Option 1. The Parliamentary Parliamentary System The parliamentary system typically has clear differentiation differentiation between the head of government and the head of state, with the former being the Prime Minister and the latter, the President. The Prime Minister is the chief executive and, together with the Cabinet, exercises executive power or the authority to form and implement policies and programs. He/she is also usually the leader of the political party that wins the majority of votes in the legislature or parliament, either assuming the post automatically automatically or gets elected by the legislature. The members of the Cabinet are chosen by the Prime Minister from the members of parliament and can come from the same party or from a coalition of parties. The head of state, meanwhile, is the President, often elected by a designated electoral college as a figurehead with ceremonial powers. In some cases, however, the President could take on a more significant role during a constitutional constitutional or political crisis. In the parliamentary system, there is fusion of powers between the executive and the legislative branches. This union serves to facilitate the exercise and coordination of governmental powers and functions to formulate desired policies and implement programs of government. The success of this fusion depends largely, though, on the reform of the country’s political party and electoral systems. For some parliamentary parliamentary governments, governments, legislatures can only amend legislation on narrow terms. There are a few permanent or standing committees in the parliament that assist in the drafting and review of legislation. Given its close association with the legislative branch, the executive can be made more accountable accountable for its performance since they are answerable answerable to the members of parliament. There are two ways by which the Prime Minister and the rest of the Cabinet can be asked to step down. The first is through a vote of no-confidence by the legislature often initiated by an opposition party or coalition of opposition parties. This may or may not result in extraordinary elections. The other route is by virtue of a party vote, which does not force a new round of legislative elections. The Prime Minister, as long as he/she enjoys the confidence of the majority of the House, can dissolve the Parliament and call for early elections.
Option 2. The Presidential Presidential System The Philippines is one of the countries with a presidential form of government together with South Korea, Indonesia, Nigeria, most South American nations and the US, which is the pioneer. Under this political system, the President is both head of state and head of government. The incumbent for the position is elected nationwide on timing that has been predetermined in the Constitution. Constitution. Thus, in the presidential system, the President is said to enjoy a direct mandate from the people. There is a fixed
term of office for the President, which may be reelected depending on the country adopting the system. The executive branch, which the President heads, is distinct from the legislative and judicial branches of government, which are all independent of one other. This separation of powers serves to check and to balance certain actuations of either branch of government. government. While the members of the legislature are elected, the members of the Cabinet are appointed appointed by the President President and may require the confirmation or consent of the legislative branch. The formulation, amendment amendment and review of legislation legislation are the sole purview of the legislature. However, on many occasions, occasions, the executive could endorse a legislative agenda for consideration and veto a bill that was passed in the legislature. The latter, nonetheless, nonetheless, could overturn it via a two-thirds vote. When it comes to the difficult process of removing a President, often the only legal way is through an impeachment process that is undertaken in the legislative branch. Reassessing the option—what now, Mang Pandoy? In theory, the parliamentary parliamentary and presidential forms of government are on opposite sides of a pole. In practice, however, countries customize their chosen system according to their needs, culture and beliefs resulting in the so-called hybrid model. France, for instance, instance, is a country with a hybrid model cited as a semipresidential semipresidential system since its President is said to enjoy broader powers than the Prime Minister. In the present state of Philippine affairs, changing its Charter and choosing the most appropriate form of government are of critical undertakings undertakings in the political scenario. It becomes even more crucial when one has to bear in mind that institutional development and good governance are the foundations of a viable democratic political system (whatever it may be) and sustainable economic development. development. The debate is expected to persist as more issues surface and the arguments become clearer. An important important consideration consideration in all these these is the question question on whether changing the system of governance would in itself solve the economic and political crises. In a nation lacking in social cohesion and suffering from public confidence, political or economic change change may simply douse the current fire but ignite a different flame. Ultimately, the transformation from within each Filipino translating into a more unified stance and action may be the more essential change that should take place to lead the country toward development and prosperity ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Tuesday, April 25, 2006 UP Professor Rene Azurin's Speech on Charter Change (My new blogsite, www.susanople.com,is www.susanople.com,is down but no worries, let me post here the speech of UP Professor Rene Azurin delivered before the Makati Rotary Club. Topic is on Charter change. Rene authored the minority report of the Consultative Commission. Commission. Please pass this on to your friends to give them the other side of the argument on this
