G.R. No. 126005 January 21, 1999 PEO PEOPLE PLE OF THE THE PHIL PHILIP IPPI PINE NES S and and ALYNN YNN PLE PLEET ETTE TE !Y, petitioners, vs. "O#RT OF APPEALS, $ILLY "ER$O and JONATHAN "ER$O, respondents.
PANGANI$AN, J.: In our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor has the quasi-judicial quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not case should be fled in court. Courts must respect the exercise o such discretion when the inormation fled against the accused valid on its ace, and no manie maniest st erro error, r, grave grave abuse abuse o dis discr creti etion on or preju prejudic dice e can can be imputed to the public prosecutor.
The Case eore us is a !etition or "eview under "ule #$, see%ing to reverse the &une '(, )**+ ecision and the ugust ', )**+ "esolution o the Court o ppeals 1 in C/" 0! 1o. 2+3)(. 2 4he assailed ecision dismissed the !etition or Certiorari fled by the petitioners, which sought to annul and set aside two 5rders o the "egional 4rial 4rial Court o 1abunturan, avao6 the &une '(, )**# 5rder dismissing dismissing the Inormation or murder fled against !rivate "espondent illy Cerbo and the ugust )(, )**# 5rder denying petitioners7 motion or reconsideration. reconsideration. 4he assailed ugust ', )**+ Court o ppeals 8C9 "esolution "esolution li%ewise li%ewise denied petitioners7 motion or reconsideration. reconsideration.
The Facts 4he case below arose rom the atal shooting o !etitioner !etitioner y7s mother, "osalinda "osalinda y, in which the primary suspect was !rivate "espondent &onathan Cerbo, son o !rivate "espondent illy Cerbo. 4he procedural procedural and actual antecedents o the case were summari:ed in the challenged ecision o the Court o ppeals as ollows6 5n ugust 23, )**2, "osalinda y, according to the petition, was shot at pointblan% range by private respondent &onathan Cerbo in the presence and at the o;ce o his ather, private respondent illy Cerbo at !uro% *, !oblacion, 1abunturan, avao. 5n 0eptember ', )**2, eyewitness
5n 0eptember '3, )**2, private respondent &onathan Cerbo executed a countera;davit interposing the deense that the shooting was accidental 8nnex 6 Rollo, pp. 2$-2+9. 5n 5ctober +, )**2, the 2rd =unicipal Circuit 4rial Court o 1abunturan-=awab, avao, ater a preliminary investigation, ound >su;cient ground to engender a well-ounded belie> that the crime o murder has been committed by private respondent &onathan Cerbo and resolved to orward the entire records o the case to the provincial prosecutor at 4agum, avao 8nnex <, Rollo, pp. 2-2(9. ter ?an@ inormation or murder was fled against &onathan Cerbo, petitioner lynn !le:ette y, daughter o the victim "osalinda y, executed an a;davit-complaint charging private respondent illy Cerbo o conspiracy in the %illing 8nnex A, Rollo, p. 2*9, supported by a supplemental a;davit o
in addition> to her previous statement that6 2. In addition to my said sworn statement, I voluntarily and reely aver as ollows6 a9 I vividly recall that while my mistress "osalinda /o and I were in the o;ce o illy Cerbo at about ))6#$ a.m. on ugust 23, )**2, =r. Cerbo personally instructed me to etch the ood rom the %itchen ?and to bring it@ to the o;ce instead o the dining room. b9 Bhile bringing the ood, =r. Cerbo again instructed me to place the ood ?o@n a corner table and commanded me to sit behind the entrance door and at the same time =r. Cerbo positioned "osalinda ?on@ a chair acing the entrance door or an easy target. c9 Immediately ater "osalinda was shot, =r. illy Cerbo called his son &onathan who was running, but did not and ha?s@ never bothered to bring "osalinda to a hospital or even apply frst aid. d9 4o my surprise, =r. illy Cerbo, instead o bringing "osalinda to the hospital, brought her to the uneral parlor and immediately ordered her to be embalmed without even inorming her children or any o her immediate relatives xxx.7 nnex /. Rollo, p. #3.9 !rivate respondent illy Cerbo submitted a counter-a;davit denying the allegations o both petitioner lynn !le:ette y and =otion or leave o court to reinvestigate the case> 8nnex I, Rollo, pp. #2-##9 which was granted by the respondent judge in an order dated pril '(, )**# 8nnex &, Rollo, p. #$9.
