrial, if one is held, void, and all the subsequent proceedings, including the judgment, are also void. The absence of notice of pretrial constitutes a violation of a person’s constitutional right to due process. (RUA: A notice of pretrial should notify the parties of the date, time, and place of the pretrial and should require the parties to file their respective pretrial briefs and served copies thereof on the adverse party in such a manner as shall ensure receipt thereof at least three days before the date of the pretrial. A notice that does not state the date, time, and place of pretrial and does not require the submission of pretrial briefs as stated above is not a valid notice of pretrial.) 25. If a party, whether the defendant or plaintiff, fails to seasonably file his pretrial brief, may the court nonetheless conduct pretrial? No. Rule 18 mandatorily requires the parties to seasonably file their pretrial briefs. Plaintiff’s failure to do so shall be cause for the dismissal of the action. On the other hand, defendant’s failure to do so shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment based thereon. The court cannot hold pretrial without the parties filing their pretrial briefs. (Vera v. Rigor, et al., G.R. No. 147377, Aug. 10, 2007)
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26. Is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 the proper remedy to nullify an executive order issued by the Office of the President? No. In Galicto v. Pres. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino et al., G.R. No. 193978, Feb. 28, 2012, it was held that a petition for certiorari and prohibition is available as a remedy to question judicial and quasi-judicial acts. Since the issuance of an executive order is not judicial or quasi-judicial, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy. The correct remedy to assail the validity of an executive order is a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, to be filed with the Regional Trial Court. Also, in Yusay v. CA, G.R. No. 156684, April 6, 2011, it was held that certiorari will not lie against the Sangguniang Panglunsod because it is not part of the judiciary settling an actual controversy involving legally demandable and enforceable rights when it adopted Resolution No. 552, but a legislative and policy-making body. 27. What are the modes of appeal? The modes of appeal are specified in: a) Rule 40 (ordinary appeal from MTC to RTC); b) Rule 41 (ordinary appeal from RTC to CA); c) Rule 42 (petition for review from RTC to CA); d) Rule 43 (petition for review from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA); e) Rule 45 (petition for review on certiorari from CA, Sandiganbayan, CTA, or RTC to the SC). As explained in Latorre v. Latorre, G.R. No. 183926, March 29, 2010, the first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, provided in Rule 45, is filed with the Supreme Court only on questions of law Further explained:
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In appeal from RTC to CA governed by Rule 41, the questions that may be raised are questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. In appeal from RTC to CA under Rule 42, the questions that may be raised are questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. In appeal from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA under Rule 43, the questions to be raised are questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. In appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 45, the questions that may be raised are pure questions of law only, subject to some exceptions. Take note, however, that in writ of kalikasan cases, habeas data cases, amparo cases, appeal to the Supreme Court is by petition for review on certiorari where the petitioner may raise questions of law, questions of fact, or mixed questions of fact and law. But in Land Bank of the Philippines v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 190660, April 11, 2011, it was held that decisions and final orders of RTCs sitting as special agrarian courts are appealable to the Court of Appeals by petition for review under Rule 42, not through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. Under Sec. 60. R.A. No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law), special agrarian courts, which are regional trial courts designated by the SC as special agrarian courts, have original and exclusive jurisdiction over: (a) all petitions for determination of just compensation to landowners; and (b) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657. And, under A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC, all decisions and final orders of RTC acting as special commercial courts in corporate rehabilitation and intra-corporate controversies under R.A. No. 8799 are appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under Rule 43. (BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Pryce Gases, Inc. et al., G.R. No. 188365, June 29, 2011) 28. Suppose the appellant appeals from the judgment of the RTC to the CA under Rule 41 by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC, but his appeal raises pure questions of law, may the CA take cognizance of the appeal? No. In Heirs Of Nicolas S. Cabigas, etc. v. Limbaco, et al., G.R. No. 175291, July 27, 2011, it was held that where a litigant files an ordinary appeal with the CA that raises only questions of law, Section
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2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court expressly mandates that the CA should dismiss the appeal outright as the appeal is not reviewable by that court. When there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn from these facts is correct is a question of law. When the petitioners assailed the summary judgment, they were in fact questioning the conclusions drawn by the RTC from the undisputed facts, and raising a question of law. In Cabigas, University of Cebu Banilad (UCB), AWG, Petrosa, the defendants in the case below, filed a motion for summary judgment, admitting as true the allegations in the complaint, but claiming that the plaintiffs had no legal right to the property in question. The RTC Cebu City granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs appealed to the CA by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC. UCB et al. filed a motion to dismiss appeal, claiming that plaintiffs raised only questions of law in their appeal; thus, they should have filed an appeal by certiorari with the SC, and not an ordinary appeal with the CA. The CA dismissed the appeal, ruling that plaintiffs (now petitioners) should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The SC affirmed the CA’s ruling. St. Mary of the Woods School, Inc. et al. v. Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City et al., G.R. No.s 174290, 176116, Jan. 20, 2009 teaches that in a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, there cannot be any question of fact or “doubt or difference as to the truth of falsehood of facts” simply because there are no findings of fact in the first place. What the trial court merely does is to apply the law to the facts as alleged in the complaint, assuming such allegations to be true. If follows then that any appeal therefrom could only raise questions of law or “doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts.” Therefore, a decision dismissing a complaint based on failure to state a cause of action necessarily precludes a review of the same decision on questions of fact. One is the legal and logical opposite of the other. Thus, if from the judgment or final order of the Regional Trial Court, the appellant raises only questions of law, the appeal should be a direct appeal to the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari. (Sps. Dadizon v. CA, et al. G.R. No. 159116, Sept. 30, 2009). 29. If an appeal is taken to the wrong court, may this erroneous appeal be transferred to the correct appellate court? No. Section 2, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: “An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not
