Plethon vs. Orthodoxy of Scholarius and the Catholicism of Aquinas

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Herausgegeben von Tzotcho Boiadjiev, Georgi Kapriev und Аndreas Speer ǕǚǞǟǕǟǠǟǔǍǞǝǒǑǚǛǏǒǗǛǏǚǍǡǕǘǛǞǛǡǕǬǕǗǠǘǟǠǝǍ

Издаван от Цочо Бояджиев, Георги Каприев и Андреас Шпеер

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Archiv XIX

IDOLIZING PAGANISM  DEMONIZING CHRISTIANITY: À PROPOS: N. SINIOSSOGLOU, RADICAL PLATONISM IN BYZANTIUM: ILLUMINATION AND UTOPIA IN GEMISTOS PLETHON &+5,67,$$1:.$33(6 81,9(56,'$''(/26+(0,6)(5,2648,72 Dr. Niketas Siniossoglou’s hefty tome1 attempts to provide the reader with an intellectual history of Byzantium, while it also seeks to solve riddles of Gemistos Plethon’s thought and intellectual character. Plethon´s „paganism,“ his place in the history of Byzantine thought (especially à propos historical rival movements, e.g., Palamism), and other themes are touched upon in S.’s work as the result of highly specialized research with an eye toward enlightening the reader to obscure aspects of Byzantine intellectual thought. This review will evaluate S.´s contribution by both contextualizing his approach and noting his method. It will also attempt to critique S.´s hermeneutic by reviewing select arguments within his work. Unfortunately, one foreboding aspect of this work is its price (originally priced at £ 70.00 or € 91.00). However, should an author successfully change the direction of scholarly discussion in his field, the specialist may find that the book price is well worth it.

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N. Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium. Illumination and Utopia in Gemistos Plethon (“Cambridge Classical Studies“), Cambridge, 2011.

Christiaan W. Kappes (Universidad de los Hemisferios, Quito) IDOLIZING PAGANISM  DEMONIZING CHRISTIANITY: À PROPOS: N. SINIOSSOGLOU, RADICAL PLATONISM IN BYZANTIUM: ILLUMINATION AND UTOPIA IN GEMISTOS PLETHON

1. An author´s bibliography may help the reader evaluate a book as much as the text itself Throughout the book S. spends significant intellectual capital in order to argue not only Plethon´s positions and influences, but also those of Barlaam the Calabrian; namely, their pagan-humanistic and „optimistic“ epistemology (inter alia). As one would suspect in this context, the content of any such epistemology is heavily indebted to Platonism. Investigation of Plethon and Barlaam through the prism of Platonism is S.’s forte in this work. This likely stems from his doctoral dissertation on Theodoret of Cyrrhus, which has also been recently published as: Plato and Theodoret: The Christian Appropriation of Platonic Philosophy and the Hellenic Intellectual Resistance.1 In this previous work, as in the present work under review, a key advisor for S.’s thesis was Dr. Peter Garnsey,2 himself an 1

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Id., Plato and Theodoret. The Christian Appropriation of Platonic Philosophy and the Hellenic Intellectual Resistance, Cambridge, 2008 (Doct. Diss.). http://www.classics.cam.ac.uk/faculty/staff-bios/research_staff/peter_garnsey/ (access 02.08.2012)

Idolizing Paganism – Demonizing Christianity:...

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expert on Platonism. In fact, in Radical Platonism in Byzantium, S.’s advisory team almost exclusively consists of experts on Platonism, some of whom have also made contributions via studies of early Christianity and (to some extent) Aristotelian philosophy.3 For this reason, it is no surprise that S. attempts to syphon out Platonic elements from both Plethon and Barlaam’s theology and philosophy (as well as from other authors and texts). This project is both commendable and interesting in itself. Unfortunately, from the very beginning, such a noble project has no possibility of being brought to term within Radical Platonism in Byzantium. To begin with, a short glance at the author´s bibliography alerts the reader to the fact that any evaluation of Barlaam by S. can only be haphazard at best. Even before a reader might want to consider engaging S.´s arguments, this summary judgment can be rendered confidently. Such an evaluation is due to S.’s apparent unfamiliarity with Barlaam´s works that should ordinarily be essential reading for interpreting the Calabrian’s theological and philosophical vision. S. failed to consult two important compilations of Barlaam’s writings relevant to his arguments (both of which are available in print and in critical editions): Barlaam Calabro. Opere contro i Latini. Introduzione, storia dei testi, edizione critica, traduzione e indici, and Dalla controversia palamitica alla polemica esicastica con un’edizione critica delle epistole greche di Barlaam.4 This glaringly incomplete treatment of Barlaam’s corpus is coupled with a lack of any references to important modern studies, especially those of A. Fyrigos.5 It may be true that not all of Barlaam’s works can 3

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Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), p. xii. Nearly all the names listed by S. are easily traceable to a university’s or professor’s site. Of course, the present judgments about S.’s advisors are the result of a perusal of each named professor’s Curriculum Vitae. Op. cit. (cf. supra, n. 1), pp. 427–429. This omission is glaring and can be found wanting in the bibliography. See: Id., Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), p. 435. Please note the following studies on Barlaam: A. Fyrigos, „Barlaam Calabro tra l’aristotelismo scolastico e il neoplatonismo bizantino“,

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Christiaan W. Kappes (Universidad de los Hemisferios, Quito)

be said to contribute to his philosophical vision,6 yet both the introductions to and the texts of many of his writings are essential for understanding his thought and its progression. In addition to Fyrigos’ modern critical editions, there is not even a reference to Schirò’s classic text of Barlaam’s epistles.7 On the contrary, S. merely employs Gregory Palamas’ comments on Barlaam (and those of some of his followers). Clearly, the reader cannot expect any global presentation of Barlaam (which is actually essential for portions of the narrative proposed within S.’s own work). Instead, S. relies heavily on Gregory Palamas’ critique of Barlaam. Of course, it is legitimate for a scholar to seek to argue that Palamas’ perspective is the most insightful interpretation of the Calabrian. Still, the difficulty lies in the fact that the book leaves the reader with an interpretation of Barlaam’s thought drawn almost exclusively from the perspective of his most vehement adversary. S. attempts to rectify this bias only to a limited degree. He does so by relying on two critically edited texts of Barlaam by R.E. Sinkewicz.8 A panoramic view of Barlaam would be naturally more

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Il Veltro 27, 1983, pp. 185–194; ed. A. Fyrigos, Barlaam Calabro. L’uomo, l’opera, il pensiero, Seminara, 1999. E.g., ed. P. Carelos, 7P`ZPó[ c^š ?PZPQ`^š @^RXbcXYø (“Corpus philosophorum Medii Aevi. Philosophi Byzantini“, 8), Athens, 1996. Still, the brief Introduction to these purely mathematical writings includes a crucial discussion of the epistemological status of mathematics, geometry, and astronomy from an AristotelianNeoplatonic prespective. Ed. G. Schirò, Barlaam Calabro. Epistole greche. I primordi episodici e dottrinari delle lotte esicaste, Palermo, 1954. S. includes the following studies in his bibliography: R.E. Sinkewicz, „A New Interpretation for the First Episode in the Controversy Between Barlaam the Calabrian and Gregory Palamas“, The Journal of Theological Studies 31, 1980, pp. 489–500 (N.B., This thesis is at odds with Fyrigos’ positions in both his Contro i Latini... and Epistole greche...); Id., „The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God in the Early Writings of Barlaam the Calabrian“, Mediaeval Studies 44, 1982, pp. 181–242. However, he fails to cite this important study, by the same author: „The „Solutions“ Addressed to George Lapithes by Barlaam the Calabrian and Their Philosophical Con-


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cognizant of his sources in his Contra Latinos. Though heavily indebted to Platonism, Barlaam’s Christian identity can in no way be cast into doubt (contra Palamam). Furthermore, in his epistles, Barlaam believed that pagan philosophers (except Platonici), and even the „rationalists“ like Thomas Aquinas, were possessed by demons.9 Barlaam’s „Platonism“ must be viewed from the optic of Barlaam’s own views of compatibility between Aristotle and Plato. Barlaam opted for compatibility, whereas Plethon upheld an incommensurability view. S.’s simplification still leads the reader to render Barlaam an enemy of the allegedly anti-philosophical Palamas. However, it requires a logical leap to further claim that Barlaam is, thus, a crypto-pagan. This conclusion merely mimics a traditional Byzantine category (and accusation) of „Hellenizer“ against those who employ pagan learning. It should not naively be upheld without foundation and the necessary nuances. Additionally, the bibliography is selective, not comprehensive. Many expected secondary sources are wanting with respect to both updated and relevant studies on the historical figures that S. wishes to engage within his opus.

