Topic: Permissibility of the death penalty According to Vann Der Haag (1983), a punishment should condemn any undesirable actions involving the violation of other’s life, liberty or property, and sc aled with respect to the seriousness of the crime. A penalty should also ac cord with ‘man’s dignity,' which is undermined when it involves the inessential infliction of pain and the lack of respect for the criminal (Pugsley, 1981). Therefore, an appropriate punishment should be one that successfully denounces illegal actions, is proportionate to the gravity of the crime and does not infringe on human dignity.
Thesis: Pojman's argument that the death penalty is permissible on the basis that death penalty is the only appropriate response to murder is largely u nconvincing. The supporting reasons are:
(1) Death penalty as a uniform response to all forms of murder as suggested by Pojman fails to account for individual circumstances and motivations behind each murder, thus leading to the meted punishment being insensitive to the severity of the crime (Brooks, 2012). (2) Punishments such as life imprisonment without parole are more appropriate responses to murder as these punishments better reaffirm the idea of showing respect to the convicted criminal as a human being and recognition of his human dignity while remains appropriatel y harsh. (Pugsley, 1981) (3) Death penalty as the sole mean to condemn acts of murder will concurrently send a wrong signal to the public that killing is the only acceptable way and permissible p ermissible under certain situations and hence would not fulfill the condemning purpose of the punishment, deeming the punishment inappropriate. (Simonovic, 2012)
Reason (1) Brooks (2012) refutes the argument that the death penalty should be handed out o ut to all murderers. He argues that most murders occurred in the heat h eat of passion, in the p resence of mitigating and aggravating factors. He furthered this argument by emphasizing the contrast between murders that are premeditated or committed for personal profits or motives and murders executed in an instant of overwrought emotions. While conceding that both cases did involve the killing of an individual, he asserts that the latter does not deserve the death penalty as much m uch as the former case, being not entirely responsible for the crime committed, or may be committed unintentionally. Since both forms of murder are arguabl y different in scales and complexity, Brooks objects to a death penalty penalt y for both cases, which breaches the concept of proportionality upheld in punishments.
Reason (2): Pugsley (1981) rejects the claim that the death penalty is the only appropriate punishment for murder as provided by Pojman. He argues that the death penalty, as a punishment, has eradicated the ability for an individual to continue living, and hence violated their fundamental right to living, which is representative of the innate and extremely pivotal ‘human dignity.' He emphasizes on the worth of each life, regardless of the deed that the individual committed, is absolute and perpetual. Through detailed analysis of the various retributivist argument provided by Kantians, he concluded that states should always prioritise individuals’ rights, including the right to life, over benefits towards the community. He thus strongly con demns the idea of the death penalty as a punishment, deeming it to negate an individual’s human dignity and moral worth to the utmost extent, as well as infringing on the primary membership of the individual in the community, even when the most humane execution is imposed. Pugsley went further than merely suggesting that death penalty is impermissible to recommend the use of punishments such as life imprisonment. He strongly believes that only through such punishments will the convicted murderer preserve his membership to the society while showing due respect to the criminal as a responsible moral agent. He accentua tes that life imprisonment, while being proportionate to the severity of the crime committed, will not inflict inessential physical suffering as death penalty did.
Reason (3): Simonovic (2012) opposes the idea of using the death penalty to convey the message to the public that killing is wrong. INstead of achieving the intended outcome, he argues that state killing will backfire by lending legal authority to the dangerous idea of killing being a permissible approach to counter violence. He does this by explaining how death penalty sends a message that killing is dependent on individuals’ distribution of power and whether is it of greater interests for the society to kill. He then points ou t the significant difference between the act of condemnation and a ‘barbaric reaction to a barbaric act which sustains the cycle of violence’, and deems the death penalty to be the latter, an act that continues the perpetuation of violence in the society. He strongly stresses that state-killing is always ‘cold, calculated and premeditated,' and should be abolished in favor of punishments that are ‘life-affirming instead of life-ending,' which could more successfully decry the act of murder.
Reference List: Brooks T. (2012). Punishment . United Kingdom, UK: Routledge Conrad, J. P., & Van D. H. (1983). The Death Penalty: A Debate. New York, NY: Plenum Publishing Corporation Feser E. (2011). Punishment, Proportionality and the Death Penalty: A Reply to Chris Tollefsen. Public Discourse. Retrieved from http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/10/4126/ Ivan Simonovic (2016). In United Nations Human Rights (2016). Death Penalty and the Victims. New York, NY: United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner. Leisor B. (1986). The Death Penalty is Permissible. In Pojman P. L. (2006). Philosophy: The Quest for Truth (pp. 593-598). New York, NY: Oxford University Press Pugsley, R. A. (1981). A Retributivist Argument Against Capital Punishment . New York, NY: Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law
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