Peltasts and Javelineers in Classical Greek Warfare. Roles, Tactics, And Fighting Methods

PELTASTS AND JAVELINEERS IN CLASSICAL GREEK WARFARE: ROLES, TACTICS, AND FIGHTING METHODS

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requi reme nts or f the degree of Master of Humanities

By

DERRICK A. NIESE B.A., University of Dayton, 2007

2012 Wright State University

WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL April 12, 2012 I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESISPREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY Derrick A. NieseENTITLED Peltasts and Javelineers in Classical Greek Warfare: Roles, Tactics, and Fighting Methods BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Humanities. ______________________________ Bruc e Laforse , Ph.D. Thesis Director ______________________________ Ava Chamberlain, Ph.D. Director, Master of Humanities Program Committee on Final Examination ______________________________ Jeannette Marchand, Ph.D. ______________________________ Rebecca Edwards, Ph.D. ______________________________ Andrew Hsu, Ph.D. Dean, Gradua te School

ABSTRACT Niese, Derrick A. M. Hum., Master of Humanities Program, Wright State University, 2012. Peltas ts and Javelineers in Classical G reek Warfare: Roles, Tactics,and Fighting Methods . The purpose of this paper is to explore the developing roles, tactics, and fighting methodsof javelin-armed soldiers n i classic al Greek warfare.he T chronol ogical scope of thepaper will be broad,ncorpor i ating early evidence from theeighth century B.C.E.but focusing onthefifth and fourth ce nturies. Through out th e thesis I will arguethat javelineers and especially peltasts earned an increasingly prominent role in Greek warfare dueto se veral nterrel i ated factor s: constant rfare wa occur ring on increa sing and unprecedented scale; professionalization of military leadership; growing frequency of large -scale cam paigns wage d on di verseterrain;andan overal l increas e in theuseof mercen ary nfan i trymen in warfare. The expa nded useof the javel in soldier wa s part ofa generaldevelo pment of ombin c ed arms tacti cs used by Greek co mmande rs dur ing the Peloponne sian War,theExpedition of Cyrus,and thevarious wars wa ged among the poleis during th e early fourth cen tury.Also ta king place during this time was a trend

toward specialization among leaders of javelin troops; this paper will highlight some of the a ccom plishments ofpeltastsnd a a j velineers unde r such ea l dership in order to illustrate their poten tial effectiveness against hop lites a nd othe r arm s in various conte xts.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

Introduction……………………………………………………….....…... 1

II.

Origins and Evidence, Pre-Peloponnesian ……………… War ....…….... 15

III.

The Peloponnesian War: Demosthenes and Trends in Light-Armed ………………….…………………………………………….... 35 Warfare

IV.

Peltasts and Javelineers in Xenophon ’s Anabasis and Hellenika………………………………….……………………..…….... 52

V.

The Career and Alleged Reforms of Iphikrates…………………..…….. 68

VI.

………………….………………………………………..…. 84 Conclusion

Bibliography ………………………………………………………………...….. 89

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I. INTRODUCTION

The hoplite, both citizen and mercenary, is the central figure in most historical investigations of classical Greek warfare. There is certainly justification for this focus, since the hoplite was numerically and tactically a key component of Greek armies. The Greeks earne d a reputa tion am ong thei r Mediterr anean and E astern neighbor s due to the quality andaccom plishments oftheir hea vy infantry,and it is the refore naturalfor scholarl y atte ntion tobedrawn most com monly to the hoplite. Nevertheless,t is i importan t to rea lize tha t thehoplite wa s not th e only fighte r with a m eaningfulrole in warfare. M any modern schol ars ofGreek warfare dism iss thesignificance of ight-arm l ed troops on thebattlefield,following ahoplite bias that is displ ayed in the ancient source s them selves. F or the ancient authors to gnore i or inim m ize thelight-armed m en is perha ps more un derstan dable;light-arm ed troops we re often for eigne rs orpoor citizenswith little

political or economic influence. However, any modern interpretation or reconstruction o Greek warfare that doe s not fully conside r therole of thelight-arm ed soldiers will inevitably lack com pleteness. tI is necess ary to ga in a better unde rstandi ng of the contri butions oflight-arm ed troopsni order to un derstan d more u f lly the trueature n of Greek warfare overall. Throughout this project I will argue that the nearly constant wars that took place B.C.E.placedhea during the fifth and fourth centuries vy dem ands upon the Gr eek city-

state s and res ulted ni significant cha nges in thenature ofwarfare. Due to a en geral 1

increase in the scale, duration, and geographic scope of conflicts during the period, a trend beganthat favor ed specialized troo ps, prof essional comm anders, and more innovative tactics. This trend as well as the frequency of expeditions and operations on unpred ictabl e and diverse te rrain spa rked an increas e in the e dmand for and use fulness of light-arm ed troops. he T m ost m i portan t of these soldiers wereave j lineers an d especially peltasts (javelin troops also equipped with light shields and short swords), who took maximum adva ntag e of range , agility, expe rience , and versa tile armament. As comb inedarms tacti cs developeddan leaders gai ned a grea ter unde rstandi ng ofeffective ran ged fighting m ethods , javelin-armed troops ea rned a position ofconsidera ble prominence in warfare b y the 36 0s. The chronological scope of this project will be broad, encompassing much of Greek history prior toB.C.E. 362in order to establish ba ckground an d context ade quately. The specific period of primary concern for my conclusions, however, will be 431-362 B.C.E.,

or the pe riod en compassing the oponne Pel sian Wa r, the m arch ofthe Ten

Thousand, and the politically turbulent years of the fourth century, ending with the death

of Epameinondas at Mantinea. This period of roughly seventy years is significant for th studyof javelin-armed light troops for a num ber of reasons . First,it was m arked by nearly constan t warf are. Second , andmore argua bly, it witness ed a transition in Greek polis warfare from relatively small interconflict to broader, more large-scale wars

betweencoalitions a nd powerf ul state s over grea ter dist ancesand lengths of m tie. This transiti on will becentralto my argum ent that sp ecialization an d professionalism brough t significant implications for the tactics and contributions of javelin troops. Third, and perhaps most m i portan tly, theperiod was relati velywell docum ented b y skilled 2

eyewitness histo rians who ha d both strongntere i st and personalexpe rience in m ilitary matters. Of thevarious kindsof light-arm ed troopsthat participatedin Gree k battles, this

project will focus on the peltast and the javelineer. Both of these types of soldiers foug

primarily from medium range with javelins; their fighting methods were similar, and the werethus d eployed in much thesame way. It would bedifficult to stud y theroles, tactics, and fighting methods of o ne without ta king th e oth er into conside ration as well. Nevertheless, it will be necessa ry to di stinguish be tweenthetwo whene ver theancient —a te sources d o so t(hey are vaguein som e instances ndency too oft en followed in

modern nalys a es) a nd to es tablish clear, separateclassifications fo r each. n I deed, at ti mes sucha distinction will bequite m i portan t, pa rticularly whe n I investigate thelong-term trends toward e mrcen ary se rvice, prof essionalization of generals an d fighting m en, and

increasing combined-arms tactics, all of which resulted in an increasingly important rol for peltasts and an expansion of their use. The introductory portion of the project will provide full descriptions of ave j lineers, pe ltasts, andtheir respective equipme nt.

Origins and Evidence, Pre-Peloponnesian War An investiga tion of theorigins ofjavelin-arm ed soldiers ni Gree k warfare is greatly hindered by a lack of historical source material. ’ s epicsHomer of course provide theearliest writtenevidencefor javelin-armed men in Gr eek warfare, alt houg h it is impossible to say with certainty whetherIliad or not andthe the Odyssey illustrate or —to any de —any real period of history. Homeric battle scenes deserve their reflect gree

own o f cusedstudi es, and this pro ject wi ll not a ttem pt to nves i tigate thepoems in gre at 3

detail. I will, howe ver, give particular atte ntion toeatures f of thebattle narratives tha t include jave lin/spe ar-throwi ng fighting methods a nd mass ta ctics; the latte r scenes describe to some degree the activities “ordinary of ” fighters (nonheroes) and m ay actu ally offer a closerepre r sentation ofbattle in som e period prior to the evelopm d ent of the hoplite. Anothe r importan t source that will beaddre ssed in this se ction is Tyrtaios,who provides valuabl e evidenceof fighting methodsandbattle tacti cs in thearcha ic period. His poe try containsxhortations e notlyon to hopli tes fighting taclosequarters (F r. 11.2934 West), but also to light-armed men armed with javelins and other projectiles (Fr. 11.35 -38 We st).The nature of warf arereve aled in the se writings is oneof relati vely loose, p oen-order com bat, with theightl armed m oving ab out and king ta cover am ong the heavy infantry —not dissi milar to thebattle scenes in theHomeric epics.Herodotus provides further evidence of javelin men in the pre-classical period, although his battle descriptions are often vague. He does provide a description of the Thracian contingent within Xerxes’ army, and they re a de scribed ess entially as pe ltastsni theirarms and dress (7.75.1). In addition to wri tten sources, thissection will also take into con sideration an y available archaeological evidence related to javelineers —primarily and peltasts vase paintings. It is in the nature of arti stic source s tobeopen to indiv idual interpreta tion, so therearesignificant nd a poten tially probl ematic factors tha t must beweighed whe n using artistic depictions as evidence for (real) history. Artistic license, preference for heroic scen es, and outri ght or uni nten tional ncor i rectnes s and inaccuracy mus t beconsi dered, although som e schol ars have depended tooheavily upon he t truthfulness an d accuracyf o 4

vase paintings. The limitations of two-dimensional images on typically round or awkwardl y sha ped items also hadnaimpact on the level f reali o sm an artist coul d achieveevenwhen he waswilling and capable of representing historical rea lity. All of —other factors thes e factor s donot dismi ss theimportance and va lue of artistic evidence

must obvi ously beconsi dered wh en dealing with writtensourcessawell —but they do limit the certainty of conclusions drawn from such pieces. The overarching purpose of this section is to construct a basic picture of the tactical use ofjavelineers an d the ir role in Greek warfare leading up to th e Peloponn esian War. The limitations of the sources, both in quality and in number, will make this a

difficult task. However, it is important to establish this foundation as clearly as possibl primarily becauseit will prom ote th e cre dibility of thetrend s and developments oflater decades forwhich I will arguein oth er sections. n I essenceI will assert tha t javelineers played a very imited l , supporting role onthebattlefield pri or to the Peloponn esian War. Up to a nd th rough th e Persian Wars, they s well a as other light troops (arch ers, slingers, stone -throwers)nd a cavalry were intermixedwith thehoplites. Following thePersian 1 Wars, he t light troopsnd a ca valry shiftedto theflanks duri ng battl There e. they enga ged

their counterparts in the opposing army and protected the flanks of their own phalanx from being riddledwith projectiles. During retre at the javelineers offeredwhat prote ction

they could to the slower hoplites, and during pursuit they inflicted what losses they cou on theopposing hopli tes. The role of the javeli neer was m odestly importan t but se ldom decisive, an d as a resulttheywereoften ignor ed unless the y performed poorly. As mentioned above , Thucydide s is thefirst historical sourceto mention thepeltast, so ti is 1 Hans van Wees, Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities (Londo n: Duckworth, 04; 20 re print, 200 5), 64, 187.

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difficult to determine the possible use of peltasts within Greece prior to the Peloponne sian War.Their app earanceon va sesindicate s tha t theywere in rel atively common contact th wi Greeks, atealst on theeri ppheral parts ofthe region nea rest to Thrace. One must also keep in mind the tendency for artists to display the exotic, so it is by no m eans concl usive evi dence tha t pelt asts were eq fr uently employed by the ee Grks before 431 .

The Peloponnesian War: Demosthenes and Trends in Light-Armed Warfare Although Gree k warfare woul d conti nue to bedominated b y the cit izen or mercen ary hopl ite, h t e Peloponne sian War 431 ( -404) di d much to el evate thepeltast n ad javelineer to a position of considerable prominence. The javelin-equipped soldier seemed to be come a popular auxi liary armin battle and on m ilitary expe ditions, andehwas prese nt oreven decisive in many e ngagements. The seconda ry roles a j velineers ha d apparently played on the battlefields of previous wars continued to hold true, but the

circumstances and conditions of the Peloponnesian War presented particular challenge that ed l to an ncrea i se in pel tasts ’ deployment, an exp ansio n in theuseof javelin-armed men overall, and a development of their tactics. In this se ction Iwill primarily discus s theincreasing leve l of profes sionali zation ’s large scale, and specialization that occurred as a result of the Peloponnesian Warlong

dura tion, an d wide geograp hic scope , as wellas th e implications of this trendon therole of javelin men. The early pha se of thewar wasmarked yb thelack of deci sive engagements orpitched attl b es, h t e expan sion of the war to other area s of Greece and ti s periphery, and theuse ofmore com plicated ta ctics in the en gagements that di d take place. 6

War ofthis sort be gan to requ ire a h igher deg reeof professionalism and military

specialization, and with the general lack of pitched battles, more skillful military leade branche d out by deve loping more com plicatedtacti cs andrelying at times on sp ecial opera tions. This typeof warfarewas m ore suited to elt p asts an d javelineers tha n were se tpieceenga gem ents onlat f ba ttlegrounds, andgood co mmande rs learned tomiplement thes e light tr oops to m aximum advanta ge. The Athenian gen eralDemosthene s provides an excel lent e xample of theseinterco nnected trends. Demosthen ’es campa igns had significant implicationsor f therole of pelt asts and javelineers, sohis career and influence will be examined closely. This section of the paper will also examine Thucydides’ accounts of combinedarms tactics an d the fi ghting m ethods se u d by ave j lineers a nd peltasts.nI doing so, will I seek to lustr il ate an increa sing level fointerde pendencebetweenhoplitesand javelin men. In short,theperiod witnessed theevolution ofGreek warfare in term s of its tactical complexity, large ly as a resul t of theincrea sing useof peltastsnd a otherightl armed men. I will also di scusstheovera ll effectiveness of the peltasts and jave lineers a gainst th eir enemy counterpa rts aswell as against hopli tes. Iwill makethebasic assertion tha t peltasts and higher-quality javelineers ha d earneda significant positi on in Gree k warfare by the end of the conflict. Their performance during the war revealed their potential, ’s typical terrain, which was typically well suited for particularl y consideri ng Gree ce

light-arm ed ope rations. While the hoplite generally could not bematche d (at thisim t e) in a head-on clash onterrai n favorabl e to him, peltastsnd a a j velineers ne vertheless dha reveal ed their own str engths and came to beviewed sa essenti al components of Greek armies bythe e nd ofthe Pel oponne sian War. 7

Peltasts and Javelineers in Xenophon ’s Anabasis and Hellenika At theend of thefourth ce ntury th e Persian princeCyrus hir ed a collection of Greek merce naries to sup port his ef fort to overthrows hi brother, rAtaxe rxes, the King of Persia. Xenophon was a participant in this famous cam paign, andhe recorded his experience in Anabasis the (“The Trip Up-Country”). This section of the paper will

particularly seek to illustrate combined-arms tactics, the versatility of peltast armament and the fefectiveness of javelin-armed fighting methods on div erse a nd often unfam iliar terra in. BecauseXenophon wa s persona lly involved n i theevents, Anabasis the provides a much m ore de tailed, memoir-style recoll ection ofthe b attles, skirmishes , special opera tions, and other nci i dents. I arguethat such a detailed firsthand account is a rfect pe companion to wor ks ofa more historical nature, suchs aThucydides or Hellenika the , particularly when investigati ng th e tactics an d effectiveness of certain categories of soldiers. Peltasts were a surprisingly sizable component ’ s Gree of kCyrus mercen ary o f rce, despite thefact tha t the re werevast rese rves ofjavelin troopsni theEast ava ilable to the Persian prince. The prese nceof roughly 2,500 e mrcena ry peltastsni thearmy (mostly from Thraceand peripheral regions ofGreece) m ay n i dicate acommon pe rception of their quali ty compared ot native, tri bal javelineers from among Persi an subjects.nI any case, Cyrus ’ attem pt to ove rthrow hi s brothernde e d in failure a nd actual ly rea ched its conclusion rly ea in Xenophon ’s narrative. tAtheclimactic ba ttle of Kouna xa, Cyruswas ’s position, and the killed during a recklessmountedcharge a imed directly at his brother

driving motivation for the expedition was lim e inated. The peltasts at Kouna xa performed 8

well (as did the rest of the Greek mercenary contingent) and provide a solid example o theflexibility oftheir fighting style. After anuneasy truceand eventua l Persian trea chery, the Ten Thousa nd were fo rced toeorga r nize and m ake the ir way hom e through hund reds of miles of enemy terri tory.During this long m arch the peltasts within thearmy dem onstr atedtheiruseful nessand versatility, and I will draw up on anumber of examples to illustra te th e use of combined-arm s tac tics. I will arguethat thearmy ’ s flexibility and coordi nation of di fferent un its we re essential to ts i su rvival. Oneexample of this is whe n theArkadian contingent of theTen Thous and (allhoplites) was b lockad ed by aforce of Thracians (peltasts as well as cavalry). Facing highly mobile, hit-and-run tactics without light-arm ed or mounte d sup port oftheir own, he t Arkadians were elpl h ess and suffered consi derably before another m ixeddivision ofthearmy cam e to their d. ai Overall the Anabasis suppor ts them i ageof the pe ltast ashe appe ars ni Thucydides’ account of thePeloponne sian War. The factthatthemercen ary pe ltasts involved in the expedition we re recruit ed not only in Thrace but in marginal parts of Greece as well indicate s tha t theequipping oftrained nd a experience d troops aseltasts p was b ecom ing m ore popular an d widesprea d. The levelof the p eltas ’ ts professionalization and specialization made them well-suited not only for traditional skirmisher tasks such as protecti ng flanks, adva ncing ahead of a m ain o f rce to se ize

heights and key positions, and pursuing enemies in flight, but also for directly engaging forcesthat we re un supp orted by ran ged troops. lthough A this s first i see n during the

Peloponnesian War, the march of the Ten Thousand confirms the effectiveness of peltas on the ir own merits an d reve als anncrea i sing appreci ation for unit interde pendence.

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Xenophon’s Hellenika resumes Thucydides ’ unfinished account basically in midsentence and continues the history through the end of the Peloponnesian War, the Corinthian War, the rise of Thebes and Epameinonda s, the decline ofSparta, and the B.C.E.). In thenarrati death ofEpam einonda s at Mantinea (362 ve, peltasts conti nueto

perform thesam e basic functions a s the y did earlier in thePeloponne sian War and during theexpedition of he t Cyrean s, with pe rhapsan increas ed degreeof effectivene ss. Most of my discussi on of he t period will illustrate points m ade earlier in the paper. Althoug h javelineers remained active in Greek warfare, the peltast became the premier javelinarmed soldier of he t day. Some schol ars ove rstatetheproliferation ofmercen aries in general during thi s period, but itis evident that the peltast was the m ost m i portant typeof mercen ary sol dier employedwithin Greece (hoplites m ore oftenfoundservice abroad). Peltasts ha d bythis point earne d an important rol e forthem selves in warf are, andtheir useand ta ctics de velope d accordi ngly.In pitched battles peltaststill s were o nt intermixed

with hoplites, since commanders continued to recognize that peltasts were most effect and valuable on the wi ngs ofthe ph alanx. However,there re a an umber of examples of peltasts engaging hopliteswith little or no upp s ort rf om their own heavy inf antry.