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text“, Mediaeval Studies 43, 1981, pp. 152–199, which reveals a lot about the identity of Barlaam’s so-called Platonism. For an example of Barlaam’s consideration of philosophers’ errors as demonic in their origin, see: Barlaam Calabro, Epistlola III, 27.256–264 (ed. A. Fyrigos, Dalla controversia palamitica alla polemica esicastica con un’edizione critica delle epistole greche di Barlaam (“Medioevo“, 11), Rome, 2005, p. 320). For an example of Barlaam’s arguments against the value of Aristotelian (and Platonic) demonstrations of „divine things“ ad sententiam Patrum, see: op. cit., 75.685–81.744. There is a thorough assessment of Barlaam and his sources (gleaned from Fyrigos’s two monumental studies) in: J.A. Demetracopoulos, „Further Evidence on the Ancient, Patristic, and Byzantine Sources of Barlaam the Calabrian’s Contra Latinos“, Byzantinische Zeitschrift 96, 2003, pp. 83–122. Also, see: Id., „Barlaam the Calabrian“, in: ed. H. Lagerlund, Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy between 500–1500, New York, 2011, pp. 141–144. This last citation provides a summary of concrete Neoplatonic texts used by Barlaam and serves as a preview to a forthcoming monograph included in the article’s bibliography.

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One small, illustrative example should suffice to alert the reader to peruse parts of S.’s text cum cautela. Toward the beginning of his work, S. proposes a precarious chronology for George-Gennadius Scholarius (a key figure in S.’s work). Therein, S. leaves the reader with the impression that Scholarius was a former disciple of Gemistos Plethon.10 This proposition is both an interesting and an exciting hypothesis, insofar as it introduces both drama and a potential personal „history“ between two rival figures (i.e., Plethon and Scholarius). Such an historical scenario could add great weight to statements made by Scholarius about Plethon’s personal history and thought. However, as his support, S. cites only two 19th century authors (and a spurious composition attributed to Scholarius). S. notes that these two authors proposed that Scholarius had ventured to the Peloponnese to study under Plethon.11 Interestingly, these two authors disagree among themselves on the possible date for such an alleged visit. In his citations, S. fails to alert the reader to the disagreement between the two authors, nor does he attempt to solve the riddle of Scholarius’ visit (which would have constituted a minor contribution to Scholarius’ biography). Instead he simply chooses one of the two authors’ proposed dates as his preference and passes over the other in silence. S. even goes so far as to propose more „persuasive“ evidence for his hypothesis by referring to a text once attributed to Scholarius. Unfortunately, S. cites the Encomium of St. Leontius

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Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), pp. 130–131. C. Alexandre, „Notice préliminaire sur Pléthon, sur ses ouvrages et en particulier sur son „Traité de Lois““, in: EZøWh\â Bü[h\ bdRR`PeńacóbhUü[T\P5EZècV^\. Traité de lois, Paris, 1858, pp. xiv-xv. H. Tozer, „A Byzantine Reformer“, Journal of Hellenic Studies 7, 1886, pp. 353–380, esp. p. 359. N.B., Alexandre claims this took place in 1427, whereas Tozer assumes it certain by his time that it was 1428. It turns out that the real date is fall of 1428. See: George Sphrantzes, Chronicon XV, 8 – XVI, 2 (ed. R. Maisano, Georgii Sphrantzae Chronicon (“Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantine“, 29), Rome, 1990, pp. 34–36).


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of Monemvasia, which has proved almost certainly spurious.12 S.’s presentation of the evidence can be misleading. He writes: „However, Lampros considered it probable that Scholarius studied in Mistra. His evidence comes from a piece attributed to Scholarius that mentions an unnamed ØeVRVc÷a `Tcńa _P`ôSTXR[PQú^d who may possibly be identified with Plethon. Zakythinos provided stronger grounds for considering a link between Scholarius and Mistra: Scholarius is the author of the epitaph of Demetrios Leontarios, an important personality in the despotate who died in 1431. In that case Scholarios’ testimony implies that he first had contact with Plethon’s ideas before that date.“13 Though S. briefly mentions (in a footnote) that Tinnefeld considers the encomium spurious, he makes no attempt to inform the reader that Tinnefeld and his lot represent the sanior pars. The reader is left with the impression that S.’s preference is in the ascendancy.14 This incomplete historical presention becomes more pronounced after surveying 20th-21st century works on Scholarius.15 12

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Were Scholarius its author, it would have firmly placed him in the Peloponnese during his younger years. For the strong arguments against the authenticity of the attribution, see: E. AngelomatiTsougaraki, „Ò ÐbXâ @Tü\cXâ Ì Y A^\T[QPbúPa ¥RYĀ[X^\ ŋ 7úâ ŋ Y^Z^dWúP ŋ bfTcXYPù _T`ù c^š Ìbú^d [TZöcPι“, @PYh\XYPù b_^dSPù 7, 1983, pp. 61–107, esp. pp. 84–85. Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), pp. 131–132. With respect to the epitaph for Demetrios Leontarios, see: M.-H. Blanchet, Georges Gennadios Scholarios (vers 1400-vers 1472): un intellectuel orthodoxe face à la disparition de l’Empire byzantin, Paris, 2008, p. 282. The authenticity of the epitaph is not debated. Still, this circumstantial evidence (especially when it stands alone) is weak. Loenertz mentions nothing of a journey of Scholarius to the Peloponnese before 1437. See: R.-J. Loenertz, „Pour la biographie du cardinal Bessarion“, Orientalia Christiana Periodica 10, 1944, pp. 116–149, esp. pp. 134–135. Turner does not allude to this possi-

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These works tend either to ignore any such visit by Scholarius to the Peloponnese in 1427/8, or they flatly deny that he either was a disciple of Plethon or had visited the peninsula during this period. Although S. is free to disagree with these authors, the nature of his work would seem to demand more detail, perhaps a synthesis of the data, and certainly some support for an important historical assertion that is anything but definitive. In fact, the present author happens to favor the Alexandre-Tozer hypothesis (along with S.) as a distinct possibility. However, support for such speculation would seem to demand taking into account more recent scholarly contributions that touch on Scholarius’ life and times within the confines of Byzantium.16

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ble facet of Scholarius’ life either. He explicitly discusses aspects of Alexandre’s work on Scholarius and Plethon, but neither confirms nor denies Scholarius’ 1428 journey to the Peloponnese. Cf. C. J. Turner, „An Anomalous Episode in the Relations between Scholarios and Plethon“, Byzantine Studies 3, 1976, pp. 56–63, esp. p. 56. It is also absent from his thorough treatment of Scholarius’ chronology in: Id., „The Carreer of George-Gennadius Scholarius“, Byzantion 39, 1969, pp. 420–455, esp. pp. 422–428. Tinnefeld makes no judgment on the matter. See: F. Tinnefeld, „Georgios Gennadios Scholarios“, in: edd. C.G. Conticello and V. Conticello, La théologie byzantine et sa tradition. II: XIIIe–XIXe s., Turnhout, pp. 477–549. The discussion is lacking in: Blanchet, Georges Gennadios Scholarios (vers 1400-vers 1472)... (cf. supra, n. 15). The present author’s agreement with S.’s hypothesis is per accidens. It would have been to S.’s credit to argue for lacunae in 20th and 21st century studies on this matter. Furthermore, it would have been an opportunity to synthesize the results of modern historical research with respect to these seminal works. Instead of relying principally on 19th century historical claims, it is now possible to argue Scholarius’ visit to the Peloponnese via the facts now known about his life. See: M.-H. Blanchet / Th. Ganchou, „Les fréquentations byzantines de Lodisio de Tabriz, Dominicain de Péra (†1435): Géôrgios Scholarios, Iôannès Chrysolôras et Théodôros Kalékas“, Byzantion 75, 2005, pp. 71–103; Th. Ganchou, „Les ultimae voluntates de Manuel et Iôannès Chrysolôras et le séjour de Francesco Filelfo à Constantinople“, Bizantinistica. Rivista di Studi Bizantini


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Though the bibliography is wanting and sometimes dated, there are some excellent and unique bibliographical references e Slavi 7, 2005, pp. 195–285. Here are but two articles establishing Scholarius’ sojourn and relations in Constantinople that can now be attested to with certainty in the 1420’s until 1426/7. Also, sufficient historical data currently exists to place him within the environs of Constantinople by 1430. Argyriou has finally allowed for a dating of one of Scholarius’ letters (viz., to Macarius Makrês) to the winter of 1430. A. Argyriou, Macaire Makrès et la polémique contre l’Islam („Studi e Testi“, 314), Vatican City, 1986, pp. 8, 46. Woodhouse thinks it likely that Scholarius was part of the imperial retinue (1426/1428). However, without directly refuting previous claims, he assumes that Scholarius never studied under Plethon. See: C.M. Woodhouse, George Gemistos Plethon. The Last of the Hellenes, Oxford, 2000, p. 39. Because of Scholarius’ associations with important political personages in the 1420’s, evidence now exists to support Alexandre´s and Tozer´s assertions that Scholarius may have accompanied the imperial retinue to the Peloponnese around 1428. A synthesis of all these facts leaves open the possibility of travel between 1428–1430. Before these 20th century studies, Scholarius’ visit was based on a couple of vague references within his corpus. This, coupled with an unknown chronology of the young Scholarius, allowed for any number of hypotheses. One modern argument for Scholarius as a possible former disciple of Plethon can be found in: Th. N. Zesses,8T\\ôSXâ7ŵGf^Zô`Xâ 7úâ ŋ bdRR`ô[[PcP ŋ SXSPbYPZúP („\ôZTYcP 7ZPcôSh\“, 30), Thessanoniki, 1979 (21988), p. 84. Zesses argues the possibility from Scholarius’ own words: „Yea, with respect to myself, I myself do not deem it unworthy to admit him to the post of teacher (translation mine)“. See: George-Gennadius Scholarius, ?PcócŮ\EZńWh\â _^`XŮ\_Ľ`Xbc^cöZTX (edd. L. Petit / X.A. Sideridès / M. Jugie, Oeuvres complètes de Georges Scholarios, Vol. IV, Paris, 1935, p. 115, ll. 7–11). Still, the meaning of this sentence can safely be derived only in view of its context; Scholarius says that, if rumors of Plethon’s desire not to be a Christian were ever falsified by Plethon himself, Scholarius would be prepared to reconcile with Plethon and recognize his wisdom –as if he were his teacher– (at least in the context of the Plato-Aristotle affair). Obviously, this has nothing to do with the issue of Scholarius’ mentors in his youth.