vital issue. Thanks.) Thanks.) The politicos who are pushing for charter change do not like to admit that the core question around the whole charter change issue is this: how will the proposed change change alter the distribution of power in our society? These politicos do not like to admit that what they are really pushing for is for more power to be allocated allocated to them and less to the rest of us. It should be made clear that the only change change that the pro ‘cha cha’ politicos are really interested in is the shift from the presidential form of government to the parliamentary form of government. Notwithstanding their loud assertions all over the media that they are for charter change because they want to open up the economy and create more jobs, their “Peoples’ “Peoples’ Initiative” Initiative” proposal in fact fact only petitions petitions for revisions revisions in Articles VI VI (Legislative Department), VII (Executive Department), Department), and XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the Constitution. In no part of the scrap of paper that they are asking people to sign is there any mention of amendments to the sections in Articles XII (National Economy and Patrimony) and XVI (General Provisions) that actually contain the restrictive economic provisions. This is disingenuous on their part. On this matter alone, it is hard not to conclude that this is not all part of a deliberate attempt to mislead and deceive the Filipino people. The pro ‘cha cha’ politicos do not tell the people the real and practical consequences consequences of the parliamentary system’s fusing of the executive power now vested in the President and the legislative power now vested in Congress into a single body (Parliament). They do not tell the people that this fusion of executive and legislative powers – the distinguishing distinguishing feature of the parliamentary parliamentary form – means that the same set of people choose the programs of government, appropriate the funds for these programs, and execute these programs. In a business organization, organization, this is analogous to combining in a single unit the functions functions of the purchasing department (the one who chooses the supplier), the functions of the finance department (the one who pays the supplier), and the functions of the operations department (the one who uses the items supplied). This means that the built-in control mechanism of having different units act on different parts of the same transaction is lost. Such a system therefore has inherently weaker controls and is more prone to abuse and corruption. This is why no company that has grown sufficiently large as to require formal systems of control ever fuses purchasing and finance and operations. operations. It is simply bad systems design. Now, if this isn’t done in comparatively small organizations organizations like business enterprises, why should the pro ‘cha cha’ politicos propose to do this in the very large entity that is the Philippine government? The pro ‘cha cha’ politicos do not tell the people that a parliamentary system discards the system of checks and balances that is an excellent feature of the presidential system. They do not tell the people that the Prime Minister and the members of Parliament – especially in the unicameral system being proposed – will be far more powerful than the President and the Cabinet in a presidential system. The Prime Minister and his ruling coalition can decide on any program they want, allocate funds to it, and implement it in any way they want. So consider this: if the P2.8 billion agricultural fund anomaly could happen in a presidential presidential system despite its built-in controls, controls, what might be possible when there are no such controls and some politicos decide to go on a public spending rampage?
The pro ‘cha cha’ politicos do not tell the people that, in a parliamentary parliamentary system, the entire national budget (except of course for certain fixed expenditures like debt servicing and salaries) is the ‘pork barrel’. They do not tell the people that there is no check for the power of the Prime Minister and his ruling gang to do what they want except to resort to the judicial system, but that is an after-the-fact control device and assumes that kickbacks can actually be documented and proven in a court of law. I know that we all are disturbed by the level of graft and corruption that occurs in the limited pork barrel system we now have. Now imagine what might happen after we've expanded the pork barrel and done away with the controls. Graft and corruption – and cronyism – flourishes more easily in parliamentary parliamentary governments, even in mature ones. The pro ‘cha cha’ politicos do not tell the people that, in a parliamentary parliamentary system, ‘horse trading’ – or the ‘I’ll go along with your project if you go along with mine’ system – is enshrined as the way of governance. This is a natural consequence of the fact that the Prime Minister and his/her cabinet are dependent for their continued stay in office on the votes of members of Parliament, and such votes can be withheld at any time. The fact that the government in a parliamentary system can fall any time there is a ‘no confidence vote’ is loudly touted by the pro ‘cha cha’ politicos as a virtue of the system. Actually, it is a very serious shortcoming because it essentially implies that the special interests represented by every member of Parliament Parliament will always be served, often at the expense of the national interest. Of course, all politicos in representative democracies – whether in presidential or parliamentary parliamentary governments – represent special interests. The problem however is compounded in parliamentary systems because too much power is placed in the hands of the members of Parliament and, as a result, they can do virtually anything to promote those interests. The pro ‘cha cha’ politicos do not