The Career and Alleged Reforms of Iphikrates The bulk of this final section will focus on the alleged peltast reforms of Iphikrate s, anAthenian commander particularly knownor f his lea dership of peltasts. I believeit is importan t and useful for this projectto address Iphikratesfully fortwo reasons. First,like Dem osthe nes before him, Iphikrate s exem plified th e tre nd towa rd professional generals who were pa cable e l aders ofspecialized, non-traditi onal (non10

hoplite) forces. Secon d, Iphikrate s’ alleged reforms have garne red m ore scholarly intere st than any other issue related to the peltast or javelineer. Because the notion of peltast reforms has obviousmiplications for he t role and tactics of peltasts on the battlefield,and becausethes e reforms are so wi dely acce ptedby schol ars (in vari ous o f rms and to vari ous degree s), I feel it is appropri ateto de vote considerable ttenti aon to the issue . Iphikrate s first sh owed his ski ll in 392 during raids on th e Phliasians and Arkadians, the latte r of which be came so te rrified of his peltasts (after “enormous numbers ” of the Phl iasians werecut down)ha tt they would not come out in arms a gainst Iphikrate s’ men. Two yea rs later Iphikrateswon thegrea test victory of his career, and the grea test in theknown istory h ofthepeltast. In this battle (Lechaion),his strongand welldrilled force of peltasts atta cked acontingen t of Spartan h oplites on the march.Iphikrates used stan dard javelin-armed fighting methodsnd a tac tics, whereby theelt pasts advan ced to within javelin ran ge, threw avolley, withdre w before the hoplitescould rea ch th em, ’ men and thenadvance d again when the enemy brok e offpursui t. Iphikrate s inflicted

terrible losses on the Spartans, who were unable to come to grips with the fleet-footed javelin men. The presence of Athenian hoplites nearby also indicates a use of combinedarms tactic s. The fighting m ethods a nd ran ged tactic s use d at Lechaion were d i entical o t 2 those used much ea rlier duri ng thecareer of Demosthene sso , itis important to note that

actua l fighting methodsfor peltasts nd a a j velineers did not seem to chan ge during the period. Some scholars attri bute th e cre ation ofnew tacti cs to p I hikrates in 390 , but tactics from various ope rations ca rried out m uch e arlier du ring thePeloponnesi an War argue against this theory. 2 Jan G. P. Best,Thracian Peltasts and Their Influence on Greek Warfare (Groningen: WoltersNoordhoff, 1969), 88.

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After other ccess su es at thehead of peltast rces fo , Iphikrates was placed in command of a m ercen ary a rmy in Persi an service. As shown yb theearlier expedit ion of Cyrus, the Persians were most often in ed ne of reliable heavy nfantry, i so the y typical ly 3 sought e mrcen ary hopl ites rathe r than ght li troopsrom f the Greeks. It therefore see ms

most ilkely tha t Iphikrate s’ force wasredom p inantly an a rmy ofhoplites. The reforms attributedto Iphikratesat this time com e from Diodorus Si culus and Corneli us Nep os, neither of whomis knownor f accu racy ni military m atters (am ong othe r subjects). Diodorus de scribes the innovations thus: phikr Iates replace d his m’en s large, heavy shi elds wi th sm aller oval ones , and in thi s wayhoplitesbecame peltasts; thei r spears hemade half again asong, l and he doubled the length oftheirswords; astl l y, he ” or light boots (15.44.1-4). Nepos relates quite equipped his men with“iphikratids,

similar claims: Iphikrate s cha nged the large shields, short spe ars, small swords, and bronze cuirasses, adopting peltai (making theinfantry into pe ltasts),spears twice as long, Iph. 1.3longer swords, and linen armor (4). Xenophon oes d n ot atta ch any sort of

innova tions to phikr I ates, an d therest of the Hellenika contai ns no reference s to pelt asts equippedas spea rmen or pi kemen. —the majority, it seems —acce ’s Manymodern schol ars pt thenotion ofIphikrate

peltast reforms, but the y do no t offer sufficient argum ents to sup port the positi on. After fairly pre senting othe r significant interpreta tions, Iwill argueagainst those scholars who support the notion of peltast reforms, regardless of the nature or degree. The above discuss ions of he t Peloponn esian War, h t Anabasis e , andthewars oftheearly fourth century will reveal a specific and proven fighting style that had been developed to 3

Matthew Trundle, Greek Mercenaries: From the Late Archaic Period to Alexander (NewY ork: Routledge, 2004), 40; .J K. Anderson,Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Cal ifornia Press, 1970), 13 0.

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incorporatethe q ualities of he t peltast. A commander who was proba bly the m ost ade pt leader of peltastsn ihistory woul d unde rstand the ir value and use s, and itdoesnot m ake practi cal sense forhim to introduce refor ms to the ir equipme nt that would ke mathe m into phalanx-fighters. My final argum ent will bethat Iphikrateswasan innova tor not ofpeltast 4 equipment but ofhoplite arm ament, and only in a shorttermsen se. He was very aware

of the a dvan tage s of mobility and ran ge, and it makessense that hewould bewilling to experiment with his heavy troopsn iorder toncorpor i ate thes e strengths of thepeltastnto i his hopli te corpsfor his pre sent circum stances (fighting against E gyptian heavy inf antry). If this was indeed thecase, then by ighte l ning hi s hopli ’tes equipment andrmi a ng them with longe r spe ars Iphikrates foresh adowe d thelater Macedonian ha p lanx of Philip and Alexander. It is certa inly interesting to notethat certain ad vantages displaye d by pe ltasts during theclassic al peri od may have inf luence d thedevelopment of a new tsyle of warfare tha t would supe rsedethe h oplite pha lanx a nd eventua lly conque r much ofthe known world. Pitched attl b es throughout the period an d to thend e of Hellenika he t were predom inantly decided b y hoplites,and this paper does not see k to obscure the fact tha t the h oplite rem ained ce ntral ot Greek warfare. However, the a bovesections will seek to illustrate trend s in warfare towa rd more spe cialized troops , more ski lled and professional commanders of such troo ps, an d more com plicate d tacti cs for deploying and usi ng them . Light troopsnd a peltasts in parti cular be nefitted fr om and even con tributedto this trend . The terrain of Greece and many regions nearby was conducive to light-armed tactics, and 4 My conclusion follows Stylianou . Syl J ianou A, Historical Commentary ’s onits major points: P. on Diodorus Siculus Book 15 (New York: Oxford University Pres s, 199 8), 34 3-45.

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weaknesses inherent in the hoplite way of war allowed sufficiently trained and experienced javel in-armed m en to carve outm aore subs tanti al role forthem selves ni warfare. he T relati velylarge s cale an d long d uratio n of theconflicts be twee n 431 and 362 weighed heavily onpoleis the, and older ways of igh f ting and ca rrying out the wars we re not suff icient. In such a con text Dem osthe nes, Iphikrate s, an d othe rs were ble a to wi n crucial victories and shape th e course of Greek history wi th pe ltasts an d javelineers.

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II. ORIGINS AND EVIDENCE, PREPELOPONNESIAN WAR

In this se ction Iwill discuss th e srcins of thepeltast and javelineer as well as the primary evidenceof their existen ce in Greek warfare p rior to the Peloponne sian Wa r. First I will describe thebasic armsand equipm ent of both, an d I will also explain the basic differences betwee n them. I will then explore theroots ofhe t fighting style particular to the eltast p nd a javeli neer by an alyzing thebattle descriptions a nd wa rriors ’ ’s Iliad. This is warran equipment featur ed in Homer ted b ecause I believethat the p eic

provides a strong lustration il d anearly example of thefluid, primarily ran ged style of warfare for which the classical peltastnd a jave lineer wereknown. Iwill arguethat, although assi cl cal Greek warfare wa s cen tere d on th e hopli te (both tac tically and

ideologically), practical effectiveness and deep roots in epic tradition gave javelin-arme troops a firm position in Greek warfare as well. It is importan t to und erstan d thetwo spe cific typesof light-arm ed soldi ers b eing jointly considered in this study. Javelineers (akontistai) were a significant group within the ove rall category of light-arm ed troops.nI the levi es ofthe cit y-statesthese m en generally were re cruited fro m the lowerlas c ses, which coul d not aff ord the rm a s and equipment of thehoplite. n I othe r case s javel ineers were e mn from particularly rugge d — most world and undeveloped regions of the Greek-speaking not ablynorthern nd a

15

5 central Greece. The jave lineer was armed with a b undle of light, bronze-hea ded javelins,

each betwee n one nd a two me ters ong l andwrapped with a ea l ther hong t thatmpro i ved rangeand accuracy. The javelins we re rel iably accur ateto adistan ce of ni nety meters if equipped with thes e thongs, com pared to alf h that distancewithout.A javelineer wore no armor anddid not ca rry a shield, althoughom s etimes he could wrap is h cloak around his 6 non-throwing armfor a sm all measureof protecti on.

The peltast originated in Thrace, and Thucydides is the first historical source to 7 make m ention ofhis existence .The Thraci an peltasts tha t saw service n i Greece were

mercen aries, as we re those pe ltasts m entioned by Thucydi des as b eingfrom Greek 8 islands and colonies that were geographically close As to mercen Thrace. aries, pelt asts

were specialists with a high degree of training and proficiency in their native style of warfare, a fact that tially ini sep aratedthemfrom many of the a bovem entionedlower9 class citizen javelineers. Peltasts —particularly Thracians —were n oted fortheir pointed 10 alopekis zeira foxskin cap ( ), long cloak ( ), and low boots. They were rm a ed with a

bundle of javelins as their primary weapons, although theymachaira also carried ,a the 11 short slashing sword, for close combat, pursuit, and the guarding of captives.

There is some debate regarding the common armament of the peltast, and although I will address thisurthe f r in later cha pters, the issuedeserves n a introduction

5

Best 19 69, 15 -16; Michael M. Sage W , arfare in Ancient Greece: A Sourcebook (London: Routledge, 1996 ), 41; van Wees004, 2 62. 6 Fred Euge ne Ray, Jr.,Land Battles in 5th Century B.C. Greece: A History and Analysis of 173 Engagements (Jefferson, NC : McFarland , 2009), 1 4-15. 7 Best 1969, 4. 8 Ibid., 13 . 9 Trundle 004, 2 47 . 10 Warfare in Antiquity: History of the Art of War, Vol. ,1trans. Best 19 69, 7; H ans De lbruck, Walter J. Renfroe , Jr. (Lincoln: University of N ebraskaPress, 1975), 12 5. 11 Best 1969, 7; JohnW. I. Lee,A Greek Army on the March: Soldiers and Survival in Xenophon's Anabasis (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 20 07), 117; T rundle 20 04, 47.

16

here. As I outlined above, scholars ge nerally agreethat peltas ts carri ed the machaira as a second ary wea pon, whi le their primary wea pon wa s thejavelin fitted with a thon g for increase d ran ge andvelocity. However, es Bt argue s tha t som e Thraci an peltasts were equipped with longe r thrust ing spears, ba sing his the ory onan interpreta tion of certai n 12 figures depicted on Attic pottery. Stylianou rejects thi s hypothe sis and points ou t tha t

none ofthe vas es ref erred to byes Bt date to ate l r than ci rca 490 ; they cannot begare rded as convincing evidencefor the ramament of peltasts in late r periods. Also, Best fails to 13 take artistic license into consideration. It shoul d benotedthat Herodotusscri debes the

Thracian contingent in Xerxes’ army as e quippe d like javelin-throwing peltasts , thoug h he does not actually use the “peltast term ”; these Thracians carry javelins, peltai

(described below), and small daggers, and they wear foxskin caps, tunics, and deerski boots(7.75.1). As thesections b elow will illustra te, thetactics an d performa nceof peltasts in the historical sources (i.e. those recruited for service in Greece) reveal that they werende i ed javel in men. Aside fr om origins an d level of specialization, theelta p st was disti nguished from the jave lineer by the fact tha t he wa s equippe d with a ilght shiel d, pelte the , from which 14 he derived hi s nam e. This type of shi eld was m ost comm only perceived a s crescen t

shaped or circular; it was rimless, constructed probably with a frame of close-woven wickerworkcove red n i goa t or sheepskin. Although th ere wa s no rea l standardization, the

12 Best 1969 , 7; also fol lowing thi s notion: Godfrey Hutchinso n, Xenophon and the Art of Command (London: Gree nhill Books, 20 00), 28; Victor Davis Hanson, A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War (New York: Rand om House, 2005 ), 91; .J E. Lendon,Soldiers & Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity (New Have n: Yale University Pres s, 2005), 96. 13 Stylianou 1998 , 346. 14 Anderson 1970, 112-13; A. M. Snodgrass, Arms and Armor of the Greeks, Aspects of G reek and Roma n Life, ed. H.H. Scullard (Ithaca: Cornell University Pres s, 1967), 78 .

17

pelte was pe rhaps twoeeft long b ( etween the “horns ” of thecres cent, in which form the

shield was ca rried with points faci ng up) and fea tured ithe e r a cen tralhandgrip or a 15 handgrip and an off-cente r arm band, an d som etimes asling for eas e of carr ying. This 16 shield was e vry ilght, perha ps aburden of onl y 1 kilogram(app roximately 2.2 pound s),

and the li ghtn ess of this defensive equipm ent certainl y was vi tal to the ffectiv e eness of thepeltast as amobile skirmisher.nI addition to be ing useful in closecombat,pelte the

was well suited for deflecting arrows and other missiles due to its weight and the patter 17 of its weaving. In short,theversatility of their arm amen — t shields, headgear, and short

—gave pe swords ltasts andvanta a ge n i com bat aga inst ot her forms of light-armed 18 soldiers.

Most sch olars se emto acce pt atwo-javelin limit (perhaps judging ga a in from vase paint ings), but I see no reason to assum e this was ne cessarily the cas e; Leeestimates that each a j velin was roughl y 1 kilogram , andthreewould have been thenorm al li19 mit. This is more reas onab le, as a peltast rea sona bly coul d have carried onejavelin in his throwi ng hand and either hel d two orhree t more in his other ha nd (if his shield had an armband) or kept xetras we dged betwe en his arm and his shiel d. In any ca se, mult iple javel ins woul d have weighed 2 to 4 kilograms; machaira the was another 1.5 kilograms, bringing the total burde n for weapons n ad sh ield to5.5 kilogram s (just over 12ound p s, with two javelins) or slightly more (depending on the number of javelins). Peltasts at the beginning

15

Anderson 19 70, 112-13; Snodgrass 196 7, 78; L ee 2007, 116. Lee2007, 116. 17 Peter Hunt, “Military Forces, ” in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, Volume I: Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome, ed. Phi lip Sab in, Hansvan Wee s, and Mi chael Whitby (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2007), 120; Hutchi nson 2 000, 94. 18 Ray 2009, 15. 19 Lee2007, 116.he Tre does not em se to be acomp elling reas on for doubting that altast pe m ight carry into battl e as many javel ins ashe could,as the y were his ima pr ry means of attack andfense. de 16

18

of the four th cen tury wore little to no rm a or, and som e may ha ve wornelt f or m piloi etal 20 (conical helmets). Overall, it is not difficult to see how the peltast was so mobile with

such asmall burde n of equipment and arms, espe cially in com parison to the hoplite, who was weighed down by abe cum rsome shiel d (at the ve ry least) and possi bly a he lm and armor ofsome kind as well. Overall, it is accurate to classify thepeltast“intermediate as 21 betweenthe javel ineer and the hoplite ” in terms of armament and tactical potential.

Both pe ltasts nd a thosejavelineers who were from unde veloped, tribal regions of Greece had an advan tageover theoor p citizen avel j in men from the poleis: they were natively trained in their style of warfare. This is a distinguishing characteristic, and Thucydides mentions such native tactics when describing the retreat of the 1,300 Thracian peltasts following their sack of Mykalessos during the Peloponnesian War. Whenthe Theban caval ry attacked them , the peltasts de fende d them selves by fo rming detachm ents tha t charge d and fel l back in turns (T huc. 7. 30).Such tacti cs were ot n the actions of a disorga nized m ob ofuntraine d men, and Pritche tt is correct in pointing out 22 thatpeltasts d hato ha ve a higher level of combat skill than hopl ites. Skillful and

effective javelin men, both peltasts and javelineers, required relatively extensive trainin and experience in or der to de velop the ir agility, speed, strength, dexte rity, and accuracy. Men from regions where jave lin-armed fighting me thods we re na tivelyexercised naturally made the e bst peltasts nd a a j velineers. As with so m any othe r topic s within the subject of ree G k history, H omer is the first source to which one ustm look to nve i stigate theorigins ofpeltasts and javeli neers. 20

Ibid., 116-17. Hutchinson 2000, 28. 22 W. Kendrick Pritchett The Greek State at War, Part II(BerkeleyandLos Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), 124. 21

,

19

Howeve r, to say tha t Homer ’s Iliad is a com plex and carefully craft ed pieceof litera ture would certainly be a n understate ment; therefore, any nves i tigation into tis historical accu racy, ma in the mes, or narra tive com ponents will inevitably prove quite cha llenging and controve rsial. Like much ofancient Greek mythology, h t e poem functions on multiple levels of significance. Most or even all of these levels of significance would have ee b n immediately recogni zable and und erstandable to the ’s rdcontem ba porary

audience, but for modern scholars they are open to conjecture. Nevertheless, warfare a combat are cen tral features of the Iliad in particular, and I believethat the com pose r of thepoemwould have based his conce ption ofwar arge l ly on thereality of his own da y in order to conne ct with his audience ’s experiences. Certain elements of Homeric — warfare —werepossibl the chariot, for instance y crea tive modifications made to suitheroic

warfare, thus crea ting asense of epi c distan ce. These elements coul d havebeen n i spired by physical/artistic remains discovered or observed by the Greeks of the Dark Age, or they coul d have be en inspi red di rectly by contem porary uses byaste e rn neighbor s (the war chariot, again). At any rate, while Iliad does the not portray definitive peltasts or javelineers, it does illustrate in an internally consistent manner a style of warfare with tactics an d fighting methods uit q e similar to those used by a j velin-arm ed troopsni later historical periods. The following section will analyze ’ arm the s, equip heroes ment,and fighting m ethodsto explore theepic ro ots of he t peltast n ad javel ineer. The warriors in the Iliad are ove rwhelmingly spea rmen, as any scan of the text ’s numerous attl b e scen es and individual combats/duel s woul d reve al. Howeve r, theiruseof thespear s i not sa often in themanner ofthehoplite (thr usting) asthat of the javel inarmed soldier (throwing). Homer sometimes expressly gives the warriors two spears 20

(Agamemnon: 11.43; Paris: 3.18; Hektor: 5.495, 6.104, 11.212; Patroklos: 16.139; Asteropa ios: 21.163; N estor:10.76;Idomeneus: 13.24 1; Sarpe don: 12.298 ), and sch olars have de bated the purpo se ofthis arm ament.Bassett argues that the second ar or spe ” andthat the use javelin is an “extra, of two spea rs does not nsti cotute the usual “Homeric

panoply. ” Achilles, Athe na, Ares, Ajax, Diomedes, and the overwhelming

majority of fighte rs are es d cribed as carrying and ne eding onlya singl e spear, and only 23 twice are two spe ars a ctual ly exp ressly use d in personal comb at (21.162, 16.462479 ).

Giventhe n umerous e rference s to flying missiles during battle as well as th e importan ce of the thrown spe ar even in si ngle com bat, it is not unrea sona ble to surm ise tha t the nameless wa rriors n i thebackground rried ca multiple spe ars as we ll. Howeve r, it is also feasible forwarriors ononeside to pick up the spears ca st by the opposi ng side, and Homer refers to ave j lins stuck ni thegroundafter ha ving missed the ir mark. At close range, how ever, the spe ar was used as athrusting wea pon. Like the peltast with hi smachaira, the wa rriors oftheTrojan War a re also equipped with swords, sheathe d at thehip andhung around theckne by a se parateel bt (11.29, 3. 334, 16.135, etc.) ; thesewere m ainly use d as slashi ng we apons. The primary weapon was und oubtedly the a sh spe ar, and the short swords are resorted to mari pri ly when a warrior has cast his —similar spear to the tactic available to the peltast. Both the spears an d the swords are early cl descri bed as b eing bronze, although ithas been pointed out that veral se detai led and brutal feats accom plished wit h the se we apons (behe adings 24 and rem ovals of limbs) woul d onlybe possibl e with iron we apon s.Consequently,

23 Samue l E Bassett,“On theUse of T wo Spe ars in H omeric Warfare, ” The Classical Journal 18, No. 2 (November 1922): 104-6. 24 Tim Everson, Warfare in Ancient Greece: Arms and Armour from the Heroes of Homer to Alexander the Great (Glouce stershire: Sutton Publishing tLd., 200 4), 64 .