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be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.” There is no longer any justification for allowing transfer of erroneous appeals from one court to the other, much less for tolerating continued ignorance of the law on appeals. (Sps. Dadizon v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 159116, Sept. 30, 2009). Where the accused is a public officer occupying a position lower than Salary Grade 27, and he commits an offense in relation to his office, jurisdiction over the offense shall be vested in the RTC or MTC pursuant to their respective jurisdictions. In Quileste v. People, G.R. No. 180334, Feb. 18, 2009, the accused was a low-ranking government employee who was charged with malversation. After he was convicted by the RTC, he appealed to the CA. HELD: Accused filed his appeal in the wrong court. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions, or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction. In Balaba v. People, G.R. No. 169519, July 17, 2009, the accused, a low-ranking government employee, was also charged with malversation. He was convicted by the RTC. In his notice of appeal, he specified the CA as the court to which he was taking his appeal. The Supreme Court reiterated its pronouncement in Melencion v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 150684, June 12, 2008 that an “error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to the appeal. However, the correction in designating the proper appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal.” If the correction is not made within the said 15-day period, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure will apply. It states: “An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.” In Estarija v. People, et al., G.R. No. 173990, Oct. 27, 2009, the accused, a public officer occupying a position lower than Salary Grade 27, was charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. He was convicted by the RTC and was meted a straight penalty of seven years. The CA, to which Estarija brought his appeal, affirmed the judgment of the RTC but modified the sentence to six years and one month to nine years of imprisonment. HELD: The CA erred in entertaining the appeal. Although the penalty imposed by the RTC is erroneous as it did not apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the decision of the RTC has long become final and cannot be modified anymore. Take note, however, of the case of Filomena Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 188630, Feb. 23, 2011. Filomena was the assistant
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regional director of the Cooperative Development Authority, a position lower than Salary Grade 27. She was charged before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court with violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). The trial court found her guilty and imposed upon her the penalty of five years of imprisonment and disqualification to hold office. She appealed to the RTC which affirmed the MCTC decision. She then filed a petition for review before the CA, but the CA dismissed the petition on the ground that it is the Sandiganbayan that has exclusive jurisdiction over the petition. She filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC. The SC ruled: There is no question that Filomena took the wrong procedure. She should have appealed the RTC decision to the Sandiganbayan. Under R.A. 8249, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction. While the SC said that the CA was correct in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, yet because of the peculiar circumstances of the case, Filomena should be given a chance to bring her case to the Sandiganbayan. (These peculiar circumstances were: (a) the administrative case against Filomena was eventually decided by the CA in her favor; (b) Filomena was shown to have paid the loan which became the subject of the criminal case; (c) there was no sufficient showing that Filomena exerted undue influence in obtaining the loan; (d) the civil case against Filomena’s husband, which was intertwined with the criminal case filed against her, was decided in favor of her husband. Thus, the SC resolved to suspend the rules to give Filomena a chance to seek relief from the Sandiganbayan by filing a petition for review within ten days from receipt of the SC’s decision. The SC, however, said that it does not countenance the inexcusable negligence committed by Filomena’s former counsel. 30. What is the remedy against an order dismissing a complaint in a civil action? Appeal is the remedy against an order dismissing a complaint in a civil action. As held in Heirs of Teofilo and Eliza Reterta v. Mores et al., G.R. No. 159941, Aug. 17, 2011: “For one, the order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was the order granting the respondents' motion to dismiss, not the denial of the motion for reconsideration. The fact that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final order for thereby completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial court to do in the action, truly called for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy.” But in Palma v. Galvez, et al., G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010, it was held that where there are several defendants, one of
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whom files a motion to dismiss which was granted by the court, plaintiff’s remedy against such order of dismissal is certiorari under Rule 65 because, as stated in Section 1(f), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, no appeal may be taken from a “judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties x x x while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom.” Since there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the special civil action for certiorari is proper. 31. If an interlocutory order of the MTC is assailed in a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 with the RTC on the ground that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion, but the RTC dismissed the petition, what is the remedy against the order of the RTC dismissing the petition? The remedy is an ordinary appeal to the CA by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The petition for certiorari filed with the RTC is an original action, the dismissal of which is a final order that completely disposed of the petition. (Galzote v. Briones and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164682, Sept. 14, 2011) 32. May an appeal under Rule 45 and a special civil action under Rule 65 be incorporated in a single petition? No. In Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Mangotara, etc., et al., G.R. No. 170375, July 7, 2010, the Supreme Court explained: It is apparent in the case at bar that the Republic availed itself of the wrong mode of appeal by filing Consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 and for Certiorari under Rule 65, when these are two separate remedies that are mutually exclusive and neither alternative nor successive. Nevertheless, the Court shall treat the Consolidated Petitions as a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 and the allegations therein as errors of judgment. As the records show, the Petition was filed on time under Rules 45. Before the lapse of the 15day reglementary period to appeal under Rule 45, the Republic filed with the Court a motion for extension of time to file its petition. The Court, in a Resolution dated January 23, 2006, granted the Republic a 30-day extension, which was to expire on December 29, 2005. The Republic was able to file its Petition on the last day of the extension period. In Ligon v. Court of Appeals where the petitioner described her petition as "an appeal under Rule 45 and at the same time as a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court," this Court, in frowning over what it described as a "chimera,"
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reiterated that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative nor successive.