tell the people exactly how their desired shift to a parliamentary parliamentary form of government government will benefit the country. All they do is point to other countries that happen to be parliamentary parliamentary and more economically economically successful than we are, and then make the sweeping statement that we would be as economically economically successful as those countries if only we changed to a parliamentary government. government. They conveniently conveniently do not mention that there many other countries that are performing better economically but do not have parliamentary governments, or that there are many other countries that have parliamentary governments but are not performing well economically. economically. These pro ‘cha cha’ politicos do not tell the people that there is no demonstrated demonstrated correlation between form of government and economic economic performance, performance, or between the parliamentary form and the rate of economic growth. In fact, economic performance is a function of a country’s economic policies, its resource endowments, and the set of environmental conditions, not its form of government. Finally, the pro ‘cha cha’ politicos do not like to tell the people that, in a parliamentary system, we ordinary citizens – already bereft of any real power – will be further deprived of the power to vote for our choice as leader of the country. In a parliamentary system, only the members of Parliament will have a say in who will lead the nation. Sila sila na lang ang mag-didikta. Props na lang tayo. It is worthwhile perhaps to remember that the US-style presidential presidential system is a later iteration of the British-style parliamentary parliamentary system of democracy. If we try to recall a little bit of history, we will note that the parliamentary form was really a late 17th-century power-sharing concoction concoction of British feudal lords whose primary concern at the time was mainly to maintain the balance and prevent any one lord from acquiring enough power to
install himself as monarch. These aristocrats, who were absolute rulers in their individual individual fiefdoms, did not feel any need to make an accounting accounting of their actions to their subjects and thus felt no compulsion to install systems of ‘check and balance’. In contrast, the people who migrated to North America were mainly the oppressed working classes of Europe who were naturally more conscious of limiting the powers of those who would ‘rule’ over them. Thus, they produced the formula of dispersing and distributing distributing powers among three separate, independent, independent, and co-equal branches of government, and allowing the people to directly elect their leaders for fixed and limited terms of office. The American system system actually must must be considered considered an improvement improvement over the British British system because it diminished the power and prerogatives of ruling elites and retained more power for the people. I consider it absolutely essential that we maintain the separation of executive and legislative powers and retain the system of ‘checks and balances’ because the powers already vested in government officials are enormous and easy to abuse. Giving more power to politicos and then removing the restraints cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, imagination, be the solution to this country’s problems. In fact, this will make the situation in the country worse than it already is. Graft and corruption is a real and serious problem in this country and shifting to the parliamentary form will aggravate it. ‘Legislative gridlock’ – the problem that the pro ‘cha cha’ politicos say they want to solve – is a minor (even imaginary) problem whose elimination will not make any perceptible impact on the country’s economic growth rate. From a systems design point of view, it does not make any sense – given the realities of the Philippine situation – to change from a system with comparatively strong controls to a system with comparatively weak controls. On the contrary, the direction of change should be toward even stronger stronger controls. controls. When you are already experiencing burglaries in your neighborhood, neighborhood, the correct response is to install a more sophisticated security system, not to remove the locks from your front door. What, in effect, we are being told by the pro ‘cha cha’ politicos is, ‘Give us more power and the problems of the country will be solved, and we will be economically better off’. One could very well wonder if the ‘we’ in that statement statement includes us ordinary citizens. citizens. A somewhat somewhat cheeky translation of that previous statement might be, ‘Remove the locks from your front door and we promise not to ransack your house, and we will see to it that you will get a new flat screen TV’. The question we must ask ourselves is: given our past experience with these politicos, should we believe them? The problem with the systems design of the parliamentary form is that it requires the presumption of good intentions for it to work well. Are we prepared to make this presumption? Frankly, I am not. I don’t believe that most of you are either. It should be obvious that the change to a parliamentary system is being railroaded by politicos because it will give them virtually unrestricted power to promote their special interests. The lengths to which they will go and the means that they are prepared to employ to ram through this change is a clear indication of how very much they want this kind of power. Both modes of change that they have put into play – the Constituent Assembly without without Senate cooperation cooperation and and the People’s Initiative Initiative option – raise serious serious legal questions, but the ‘cha cha’ proponents speak confidently not only of the Supreme Court ruling in their favor on these questions but of it ruling on these in record time. Why are they so sure? Are they implying that even the Supreme Court is already on board their railroad train?