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schol ars ha ve generally reas oned tha t thedescription of w eapons sa being exclusively bronze, an d yet being capa ble of feats onl y possible with ri on, represe nts “throwback a ” 25 elem ent anda form of archaiz ing. Sincetheseacts wereeing b pe rformed by heroes,

howeve r, it is also possi ble tha t the o pet wa s not conce rnedwith matters sapractic al as thecomparative stren gths of m etals.In either v eent, therms a of theHomeric soldier are not dissi milar fromthoseof thepeltast. The defensive equipment of the heroes is undoubtedly heavier than that used by thepeltast (and th e jave lineer, ofcourse ). The armor use d by th e Hom eric warri ors si mostly construct ed of bronze, though al ce rtain m en, suchsathelesser Ajax and Amphios, are de scribed as wearing linencorslets. Everson rgues a that A gamemnon ’s armor (11.19-28) is anexample of scal e armor, and tha t its lengthy an d detailed description indicates that it was n ot in use during Hom ’er s own time (it deserved special attention for the audience to picture ). it Furthe rmore, Everson sup ports hisiew v by pointing out the fact tha t Homer de scribes thearmor as ha ving be en a gift from Cyprus, 26 where scal e armor is known tohave be en use d.Most warri ors wear bronzeplatearmor

and other pieces such as the war belt and armored kilt. Overall, Homeric warriors are more he avily arm ed and armored tha n javelin-throwing soldiers ofthehistorical periods, thoughthis should com e as no surpri se. Armor represe ntedwealth an d nobility, so naturally the pri nces on oth b sides would be o s equipped . Perha ps we rae to assum e tha t the na meless sol diers o f llowing thes e leaders were a rmoredto a m uch e l sser de gree , more closely resembling peltastsnd a javelineersratherthanhoplites.

25

Ibid.; Snodg rass1967, 37 ; P. A. L. Greenhalgh Early , Greek Warfare: Horsemen and Chariots in the Homeric and Archaic Ages (New York:Cambridge Universityess Pr, 1973), 41 . 26 Everson 200 4, 49.

22

Shields are auniversalfeature am ong thewarriors, andthey re a typi cally made of oxhide. Homer is rathe r ambiguous reg arding thegeneral form of this piece of equipment, howeve r; theshield of Hektor si described as bum ping against bothish neck and his ankles (6.117),and Peri phetes tri ps over the rim of his shield as ehturns to re treat (15.6457), but m any a re de scribed asround. Leaf argue s tha t such round shiel ds were not ne cessarily circular, sincethe large ones carried by Hektorand Ajax would have been five feet in diam eter if this were th e case. The shields we re poss ibly oblong a nd sh aped like the surface of a cylinder, and the poet applied the description of roundness to an 27 older formof shield passed down n i epithets from earlier epic tr adition. There s i another

possibility: the shields were oblong and rounded but flat-surfaced, oxhide over some kin pelte of wicker, an d therefore similar in constructio n to th e —ideal for warfare involving

both an r gedand close-quarters m co bat. Helmets a nd grea ves a re also found ni abunda nce am ong the chi ef Homeric warriors,and thissi onesignificant differencebetwee n theheroes n ad late r javelin-arm ed men. Most helme ts are of bro nze, an d thehelmets ni particular are de scribed variously as having hollow eye s, horns, or hor sehair crests (al thoughDiomedes dons aleather kul s l capduring thespying/raiding mission, 10. 257-9) . The imagery of he t gleaming masses of warriors sugge sts that ost m ofthe m en we re eq uipped with bronze hel mets along wi th the rest oftheir metal panoply 2.455 ( -8), although worthen m tioning is the ’o bsartusk helme t, described in detail by Homer and worn by Odysseus during theraiding mission (10.261-5).

27

Walter e Laf,“Notes onHome ric Armou r, ” Journal of Hellenic Studies 4 (1884): 283-85.

23

There are conflicting views regarding the tactics and methods of combat featured in the poem , and these de serve some attenti on here due Iliad to het’s position as a basic

illustration of early (predominantly ranged) Greek warfare. The opinion of scholars such —namely t as Lendon hat Homeric warfarerepre sents aconfusi on offighting styles

becauseit wassimply meant to sh ow he roes exce lling n i heroic virtue —is s rather narrow. His claim that the massof soldiers se rves merely“stage as achinery m ” for the actions of theheroes isless tha n com pelling in light of he t rich de tail and atten tion de voted yb Homer to de scriptions of the ove rall battl28 e. In thesame way Finley ’ s assertion that Homer was interested solely in theheroes and tha t he b rought ni details of the b attles 29 only“to maintain he t necessary realism of the b ackground ” falls short of persuasion.

—melee Willcock’s view, that Homeric warfare consists of two fighting situations and 30 retreat/pursuit —is just too simplistic. The assertion ofAlbracht se ems most reasona ble:

Homer use s individual comb at and theactions ofheroes as snapshots or highl ights ofhe t overal l battle scene , a dimensio n in which thepoet is undoubte dly intere s31 ted I.will focus on the two om dinant viewpoi nts, those ofritchett P nd a va n Wees , as they re a the most de veloped and areparticularly relevant for a study ofightl armed warfare. Pritchett see s the ism d ounted e mn-at-arms as the he avy nfantr i y, the m asse s as made up of ifghting men as well, light-arm ed archers safairly effective, and chariots asa means of flight a nd pursuit . In thecourseof battle one line or the oth er is broken , and this event resul ts in num erous si ngle com bats orfights e btwe en bands ofheroes. He attribute s

28

Lendo n 200 5, 3132. M. I. Finley, The World of Odysseus (New York: Viking Press, 19 78), 75. 30 A Companion to the Iliad (Chicago: University of Chicago Pres Malcolm Willcock, s, 197 6), 29

280.

31 Franz Albracht, Battle and Battle Description in Homer: A Contribution to the History of War, trans . and ed. Pete r Jones, Malcolm Willcock, nd a Gabriele Wright (London : Duckworth, 20 05), 54-55.

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theduels to thenorm al anci ent Mediterranean practi ce of monoma chy. n I tere stingly, Pritchett vi ews thepassage at 13 .125-205(the densely massed formation ofthe Gr eeks checki ng theTrojan advanceagainst he t ships) “as the most informative, ” and he si 32 particularly intereste d in the descriptions of cl osearrayin Homeric com ba t.

Pritchett ’s approa ch is also ose cl ly analytical ofHom’er s vocabul ary and use of terms. Words such phalanx as and stikhes are som etimes use d in the poe m simply to describe ranks of footsol diers, but othe r times seemto imply certainformation, 33 companies, battali ons,squa res,and more. The front-fighterspromakhoi or were,

“the fo ” according to Pritchett, remost ifghters am ong themen-at-arm s,and they wer e

actua lly made up of a disti nct com pany or battali on. The cham pions ad vancebeyond thi s group to hurl javelins or en gage in single comb at, an d the n the y withdraw ba ck to a position amongpromakhoi the .34 Again, he t density offormations si emphasized m ost by Pritchett,who eve n supp oses tha t the m en (parti cularly the Gr eeks) must haveosse p ssed a high level of discipline and pra ctice in light of their seemingly dense, orderly advances. Terms used by the poet for battle supposedly lead us to the same assumption of close-in fighting as the orm n . The purpo se of the de nse fo rmations was to brea k the nem e y mass, and Pritchett eve n surmises that the ass-m shoveothismos or was com mon in Homeric warfare, eve n thoug h thenoun is ne ver use d. Brief lulls allowed forboth sides to tch ca their breath while throwi ng javeli ns at theothe r, but the funda mental feature ofHomeric battle was mass com bat betwe en m en-at-arms clashingin disciplined and organized 35 formations.

32

Pritchett 1974, 14-15. Ibid., 24-25. 34 Ibid., 25-26. 35 Ibid., 27-30. 33

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Van Wees ’ view is markedl y different, nd a I agreewith his concl usions for m y own sum mary ofthe sh ape of Homeric battl e. As mentioned above, van ’W ees interpreta tion is based ontheorganization of he t warriors into ba ndsof personal followers,and this is most reas onab le whenone loo ks at thefluid and free movem ent of theheroes aroundthesectors of h t e battlefield. The numerous reference s to m issiles flying probab ly indicate e thprese nceof significant num bers of lighte r-armed men, and thefootsol diers clearly wereoftendrawn up in rel ativel y dense crowds . However, van Wees doe s not ake t this to mean (as Pritchett does ) that the en m we re arrayed n iorderly formations,but a rther that theyre we pressed toge ther,at times, n i an amorphous 36m ass. This makes the most sense of the text and the ambiguity of the terms used, since there is no clear impression of orderly ran ks an d files in thebattle scenes. Also in con tras t to Pritchett ’s opi nion, van Wee s see s the typi cal adva nce ofthe a rmies as rathe r loose n ad undisciplined: despite the efforts of the leaders, chariots pull ahead of the footsoldiers, 37 less e ager men a l g be hind, and the arm y becom es qui te spread out.

Accordi ng to va n Wee s, the ene g ral shape of thenit i ial clashand ensuing ba ttle is not oneof massed hand-to-hand com bat, but rathe r of a more lfuid form of fighting. The armies adva nceto a fai rly close proxi mity to oneanother,with themasses of troops barely within missile range, while promakhoi the (which includemore men thanjust the heroes them selves) an r ge in ront f ofthe m asses andfight wi th those ofhet opposi ng side. The promakhoi move n i and out ofthe m ass ofsoldiers beh ind them , rathe r than following Pritchett ’s sce nario of cham pions m oving n i and ou t of the promakhoi. The front-fighte rs en gage m ostly in spe ar-throwi ng, thoug h occa sional ly they re a able to 36

van Wees,“Homeric Warfare, ” in A New Companion to Homer, ed. Ian Morris and Barry Powell (New York: Brill, 1997), 674-75. 37 Ibid., 676.

26

move n i close e nough for a spear-thrust or swor d attack. h Tere si also enough room in 38 between the armi es and am ong he tpromakhoi for randomchari ots to m ove fr eely.

Homer se ems to com bine threedifferen t elem ents ofwarfare: fluid and ope npromakhoi, close-o order fighting among rder m asshand-to-hand fighting, an d mass

excha ngeof missiles. Althoughchol s ars such as Pritchett ha ve address ed this apparent confusi on differently, proposing tha t anopening ph ase of massed fightingeading l to the opening of space formissile comb at and skirmishing, van Wee s sug gests “tha the t 39 confusion is in our minds. ” References “to shields clashing ” do not necessarily indicate

“missiles flying ” necessit masse d close-combat, nor do atestrict pha ses of o l ng-range

comba t. Rathe r, the fu ndam ental shape of battle is basedupon the com bat of he t promakhoi leaping forward an d drawing ba ck into the m ass, throw ing javelins and

meeting theenemy face-to-facewith swor d, spea r, andstone. rBeakthro ughsresul t from

collective effort or conspicuous killings, but even the latter tends to occur amid collect success . An army brea ks an d falls into rout,he tn reestablishesitself and res umes stan ding battle until another brea kthrough occurs.he Tre is freed om of movem ent for men to range side to side sawell as front to re ar. Van Wee s sees theintensification of battles a typically stem ming from the ne ed to recove r a corpse or lp hea com rade . Howeve r, despite theeffectivene ss ofmassing oops tr ni denseformation for the purpose s of defense, thecrea tion ofa totally cohe sive formation si exce ptional in thetext n ad is 40 followedby norm alpromakhoi-style fighting.

Overall , theopinions ofvan We es are most com pelling. His the ories are based on a logical reading of he t text, obse rving the fluid nature of thebattles and the’poe s overt t 38

Ibid., 677-78. Ibid., 678-80. 40 Ibid., 680-86. 39

27

and sub tle referen ces to the unna med warriors. There s i simply not enoug h evidence in the te xt tosupport Pritche t’ts view of o rderly masse d com bat; he tend s to overl ook the

significance of missiles flying during battle and the ability of light-armed archers to mo in and out of pr otecti ve cove r, and healsoseems to m iss the impl ied prese nceof chari ots and charioteers in the background. promakhoi Certainly-style combat is conveniently suitable for displaying grea t heroes ni action, so o ne might the refore con cludethat this form of warfarewaschose n or createdfancifully by thepoet for this purpos e. Howeve r, in a text so ca refully related totheeveryday xpe e riences of ts i contem porary audience , it is also si gnificant tha t thewarriors are ca st n i such a d etailed environment dep endent upon the ovem m ents ofthe m asse s aswell as of the he roes. fI any e xamples we re to be drawn rom f the poe m or if it was importantorf the p oet to cr eate an imagethat reson ated personal ly with his audience members, then itshoul d beno surpri se tha t the m ethod of warfare in the Iliad appearsto beplausibl e and internal ly consi sten t. In conclusi on, I again maintain tha t Homeric warfareis indeed interna lly consi sten t and o des rep rese nt a b asic pi cture of warfare a s it would havebeen known to his contem porari es; the crea tive m odifications m adeto sui t the e hroic war arexam e ples of epic distancing inspi red b y physi cal and rti astic rem ains di scove red or obs erved by th e Greeks oftheDark Age. Van Wee s sees in Homeric warfare possibl a “embryonic e ” a reflection of a period just prior to the hoplite ph alanx ni theprocess of deve lopment,

rise of this style of41war. Although this positi on is ce rtainl y not u nassailable, it is a convincing view that he lps to sh ed light on aperiod tha t is lamentably unclear. The epic 41 Ibid.,691-92. Thoug h the re are objections to van’ swillingne Wee ss to h istoricize th e poem and also aga inst h is methodo logy, Ifind no co mpelling re ason to rejec t his approach.SeeEverett L. Wheeler, review of Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities , by Hans van Wee s,Journal of Military History 69, no. 4 (Octobe r 2005): 1192-94.

28

is by n o means exactly rep resentative ofhistorical reality, but I believeit doe s reflect a particular noti on ofmixedcomb at (range d and close-quarters) thatmportant is i to ep kein mind wh en investigati ng themurky histor y of a j velin-armed soldiers in Gree ce. n I short, the Iliad is highl y informative regarding an early formor conce ption of Greek warfare, and this form re markably parallels the knowncti ta cs and fighting style of a l ter pe ltasts and javelineers. With the emergence poleis of and hopl ite armament ni theeighth centur B.C.E. y ,

the socially and politically dominant classes in Greek city-states such as Athens, Thebe and Korinth b egan to fight e xclusively as heavy infantry.In oth er regions tha t did not develop into poleis, includ ing Phokis, A itolia, Akarnania, and portionsof Lokris, fighters reta ined theolder, more lfuid form of warfare b asedon ran ged light n i fantry,duelargely to theparticularly rugge d terrai n in such are as where itched p battles on flatter round g 42 were impossible. This was ofourse c similar to Hom eric warfare, an d Lendon a rgue s

” from the similarity of their fighting that javelineers and peltasts“epic derived legitimacy

style to th at of theHomeric heroes. D espite the fact tha t their ac t tics conf lictedwith hoplite ide als, he t javelineer and peltastfit wellwithin Greek military cultureecau b se of 43 this Homeric tradition. Hunt ikewi l se points outthat Hom eric exa mple may have

alleviated some of thecontem pt Greeks fel t rega rding thepeltast nd a his fighting 44 methods. Even in thecity-states, howeve r, light troopsrm aed with javelins and stone s 45 continued to participate in warfare. The predom inanceof roughterrai n throughout the

42

Hutchinson 2000, 26. Lendo n 200 5, 96, 105-6, 158. 44 Hunt2007, 127. 45 Snodgrass 196 4, 67; T rundle 2004, 47-48; van eesW 2004, 174-75. 43

29

46 territory of the cit y-state s made theprese nceof light nfan i try necessa ry to som e deg ree.

These men were largely ignored or scorned in literature because they were recruited eithe r fromthepoor, an l dless class or rf omsemi-foreign tri bes, they fough t in a hit-and47 run styl e, an d the y were o l osel y organiz ed . As Snodgrass obse rves, there wa s no time or 48 inclination to tra in such m en , and this woul d certai nly havehad animpact on the ir

degree of effectiveness. Light roops t sa well as ca valry were likely intermingledwith th e hoplite phalanx as it evol vedthroughou t thearcha ic period, as it was onl y after the Persian Wars that 49 light-armed fighters were moved to the front and flanks of the Prior heavy toinfantry.

this general shift to the flanks, light infantry would have continued to fight much like t Iliad—dashing forward a warriors in the nd ou t from thecover ofmutual pr otecti on to

cast their missiles, then falling back, all while individuals and groups of heavier armed men clashed in close-quarters com bat. The hoplites the mselves we re still highly mobile and seemed to fight n i loose fo rmations, and the y conti nued to usetheirspears a s missiles as well —blurring thedistincti on be twee n heavy nfan i try and ght-arm li ed. Up to a round 640 B.C.E.vase paintings su ggest that he avier-armed m en conti nued to carr y multiple spea rs into battl e, andin the ima gesthesespea rs are som etimes equipped with thr owing

46 Hutchi nson 200 0, p.20, argue s that Gr eek methods ofwarfare de veloped asresul a t of the country ’s topography —it was a m ountainous area , so ba ttles took pl aceon flat plai ns be twee n the range s. This statement makes as much sense as saying that the men of a plains region would fight battles in the woods be twee n fields. 47 Victor Davis Hanson,The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of Cal ifornia Press, 2 000), 5 1; va n Wees 2004, 65; Se rgeY aliche Mercenaries v, of the Ancient World (London : Constable, 1997), 119 . 48 Snodgr ass1967, 61. 49 van Wee s 2004, 64, 187; Peter rentz, KThe Battle of Marathon(New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 2010), 59-60.

30

50 loops. The most a f mous ofthes e vasepaint ings is ound f on theChigi vase(circa 640

B.C.E.), which

clearly depicts such rowi th ng spears in thehands of hoplites.

The picture presented by the late seventh-century poet Tyrtaios reveals a new development, in which light-armed (range d) troops n ad heavy-armed (hand-to-hand) troops re a clea rly distinguishe d from each othe r in term s of their fighting methods , though they remained intermingled (Fr. 11.35-38 West; 23a.10-14). Tyrtaios explicitly address es thehoplites a nd light-armed men se paratel y, exhorting each ofthemto excelin their es r pective methodsof combat. Specifically, thepoetcalls upon thelight-armed men ’s to hu rl their rocks an d javel ins while standing cl oseto thehoplites, using thelatter

shields as cover whe n necess ary F ( r. 11.3538). Thoughthetwo broad teg caories of soldiers (hopl ite and light-armed men) conti nued to fight si de by side, there wa s at least more distinction be twee n the ir fighting methods nd a ove rall functions on the battlefield. It is also lea c r that na attitudewasdeveloping, at leas t am ong thelanded middle class, in ’s which the idea ls and martial virtues of lose c com bat (the hopli tefighting method) were

emphasi zed; me n who fo ught rom f a distancewere now comi be ng m arginalized and even 51 scorned.

Change again took lace p following thePersian Wars of the early fifth ce ntury. nI a new posi tion in front or on the sides of the ph alanx,light-armed men and caval — ry —were coun another se conda ry, marginalized g roup ted up on to gua rd the anks fl ofthe

army, protect theopl hites n i theevent ofretreat, and pursue the e nemy in vic52 tor The y. 53 light troops were also useful in ravaging enemy Wheeler territory. poi nts out tha t the

50

van Wees 2004, 169. SeeKrentz 2010 , 43-44. 52 Ibid., 196. 53 Hanson 2005, 91. 51

31

wars ni Greece betwe en the late ven se th an d early fifth centuri es generally had “limited 54 strategic goals ” and primarily took the form of border conflicts. While this is certainly a

generalization, it does help to explain the lack of focus on light-armed warfare in the ’ s rough period; the military efficiency and practicality of using light troops on Greece

terra in was less im portan t tha n the confirmation of soci al andpolitical reali ties offeredby hoplite warfare. Although javel in-armed men did not ha ve a central ro le in pitched battles, van Wees is cor rect ni asserting that aGreek com mander coul d be dismissive of ightl armed troops onl y when hehad hi s own tonegatethose on the nem e y 55 sidThe e. new position on theflanks—thus ph ysically rem oved fr om thehoplites — must havelso a increase d the disparaging attitude com monly held againstave j lin-armed m en. Despite thethreat osed p by thelight troops , social andpolitical forces upto thePeloponn esian War kep t the hoplite on ce nter stagein warfare, ateas l t in theGreek mind.It is not certa in how exclusively theideal ofthehoplite clash wasactua lly carried out prior to the

Peloponnesian War, since the evidence for the period is scanty and primarily concerned with thehoplite. A discuss ion of h t e natureof hoplite battle during this time is be yondthe scopeof this paper. Howeve r, it is evident that com manders gen erally dismissed the importan ce and po tential effectiveness of light-armed warfare. ’ second As a result of light troops ary roles in warfare, ti is also com monly 56 assumed that the y were rarely a decisive factor ni theoutcom e of battl eLaze s. nby goe s

so far as to y sathat “there was really no place for [light troops] in a set-piece battle 54

Wheeler, “LandBattl es,” in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, Volume I: Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome, ed. Philip Sab in, Hans va n Wee s, and Michael Whitby (Cambridge: Camb ridgeUniversity Press, 20 07), 197-98. 55 van Wees 2004, 64. 56 Ray 2009, 14.

