Ownership Digest

Property (Atty. Labitag) II. OWNERSHIP Case Digest

describe the parcel of land referred to as the subjectmatter of this action; both of which are essential requisites for determining the jurisdiction of the Court where the case is filed. In this case, however, the assessed value of the land in question is totally absent in the allegations of the complaint and there is nothing in the relief prayed for which can b e picked-up for determining the Court’s jurisdiction as provided by law.

The Hilarios (Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla) are coowners by inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador of a parcel of land located at Sawang, Romblon, Romblon. This was adjudged as the hereditary share of their father, Brigido M. Hilario, Jr. when their father was still single, and which adjudication adjudication was known by their father’s co-heirs. Sometime in 1989, Salustiniano Salvador constructed his dwelling unit of mixed materials on the property of the plaintiffs’ father without

the knowledge of the herein plaintiffs or their predecessors-ininterest. They demanded Salvador to vacate the premises but the latter manifested that he had asked the prior consent of their grandmother, Concepcion Mazo Salvador. To reach a possible amicable settlement, the plaintiffs brought the matter to the Lupon of Barangay Sawang, to no avail, evidenced by the Certificate to File Action. The Hilarios filed a complaint with the RTC. The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action, citing Section 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended by Section 3(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691. He averred that – (1) the complaint complaint failed to state the assessed assessed value value of the land in dispute; (2) the complaint complaint does not sufficiently sufficiently identify and/or

The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and ruled in favor of t he petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this petition. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case filed by the Hilarios.

No. The Court does not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the ruling of the CA that the action of the petitioners in the RTC was an accion reinvindicatoria . The Court finds and so rules that the action of the petitioners was an accion publiciana , or one for the recovery of possession of the real property subject subject matter thereof. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery of possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession possession based on the said ownership. On the other hand, an accion publiciana is is one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess. possess. It is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.


The action of the petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not involve a claim of ownership over the property. property. They allege that they are co-owners thereof, and as such, entitled to its possession, and that the private respondent, who was the defendant, constructed his house thereon in 1989 without their knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite demands for him to do so. They prayed that the private respondent vacate the property and restore possession thereof to them. When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3, 1996, R.A. No. 7691 was already in effect. It states that the jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now determined by the assessed value of the said property and not the market value thereof . The assessed value of real property is the fair market value of the real property multiplied multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value. The fair market value is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy. Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does not contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property subject of the complaint. The court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of lands. Absent any allegation in the complaint of t he assessed value of the property, it cannot thus be determined whether the RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners’ action. The Court quotes with approval, in this connection, the CA’s

disquisition: The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7691 discloses, the assessed value of the property in question. For properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds P20,000, and

the MTC, if the value is P20,000 or below. An assessed value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality where the property is located, and is contained in the tax declaration. In the case at bench, the most most recent tax declaration secured and presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark made by them that the property was worth 3.5 million pesos, not to mention that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the fact that there is an assessed value. It is the amount in the tax declaration that should be consulted and no ot her kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit B, this is P5,950. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, and not the court a quo . It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency. Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, all the proceedings therein, including the decision of the RTC, are null and void. The complaint should perforce be dismissed.


A complaint for forcible entry was filed by siblings Crispulo Vasquez and Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano against Cesar Sampayan before the MCTC of Agusan del Sur, for allegedly having entered and occupied a parcel of land through strategy and stealth, and built a house thereon without their knowledge, consent or authority. The private respondents, alleged that their mother Cristita Quita was the owner and actual possessor of Lot No. 1959; that after their mothers death on January 11, 1984, they became co-owners pro-indiviso and lawful possessors of the same lot; that on June 1, 1992, while they were temporarily absent from the lot in question, petitioner Cesar Sampayan, through strategy and stealth, entered the lot and built a house thereon, to their exclusion; and that, despite their repeated demands for Sampayan to vacate the lot and surrender the possession thereof to them, the latter failed and refused to do so. Defendant Sampayan denied the allegations and moved for the dismissal of the complaint. He averred the following: that neither the plaintiffs nor their mother have ever been in possession of the land and that he does not even know plaintiffs’ identities or their places of residence. he did not enter the subject lot by stealth or strategy because he asked and was given permission therefor by 



Maria Ybañez, the overseer of the lot’s true owners, Mr. and Mrs.