33. Is failure to pay the appellate court docket and other lawful fees a ground for the dismissal of the appeal? Yes. In D.M. Wenceslao and Associates, Inc. v. City of Parañaque, et al., G.R. No. 170728, Aug. 31, 2011, the Supreme Court has explained that the payment of appellate court docket fees is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement, without which the decision or final order appealed from becomes final and executory as if no appeal was filed. Under Sec. 1, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal. While there are circumstances, like fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, that may justify the relaxation of the rules on payment of docket fees, extremely heavy workload or excusable inadvertence of appellant’s counsel is not among them. 34. In what instances is record on appeal necessary? As provided for in Sec. 2, Rule 41, record on appeal is necessary only in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals. (Rovira v. Heirs of Jose C. Deleste, etc., G.R. No. 160825, March 26, 2010). Where record on appeal is required, the period for perfecting an appeal is 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from or notice of the order denying motion for reconsideration or motion for new trial. An order appointing an administrator of a deceased person’s estate is a final determination of the rights of the parties in connection with the administration, management and settlement of the decedent’s estate; hence, it is a final order and thus appealable. In special proceedings, such as appointment of an administrator, record on appeal is required and is to be filed, along with the notice of appeal, within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. (Zayco, et al. v. Hinlo Jr., G.R. No. 170243, April 16, 2008). Republic of the Philippines v. Nishina, G.R. No. 186053, Nov. 15, 2010 teaches that although Section 2, Rule 41 requires a record on appeal in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals, in proceedings involving cancellation of birth record and
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change of surname in the civil registry, record on appeal is not necessary. Rovira v. Heirs of Jose C. Deleste, etc., G.R. No. 160825, March 26, 2010, holds that a trial court’s ruling on the matter of attorney’s fees initiated through a motion in the same case of recovery of ownership and possession of land, may be appealed by a mere notice of appeal. Since the suit for recovery of ownership and possession is not one where multiple appeals are taken, a record on appeal is not necessary. Record on Appeal is not required in contempt proceedings. (Flaviano B. Cortes v. Judge Felino Bangalan, etc., G.R. No. MTJ-97, Jan. 19, 2000). 35. Are judgments rendered by the Family Courts (or RTCs in places where there is no Family Courts) in summary proceedings under Art. 238 of the Family Code appealable? No. Judgments rendered in summary proceedings under Art. 238 of the Family Code are immediately final and executory as provided for in Art. 247 thereof; hence, they are not appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a petition for certiorari to question grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed with the Court of Appeals in accordance with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Even if the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal. (Republic of the Philippines v. Tango, G.R. No. 161062, July 31, 2009) 36. What is the remedy of a party who is aggrieved by the resolution issued by the City/Provincial Prosecutor in a preliminary investigation? His remedy is to appeal to the Secretary of Justice. If the Secretary of Justice dismisses his appeal, he must file a motion for reconsideration. If his motion for reconsideration is denied by the Secretary of Justice, he may now file a petition for certiorari under
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Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. (Filadams Pharma, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 132422, March 30, 2004). Take note also that the resolution of the DOJ in offenses where the penalty imposable is reclusion perpetua to death is appealable administratively to the Office of the President, and the decision of the OP may be appealed to the CA pursuant to Rule 43. (de Ocampo v. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. 147932, Jan. 25, 2006; See also: Heirs of the Late Nestor Tria v. Epifania Obias, G.R. No. 175887, Nov. 24, 2010; Angeles v. Gaite, et al., G.R. No. 176596, March 23, 2011).
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1. The RTC issued a search warrant. On motion of the person against whom it was issued, the RTC quashed the search warrant. What is the remedy against the order quashing search warrant? Is it appeal or a petition for certiorari under Rule 65? Worldwide Web Corporation et al. v. People of the Philippines et al., G.R. No. 161106, Jan. 13, 2014, teaches that: An application for search warrant may be filed as an incident in a main criminal case already filed in court. Or, such an application may be filed in court in anticipation of one yet to be filed (here, the application for search warrant is instituted as a principal proceeding prior to the filing of the criminal action). Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal action, an order quashing the search warrant is merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable. Such order may only be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. But an order quashing a search warrant issued independently prior to the filing of a criminal action is a final order that can be the proper subject of an appeal. 2. Suppose the court issued an order quashing the search warrant. The applicant filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, but his motion was denied by the court because it does not bear the conformity of the public prosecutor. In denying the motion, the court relied on Sec. 5, Rule 110, which provides: “All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. Is the court correct?
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No, the court is not correct. Sec. 5, Rule 110 does not apply because an application for search warrant, although it is a criminal process, is not a criminal action. Therefore, the conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary to give the applicant a personality to question an order quashing the search warrant. (Worldwide Web Corporation et al. v. People of the Philippines et al., G.R. No. 161106, Jan. 13, 2014) 3. Notwithstanding notice to him, the accused failed to appear during the promulgation of judgment. The RTC promulgated the judgment, convicting him of the crime charged. Later, the accused moved for reconsideration, questioning the validity of the promulgation, the factual and legal basis of his conviction, and the correctness of the penalty imposed. The regional trial court denied his motion for reconsideration. Accused then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The CA granted the petition and acquitted the accused. Is the acquittal of the accused correct? No. Errors of the trial court in its judgment is correctible only by appeal, not in a certiorari proceedings. In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 as in the problem presented, the Court of Appeals is authorized to resolve only errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. (Almuete v. People, G.R. No. 179611, March 12, 2013) 4. What are the requirements for motion for bail in offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment? As provided for in Section 6, A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC, March 14, 2014, but took effect May 1, 2014 (Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails by Enforcing the Rights of Accused Persons to Bail and to Speedy Trial), the requirements are: a) the hearing of the motion for bail shall be summary; b) the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong; c) if the accused wants the court to consider his evidence, he may submit the affidavits of his witnesses attesting to his innocence;
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d) at the hearing of the motion for bail, the prosecution shall present its witnesses with the option of examining them on direct or adopting the affidavits they executed during the preliminary investigation as their direct testimonies; e) the court shall examine the witnesses on their direct testimonies or affidavits to ascertain if the evidence of guilt is strong; f) the court shall then allow counsel from both sides to examine the witnesses as well; g) afterwards, the court shall hear the oral arguments of the parties on whether the evidence of guilt is strong; h) within 48 hours after hearing, the court shall issue an order containing a brief summary of the evidence adduced before it, followed by its conclusion of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. 5. What are the modes of service of subpoena? Under Section 6, Rule 21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, service of subpoena shall be made in the same manner as personal or substituted service of summons. However, in criminal cases, the following are the additional modes of service of subpoena as provided for in Section 11, A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC, March 14, 2014: a) electronic mail (e-mail); b) mobile phone, either through phone calls or through short messaging service. How may service of subpoena be proved? When served by electronic mail or mobile phone, service of subpoena may be proved by: a) printouts of sent email and the acknowledgment of the recipient; b) printouts of electronic messages transmitted through the court’s equipment or device and the acknowledgment of the recipient; or c) reports of phone calls made by the court.