By July this year (or in about three months from now), some politicos are assuring us with absolute confidence confidence that we will have a new parliamentary system in place. The resources that they are using to meet this timetable and the haste with which they are forcing through such a major structural change change in our society seems not only indecent, but actually grotesque. The interests of the very few are once again about to triumph over the interests of the country as a whole. It is easy to imagine these ‘cha cha’ proponents enjoying laughs laughs in private at the ease with which they are putting one over us. My friends, we certainly need judicial reform. We need electoral reform. We need economic reform. What we do not need is a change in our form of government. My friends, it is up to you and me to tell the people what this proposed change change to a parliamentary parliamentary system really means. We need to spread this message and persuade the various groups and organizations that we are members of – civic, professional, social, and religious – to make a public stand against against this brazen attempt to put one over the Filipino people. I believe that we urgently need to raise the level of public awareness and, more importantly, importantly, the level of public outrage in order to derail their railroad train, if derailing it is still at all possible. In any event, we must try. If we don’t do this and if we don’t fight this politico initiative now, then we – you and I – must bear responsibility for the problems and the pain this will cause our children, their children, and future generations generations of Filipinos. We started by saying that the proposed charter change is really about the re-allocation of power. Who gains? Who loses? In the shift to a parliamentary system, the politicos will gain power. We ordinary citizens will lose what little power we still have. Is that what the Filipino people want? Do we really want to give our politicos more power? Do we want to give them the key to our national treasury’s front door? I definitely don’t. Do you?
Stationary Bandits’ – A Preface By Rene Azurin INQUIRER.net First Posted 13:07:00 02/22/2007 Filed Under: Books, history, Politics When I accepted an invitation (on September 12, 2005) to become a member of the Consultative Consultative Commission to propose revisions to the 1987 Philippine Constitution, or ConCom, I had a public position (contained in published articles) favoring an open, less regulated economy, economy, but had no public position at all on proposals for reforming the political system in the country. In particular, I had not expressed any opinion in public on whether the Philippines should shift from a presidential form of government to a parliamentary parliamentary one or convert from a unitary structure to a federalized one.
At that time, time, however, I was was really quite receptive receptive to considering considering certain political political reforms reforms although I had not yet made my mind up about what changes to the nation’s Charter were actually necessary or desirable. In joining the ConCom, I fully understood – as a serious student of strategy – that it was very likely that the ConCom’s final position on certain issues had been pre-designed by the simple expedient of making sure that the majority of those appointed as members of the body consisted of those who could be counted on – for whatever reason – to vote for the desired outcomes on the issues deemed critical. Nonetheless, Nonetheless, after having been assured that the deliberations deliberations in the ConCom would be free and uncontrolled, I thought that an initiative to revise the nation’s Charter was too important to ignore, regardless of the likely eventual outcome. What was important (I believed) was that, for the historic record, no reasonable view be left unarticulated. It also quickly became obvious that the only two issues deemed crucial by the top national national officials who were pushing for Charter change was the change in the country’s form of government from the present US-style presidential system to a UK-style parliamentary parliamentary system and the postponement of the scheduled May 2007 elections. Other issues – like federalization federalization or economic reform or judicial reform – might have been loudly proclaimed by the proponents of Charter change to be important but were clearly merely incidental to the whole exercise. Those who advocated changing the country’s form of government to a UK-style parliamentary parliamentary one argued essentially that it was the only way of solving the country’s political problems and achieving better economic performance. Their arguments, arguments, however, clearly lacked logical or empirical basis. Instead, what was clear was that the parliamentary parliamentary system was being pushed to increase the power of the ruling political elite and weaken the restraints on that power. It meant that the controls provided by the ‘check and balance’ built into the presidential system where executive power and legislative power are wielded by separate, independent branches branches of government – which are fused in the parliamentary system – would be trashed and eliminated. It meant that the proposed system would be easier to abuse and that graft and corruption and the promotion of special vested interests would be so much simpler. Since there was no way of changing – or even modifying – the ConCom majority’s principal recommendation of changing changing the country’s form of government from its present US-style presidential system to a UK-style parliamentary system, I decided to simply write my objections in a Dissenting Report and submit it (on December 16, 2005) to the President and to the leaders of both houses of Congress for their consideration. In that Report, I argued that the amendments to the nation’s Constitution, proposed by the ConCom's majority, were not logical responses to the country's current political and economic realities, nor did these properly address existing problems or specific systemic deficiencies. I am of the opinion that most of the country’s problems can be traced to poor governance, governance, and that can be traced to the way our politicos use their powers to promote special interests. Accordingly, I strongly believe that giving these politicos even more
power is the completely wrong reaction to the realities of our present situation. The way our politicos now wield somewhat restricted powers, it is distressing to imagine what will happen should the people allow them less restricted powers. In the campaign to effect the shift to a parliamentary parliamentary form of government, government, the main proponents used the massive resources of government and were not above blatant acts of deception. Underlying one such deception is the claim (made in all their communications) communications) that a change change to the parliamentary form of government government is necessary for the country’s economic progress. In their obsession with obtaining the support of the Filipino people for their agenda, the proponents of the parliamentary shift deliberately deliberately hid from the people the fact that there is no causal link between a country's country's form of government and its economic performance, or between the parliamentary form and the rate of economic growth. Nonetheless, the parliamentary parliamentary advocates kept repeating this claim, apparently operating under the assumption that, if you say a thing often enough, people will eventually believe that it's true. Most of the essays in this book are an offshoot of my own efforts to get an initially indifferent Filipino public interested enough in the admittedly abstract issue of Charter change change to actively oppose the proposed shift to a parliamentary parliamentary form of government. The pieces contain the ideas and substance (though not quite the form) of talks I have given to various groups about the concentration of political power and articles I have written for print publications publications regarding the proposed Charter changes. changes. Although the the objective of generating generating interest interest now (finally) (finally) appears to have have been achieved, my purpose in putting these into essay form and collecting them in this volume is to allow these to be disseminated more readily and considered in greater depth. The aforementioned ConCom Dissenting Dissenting Report is also included in this book. While this was, understandably, understandably, not acted upon by the powers advocating advocating the shift to a parliamentary parliamentary system, it was widely disseminated (mainly via the Internet) and did, I think, provide those who eventually came to constitute the opposition to the politicoinitiated Charter change effort with the arguments arguments and the language to demolish the specious and deceptive claims of parliamentary shift proponents. I must thank numerous friends and former students who helped spread these dissenting views and counter arguments in various parts of the country and among different sectors of the population. I am also profoundly grateful to several TV, radio, and print media personalities – I will not name them here for fear that they will incur the wrath of powerful pro-Charter change change proponents – who, even when they might not have agreed with what I was saying, believed – very admirably – that a forum for the articulation of contrary views was necessary and needed to be provided. In this way, they contributed immeasurably immeasurably to the building of what seems to have become a strong no-to-Parliament movement. That such a significant significant ‘contra’ movement has emerged in spite of the massive financial and organizational organizational resources being used by the government to railroad its desired changes changes to the nation’s Charter must also be a testament to the undiminished ability of the Filipino people to separate truth from self-serving political propaganda. propaganda.
Since time immemorial, those who have sought political power within human communities have claimed that their quest for power was driven by the noblest of motives, to achieve some general good for the entire community. community. History reveals, however, that with rare exceptions, this has been a lie. Those who are driven to seek power do so primarily to serve their own interests and gratify their particular appetites. In the light of the current quest by Philippine politicians to acquire even greater power for themselves, this point is deemed worth emphasizing at this time. The dissident writer Vaclav Havel once suggested that “the power of the powerless” i n society lies in refusing to live with a governing regime’s lie and in just expressing the truth because there is an “existential” “existential” need within each of us to affirm truth, even if we do not, or cannot, immediately act on it. That is an encouraging thought. Accordingly, like the powerless boy in Andersen’s popular fairy tale, I hope that this small volume will allow the truth that “the emperor has no clothes!” to spread and acquire motive force.