In his resolution dated =ay $, )**#, !rosecutor Dumangtad recommended the fling o an amended inormation including illy Cerbo >. . . as one o the accused in the murder case . . .> 8nnex E6 Rollo, pp. #+-#*9. ccordingly, the prosecution fled an amended inormation including illy Cerbo in the murder case. warrant or his arrest was later issued on =ay ', )**# 8 Rollo, p. '9. !rivate respondent illy Cerbo then fled a motion to quash warrant o arrest arguing that the same was issued without probable cause 8 Rollo, p. '9. 5n &une '(, )**#, respondent &udge issued the frst assailed order dismissing the case against illy Cerbo and recalling the warrant or his arrest?F@ the dispositive portion o ?the order@ reads6 I1 4< DI/4 5A DD 4< A5"
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals In its )3-page ecision, the Court o ppeals debun%ed petitioners7 assertion that the trial judge committed a grave abuse o discretion in recalling the warrant o arrest and subsequently dismissing the case against illy Cerbo. Citing jurisprudence, & the appellate court held as ollows6 4he ruling is explicit. I upon the fling o the inormation in court, the trial judge, ater reviewing the inormation and the documents attached thereto, fnds that no probable cause exists, must either call or the complainant and the witnesses or simply dismiss the case. !etitioners question the applicability o the doctrine laid down in the above?-@mentioned case, alleging that the acts therein are diGerent rom the instant case. Be rule that the disparity o acts does not prevent the application o the principle. Be have gone over the supplemental a;davit o
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the case as against private respondent illy Cerbo or lac% o probable cause. xxx xxx xxx 4he prosecution, i it really believed that illy Cerbo is probably guilty by conspiracy, should have presented additional evidence su;ciently and credibly demonstrating the existence o probable cause. xxx xxx xxx
5
In sum, the Court o ppeals held that &udge
The Assigned Errors !etitioner y avers6 )9 4he Court o ppeals gravely erred in holding that the "egional 4rial Court &udge had the authority to reverse ?the public prosecutor7s@ fnding o probable cause to prosecute accused . . . and thus dismiss the case fled by the latter on the basis o a motion to quash warrant o arrest. '9 4he Court o ppeals gravely erred in ully and unqualifedly applying the case o llado, et. al. vs. !CC, et. al. /.". 1o. ))2+23, ?to@ the case at bench despite ?the@ clear diGerence in their respective actual bac%drop?s@ and the contrary earlier jurisprudence on the matter. ' 5n the other hand, the solicitor general posits this sole issue6 Bhether the Court o ppeals erred in fnding that no probable cause exists to merit the fling o charges against private respondent illy Cerbo. (
The Court's Ruling
4he petition is meritorious. 4he trial court erred in dismissing the inormation fled against the private respondent. Consequently the Court o ppeals was li%ewise in error when it upheld such ruling.