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6. Under Section 5 of R.A. No. 10389, approved March 14, 2003, otherwise known as Recognizance Act of 2012, release on recognizance is a matter of right. What are its requisites? Requisites: Recognizance is a matter of right if the following requisites are present: a)
the offense is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, of life imprisonment; and, accused or a person on his behalf files an application before or after conviction by the MTC or before conviction by the RTC (But a person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the imposable penalty shall be released on his recognizance)
b)
Requirements: But under Section 6 of R.A. No. 10389, the requirements for the release by the court of a detained person on recognizance are: a)
a sworn declaration by the accused of his indigency or incapacity to post bail either in cash or property; a certification issued by the head of DSWD of the city or municipality where accused resides that he is indigent; the accused has been arraigned; and, the court has notified the city of municipal sanggunian where the accused resides of the application for recognizance.
b) c) d)
Disqualifications: Although all the requisites and requirements have been complied with, still the accused may not be released on recognizance if he has any of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 7 of R.A. No. 10389, which are as follows: a) b) c)
the accused has made untruthful statement in his sworn declaration; the accused is a recidivist, quasi recidivist, habitual delinquent, or has committed the offense with the aggravating circumstance of reiteracion; the accused had been found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated
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d) e) f) g)
the conditions of bail or release on recognizance without valid justification; the accused had previously committed a crime while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon; the personal circumstances of the accused or narture of the facts surrounding his case indicate the probability of flight if released on recognizance; there is a great risk that the accused may commit another crime during the pendency of the case; the accused has a pending criminal case which has the same or higher penalty to the new crime he is being accused of.
7. In a criminal case, the prosecution filed a motion to take the testimony of its witness by oral deposition in Laos, Cambodia, citing as its reason that this witness, himself the private complainant, was sick and of advanced age. The trial court granted the motion. Is the trial court correct? No, the trial court is not correct. The applicable rule is Sec. 15, Rule 119 that reads: “When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as examination at the trial. …” While the condition of the private complainant as being sick and of advanced age falls within the provision of the Section 15, the same rule provides that he should be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Nowhere in the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not. To take the deposition of a prosecution witness elsewhere other than before the court where the case is pending would not only deprive the accused of his right to attend the proceedings, but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness’s deportment. It would also violate the right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face. (RUA: For conditional examination of a defense witness before trial in a criminal case, please read Secs. 12 and 13 of Rule 119. Note
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that the conditional examination of a witness for the accused may be taken before a judge, or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar in good standing so designated by the judge in the order, or if the order be made by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be designated therein.) It is different in civil cases. Rules 23 to 28 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure allow the taking of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public, or person authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other party. (See: Harry L. Go et al. v. People et al., G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012) 8. In what instances may habeas corpus be resorted to as post-conviction remedy? The writ of habeas corpus may be resorted to as post-conviction remedy in any of the following exceptional circumstances: a)
there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person;
b)
the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence;
c)
the imposed penalty is excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.
Under the Rule on DNA Evidence, habeas corpus may also be resorted to as post-conviction remedy where the result of the DNA examination is favorable to the accused. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus was held available where an accused was deprived of his right against self-incrimination. (cited in de Villa v. The Director, New Bilibid Prisons, G.R. No. 158802, Nov. 17, 2004). But habeas corpus is not available as post-conviction remedy where the appeal is still pending. (People v. Maquilan, G.R. No. 126170, Aug. 27, 1998). 8. What is the rule regarding Post-Conviction DNA Testing?
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The rule on post-conviction DNA testing is expressed in A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, Effective Oct. 15, 2007, as follows: “Sec. 6. Post-conviction DNA Testing. – Postconviction DNA testing may be available, without need of prior court order, to the prosecution or any person convicted by final and executory judgment provided that (a) a biological sample exists, (b) such sample is relevant to the case, and (c) the testing would probably result in the reversal or modification of the judgment of conviction.” (Rule on DNA Evidence, A.M. No. 06-11-5SC, Effective Oct. 15, 2007) “Sec. 10. Post-conviction DNA Testing – Remedy if the Results Are Favorable to the Convict. – The convict or the prosecution may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of origin if the results of the postconviction DNA testing are favorable to the convict. In case the court, after due hearing, finds the petition to be meritorious, if shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and order the release of the convict, unless continued detention is justified for a lawful cause. A similar petition may be filed either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, or with any member of said courts, which may conduct a hearing thereon or remand the petition to the court of origin and issue the appropriate orders.” 9. As a general rule, courts will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction, preliminary or final, to enjoin or restrain criminal prosecution. What are the exceptions? The exceptions are: 1) When the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; 2) When it is necessary for the orderly administration of justrice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; 3 When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; 4) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
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5) When the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; 6 When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; 7 When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; 8 When it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; 9 When the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; 10 When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied. (Borlongan Jr. v. Pena, et al. G.R. No. 143591, Nov. 23, 2007) 10. C and L, who were charged as co-conspirators, were convicted of violation of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) in a judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan, imposing upon each of them the penalty of imprisonment from six years and one month to twelve years and one month. They filed separate appeals to the Supreme Court by filing their respective petitions for review on certiorari. L’s appeal was dismissed on technicality. During the pendency of the appeal, C died. a) Should C’s appeal be dismissed on the ground that his death has rendered his appeal moot and academic as his death has already extinguished his criminal liability? No. C’s appeal should not be dismissed. The two petitions are so intertwined that the absolution of C is ultimately determinative of the absolution of L. The exoneration of C will necessarily signify the injustice of carrying out the penalty imposed on L. Thus, the SC, in this instance, has to ascertain the merits of C’s appeal to prevent a developing miscarriage of justice against L. Courts must still decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, in the following instances: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3) when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. In the problem presented, the exceptional character of the appeal of C and L in relation to each other, as well as the higher
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interest of justice, requires that the Court determine the merits of C’s petition and not dismiss it outright on the ground of mootness. b) Does the reversal of the decision of the Sandiganbayan as against C benefit L whose appeal was dismissed on technicality? Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: “An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.” The phrase “did not appeal” applies also to a co-accused who withdrew his appeal, failed to file an appellant’s brief, or filed a notice of appeal with the trial court but eventually withdrew the same. The Supreme Court has at various times applied the foregoing provision without regard to the filing or non-filing of an appeal by a co-accused, so long as the judgment was favorable to him. Thus, the foregoing provision should be applied to L whose appeal was dismissed on technicality. (Constantino v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 140656, Sept. 13, 2007; Lindong v. People, et al., G.R. No. 154482, Sept. 13, 2007.) 11. The accused, who claims that he was illegally arrested, refused to enter a plea when arraigned; whereupon, the court entered a plea of not guilty for him. May he still question the validity of his arrest? Yes. The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of his arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during the trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto. (Borlongan Jr. v. Pena, et al. G.R. No. 143591, Nov. 23, 2007). Thus, the accused may still question the legality his arrest, etc. where, at the arraignment, it is the court that entered the plea of not guilty for him. 12. Frank, who was 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, was charged with murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Crediting the accused with the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the RTC rendered judgment sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of 12 years and one day to 17 years and four months of reclusion temporal. The trial court, however, suspended Frank’s sentence and ordered his commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth, he being a juvenile in conflict with law. Is the trial court correct in suspending Frank’s sentence?