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that point to S.’s philological background and studies. These are valuable, indeed, for any scholar who wishes to compile a replete bibliography covering figures of late Byzantium such as Plethon, Palamas, etc.

2. Interpretive approaches to philosophy and authorities Before entering into the main thesis of the author (i.e., a historical revision of the personality and thought of Plethon in Byzantium), it first behooves the reader to consider other recurring oddities in the book so that s/he might be able to make a discerning read of it. Another important facet of S.’s approach to the historical data can be illustrated by his use of terminology and footnotes. S.’s project in Radical Platonism in Byzantium is expansive and ambitious. This, of course, can be a positive facet of any work. However, the difficulty encountered in this ambitious work is found in the illusive nature of his „categories“ to describe the intellectual commitments and thought of several authors who may only tangentially or partially fall into a category or under a term employed by S. For example, in medieval philosophy, there exists the traditional category of „Thomist“ (i.e., philosopher/ theologian ad mentem Thomae). This is meant to convey, more or less, a generic idea, which encompasses a philosopher or theologian’s worldview or intellectual method. Additionally, „Aristotelian“ and „Platonic“ are examples of adjectives employed within ancient philosophy to categorize a thinker according to a specific criterion. The historical difficulty with such labels is that, in the absence of a Rosetta stone within the author’s own text to understand the „essential doctrines“ denoted by such terms, each category could end up as either equivocal (varying in meaning from author to author) or merely denote some peculiar univocal idea held by the author that must be gleaned from within his text. For example, an author could idiosyncratically define a Thomist as: „anyone who admires the philosophy/theology of Thomas Aquinas.“ In scholarship, however, a normative use of „Thomist“


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would ordinarily signify something like: „a thinker who holds ‘x’, ‘y’, and ‘z’ philosophical and/or theological principles ad mentem Thomae, or a thinker who employs Aquinas’ method to philosophize/theologize.“ Throughout his work, S. frequently attempts to impose metaphysically and philosophically gravid labels on theologians and philosophers, which often prove to be simplistic and/ or idiosyncratic. Nowadays over-generalized and unqualified categories have all but been abandoned by modern scholarship in disciplines like the history of medieval philosophy. Most scholarly historical approaches to theologians and theology take into account the limitations of a category to encapsulate the thought and worldview of any one individual author. Instead, historians of philosophy and theology tend to give the reader a working definition for any significant genus (e.g., „Platonist“) within defined limits or, at least, an author will alert his reader to the school of thought that he espouses (e.g., „neo-Thomist“) in order to help the reader have an idea of the author’s semantic preference for terms with more than one application/meaning. After providing the reader with a definition or a point of reference, a philosopher or theologian under study can be collocated in said category to the degree to which his thought corresponds to the essential content falling within that same category. This helps the reader to have in mind a clear definition of any term, which may have various meanings or ranges of application. For example, in medieval studies, scholars’ early presuppositions that a „Thomist“ school of philosophy (i.e., a school adhering to Pius X’s 24 theses)17 existed from the 13th 17

Scil., Sacra Studiorum Congregatio: „Theses quaedam, in doctrina Sancti Thomae Aquinatis contentae, et a philosophiae magistris propositae, adprobantur“ (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 6, 1914, pp. 383– 386). This paragraph’s distinctions are quite necessary to make. S.’s published book-review (viz., N. Siniossoglou, „Judith R. Ryder, „The Career and Writings of Demetrius Kydones: A Study of Fourteenth-Century Byzantine Politics, Religion and Society““, Speculum 87/4, 2012, p. 1248) argues that both nuance and objectivity constitute a contentious concept and fictitious approach to scholarship, respectively. The entire review, in polemical terms, is more of

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century on have proved unfounded due to the ahistorical nature of this modern anachronistic category.18 Instead, scholarship now requires that each Scholastic author’s thought must be studied and evaluated so as to discover each individual author’s intellectual commitments expressed within his works. Only after one uncovers a thinker’s sources and core intellectual values, to the extent that it is applicable, can a modern author designate a thinker as a „Thomist,“ „Aristotelian,“ etc. The effect of this sort of methodological approach has destroyed many ahistorical myths about not only Thomism and the Thomistic „school“ of the 13th and 14th centuries,

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a manifesto for rejecting „objective points of view.“ The difficulty with this assertion for many a philosopher (even some nominalists) lies in cross-cultural intelligibility of universal concepts (generals). S. contends: „This widespread perspectivist assumption is anachronistic to the extent that, say, Kydones did not thusly [sic] bracket his self-understanding. It is also self-refuting, for it culminates in an awkward type of unconfessed realism: it is only by tacitly claiming access to reality (read: to the truthfulness of ‘balanced’ and ‘nuanced’ interpretations) that we can bracket the theological and historical categories of our historical agents.“ It is highly doubtful that most scholars hold „nuance“ to be a virtue if clarity already exists (thus it is not an absolute value in every instance). However, one can suspect that „balance“ (i.e., looking at different actors’ and sources’ presentation of the same material object) is a virtue in modern scholarship. Yet, it must be conceded that S. faithfully applies this (anti-)principle in Radical Platonism in Byzantium. He rejects possible divergences from his preset universal categories (without reference to historical figures’ own literary production) and picks a „polarized“ interpretation of an author/event, generally developing each as an instance of his pre-established divisions of thought, etc. Of course, philosophically and historically, if scholars cannot arrive at „universals“ through a gradual a posteriori process, such that general categories can accurately and objectively describe their individual instantiations, doesn’t scholarship –in contingent matter– itself become a „flatus vocis“? Among the last neo-Thomist attempts to defend this thesis, which can still be read with benefit, was: F. Roensch, The Early Thomistic School, Dubuque, 1964.


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but even other alleged rigid intellectual movements. Thus, the socalled genetic method, which includes studying an author’s entire corpus, coupled with a comparison and contrast of his works to his sources and various contemporary „schools“ of theology/ philosophy, supplies a modern reader with convincing evidence for collocating a thinker of the Middle Ages and Renaissance within a supposed intellectual movement.19 Such nuance and investigation of individual authors are at times lacking when S. categorizes personalities within medieval and Byzantine philosophy. For example, the famous „Thomist“ (Demetrius Cydones) is incorrectly overgeneralized as a „Platonizing philosopher“ at the beginning of the book.20 The reader will wait in vain, in subsequent chapters, to see either authorities or arguments presented for such a hypothesis.21 Though 19

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The winds have even changed within the Dominican Order (dedicated to defending the life and teaching of Thomas Aquinas). Many Dominican heroes, or early „Thomists“, have been reevaluated in light of modern scholarship, and these famous Dominicans have often been found to be quite eclectic. For example, the following may be consulted with profit: Saint Thomas au XIVe siècle. Actes du colloque organisé par L’Institut Saint-Thomas-d’Aquin les 7 et 8 juin 1996 à l’Institut Catholique de Toulouse (“Revue Thomiste“, XXVII/1), Toulouse, 1997. Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), p. 1. On the myth of „Cydones Platonicus“ or „semi-paganus“, see: J.A. Demetracopoulos, „Thomas Aquinas’ Impact on Late Byzantine Theology and Philosophy: The Issues of Method or „Modus Sciendi“ and „Dignitas Hominis““, in: edd. A. Speer / Ph. Steinkrüger, Knotenpunkt Byzanz: Wissensformen und kulturelle Wechselbseziehungen, Berlin, 2012, pp. 333–410, at pp. 339–340. One attempt at „proof“ for this revisionism is the following: „Kydones is usually presented as a Thomist, yet in his letters to Manuel and John Kantakouzenos he moves in the opposite direction from Aquinas’ The Rule of Princes.“ See: Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), p. 375. However, later, S. attributes to Demetrius Cydones „Thomist ideas“ within the limited scope of ecclesiastical union. Ultimately, the reader is simply left in limbo with respect to Cydones’ intellectual commitments; for even if

