OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS OF THE SANGGUNIAN
By: Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr.
Internal Structure of The Sanggunian
Internal Structure of The Sanggunian
Sanggunian Committees • The manner of selecting the Chairman and Members of various committees is through election. election. (Sec. 50, LGC) • The majority can prepare a list and the sanggunian can vote to approve it, provided this is indicated in the IRP. • DILG Opinion No. 112-98 (09-07-1998)
Ex-Officio members and the selection of committee chairs • SK Chairmen and Punong Barangays are non-partisan. • Thus, they cannot participate in the election of officers and the selection of chairmen and members of various committees – because this is mainly dependent on the majority and minority party affiliation in the sanggunian. • However, these ex-officio members are assured of the chairmanship of the corresponding sectors that they are representing in the sanggunian, that is, the youth and barangay affairs, respectively. • DILG Opinion No. 112-98 (09-07-1998)
Can the vice mayor chair a committee?
• NO. • The vice-mayor may chair a special committee created for a special purpose (DILG Opinions Nos. 2431992; 156-1994) but cannot head a regular committee. (DILG Opinions Nos. 243-1992; 29-1993)
What is quorum? majority • “A of all the members of the sanggunian who have been elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum to transact official business…” (Section 53, LGC)
What is meant by “majority”?
• 50% plus one of the entire membership of the sanggunian; • The closest number to more than one-half of the total membership of the sanggunian; (La Carlota City vs. Atty. Rex Rojo, G.R. No. 181367, April 24, 2012)
Is the vice-mayor included in the determination of quorum? • Yes. The Vice Mayor is a member of the sanggunian. • He will thus be included in the total number of sanggunian members for purposes of determining quorum. (DILG Opinion No. 28-2000, dated 17 April 2000; La Carlota City vs. Atty. Rex Rojo, G.R. No. 181367, April 24, 2012)
Determining Quorum • 19 members = 19/2 = 9.5 + 1 = 10.5 • The quorum for a sanggunian with 19 members is therefore “10” • 11 members = 11/2 + 1 = 6.5 • The quorum for a sanggunian with 11 members is therefore “6” (DILG Opinion No. 60-2004, dated 19 July 2004)
Vote Required in Sessions
• Ordinary measures shall be decided by a simple majority of the members present at any meeting there being a quorum. • (DILG Opinions Nos. 26-1996; 183-1994)
Two-Thirds (2/3) Vote Required • Extending Loans or entering into contracts; • Issuance of bonds or securities; • Authorizing the lease of public property; • Grant of franchises; • Creation of LGU liability or indebtedness; (DILG Opinion No. 1072003, dated 15 August 2003)
Two-Thirds (2/3) Vote Required • • • •
Over-ride the veto of the Mayor; Grant of Tax exemptions; Levy of taxes; Discipline / suspend a member of the sanggunian; • Opening or closing of roads; • Selection and transfer of gov’t site or offices; • Concurrence in the appointment of personnel; (DILG Opinion No. 107-2003, dated 15 August 2003)
Regular v. Special Session • Regular session is that indicated in the IRP as the usual day of meeting. Notice may be dispensed with and o t h er m at t er s n o t i n t h e ag e n d a may be discussed. • Special session is any other session outside of the regular schedule. It may be called by the local chief executive or a majority of sanggunian members. • Notice required. Only matters in the agenda may be discussed.
Can a Sanggunian agree to a recess of two weeks or more? • NO. Section 52 of the LGC provides that the MINIMUM number of regular sessions SHALL be ONCE A WEEK. • Under Section 53 of the LGC, a recess is valid only for a short period of time or when there is no quorum. • A recess of two weeks or more is invalid even if approved by a majority of the sanggunian because it will violate section 52 of the LGC. (DILG Opinion No.104-2002, July 17, 2002)
Requisites for a Valid Special Session • There must be a CALL for a special session either by the mayor or a majority of the sanggunian; • Written notice of the special session must be personally served upon all sanggunian members at their usual place of residence; • The notice must be served AT LEAST 24 HOURS BEFORE the special session. (DILG Opinion No.76-2002, May 13, 2002)
Vice-Mayor as Presiding Officer • Being the presiding officer of the council, a vice-mayor is considered a regular member of the local legislative council concerned, (DILG Opinion Nos. 138, 342 - 1992; 81-1995)
• But a vice-mayor acting as mayor cannot preside over the council until the mayor reassumes his/ her position since this will violate the local separation of powers. (Gamboa v. Aguirre) • In such situation, the senior councilor may preside. (DILG Opinions Nos. 142, 174 - 1994)
Presiding Officer as member • As presiding officer, he can only vote to break a tie; • As a member, he may participate in the deliberations, vote, sponsor or co-author a bill or chair a special committee. • He/ she may temporarily relinquish his/ her chair -- as presiding officer -- to the majority floor leader or to any sanggunian member . (DILG Opinion No. 65-1995)
• If he will participate in the session as a member, he may choose the temporary presiding officer. (DILG Opinions Nos. 29, 132 1993)
Temporary Presiding Officer
• In case of temporary absence of the presiding officer, the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer. • He shall certify within 10 days from the passage of ordinances / resolutions adopted by the sanggunian in the session over which he temporarily presided.(Art. 102-IRR, LGC)
Permanent vacancy: Presiding Officer
• In case of permanent vacancy in the position of vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member will succeed as vice mayor /presiding officer. • The vacancy shall be filled by the other members of the sanggunian in accordance to their ranking. (Section 44, LGC)
Permanent vacancy: sanggunian
• In case the permanent vacancy was caused by a member who belongs to a political party, the party will nominate and the president will appoint the replacement; • If he does not belong to any political party, the other members of the sanggunian will nominate and the president will appoint the replacement. Section 45, LGC
Sanggunian Secretary • The secretary to the sanggunian is a career public official with rank and salary equal to a head of a department. (DILG Opinions Nos. 91, 253, 286 - 1992; 781995;) • A sanggunian secretary shall automatically continue in office despite the lapse of 3-year terms of elective officials unless otherwise removed for cause. (DILG Opinion No. 176-1992)
Appointment of Sanggunian Secretary
• It is the vice mayor , not the mayor, who is authorized to appoint the secretary to the sanggunian (CSC En Banc Resolutions Nos. 94-7153 December 29, 1994, 92-111 August 20, 1992; DILG Opinions Nos. 348-1992; 7, 155, 236, 245 - 1993; 85-1995) with the concurrence of the sanggunian concerned. (DILG Opinion No. 8-1995)
• Q: Under the Local Government Code, what are the prohibitions against the practice of other professions? • A: • 1. Local Chief Executives (governors, city and municipal mayors) are prohibited from practicing their profession; • 2. Sanggunian members may practice their profession, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours; • 3. Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work in cases of emergency provided that they do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
• Under the Local Government Code, can the members of Sanggunian engage in the practice of law? • A: GR: Yes. • XPNs: • 1. Cannot appear as counsel in any civil case where in a local government unit or any office, agency or instrumentality of the Govt. is the adverse party; • 2. Cannot appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local Govt. is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office; • 3. Shall not collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceeding involving the LGU of which he is an official; and • 4. May not use property and personnel of the Govt., except when defending the interest of the Govt.
Temporary vacancy: Mayor • A mayor may designate in writing an officer-in-charge (e.g. councilor, any appointive official or employee) to assume the office but only for three (3) days. • On the 4th day, the vice-mayor assumes the post regardless of the nature of the absence of the mayor . (DILG Opinions Nos. 22, 30, 87-A - 1993; 52, 53 - 1994)
• Henceforth, the designation of the officer-incharge ceases. (DILG Opinion No. 87-A – 1993)
Powers: Acting Mayor • A vice-mayor acting as mayor possesses the powers incidental to the office, including the authority to solemnize marriages, during the period of temporary incapacity (DILG Opinion No. 25-1994) • An acting mayor can exercise the power to appoint and to discipline only after the lapse of 30 working days from the time the mayor is temporarily incapacitated. (CSC En Banc Resolution Nos. 94-0959 February 15, 1994, 94-6892 December 20, 1994)
Acting Mayor CANNOT: • administer oaths (DILG Opinion No. 136-1994); • the power to approve or disapprove ordinances and resolutions enacted by the council (DILG Opinion No. 149-1993); • preside over council sessions (DILG Opinions Nos. 270-1992; 142, 174 -1994); • appoint, suspend or dismiss employees within 30 days except when the cause of the temporary incapacity of the mayor is suspension for more than 30 days.
Is the signature of the Vice mayor on an enacted ordinance necessary?
• No. Section 469 (c)(3) of the LGC provides that enacted ordinances must be certified by the presiding officer before they are submitted to the mayor for his approval. • However, any presiding officer may certify an enacted ordinance. (DILG Opinion No. 16-2005, dated 15 Feb. 2005)
May an ordinance become valid even without the signature of the mayor?
• Yes. If he fails to act on an ordinance submitted to him for his review within 10 days from his receipt thereof; • When the sanggunian overrides the veto of the mayor by 2/3 vote . (DILG Opinion No. 22-2003, dated 27 Feb. 2003)
Veto Power by the Punong Barangay
• By express provision of law, a punong barangay has no power to veto ordinances approved by the sangguniang sangguniang barangay. • This is so since he is a member of the sanggunian. • Thus, the action of the sanggunian binds the punong barangay and all that remains for him to do is to sign and implement said ordinances. • DILG Opinions Nos. 128-1995; 15-1996
POLICE POWER
May an LGU alter the zoning classification of a portion of its territory and order the transfer of businesses located therein?
• Yes. The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality. • Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr., 517 SCRA 657 (2007) and 545 SCRA 92 (2008)
SAMPLE PROBLEM An aggrieved resident of the City of Manila filed mandamus proceedings against the city mayor and the city engineer to compel these officials to remove the market stalls from certain city streets which they had designated as flea markets. Portions of the said city streets were leased or licensed by the respondent officials to market stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance. Decide the dispute.
S u g g e s t ed ed A n s w er :
The petition should be granted.
In accordance with Macasiano v. Diokno. 212 SCRA 464 [1992], since public streets are properties for public use and are outside the commerce of man, the City Mayor and the City Engineer cannot lease or license portions of the city streets to market stallholders.
May an LGU prescribe a central terminal for public utility vehicles within its territory? terr itory?
• No. Since the compulsory use of the terminal would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive. • Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc., 452 SCRA 174 (2005)
May an LGU regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction?
• No. Regulation of CATV subscriber rates is lodged in the NTC, not LGU‘s. • LGUs, likewise, have no authority to grant franchises for such undertakings. • Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 439 SCRA 326 (2004)
May an LGU enact an ordinance to phase out motels, night clubs, and other establishments to protect public morals?
• NO. Businesses may only be regulated but cannot altogether be prohibited. • Simply because there are no ‗pure‘ places where there are impure men.‖ • That these motels and clubs are used as venues for prostitution is of no moment. sexual immorality may take place in the most innocent of places • City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 455 SCRA 308 (2005)
May an LGU regulate the short time periods and wash rates of motels, to protect public morals? • NO. ―Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. • However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. • The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. • The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and rentingout a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions. • White Light Corp., vs. City of Manila, 576 SCRA 416 (2009)
May an LGU validly use public funds to undertake the widening, repair and improvement of the sidewalks of a privately-owned subdivision? • In May 1999, the City of Marikina undertook a public works project to widen, clear and repair the existing sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subd. • It was assailed as an illegal use of public funds. • The SC ruled that subdivision streets belong to the owner until donated to the government or until expropriated upon payment of just compensation. • The use of LGU funds for the widening and improvement of privately-owned sidewalks is unlawful as it directly contravenes Section 335 of RA 7160. • Albon v. Fernando, 494 SCRA 141 (2006)
LGU Power to Grant License to Cockpits • It is the sanggunian bayan concerned alone which has the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks within its territorial jurisdiction. • Nevertheless, while the sanggunian retains the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits, its discretion is limited in that it cannot authorize more than one cockpit per city or municipality, unless such cities or municipalities have a population of over one hundred thousand, in which case two cockpits may be established. a, 45 2 S CR A 53 (2005) • Tan v . Per eñ
Can the Governor Issue Small-Scale Mining Permits? • NO. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7076, which took effect on 18 July 1991, approval of the applications for mining permits and for mining contracts are vested in the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. • Composed of the DENR representative, a representative from the small-scale mining sector, a representative from the big-scale mining industry and a representative from an environmental group, this body is tasked to approve smallscale mining permits and contracts.‖ • Considering that the governor is without legal authority to issue said mining permits, the same permits are null and void.‖ • C al an z a v . P ap e r In d u s t r i e s C o r p o r a t i o n o f t h e Phi lip pi n es (PICOP), 586 SCRA 408 (2009)
Consultation and Sanggunian Approval for Infrastructure projects • ―Section
27 – Prior Consultations Required --- No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2(c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained…‖
Can a Sanggunian prohibit the operation of Lotto in their LGU? • NO. Section 27 of the LGC applies only to national programs and/or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. • Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the national government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO. • Besides, the PCSO charter is statute. ordinance cannot amend or modify a statute. • Lina vs. Pano, 364 1 SCRA 76 (2001)
An
If the MMDA seeks to establish a sanitary landfill in an LGU, is the prior approval of the Sanggunian Bayan required? • YES. Section 27 of the LGC mandates two requisites that must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. • Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project‘s implementation is illegal.‖ •
, 477 SCRA 436 (2005) Prov inc e of Rizal v. Execu tive Secretary
EMINENT DOMAIN
EMINENT DOMAIN 1. An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor, 334 SCRA 127 (2000) 2. Section 19 of the LGC requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of eminent domain. Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, 328 SCRA 137 (2000) 3. A valid and definite offer to acquire the property is necessary prior to the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The offer must not be accepted. Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. vs. Municipality of Pasig, GR 152230, August 9, 2005
Procedure for Eminent Domain
• • • •
•
The land must be a private property; It must be for a public purpose; There must be genuine necessity; There must be a previous valid and definite offer to buy the private property in WRITING. It shall specify the property sought to be acquired, the reasons for the acquisition, and the price offered. The offer is denied or rejected;
Procedure for Eminent Domain •
If the owner rejects the offer, the LGU can then file a complaint for expropriation in the RTC.
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The LGU must then deposit the amount equivalent to 15% of the f a ir m a r k e t v a l u e of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration.
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The LGU may then enter the property.
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The Court will determine the amount of just compensation for the property expropriated.
May an LGU expropriate a property for the benefit of a specific homeowners association? • NO. A local government unit cannot use the power of eminent domain to expropriate a property merely for the purpose of providing a sports and recreational facility to a small group of persons, such as those belonging to homeowners‘ association. • ―Where the taking by the State of private property is done for the benefit of a small community which seeks to have its own sports and recreational facility, notwithstanding that there is such a recreational facility only a short distance away, such taking cannot be considered to be for public use. Its expropriation is not valid.‖ • