178. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997 FACTS FACTS
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Accused-apellant Leo Echegaray was charged and convicted for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been committed committed sometime sometime in April, April, 199, during which time !epublic !epublic Act "o. #$%9, commonly &nown as the 'eath (enalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death. )n appealing the conviction, it raised the constitutionality of the 'eath (enalty Law as being severe and e*cessive, e*cessive, cruel cruel and unusual in violation violation of the constitution. constitution. +e invo&es invo&es the ruling in Fur+a% &. Geor"!a wherein the upreme upreme ourt categorically ruled that death penalty is cruel and degrading. +e also argues that death is an e*cessive and cruel punishment for a crime of rape because there is no ta&ing of life in rape. +e invo&es the ruling in Co-er &. Geor"!a which said that while rape deserves serious punishment, it should not involve the ta&ing of human life. )n rape, life is not over for the victim. 'eath penalty should only be imposed where the crime was murder. ISS SSE
/hether or not 'eath (enalty is cruel and unusual punishment.
HEL/ "0. The penalt y is neither cruel, unust nor e*cessive. )n the case of 2emmler, 2emmler, it was held that punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death. )t implies there something inhuman, barbarous, something more than the e*tinguishment of life. )t is degrading if it involves public humiliation. The severity is not sufficient, but must be disproportionate to the crime committed. E*cessiveness is measured by 13 seriousness of the crime, 43 policy of the legislative, 53 perversity of the accused.
The issue in Fur+a% &. Geor"!a is not so much the death penalty itself, but the arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed imposed by the ury. )t was nullified because because the discretion in which the statute vested in trial udges and sentencing uries was uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or standards. /ith regard regard to the case case of Co-er &. Geor"!a, the held that this case has no bearing on (hilippine e*perience and culture. uch a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive ustice of 6an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth6. 7ut, the forfeiture of life simply because life was ta&en, never was a defining essence of the death penalty in the conte*t of our legal history and cultural e*perience8 rather, the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably e*ecrable acts that have so deeply dehumanied a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects, and because they have so caused irreparable and substantial inury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so. so. !A #$%9 already sufficiently defined what are heinous crimes : crimes punished with death are those that are grievous, odious, and hateful by reason of inherent viciousness, atrocity and perversity, those that are repugnant and outrageous to common standards of norms and decency and morality in a ust, civilied and ordered society . They also include crimes which are despicable despicable because because life is callously callously ta&en, or the victim is treated treated as an animal or dehumanied.