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the theological and philosophical literature until present has continuously and firmly established Demetrius as a „Thomist,“22 S. seems unwilling to subscribe to such a thesis, yet he fails to argue his counter-thesis via reference to primary sources or secondary literature. Scholars typically apply the epithet „Thomist“ (and thus „Aristotelian“, by extension) to Cydones from at least three perspectives. First, Demetrius describes himself as a Thomist.23

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some concessions are made to Cydones’ Thomism late in the book, S. attempts to dilute Cydones’ Thomism (once again) by attributing Cydones’ Thomistic enthusiasm to pro-Latin political motives. Op. cit., p. 402. A study of Cydones’ philosophical and theological thought is badly needed and the recent monograph by J. Ryder, The Career and Writings of Demetrios Kydones: a Study of FourteenthCentury Byzantine Politics, Religion and Society, Leiden-Boston, 2010, does not fill this gap. Still, S. does not seem aware of the different degrees of progress in the research on Cydones (inter alios). See: J.A. Demetracopoulos, „Thomas Aquinas’ Impact...“ (cf. supra, n. 21), pp. 339–341, 346–347, 352–354. The Emperor John Cantacuzenus had admired ThomasAquinas and his erudition. Because of Demetrius Cydones’ initial translations, the emperor even financed the entire translation of the Summa contra Gentiles. See: N. Russell, „Palamism and the Circle of Demetrius Cydones“, in: edd. Ch. Dendrinos / J. Harris / I. Harvalia / J. Herrin, Porphyrogenita. Essays on the History and Literature of Byzantium and the Latin East in Honour of Julian Chrysostomides, London 2003, pp. 153–174, at p. 155. However, Demetrius went so far as to even recommend Thomas to the Emperor Manuel II, known as an anti-unionist (N.B., the identity of the recipient of the letter below is not known with absolute certainty, other than being one of the three emperors that Demetrius served). Demetrius recommends to the emperor the „Master“ of the Dominicans who he claims is the apex of theologians and that Thomas has taught only what is best and greatest in the realm of the things of God. „ZZĽ ÐcXc^š[PYP`ú^d[T[\V[ö\â=h[Ķ Ð\Ìc^þch\f^`ûaY^`dePŒ^\ Sö]Pc^ YPù Ð\ ^×Y \ P»bfd\^ú[V\ YPù [TRúbc^Xa SXSôbYPZ^\ [Pdc^š _`^bTX_Ā\ ^×Y TÁf^\ [÷ c^ýa YTú\^d f^`Tdcóa YPù eXZTŒ\ YPù P»STŒbWPX YPù _Ķ\ Ø_õ` c^þch\ ZöRTX\ Ð Y\ YTŒ\^\ T»_TŒ\\ü[XbPZPQü\cPeh\ø\ (Epistle 399, ll. 10–14).“ See: ed. R.J. Loenertz, Démétrius Cydonès. Correspondance. Vol. II (“Studi e


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Secondly, following the studies of M. Jugie, many of Cydones’ writings have been analyzed by theologians and philosophers and have been found to utilize Thomistic theses and Scholastic terminology.24 Finally, Cydones confesses that he was personally motivated to translate several works of Aquinas and his followers because of his devotion to the Angelic Doctor and his system.25 Of course, possible exceptions to a purely „Thomistic“ Cydones could be flushed out of some of his works, like his De contemnenda morte26 and his apologetic writings employing the Fathers of the

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Testi“, 208), Vatican City, 1960, p. 354. Presuming that this letter is addressed to Manuel II Palaologos, it may serve as the explanatory cause for Manuel’s latent uses of Aquinas’ theonymical doctrine in formulating his own Palamism. See: J.A. Demetracopoulos, „Palamas Transformed. Palamite Interpretations of the Distinction between God’s ‘Essence’ and ‘Energies’ in Late Byzantium“, in: edd. M. Hinterberger / C. Schabel, Greeks, Latins, and Intellectual History 1204–1500 („Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales“, 11), Leuven, 2011, pp. 327–341. For example: M. Jugie, „Démétrius Cydonès et la théologie latine à Byzance aux XIVe et XVe siècles“, Echos d’Orient 27, 1928, pp. 385–402 ; M. Candal, „Demetrio Cidonio y el problema trinitario palamitico“, Orientalia Christiana Periodica 28, 1962, pp. 76–120; F. Kianka, „Demetrius Cydones and Thomas Aquinas“, Byzantion 52, 1982, pp. 264–286. A. Glycofrydi-Leontsini, „Demetrius Cydones as a Translator of Latin Texts“, in: eds. Ch. Dendrinos – J. Harris – I. Harvalia – J. Herrin, Porphyrogenita. Essays on the History and Literature of Byzantium and the Latin East in Honour of Julian Chrysostomides, London, 2003, pp. 175–185. Demetrius, through the emperor’s patronage, was able to both translate and distribute multiple copies of his Summa contra Gentiles to both his fellow Byzantine scholars and his own disciples. In his Apologia pro vita sua he remarked with a certain degree of legitimate pride: „Thus I provided our learned scholars with the opportunity to become even more learned“. Demetrius Cydones, Apologia, in: ed. J. L, Ending the Byzantine Greek Schism, New York, 1992, p. 26. Ed. H. Deckelmann, Demetrii Cydonii De contemnenda morte oratio, Leipzig, 1901. N.B., Even though previous studies have referred to this minor opus as an example of Platonism, Cydones included

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Church.27 The former contains Platonic elements in some of its sections, while the latter argues from the perspective of patristics and Greek (as well as Latin) authorities. This incorrect use of a Platonic epithet points to a puzzling tendency of S. to make use of categories in an unexplained or confusing fashion. It is highly doubtful, when looking at S.’s passing descriptions of Aquinas, that S. considers the Angelic Doctor a „Platonizer.“ Yet –to a considerable degree– Aquinas’ Platonic pedigree has also been firmly established for over half a century.28 A modern analysis, employing nuance and analyzing Aquinas’ sources, easily recognizes a more complex picture of Aquinas (and by extension his strictly „Thomistic“ disciples like Cydones). Like Cydones’ use of occasional Platonic elements, Aquinas utilizes Platonism frequently within his works. It is undeniable that fundamental Aristotelian concepts dominate throughout Aquinas’ works (e.g., unicity of substantial form, matter as principle of individuation), but there is considerable influence of Platonists within the Thomistic corpus.29 What is more, Aquinas (especially in ethics) also makes considerable concessions to Stoic philosophy, viz., pace Cicero.30 On the contrary, S.’s use

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an argument for the immortality of the soul he borrowed from Aquinas as well as material from Gregory of Nyssa et al. This argument was subsequently adopted by Plethon and Scholarius. See: J.A. Demetracopoulos, EZøWh\ YPù =h[Ķa YdX\ôcVa _û c÷\ ¼bc^`úPc^šQdUP\cX\^šWh[Xb[^š, Athens, 2004, pp. 39–41, 54–59, 165–168. Ed. A. Koltsiou-Nikita, Hû Yš`â cŮ\ EPcö`h\ cńa ¥YYZVbúPa AXó\öYS^cV_Xbc^ZXY÷_`PR[PcTúPřJXZ^bêXY÷YPùWT^Z^RXY÷ 7XQZX^WøYVř, 42), Thessaloniki, 2000 (22002). This seminal work is still the most authoritative on the subject. See: R. Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism. A Study of the Plato and Platonici texts in the Writings of Saint Thomas, The Hague, 1956. See: Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism... (cf. supra, note 29), pp. 7–241. A quick perusal of these passages will easily result in a rather „nuanced“ approach to Thomas´ attitude to Plato and Platonists. An excellent study of the Stoic elements (inter alia) in Aquinas’ divisions of the virtues in his ethics demonstrates this thesis convinc-


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of undefined and summary categories (e.g., „Platonizer“) for personalities like Demetrius Cydones severely limits the reader’s ability to understand Cydones, while simultaneously leaving the reader without arguments in support of S.’s alternative view. Quite a number of S.’s observations that employ metaphysical terms or philosophical vocabulary requires more justification or a helpful reference to support his presuppositions. A second example of this is found where S. makes the gratuitous assertion: „As if in a purposeful effort to corroborate the suspicions of Aquinas [...] that Platonism is the source of all things heretic[al], Plethon proceeds to a dechristianisation of Plato.“31 In order to investigate this claim, a convenient resource exists for uncovering each and every one of Aquinas’ references to Plato and the Platonici. S. assumes that Aquinas held Plato responsible for being the source of every heresy. This is exaggerated, even

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ingly. See: R.E. Houser, The Cardinal Virtues: Thomas, Albert and Phillip the Chancellor, Toronto, 2004. Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), p. 223. Though S. proposes this as Aquinas’ ideology, he provides the reader with no reference for verification. If the reader diligently searches for some evidence for this position, one might suppose S. is referring to his position on p. 17, wherein he notes Scholarius’ affinity for Aquinas’ arguments „against the Hellenes“ in Scholarius’ epitome of the Summa contre Gentiles. Both Aquinas and Scholarius associate Arius and Eunomius with theologia platonica on a particular theological question. In the Summa contra Gentiles IV,6, Aquinas writes: „Est autem haec positio Arii et Eunomii. Et videtur a Platonicorum dictis exorta, qui ponebant summum Deum, patrem et creatorem omnium rerum, a quo primitus effluxisse dicebant quandam mentem, in qua essent omnium rerum formae, superiorem omnibus aliis rebus, quam paternum intellectum nominabant; et post hanc, animam mundi; et deinde alias creaturas.“ This is something much narrower: it only has to do with the Trinitarian doctrine, not „all things heretic [sic].“