Anas Anasta taci cioo Terr Terrad adoo who were then temporarily residing in Cebu City for business purposes. plaintiff s’ claim has long prescribed for the reason that the lot in dispute had been possessed and

declared for taxation purposes by the spouses Felicisimo Oriol and Concordia Balida-Oriol in 1960,and that in 1978, the Oriol spouses sold one-half (1/2) of the lot to the spouses Mr. and Mrs.Anastacio Terrado, while the other half, to the couple Manolito Occida and Juliana Sambale-Occidain 1979. Both vendees have actually possessed the respective portions purchased by them up to the present. On March 21, 1996, while the case was pending with the MCTC, the presiding judge thereof personally conducted an ocular inspection of the contested lot in the presence of the parties and/or their counsels. Among those found in the area during the inspection are: the house of petitioner Sampayan; the dilapidated house of a certain P eter Siscon; and a portion of the house of Macario Noynay, husband of Dionisia Noynay, one of Sampayan's witnesses. Based on his ocular findings, the judge concluded that the improvements improvements he saw in the premises premises could never have been introduced by the plaintiffs nor by their mother Cristita Quita but by the vendees of the same lot. The MTC concluded that, from the appearance of the improvements introduced by the predecessors-in-interest of the now petitioner, it is showed that they have been in possession of the land for more than one (1) year. Hence, the action of the private respondents, if any, is accion publiciana or or plenaria de possession.

The MCTC rendered jud gment dismissing the compliant “for lack of merit”. Therefrom, the private respondents appealed to the RTC, which reversed that of the MCTC, taking note of the fact that Cristita Quita was among the expositors in Cadastral Case No. 149 and that she filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application over the lot. On the basis of such finding, the RTC concluded that it was Cristita Quita, predecessor-in-interest of the herein


private respondents, who was in actual prior physical possession of the land. Unable to accept the RTC judgment, Sampayan went to the CA on a petition for review which was denied. His motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied. Sampayan now files a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

the private respondents nor their mother had ever possessed Lot No. 1959. Coming as it does from an immediate neighbor, Dionesias statement commands great weight and respect. Incidentally, the MCTC judge himself found during the ocular inspection that a portion of the house of Macario Noynay, husband of Dionesia, protruded on Lot No. 1959.

Whether or not the respondents have been in prior physical possession of the property.

We note that in the herein assailed decision, the Court of Appeals attached much significance to the fact that private respondents mother Cristita Quita was an oppositor in Cadastral Case No. 149.

After a careful evaluation of the ev idence at hand, we find for the petitioner. To begin with, we are at once confronted by the uncontested findings of the MCTC judge himself during his ocular inspection of the premises in dispute that what he saw thereat confirmed the allegations of the defendant [now petitioner Sampayan] that his predecessors-in-interest have introduced improvements by planting caimito trees, coconut trees, and others on the land in question, adding that [N]othing can be seen on the land that plaintiff had once upon a time been in possession of the land, and categorically stating that [T]he allegation that Cristita Quita, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs had been in possession of the said property since 1957, openly, exclusively, continuously, adversely and in the concept of an owner is a naked claim, unsupported by any evidence. Then, too, there is the sworn affidavit of Dionesia Noynay to the effect that she had been residing since 1960 onward on Lot No. 1957, the lot adjacent to Lot No. 1959, and that neither

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the Decision and Resolution, respectively dated May 16, 2002 and November 7, 2002, of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE.


petitioner,

The MTCC ruled in favor of petitioner which was affirmed in toto by the RTC.

vs. respondents.

The CA reversed the decision of the lower courts and held that petitioner’s proper remedy should have been publiciana before the RTC, not an action for unlawful an accion publiciana

Petitioner, Reuben Santos averred that he is the registered owner of three lots situated at Lanzona Subdivision, Matina, Davao City while respondent spouses Ayon are the registered owners of an adjacent parcel of land. The previous occupant of the property owned by the spouses Ayon built a building which straddled both the lots of the herein parties. Respondents have been using the building as a warehouse. Petitioner further alleged in his complaint that in 1985, when he bought the three lots, he informed respondents that the building occupies a portion of his land. However, he allowed them to continue using the building. But in 1996, he needed the entire portion of his lot, hence, he demanded that respondents demolish and remove the part of the building encroaching his property and turn over to him their possession. But they refused. Instead, they continued occupying the contested portion and even made improvements on the building. The dispute was then referred to the barangay lupon , but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Respondents sought a dismissal of this case on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over it since there is no lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Respondents denied they were occupying petitioner's property by mere tolerance, claiming they own the contested portion and have been occupying the same long before petitioner acquired his lots in 1985.

detainer.

Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in holding that petitioner's complaint is within the competence of the RTC, not the MTCC.

Yes. There is no error in the MTCC assuming jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint. A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Here, there is an allegation in petitioner's complaint that respondents occupancy on the portion of his property is by virtue of his . Petitioner's cause of action for unlawful detainer springs from respondents' failure to vacate the questioned premises upon his demand sometime in 1996. Within one (1) year therefrom, or on November 6, 1996, petitioner filed the instant complaint. It bears stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. Roxas vs. Court of Appeals is applicable in this case: "A person


who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him."


part of the seashore. The other respondents ordered to vacate the lot filed an appeal before the CA but was denied. Violeta Herrera filed 21 ejectment ejectment Complaints[4] before the 16th MCTC in Jordan, Guimaras. alleging that she owns Lot 1227 of the C adastral Survey of Jordan, Guimaras, with an area of 43,210 square meters; that she inherited the lot from her parents; and that she only tolerated petitioners to construct residential houses or other improvements on certain portions of the lot without rental. Sometime in September or October 1 996, Herrera demanded that the petitioners vacate the lot and remove their houses and other improvements thereon. Petitioners refused, despite offer of money by way of assistance to them. After the barangay conciliation failed, herrera filed the complaints. In their Answers, eight of the petitioners claimed that Lot 1227 was formerly a shoreline which they developed when they constructed their respective houses. Another eight maintained that their houses stood on Lot 1229 of the Cadastral Survey of Jordan, Guimaras. The other three asserted that Lot 1227 is a social forest area. The MCTC decided in favor of herrera ordering Ganila et al to va cate the disputed lot. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MCTC and ruled that the evidence showed the better right of private respondent to possess Lot 1227. Private respondents position paper, affidavit and tax declaration supported her allegations. In addition, the commissioners report and sketch plan showed that indeed petitioners occupy Lot 1227. On the other hand, according to the RTC, the petit ioners failed to present evidence which would show that they are entitled t o possess the lot. Based on the sketch plan, the RTC dismissed the cases against Gabasa and Amatorio since their houses occupy only a small area of Lot 1227. It declared that Gabasa and Amatorio believed in good faith that the whole area they occupied was

Issues: (1) Did the MCTC err in taking jurisdiction over and deciding the cases? (2) Did the RTC err in sustaining the MCTCs judgment? (3) Did the CA err in denying the petition for review filed by the 19 petitioners ordered to be ejected? Ruling: NO, NO, NO, Ganila et al insist should have filed an action to recover possession de jure or juridical possession and not a mere complaint for ejectment because they possessed the lot in good faith for more than 30 years and tha t there was no withholding of possession of the lot. The SC sided with herrera that there is no error in her choice of remedy. The complaint itself is defined by the allegations thereim and not the allegations made by Ganila et al. Moreover the Ganila et al have admitted in their preliminary statement that the complaints filed are indeed unlawful detainer and that the only issue to be determined is mere physical possession not juridical possession. Futhermore, ganila et al confuse the action for forcible entry with that of unlawful detainer. In unlawful detainer, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary. It is enough that plaintiff has a better right of possession. Actual, prior physical possession of a property by a party is indispensable only in forcible entry cases. In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess. Thus, the fact that petitioners are in possession of the lot does not automatically entitle them to remain in possession. And the