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No, the trial court is not correct. Art. 192 of PD No. 603 provides that the benefits of the law on suspension of sentence shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment or to one who is convicted of an offense by the Military Tribunals. A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC also provides that the benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the time of promulgation of judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or over. It is clear, therefore, that a person who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of a suspended sentence. The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime charged and the imposable penalty therefor, and not on the penalty imposed by the court after trial. It is not the actual penalty imposed, but the imposable penalty which determines the disqualification of a juvenile. Thus, where the youthful offender is charged with an offense punishable by death, life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua, he is not entitled to the benefit of suspended sentence although the penalty actually imposed by the court is, say, reclusion temporal. R.A. No. 9344, which took effect on May 20, 2006, did not change the foregoing ruling. Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides the following: “Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.” R.A. No. 9344 merely amended Art. 192 of P.D. 603 in that the suspension of sentence shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. The other disqualifications in Art. 192 of P.D. 603 and
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in Sec. 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have not been deleted from Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344. Hence, juveniles who have been convicted of a crime the imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death are disqualified from having their sentence suspended. Take note, however, that in People v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, Sept. 10, 2009, 599 SCRA 20, cited in People v. Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011, it was held that although suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of 21 can no longer avail himself of the provisions of Secs. 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to suspension of his sentence because this has already become moot and academic. 13. May the offended party in estafa and violation of BP 22 arising from the single act of issuing a bouncing check intervene through a private prosecutor in both criminal cases? Yes. Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two distinct criminal offenses: estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The Rules of Court allow the offended party to intervene through a private prosecutor in each of these two penal proceedings. However, the recovery of the single civil liability arising from the single act of issuing a bouncing check in either criminal case bars the recovery of the same civil liability in the other criminal action. While the law allows two simultaneous civil remedies for the offended party, it authorizes recovery in only one. In short, while two crimes arise form a single set of facts, only one civil liability attaches to it. (Rodriquez v. Ponferrada, et al., G.R. Nos. 155531-34, July 29, 2005) 14. After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused files a demurrer to evidence. In resolving the demurrer to evidence, should the trial court likewise decide the civil aspect of the case and determine the civil liability of the accused? The answer should be qualified as follows: a) If the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court:
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If the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case is submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived his right to present evidence. In this situation, the court is called upon to decide the case including its civil aspect, unless the offended party has waived the civil action, or has reserved his right to institute it separately, or has instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action. In case of conviction, the trial court should state in its judgment the civil liability or damages to be recovered by the offended party from the accused. In case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; or (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. But if the accused is acquitted and there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, then the civil action based on the delict is deemed extinguished. b) If the demurrer to evidence is filed with leave of court: If the court denies the demurrer to evidence because the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient, the accused may present evidence regarding both the criminal and civil aspect of the case. If the court grants the demurrer to evidence because the evidence so far presented by the prosecution is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. Thus, if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case shall proceed, except if the trial court finds that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. (Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, G.R. No. 165496, Feb. 12, 2007)
15.a) The trial court granted the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused. May the prosecution appeal from the order granting demurrer to evidence? No. An order granting the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused is an adjudication of the case on the merits, and it amounts to
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an acquittal. An appeal from said order would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. This is based on the finality-ofacquittal rule – which means that verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable. b) If appeal is not a remedy against an order granting demurrer to evidence, what then is the remedy? The remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. In Sanvicente v. People, 441 Phil. 139 (2002), the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the CA which reversed the acquittal of the accused upon a demurrer to evidence, holding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in preventing the prosecution from establishing the due execution and authenticity of a certain letter marked as Exh. “LL” which positively identified the accused as the perpetrator of the crime charged. To put it another way, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. To this rule, there are exceptions as follows: (1) when the prosecution is denied due process, as in the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-72670, Sept. 12, 1986, where the Supreme Court declared the sham trial a mock trial, and the predetermined judgment of acquittal was held unlawful and void ab initio; (2) when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in granting the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused. Thus, double jeopardy will not attach when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. (People v. Laguio Jr., G.R. No. 128587, March 16, 2007) In People v. Sandiganbayan and Barcenas, G.R. No. 174504, March 21, 2011, it was held that although the grant of demurrer is not subject to appeal it is still reviewable through certiorari under Rule 65. The Supreme Court ruled, in Ysidoro v. Hon. Leonardo-de Castro et al., G.R. No. 171513, Feb. 6, 2012, that the rule against double jeopardy cannot be properly invoked in a Rule 65 petition, predicated on two exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment of acquittal rendered with grave abuse of discretion by the court; and
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where the prosecution had been deprived of due process. The rule against double jeopardy does not apply in these instances because a Rule 65 petition does not involve review of facts and law on the merits in the manner done in an appeal. A review under Rule 65 only asks the question of whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not the question of whether the judgment is legally correct. In the other words, the focus of the review is to determine whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds. (RUA: A petition purportedly brought under Rule 65 should be dismissed if it does not raise any jurisdictional ground, as when, for example, it seeks to have the evidence reviewed by the higher court.) 16. Jayson was involved in a vehicular collision where Nestor, the driver of the other vehicle, died. Evangeline, Nestor’s wife, sustained only minor injuries, although their vehicle was heavily damaged. Jayson was charged with two offenses before the MeTC of Pasig City, namely: (1) Criminal Case No. 82367, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries; and (2) Criminal Case No. 82366, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. Jayson pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted the penalty of public censure. Invoking his conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367, he moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 on the ground of double jeopardy, but the trial court denied Jayson’s motion. Is the trial court correct in refusing the quashal of the information? No, the trial court is not correct. In Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro et al., G.R. No. 172716, Nov. 17, 2010, the Supreme Court, held that double jeopardy has already set in. Citing the opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the earlier case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383, March 29, 1968, it said: “… as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.” 17. If the trial court convicted the accused of frustrated homicide, but on appeal the appellate court found him guilty of attempted homicide as the accused had insisted all along, may he apply for probation? Yes, as held by the Supreme Court (En Banc) in Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, Dec. 13, 2011.