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if it approaches more to the truth than the opposite view.32 An informed study of Aquinas easily uncovers Aquinas’ more critical utilization and inferior regard of Plato and Platonists (with respect to Aristotle) in his many works since he often had to „purify“ them of fundamental philosophical errors. Although Aquinas may reject many doctrines that he believes are fundamental to Plato and the Platonists, nonetheless, at times he recognizes Plato’s insights, as well as those whom he designates „Platonists.“33 In a last example within the vein of Thomism, S. reaches a startling conclusion toward the end of his book. He writes: „In the Differences as well as in the Nomoi Plethon challenged apophaticism and the major proposition shared by Palamas and Aquinas that god is not in a genus, that the essence of god is ultimately inaccessible to the human intellect.“34 This amazing assertion betrays the author’s unfamiliarity with the basic fundaments of Thomistic theology and Thomism’s historical conflict with Orthodoxy vis-à-vis Palamism. Whereas God may not be in any metaphysical genus of „being“ for either Palamas or Aquinas, nonetheless, Aquinas is adamantly convinced and quite vocal that the human intellect can be capacitated to see God’s essence via the lumen gloriae.35 After the translation 32

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Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism... (cf. supra, n. 29), pp. 347– 350. Here the author provides the reader with several passages of Aquinas that clearly distinguish the errors of the pre-Socratics from Plato. Apparently, Aquinas was quite aware that other philosophers, irreconcilable with Plato, had contributed to errors in philosophy. Op. cit., pp. 421–425. The author’s conclusions recognize the critical attitude of Aquinas to some central doctrines of Plato and Platonists, as well as Aquinas’ utilization of Plato as an authority. Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), p. 405. J.F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: from Finite Being to Uncreated Being („Monographs for the Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy“, 5/1), Washington, D.C., 2000, p. 541. Instead of providing the numerous clear references to Thomas’ doctrine, it has been deemed preferable to use a reference


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of Aquinas’ Summae into Greek, Palamites made this a point of contention with Thomists.36 The Council of Florence (1439) marks a crescendo in the conflict between the Thomistic school’s assertion that man can see God’s essence and the Palamites’ denial thereof.37 The Palamites refused to concede this point at the Council.38 Therefore, a compromise formula had to be adopted to please the Greek contingent present at Florence.39 Even before the Council, there already existed a consistent interpretive tradition of Palamas that pitted Thomism against Palamism precisely on the point of the visio beatifica.40 So far as the present author is

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to Wippel. S. himself utilizes Wippel approvingly as an authority for his own interpretations of Aquinas. Here, however, Wippel clearly asserts an interpretation that contradicts S. with regard to Aquinas’ view of the beatific vision. Cf. Summa Theologiae, Ia, qu. 12, art. 6; De veritate X,12, Quaestiones quodlibetales VII,1. Of course, there are numerous other works and places for Aquinas’ clear exposition of the divine essence as the ultimate and direct object of the human intellect. Scholarius himself omitted references to the lumen gloriae in his translation-summaries of the Summa contra Gentiles and Summa Theologiae. This was an accommodation of Aquinas to Palamite theology and its rejection of a „habitus“ allowing it to „see God’s essence.“ See: George-Gennadius Scholarius, An Abridgment of the „Summa contra Gentiles“ III,58 (edd. L. Petit / X.A. Sideridès / M. Jugie, Oeuvres complètes de Georges Scholarios, Vol. V, Paris, 1931, p. 150, ll. 35–38; id., An Abridgment of the „Summa Theologiae“, Ia, qu. 12, art. 1–13 (edd. Id., ibid.), pp. 346–348). Another source cited by S. notes the controversy on divine vision (et alia) between the Thomists and Palamites. See: J. Gill, The Council of Florence, Cambridge, 1959 (repr. 2011), pp. 120, 206, 225, 285. Op. cit., pp. 285–286. Gill accurately describes the Thomist-Palamite antipathies (including the visio beatifica). This conflict is ably treated in a study more recent than Gill’s. See: A. de Halleux, „Bessarion et le palamisme au concile de Florence“, Irénikon 62, 1989, pp. 307–332. This anti-Thomistic Palamism reached its zenith in Mark Eugenicus’ explicit condemnations of Aquinas’ theological tenets (vis-à-vis Palamism). See: Mark Eugenicus, On the Distinction between Es-

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aware, interpretation of the Angelic Doctor on this point has never wavered, even withstanding Scotist attacks. Scotists thought it absurd that an accidental quality could be added to the soul to allow it to see an infinite essence, especially since Thomists claimed that the only adequate objects of the intellect are created essences via abstraction.41 Even outside of the context of Thomism, S. seems unaware of important distinctions that must be made to comprehend Scholasticism and the diverse Western approaches in theology. Within S.´s bibliography, one work appears that should have alerted him to understanding Scholarius’ Scotistic tendencies. Sebastian Guichardan´s Doct. Diss. (Le problème de la simplicité divine en Orient et en Occident aux XVe et XVe siècles) is still useful for illustrating aspects of Scotism’s role in the theology of Scholarius.42 A quick perusal of its treatment of John Duns

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sence and Energy: First Antirrhetic against Manuel Kalekas, ll. 5–7 (ed. M. Pilavakis, On the Distinction between Essence and Energy: First Antirrhetic against Manuel Kalekas. Editio princeps (Doctoral Dissertation), London, 1987, p. 187). „D×Sõ\_úYcVc^\cŮ\WTúh\ »SXh[ôch\ Y[ö\c^XcŮ\_^cTZTb[ôch\ SVZPS÷cŮ\YcXb[ôch\ YPcócóa\T`RTúPacPþcPa ZZĽ^×YPcĽ^×búP\Ì=TûaÌ`ĶcPX “ In op. cit., pp. 175–176, Mark explicitly embroils „Latins“ and „Aquinas“ in a theological conspiracy to make the Holy Spirit into a creature, etc. Aquinas is likewise his enemy in the passage just above (contra Calecam). Eugenicus had clearly explored Aquinas’ read of both Ps.-Dionysius and Damascene in Summa Theologiae, Ia, qu. 13, art. 2 and art. 8. He was not impressed by Aquinas’ arguments that we name the divine attributes from their effects since the human mind can only process creaturely perfections, which are multiple, while God himself is an indistinguishable principle. This is coupled with Mark’s denial of Aquinas’ assertion that the intellect can see the divine essence. R. Cross, Duns Scotus, New York, 1999, pp. 149–152. S.´s puzzling presentation Thomism must be paired with the notable absence of discussion of Scotism, for S. cites an important study on Scotism and Scholarius wthin his work. This published dissertation should have alerted S. to the important role of the De ente et essentia commentary for contextualizing the two subsequent trea-


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Scotus would have led to the conclusion that all Scholasticism is not the same. Furthermore, Scotism is particularly reconcilable to Palamite sensibilities (with respect to ad intra divine attributes). M. Jugie had also made this philosophical judgment.43 In effect, a plurality of distinct energies/attributes within God’s essence represents a commonality between Scotists and Palamites (quoddamodo). This calls into question S.’s assertion: „The principal objection of all major anti-Palamite intellectuals was that a plurality of divine energies comes dangerously close to Proclan henotheism while in a sense re-sacralising the physical world. With one possible exception, Celtic Christianity, this Hellenic connection was atrophic in the Latin West.“44 Had S. been aware of Scotism’s (let alone via Guichardan) basic metaphysical premises, he still would have been able to claim that „anti-Palamites“ were intellectually opposed to a metaphysical multiplicity of distinct perfections within the godhead (since Scotists can interpret this in a manner favorable to Palamism). However, the rather large and sometimes dominant medieval school ad mentem Scoti calls into question the „atrophic“ evaluation of Western theology vis-à-vis a „real“ distinction between God’s essence and energies/attributes.45

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tises on the essence-energies question. See: S. Guichardan, Le problème de la simplicité divine en Orient et en Occident aux XIVe et XVe siècles: Grégoire Palamas, Duns Scot, Georges Scholarios, Lyon, 1933, pp. 184–199. M. Jugie, Theologia dogmatica christianorum orientalium ab ecclesia catholica dissidentium, vol. 2, Paris, 1933, p. 148. Jugie referred to Scotistic ad intra metaphysics of the godhead as Palamismus in fieri. Though one minor article of Jugie is cited in S.’s bibliography, vols. 1 and 2 of this important work are notably missing in S.’s revision of Plethon and his personality. Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), pp. 400–401. Vos spends some time emphasizing the reality of this distinction. In fact, the entire Franciscan tradition lays claim to priority of the

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A thorough read of S.’s work raises many doubts concerning S.´s piecemeal presentation of medieval and Byzantine Scholastic philosophy. This leads one to the conclusion that S. would have benefited greatly from at least one medievalist or Scholastic on his advisory team.

