People vs Jabinal

People vs. Jabinal

February 27, 1974 Facts:

On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be in possession of a revolver without the requisite license or permit. He claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, altho although ugh he had no licens license e or permit permit,, he had had appoin appointme tments nts as Secre Secrett Agent Agent from from the Provi Provinc ncia iall Gove Govern rnor or of Bata Batang ngas as and and as Co Conf nfid iden enti tial al Agen Agentt from from the the PC Prov Provin inci cial al Comma Commande nder, r, and the said said appoin appointme tments nts expr express essly ly carrie carried d with with them them the autho authorit rity y to possess and carry the said firearm. The accused further contended that in view of his appointments, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decisions in People vs. Macarandang and in People vs. Lucero.  The trial court found the accused criminally liable for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings in Macarandang* and in Lucero* were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa**.  The case was elevated to the Supreme Court. Issue:

Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the Supreme Court’s rulings in the cases of Macarandang and of Lucero. Lucero. Ruling:

 The appellant was acquitted. Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the law means; this is the reason why Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides that, “Judicial decisions applying and interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form form part part of the legal legal system system.” .” The interpr interpreta etation tion upon a law law by the Supreme Supreme Court constitutes in a way a part of the law as of the date the law was originally passed, since the court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim “legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet”— the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and in Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law of the land, land, at the time appell appellan antt was was found found in posses possessio sion n of the firear firearm m and when he was was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. Consid Consideri ering ng that that the appell appellant ant posses possesse sed d a firea firearm rm pursua pursuant nt to the prevai prevailin ling g doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and in Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm, the appellant should be absolved. The appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

 _____________________  *The accused were acquitted for through their appointment as confidential/secret confidential/secret agent they were deemed  to be “peace officers”. Peace officers had the privilege of carrying firearms without license. **Mapa was convicted although he was a secret/confidential agent. The court ruled that the law did not explicit explicitly ly provide provide that secret/ secret/confi confident dential ial agents are among those who are exempted from acquiring a license to carry a firearm.