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Arnel Colinares was charged before the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur, with frustrated homicide. Convicted of frustrated homicide, he was meted the penalty of from 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum. He appealed to the CA, but the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. He then went to the SC on petition for review on certiorari. The SC found him guilty of attempted homicide only as the injury he had inflicted on the victim was not fatal. The SC sentenced him to suffer the penalty of 4 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as maximum. Is Colinares entitled to probation? Yes. The SC held: In appealing his case, Colinares raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction for attempted homicide only, which crime calls for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, he sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for probation. In a real sense, the SC’s finding that Colinares was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. 18. May a judgment be promulgated in a criminal case even in the absence of the counsel for the accused? Yes. The presence of counsel for the accused is not indispensable for promulgation. (Icdang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185960, Jan. 25, 2012) 19. Is the “fresh period rule” laid down by the Supreme Court in Neypes, et al. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 141524, Sept. 14, 2005, applicable in criminal cases? Yes. In Yu v. Samson-Tatad, et al., G.R. No. 170979, Feb. 9, 2011, the SC ruled that its pronouncement of a “fresh period” to appeal in Neypes, et al. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 141524, Sept. 14, 2005, should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Neypes is also applicable in special proceedings where record on appeal is required. (Zayco, et al. v. Hinlo Jr., G.R. No. 170243, April 16, 2008) EVIDENCE 1. Sec. 24 (c), Rule 130 states that a physician “cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be
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examined” regarding advice or treatment given by him to his patient “which would blacken the reputation of the patient.” Does this apply only to testimonial evidence? Chan v. Chan, G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013, is a case for declaration of nullity of marriage. The wife, plaintiff in the court below, sought the production of her husband’s hospital records. She argued that the rule on physician-patient privilege applies only to testimonial evidence. The Supreme Court said the physician-patient privilege applies not only to testimonial evidence but also to patient’s records. The physician may not be compelled to disclose the records of his patient. 2. Is a certified copy of the report of a government medical, chemical, or laboratory expert relating to a criminal case admissible in evidence even if the witness who prepared the report does not appear in court to testify thereon? Yes. Sec. 13, A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC provides: “A certified copy of the report of a government medical, chemical, or laboratory expert relating to a criminal case shall be admissible as prima facie evidence of the truth of its contents. The personal appearance in court of a witness who prepared the report shall be unnecessary unless demanded by the accused for the purpose of cross-examination.” 3. What are the guidelines that will serve as jurisprudential benchmark in appreciating age of the victim either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance: The guidelines as formulated in People v. Pruna, 439 Phil. 440 (2002), and reiterated in People v. Padigos, G.R. No. 181202, Dec. 5, 2012, are: a) the best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party; b) in the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age; c) if the certificate of liver birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of
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the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: 1) if the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; 2) if the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; 3) if the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. d) in the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. e) it is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. f) the trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim. 4. Is a police report admissible in evidence even if the police investigator who prepared it was not presented as a witness in court? Yes. A police report is considered an entry in official records; hence, it is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Section 44, Rule 130 provides: “Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.” The requisites for the admissibility of entries in official records are: a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
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b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his or her duties or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him or her stated, which must have been acquired by the public officer or other person personally or through official information. Thus, the presentation of the police report itself is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule even if the police investigator who prepared it was not presented in court, as long as the above requisites could be adequately proved. (Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Ablerto et al., G.R. No. 194320, Feb. 1, 2012) 5. Is plaintiff’s evidence the only basis in resolving a demurrer to evidence? No. Sec. 1, Rule 33 provides, in part: “After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. x x x” The “facts” referred to in Section 8 should include all the means sanctioned by the Rules of Court in ascertaining matters in judicial proceedings. These include judicial admissions, matters of judicial notice, stipulations made during the pre-trial and trial, admissions, and presumptions, the only exclusion being the defendant’s evidence. (Casent Realty Development Corp. v. Philbanking Corp., G.R. No. 150731, Sept. 14, 2007) 6. Sec. 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the “court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.” Why is a formal offer of evidence necessary? A formal offer of evidence is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. (Heirs of Pedro Pasag, etc., et al. v. 55483, April 27, 2007) 7. What is the principle of adoptive admission?
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By adoptive admission, a third person’s statement becomes the admission of the party embracing or espousing it. Adoptive Admission occurs when a party: (a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another; (b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it; (c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another; (d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but ignores further points which he or she has heard the other make; or (e) reads and signs a written statement made by another. (Republic of the Philippines v. Kenrick Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149576, Aug. 8, 2006) 8. In paternity cases, is it necessary that there be a prima facie showing of paternity before the court may issue an order for DNA testing? Yes. Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011 holds that a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order. During the hearing on the motion for DNA testing in paternity cases, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. 9. In cases involving paternity, if the results of DNA examination show that the value of probability of paternity (VPP) is 99.9% or higher, are the results already conclusive evidence of paternity? No. Section 9(c) of the Rule on DNA Evidence states the rule as follows: a)
DNA results that exclude the putative parent from paternity shall be conclusive proof of non-paternity;
b)
If the value of the Probability of Paternity is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA testing shall be considered as corroborative evidence;
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c)
If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.