32

57 between hoplites; ” prese nting an even more extrem e view, Williams declares tha t light

troops werenever m i portant in classic al Greek battle58s.These positions se emmerelyto perpetua te theancient bias against theightl armed, and there rea lly is not enough historical eviden ce to warran t such blanke t sta tements. In carrying out the functi ons above, light troops we re basically meant to fill oneoverarchi ng and myopic role: to cance l out their counterparts n the i opposi ng army. Ray points out tha t this important but unglamorous role contributed to the light-armed ’ s image, soldier as suc h me n earned “unde served anonym ity

59 in victory and over-state d notor iety in defeat. ”

In sum mary,therole and importance of pelt asts an d javelineers we re ce rtainly limitedprior to the Peloponn esian War. Homer ’ s Iliad illustrates an early form of Greek warfare emphasizing light-armed style tactics and ranged, fluid fighting methods, and available v eidence n i dicate s tha t this form of warfarepersistedthroughou t thearcha ic period. Hoplites th emselves foughtn iope n orde r, oftenwith throwi ng spears a s wellas hand-to-hand we apons, unti l the later rt paoftheseve nth ce ntury,and javelin men (along with othe r light troops, such sa archers) ere w m ixed wit h the m. Over thecourse of centuries, however, the — hoplite fighting hand to hand and in relatively close —cam formation e to dom inate th e battlef ields ofGreece. Althoug h thejavelin soldiers

were oft en overlooked in literature duri ng sub sequent peri ods,they m ust have been considere d dangerous en oughto thehoplite phalanx to u j stify the ir inclusion in thelevies (eve n if it was m ore a s a defensive measure ). If thejavelineers were ineff ective, it was not dueto their m ars or m ethod offighting, but rath er to the way ni which theywere 57

J. F. LazenbyThe Peloponnesian War: A Military Study, Warfareand History (New York: Routledge-Taylor and Francis Group, 2004), 143. 58 Mary Frances Williams, men's Spe cial Forces : Peltastsnd a aNew Kind of Greek “Philopoe Light-Armed Warfare(Livy 35.27), . ” Historia: Zeitschrift fur Alte Geschichte 53, No. 3 (2004), 262 59 Ray 2009, 14.

33

deployed y b com manders who we re primarily concerne d with theclashof hoplites. U p to the Pel oponne sian War,then , thes e troops see m to have ee bn deployed an d utilized neither creatively nor proactively in battles or campaigns.

34

III. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR: DEMOSTHENES AND TRENDS IN LIGHT-ARMED WARFARE

This section will focus on the Peloponnesian War (431-404), a critical period of increa sing se rvice and ta ctical developm ents for peltasts an d javelineers. Althoug h Greek warfarewould conti nueto bedominate d bythecitizenor me rcena ry hopl ite, the Peloponn esian War eva el ted thepeltast and javeli neer to a position ofconsiderab le prominence.s Adiscussed in the previ ous se ction, these light-armed troops had played

secondary roles on the battlefields of previous wars, but the circumstances and conditio of thePeloponne sian War presen tedparticular chal lengesthat led ton aincr ease in peltasts ’ and javelineers ’ deployme nt, an expan sion of theiruses , and a de velopment of their tactics. In this se ction Iwill discuss th e early phase of thewar, thelack ofdecisive engagements orpitched attl b es, h t e expan sion of the war to other area s of Greece and ti s periphery, and theuse ofmore com plicated ta ctics in the en gagements that di d take place. War bega n to requir e a higher degree of professio nalism, and the A thenian ge neral ’es Demosthene s prov idesan exam ple of this trend. em D osthen campa igns had

implications for the role of peltasts and javelineers, so his career and influence will be primary concern.hrough T out, Iwill attem pt to de termine th e ove rall effectiveness of thes e light-armed troops ainst ag both their enemy counte rparts and , more importantl y, against hopli tes. While the h oplite still could not e b matche d in a head-on clashon 35

reas onab ly flat terrain, pel tasts nd a javel ineers neve rthelesshad reve aled the ir own strengths an d become essen tial components of Greek arm ies by the endof the Peloponnesian War.

The outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C.E.marked the beginning of a

long-expected showdown between the two greatest powers in Greece. On one side were

the Spartans, nearly all the Peloponnesian states, the Boiotians, and several other stat outsi de the Pel oponne se (Thuc. 2. 9). The Spartan s werewidely eg r arde d as thestrongest land power in all of Greece, and Hanson points out that the Boiotians were the next strongest in this 60 area. As a result , the Spartan s and the ir allies enteredthewar wi th a significant d egein army strength and repu tation. On theother si de weretheAthenians and their widespread allies and tributary cit ies, all of which provi ded either ships or soldiers an d money(Thuc. 2.9). The stren gth of A thens wa s in its fleet, althoug h the city’s army wa s considere d formidable as we ll (1.80, 2.13). nI sum , the Peloponn esian War was a strange ly matche d affair betwee n two powers h witvery differen t strengths , and the x eercising ofthes e streng ths dete rmined the cour se of the war. During thefirst pha se of theconflict (the rAchidamian War), theSpartan s led large, annual invasions of Attika, thecountryside ofthe Ans, an d laid was te to the

territory. As a result, the Athenians brought into the city their rural population and all t goodsthey could bring with the m (Thuc. 2.12-14). Perikles, the Athenian general, made it his policy to avoi d a direct,pitched battle with theenemy, andnstea i d dispatche d naval expeditionary forces to raid the Peloponn ese (2.23, 2.55-6) . Light troopslaye p d no

60

Hanson 2005, 126-27.

36

significant role in any ofhe tse operations, as the Athenians use d citizen h oplitesand eithe r arche rs (in 431) or cav alry (in 430) on the ir nava l expeditions; or f theold role of rava ging enemy terri tory, howeve r, both side s employed light troops (2.29-31,. 3.1) The annual invasions of Attika did notroduce p any decisive re sults or f the Peloponn esians dueto the ir inability toengage theAthenian land for ces directly. A plaguerava ged Athens, howe ver, and ca used immense suffering and loss oflife. Put simply, neither side felt that it could sustain its initial 61strategy. As a re sult, thewar beg an to shif t to peripheral areas and to cam paigns of indirect atta ck, developments for which light-armed troops were to prove very well suited. In his report of onesuchoperationni 429, Thucy dides provi des thefirst exa mple of thepoten tial impact oflight troops whe n thoseon oneside outm atche d theother. nI this insta nce, at Spa rtolos (in northern Greece), uniden tified Athenian light-arm ed men and cava lry were be aten b y Chalkidian and Olynthian peltasts , othe r light troops , and cava lry. Initially theAthenian hoplitesweresucce ssfulagainsttheir opposingum n bers in the Cha lkidian army, but the latter ’s cav alry and light troops (m ost m i portan tly peltasts ) were in turnctori vi ous a gainst thecava lry and ghtli armed on th e Athenian side. More peltasts from Olynthosarrivedas reinforcements for theChalkidians, an d all these light troops, wi th cavalr y support, launcheda new attack on thethenian A rmy a a nd drove it back. Whenever theAthenians woul d attem pt to cha rge, theghtli armed troops simply fell back and then press ed for ward ag ain as soon sa the A thenians gan be to withdraw (Thuc. 2.79).he T effectiveness ofthepeltasts is clear, and Lazenby n otesthat Spa rtolos “is

aninteresting example of the way in whi ch trai ned light troopsnd a ca valry, if

61

Ibid., 88 .

37

62 properly handled, could defeat ”hoplites. The battle is perhap s an e arly dem onstr ation

of the peltast ’s sup eriority com pared to oth er forms of javelin-armed men. Spartolos is also anexample of howhe t war was eing b ca rried out ndi i rectly through ga engements in peripheral areas rathe r thanin Attika or the Peloponnese . In 426 theAthenians suffered a more signi ficant defea t at thehands of lightarmed troops, and sthitime their commande r, Demosthenes, earned l a valuable lesson. Demosthene s waspersuade d bytheMessenians of aup N aktos tonvad i e Aitolia, asizable Greek natio n whosemen fought exp ertly as ilght-arm ed javelineers. The Athenian general arranged fortheOzolian Lokrians to joi n his orces f in okr L is because they were neighbors of theAitoliansand fought ni thesam e manner (Thuc. 3. 94-5) . Demosthen es therefor e must ha ve consideredsom it ewha t dan gerous to fi ght ag ainst ave j lineers in rugged, unfamiliar country, but not dangerous enough: after initial successes, he advanced farth er into Aitolia, against thetownof Aigition, without waiting for the Lokrian javelineers. The Aitolians attacked fromthehills in all directions, advancing and throwing volleys of javelins then withdrawing before the Athenians could close with them . The archers accompa nying Dem osthenes ’ forces e hld off thejavelineers fora time, but once th eir arrows werepe snt and their capta in was killed, the A itolians wereable to presshard andforce an Athenian retrea t. This withdrawal turnedinto arout,and thefleetfootedjavelineers wre akedhavoc on the slower, pa nicked Athenian soldiers (3.97-8) . Aigition is a prime example of a j velin-armed troopssing u te rrain, rang e, and mobility to ma ximum adva ntag e against a rce fo ll-eq i uipped to m atch the m. Lazenby sugges ts that the ba ttle was“classic a demonstration of the folly of taking hoplites into

62

Lazenby 2004, 43.

38

63 terrain that suited light ”troops. This statement is true but seems to overlook one simple

fact: m ost ofGreece is rugged and much be tter suit ed for light troops tha n forhoplites. The shift of the war away from the fields of Attika and the Peloponnese to less familiar terra in meant tha t light troops we re offered a large r role with more opportun ity todisplay theireffectiveness. Demosthene s had recogni zed th e potenti al threa t javelineers posed to his exp edition, but cl early he h ad unde restimated thelevel of danger by advan cing without is h own jave lineers as protectio n. As a result ofthis mistake, 120Athenian hoplites lo st theirlives, and Demosthene s choseto rem ain in or nea r Naupaktos ather r return home to face his fellow citizens (Thuc. 3.98). Fortuna telyfor theAthenians, it did not ta ke long or f Demosthe nes to show tha t he had learned from his exp erience against the javelineers n i Aitolia. During thewinter of 426/5 he wa s chosen by thekarnani A ans to lead an a llied army aga inst a arge l r Peloponnesian force at Olpai. Realizing that his army would be outflanked by the Peloponne sians, Demosthene s placed 400 hopl ites a nd ilght-armed troops n i a hidden position ononeof his wings. He also use d Amphilochian javelineersactuall y to constitute part of his’sarmy cen ter an d left wing. When thePeloponne sians beganto ’ right lfank, the m encircle Demosthenes ixed troop s lying in ambush took the enemy in

the rear and put most of their army to flight (Thuc. 3.107-108). ’ plann Demosthenes ed ambushand his useof javelineers ni thebattle line, rathe r

thanas skirmishers, to gether ndi i cate o bth an incr easing awarene ss ofcombinedarms tacti cs an d anincreas e in thespecialization ofGreek commanders. Best ass erts tha t

63

Ibid., 61 .

39

64 Demosthene s introduce d am bush tactic s at Olpai, but this is difficult to accept given the

centuries of warfarethat a hd takenplacein Greece prior to thi s occasion. Perha ps, though, em D osthene s was thefirst to mix hopl ites a nd javel ineers for such aurpose; p “in all ’ successful campaigns there was Best is correct in pointing out thatDemosthenes 65 some manner of co llaboration betwee n light nfan i try and hoplites. ” Demosthenes ’

special tacti cal skills were noticedven e prior to thebattle, and his selection by the Akarna nians to e l ad in coope ration w ith theirown ge nerals reve als an ncrea i sing awareness of specialized skill and professionalization among commanders. In downpl aying Demosthene s’ abilities regarding the effective use of light-armed troops, Roisman argues tha t there we re othe r, more imp ortant d euca ting facto rs in the Aitolian experience, including ove rambition, ba d intel ligence, and lack of ade quate manpower.He state s tha t Demosthene s had procee ded further nto i Aitolia without Lokrian reinforcements e bcausehe hadreason to be lievethat surpri se would ov ercom e 66 his deficiency in light infantry. Presum ably, then , the Athenian defeat t the a hands of

theAitolians was a les son notos much n i theeffectiveness of javelineers as in the management of an army in ene my terr itory. Roisman also argue s that Ol pai was not a clear stepforwardni light inf antry usa ge or tac tics, as it was primarily a hoplite battle with the javeli neers playing aimited l a nd un clear role. The keys to D emosthe ’nsuccess es 67 were“local intelligence and military”tactics. While I agreethat surpri se and

intelligence were important in Demosthenes ’ cam paigns,it is evident that the ne geral ’s useof javelineers after Aigition wa s remarkable. lAthoughthejavelineersat Olpai did 64

Best 1969, 18. Ibid., 25 . 66 Joseph Roisman,The General Demosthenes and His Use of Military Surprise , Historia Einzelschriften 78 (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1993), 25-27. 67 Ibid., 29, 31 . 65

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not do th e bulk of the fighting, thefact that thehoplites we re mixed wit h light-arm ed troops n i the am bush an d that the javel ineers were de ployed sa more tha n skirmishers reve als a stronge r graspof theversatility andpote ntialof light-arm ed troops. By 425 thePeloponn esian Wa r was being fought in a manner radically different from that which thebelligerents would ve haanticipated. The shift of theaction to unfamiliar pe ripheral areas m eant that hopli tes coul d not alw ays becounted up on asthe decisive part ofan army. In these regions,ocal l populati ons often fought ffecti e vely as javelineers, and peltasts were nearer at hand and more able to demonstrate their deadly

potential. The result of this shift in geographical focus was an increasing appreciation o professional and specialized skill, both in generals and in soldiers. The selection of troops for the operation against the Spartans on Sphakteria (in 425) provides furthe r evidence of this incre asing professional ization, though ere th we re considerab le political m otivations b ehind thedecision. After theAthenian assembly compelled Kleonto serve as general, he decided to ta ke anon-Athenianorce f as his army. This was done partially to appease the Athenian public (his popularity was plummeting at the time , and this w ould not ri sk more cit izens ’ lives) and also as part of a boast tha t hecould defeat theSpartan s with foreigners.nI addition to the Lemniansand Imbrians who we re in thecity, Kleon se lected 0 40 forei gn archers nd a aforce ofpeltasts from Ainos (Thuc. 4. 28).The arche rs an d peltasts we re mercen aries, and th e others we re 68 mostly light troops. Such a mixed force, primarily non-hoplite and wholly consisting of

outside rs and mercena ry specialists, si indicati ve ofa developing tren d tha t consisted of two interrelated parts: the hiring of foreign specialists in place of citizen light-armed

68

Lazenby 2004, 75.

41

troops, an d theuseof professio nals in placeof amateur sol diers. The movem ent a way from using citizen hopl ites a nd amateur comm ande rs was ar f from complete, but the 69 process certainly beganduring thePeloponne sian War.

The ensuing battle of Sphakteria is perhaps the war’s most m i portantni dem onstr ating theeffectivenessof javelin-armed troops. KleonchoseDemosthene s as his colleague fortheexpedition, and itis possibl e that the latte r hadinfluenced the for mer in 70 selecting primarily light troopsnd a mercena ries for theundertaking .The generals

landed their800hoplites m ( ost ofthes e must ha ve been at Pylos already) just befor e dawn and overran oneallsm Spartan de tachm ent. The re st ofthe fo rce a l nded at dawn and included 800 rachers,over 800 pe ltasts, arm ed sa ilors from more tha n seve nty shi ps, andother conti ngen ts. Demosthenesdividedthesemen n i to detachm ents ofabout 200 and posit ionedthemon differen t area s of high ground; he wa s counti ng on thelight troops ’ rang e and mobility to overwhel m theenemy from multiple directions. When the Spa rtan hoplites a dvan ced to en gage theAthenian hopl ites the y were atta cked by theght li troo ps, whostruckfrom the si des and eluded Spartanttem a pts to chas e themdown.The rough terrai n of Spha kteria worked a gainsthe t cum bersome, heavy-armed hoplites, and the w s ift pelt asts an d othe r light troops were ven eable to atta ck while retreating from theirpursue rs. The Spartans wereoverwhel med just as Demosthene s had planned, and the y fell back to a fo rtified position at theend of h te island. A long sta lematewasaverted whena force of arche rs and ght li troops, creep ing along a p recari ous but ungua rded pa th, reach ed aposit ion on hi gh ground to therrea of

69

Y alichev 1997, 124; H. W. Parke ,Greek Mercenary Soldiers: From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 20. 70 Best 1969, 21.

42

the Spartan fort. Seeing that their position was untenable, the Spartans retreated and s agreed to terms (Thuc. 4.31-8). The peltasts and other light-armed troops were decisive at Sphakteria.71 In fact, in a sharp reversalf o the norma l roles, the Athenian hopl ites p erformed only a secondary function in drawing theSpartansforward. his T situation woul d not e bcome commonplace, but the interdep endence ofheavy and ght li troo ps did conti nueto increas e throughout the r. waAs a resul t, supe rior comm anders be gan to unde rstand the lue va and 72 importance of incorporating light Roism troops. an, again opp osing theidea of

Demosthene s as aninnovatorn i theuseof javelin-armed troops, em phasizes sup erior numbers anduck l and argue s that these u oflight-armed m en wa s simply to tire the 73

Spartans.Numbers werecerta inly a factorni how quickly the li ght troops on Sph akteria were ble a to ove rwhel m the e nemy hopl ites, butt iis clear that the us e of light-armed tactics on favorab le terrain was thekey totheAthenian victory.If hopliteswerenot a ble to com e to gri ps with theirlight-armed atta ckers, then it uld wo certainly havebeen difficult for the ou tcom e to b e in theSpartans ’ favor, especially if the light troops were prese nt in significant u nmbers. Demosthen es ’ hopl ites we re aseconda ry force, an d the whole battle was m eant to e b an efficient and primarily light-armed operatio n. In addition to rpoviding ye t another xam e ple of developing comb ined-arms tactics,Thucydide s’ account of Spha kteria is also themost nform i ative demonstr ation of thefundamental fighting method forjavelineers andpeltasts. The “attack-evade-attack ” tactic, which already fea turedprom inently in Thucydides ’ reports of Spartolos and Aigition, se ems to h ave been thecentral ea f tureof javelin-armed fighting. his T fighting 71

Hanson 2005, 91; estB1969, 23. Ray 2009, 196. 73 Roisman 19 93, 38-40. 72

43

style, carried out m ost eff ectively on rugge d terra in, would have quir re ed many physi cal 74 qualities only a professional specialist could Certainly offer. the Peloponnesian War

would not have provided the Spartans or the Athenians with their first experience of thi style of fighting, buttsi succe ss at such cruci al points a nd against su pposedly sup erior forces reinf orces the ide a tha t javelin-armed soldiers ha d been unduly marginalized previously. Rather than consisting primarily of the poor and untrained variety, the effective javelin men in Thucydides ’ accounts we re mostly javelineers an d prof essio nal peltasts who fought withllski develope d from native training. Their succes s on th ese 75 occasi ons m ust have had an effect on stan dard percep tions oflight-armed warfa re.