3. The author’s method for making references to previous studies Another important consideration of S.’s method is derived from an occasionally unconventional way of employing footnotes. S. can sometimes be found asserting a fact in the text and then footnoting an authority for such an assertion, although the work cited actually contradicts his point in the text. For example, S. relies on Paul Tavardon’s dated study on Scholarius’ and Plethon’s interpretation of Aristotle’s statement that „being is said in many ways.“46 S. argues that Plethon holds for the doctrine of „univocity of being“ on the authority of Tavardon’s study (which itself has problems that other scholars always mention).47 Then, immediately following this citation, S. claims that Scholarius argues for „equivocity of being“ in the same

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thing over mind, and gives credit to the human mind for having recognized something that really is distinct in the considered object. See: A. Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, Edinburgh, 2008, p. 255. Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), pp. 230–231. Also see: P. Tavardon, „Le conflit de Georges Gémiste Pléthon et de Georges Scholarios au sujet de l’expression d’Aristote cûÍ\ZöRTcPX_^ZZPfŮař, Byzantion 47, 1977, pp. 268–278. E.g., S. Ebbesen / J. Pinborg, „Gennadius and Western Scholasticism. Radulphus Brito’s Ars Vetus in Greek Translation“, Classica et Medievalia 33, 1981–1982, pp. 263–319; J. Monfasani, „The ProLatin Apologetics of the Greek Émigrés to Quattrocento Italy“, in: ed. A. Rigo, Byzantine Theology and its Philosophical Background (“Studies in Byzantine History and Civilization“, 4), Turnhout, 2011, pp. 160–186.


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breath. S. fails to alert the reader that his assertion of Scholarius’ „equivocity of being“ is polar opposite to Tavardon’s study (which he just cited as his authority). Tavardon’s study in fact argues that both Plethon and Scholarius hold doctrines of univocity.48 More precisely, Tavardon attempts to demonstrate that Plethon and Scholarius hold for univocity of the „concept“ of being. The effect of this use of authorities confuses the reader into believing that there is scholarly agreement about Scholarius’ equivocity, whereas, in reality, Scholarius may have indeed adopted (at least in the 1430’s) a concept of univocity very close to the one espoused by John Duns Scotus.49 This is further complicated by the fact that S. accuses Plethon of pantheism claiming that „all univocity leads to pantheism.“ In reality, there are at least two kinds of univocity identified by Tavardon (i.e., Plethonic-pantheistic and Scholarianmodist/Scholastic). A more thorough study of medieval modism would even lead to nuances within the camp of „univocity of the concept of being.“50 Metaphysical univocity may well lead to pantheism, yet the univocity espoused by many medieval Christian philosophers and theologians has been convincingly argued to be free of any such danger. Considerable literature has been written on the subject since the renewed interest in univocity of being in the 1930’s until present.51 48

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P. Tavardon, „Le conflit de Georges Gémiste Pléthon...“ (cf. supra, n. 47), pp. 268–278. S. Ebbesen, „Concrete Accidental Terms: Late Thirteenth-Century Debates about Problems Relating to Such Terms as „album““, in: ed. N. Kretzmann, Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy. Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg (“Synthese Historical Library“, 32), Boston, 1998, pp. 107–174, esp. pp. 120–132. This article is invaluable for comparing the various theories of „univocity“. Especially pertinent to the present discussion is the comparison between Radulphus Brito and Duns Scotus’ univocities. Ibid. Parthenius Minges has been recognized as one of the first modern expositors of Scotus who has attempted to be faithful to the ipsissima verba of Scotus, despite the lamentable lack of solid knowledge surrounding Scotus´ authentic corpus at the time. For

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This important similarity between Plethon and Scholarius is clearly emphasized and argued in Tavardon’s study. Tavardon was operating under the false assumption that Scholarius had himself composed „his“ logical commentaries. However, Scholarius did not compose, but (for the most part) translated these logical commentaries from Radulphus Brito. This important point was unknown to Tavardon and represents a severe limitation to Tavardon’s study.52 S. seems to be unaware of several limitations of Tavardon’s study and misuses Tavardon’s main thesis to contrast Plethon’s univocity to Scholarius’ equivocity. From S.’s bibliography, one may glean the reason why he is unaware of many nuances and facets of Scholarius’ thought. Both Ebbesen and Pinborg’s article, as well as Barbour’s study on Scholarius’ sources and translations, could have saved S. from misinterpretations

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his clear defense of univocity, see: P. Minges, Ioannis Duns Scoti doctrina philosophica et theologica quoad res praecipuas proposita et exposita, vol. 1, Ad Claras Aquas, 1930, pp. 22–40. A (now) classic monograph on univocity followed the work of Minges with: C. Shircel, The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, Washington, D.C., 1942. However, some of Shircel’s errors were corrected (passim) in: A. Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (“Philosophy Series“, 3), St. Bonaventure, 1946. From this point on, Wolter –to a large degree– became the apostle of a „Scotistic evangelization“ of the English-speaking philosophic world. His efforts began to bear significant fruits in the last quarter of the 20th century. One such beneficiary of these Scotistic forebearers, A. Vos, has made it a point to acknowledge Minges as a faithful expositor of the Subtle Doctor. See: A. Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus... (cf. supra, n. 46), pp. 120, 565. Lastly, some of Scotus’ philosophic inspiration on this point stems from a cultivation of seedling beneplacita in Bonaventure’s philosophy. See: E. Bettoni, „Punti di contatto fra la dottrina bonaventuriana dell’illuminazione e la dottrina scotista dell’univocità“, in: Scholastica: ratione historico-critica instauranda. Acta Congressus Scholastici Internationalis („Bibliotheca Pontificii Athenaei Antoniani“, 7), Roma, 1951, pp. 517–532. Tavardon also thought that Radulphus was a „Briton“ and not a „Breton.“


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of Scholarius’ philosophy and intellectual tendencies.53 It is most likely that S. misappropriates Scholarius’ two essenceenergies works, written against Latins and Latin theology, for the Scholarius-Plethon debate due to his unfamiliarity with important contributions of secondary literature. These grave errors call into question S.’s efforts to contextualize the real debate between Plethon and Scholarius. The result of such a trajectory in Radical Platonism in Byzantium is to undermine a reader’s confidence in any conclusions or observations that S. may have about the nature of the Plethon-Scholarius debate.

4. Methodological considerations with respect to the relaton between primary and relevant secondary literature Within the narrative driven by S., Scholarius’ two essenceenergies treatises are presented as works against Plethon and are implicated as being a reaction against humanism-paganism.54 This, of course, puzzles the reader since S. seems intent on designating Byzantine humanists as crypto-pagans (or at least unconscious bearers of paganism).55 From the very first chapters of the book this thesis is developed to some extent, but it conveniently ignores any in-depth treatment of personalities like Photius of Constantinople (and later Mark Eugenicus). Both are considered humanists and, simultaneously, pillars of Orthodoxy.56 In a section dedicated 53

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Viz., Ebbesen / Pinborg, „Gennadius and Western Scholasticism...“ (cf. supra, n. 48); H. Barbour, The Byzantine Thomism of Gennadios Scholarios and His Translation of the Commentary of Armandus de Bellovisu on the „De Ente et Essentia“ of Thomas Aquinas (“Studi Tomistici“, 53), Vatican City, 1996. Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), pp. 230–247. Op. cit., pp. 64–66, 400–401. S. omits such a discussion, though he approves and is aware of Podskalsky’s work on this exact subject. Podskalsky firmly places Pho-

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to humanism, S. gives the reader the idea that humanism and Platonic study were trends that went against the grain of the entire ecclesiastical establishment during Photius’ time. However, S. fails to resolve for the reader how Photius can be both a humanist and the leading figure of the ecclesiastical establishment within the same period without being at war with himself.57 The position of Photius (and, later, Mark Eugenicus) within S.’s categorical division of Byzantine intellectuals into conscious or unconscious cryptopagans (i.e., humanists), Palamites, and Thomists leaves some important figures in Byzantium in the position of intellectual exiles. Furthermore, S.’s belief in the anti-Plethonic nature of Scholarius’ two essence-energies treatises is a lesson to the scholar on the important role that secondary literature can play when writing a book that (meritoriously) prefers primary sources for the bulk of its discussion. No doubt S. has a solid grasp of the Greek language and a specialization in Platonism. However, he is seemingly unaware of the role that Scholarius’ translation-commentary De ente et essentia (especially chapters 94–95) plays in the genesis of the two essence-energies treatises. This translation-commentary (1445) predates the two essence-energies treatises, and has been

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tius, Mark Eugenicus, and George-Gennadius Scholarius within the humanist camp. See: G. Podskalsky, Von Photios zu Bessarion: der Vorrang humanistisch geprägter Theologie in Byzanz und deren bleibende Bedeutung („Schriften zur Geistesgeschichte des östlichen Europa“, 25), Wiesbaden, 2003, pp. 16–18. Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), pp. 64–65. S.’s only effort to contextualize Photius’ positive and/or negative contribution to his theory happens when he notes one historical episode from Photius’ life, wherein he converts a wayward humanist by appeal to Aristotle. From this, should one understand that Photius was an „Aristotelian“ with a disdain for Plato and (neo) Platonists? Photius, too, is a more complicated figure; for he seems to have argued staunchly against the philosophical sustainability of Platonic „ideas“ as well as against the Aristotelian „forms“ and opted for the Stoic „conceptualist“ views of universals. See B.N. Tatakis, Byzantine Philosophy (La philosophie byzantine, Paris, 11949), translation by N. Moutafakis, Indianapolis, 22003, pp. 101–105.