issue of prior lawful possession by the defendants does not arise at all in a suit for unlawful detainer, simply because prior lawful possession by virtue of contract or other reasons is given or admitted. Unlike in forcible entry where defendants, by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, deprive the plaintiff or the prior physical possessor of possession. Here there is no evidence to show that petitioners entered the lot by any of these acts In this case for ejectment, private respondents allegations sufficiently present a case of unlawful detainer. She alleged that (1) she owns Lot 1227; (2) she tolerated petitioners to construct their houses thereon; (3) she withdrew her tolerance; and (4) petitioners refused to heed her demand to vacate the lot. The Complaints were also filed within one year from the date of her demand. The cause of action for unlawful detainer between the parties springs from the failure of petitioners to vacate the lot upon lawful demand of the private respondent. When they refused to vacate the lot after her demand, petitioners continued possession became unlawful. Her complaint for ejectment against respondent, to put it simply, is not without sufficient basis. Petitioners contention that private respondent should have filed an action to recover possession de jure with the RTC is not supported by law or jurisprudence. The distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land is settled in our jurisprudence. jurisprudence. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary

action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession. It is not up to defendants, now petitioners herein, to dictate upon plaintiff, now the private respondent, what her initial recourse should be. Her choice of an action for ejectment against socalled squatters is well within her rights.


A complaint for ejectment filed by petitioners against respondents before the MTC of Mandaue City, Branch I. In the complaint, petitioners alleged the fact of their ownership of three (3) parcels of land. Petitioners likewise acknowledged respondent Elizab eth Ong’s ownership of the lots previous to theirs. Lawyer representing Mandaue Prime Estate Realty, wrote respondents informing them of its intent to use the lots and asking them to vacate within thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter. But respondents refused to vacate, thereby unlawfully withholding possession of said lots, so petitioners alleged. It appears that Mandaue Prime Estate Realty had acquired the properties from the respondents through a Deed of Absolute Sale, however, this deed of sale a nd the transfers of title consequential thereto were subsequently sought to be annulled by respondents in a complaint filed before the Mandaue RTC against Mandaue Prime Estate Realty. Per record, this case is still pending resolution. Thereafter, Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King and Sons, Inc. (petitioners) had acquired the lands from Mandaue Prime Estate Realty through a sale. MTC resolved the ejectment case in in favor of the petitioner ordering respondents to vacate the premises in question and to peacefully turn over possession thereof to petitioners. RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. Respondents appealed to the CA, which ruled that the MTC had no jurisdiction over said case, as there was no contract contract between the parties, express or implied, as would qualify the same as one for unlawful detainer.

1.) W/n the allegations in the complaint constitute a case for unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC. 2.) W/n petitioners, as registered owners, are entitled to the possession of the subject premises. 1.) YES, it was held that the allegation in the complaint that there was unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful detainer cognizable by the MTC. The phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant. Based on this premise, the allegation in the Complaint that despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots; is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case. In the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of the lots. By their implied tolerance, they have allowed respondents, the former owners of the properties, to remain therein. Nonetheless, they eventually sent a letter to respondents asking that the latter vacate the said lots. Respondents refused, thereby depriving petitioners of possession of the lots. 2.) With the conclusion of the first issue issue in favor of petitioners, there is no need to discuss the second assignment of error which is related to the second issue.


II.

Whether or not MTC has jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 165177, August 25, 2005 Petitioner Lilia V. Peralta-Labrador filed a case for Recovery of Possession and Ownership. She alleged that she is the owner of Cadastral Lot No. 2650, with an area of 400 sq. m. located in Zambales and that she purchased the same from spouses Artemio and Angela Pronto in 1976. The following year she was issued Tax Declaration No. 10462 and paid the taxes due thereon. In 1990, the Department of Public Works and Highways constructed a road which traversed Cadastral Lot No. 2650 thereby separating 108 sq. m. from the rest of

I.

Yes. The action was brought after more than than one (1) year and it is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such process. The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the la nd. However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right reivindicatoria, which is an of possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, action to recover ownership as well as possession.

II.

No. The cause of a ction for forcible entry has prescribed and the MTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.

petitioner’s lot, for which she was issued Tax Declaration No.

02-2460R in 1991. Sometime in 1994, respondent Silverio Bugarin forcibly took possession of the 108 sq. m. lot and refused to vacate the same despite the pleas of petitioner. Hence, on January 18, 1996, she instituted a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership against respondent. In his Answer with Counterclaims, respondent contended that the area claimed by petitioner is included in the 4,473 square meter lot, covered by the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-13011; and that he has been in continuous possession and occupation thereof since 1955. In his Amended Answer with Counterclaim, however, respondent failed to allege that the questioned lot is covered by the aforementioned OCT and instead asserted that he planted fruit bearing trees in the property. I.

Whether or not the action has prescribed.

Petitioner’s complaint therefore should have been filed

with the proper RTC. It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence or even express consent. Hence, the failure of respondent to insist on the defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription stated in his Amended Answer with Counterclaim will not vest the MTC with jurisdiction over the case.


On Aug. 11, 1982, spouses Dr. Jesus and Enriqueta Seriña filed a Complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession, and damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent Victor Caballero and his tenants, Teodoro and Oliver Donela. When Dr. Seriña died on Aug. 6, 1983, he was substituted by his children, petitioners Jesus, Jr., Antonio, Violeta, Reynaldo and Emmanuel Petitioners allege that they are the absolute owners and have been in actual and constructive possession for thirty-five (35) years of a parcel of land described as follows: Lot No. 3533 A, Cad-237, Cagayan Cadastre, Tax Declaration No. 02161, Location - Mantadiao, Opol, Misamis Oriental, Area - 2.5000 has Boundaries: North - Alejo Seriña, South - T. Sabornido, East - A. Seriña & T. Sabornido, West - F. Caballero, and that they discovered that respondent Caballero was claiming ownership over the said land and offering it for sale or mortgage to third parties. They also discovered that the respondents Donelas were occupying the land as tenants and caretakers. The petitioners claimed that their father, Dr. Seriña, bought the land from Lucia Vda. de Marbella, as proved by a Deed of Sale Sale6 dated Aug. 23, 1947 and Tax Declaration No. 4029. Petitioners also averred that they regularly paid taxes thereon since 1947 up to the present.

Respondent Caballero alleged that he was the lawful owner, and had been in actual physical possession of the disputed land since time immemorial and that it was originally owned by his grandfather, Eustaquio Caballero. RTC ruled in favor of Caballero. CA affirmed the decision in toto.

(1) whether the petitioners were able to establish the identity of the land being claimed by them; (2) whether acquisitive prescription should be appreciated in favor of the petitioners.

(1) No. The documentary and t estimonial evidence presented by the petitioners did not prove the identity of the land being claimed. The petitioners did not present evidence to prove that the land registered in the name of Eustaquio Caballero was sold to Lucia Vda. de Marbella or her predecessor-in-interest from whom they purchased the land subject of their complaint. A person who claims ownership of real property is dutybound to clearly identify the land being claimed, in accordance with the title on which he anchors his right of ownership. In order that an action for recovery of possession may prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the action fully proves not only his ownership but also the identity of the property claimed, by describing the location, a rea and boundaries thereof.


(2) No. Insufficient identification of the portion of land claimed in absolute ownership cannot ripen into ownership. Petitioners were not able to prove that they have been in possession of the property for the requisite number of years. Prescription requires public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the property in the concept of an owner for ten years, in case the possession is in good faith and with just title.


petitioners, vs. respondents. Civil Case 689 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas was an action to quiet title over a piece of land filed on March 20, 1959, by spouses Basilio Perez and Pet ra Montalbo with spouses Nicolas Mendoza and Margarita Macalalad as defendants. According to the complaint, the land in in controversy is located in barrio Dagatan, municipality of Taysan, Ba tangas, declared for taxation purposes in the name of the "Heirs of Estanislao Montalbo", and is "bounded on the north by a school site, on the east by Calixto Flores, on the south by a creek, and on the west by a creek and the land of Gregorio Mendoza." On the basis of evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court then presided by Hon. Lorenzo Relova rendered judgment on February 19, 1962, dismissing the complaint and declaring the spouses Mendoza "to have a better right to the property in question. The litigated parcel of land was was originally part of a bigger tract owned by Estanislao Montalbo. When Estanislao died in 1918, his properties passed on to his children Petra, Felisa, and Pedro a ll surnamed Montalbo, and because Pedro died single the two women remained as the only heirs. A part of the land was donated to by Andrea Montalbo to be used as a school and the remaining was donated to her daughter Margarita Macalalad on the occasion of her marriage to Nicolas Mendoza, which was confirmed by a public instrument. Petitioners contend that the disputed property was inherited by Petra and Felisa Montalbo from their father

