Pritchard Epistemological Contextualism; Problems and Prospects

Scots Philosophical Association University of St. Andrews

Epistemological Contextualism: Problems and Prospects Author(s): Michael Brady and Duncan Pritchard Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 219 (Apr., 2005), pp. 161-171 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews

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Vol. ThePhilosophical 55,No.219 Quarterly, ISSNoo3-8o94

April 2005

EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONTEXTUALISM: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS BY MICHAEL BRADY AND DUNCAN PRITCHARD

andwidely discussed new contextualism has become oneofthemostimportant Epistemological inthetheory Thisspecial issuecontributes tothedebate proposals ofknowledge. bybringing together Hereweoffer a some toprovide a state-of-the-art discussion ofthe ofthemain proposal. participants that havebeen overview describe some brief ofthemainlinesofcriticism ofthecontextualist position, levelled theview, andpresent a summary tothiscollection. against ofeachofthecontributions

I. EPISTEMOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTOR CONTEXTUALISM: THE FIRST WAVE One of the mostimportantmovementsin contemporary has epistemology been thatof epistemological attributor Like all contextualist contextualism. thesesin epistemology, thisviewholdsthatthe epistemicstatusofa beliefwhether the typically, targetbeliefis an instanceofknowledge- can depend in a non-trivial attributor way upon contextualfactors.More specifically, contextualism is a thesis, (henceforth just 'contextualism') primarily linguistic in thatit holdsthat'knows'is a context-sensitive termin thefollowing sense: assertionsof sentencesinvolvingthis termwill vary in theirtruth-value theassertion. This is whythe dependingupon the contextoftheperson making viewis knownas attributor in orderto emphasizethefactthat contextualism, it is the contextof the person makingthe assertionthat is importantto the contextof the subepistemicstatus,ratherthan,wherethisis different, we here focus on ject who is being ascribed knowledge.(For simplicity, attributor contextualism about 'knows'ratherthanon relatedcontextualist thesesregardingotherepistemicterms,such as 'justified'or 'warranted'.) two people could both simultaneously assertthat,say, 'John Accordingly, knowsthat Paris is the capital of France', and be in agreementon every relevantepistemologicalfact about John, and yet one could be speaking trulyand the otherfalselybecause theirrespectiveassertionsare made in C The Editorsof ThePhilosophical Road, Oxfordox4 2%, UK, 2oo5. Publishedby BlackwellPublishing, Quarterly, 96oo Garsington and 350Main Street,Malden,MA02148,USA.


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contextswhere'knows'is governedby different different standards,and thus wherethepropositionassertedin each case is different.' of thisvarietycan be foundin the The historicalbasis forcontextualism such as Austinand Wittgenstein.2 It writingsof a numberof philosophers, was not,however,untilDavid Lewis' workon how to keep the score in a languagegame thatwe have thebeginningsofthefirstreal accountofwhat a context-sensitive account of 'knows'mightlook like and how it can be Lewis' work applied to some of the perennialproblemsof epistemology.3 gave impetusto a numberofphilosophersat thevanguardofthefirstwave a groupwhichincludedas centralfiguresKeith of attributor contextualism, DeRose and StewartCohen; and Lewis himselfalso returnedto thefrayto spell out the detailsof his particularvarianton thisthesis.4Althoughthere are importantdifferencesbetween the positions advocated by Lewis, DeRose and Cohen, whatis commonto theseviewsis thegeneralidea that thecontextualist thesispresentsus withthebestway of accommodatingthe data a linguistic regardingour use of epistemicterms,while also offering neat and compellingresolutionto variousepistemological as such problems, theproblemofradicalscepticism. It is worthlookingat thislast claimin moredetail,sincemuch of theattractionof the contextualist view has tended to lie in its responseto the the Consider sceptic. followingscepticalargument,where'e' is some paradigm 'everyday'propositionwhich we would all take ourselvesto know (suchas thatone is presently seated),and 'sh' is a scepticalhypothesis (such the in as 'brain a vat' hypothesis) withe: whichis inconsistent I don'tknowthatnot-sh IfI don'tknowthatnot-sh, thenI don'tknowe SC. I don'tknowe. SI.

S2.

Issues,Io (2000), pp. 94-107, Philosophical 1 See S. Cohen, 'Contextualismand Skepticism', at p. 94, fora neatpresentation ofthispoint. 2 See J.L. Austin,'Other Minds', Proceedings oftheAristotelian Supp. Vol. 20 (1946), Society, On Certainty, ed. G.E.M. Anscombeand G.H. von Wright(Oxpp. 148-87; L. Wittgenstein, ford:Blackwell,1969).Variantson thecontextualist thesiscan also be found(sometimesinjust a suggestiveform)in thefollowingtexts:A. Goldman,'Discriminationand PerceptualKnowledge', Journalof Philosophy, 73 (1976), pp. 771-91; G.C. Stine, 'Skepticism,Relevant and Deductive Closure', Philosophical Alternatives, Studies, 29 (1976),pp. 249-61; D.B. Annis, 'A ContextualistTheory ofJustification', American Philosophical 15 (1978),pp. 213-19; Quarterly, F. Dretske, 'The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge', Philosophical Studies,40 (1981), Doubts:Epistemological Realismand theBasis of Scepticism pp. 363-78; M. Williams, Unnatural (Oxford:Blackwell,i991). 3 See D. Lewis, 'Scorekeepingin a Language Game', Journal ofPhilosophical Logic,8 (i979), PP. 339-59. 4 See K. DeRose, 'Solvingthe SkepticalProblem',Philosophical Review, o104(1995),PP 1-52; Cohen, 'Contextualismand Skepticism';Lewis, 'Elusive Knowledge', Australasian Journalof 74 (1996),pp. 549-67. Philosophy, ? The Editorsof ThePhilosophical Quarterty, 2005


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Famously,some have respondedto thisargumenteitherby simplydenying (SI) or by denying(S2) via a rejectionof the principlethat knowledgeis closed under known entailment(the 'closure' principle)on which (S2) appears to depend (veryroughly,closureholds thatif one knowsone proposition,such as e, and one knowsthat thisentailsa second proposition, such as not-sh,then one also knowsthe second proposition,in thiscase Neithermanoeuvreis particularly not-sh).5 compelling,however,sinceboth (Si) and the closure principleare highlyintuitive.Accordingly,rejecting thesepremisesseemstantamountto large-scaleepistemological revisionism. This is whatmakesthealternative of the diagnosis scepticalproblemoffered it contextualism so since holds out the attractive, by promiseofresolvingthis in without to revisionism of thissort. difficulty having engage to what is According contextualism, happeninghere is a shiftin the contextwhichbringsabout a shiftin the epistemicstandardsdemandedof an agentbeforethatagent can be trulysaid to have knowledge.In particular,the idea is thatin quotidiancontextsthe epistemicstandardswillbe low, therebyensuringthatassertionsof ascriptionsentences(i.e., sentences whichascribeknowledgeto an agent)willtendto be true.This accountsfor since normallythe assertionof an why we find(SC) so counter-intuitive, sentence an ascription regarding e-typepropositionwilltend to expressa truth.Moreover, since closure holds, it followsthat our possessionof knowledgeof e-typepropositionsrelativeto the epistemicstandardsin play in quotidiancontextswillbe accompanied(providedwe knowthe relevant entailmentat least) by knowledgeof the denials of scepticalhypotheses, contra (SI). In contrast,in more demandingcontexts,such as contextsin which the scepticalproblemis at issue,the epistemicstandardswill rise,so that assertionsof ascriptionsentenceswill now no longer tend to be true. it willnow be trueto say thatwe lack knowledgeofthedenials Accordingly, of scepticalhypothesis, which is the intuitiondriving(Si), and relativeto thesestandardsan assertionofthescepticalconclusion,(SC), willlikewisebe truealso, so thereis no tensionwithclosurehere either.The contextualist therefore has a powerfuldiagnosisof the problemof scepticism- one that accommodatesboth scepticaland anti-scepticalintuitionswhile retaining thehighlyintuitive closureprincipleforknowledge. 5 The first tacticofsimplydenying(SI) is oftencalled the 'Moorean' anti-sceptical strategy, since it sharescertainfeatureswiththe responseto scepticismofferedby G.E. Moore. See BritishPhilosophy Moore, 'A Defence of Common Sense', Contemporary (2nd series),ed. J.H. Muirhead(London:Allenand Unwin,1925),and 'Proofofan ExternalWorld',Proceedings ofthe British Academy, 25 (1939),Pp. 273-300. For the main discussionsof the second tacticof denying the closureprinciple,see Dretske,'EpistemicOperators',JournalofPhilosophy, 67 (1970), pp. 1007-23;R. Nozick,Philosophical Explanations (OxfordUP, 1981). C The EditorsofThePhilosophical 2005 Quarterly,


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In general,thecontextualist has been to use thisthesisabout the strategy of 'knows' to capture the intuitionswe have regarding context-sensitivity the varyingconditionsunderwhichwe deem it appropriateto ascribe(or deny)knowledge.It seems,forexample,thatwherethereis a lot at stakein an ascription,the standardsthatthe subjectneeds to meet in orderto be is clearlyin trulyascribedknowledgerise accordingly,and contextualism a strongpositionto accommodatethisintuition.Moreover,by takingseriof epistemicterms,contextualists have ouslytheapparentcontext-sensitivity that this view can be to cast on a number of other argued employed light centralissuesin epistemology aside fromthe scepticalproblem,such as, for has so example,thelottery puzzle. It is thuslittlewonderthatcontextualism become one of the in most discussed quickly positions contemporary ifnotin philosophyas a whole. epistemology, II. REACTIONS AND REFINEMENTS thisfirstwave ofworkon contextualism was followedby thefirst Inevitably, wave ofcritique.Althoughthisis notat all an exhaustivelist,one can regard thefirst wave ofcriticism as focusedon thefollowing threeissues: The contextualist claimthatwe are able to knowthedenialsofsceptical in hypotheses undemandingcontexts 2. The intellectual adequacy ofthecontextualist responseto scepticism The basis for in contextualism; particular,whether the 3. linguistic 'data' could not be betteraccountedforby a non-contextualist linguistic view. (i.e.,invariantist) I.

The firstproblemconcernsthe unusual statusof our knowledgeof the denials of scepticalhypotheseson the contextualist view. It is essentialto contextualismthat we are able to possess thisknowledge,since, shortof to scepticismat any rate,theretentionof closurewilldemand surrendering it.The problemis thatthisputativeknowledgehas an odd standingaccording to thistheory,since althoughit is possessed,one can apparentlynever trulyasserta sentencewhich ascribesthisknowledge,since in raisingthe in thisway one raisesthe epistemicstandards,thereby scepticalpossibility what is asserted false. At the very least, then,it seems to be a making of contextualism thatepistemologists, who are concernedwith consequence like a this as matter of are able to knowverymuch.6 course, rarely problems 6 At least unlesswe can make sense of Lewis'

suggestionthatwe are 'compartmentalized' thinkers,such that one 'compartment'is able to know a great deal even while a second 'compartment',thatwhichis concernedwiththe scepticalproblem,knowsnext to nothing. See Lewis,'ElusiveKnowledge'. 2005 Quarterly, ? The Editorsof ThePhilosophical



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A relatedproblemis thatifwe can make sense of the idea thatwe are thenitis farfromclearwhy able to knowthedenialsofscepticalhypotheses, we would also wantto endorsecontextualism. Afterall, the rejectionof (SI) willbyitselfsuffice to blockthescepticalargument, regardlessofwhetherit is allied to a contextualist thesis.Rememberthattheproblemwith(SI) wasn't thatwhile we approximateto meetingthe standardsnecessaryforknowledge,in thiscase we don'tquitemeetthem,butratherthatthisis thesortof for creatureslike us to know, whatever propositionthat it is impossible incremental we mightmake to our epistemicpositions.Thus improvements it is farfromclear thatmerelyloweringthe epistemicstandardsforknowledgewilldo thetrick.And notethatifthisdoes do thetrick- iftheproblem hereis simplythatwe don'tquitemeetausterescepticalepistemicstandards - thenthisinvitesthethoughtthatperhapsthemoralto be drawnis notthat we should regard'knows' as a context-sensitive term,but ratherthatwe shouldresistthemove to thesceptic'saustereepistemicstandardsand insist instead on evaluatingassertionsof ascriptionsentencesrelativeto more relaxedquotidianepistemicstandards(in everycontext).7 As we just noted,thecontextualist of scepticismseemsto leave treatment the contextualist witha muteresponseto the sceptic,sincethe challengeis contextwhere assertionsof always,by its verynature,posed in a sceptical will tend This sentences to be false. sort of difficulty fortheview ascription has led manyto questiontheintellectual of the contextualist antiadequacy thesis. since the it contextualist allows that is the Indeed, sceptical sceptic who is workingwiththe higherepistemicstandards,it is easy to see why some commentatorshave claimed that the contextualist'resolution'to leavesone withtheuneasyfeelingthat,strictly scepticism speaking,we don't have knowledgeafterall, it'sjust thatit's OK (thoughstrictly speakingfalse) to say thatwe do whenwe are speakinglooselyin quotidianconversational contexts.In short,the worryhere is thatcontextualism seemsto leave the door open to infallibilism ofthesortdefendedin earlyworkby PeterUnger, where 'knows',ratherthan being treatedas a context-sensitive term,is in facttreatedas an absolute termsuch thatno one, strictly speaking,ever has since the standards demanded for any knowledge, knowledgepossession are so strongthatno one can evermeetthem.8 (infallibility) 7 For more on this problem,see D. Pritchard,'Recent Work on Radical Skepticism', American Philosophical 39 (2002), pp. 215-57,in ?6. CrispinWrightalso exploresthis Quarterly, ofscepticismin hiscontribution treatment to thisvolume. problemforthecontextualist 8 See P. 8o (I97I), pp. 198-219,and Review, Unger,'A Defence of Skepticism',Philosophical Ignorance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). In more recentwork Unger has argued for the weakerthesisthatthereis no way of adjudicatingbetweena contextualist accountof 'knows' whichenablesus to avoid scepticism, and an infallibilist non-contextualist accountwhichdoes not. Accordingly, we are in no betterpositionas regardsthe scepticalproblem,sincewe still have no reasonnotto be sceptics.See Unger,Philosophical Relativity (Oxford:Blackwell,1984). C The EditorsofThePhilosophical 2005 Quarterly,


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views A similarproblemin thisregardis thatwhiletheearlycontextualist could be raised so for were veryclear about how the standards knowledge thatitwas no longerpossibleto assertascriptionsentencestruly,itwasn'tat all clearwhatwouldbe involvedin loweringthe standardsagain afterwards so that assertionsof these same ascriptionsentenceswould now express truths.This is the so-calledproblemof 'epistemicdescent',and it is crucial have an account of such descentif theyare to explain thatcontextualists how those who have activelyconsideredthe scepticalproblemcan, once theyengage once more in normalquotidiancontexts,returnto asserting ascriptionsentencestrulyas theydid before.9 This last issue relatesto the thirdtype of probleminitiallyraised for basis oftheview.The challenge whichconcernsthelinguistic contextualists, factors can altertheepistemicstanhereis to specify how conversational just dardsin play,and do so in a way thatdoes not offendagainstthelinguistic data. For example,in the case of epistemicdescentjust described,it seems thatwhat the contextualist predictsin termsof linguisticbehaviouris willof the on the agent(i) to asserttherelevantascriptionsentence ingness part in a quotidian conversationalcontext;(ii) to assert the negationof this ascriptionsentenceonce the agent moves into the scepticalconversational have the knowledgethat context(i.e., to say thatthe targetsubjectdoesn't to assertingthe original to and to back was previouslyascribed her); (iii) go when conversational contextreturns.On the quotidian ascriptionsentence data. thefaceofit,however,thispredictionis notborneout by thelinguistic In general,we wouldnottreatsomeoneas a good 'asserter'ifshe alteredher factorsin thisway.'0 assertionsmerelyin thelightofconversational line of critiquein thisregardhas concerned More generally,a further whetherthe apparent context-sensitivity of 'knows' could not be simply accommodatedwithina Gricean picture.On thisview, certainassertions become unassertableas the conversationalcontextchanges- perhapsbecontextmeansthattheassertion cause, forexample,thenew conversational now carries different conversationalimplicatures,ones which are now It could be, mostlyfalse- even thoughtheydo notshiftin theirtruth-value. forexample,thatit is conversationally one knows to that inappropriate say thatone is notthevictimofa scepticalhypothesis, eventhoughthisis in fact true,because ofwhatthisassertionwouldimply."I 9 For a developmentofthisline ofcritique,see Pritchard,'Contextualism, and Skepticism, theProblemofEpistemicDescent',Dialectica, 55 (2oo0), pp. 327-49. 10For more on this point, see Pritchard,'Contextualism,Skepticismand Warranted Assertability (eds),KnowManoeuvres',inJ. Keim-Campbell,M. O'Rourke and H. Silverstein andSkepticism ledge (MIT Press,forthcoming). " For thefirstsustaineddevelopmentofthissortofobjection,see P. Rysiew,'The ContextofKnowledgeAttributions', Sensitivity pp. 477-514. Noas,35 (200oo), C The Editorsof ThePhilosophical 2005 Quarterly,



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Relatedly,contextualismhas come under pressurefroman alternative invariantism'(SSI), which has been account, known as 'subject-sensitive proposedbyJohnHawthorneand Jason Stanley.'2Whereascontextualism holds that it is the contextof the person makingthe assertionthat is of a knowledgeascription,SSI deniesthisand importantto the truth-value maintainsinstead that epistemicstatusdepends upon the contextof the to subject.In particular,SSI holdsthatit is the salienceof errorpossibilities rather thesubject thatdetermines whetheror notshe knowssomeproposition, thanthesalienceofsuchpossibilities to theascriber.In thisway,proponents so as to avoid a of SSI reinterpret the phenomenonof context-sensitivity contextualistconclusion.Moreover,supportersof SSI maintainthat the construal evidencefromordinarylanguageno moresupportsa contextualist invariantist than it supportsa subject-sensitive of such sensitivity reading. Contextualiststhus owe us an explanation as to why we should be ratherthaninvariantists ofthissort. contextualists III. CONTEXTUALISM AND ANTI-CONTEXTUALISM: THE NEW WAVE refineand deThe recentworkon contextualism has seen contextualists velop theirviewin responseto objectionsofthissort,and has also seen those to contextualismdevelop theircritiquesas a result.This unsympathetic of thisnew wave of debate special issue representsa broad cross-section about contextualism. The firsttwo papers focuson the critiqueof contextualismraised by Hawthorneand Stanley,and hence on the relativemeritsof contextualism versus SSI. In the firstof thesepapers, 'The OrdinaryLanguage Basis for and the New Invariantism', Keith DeRose arguesthatthe Contextualism, over this rival approach. DeRose is linguisticdata supportcontextualism concernedto set the contextualist projectsquarelywithinthe traditionof as in the workof Austin,and 'ordinarylanguage' philosophy, exemplified the that best for contextualism argues grounds concerningknowledge attributions come fromhow knowledge-attributing (and knowledge-denying) sentencesare used in ordinarynon-philosophical talk.(DeRose thinksitbest to put the scepticalproblemto one side,largelybecause it is not clearwhat to make of disagreementsin the sceptical case, but also because it is importantthat contextualismcan be motivatedon grounds that are independentof this problem.) Building on his earlier work, but going andLotteries 12 See especially, J. Hawthorne,Knowledge (OxfordUP, 2004);J.Stanley,'On the Studies, LinguisticBasis forContextualism', Philosophical I19 (2004),pp. 1I9-46. C The Editorsof ThePhilosophical Quarterly, 2005