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amply explored by H. Barbour in the mid-1990’s. A perusal of this monograph would key the reader into the chapter where Thomism explicitly inspired Scholarius to plan to write a treatise on the essence-energies question due to Armandus of Bellovisu’s (and other Thomists’) theory of ‘second intentions’ in metaphysical logic.58 Scholarius alludes to the fact that Thomism’s theory of ‘second intentions’ and the divine attributes are suspect as being „Akindynist“ and that Thomas may even deserve the appellation „Barlaamite.“ This is hardly new, for some aspects of this Palamite accusation against Aquinas, per S. Salaville, had already been noted as early as the 1920’s.59 Barbour has more recently discovered the source text for Scholarius’ worries about Thomistic metaphysical logic in Armandus’ commentary on the De ente et essentia that led to his two additional treatises.60 Even excluding the translation of Armandus’ De ente et essentia commentary, in Scholarius’ later essence-energies treatises, he explicitly condemns „Barlaamites,“ „Akindinysts,“ and „Latin-thinkers“ (with no mention of Plethon or pagans).61 Scholarius even explicitly cites Mark Eugenicus’ 58

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See: George-Gennadius Scholarius, Commentary on Aquinas’ „De ente et essentia“ (edd. L. Petit / X.A. Sideridès / M. Jugie, Oeuvres complètes de Georges Scholarios, Vol. VI, Paris, 1933, p. 283, ll. 3–19). The De ente et essentia commentary was also studied in detail by another of S.’s bibliographical references, well before Barbour. Guichardan draws attention to ch. 94 as well. See: Guichardan, Le problème de la simplicité divine... (cf. supra, n. 43), pp. 190–195. S. Salaville, „Un thomiste à Byzance au XVe s.: Gennade Scholarios“, Echos d’Orient 23, 1924, pp. 129–136. Here, Scholarius explicitly predicts the possibility of writing a future treatise on second intentions. See: Scholarius, Commentary De ente et essentia, (cf. supra, n. 59), p. 285. „?PùcPšcP[õ\`YTú! ch cüRT\š\£f^\ bcT\ŮacTT»`V[ö\Päa\YS`^[ŅYPù_Z^þ! bcT`ü\_ha äa\_ZTú^bX\£YSVZPT¿V ¥\»SúĴSõ_`PR[PcTúĴ_T`ù c^þch\ \ Ì =Tûa WöZł [QPWd\^š[T\ ců UVcø[PcX c^þcŬ YPù ÐbPSTŒ_T`ùP×c^š\Xf\Tþb^[T\ YPWÿa\cüWĽ¬[Œ\[_\TdbWTúV K^[[T\cP`g^\cVT»9TT\cTTcTbbT\cXP“ XCIV, p. 285, ll. 18–22).“ See: George-Gennadius Scholarius in his Against the Partisans of Acindynus: à propos a passage of Theodore Graptos (edd. L. Petit /

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treatise against Manuel Calecas (and Thomas Aquinas) as one of his inspirations for his first essence-energies treatise. Scholarius further argues based on his own Scholastic theory of second intentions (which he mentions in the De ente et essentia and his first and second essence-energies treatise)62 within the realm of metaphysical logic. There is no room in these treatises for antiPlethon apologetics or themes. Instead, they are directed toward anti-Palamites ad mentem Thomae.

5. Observations on the author’s arguments and appeal to authorities Sometimes in S.’s work, it is difficult to understand the philosophical commitments and perspectives that lead to his conclusions. For example, in the medieval philosophical world (as well as the Byzantine), there are different philosophical and theological tenets espoused by different thinkers for what does and does not violate divine simplicity.63 S.’s narrative assumes that Palamas „violated“ divine simplicity. He writes: „More evidence is apt here. According to Palamas, Akindynos taught that god possesses no energies but is pure divine essence. He merely is (TX\PX), which means that god’s will is indistinguishable from his real essence. The inescapable conclusion is that the Palamite distinction between energies

62

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X.A. Sideridès / M. Jugie, Oeuvres complètes de Georges Scholarios, Vol. III, Paris, 1930, p. 212, ll. 7–17). See: id., Commentary on Aquinas’ „De ente et essentia“ (cf. supra, n. 59), p. , ll. 6–7; id., Against the Partisans of Acindynus: à propos a passage of Theodore Graptos (cf. supra, n. 62), p. 212, ll. 25–26; id., On the Distinction between the Essence and Its Operations (edd. L. Petit / X.A. Sideridès / M. Jugie, Oeuvres complètes de Georges Scholarios, Vol. III, Paris, 1930, p. 230, ll. 9–10). Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), p. 266.


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and essence in god hopelessly compromised divine simplicity and purity.“64

It may be that Palamas compromised divine simplicity, but the reader is left in the dark as to whether S.’s evaluation of Palamas springs from Platonic, Aristotelian, Thomistic, Scotistic or contemporary philosophical principles being applied to Palamas’ theology. An Orthodox Christian could object to S.’s critique based upon theological tenets that liberate the Christian from pagan philosophy; for –among the Seven Ecumenical Councils– no Aristotelian or Platonic definition of „divine simplicity“ has ever been imposed on the Christian Church. A Latin Christian, like Bonaventure and Scotus, would also reject Aristotle’s simplicity criterion. Yet, both mutually opposed camps of Christians still thought of God as super-simple, though with meaningful and (with the latter) formally distinct attributes.65 It is unclear from what perspective S. levels his accusation against Palamas for his „theological crime“; for S. inserts his opinion into the middle of a description of Palamas’ and Akindynos’ arguments against one another without opting for one or the other side.66 This leaves the impression that S. is an objective observer making his own evaluation based on some criterion to which both Akindynus and 64 65

66

Ibid. The roots of Duns Scotus’ formal distinction have already been discovered (for some time) to be traceable to Bonaventure, the doctor of the Franciscan Order. T. Svabó, „De distinctionis formalis origine bonaventuriana disquisitio historico-critica“, in: Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda. Acta Congressus Scholastici Internationalis (“Bibliotheca Pontificii Athenaei Antoniani“, 7), Rome, 1951, pp. 380–445. This phenomenonoccurs repeatedly, as already mentioned above. See: Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), p. 405. These tendencies are all the more interesting since S. seems to reject the possibility of such „perspectivism“ in his critique of scholarship (pace J. Ryder). There he seems to advocate „taking sides“. However, it is not clear whose side S. is taking contra Palamam here. See: Id., Book-review: „Judith R. Ryder, The Career and Writings of Demetrius Kydones...“ (cf. supra, n. 18), pp. 1248–1250.

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Palamas are not privy. However, the reader is never clued into what philosophical principle guides S.’s own evaluation.

6. Observations on the revisonist history of Plethon The reader may reasonably ask whether or not this review will engage the main thesis of the author in detail. Unfortunately, the answer must be in the negative. Due to the wide range of deficiencies in S.’s approach to his revisionist history of Gemistos Plethon, it is doubtful that he can accomplish the colossal task of deciphering both the context and content of Plethon’s thought (let alone his attempts to connect Plethon to modern and contemporary philosophers). This last section will illustrate clearly why this review must continue to limit itself to methodological concerns about S.’s approach to the question of Plethon and his role in Byzantium. Though S.’s work does recognize (to a limited degree) some ways in which Plethon is dependent on his intellectual predecessor, Michael Psellos, S. seems generally uninterested in integrating known late Byzantine sources for Plethon’s literary production into his synthesis of all previous scholarly work in order to enunciate his revisionist historical conclusions.67 One outstanding illustration of this fact will be sufficient to alert the reader to be wary of the necessarily incomplete and haphazard nature of S.’s revisionist conclusions due to his tendency

67

There are only a total of five pages of the entire work dedicated to Psellos’ relationship with Plethon. This seems incredibly modest, especially given the discoveries of Plethon’s dependencies on Psellus in modern scholarship. For a good example noting Plethon´s textual dependence on Psellos, see: L. Brisson, „Pléthon et les Oracles Chaldaïques“, in: eds. M. Cacouros / M.-H. Congourdeau, Philosophie et sciences à Byzance de 1204 à 1453 (“Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta“, 146), Leuven, 2006, pp. 127–142.