Estanislao who died in 1918 and since that date the two sisters were in possession of said land. In 1934 a deed of partition of the various properties of Estanislao was executed between Petra and the heirs of Felisa, and the land in question was divided equally, between them. They claim that Felisa's husband, Jose Ortega, and children sold their one-half share to spouses Petra Montalbo and Basilio Perez, now petitioners, but the deed of sale was lost a year after. Sometime in 1946 petitioners leased the property to the Mendozas and when the lease expired in 1951 they demanded for the return of the land but the Mendozas refused and so petitioners had to file an ejectment suit. Whether or not spouses Nicolas Mendoza had better right to the property in question. Yes, the evidence has conclusively shown that the defendants have been in continuous possession of the land since 1927 to the present time, and they have built a house on the land in 1928 where they have resided and lived to the present. Respondents Mendoza have been in possession possession of the property since 1927 in concept of owners thereof. We have the testimony of respondent Nicolas Mendoza that after the land was donated to his wife in 1927 they b uilt a house on it and lived there continuously. Possession is an indicium of ownership of the thing possessed and to the possessor goes the presumption that he holds the thing under a claim of ownership. Article 433 of the Civil Code provides that "(A)ctual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property." In Chan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-27488, June


30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737, this Court upheld the finding of the Court of Appeals that the litigated property belonged to the private respondents therein based on their possession of the property, not only because such findings of fact of the appellate court are conclusive and binding on this Court but because the conclusion is in accordance with Articles 433 and 531 of the Civil Code. The pretension of petitioners that the possession of the Mendozas is that of a mere lessee was not believed by the trial judge and the appellate court not only because of the absence of any written or oral evidence on the matter other than the bare testimony of petitioner Basilio Perez, but also due to the circumstances present in the case which We indicated and enumerated at pages 7 to 9 of this decision. In fine, it is a fact that the Mendozas are presently in possession of the property and the presumption of ownership in their favor has not been that they are mere lessees of successfully rebutted by evidence that the land in their possession as claimed by petitioners


G.R. No. 101929 January 6, 1993

The spouses Hilario Galang and Martina Laxamana owned two lots located in San Agustin, Potrero, Municipality of Bacolor, Province of Pampanga. They had six children, namely, Dionisio, Marciana, Potenciana, Flaviana, Leonora and Gertrudes. The spouses (Hilario and Martina) mortgaged the aforesaid lots to Camilo Angeles. It is alleged by the respondents that Dionisio Galang redeemed these lots in his own name, despite the fact that part of the funds used for the redemption came from his sisters. Respondents, who are heirs of Galang's sisters, claim that Galang and his five sisters had partitioned the subject lots by virtue of an unnotarized affidavit executed by Galang. As a consequence, Galang’s sisters constructed a house therein that was passed from generation to generation without being questioned or disturbed. Petitioners contend that the issuance of the original certificates of title in the sole name of Galang by way of a cadastral proceedings proceedings was a proceeding “in rem” thus

binding to the whole world and without the respondents raising an objection to it. The Trial court favored the petitioner but the decision was reversed by the Appellate court and upheld the rights of the respondents on the ground that co-ownership existed between respondent’s predecessors-in-interest and those of petitioners,

on the basis of Galang's affidavit which, although unnotarized, was nonetheless an ancient document, pursuant to Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, since it was executed on 27 June 1920. As such, proof of its due execution and authentication could be dispensed with, according to the appellate court. Hence, this petition.

1. Whether or not the respondents have rights over the lots owned by Dionisio Galang as successors-ininterest of Galang’s sisters

No. The court upheld the decision of the Trial Court and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals on the ground that the said affidavit is a sufficient or support for what is alleged by respondents as a partition among Dionisio and his now deceased sisters. It does not, as correctly stated by the trial court, amount to anything insofar as the two lots involved. The Court, likewise, agree with the trial court that in the a bsence of definite proof establishing respondents' link/relationship to their alleged predecessors-in-interest, i.e., the Galang sisters, they do not have any cause of action, and the suit for partition must necessarily fall. They failed to establish their connection or relationship with any of these five sisters save for their unfounded averment that they are indeed descendants and heirs of these deceased individuals.

Ownership Digest

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