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beyond it in key respects,DeRose identifiesvarious aspects of ordinary language use and explains why they provide such strongsupport for contextualism. He thenturnshis attentionto therivalSSI account,and thesupportthis positionis thoughtto receivefromcertainjudgementsordinaryspeakersare allegedlyinclinedto make about how the contentsof various assertions relateto one another.DeRose arguesthatthe linguisticdata do not leave thetworivalpositionsin an impasse, as Hawthorneand Stanleyclaim,butin factprovidemuchgreatersupportforcontextualism. In 'Knowledge, Speaker and Subject', Stewart Cohen also defends contextualism againstSSI. Cohen beginsby discussinghow contextualism to resolve the lotteryparadox, and then goes on to consideran attempts to due to Hawthorneand Stanley,to theeffect that objection contextualism, it cannot account for how 'knows' functionsin propositional-attitude reports.Cohen arguesthaton closeranalysisthisobjectiondoes not hold with Hawthorneand Stanley's water,and aftercomparingcontextualism alternativeproposal forresolvingthe lotteryparadox, concludesthat the latterfallsshortofprovidinga satisfactory resolution.Cohen thusconcludes that contextualism has significant advantagesover SSI when it comes to accommodatingour epistemicintuitions. The thirdpaper in this collectionalso focuseson the debate between contextualists and invariantists, but seeks to defendinsensitive invariantism againstboth contextualismand SSI. In 'Contextualism,Subject-Sensitive Invariantismand Knowledge of Knowledge',TimothyWilliamsonargues thatinsensitive invariantism has the explanatoryresourcesto accommodate the standard cases used to support both contextualismand SSI, and concludesthattheusual motivation offered forthesetheoriesis undermined. Williamsonbeginsby arguingthatalthoughcontextualism and SSI rely a of in their of assertions upon principle charity interpretation involving thisprinciplefully,in whichcase epistemicterms,neitherapproachsatisfies insensitiveinvariantismshould not be dismissed(as it usuallyis) on the grounds that it alone violates such a principle.Since all theoriesare committedto the view that speakers make systematicerrors in using epistemicterms,thechoice betweenthetheoriesmightseem now to reston how well theycan explainsuch errors.Williamsonproceedsto sketchhow insensitive invariantism can explainthe 'illusionof ignorance'surrounding our denialsofknowledgein highstandardscontextsby appealingto psychological bias caused by salience effects.One possibilityis that the psychologicalsalience of high practicalcosts or vivid scepticalscenarios focusesour attentionon certainerrorpossibilities in such a way as to give rise to psychologicalbias effects. Williamsonargues thata more plausible ? The EditorsofThePhilosophical Qarterly, 2oo5