As thewar conti nued, both des si expanded theiruses of pel tasts nd a javel ineers in expeditions ab road. In thewinter of 424/ 3, the Spa rtan general Brasidas m ade special use of his peltas ts whe n taking thetown of T oronein the Chalkidiki. After a sm all detachm ent oflight-armed m en ha d slipped into h t e town and open ed the ga tes to the market square, 100 ltasts pe desig nate d by Brasidas rushed into the townea ah d of h t e rest of the army (Thuc. 4.110-11). With this action Brasidas showed himself to be a fairly skillful leader of peltast 76 forces. Such usage of peltasts in special detachments reflects an early appreci ation of h t eir versati lity, as theywereequipped for spe ed and armed for both long-and close-r ange comb at. tI shoul d benotedthat theAthenians also carr ied out a ’ army included campaign in the Chalkidiki (in 423), and for this operation Nikias a force

of allied peltasts an d Thracian mercena ries —presumably peltasts as well (4.129). Peltasts, m ercen aries, and other for eigners(non-Peloponne sians) featured ’ army a prominently in Brasidas t Amphipol is (422),reve aling tha t the tren d towa rd 74

Y alichev 1997, 1 17-18. Parke 1970 , 17; Hanson 200 5, 92. 76 Best 1969, 31. 75

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nontradit ional me ans of fighting wa s occurri ng on o bth sides of thewar. The Spartan general had about 2,000 hopl ites an d 300 Gr eek horsem en, but the rest his of army consi stedof 1,500 h Traci an mercen aries, the Edonian rm a y of pel tasts nd a cava lry, 1,000 Myrkinian and Chalkidian peltasts, an d othe r peltasts stationed in Amphipolis (Thuc. 5.6).It is notab le that Brasida s did not ha ve confidencein the quality ofhis own troops in comparisonwith theAthenian soldiers(5.8), but th is is no u s rprise consideri ng the prepond eran ce of pel tastsni his army. Such tro ops we re not tatheirbest in a set-piece, pitched attl b e. Brasidasbroke theAthen ian e l ft andcenter by usi ng astratage m, and the stubb orn Athenian ght ri wasoverwhel med by pe ltasts nd a ca valry. Both ge nerals were killed in action, and a mny Athenians were struckdown bythe h orsem en and peltastsni theensuing flight (5.10).ga Ain, thebattle of Amphipolis is repre sentative of both the increasing presence of peltasts within Greek-led armies and the willingness to rely on nontraditional methods of fighting. The ill-fated Sicilian expedition is another example of the effectiveness of javelin men against poorl y supp ortedhoplites on the march. T he expe dition is also noteworthy becauseit was thefinal chap ter ofDemosthene ’s illustrious career. The general was one ’ first of two com manders of a reli ef force se nt o t Sicily to re inforce theAthenian s effort,

which was tathis point (414/3)led by Nikias. Demosthe nes spe nt the winteraking m prep arationsor f the expedition an d sailed out ta the e bginning ofspring 413 (Thuc. 7.17; 7.26) . In accordancewith Dem osthene ’stend ency to m eploy light-armed specialists, he had planned to take ,300 1 Thraci an peltasts th wi him. Unfortuna tely, these men arrivedat Athens tooate l , and becausetheirwage s were consi dere d too expen sive to k eep themin service, h t e Athenians cide de d to send the m home (7.27; 7. 29).Demosthene s recrui ted a s 45

best hecould o n theway to Si cily, and he arrived the re with a con siderable orce f ofboth Greek and foreign ave j lineers in addition to hi s 5,000hoplites a nd con tingents ofarche rs and slingers (7.42) . Howeve r, Best argue s tha t theAthenians ad me a mistake in tur ning away theThraci ans, si ncethe q uality of the Thraci an peltasts woul d have excee ded tha t 77 of the javelineers. As it turned ou t, the relief force was not ab le to sa ve th e Athenians

from disaster. After de feats on landnd a at sea , Demosthene s and Nikias led the ir forces on amassiv e overland retrea t. Ironically Demosthene s, commanding the rear half of the army, found hi mself surrounde d and hemmed n i bySyracusan s fighting at long ran ge (Thuc. 7.81-2) . The Athenian general was forced tourren s der by thevery sort fotactics he ha d done so uc mh to expand. Demosthenes, “Sparta ’s grea testenem y,” was put to death soon after (7.86).

In sum mary, Thucydide s’ account of the Peloponnesian War provides a basic ’s tactical function in warfare. The victories (and final defeat) of picture of the peltast

Demosthene s, in which light-armed javelin men performed thetasks ch aracte ristic of

peltasts, revealed the reality that hoplites were relatively defenseless against such light armed troopsni unfamiliar hilly country. These men laid ambush es, launche d surpri se 78 attacks, performed reconnaissance, and secured dominant The gpositions. eograp hy of

—largely unsuit Greece ed for pitche d battle— s suggests that this realization of the

peltast ’s ad vanta ges had to have takenplace long befo re thePeloponne sian War.I would argue that theability ofthepeltast or a j velineer to a l unch his m issiles, withdra w in the ’ s pursu faceof the ene my it, and then return attack to agai n once thenem e y had be gun to

77 78

Best 1969, 28. Ibid., 19 .

46

retire, could beused to ad vantagenot onl y on rugge d terrain,which alread y hindered the

movements of the heavier hoplites, but also on flat country, where the peltasts would st be freeto str ike an d flee beyond the reachof the he avy troops. On flat ground, howeve r, ’ success that the it would be vital for the peltasts nem ey be unprot ected yb caval ry or

light-armed troops of their own, since these would nullify the advantage and expose th peltasts to theang d er ofbeing run down.lso, A in such ascenario the pe ltasts woul d likely not e b able to old h ground, bu t could onl y attack, wi thdra w, an d avoid closi ng with the h eavy-armed hoplites. The peltast coul d beused even a gainst cavalr y on open terrain, howeve r, as is show n by theperformanceof the Thraci an peltast mercena ries who sacked Mykalessos; these Thraci ans(themen sent hom e from Athensafter arriving too ate l for theSicilian expedition), set upon first by the Theban cavalr“yput , upa good de fense yb adopting thetacti cs oftheircountr y, that is to say yb chargi ng outni detachm ents nd a then falling back again ” (Thuc. 7.30.2). Althoughthis tactic could havebeen effective if launched byspear-wielding soldiers (see Chapter Two for a brief discussion of spear-wielding Thracians), I would arguethat the useof small detachm ents ofjavelin-throwers woul d be more conduci ve to thedevelopment of such apracti ce. At no placen itheaccount ofhet Peloponnesi an War is the re aclear reference to thetacti cal, purpose ful useof peltastss aclose-quarters

fighters, and the availability of quality close-combat troops (hoplites) on both sides also argue s againsthe t hiring ofpeltast e mrcen aries armed with spea rs rathe r than javelins. Furthermore, doub I t theeffectivene ss of a ski rmisher-spearman against a unit of hoplites; pel tasts arm ed n i such a way coul d only enga ge theenemy on gr ound that was just as well suited to the hoplites themselves, and the mobility of the peltast (due to his 47

lighte r shield) would be negatedby his ncrea i sed vulnerability (again,dueto thelighte r shield) andby therangeto whi ch hewould have to closewith theenemy. If peltast spearmen did exist, h t ey proba bly servedmostly in the ir nati ve countr y of Thraceand attracte d little intere st in Greece, where spe armen we re hopl ites a nd thereal nee d was fo r effective ranged fighters. The requirements for and characteristics of being a peltast seem to be reasonably clear at this point. As mentioned pre viously, theamount oftraining re quired for the ith and-run styl e of pel tast warf arewas m ore thanwhat coul d be given to the low er classes in theGreek state s in or der to crea te effective bodies of citizen p eltasts, al though ppa a rentl y the p erformance ofthe m ercena ry pel tasts duri ng th e Peloponne sian Wared l to the 79

arming foGreeksni the am s e manne r.Scholars have argued tha t“peltast warfare, relying on skirmishing, required far greater efficiency in the use of arms than hoplite fighting, where thesoldier coul d supplement his own inade quacy by the supp ort of h te 80 ” Although would rest of the phalanx. I say tha t pers onal combat was quitemiportan t in

hoplite warf are, ti does see m reas onab le to assum e tha t the tasks ofthe pe ltast requir ed more extensi ve trai ning and experi ence in order toebeffective. One can m i agine the requi rements: sur e-footedne ss, agil ity, speed and athleticism, end urance, rea sona ble strength and accuracy with the throwing arm, dexterity, discipline (in pressing pursuit, holding ground up to the last ble possi moment to bait the en emy, and in the prude nt expenditure of missiles), and so forth. Units of men who were raised in the traditi on of fighting in this style would obviously make the most effective peltast forces. 79 Anderson970, 1 114. Oneust ma lso wonde r if the exorbi tantcosts of ring hi suchmercenaries led to this deve lopmentas well. The 1,300 Thr acian peltastswho arri vedat Athens late for the xpedit e ion to Syracusewere sent awaybecauseof theircost (T huc. 7.27.12). 80 Pritchett 1974, 124.

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Finally, the Peloponnesian War also reveals the typical arrangement of peltasts and rang ed troops on the flanks of hoplite ph alanxe s, where the y (and cava lry) could still be available to ca rry out the ir traditi onal duties ofprotec ting th e phalan ’sxwings, 81 covering retr eats, and pursui ng thebeaten n eem y.This arrang ement is often se en as a

key tothe pe ltast ’s overall effectiveness: a peltast force would be able freely to inflict losseson anenemy hoplite formation only dueto the ea n rby presen ce of a rel iable friendly hoplite phalanx, since the enemy could not risk breaking formation in such a 82 situation. I propos ed abovethat peltasts could sti ll beeffective in n i flicting damage on

hoplites on ope n, level ground, andargue I that this wo uld rem ain true eve n whenthe peltasts were not sup ported yb hopl ites. Enemy hopl ites coul d enduretheirlossesand try to drive th e peltasts e mthodically from th e field,but b reaking formation against such elusive and light-footedenemies would negatethehoplites ’ defensi ve advantage and allow for themto beworn downnd a picked off (as p I hikra’tes peltasts would accomplish at Lechaion; seeChapter Five). Thus, it seems more ilkely tha t thepractice of dep loying light troops (or cavalry) in com binati on with hopl iteswasnot a doptedin orde r to m ake the for mer more effective, but rathe r as adefensiv e measure g aainst ilght-armed sold’iers independent effectiveness. It is also argued that the Peloponnesi an War m arked the beginning ofthe e nd of “agonal ” warf are

n i Greece , as ne w developments favored de ception, stratag ems, and

83 special training. Wheeler asserts tha t thewar did notring b new and large r roles for light

infantry and cava lry, but nste i ad began a trend in which thestyle of warfarealready 81

van Wees 2004, 187, 196. Anderson 1970 , 127; Sage 96, 19 143. 83 Peter Hunt, Slaves, Warfare, and Ideology in the Greek Historians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 196. 82

49

prevalent in the peripheral (colonial) parts of Greece replaced the agonal style of the 84 mainland. I do no t sup port the theory that wa rfarewasstrictly agonal in theprior

period, although it is difficult to determine one way or the other since the best military sources begin with Thucydides. In my view, howe ver, Whee l’er s particular view is somewhat illogical: even if the Peloponnesian War merely brought colonial/peripheral tacti cs to m ainlandGreece, thi s obvi ously meant tha t javelineers, peltasts, and other rm as werebeing given large a r role in m ainland Greek warf arethanthey e hld previously. Again,the c sale, durati on, and hi gh sta kes of he t war broughtbout a cha nges, as o bth sidesattem ptedto ga in whatever a dvan tage s the y coul d in a conflict ofattri tion; n i short, the Peloponne sian Wa r stimulated agrowthni Greek tactical and strate gic though t, which werepossi bly lagging behind the dem ands of real ity. In conclusi on, I arguethat Demosthe nes and Brasi das were brilliant tactici ans, and they rea lized m ore tha n theirpeers that the Peloponne sian War eq r uired a higher ’ ts level of special ization and professionalism than wars pa st. In their recogn ition of pe ltas

and javelineers ’ pote ntial, howeve r, they were still excep tiona85 l. The hoplite continued to play acentralole r in Greek wa rfare, but the best ge nerals werenow those who coul d also integrate the otherrms. a86 The increasing use of specialists contributed to this development, since themanagement of specialists requi red m ore prof essio nal 87 “weren ’t leadership. Ray argue s tha t by theend of h t e fifth cen tury, whene ver hopl ites

themselves dri ving to vi ctory, they we re us ually forcing th e enemy to counte r with the ir

84

Wheeler 2007, 215, 221. Best 1969, 35. 86 Y alichev 1997, 1 19. 87 Ibid. 85

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88 own armored fighters. ” While this statement warrants no real disagreement, it is

interesting because it ndicate i s a degree of equalization in terms of battlefield roles and importance . As mentioned in thefirst secti on ofthe p aper, ilght troops dhabeen counte d ” theircounterparts in theosi upon previously“cancel to out opp ng army. The fact tha t

hoplites we re now m eant to do the sam e, eve n if only in a minority of battl es, sugg ests 89 thatthe Pel oponne sian War bega n a trend toward ore m diverse, speci alized o f rces .

The Peloponnesian War brought very significant changes in the tactics and deployme nt ofjavelineers an d peltasts. h Tese developments were notmm i ediatel y continued after the aths de of Demosthene s and Brasidas, but therole of a j velin-armed troops was neve rthelessperm anently change d. The unprecede ntedchallenge s of h t e war crea ted ademand for professionals and spe cialists wellsuitedor f long-termwarfare on unpredictable terrain in diverse regions, while the lack of pertinent skills and training (and thewillingne ss to m i part them) among thelower cl asses of the poleis created a specific need for foreign m ercen aries to se rve ni thes e capaciti90 es.The age of the hoplite was n ot over as long as re thewas sti ll a need forheavy-armed soldiers (and the re was) and as lo ng as the hopl ite proved supe rior in set-pieceengagements; howeve r, the ’ s short hoplite comings were now ecogn r ized by G reek com manders who sought to

explo it themto the ful lest e xtent. ave J lineers a nd pe ltasts thu s had earne d an important position within Greek warfare by th e end of thecentury,aying l the found ation for continued development in therst fi de cades of thefourth century.

88

Ray 2009, 284. Parke 1970 , 21. 90 Trundle 2004 , 40-41, 48, 118 ; Hutchi nson 200 0, 231 , 236. 89

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IV. PELTASTS AND JAVELINEERS IN XENOPHON’S ANABASIS AND HELLENIKA

The image of the javelin-armed soldier found in Thucydides is consistent with that which Xenophonconve ys in his histor ical narratives ndatrea tises, including the Anabasis and Hellenika. Likewise , thetrends towa rd specialization, prof essiona lism

(among bothea lders and troops), and result ant com bined-arms tacti cs conti nued in the confused political aftermath of the Peloponnesian War. This section will primarily be —with devotedto highl ighting th e examples of javelin troopsni action du ring theperiod

thenota ble e xcep tion of p I hikrate s, who wi ll be thetopic ofthenext se ction. Such examples will illustra te theincrea sing level of orga nization among th e light-arm ed within large r forces, thei r importance on along ca mpaign coveri ng diverseterrain, and their pote ntialeffectiveness against hopli tes. The Anabasis offers a unique and valuable perspective of a campaign abroad and —albeit unde the inner wo rkings ofa mercen ary army r atypical circum stances. Although

theGreeks them selves were m ost of tenhired by foreignerssaheavy nfan i try, it is importan t to note tha t light-arm ed conti ngents fromthe fringes of Greece also joined the expedition of Cyrus under Greek command. ’ ownCyrus native forces certainly would have incl uded signi ficant num bers of light-arm ed troops, soethinclusion of so m any peltasts app ( roximately 2,500) and others mong a theGreek m ercenary nti congen ts may indicate n a inten tion tousethe Gr eek compone nt as a om s ewha t independent, self52

sufficient and com plete force wit hin the overa ll army. Regardless of n i tentions, the army ’ s diversi ty (in termsof both ts i ethn icity and rm a ament) is apparent rom f thevery beginning ofthenarrative. In addition to thehoplites b rought to Sardis by chea Greek 91 “light infantry ” under Proxenos, general, therewere 500 300 p eltasts unde r Pasion,500

peltasts with Menon —identified as Dolopian s, Ainianians , and Olynthian — s and another 800Thracian peltasts und er Klearchos Xen. ( Anab. 1.2);Xenophon g ivestheround figure of 2,500 as the peltasts ’ strength just befo re thebattle at Kouna xa (1.7). Leestates 92 that200hoplitestransferredto light nfan i try som etime befor e thebattl eIt . is also

possi ble tha t cert ain men from among the cam p followers became members ofthe pe ltast forces, orperhaps sm aller peltast units were ncliuded (but not en mtioned initially) among the othe r Greek con tingents or those that jo ined later in themarch,serving und er Cheirisoph os or having fected de from Abrokom as (1.4). Prior to the attl b e at Kouna xa, these troops, alongith w the opl h ites, marched sepa ratel y unde r theirrespecti ve comm ande rs, an arrangem ent tha t nea rly led to a skirmish at on e point betwe en themen of Klearchos an d Menon (1.5). The light troops in particular were organized taxeis into (battalions) of unknown size, and they were 93 probab ly brok en into sm aller groups se ba d on e thnicity for marchi ng and m aneuve rs.

Such ethnically-base d units wer e more com mon am ong the pelt asts tha n am ong the taxiarchoi hoplites, and there was also ethnic diversity among.94the

The fragmented command structure of the Greek force was suitable enough for themarch nlan i d, but amore unified, cooperative effort wasnecessa ry for a se t-piece 91

Thesemen may havebeen javel ineers rather thanltasts. pe See Hutchinson 2000, 43. Lee2007, 48. 93 Ibid., 95-96. 94 Ibid., 65 . 92

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battle. At Kouna xa, Cyrus de ployed his Greek mercena ries ontheright wing of he t army. Klearchos an d his hoplites h eld the rom p inent far ight r positi on, and Proxenos ndath e othe r Greek gen eralsled the ir contingents down th e line, with Men ’on s forces stationed on theGreek left.Next to thes e hop lites we re the ative n troops , and Cyrus positi oned himself in thecente r with his mountedbodygua rd. On theextrem e right lfank of the Greek force,next tothe Euphra tes River,werethepeltasts. A thousa nd Paph lagonian cava lry reinforcedthese troopsnd a th oseof Klearchos.Arrayed oppos ite thepeltasts were whi te-armored Persi an horsem en und er the com mand of Tissaphernes (1.8). ’ts In theensuing battle, theflexibility of thepeltas style of warfare n ad armament

is made clear. The Persian cavalr y unde r Tissaphernes drove up on thepeltastsnd a broke through , but c acordi ng to Xenophonthey did so wi thout ki lling asingle m an. The peltasts, e l d byEpisthe nes of Amphipol is, merely ope ned the ir ranks, whi ch we re in all likelihood fai rly loose fr om the tsart, an d struckhe t enemy horsem en with swor ds and javelins as they rode by. Tissaphernes decided not to turn about and face the peltasts again,and instea d hecontinued forward to m eet up wi th the K ing and othe r Persian forces tha t had circled round the considera bly smaller Cyrea n force.Xenophon p raises

the skill of Episthenes, though it is uncertain whether the author was complimenting the peltast co mmander ’s person al fighting skill or tactical ab ilities (1.10 ). In any case, the ’ acti — much like the peltasts ons a t Kouna xa wereexemplary butni no wa y decisive

Greeks ’ performance a t the a bttle ove rall. The march homeward, which makes up the bulk of Xenophon’s narrative, requiredmiprovisation an d flexibility on the art p ofthe Gree k commanders, and th e peltasts proved to xtr beem eely valuable in the rmy a’s effort to escape hostile territory. 54

Early on n i the m arch the Gr eeks wereorced f to adop t the sq uare formatiplaision on ( ) as a defensi ve measure g aainst ersi P an attack.In thisarrang ement, which was se en earlier during the Peloponnesian War, the peltasts worked in conjunction with hoplites in ’ syarchers designated groups to ve drioff enemy slingers who outrange d thearm and

javelin-throwers (3.3-4). Xenophon informs us that the light troops were kept within the squa re, and Leepoints out that the eltapsts were consol idated a nd reorganiz ed so that somewere ni the fr ont,some in therear, andthe restn i thecenter as rese a95 rve. The peltasts we re vital, thoughit wasthenewly formed corps of Rhodian slingers that a mde the difference at this point (3.3). The Cyreans also depended on the peltasts to seize heights and commanding —som —as positions during the march etimes with hopl ites a nd othe r times n i dependently

well as to storm enemy posit ions. At onepoint relati vely early on themarch hom e, Persian troops onse aries of foothills harass ed the Gree ks an d preve nted the ir light troops from sallying forth.Hoplites we re un able to en gage th e light-footed ne e my on the slopes , and theGreek infantry were attacked as theydescend ed each hill as well. A force of peltasts was nt seup the adjacent ountai m n and onto gro und that was higher than the position he ld by theenemy, and thisforced the Persians to withdra w or risk being struck from multiple sides. he T Cyrea ns procee ded this w ay fortheremainde r of the d ay, with most ofthetroops m archi ng across thefoothills as theforce of pelt asts movedparallel with them along the m ountai nside (3.4). Peltasts were lso a cal led upon to cap ture high groundn ithefaceof enemy troops, which made formuch m ore dangerous and strenuous work , particularly given the

95

Ibid., 54 .