10. What are the guidelines to be used by courts in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence? In People v. Vallejo, 382 SCRA 192 [2002], which involves a rape-slay of a 9-year old girl, the court admitted in evidence the DNA samples of the victim which were found on the bloodstained garments of the accused. In this case, the Supreme Court adopted the following guidelines to be used by courts in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence: a) b) c) d) e)
how the samples were collected; how they were handled; the possibility of contamination of the samples; the procedure followed in analyzing the samples; whether the proper standards and procedure were followed in conducting the tests; and f) the qualification of the analyst who conducted the test. In People v. Yatar, 428 SCRA 504 [2004], the SC affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with homicide when the test showed that a match existed between the DNA profile of the semen found in the victim and the DNA profile of the blood sample given by the accused. Yatar upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA and rejected the contention that compulsory DNA testing violates the right of the accused against self-incrimination. 11. What is the Doctrine of Presumed Identity Approach? The Doctrine of Presumed Identity Approach, also known as the Doctrine of Processual Presumption, holds that in the absence of proof, the foreign law will be presumed to be the same as the law of the jurisdiction hearing the case. This doctrine comes into play where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, in which event the presumption is that the foreign law is the same as our law on the matter. (ATCI Overseas Corp. et al. v. Echin, G.R. No. 178551, Oct. 11, 2010) 12. On parental and filial privilege, Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, provides: “No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct ascendants.” Does this
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apply to stepdaughters or those not connected by common ancestry? No. In Lee v. CA, 625 SCRA 66, July 13, 2010, it was pointed out that Sec. 25 was taken from Art. 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Court extended the prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative filed against parents and other direct ascendants or children and other direct descendants. The privilege applies only to “direct” ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by common ancestry. Since a stepdaughter has no common ancestry with her stepmother, one can be compelled to testify against the other. Take note, however, that under Art. 215 of the Family Code, a descendant may be compelled in a criminal case to testify against his ascendant when such testimony is indispensable in: (a) a crime committed against the descendant; (b) a crime committed by one parent against the other. 13. What is the purpose for establishing a chain of custody? The purpose of establishing a chain of custody is to guaranty the integrity of the physical evidence and to prevent the introduction of evidence which is not authentic. Since it is called chain, there must be links to the chain. The links are the people who handled or had custody of the object. As long as one of the “chains” testifies and his testimony negates the possibility of tampering and that the integrity of the evidence is preserved, his testimony alone is adequate to prove the chain of custody. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 1. Gerbert, a Filipino who became a Canadian citizen, married Daisylyn in Pasig. Because of work commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. After about five months, he returned to the Philippines, but was shocked to discover that Daisylyn was having an affair with another man. Disappointed, Gerbert went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. After obtaining a divorce decree, he returned to the Philippines and registered the divorce decree in Pasig local civil registry. Then, he filed a petition with the RTC for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree. The court, however, denied Gelbert’s petition on the ground that the remedy under the second
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paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is available only to the Filipino spouse. The second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code reads: “Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.” Is the court correct in holding that the remedy under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is available only to the Filipino spouse? Is the court correct in dismissing Gerbert’s petition? Yes, the court correct in holding that the remedy under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is available only to the Filipino spouse. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas et al., G.R. No. 186571, Aug. 11, 2010, it was held that the alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right that it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. The court, however, is not correct in dismissing Gerbert’s petition. The Supreme Court has explained in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas et al. that the foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Sec. 48, Rule 39 which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This section provides: “Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows: a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.” The foreign judgment (or foreign divorce decree), once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties.
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In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas et al., the Supreme Court also explained that the recording of the divorce decree by the Pasig local civil registry on the strength alone of the foreign divorce decree presented by Gerbert is improper because there is no judicial order yet recognizing the foreign divorce decree. If there is now an order recognizing the foreign divorce decree, such an order does not by itself authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment (or foreign divorce decree) is not the proper proceeding contemplated under the Rules of Court for the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. A petition under Rule 108 must be filed. Rule 108 sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment authorizing the cancellation or correction may be annotated in the civil registry. Does it mean that two petitions must be filed – one for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree and another for cancellation of entry in the civil registry? No. Corpus v. Sto. Tomas et al. explains that recognition of foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.” Fujiki v. Marinay et al., G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013, reiterates the ruling in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas et al. that recognition of a foreign judgment may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108. 2. Fujiki, a Japanese national, married Marinay in the Philippines. After the marriage, Fujiki returned to Japan, but Marinay remained in the Philippines because the marriage did not sit well with Fujiki’s parents. Two years later, Marinay met Maekara, also a Japanese national. Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara got married. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. But because of physical abuse, Marinay left Maekara. Soon, Marinay and Fujiki met and reestablish their relationship. With the help of Fujiki, Marinay obtained a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on ground of bigamy. Fujiki came to the Philippine and filed with the RTC a
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petition entitled “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).” A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC dismissed the petition, citing Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which provides: “A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.” Is the dismissal of the petition correct? No, the dismissal of the petition is not correct. Fujiki is a real party in interest (he has the personality) to file the petition because the foreign judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable in a petition for recognition of foreign judgment relating to the status of marriage where one of the parties is a foreigner. It does not also apply if the reason for the petition is bigamy. (Fujiki v. Marinay et al., G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013) 3. Merlinda requested from the NSO a certificate of no marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean national, on June 24, 2002. She denied having contracted marriage and claimed that she did not know Ye Son Sune and that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. She then filed a petition for cancellation of entries in the marriage contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. She impleaded the local civil registrar and Ye Son Sune as parties to the case. The RTC granted the petition and ordered the local civil registrar to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of Merlinda and Ye Son Sune. The Republic appealed, alleging that granting the cancellation of “all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract” is in effect declaring the marriage void ab initio. Is Republic’s appeal meritorious? No. In Republic of the Philippines v. Merlinda L. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538, Feb. 14, 2014, which has the same factual backdrop, the Supreme Court said that while it is true that the court has no jurisdiction of declare a marriage void in a Rule 108 proceeding, the
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trial court in this case did not declare the marriage void because there was no marriage to speak of in the first place. 4. Where may the estate of a deceased person be settled? The estate of the a deceased person may be settled – a) in the province or city where he resided at the time of his death, if he was a resident of the Philippines. Note that under Sec. 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the Regional Trial Court of the “province in which he resides at the time of his death.” As held in Garcia Fule v. CA, G.R. Nos. L-40502 & L-42670, Nov. 29,1976 [74 SCRA 189], the term “resides” connotes “actual residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” In other words, “resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. (See also: San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. No. 133743 and G.R. No. 134029, Feb. 6, 2007) b) in the province where he had estate, if he was not a resident of the Philippines. 5. What are the two exceptions to the requirement that the estate of a decedent be judicially administered through an administrator or executor? The two exceptions are: a) if there is extrajudicial settlement among the heirs; and b) in summary settlement of estate of small value. 6. What are the requisites of a valid extrajudicial settlement? The following are the requisites: a) the decedent died intestate; b) there is no outstanding debts of the estate at the time of settlement;
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c) the heirs are all of legal age; or if minors and incapacitated, they are represented by their judicial guardians or representatives; d) the settlement is made in a public instrument; e) the fact of extrajudicial settlement is published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three consecutive weeks. (Note that if the case is proper for extrajudicial settlement, an heir cannot insist on instituting administration proceedings which would be superfluous and unnecessary. If the heirs cannot agree on the manner of partition, they may institute an action for partition.) If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. 7. What is the Statute of Non-Claims? The Statute of Non-Claims is the period for the filing of claims against the estate, which period shall not be more than 12 months nor less than 6 months after the date of the first publication of the notice to the creditors. Note that immediately after granting letters testamentary or of administration, the court shall issue a notice requiring all persons having money claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court. The following are barred forever if not filed within the time specified in the notice to the creditors: a) all claims for money against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent; b) all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent; c) judgment for money against the decedent. But though barred forever, the aforesaid claims may nonetheless be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor/administrator may bring against the claimant.