Executive Deterination of !ro"a"le Cause 4he determination o probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a unction that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive unction, 9 the correctness o the exercise o which is matter that the trial court itsel does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. 4he 0eparate 8Concurring9 5pinion o ormer Chie &ustice ndres ". 1arvasa in Ro"erts v. Court of Appeals 10 succinctly elucidates such point in this wise6 xxx xxx xxx In this special civil action, this Court is being as%ed to assume the unction o a public prosecutor. It is being as%ed to determine whether probable cause exists as regards petitioners. =ore concretely, the Court is being as%ed to examine and assess such evidence as has thus ar been submitted by the parties and, on the basis thereo, ma%e a conclusion as to whether or not it su;ces >to engender a well ounded belie that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereo and should be held or trial.> It is a unction that this Court should not be called upon to perorm. It is a unction that properly pertains to the public prosecutor, one that, as ar as crimes cogni:able by a "egional 4rial Court are concerned, and notwithstanding that it involves an adjudicative process o a sort, exclusively pertains, by law, to said executive o;cer, the public prosecutor. It is moreover a unction that in the established scheme o things, is supposed to be perormed at the very genesis o, indeed, preatorily to, the ormal commencement o a criminal action. 4he proceedings beore a public prosecutor, it may well be stressed, are essentially preliminary, preatory and cannot lead to a fnal, defnite and authoritative adjudgment o the guilt or innocence o the persons charged with a elony or crime. Bhether or not that unction has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment o the existence o probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itsel does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. It is not or instance permitted or an accused, upon the fling o the inormation against him by the public prosecutor, to pre-empt trial by fling a motion with the 4rial Court praying or the quash or dismissal o the indictment on the ground that the evidence upon which the same is based is inadequate. 1or is it permitted, on the antipodal theory that the evidence is in truth inadequate, or the complaining party to present a petition beore the Court praying
that the public prosecutor be compelled to fle the corresponding inormation against the accused. xxx xxx xxx Indeed, the public prosecutor has broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he or she believes to have committed the crime as defned by law. 5therwise stated, such o;cial has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case list be fled in court. 11 4hus, in Crespo v. #ogul, 12we ruled6 It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by inormation shall be prosecuted under the direction and control o the fscal. 4he institution o a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion o the fscal. e may or may not fle the complaint or inormation, ollow or not ollow that presented by the oGended party, according to whether the evidence, in his opinion, is su;cient or not to establish the guilt o the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 4he reason or placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control o the fscal is to prevent malicious or unounded prosecutions by private persons. . . . !rosecuting o;cers under the power vested in them by the law, not only have the authority but also the duty o prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received rom the complainant, are shown to be guilty o a crime committed within the jurisdiction o their o;ce. 4hey have equally the duty not to prosecute when the evidence adduced is not su;cient to establish a pria facie case. 4his broad prosecutoral power is however nor unettered, because just as public prosecutors are obliged to bring orth beore the law those who have transgressed it, they are also constrained to be circumspect in fling criminal charges against the innocent. 4hus, or crimes cogni:able by regional trial courts, preliminary investigations are usually conducted. In $edesa v. Court of Appeals, 1% we discussed the purposes and nature o a preliminary investigation in this manner6 4he primary objective o a preliminary investigation is to ree respondent rom the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress o deending himselJhersel in the course o a ormal trial, until the reasonable probability o his or her guilt in a more or less summary proceeding by a competent o;ce designated by law or that purpose. 0econdarily, such summary proceeding also protects the state rom the burden o the unnecessary expense an eGort in prosecuting alleged oGenses and in holding trials arising rom alse, rivolous or groundless charges. 0uch investigation is not part o the trial. ull and exhaustive presentation o the parties7 evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belie than an oGense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereo. y reason o the abbreviated nature o preliminary investigations, a
dismissal o the charges as a result thereo is not equivalent to a judicial pronouncement o acquittal. ence, no double jeopardy attaches.