55

footrace (or climbing race) that ensued. On one such occasion, the —led Greek vanguard by Cheirisophos —found tha t enemy forceshad seized tsrategic hei ghts overl ooking the road a short distan ce ah ead. At the same time, Tissap hernes was p aproachi ng from the rear,a fact that was notic ed by Xenophon an d the rea rguard.Cheirisophos reque stedthat Xenophon ring b his peltasts to the fro nt n i orderto dri ve theenemy off the heights, but Xenoph on did not think it wise to leavetherea “unprotected r ” and rode forward without thepeltasts to te ll Cheirisoph os of Tissaphernes ’ app roach. The generalsdecided to make an attempt at seiz ing the m ountain sum mit above the ights he o n which the enemy was positioned , andXenophon hi mself led forth thepeltasts from thevanguard, thosein the middle of h t e squa re, and a pick ed for ce of300 h oplites. These men ra ced to the summit andarrived the re befo re the nem e y troops,causi ng the latt er to ab andon the he ights and scatte r (3.4-5). It seems most ikel l y tha t thepicked h oplites we re men chosenfor thei r strength a nd agility, given theclimb they faced , and tha t the o hplites we re taken along to form a solid body oftroops who would ne be arly impossibl e forthenative troops to dislodge. It is noteworthy hat the pe ltasts were viewed s so a ess ential to the ’rasmy safety ” Certainly, on that ta king the m away from the rea rguard woul d leave“unprotected. ti

such terr ain and against m obile and range d enem y forces, pel tasts an d thelike were uch m better sui tedto protecti ng ahost on the march tha n werehoplites. The hoplite sti ll remained the best he avy nfan i try in theknown world, but perha ps the ir dominance

against foreign adversaries was so great that few enemies could or would stand agains

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96 them (at this point in time). Againsthose t enemy forcesthat nstea i d conf rontedthem —

cavalry and light infantry —other type s of troops we re not only ore m effective but actu ally vital to the urvi s val of thearmy a s a wh ole. On openterrain peltas ts coul d outrun and outm aneuve r hoplites, o n rough te rrain peltasts coul d do the sam e with even grea ter effect, and on any terrain sufficiently disciplined and supplied peltasts could strike from afar and ove m wi thout es r orting to the ir seconda ry wea pons nd a shiel ds. Set pieceattl b es were the place or f hoplites to show the ir value, but the y were vul nerab le on themarch or against an nem e y that had no intenti on ofmeeting them in a head-on clash a t close range . Anothe r prime example of the tactical use ofpeltasts nd a other light troops is ni coveri ng thearmy as it crossed theriver Centrites into rm A enia ni thefaceof enemy troops to the ont fr an d rea r. As Cheirisophos nd a th e vangua rd crosse d at one for d, Xenophon an d the re argua rd made a feint toward a feren dif t ford in order to dece ive the enemy cavalr y on theopposi te bank. The ploy worked, and thepeltasts d ancav alry in the vang uard together pursued the e nem y horsem en. Xenophon posi tioned ihs troops aci f ng theKarduchiwho ( weredva a ncing on the Greeks ’ rear), and Cheirisophos sent back across the river hi s peltasts, inge sl rs, and archers for Xenophon to com mandas he saw fit. Xenophon pl aced the se m en n i theriver at the ready, whi le his hopl ites m ade a chargeto drive theKarduchiback. The natives were put to fl ight, an d the hoplitesquickly turne d ’ missiles about and crossed river the under the cover ofthe p eltasts an d range d troo ps

(4.3).

96

The Chalybes we re anotabl e excepti on, whom eXnophon es dcribes as themost warlike of the tribes theCyreanswere to encounte r. The Chalybes we re willing to com e to grips with thehoplites, sa they wore linen body armor th wi thick, twisted cords be neath, as we ll as greaves a nd he lmets. They we re arme d with long spe ars and agge d rs. Because of the Chal ybe s al skill and fortified settlements, the Greeks ’ marti were n uable to takeanythingrom f the m while passing through their terr itory 4.7) ( .

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Xenophon lso a prov idesother exa mples of peltast conti ngents cha rging theenemy both nde i pendently and with hopl ites a cting n i support.In onecase , after thearmy had crossed through som e mountai ns, the pe ltasts at the nt froofthe a rmy moved orward f to stormthecam p of Tiribazos without wa iting for he t hoplitesto com e up in sup port. The enemy did not standgainst a he t m after he aring the ir approach, and som e were killed despite the ir early flight (4.4). On an othe r occasion, a mixed force of pelt asts a nd hoplites seized key eights h overl ooking a roa d and engaged the n eemy troops posi tioned the re. On the p lain below, another orce f of pel tasts dvan a ced a t thedouble ag ainst thenative for ces, ahead of h t e hoplites fo llowing at a quick pace . The enemy on theplain broke whe n the y saw that the ir comrade s on the eights h wereaving h the worse he of fighti t ng (4.6) . At a 97

” range later time thepeltasts, alo ng wit h an uns pecified number “of spearmen, d about

half a mile ahead of the re st of therm a y and attacke d a fortified position. Their initiative was not enough to overc ome theplace ’s defenses , and Xenophon an d the hopl ites ha d to “laxity in command, ” but allows come up in sup port 5.2). ( Hutchi nson se es a potential

for the possibility that initiative was98allowed. On such a protr acted ca mpaign in unfam iliar terri tory and against diverse , often-unknownenemies, initiative would have been essential, and itis difficult to m i agine how thearmy could have survived without 99 improvisation and indi vidual daring on th e part ofboththehoplitesand light troops .

’ more interesti One of the peltasts ng actions took ace pl against theMossynoeci.

The generals advanced against the native troops with the Cyrean army arranged with compa nies n i columns an d archers between thegaps. The archers and peltasts drovef of 97

These spearme n were eitherightl l y arme d hopli tesor otheright l in fantry who we re equipped with spears. Hutchinson 2000, 81. 98 Ibid., 78 . 99 The peltasts cha rging forward fr om theflanks ofthe b attle ine l withou t orders, and being driven back (6.5),would ofcourse eb an exa mple of the ne gative side of initiative.

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the opp osing light-armed troops, andthenthe p eltasts eng aged the Mossynoeci infantry at close q uarters unti l the latte r fled at the p aproach ofhe t hoplites. The peltasts an d hopli tes toge ther pursue d the m to theircity and the n drove the m from theirpositions 5 ( .4). “more Hutchinson correctly sees in this action sophisticated tactical thinking than the

period in question has attested elsewhere, ” with the peltasts not fighting as skirmishers 100 but as the “cutting edge of the attack. ” This engagem ent thusllustrates i a tacti cal

advantage of the eltast p ove r othe r forms of light n i fantry,namely his ability to closea distancerapidly and n egage a m obile enem y at close qua rters (r ather tha n only at onge l r rangeas skirmishers).Hoplites m ay not ha ve been able to com e to gri ps with the Mossynoeci due to thegrea ter we ight of he t ir shields and armor, while other type s of light troops (nam ely slingers and rchers) a d not ha di ve suitable arms or defensive equipment to ifght at clo se quarters, eve n against otherightl armed. The peltast was indeed in hi s elem ent fighting against m anyof the n ative forces n ecountered by theTen Thousand, particularly with the heavy support of the hoplite arm close by. The best example provided in the Anabasis to illustrate the effectiveness of peltastsga ainst un supp ortedhoplite formations si whe n theArkadian nd a Achaian contingent of the Cyrea n army wa s blockad ed by a for ce ofThracians. Only days fter a Cheirisophos was chose n as su prem e com mander of the a rmy, he t Arkadian andchai A an hoplites s plit from the re st and formed the ir own body, ab out 4,000trong. s As a re sult, Xenoph on and Cheir isoph os further divided thearmy in two, with Xenophon commanding 1,700hoplites, 300 peltasts, an d 40cava lry, andCheirisophos lea ding 1,400 hoplites a nd 700 peltasts , including theThracians who ha d served un der Klearchos 6.2). (

100

Hutchi nson 20 00, 84-85.

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The three divisions entered Thrace separately, and the Arkadians and Achaians soon found th emselves in tro uble fater a ttacki ng a series of villages. The hoplites h ad divided into ten com panies forthe a ttacks an d looting, an d two were stroyed de by Thraci ans before theycould ren dezvous wi th theircomrade s. Emboldened by the ir success, the Thracians gathered their forces from the area—all peltasts an d cav alry—and massed around the hoplites ’ hilltop cam p in largenumbers. There the y were ble a to a dvan ce, cast

their projectiles, withdraw, and attack pursuing hoplites from a different direction at will sincetheArkadians and Achaians had no ight l troops or horsem en forprote ction. After being cut of f from theirwate r suppl y, the hoplites b egan to ne gotiatea truce, bu t their atte mpts cam e to nothi ng. Only the p aproach of Xenophon ’s army convinced the Thracians to withdraw (6.3). I have alread y dem onstr ated that pe ltasts we re highl y effective against unsup ported hoplites, but the re s i perhaps on better x eample thanthis incident. It is not ’ s intervention, the Arkadian and Achaian hoplites difficult tosee that, without Xenophon

in all likelihood would have been wiped out or forced into an unconditional surrender. This was a case of hoplites operating outside their element—on terrain without sufficient confining fea tures , without the mobile protection prov ided by p eltasts or oth er light troops that we re so oft en seemingly taken for grante d on thebattlefields ofGreece, fighting anenemy that hado nreason orneed to m eet themin close qua rters co mbat. Within Greece itsel f thehoplite wa s most eff ective, som etimes evenwithout su pport, due to thelimitednumber of available battlefields, he t relati vely conf ined nature of thes e

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plains, and the general lack up to this point of suitably disciplined and proficient light 101 troops that were vailaable to meet themin battle there.

Overall the Anabasis confirms theimageof thepeltast asI have described him in previous cti seons. He was a hybrid (mid) ranged soldi er, armed with javelins an da sword, oftenrecrui ted fro m locales (such sa Thraceor central ree G ce) where the m en

were traditionally experienced and well-trained in a fluid and evasive form of skirmishi combat. This made thepeltasts pa rticularly suited for protecting lan fks (as at Kouna xa andat a l ter, sma ller enga gem ents on the march) , advanci ng ah ead of a m ain force to se ize heights n ad ke y posit ions, pursui ng enemies in lfight, andevendirectly engaging forces that were supp un orted by ran ged troops orcava lry. Anderson argue s tha t peltasts were unde niably valuable fortheCyrea n expedition and retr eat after Kouna xa, butha t t theirimportance was om s ewha t less tha n tha t of the slingers and archers in thearmy. He points out tha t hopl ites a nd peltasts (who hadidm range capabilities) coul d only enduretheattacks of inge sl rs, arche rs, and cavalry; in order to comb at the m effectively, the h oplites a nd peltasts hadto haveat e l ast a sm all force of 102 cavalr y andsome long-range troops on theirown si de . This is certainly true for the

situati on in which the Cyr eans found the mselves; after l,althe a s me factorha t t made the peltast such a threa t to unsupp orted hoplites coul d in turn be use d againstthemby troo ps with eve n gre ater range and equal mobility. The slingers and rchers a ni thearmy were indeed m ore vital dur ing theportion oftheretrea t whenthe Cyr eans we re facing the Persians ni relatively open country, but thepeltastsn iturn see m to havebecome more 101 This was changing too, cour of se. Examples from thePeloponne sian War at test to thi s, and the actions of Iphikrates, det ailed in thenext se ction, reve al thehoplite s onseven ontheterrain of ’ limitati Greece. 102 Anderson 19 70, 115.

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important whe n thearmy was marchi ng throughthedifficult terrai n inhabit ed by va rious hostile native populations. In Xenophon ’ s Hellenika we find pe ltasts se rving thesame functions with

basically the same degree of effectiveness as earlier in the Peloponnesian War and du the expedition of the Cyreans. One notable performance is that of a force of Bithynian peltasts who fought against Greek hoplites shut up within a stockade. The peltasts approache d within throwi ng ra ngeof thestock ade and began hurl ing the ir javelins at the vulnerable opl h ites fro m all possibl e directions (thestockad e was only head-high). The

desperate hoplites charged out at various places and times, but the peltasts were easily able to give groundand stri ke at themfrom a distan ce. Out fo200hoplites, onl y about fifteen managed to esca pe theslaughter Xen ( Hell. . 3.2.3-4). This again is clear evidence of thetypical,javelin-equipped peltast tac tic of attack, withdra w, and counte ratta ck. In theHellenika Xenophon provi des anexample of h t “etypical ” arrange mentof battle fora combined arms force: when arranging shiarmy ni prepa ration for a battle against the Persians, Derkylidas positi oned his peltasts an d cavalry on theflanks ofhis

hoplite phalanx (3.2.16). Obviously, specific circumstances would dictate decisions abo deplo yment offorces, butt isee ms clear thatcomm anders vi ewedpeltasts sa most effective and valuable on thewings, where theirjavelins coul d both kee p theenemy light troops occupi ed and harass the main enem y force from the sides.n Icontrast, howeve r, is Agesilaus ’ useof peltas ts in conjuncti on with the oth er arm s in a skirmish nea r Sardis during th e year 396/5.On this occasion, theSpartanbrough t his pha lanx into positi on —which, notably, was entirely— facing a Persian force cavalry and ordere d his hopl ites in

the 2 0-30 age group to cha rge a t a run, w ith his pelt asts chargi ng ahead of them . In front 62

of the p eltasts were ca valry, whosecharge thePersians wit hstood. he T enemy brok e, howeve r, whenthe nfan i try closed on the m. Xenophon tell s us that som e of h t e enemy were killed “on the spot ” while trying to cross the river, and the rest fled and abandoned their am c p (3.4.2324). Agesilauslikely selectedthis arrangem ent becaus e he wasfacing unsupported cavalry, which is not we ll suited for holding ground ga a inst massed infantry, but he m ust have seen someuse in havi ng pe ltasts fo llow the ca valry. Their greater spe ed would have allowedthem to follow the orsem h en more closely, andtheir javelins likely had a disruptive effect on the orderly ranks of Persian cavalry (such as they were while recei ving the Gr eek mountedttack) a . This may ha ve made thePersians a ll the m ore rea dy to retre at in thefaceof theoncom ing infantry. In any ca se, Agesilaus ’ tactics here are ’s de reminiscent of some of the Ten Thousand ployments.

Javelin men had slightly more limited roles in most of the campaigns in Greece. As a Spartan -led armyentere d Korinthian te rritory,it sufferedconsiderab le casualties from arrows a nd jave lins fired fro m theheights ove rlooking theroute . Howeve r, this threat wa s overcom e oncethe a rmy rea ched lo wer,level ground by thease (4.2.1415). At the n esuing B attle of Nemea (394 BCE) Xenophon oes d not sp ecifically mention any peltasts on iether side, despite de i ntifying forces ofarche rs an d slingers with theSpartan army. He doesstatethatthe m ajority ofthe light troops on the allied side were wit h the Korinthian conting ent, including Ozol ian Lokrians, Malians, and Akarnanians (4.2.17 ), and the se likely woul d have been javelineers or pel tasts. Light-armed troops we re not a factor ni theoutcom e of h t e battle in any case , nor were the ir acti ons eve n described in the c acount.

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It is nota ble tha t at th e Battle of Koroneia, one of the great hopli te battles of the period, Xenophon rep orts that ethSpa rtan s had a large su periority in peltasts (4.3.15). It is not ce rtain whe ther or not this supe riority hadan effect onthebattle, though Best contend s that theeltasts p am ( ong the fo reign troo ps un der Herippidas) acte d“shock as 103 troops ” at the open ing ofthe b attle. These m en, toge ther wi th som e hopl ites, charged

forward from Agesilaus ’ phal anx andnduced i the enemy to flee once they had come within striking distan ce. After the a bttle it wastheSpartan ramy tha t suffered from javelins and stones when Gylis led the army to Phokis and then into Lokris. The Lokrian javelin men first harassed the army frombehind; after the Spartans managed to drive off theLokrians and inflict som e losse s, thejavelineers took to the heights ove rlooking the march and conti nued theirattacks. m Aong the um n erous hopl ite losses we re ab out eighteen Spartan officers, including Gylis (4.3.21-23). Agesilaus hims elf also suf fered a t thehands of enemy peltasts in Akarna nia. After making cam p on the slope aofmountai n, a strongorce f ofpeltasts arri ved a nd attacked from theridges above . Agesilausmoved his army down theslope a nd intohe t plain below, at which time the peltasts withdrew. During ’ march Agesilaus out of Akarnania the p eltaststruck s again from the h eights surrounding thelying low- road . The attacke rs rangedfarther dow n theslopes nd a m adetheir assaul t so iferce that the Spartans andtheir

allies could not proceed. At first Agesilaus sent out hoplites together with cavalry to dr themoff, but thepeltasts sily ea esca ped harm. When theAkarnani ans ca me in close on his left side, Agesilaus had his young hoplites charge with the cavalry as he followed with the re st ofthe a rmy. The closes t of the e nemy were routed and killed, but the

103

Best 1969, 84-85.

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Akarnani an hoplites a nd m ost oftheirpeltasts were formed up n i battle order nea r the summit of the m ountai n. This force wit hstoodthecavalr y charge but b roke and ran before the Spartan hoplites could come to grips with them (4.6.7-11). This incident, though rather inconsequential, is particularly interesting because it illustrate s the fund amental realities of land warfare on th e sort ofrough te rrain tha t is prevalentn iGreece. The Akarnani an peltasts were unstoppa ble whentheyoccupi ed high ground wi th slopestoo stee p or rugge d for hoplite or m ountedcounteratta cks.Under the hailstorm of javelins and stones Agesilaus ’ men were uite q powerl ess to proc eed or even fend off their atta ckers, so it coul d seemlike th is sort of terri torial defens e would have

been perfectly suited to the terrain of Greece. However, the hoplites seemed to be out immediate da nger when the y encam pedon the pl ain belo w the m ountai n, and theold b peltasts who pproach a ed Agesilaus ’ arm y too cl osely were stil l struck downs athe y fled across e l ss stee p and rugged grou nd. If this is a reasona bly typical exam ple of ilght-arm ed fighting methodsbeing used to defend territory against he avy nfantry i an d cava lry, then we m ust concl udethat a defensi ve str ategy ba sed on rang ed attack s and harassm ent rom f high gro und wasunable to defeat combined-arms tactics decisively or reliably, at least not on its own. Perhaps with suff icient num bers an d bette r discipline the Akarna nians might h ave whitt led ’ arm Agesilaus y down to nothi ng, but as long peltasts as faced oplhites a nd ca valry on

ground that was sufficiently accessible for the latter two types to close the distance, the peltast wasstill pote ntially vulnerable onhis own. T he fact tha t poleis the did not de fend them selvessolely by m eans of pelt asts, javelineers, and othe r light nfan i try in passes and mounta inousroute s is evidence for this. Krentz also poi ntsout twoothe r factors:first, 65

most Greek passes could be turned or bypassed along other routes. Second, most of the majorpoleis were on the sea, which meant that hopli te forces could be ande l d via 104 transports. Relying on a efens d e of light troops holdi ng passes and high groun d was

too risky. By the370sthetacti cal po tential of the peltast em ses to ha ve been fully real ized, though thi s poten tial was m ore often achieved by prof essionalcomm anders who were experienced and specialized p eltast lea ders. Aside from Iphikrate ’s actions, during this period we se e peltasts an d javelineers am bushi ng en emy forces (unde r Chabrias; Hell. 5.10-12), charging in cl osesupport ofcava lry (5.3.6) , guarding and clea ring passes (5.4.14), andem h ming in heavy nfan i try on themarch (5. 4.43).Peltasts are prese nt both B.C.E.), though,just as at the Nem at Leuktra and at Mantinea (362 ea, they do not seem to

have been a decisive factor. nI pitchedattles b on relati velylevel ground th e hoplite wa s still thedecisive arm, as evidenced by Xenophon ’s accounts. e Wshoul d be carefu l, therefor e, not to overstate the ncrea i sed importance of het javelineer and pe ltast, atea lst in termsof theiruses in pitchedbattles. The decades following the Peloponnesian War saw the continued development and frequent useof peltastson o l ng cam paigns an d in spe cialized rol es suited totheir

qualities, but if Greek commanders were learning anything during the period, it was the effectivenessof comb ined arms forceson va ried terrai n. Hutchinson raguesthat n a army of hoplites with cavalry was better than one of hoplites with peltasts, as the former combination was m ore m obile and th e latter couldllsti bevulnerable. T he best option, of

104

Pete r Krentz,“War,” in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, Volume I: Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome, ed. Philip Sab in, Hans va n Wee s, and Michael Whitby (Cambridge: Camb ridgeUniversity Press, 20 07), 160.