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8. How may a claim be filed, and where? A claim may be filed with the clerk of court, serving a copy thereof on the executor/administrator. Within 15 days from service thereof, the executor/administrator shall file his answer, admitting or denying the claim specifically and setting forth the substance of the matters which are relied upon to support his admission or denial. He shall serve a copy of his answer on the claimant. Any claim admitted entirely by the executor/administrator shall be immediately submitted by the clerk to the court who may approve the same without hearing, although the court, in its discretion may notify all known heirs, legatees, or devisees. If any heir, legatee, or devisee opposes the claim, the court may allow him 15 days to file his answer. Contested claim shall be set for trial, with notice to both parties. The court may refer the claim to a commissioner. The judgment of the court approving or disapproving the claim is appealable. Note that the appeal should be by notice of appeal and record on appeal. 9. So it is said that the creditor’s claim is barred forever if not filed within the time specified in the notice. But, does the creditor who fails to file his claim within the time specified in the notice still have a remedy? Yes. His remedy is to file a motion for leave to file his claim. He may file this motion at any time during the administration proceedings provided no order of distribution has yet been entered. The court may grant the creditor one-month period from notice of order granting his motion to file his claim. 10. What are the remedies of a creditor holding a claim secured by a mortgage? a) he may waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the deceased debtor-mortgagor as an ordinary claim; b) he may foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; c) he may rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency. (Sec. 7, Rule 86; Maglague v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 109472, May 18, 1999.)
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11. May a probate court issue a writ of execution? No. A probate court may not issue a writ of execution because its orders usually refer to the adjudication of claims against the estate which the executor or administrator may satisfy without the need of writ of execution. But by way of exceptions, the probate court may issue a writ of execution in the following instances: a) to satisfy the contributive shares of devisees, legatees and heirs, who have taken possession of decedent’s estate, for debts and expenses of the estate; b) to enforce payment of expenses of partition; c) to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for examination in probate proceedings. 12. When may distribution of the estate be made? It may only be made after all debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate taxes have been paid. It may also be made before payment of such obligations, provided the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligation within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations. 13. AA, BB, CC, and DD are the heirs of XX who died on July 16, 2003. XX had three other children by his paramour. His illegitimate children are: MM, NN, and OO. AA filed a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of XX. During the pendency of the petition for issuance of letters of administration, AA, BB, CC, and DD discovered that MM, NN, and OO had executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of XX involving a property located in Dagupan City. AA, BB, CC, and DD filed a complaint against MM, NN, and OO for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement and for the recovery of the Dagupan property. Defendants MM, NN, and OO filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiffs AA, BB, CC,
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and DD are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of XX in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings. Question: May the heirs (AA, BB, CC, and DD) bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an administrator? Yes. During the pendency of the administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3 and Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. The legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the decedent under administration pending the appointment of an administrator has long been recognized. The heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated. In fact, even if an administrator is already appointed, the heirs may still institute the proper action for the recovery of a property of the estate in the following instances: (1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and (2) when the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of and he is made a party defendant. Thus, if the question is: What are the exceptions to the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property of the estate during the pendency of the administration proceedings? Then the answer is as follows: (1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; (2) when the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of and he is made a party defendant; and (3) when no administrator has yet been appointed. (Rioferio, et al. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 129008, Jan. 13, 2004). 14. Betty was appointed administratrix of the estate of deceased Jose. She submitted an inventory to the court of the real and personal properties of the deceased. AMC, one of the creditors of the deceased, filed a claim against the
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estate. Thereafter, AMC noticed that the shares of stocks of the deceased with Ayala were not included in the inventory. AMC then filed a motion to require Betty to explain the noninclusion of these shares of stocks. Betty explained that these shares of stocks had already been transferred to other persons prior to the death of Jose. AMC filed a motion for the examination of the supposed transferees. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that it was merely a fishing expedition. Is the trial court correct? No, the trial court is not correct. Persons, or third persons, to whom the decedent’s assets had been conveyed may be cited to appear in court and examined under oath as to how they came into possession of the decedent’s assets. If they refuse to appear, the court may punish them for contempt. The trial court has the inherent duty to see to it that the inventory lists all the properties, rights and credits which the law requires the administrator to include in his inventory. In compliance with this duty, the court has also the inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased should be included by the administrator in the inventory. An heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased may call the court’s attention that certain properties, rights and credits are left out from the inventory. In such a case, it is likewise the court’s duty to hear the observations of such party. The court has the power to determine if such observations deserve attention and if such properties belong prima facie to the estate. However, in such proceedings the trial court has no authority to decide whether the properties, real or personal, belong to the estate or to the persons examined. If after such examination there is good reason to believe that the person is keeping properties belonging to the estate, then the administrator should file an ordinary action in court to recover the same. A separate action is necessary for determination of ownership and recovery of possession. (Betty T. Chua, et al. v. Absolute Management Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 144881, Oct. 16, 2003)