%udicial Deterination of !ro"a"le Cause 4he determination o probable cause to hold a person or trial must be distinguished rom the determination o probable cause to issue a warrant o arrest, which is a judicial unction. 4he judicial determination o probable cause in the issuance o arrest warrants has been emphasi:ed in numerous cases. In &o v. !eople , 1& the Court summari:ed the pertinent rulings on the subject, as ollows6 4he above rulings in Soliven, nting and $i, Sr . were iterated in Allado v. Dio(no, where we explained again what probable cause means. !robable cause or the issuance o a warrant o arrest is the existence o such acts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an oGense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. ence, the judge, beore issuing a warrant o arrest, >must satisy himsel that based on the evidence submitted, there is su;cient proo that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereo.> t this stage o the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tas%ed to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is su;cient that he personally evaluates such evidence in determining probable cause. In )e"" v. De $eon we stressed that the judge merely determines the probability, not the certainty, o guilt o the accused and, in doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing. e simply personally reviews the prosecutor7s initial determination fnding probable cause to see i it is supported by substantial evidence. 8sort o reviewhun niya ang determination by the prosecutor in re probable cause9 xxx xxx xxx In light o the aorecited decisions o this Court, such justifcation cannot be upheld. Dest we be too repetitive, we only emphasi:e three vital matters once more6 Airst, as held in Inting, the determination o probable cause by the prosecutor is or a purpose diGerent rom that which is to be made by the judge. Bhether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty o the oGense charged and should be held or trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. 4he judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant o arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity or placing him under immediate custody in order not to rustrate the ends o justice. 4hus, even i both should base their fndings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no conusion as to their distinct objectives. 0econd, since their objectives are diGerent, the judge cannot rely solely on the report o the prosecutor in fnding probable cause to justiy the issuance o a
warrant o arrest. 5bviously and understandably, the contents o the prosecutor7s report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused o an oGense and hold him or trial. owever, the judge must decide independently. ence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor7s bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own fndings on the existence or non-existence o probable cause to issue an arrest order. 4his responsibility o determining personally and independently the existence o non-existence o probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law o the land. !arenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden o the judge and speed up the litigation process by orwarding to the latter not only the inormation and his bare resolution, but also so much o the records and the evidence on hand as to enable is onor to ma%e his personal and separate judicial fnding on whether to issue a warrant o arrest. Dastly, It is not required that the complete or entire records o the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. Be do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records o every case all the time simply or the purpose o ordering the arrest o the accused. Bhat is required, rather, is that the judge must have su;cient supporting documents 8such as the complaint, a;davits, counter-a;davits, sworn statements o witnesses or transcript o stenographic notes, i any9 upon which to ma%e his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon which to veriy the fndings o the prosecutor as to the existence o probable cause. 4he point is6 he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor7s recommendation, as the "espondent Court did in this case. lthough the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption o regularity in the perormance o his duties and unctions, which in turn gives his report the presumption o accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance o warrants o arrest. 4his Court has consistently held that a judge ails in his bounded duty i he relies merely on the certifcation or the report o the investigating o;cer. xxx xxx xxx Herily, a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant o arrest i he or she deems that there is no probable cause or doing so. Corollary to this principle, the judge should not override the public prosecutor7s determination o probable cause to hold an accused or trial on the ground that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance o an arrest warrant was insu;cient, as in the present case. Indeed, it could be unair to expect the prosecution to present all the evidence needed to secure the conviction o the accused upon the fling o the inormation against the latter. 4he reason is ound in the nature and the objective o a preliminary investigation. ere, the public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt o the guilt o the person chargedF they merely determine >whether there is su;cient ground to engender a well-ounded belie that a crime . . . has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereo, and should be held or trial.> 15
napplica"ilt* of Allado and Salonga 4he Court o ppeals anchored its ruling on the pronouncement made in Allado v. Dio(no6> . . . ?I@, upon the fling o the inormation in court, the trial judge, ater reviewing the inormation and the documents attached thereto, must either call or the complainant and the witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. 4here is no reason to hold the accused or trial and urther expose him to an open and public accusation o the crime when no probable cause exists.> 1' In llado, !etitioners iosdado &ose llado and "oberto I. =endo:a, practicing lawyers, were accused by the !residential nti-Crime Commission 8!CC9 o %idnapping with murder and ordered by &udge "oberto C. io%no to be arrested without bail. 4he petitioners questioned the issuance o the warrants or their arrest contending that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse o discretion and in excess o his jurisdiction in holding that there was probable cause against them. 4hey contended that the trial court relied merely on the resolution o the investigating panel and its certifcation that probable cause existed, without personally determining the admissibility and su;ciency o the evidence or such fnding and without stating the basis thereo. 4hey maintained that the records o the preliminary investigation, which was the sole basis o the judge7s ruling, ailed to establish probable cause against them that would justiy the issuance o warrants or their arrest. 4he Court declared that &udge io%no has indeed committed grave abuse o discretion in issuing the arrest warrants. Contrary to the constitutional mandate and established jurisprudence, he merely relied on the certifcation o the prosecutors as to the existence o the probable cause, instead o personally examining the evidence, the complainant and his witness.> Aor otherwise,> the Court said >he would have ound out that the evidence thus ar presented was utterly insu;cient to warrant the arrest o the petitioners> 1( In categorically stating that the evidence so ar presented did not meet the standard o probable cause and subsequently granting the petition, the Court noted the ollowing circumstances6 frst, the corpus delicti was not established, and there was serious doubt as to the alleged victim7s death6 second, the extra judicial statement o the principal witness, who had priorly conessed his participation in the crime, was ull o material inconsistenciesF and third, the !CC operatives who investigated the case never implicated the petitioners.
Citing Salonga v. Cru+!a-o , the Court o ppeals pointed out that when there was no pria facie case against a person sought to be charged with a crime, >the judge or fscal, thereore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn out during trial, or this would be Kagrant violation o a basic right which the courts are created to uphold.> 19 In the aorecited case, !etitioner &ovito ". 0alonga sought to bar the fling o an Inormation or violation o the revised nti-0ubversion ct, which &udge undue haste in the fling o the Inormation and in the inordinate interest o the government> in pursuing the caseF 21 and in 0alonga, > . . . the ailure o the prosecution to show that the petitioner was probably guilty o conspiring to commit the crime, the initial disregard o petitioner7s constitutioner rights ?and@ the massive and damaging publicity against him.> 22 In other words, while the respective sets o evidence beore the prosecutors in the Allado and Salonga were >utterly insu;cient> to support a fnding o probable cause, the same cannot be said o the present case. Be stress that Allado and Salonga constitute exceptions to the general rule and may be invo%ed only i similar circumstances are clearly shown to exist. ut as the oregoing comparisons show, such similarities are absent in the instant case. ence, the rulings in the two aorementioned cases cannot apply to it.
#otion )ithout Reuisite /otice 5ne more thing, !etitioners aver that !rivate "espondent Cerbo did not give them a copy o the =otion to Luash the Barrant o rrest, which had been issued against him, or a notice o the scheduled hearing. 4hus, they contend, &udge Halles should not have entertained such motion.
It is settled that every written motion in a trial court must be set or hearing by the applicant and served with the notice o hearing thereo, in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party. 4he provisions on this matter in 0ection # and $, "ule )$ o the "ules o the Court, 2% are categorical and mandatory character. 2& Mnder 0ection + o the said rule, no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proo o service thereo. 4he rationale or this rule is simple6 unless the movants set the time and the place o hearing, the court will be unable to determine whether the adverse parties agree or object to the motions, since the rules themselves do not fx any period within which they may fle their replies or oppositions. 25 4he motion to quash the warrant o arrest in the present case being pro fora, inasmuch as the requisite copy and notice were not duly served upon the adverse party, the trial court had no authority to act on it.
Epilogue In granting this petition, we are not prejudging the criminal case or the guilt or innocence o !rivate "espondent illy Cerbo. Be simply saying that, as a general rule, i the inormation is valid on its ace and there is no showing o maniest error, grave abuse o discretion or prejudice on the part o the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it or 7want o evidence,7 because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial. 4he unctions and duties o both the trial court and the public prosecutor in >the proper scheme o things> in our criminal justice system should be clearly understood. 4he rights o the people rom what could sometimes be an 77oppressive> exercise o government prosecutorial powers do need to be protected when circumstances so require. ut just as we recogni:e this need, we also ac%nowledge that the 0tate must li%ewise be accorded due process. 4hus, when there is no showing o nearious irregularity or maniest error in the perormance o a public prosecutor7s duties, courts ought to rerain rom interering with such lawully and judicially mandated duties. In any case, i there was palpable error or grave abuse o discretion in the public prosecutor7s fnding o probable cause, the accused can appeal such fnding to the justice secretary 26 and move or the deerment or suspension o the proceeding until such appeal is resolved. B<"