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proposal emerges once we focus on the proprietyof employingour knowledgein practicalreasoning.On thefaceofit,thisshiftoffocuswould seem to favourcontextualism and SSI, sincewhileit is appropriatefroma practicalstandpointto relyon one's knowledgein low standardscontexts,it becomes too riskyto relyon the same propositionswhen the stakesare raised and standardsbecome high. Williamsonargues, however,that a propositioncan be an appropriatepremiseto use in practicalreasoningeven thoughone is not in a positionto know that it is appropriate,and so maintainsthat one can thereforeknow somethingwithoutbeing in a positionto knowthatone knowsit. On Williamson'sview,thisfactcan be used to explain why we are mistakenlytemptedto deny ascriptionsof knowledgein highstandardscontexts. In 'Contextualismand Scepticism:Even-handedness, Factivityand Surreptitiously Raising Standards',CrispinWrightofferstwo key strandsof criticismagainstcontextualist responsesto scepticism.The firstarguesthat the factivity of knowledgeensuresthat contextualismis unable to maintain the even-handedtreatmentof scepticismand anti-scepticism that it itself as that That maintains contextualist is, offering. presents Wright responsesto scepticismare appealing,at leastin part,because theyseem to allow us to be sympathetic to both sides of the traditionalscepticism/antiand to recover some truthin theassertionsmade by both scepticismdebate, parties.Wrightargues,however,thatthisis illusory,since closerexaminationoftheroleoffactivity forknowledgeindicatesthatthecontextualist is in factunable to maintainany such dialecticaldistanceand thus musttake sidesin thisdebateafterall. The second strandof criticismthat Wrightlevels againstcontextualist responsesto scepticismis thattheyare unable to respondadequatelyto the main scepticalarguments.This is because the contextualist diagnosisof thescepticalthreattreatsthatthreatas arisingout ofa raising oftherelevant epistemicstandards,and yet, argues Wright,many of the key sceptical argumentsdo not trade on a raisingof the epistemicstandardsat all. contextualism is impotentat dealingwithscepticalarguments Accordingly, ofthissort. The fifth paper in thisspecial issue,JessicaBrown's'Adapt or Die: the Death of Invariantism?', focuseson anotherissueof contextualism, namely, the questionof whetherthe context-sensitivity of 'knows'can be straightaccommodatedwithina Gricean picture,as a numberof comforwardly mentatorshave claimed.'3DeRose has arguedagainstthisviewby claiming thatthereis no way of explainingaway the apparentcontext-sensitivity in 'The Context-Sensitivity ofKnowledge Attributions'. Rysiew, '3 See especially ? The Editorsof ThePhilosophical 2005 Quarterly,


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of our usage ofepistemictermsby solelyappealingto thecontext-sensitivity of sentencesthatemploythoseterms.14It is this the assertability-conditions DeRosean thesisthatBrowntakesissuewith. Brown begins by notingthat the classic argumentfor contextualism correctto ascribeknowledgeto a exploitsthefactthatitcan seemintuitively in in not one but another,even thoughshe is in the same context, subject epistemicpositionin both contexts.In response,however,an invariantist manoeuvre(or WAM) accordingto may exploita warrantedassertability reflectmerechangesin the conversational whichtheproblematicintuitions proprietyof the relevantassertions,rather than changes in the truthconditionsofthesentencesasserted.Brownthenfocuseson DeRose's attack on the possibilityof an invariantist WAM, notingfirstthat his argument directlyaffectsonly classical invariantism,and not the more recently developed view of SSI. Brown proceeds to considerDeRose's use of the knowledgeaccountof assertion,as popularizedby Williamson,and claims (withWilliamsonin mind) that there is an importantequivocationhere regardingthe notionof 'warrant'in play when one talksabout 'warranted' assertions.With these considerationsoutlined,Brown offersa classical invariantist data theoryof how one mightunderstandtherelevantlinguistic thatworkswithinany reasonableconstraints we mightplace on a WAM. On the basis of the linguisticdata alone, then,the stateof play as regards contextualism and invariantism as Brownsees it is one of impasse ratherthan thedefaultsupportforcontextualism thatDeRose claims. In thefinalfull-length paper in thisissue,'A Sense of Occasion', Charles Travis draws connectionsbetween epistemologicalcontextualismand a different, althoughrelated,positionin thephilosophyoflanguage.He seeks to explain a view of knowledgewhich emergesout of the writingsof the BritishphilosopherJohn Cook Wilsonand featuresprominently in thework of Austinand John McDowell. Travis beginswithCook Wilson'sconceptionofknowledge,whichtreatsitas havingtwocentralfeatures:(i) itis 'irreducible'(inparticular, itis nota speciesof,and does notinvolve,belief);and so forone). (ii)itis 'unmistakable' (ifone knowsp, thenp is unmistakably Accordingto Austin,argues Travis, we need to appeal to a speaker's in orderto fixa standardoftruthforthespeaker'sutterances. circumstances As Travisputsit,'whatone does say ... in sayingthingsto be suchand such a way will depend upon the circumstancesin which one says it'. Travis points out that similarthingscan be said forsuch notionsas 'evidence', 'what mightbe', and, importantly in Cook Wilson's picture,for 'factive 14 See DeRose, 'Contextualism: an Explanationand Defense',inJ. Greco and E. Sosa (eds), (Oxford:Blackwell,1999),pp. 187-205,and 'Knowledge,Assertion,and Context', Epistemology Review,I11 (2002), pp. 167-203. Philosophical ? The Editorsof ThePhiosophical Quarterly, 2005