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to ignore known sources and important influences for Plethon’s theological and philosophical production. S.’s work cites an important monograph, which is essential for understanding Plethon’s own approach to philosophy and theology. This study has recently provided Byzantine scholars with solid evidence demonstrating Plethon’s own reliance on Thomas Aquinas for important aspects of his own intellectual production.68 Numerous extracts from Thomas’s Summae were lifted by Plethon only to be incorporated into his theological vision. Demetracopoulos argues that Plethon has a discernible method for employing these extracts within his writings.69 In a fascinating example of Plethon’s Thomistic bent, Demetracopoulos uncovers Plethon’s manner of arranging the four cardinal virtues ad sentetiam Thomae, drawing his inspiration directly from the Summa Theologiae.70 It comes as quite a surprise, even to the specialist, that Plethon was a „Thomist,“ albeit in a very bizarre (and admittedly limited) way. That Plethon would side with Aquinas’ own approach to understanding some aspects of ethics is quite significant. This should immediately raise questions as to how much influence Demetrius Cydones and Thomas Aquinas both had on Plethon’s ethical theory. However, in S.’s historical revision of Plethon’s character and role in Byzantium, there is no real attempt to contextualize or evaluate Aquinas’ role in Plethon’s thought.71 Not only does 68

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70 71

Demetracopoulos, EZøWh\ YPù =h[Ķa YdX\ôcVa (cf. supra, n. 27), pp. 49–68. Ironically, Demetracopoulos noted that in Woodhouse´s scholarly work on Plethon (cf. supra, n. 17), he was correct to note the genuine influence that Thomas´ Summae had on late Byzantine thought. Unfortunately, Woodhouse had not noticed that his own observation was especially pertinent with respect to Plethon. This correction of Woodhouse´s oversight must have been missed by S.´s reading Demetracopoulos´ work on the matter. See: Demetracopoulos, EZøWh\YPù=h[ĶaYdX\ôcVa... (cf. supra, n. 27), p. 49. Op. cit., pp. 41–43. Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), pp. 99, 268.

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Chapter Three of EZøWh\YPù=h[ĶaYdX\ôcVa provide dozens of pages where Plethon adopts Thomism, but its Appendix II provides another dozen or so pages of Plethon’s works in which extracts were lifted from Aquinas’ Summae.72 Though S. makes a reference to Demetracopoulos’ study in his lengthy tome, the reader has no idea what real content and discovery lie hidden among the pages of that study. With respect to this same monograph, the modern reader would encounter real obstacles to consult this study on his own, for it is only limitedly available and, at that, only in Modern Greek. Still, there is a very useful 66-page long English abridgement of the monograph available. 73 S. does once make reference to his own perusal of this important study listed in his bibliography.74 That Plethon´s Thomism fails to be considered in the historical revision of the personality and role of Plethon in Byzantium is really unfathomable. This also draws attention, once again, to the puzzling use of footnotes in S.’s work. Any scholar who confronts Plethon’s Thomism will certainly have to spill a considerable amount of ink explaining what effect this eclecticism has on categorizing Plethon as both a philosopher and a theologian. One will simply look in vain within S.’s revision of the intellectual character of Plethon to find any indication of what role this Thomist aspect of Plethon’s thought plays in his worldview. Given this deficient approach to Plethon´s sources and thought, it remains to be seen how much of Plethon´s Platonism reflects a direct dependence on Plato and „Neoplatonists.“ Much of what Plethon has to say come from indirect citations made 72

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Demetracopoulos, EZøWh\YPù=h[ĶaYdX\ôcVa... (cf. supra, n. 27), pp. 145–168. See: Id., „Georgios Gemistos-Plethon’s Dependence on Thomas Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles and Summa Theologiae“, Archiv für mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur 12, 2006, pp. 276–341. S. is non committal to whether or not Plethon is significantly influenced by Aquinas. He ignores Demetracopoulos’ main thesis and merely alerts the reader that Demetracopoulos suggests that Plethon may have been influenced by an anti-Palamite theologian, John Kyparissiotis. See: Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium... (cf. supra, n. 1), p. 268.


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from late Byzantine authors or even Latin authors’ utilization of Neoplatonists within their opera (e.g., Aquinas). S.’s advisory team was undoubtedly useful for confirming S.’s suspicions of possible links between Plethon and the Hellenic past. Still, this is simply not sufficient for a thorough treatment of a Byzantine author who has already been shown to be dependent on ex professo Christian authors, who themselves adopted Platonic elements in their pursuit of knowledge and exposition of wisdom.

7. Conclusions Undoubtedly, S. makes many insightful suggestions of potential Platonic and Neoplatonic influences within the works of various Byzantine writers that he investigates within Radical Platonism in Byzantium. The present author appreciated all of S.’s attempts to maximize Platonic readings of the 14th and 15th century Byzantine authors. Had S. limited his project to just that, he might have been able to accomplish a more modest task within the limits of his expertise. Instead, S.´s attempted tour de force – spanning the entire history of Byzantine philosophy and theology and beyond– has, perhaps, exposed him to unfamiliar themes in late Byzantine studies. Furthermore, his occasional ventures into the realm of Scholasticism also betray lack of familiarity with another very specialized –and difficult to master– field. In such cases, it always benefits a neophyte to rely on advice and critiques from scholars operating within any realm of study new to a researcher. By relying on academic peers within the new field of study, an author can avoid many an embarrassing mistake and misinterpretation of sources or major lacunae with respect to secondary literature. If a reader attempts to engage S.´s work he will encounter an author with many interests. S. engages his reader through the optic of (neo)Platonism, metaphysics, history of medieval philosophy, Byzantine history and theology, modern and contemporary philosophy (e.g., Spinoza and Levinas), and more. However, if the reader wishes to limit his interests to Plethon and

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his thought and immediate influence, a reader would still do well to concern himself first with Masai´s classic text and follow up with Woodhouse´s more recent work on Plethon.75 Now, an even more recent monograph is available by Brigitte Tambrun.76 One would expect that her approach to Plethon would be satisfactory for a scholar with S.’s views; for she fully recognizes Plethon’s antiChristian spirit and sincere adherence to Plato. She, furthermore, argues at length for Plethon’s optimistic and cataphatic theology. All the same, her research into Plethon’s thought does not occupy the place it deserves in S.’s reconstruction of Plethon’s thought. In fact, granted that both of their readings of Plethon harmonize on many points, S. fails to provide his reader with any new views or substantial development of his intellectual predecessor’s thought. Until S.´s basic methodological approach is adjusted, it will simply not be able to contend with these well established works as a standard text for understanding the life, thought, and significance of Plethon´s intellectual production in Byzantium. As a last point, it may be helpful to draw attention to an observation of a contemporary philosopher, who was also cited with approval by S. Karl Popper’s critique (and attempted corrective) of modern science, as well as its methods for theorizing, argues the validity of an important axiom.77 The same is also useful for evaluating S.´s ambitious project. Popper reminds the scientific community repeatedly that the probability of falsification of a scientific theory proportionally increases as more complex versions of the theory seek to explain more and more puzzles. In other words, the more expansive the theory is, the greater the statistical probability that it will fail (i.e., falsification). This is especially the case for all-encompassing theories built on series of 75

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Scil., F. Masai, Pléthon et le platonisme de Mistra, Paris, 1956; C.M. Woodhouse, George Gemistos Plethon... (cf. supra, n. 17). Scil., B. Tambrun, Pléthon: le retour de Platon, Paris, 2006. This work represents the culmination of her research from the 1980’s until 2006. K.R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, London, 1962 (72002).


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unproven hypotheses. As such, a modest theory (distasteful as it may be) establishes the safest path for the scientist to be successful. In a similar vein, the attraction of S.´s grand theory is that such a theory claims for itself the capacity to answer all major questions and to impose order on intellectual figures, complex movements, and history itself (pace paganism and its clash with Palamism in Byzantium, paganism’s culmination in the figure of Plethon as the precursor to Spinoza, etc.). The weakness of S.´s theory (after the fashion of Hegelianism) is that S.’s a priori points of departure inherently risk ignoring any anomalies incommensurate with S.’s pre-established categories. Furthermore, a posteriori disciplines, which require a method of reducing a very complex and messy set of data either to a fewer set of probable principles or to likely causes, can play only a tangential or auxiliary role (at best) to confirm S.’s paradigms. It is the present author’s opinion that, in contingent matters like history, disciplines that favor a genetic and historical method to catalogue the history of philosophy are far better equipped than an ingenious philosophy of history78 to produce a study of perennial value for both the enthusiast and specialist on Byzantine studies and other related fields.79

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This criticism was also proferred by A. Johnson, when reviewing S.’s work on Theodoret. See: http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2009/2009– 05–05.html (access 2013). Among the reviewer’s personal comments, he draws attention to the fact that S. is more of a philosopher than a historian. He also correctly identifies S.’s polemically charged arguments against Christian authors on behalf of pagans. In a similar way, Radical Platonism in Byantium is likewise „philosophical“ in nature and tends to belie its objective investigation with the same polemical spirit and equally one-sided readings of the sources. I would sincerely like to thanks Mrs. Carol Kappes and Rev. Dr. Peter Damian Fehlner, FI, for their suggested corrections.

ʡ̒̈̉˽̊˽

Plethon vs. Orthodoxy of Scholarius and the Catholicism of Aquinas

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