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105 course , was abalanced force ncl i uding peltasts, alr cav y, slingers, and archers. I agree

with the se conclusions, though is it importan t to recognize tha t a hopli te army su pported only by cavalry could also be vulnerable on particularly rugged terrain, where light infantry can e b more surefo otedthanhorses. sA I mentioned above, theirst f seve ral decades of the fourth cen tury saw the full realization ofthepeltas ’s tpotential, particularly whenthepeltasts we re n i thehands of pr ofessional, speci alizedcomm anders. The most famous of these generals, Iphikrates, is the subject of the following section, not only becausehe was themost sk illful and accomplishedof the lea ders, but also be cause he is of tencredited wi th the intro duction ofa reformed ve rsion ofthepeltast.

105

Hutchinson 2000, 93.

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V. THE CAREER AND ALLEGED REFORMS OF IPHIKRATES

From a modern erspe p ctive, Greek warfarein theearly fourth cen tur B.C.E. y is as unclear and convoluted as’sthe politics, era fi not m ore s o. One could also poi nt ou t tha t this relative de gree of confusi on was wi despread among e arly historians and chroni clers — ’s closing words inHellenika as well, and ven e a mong cont emporarie sXenophon the

areevidenceenough forthis. Nevertheless, onearacte ch ristic of the p eriod tha t is certa in (within the realm of military history) is the prominence in the historical tradition of key

individuals, each tied to great accomplishments and victories, the advancement of cert trend s, an d theconce ption of bri lliant innova tions. Onesuch indi vidual, andonewho fits within thescopeof this larger survey of javelin-armed troops,s itheAthenian general Iphikrate s. Both an cient authors d anmodern schol ars ha ve widelyrega rded phik I rates sa a ’s t skilled com mander and brilliant innovator who, th wi his all eged reforms of thepeltas

equipment an d arms, madean indel ible mark on theGreek way of war and —or even inspired —theMaced foreshadowed onian phalanx of Phi lip and Alexander. I

believe the ’era s widesprea d confusi on, mentioned above , combined with impreci se use of terminology among ancient writers, contributed to the rise of this theory of peltast

reform. Before evaluating the validity of this assumption, this section will briefly explore theearlier porti ons of ph I ikrate ’smilitary ca reer in orde r to e stablish backgroun d. In 68

rega rds to his lege al d refor ms, I will arguethat theinnovations n i equipme nt and armament were app lied not to pelt asts but to hopl ites,and that these change s were a tem poraryactic t al measure or f a specific situati on, rathe r than apermanent stepni the evolution of the Greek way of war. By the end of the period (circa 362), the peltast remained sa hehad always be en: a mid-rang ed, javelin-armed light nfan i tryman. We com e upon Iphikrates leading pe ltastsni 392 , as he was in com mandof such a mercena ry force ope ratingni and around K orinth. The Athenians held theIsthm us with this mercena ry force, whi ch was ra ised in theHellespon tine region ne ( ar Thrace) by Konon n ad Pharnab azos duri ng thewinter of 394/3, andIphikrateswaslikely put in 106 comm and ofthe m ercenari es in summ er 393. Best surmises that while there were

proba bly Thracians among thisorce, f the majority were kel li y recruit ed in the Greek cities ofthe reg ion. The whole force m ay ha ve amountedto seve ral thousan d men, 107 although ark P e places the umb n er at bout a 1, 500. Iphikrates was ayoung m an at this

time but may ha ve be en se en as particularly qual ified to com mand peltasts beca use ofhis alleged familial connections to108Thrace. He also may haveserved unde r Konon at the battle of Knidos, andoscoul d have rece ivedthe a ppointment from the m an who rai sed 109 the force.

Iphikrates first prove d his value in raids on e thPhliasiansand Arkadians, the “enor latte r of which be came so terri fied of thepeltasts (after mous numbe rs” of the

Phliasians we re cut own) d ha t t the y woul d not com e out n i armsagainst phik I rates ’ men. HereXenophon m akesit clear that phik I rates ’ men wereinde ed javelin-throwing peltasts. 106

Parke 19 70, 50-51;es Bt 1969, 85. Best 1969, 86;arke P 1970 , 52. 108 J.K. Davies,Athenian Propertied Families, 600-300 B.C. (London: Oxford Uni versity Pre ss, 1971), 249; Parke 1970, 52; es Bt 1969, 86. 109 Parke 1970 , 52. 107

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The Spartans, for their part, scorned not the peltasts—who were terrified of the Spartans —but rathe r theirown a llies who e f ared th e peltastsosgrea tly. This dismissive attitude onthe Spartans ’ part and fear on the pe ltasts ’ aros e because so me you nger Spartansad h caugh t up wi th an d killed some peltasts on one occasi on (XHell en. . 4.4.157). This at least shows tha t thecommon peltast tacti cs were ot n alw ays su ccessf ul: particularly energetic hoplites (in this case young ), despite be ing we ighed down yb the ir

cumbersome shields, could overtake peltasts who were either exhausted, overconfiden their own speed, or simply unlucky. The most significant action of Iphikrates’ career took pl aceduring theKorinthian War,at Lechaion in 390. The Spartan garrison com mander at Lechaion took both his regime nt ofhoplites a nd th at of cava lry out ofthecity in orde r to escort som e of his men (Spartan s from Amyklai) back to the ir hom es for a re ligious festi val.The routeof their march woul d take th empast Korinth, where Iphikrate ’s peltasts a s well as Kallias ’ Athenian hopl ites we re statio ned, but the Spa rtans we re conf ident tha t the ne e my would not com e out to nga e ge them . The polemarch tur ned back with his hopl ites ne ar Sikyon and sent thecava lry onward to conti nueescorting th e men of Amyklai. He reckoned incorrectly regarding theenemy forcesin Korinth: Kallias drew uphis pha lanx close to thecity, while Iphikrate s led his peltasts ga a inst the Spa rtan s. The peltasts began to cast their javelins, and after some Spartans fell, the polemarch ordered his younge r hoplites to cha rge th e peltasts.he T charging hoplites became disorganized in their futile pursuit, and they were hit again by javelins from behind an d from the unshiel ded side. The polemarch or dered a ec s ond cha rge wi th more of the y oung er hoplites, but with the am s e result.After thi s the ca valry returne d, but they 70

helped the third pursuit and retreat only to the extent of keeping pace with the hoplite (theydid not rpess he a ad of the inf antry ranks). The peltastsncreas i ed theirpressu re with each successf ul attack,and eve ntuall y the desperate Spartan s formed up ni a body on a ’ men began to advancenst small hill, which didoth n ing for th eir plight. Kallias agai

them , and the Spa rtans broke an d fled completely. 250of the 6 00 we re killed, and the only men to escap e“unscathed ” were the atte ndants who arl e y in thefighting we re 110 ordered to bea r the Spa rtan de ad and wounde d back to Lechaion (4.5.11-7) .

It is clear that Iphikratesused thesame tactics at Lechaion astheAitolians had 111 against Demosthenes, and e Dmosthene s aga inst h t e Spa rtan s. The victory did not result

from any revol ution in tactics orin thearrangement of troops, but nstea i d res ultedfrom ’ theaction of the gular re ave j lin-throwi ng peltast; the on ly nove lty was in pe ltasts 112 apparently high rateof succe ss du ring thecourse fothe fightin g.Indeed, it is difficult

to see how Hamilton identifies “newas tactics ” the familiar method of casting javelins 113 and withdrawi ng before theadvanceof theslower hopl ites. At any rate , very m i portant

factors ni theeffectiveness ofIphikrate ’speltasts were the high degree of training and discipline they a hd recei vedfrom theircomm ander andthe level of esprit-de-corps that 114 resulted fro m theunusually long du ration of their consisten t servi ce tog ethe r.This

uninterrupted training and continual service, even throughout winter quarters, was ma

110

Huntstate s that m ost ofthe Spartan survi vorswere thosewho were wounded nd acarr ied away early in thebattle, rathe r thanthosewho fled by runni ng or swimming. Xenophon ’s wording is clear, howeve r, in tha t theatte ndan ts we re theonly men who survi ved with thei r honor and we ll-being intact. See Hunt1998 , 155. 111 Best 1969,88. 112 Parke 1970 , 54. 113 Charles D. Hamilton, Sparta s Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press , 1979), 282. 114 Parke 197 0, 54; Wi lliams 2004, 265. ’

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possible by Persian 115 gold. As mentioned in an earlier section, the level of training requi red ni orderto create areliable n ad effective peltast force wasalready consi derably higher than tha t requiredor f hoplites d ue to the nature ofpeltast tacti cs. Iphikrate ’ s peltasts were trained we ll enough to ope rate in preci se for mation eventhough the y fought 116 in open order. The added advan tageof serving as a cohe sive unitfor such arelatively

long p eriod of im t e would increa se theeffectiveness of anyighti f ng unit. Much si also made rega rding theimportance of the thenian A hopl ite ph alanx a t Lechaion.Williams argue s tha t the se hoplites followed th e peltasts and actuall y ’ peltas concluded thebattle, an d tha t Iphikrates ts fough t in conjuncti on with aphalanx

and not onaids. r 117 Anderson alsoclaims th at it was th e Athenian hoplite ph alanx tha t ’ men. This preven tedthe Spa rtan cava lry from pressi ng theatta ck on Iphikrates

combination of arms worked in the ’ favor, peltasts since the y nee ded the su pport fo reliable hoplites in or der to beeffective, and th e tactics use d by p I hikrates would not ve ha been successfu l if the Spartansdha been strong e nough to gag en e the Atheni an 118 phalanx. Sagesees thevictory at Lechaion a“sclear evidence of what combined light119 and h eavy-arme d troops coul d do ni lesse r engag ements. ” Along thesam e lines,

’ speltasts, worked best in Whee ler states that light infantry,includingph I ikrate

conjunction with hop lites; Iphikrate ’ men were fe s fective at Lechaion only becausethe “Athenian

120 ” hoplites provided a tactical base for hit-and-run Finally, tactics. while

115

Pritchett 1974, 123; Williams 2004, 269. Y alichev 1997,152. 117 Ibid.,269-70. Ido not se e how this second p art si a te nable position, since Xenop hon ha s already told us tha t Iphikratesraided theterritories of Phleious a nd Arkadia. 118 Anderson970, 1 125-26.utchi H nson m akesa similar argum ent, sta ting tha t theAthenian hoplites a ctedas a deterrence of Spar tan p ursuit. Hutchi nson 200 0, 158. 119 Sage 1996, 144. 120 Wheeler 2007, 220. 116

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Parke sees the hoplites ’ role as one of pas sive su pport pe ( rhaps simi lar to Anderson), Best disagree s and m e phasizes theact f that the Spa rtans only broke when thethenian A 121 phalanx bega n to appro ach.

’snstatem Howeve r, it is importan t to kee p in mind e Xnoph o ents prior to the

battle: Kallias and Iphikrate s noticedthat theSpartanforce wa s not only relatively sm all but also unprotected by peltasts or cavalry, and so they “it would decided be that safe to attack them with their own”peltasts (4.5.13).The two commanders saw that the eltas p ts would beable to atta ck the xpose e d sides ofhe t Spartan hoplites wi th theirjavelins as the Spartans arche m d on h t e road , and the pe ltasts woul d easily be ab le to eva de thehoplites (4.5.13). O f course Xenophon wa s not pres ent during their deliberations, but t isi still noteworthy that he does not mention any explicit purpose for the hoplite phalanx; he simply writes that Kallias formed uphis pha lanx in close roxi p mity to thecity walls while Iphikrates and thepeltasts ran ged fart her out toaun l ch their attacks 4.5. (122 14). ’ role as h Perha ps theAthen ian hoplites eavy suppor t was ssum a ed, si nce they were

arrang ed in battl e formation, but X enophon doe s not ndi i catethat the ir presence preven tedtheSpartans from taking any othe r form of action tha n theonethey did.As Lendon poi nts out, thethenian A hopl ites we re se en to beapproachi ng onl y oncethe 123 Spartansad h retreated to the hill.

’ hoplites At first ti may be reasona ble to accep t theargum entthat Kallias

passively preven tedthe Spa rtan ca valry from pressi ng apursui t, but Xenophon m akes it

121

Parke 197 0, 53; B est 1969, 89. Underhill states tha t the Athenian hop lites were quite far off when Iphikrates first attac kedthe Spartans. G. E. Underhill, A Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900), 147. 123 Lendon 2005 , 94. 122

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124 clear that the Spa rtan cava lry was mis managed (4. 5.16) . I find it difficult to accept

both ar gum ents at once —either the ca valry was m ismanaged (as Xenophon state s), as it shoul d havepursued the p eltasts more vigorousl y, or theAthenian hopl ites p reven ted such pursui t, which wou ld have excused the management of the h orsem en. I aminclined to trust e Xnophon ’s asse rtion, so I arguethatthe Athen ian hoplites we re prese nt at a distanceonly asa precautio nary measure, and Iphikrate ’s men we re able to dealithwthe Spartansindependently. Kallias ’ men do no t seemto have beennecessary a partof finishing theenemy, as thepeltasts were clea rly in controlof thesituation, an d the Spartans we re helpl ess a nd exhau sted. L echa ion is therefo re an xam e ple of the succe ss capably led and disci plined peltasts coul d achieveagainst hop lites —even on relatively —when those open ground hoplites we re not supp orted by the ir own light-armed or

mounte d forces, sincethecava lry that wa s prese nt did notght fi e ffectively.All of this doesnot preclude the battle from providing an example of co mbined-arms tactic s, but without more detailed evidence regarding the role of the hoplites, there is no certainty that Iphikrates ’ and Kallias ’ men acted in conjunction once the fighting started. In any event, Iphikrateswon con siderable fam e for his victory,and he followedit 125 up with more successful operations against Spartan strongholds Two years (4.5.19).

later (in 388), after Iphikrates wa s back n i Athens, he wa s sent with 1,200eltas p ts to the Chersone se; Xenophon tel ls us that ost m of thes e men we re from the o f rce hehad commanded at Korinth (4.8.34), which helps to x eplain the ir ens uing succe ss. In

124 Hutch inson ragues simul tane ously that the Spa rtan cavalr y was m ismanaged and hat t p I hikrates used Kallias’ hoplitesas a deterrence o f pursuit. Hutchi nson 0 200, 93, 106,8, 15236. 125 Parke state s tha t this victory gavethe pe ltast anew repu tation for deadliness, and as a res ult they e bcameprese nt in all armies for thenext ha lf-centu ry and upe s rsede d all othe r types of light troops. SeeParke 1970 , 54. Best points out, more convi ncingly, that the velopme de nt ofthe pe ltast sa themost importa nt of ight l roops t ha d set in longbefore Iphikra’te victory s at echaion. L ee S Bes t 1969, 89.

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Abydene territory,near Kremaste, Iphikrates s et an a mbush with his force an d waited fo r the e nemy army toea lve level ground an d begin its desce nt on aong l sl ope. W hen Anaxibios an d his Spa rtans (who were positioned at therear of the force) were just ’ men cha beginning th eir descent, Iphikrates rged them and ki lled theSpart ans either

where the y stood or whi le the y were leeing; f the re st ofthe a rmy suffered cons iderablyin its flight to Abydos (4.8.35-9). Although e Xnophon doe s not m ention Iphikrates betwee n the ye ars 387nd a 37 3, we lea rn from Diodorus Si culus (15.29.4) hat hewas e s nt by Athensstrategos as to act in alliance with the rsi Peans in 377/6. Diodorusnform i s us th at Iphikratescommanded

20,000 mercenaries as part of a coordinated effort with Pharnabazos to bring Egypt ba into thefold of thePersian Empire (15.41.1) . The size of thi s mercena ry force si unrel iable and proba bly exa ggerated, an d Diodorus doe s not provi de any cl ue as to wheth er pe ltasts we re aconti ngent within thearmy. As evidenced b y the arl e ier expedition ofCyrus, he t Persians were most often in ne ed of reliable heavy n i fantry,and so the y typi cally sough t mercen ary hopl ites fr om theGreeks rathe r thanforms of m issile126 armed light infantry. With thisni mind, it seems likely tha t Iphikrate ’s force, whatever

size it was ni truth, wasred pominantly an a rmy ofhoplites, thoug h (like theCyrea n army and typical Greek armies of the d ay) ti may ha ve ha d an attache d conti ngent ofGreek or Thracian peltasts for support. As to thereforms attributedto Iphikratesat this time, our ori ginal source s are Diodorus Siculus and Cornelius Nepos (following their source, Ephorus). The former ’s large, heavy shields with describes theinnova tions thu s: Iphikrates replaced his m en

126

Trundle 2004 , 40; Anderson 1970, 130 .

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smaller ovalones, an d in this way hopl ites be came peltasts; thei r spea rs he m ade half again as lo ng, an d hedoubled the length of heir t sw ords; as l tly, he equipped his me n with “iphikratids, ” or

light boots (15 .44.1-4). Nepos re lates quite similar claims: Iphikrate s

chan gedthe large ields, sh short spea rs, small swords,and bronze cuir asses, adopting peltai (making theinfantry n i to pe ltasts), spears twice as long,onge l r swords, an d linen

armor (Iph. 1.3-4). Xenophon, theost m rel iable sourceor f the pe riod, doesot n attach ny a sort ofinnovations tophikr I ates, andtherest of Hellenika the contains no references to peltasts equi pped as spe arme n or pikemen. —themajority, it se —acce ’s Manymodern schol ars ems pt thenotion ofIphikrate

reforms to thepeltast. rPitchett m siply recogni zes theimprovem ents to the peltast ’s 127

equipment without question or comment. In a similarly vaguemanner, Y alichev sta tes that Iphikrates ’ innova tions m ay havehad a m ajoreffect on the fighting style of lightarmed troops, but hent points out howhetre is no contem porary evi dence for the e xtent to 128 which the refor ms were ad opted or used . Sageacknow ledges theproblems associated

with the al leged reforms, but heaccepts that the m en thus equi ppedwere nde i ed peltasts; sinceIphikratesneeded soldi ers who coul d close wit h theenemy (this is assum ing, I supp ose, that his enti re force wa s of peltasts) , hetook Greek andGreek-trained m en who hadsomeexpe riencein fighting ha nd-to-hand and arm ed themin the m anne r statedby the sourcesnda thus crea tedthe e quivalent of a light-armed hopl129 ite.This idea seems to be shared by van Wees , who states that phik I rates “appe ars tohave createdhybr a id

soldier ” equipped with a light shield, light armor, light peltast boots, a long sword, and a longe r spe ar (10-15 fee t in length),and th at this typeof soldier created a different styl e of 127

Pritchett 1974, 125. Y alichev 1997,161. 129 Sage 1996, 147. 128

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static warfare . Althoug h thenotion did not ga in support n i Athens, Philip of Macedon 130 followed th e example in his crea tion oftheMacedonian ph alanx. Similarly,

Hutchinson sse a rts tha t Iphikratescreate d hybrid phalangites b y getting rid of greave s “bootlets, ” quilted linen armor, small leatherand equipping his men with laced leather

covered shiel ds, and a longer (3.5-meter) spear to can cel out the disadvan tageof having 131 lighter armor. However,some of these cha nges (aban donme nt of greave s and

increa sing use ofquilted linen armor) had alrea dy take n placebefore Iphikra’tes time. Hamilton see s thereformed equipment astaking theform of heavier a j velins, ’ te which caus ed more da mage on m i pact, and modified boots.nI his opinion, Iphikra s 132 tactical innovations “almost revolutionized warfare. ” I do not se e evidence to support

this notion ofheavierjavelins, as itis clear fromthe o s urcesthat the re forms sup pose dly focusedon increa sing thelength ofthe p s ears. D oing so naturall y would have made the javelins heavier, but there is no indication that greater weight and destructive force were “almost ” revolutionized Greek thegoals. Nor is it clear in wha t waytheinnova tions

warfare. Snodgrass is cauti ous ab out tr usting Diodorus and Neposut b doe s sta te tha t the adoption ofIphikrate s’ reforms may have ledto atem porary ecl ipsing of he t original 133 —particularly of the Thracians. form of peltast There is no vide e nceof this, howe ver. fI

actu al Thracians were employed in decrea sing numbers by Gree k cities, which is difficult to de term ine in the rst fi place, it was m ore likely becaus e typical pel tast arm ament was sprea ding m ore and more to pa rts ofGreece itself. At anyrate, Ido not ee s anyindication that Thracian peltasts lost any of their reputation as the finest peltasts available. 130

van Wees 2004, 197. Hutchinson 2000, 235-36. 132 Hamilton 197 9, 281 -82, 2 79. 133 Snodgrass 1967, 110. 131

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Lendon b elieves tha t Iphikrates ’ reforms involveda chan ge in peltasts ’ fighting method; n i addition to the round pelte and longer swords, “some ” of the peltasts were 134 given thrusting spears. He offers an nte i resting pe rspe ctive in sup port ofthese reforms,

’ chan arguing that Iphikrates gesdrew inspi ration and recei vedlegitimacy fr om epic

traditi on. In addition to se rving apractical purpos e, longe r swords and spears a s wellas roundshields we re thecommon wea ponsof Homeric heroes. Along wi th thepeltasts ’ typical style of fighting (charging forward, attacking as individuals, withdrawing and regroupi ng, clusteri ng for common prot ection), such ne w arm ament would have formed a 135 strong link to the epics. Peltasts thus fit more into Greek military culture than archers 136 and slingers overall, and theyeven poss essed a sort ofheroic code. While this

perspecti ve is ntere i sting and worthy of consi deration as a way of expl aining thesprea d of peltast service within Greece, it is not astrongargum ent in favor ofIphikr ’ates reforms. I see no n i dication tha t Greek com manders actively sough “epic t legitimacy ” through thearmament of theirmen. It would also see m odd tha t if the Gr eeks were so inclined to value Ho meric images in contem porary warf are, such cha nges in equipment were m ade to pe ltasts rathe r thanto hopl ites, who were the focus ofGreek imaginati on and central to their perception of Hellenic warfare. Anderson an d Parke of fer more detailed supp ort ofthereforms. Anderson acce pts ’ innovati that Iphikrates ons cam e latein his caree r, and (like othe rs ab ove) acknowl edges

that there are no contemporary accounts of their use or clear examples of peltasts usin them . Sincethenew equipment was m ore suited to infantry drawnup close, D iodorus is ’ Persian service in Egypt. The Egyptians correct in attaching the reforms to Iphikrates 134

Lendon 2005 , 413. Ibid., 96 -97. 136 Ibid. 135

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wereknown fo r using long spe ars (Xen Anab. . 1.8.9;Cyr. 6.2.10, 7.1.33), so Anderson argue s tha t Iphikrates m ust have madehis peltastsnto i pi kemen n i order to dea l with 137 them while also retaining peltai the as their shields.

Parke se es the p I hikratea n peltast asnot a ski rmisher or a supp lement to h t e old versi on but as com a plete improv ement a nd repl acem ent. H e also proposes tha t the peltasts ’ success at Lechaion may ha ve e l d Iphikrates to ifnd a m ore reg ular em ployment for them (ignoring thevery ba sis of their succes — sthat is, their ranged, hit-and-run fighting method). arke P laso favors the idea of gradua l chan ge, and ays s tha t the refor ms 138 could eve n havebeen brought ab out by bothphik I rates and Chabri as.This new type of

peltast, with a sta ndardized sh ield,was ca pable ofwielding a p ike within a massed 139

’s view, the p ” from formation. Somehow, in Parke eltast m siultaneously“freed warfare

the hoplite ’ s dom inance, gave ski rmishing a ne w degree of importance , and beca me (after Iphikrate s’ reforms) an m i provem ent of and replacem ent for the hopl’ite s close-combat role.140 I am in cautious a greement with th e first claim, sinceit is difficult to de term ine theactua l extent to whic h thehoplite trul y dom inate d warfare. The second cl aim is in my view too gen eral, for the peltast and othe r light-arm ed troops didind f increa sing us e during theperiod beginning with the Peloponn esian Wa r; the central poi nt of si gnificance rega rding the ir developing role, however, is that theyeg ban to opera te as much m ore tha n ’s third point has no concrete evidence beyond Diodorus simple skirmishe rs. Lastly,Parke

andNepos.

137

Anderson970, 1 129 -31. Parke 19 74, 79-81. 139 Ibid.,236, 79. 140 Ibid., 23 6. 138

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J. G. P. Best is the primary opponent of the notion of peltast reforms, and he points out tha t if ancient authors scri de bed fourth-century peltasts sa thesam e as before, then thi s is reasonnough e toeject r the noti on that a w netype e merged nd a supe rseded 141 them. The alleged reforms were ot n am atte r of equipment stand ardization, rtoop

denationalization, or the crea tion of com pletely newtypeof pelt ast. In fact, the re is no justification for assuming any kind of reforms on Iphikrates’ part: his “new” peltast was

really a variant of an already existing type of Thracian peltast (a thrusting-spear-wieldi variety). Best the n attributes th e con fusion ofinnova tions to the author on whom 142 Diodorus and Nepos pen de ded .

Griffith an d Stylianou offer more rea sonable theories tha t do n ot reject the reforms out ofhand, but nste i ad acce pt the m with som e major (but lo gical) adjust ments. For his part, Griffith asserts th at Iphikrate s likelybroug ht the “iphikratids ” from Thra ce, proba bly dating back tothe 3 90s. The Athenian wa s leading mostly hoplites du ring th e cam paign ni 374, an d sinc e he was confr onting Egypti an infantry, heconvertedotn peltastsutb hopl ites into kem pi en. There is no gn si of the longer ar spe in use by the Greeks afterw ard, alt houghtheinnovati on may havehad some influence on Philip of 143 Macedon(not ne cessarily a decisive influence, howeve r).

Stylianou ’ s opinion is in my opinion the most compelling, and it goes as follows. It is most ilkely tha t Diodorus nd a Nepos m isunderstood the ir own source,ph Eorus, especially if Iphikrate s did nd i eed equip som e of his hopli tes in a ne w manner to sui t the 141

Best 1969, 110-11. Ibid., 10 3-5. 143 G. T. Griffith, “Peltas ts, andhe t Origins ofthe Mace donian Phalanx, ” in Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honor of Charles F. Edson, ed. Harry .J Dell (Thessaloniki: Institute for BalkanStud ies, 1981), 164-65. Griffith ons d iffer in this work from thos e express ed in anearlier book, in which heargue s ’s opini in favor fo thereforms . Griffith, The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World (Chicago: Ares Publishers, Inc., 1975), 5,17, 239. 142

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condi tions ofthe Egypti an ca mpaign.The new equi pment was m eant to co mbine thebest of light-and heavy-armed fea tures:he t long spe ar an d swordor f hand-to-hand com bat, and the pelte and light armor for mobility. There is no evidence for peltasts of this sort in useduring th e fourth cen tury,and the re is every ndi i cation tha t battles in Classical and Hellenistic Greece invol ved trad itional hoplites a nd peltasts that were(as far as we ca n tell) of the old javelin-throwing type. However, the specific context ’ claims for Diodorus indicates tha t there ust m be som e substance to them , andEphorus woul d not have inven ted th e ide a of equipm ent reforms. SinceIphikrate ’s army in Egypt would have been predom inantly hoplite, ti is quit e possible tha t heequipped at least som e of h t ese men in o rder to outr each and also outm aneuve r the heavy an d unwi eldy Egypti ans. After all, Diodorus an d Nepos te ll us not tha t the jave lin was rep laced b y the lo ng sp ear, but that thepe sar wasen l gthen ed; hoplites were be tter sui ted o f r close com bat already and would havebeen m ore adept at managing thepike. As for the lighterinen l armor, it was far be tter than eta ml or leather for the hot an d hum id climateof Egypt, so thi s makes sense as well. Iphikrate s ’ reforms were probably temporary and specific to the conditions 144 of thecam paign; the oots b an d his pro fessionalism were his tr uly lasting innovati ons.

I am in agree ment with Styl ianou on lal majorpoints. The discussio ns in Chapter Three regarding the use of peltasts and javelineers in the Peloponnesian War, and in Chapter Four e r garding thewars ofthe e arly fourth cen tury, are m eant to show how a specific and prove n method offighting had been develope d to fit the qu alities of the peltast. A commander who was proba bly the m ost ade pt leader of peltastsn ihistory would understand their value and use s more tha n anyone, and t does i not ake m practi cal

144

Stylianou 1998, 343-45.

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sense forhim to introducereforms to thei r equi pment that woul d maketheminto phalangites.ne O key si theunderstan ding tha t Iphikrates led m ostly hoplites in E gypt, not sol ely peltasts sa before at Korinth a nd elsewhere. n Aothe r key si themore obvious reading of Diodorus and Nepos:—javelins which were certainly the weapon of the peltast —did not gi ve wa y to ong l sp ears, but rathe r short er sp ears (i.e. hopl ite one s) were replace d with longer one s. In a sense, hoplites d id “become ” peltasts, but only tem porari ly, in a very specific are a and time, an d only in the li tera l meaning of becom ing men who carried peltai. Iphikrateswas ve ry aware of thedvan a tage s of mobility and range , and itmakessense that e h would bewilling to xeperiment with his heavy troopsn i orde r to incorpora te th ese stren gths ofhe t peltast into his hopli te corps.phikr I ates wa s an innovator not of tast pel q euipment but of hopl ite armament, and only in a shortterm sense.

In sum mary,Iphikrates appears to have been avery capa ble leader of peltasts, worthy ofa prominent posit ion am ong themany ski lled commanders ofhe t early fourth century. His accom plishments in the Korinthian War, pri marily at Lechaion, hi ghlight the best qua lities ofpeltasts as llwe as theplacethey ha d earne d for themselves n i Greek warfare, which extende d beyondsimple skirmishing. Like thegrea t Theban general Epameinonda s, howeve r, Iphikrates wa s not trul y a ta ctical n i nova t— orat least in rega rds to his use of peltasts —and we th erefore should not attri bute all fourthcentury developments in light-armed warfare to him alone. While Epameinondas skillfully synthesiz ed and implemented n umerous de veloping tactic s (and olitical p st rategy ) that repre sented, for his time, the m ost adva nced application ofhoplite wa rfare possibl e, 82

Iphikrate s likewise us ed peltast tactics an d fighting methods th at were alrea dy conce ived and put to use prior to his time, but did so with remarkable proficiency.

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VI. CONCLUSION

In any focuse d study of a articul p ar historical group the re is som e risk of overemphasizing or glorifying the subject. This paper has likely followed this tendency a certain degree ni seve ral placesthroughout , but Ihavemadeevery attem pt to em phasi ze that e pltasts an d javelineers by no m eans replaced hoplites a s thecentralfiguresni Greek warfare. espite D the fact tha t Greek top ogra phy is wel l suited for thetactics and fighting methods oflight-armed troops, thetacti cal st rengths of thehoplite phalanxon the economically vital plains within poleis the —as well as strong social and cultural —gua factors rante ed continued prominence for theheavy n i fantryman right down to the

period ofthe Macedonian conq uest andthe d evelopment of that m ilitary system . Howeve r, the e xten t to which thehoplite dom inatedthe b attlefields ofhis day shoul d not be overstated. Epic tradition established a certain level of legitimacy for the javelin-armed ’ s Iliad soldier; indeed, the battle descriptions found in Homer illustrate a fluid, primarily

range d way of warfarethat clo sely rese mbles the fighting m ethodsof later javelineers and peltasts. h Te warriors in theHomeric battles are va riously armed and equipped, but generally tende d to be armored sp earmen who m ost often o f ught rom f afar bycasti ng their weapons at the enemy. One can rather sily ea imagine how suchsyst a em, base d on bands of tr oops lendi ng su pport promakhoi to , evolved into the earliest form of hoplite warfare, in which hea vier-armed spearmen —armored as hoplites but fighting both from a 84

distance an d hand tohand —were m ixed withight-arm l ed troops such as javelineers in a style of combat reminiscent of the battles of the Trojan poleis War. andAsthe thehoplite class grew, their way of war changed to emphasize the heroic virtue of close combat; combat described by the seventh-century poet Tyrtaios clearly reveals a distinction betwee n light, a rnged fighte rs an d the close-f ighting hopl ites, thoughey th con tinued to be intermixed. The wars of very limited scope and duration throughout the archaic period hindered thedevelopment of javelineers ’ specialized role and tactics. During the Persian Wars weirst f seethe light-armed troops arrayed separatelyrom f thehoplite phalanx, which made tacti cal andorganizational sense . Howeve r, thejavelin men (and othe r lightarmed troops) we re asomewha t marginalizedarm, usef ul for pursui t, skirmishing, an d prev enting the ir counte rparts from p eppering thephalanx wi th missiles. Given h ow potentially crucial these responsibilities were, it is difficult to determine if this marginalization was tronge s r in theprimary source s tha n in actual practi ce, but without a doubtthe javel ineer wa s viewed as a completely seconda ry fighter wi th little independent effectiveness. The shifting of auxiliary troops to the flanks of the hoplite phalanx likely —eve — reinforced this perception of inferiority n thought iwas atacti cal improvem en t

since m en of thehoplite class could view it as rem oving th e light troops fro m thereal hazards of the battle. While it si difficult to as certa in the exte nt to which the se percep tions n i fluenced actual practice ong am Greek military ea l ders, thehoplite biasni thelitera ry source s—someof whom were them selves hopl ites an d general —scertainly ’ role. sugg ests that cti tacs were rej p udicedtowardthehoplites

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Someof thes e percepti ons beg an to chan ge during the Pel oponne sian War,as the unprece dented sca le and geogra phical scope ofthe conf lict create d new dem ands for specialized for cesas well as professional roops t nd a commanders. Indeed, the increa sing useof mercena ries went a hnd in hand with therising prominence of javelin troops overall and of the peltast in particular. In a sense the rise in total me rcena ry servi ce, including hoplites, also dev aluedthe ide alizedpercep tion ofthehoplite ’ s honor and heroic virtue, a chan ge tha t may have rem oved som e of the prejudi ce againstpeltasts asonn citizen hirelings (though not sti the gma tha t many faced as non-Greeks). As the war pro gres sed and expa nded to h t e periphery of Greece, pel tasts an d javelineers found themselves fighting under circumstances and conditions that were more favora ble to the ir fighting methods. n I the notab le battles taSpartolos, Olpai,Spha kteria, Amphipol is, and Aitolia, light-arm ed soldiers we re undeniably decisive and provedtheir effectivenesswith hit -and-run tactic s (evading counterattacks), ntag adva eoususeof rugge d terrain against slo wer opp osition, andeven as fighte rs within the m ain battle line (mixed wi th hopl ites).The general Demosthene s em erge d asan n i nova tive e l ader of light-armed troops, and he se ems to be theearliest Gr eek commander toseek proacti vely thevarious waysni which se ason ed javelineers andpeltasts coul d beput to use . By the endof the war, pel tasts and javelineers seem ed to beviewedas essen tial components of any Greek military ope ration,both withi n and outside ofree G ce proper. This development is made clear by the prominence of the peltasts during the Expedition ofCyrus n ad through out thewars of thearly e fourth cen tury.The Cyrea n peltasts ought f co mmenda bly at Kounaxa, and they beca me an n i dispensa ble armof the remaining mercen ary o f rce tha t em barked on the lo ng m arch hom e following Cyrus ’ 86

death. The march ofthe Ten Thousa nd wa s certai nly an e xtraordi nary cam paign that did not ne cessa rily reflect thenorm al methodsof waging war; at thesam e time, however, t i was aperfect opp ortunity for bot h theapplication ofcombinedarms tactic s and the

continuation of their development that began during the Peloponnesian War. Within the new system of Greek warf are, pe ltasts nd a javel ineers werenot m erely helpful (to fend off opposing missile troops du ring a pitched infantry battle, for exa mple) but were truly vital for the protecti on of he t slower hopl ites a gainst m ore mobile, rang ed enemies, no matter the terrai n. The peltasts proved this nume rous im t es during theCyreanexpe dition, and the d isastrous exp erience ofthe Arkadian/A chaian hopli tes a gainst the hra T cians without pe ltast suppo rt is furthe r evidence. The numerous conflicts of the early fourth century did not necessarily witness the development of more advanced ta ctics for the pe ltast an d javelineer as m uch asti brought the continued application of those tactics developed during the Peloponnesian War an the Exped ition ofCyrus.Most ofthe g reat hopli te ba ttles of the p eriod se emed to ha ve relati vely ittl l e invol vement on thepart ofjavelin men, but pe ltasts and javelineers did continueto carry out their specialized rol es with grea t effectiveness. The most nota ble — example is at Lechaion,where Iphikrate s the grea test of lalpeltast com mande r— s

scoreda decisive victory over a for ce of Spartan h oplites. Many scholars cien an t and modern creditphikr I ateswith initiating a revoluti on in thearming of peltasts, turni ng his javelin troops into pikemen of sorts. I have argued that this alleged reformdid not take place at — allat leas t am ong thepeltasts.t Iis more plausibl e that phik I ratesarmed his hoplites with peltai and longe r spe ars ni order to confr ont Egypti an infantrymen more

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effectively. His refo rmsseemed to betem porary and limited to the cam paign ni which he wasengage d. It is intere sting to note, howeve r, thatthepeltast an d javelineer did not becom e more effective and use ful as aresul t of any m i provements to he t ir arms and equipment, as is so oft en thecase when military tactics evol ve. Javelins (an d for the p eltast, ahort s sword, cap, and pelte) remained the tools of the trade for these troops, and it does not appear thatthere we re an y significant cha nges to thi s equipment during theperiod. Inste ad, the evelopm d ent of effective ta ctics an d spe cialized rol es for theave j lineer and

peltast followed the general refinement of combined arms tactics used by professional

generals. The changing context of Greek warfare, involving relatively large alliances an leagues of state s wag ing wa rs on di verse te rrain with an d against heteroge neous o f rces, also contri butedto theincre asing reli ance uponspecialized light inf antry. The peltast and javelineer gained a more prominent position within Greek warfare throughboththeeffective executi on ofnew tacti cs andthe imp rovem ent of their traditi onal ro les. In Thucydides and Xenophon wesee the full rang e of acti ons a ssociated with the se old and new roles: ski rmishi ng, flanking and protec ting of flanks, ambushing hoplites a nd mixed for ces, guarding sse pas, seizing and defen ding high ground, aiding, r storming posit ions, c harging among or tathehead of hoplites, pursui ng an enemy in flight,and more. When se rving un der capab le, spe cialized com manders such as Iphikrate s, peltasts n iparticular became theperiod ’s light troops par excellence and established the mselves as an exce ptionally formidable and versatile infantry arm.

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