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in thisway,and too willbe occasion-sensitive meaning'.Giventhis,knowledge and contempTravis goes on to explainhow thisis relevantto externalist orarycontextualist thought.In the finalsectionTravis explainshowJohn McDowell incorporatesCook Wilson'score conceptionof knowledge,but of epistemic withoutacceptingAustin'saccount of the occasion-sensitivity notions.Travis argues that thisis a mistakeon McDowell's part,since it leads to a tensionwhichMcDowell cannotresolve.Occasion-sensitivity thus appearsobligatory. The issuecloseswithdiscussionsoffourofthearticles.In 'Contextualism, Hawthorne'sInvariantismand Third-PersonCases', AnthonyBrueckner castsa criticaleye overDeRose's contribution to thisissue.In particular,he focuseson DeRose's treatment of knowledge-attributing sentencesin thirdcases and maintains that there are some person importantcriticallacunaein DeRose's arguments. In her discussionof Williamson'sarticle,'Williamsonon Luminosity and Contextualism',Brown claims that Williamson'sappeal to the nonofknowledge- beingsuchthatone can knowa proposition withluminosity out knowingthatone knowsit - is unnecessary, since the critiqueWilliamson offersof contextualism in termsof psychologicalbias would sufficeby itself.Moreover,arguesBrown,thisaccountof how psychologicalbias can affectour knowledgeattributions also offersthe best account of why the cases that contextualists oftenappeal to are characterizedby a failureof luminosity. Tim Black's discussionpiece, 'Classic Invariantism,Relevance and WarrantedAssertability a critiqueofBrown'sfull-length Manoeuvres',offers article,and along theway also criticizesan earlierarticleby DeRose. Brown offers a broadlyGriceanaccountofhow one could accountfortheapparent in our epistemictermsby appealingonlyto the shifting context-sensitivity forknowledgeclaims.This account makesuse of the propriety-conditions ruleofrelevance,and itis thisfeatureofBrown'sthesisthatBlacktakesissue withhere,arguingthat,amongstotherthings,the correctGriceanaccount oftheapparentcontext-sensitivity ofour epistemictermslieselsewhere. in 'Travis' Sense of Alan Millar offersa criticaldisOccasion', Finally, cussionof Travis' paper. In particular,Millar raisessome issuesregarding exactlyhow Travis' view is to be understood,and queries the extentto whichTraviscan employconsiderations to reregardingoccasion-sensitivity solvetheepistemological he is concerned with. problems University ofStirling

? The Editors of The PhilosophicalQuarter~l,200oo5


Pritchard Epistemological Contextualism; Problems and Prospects

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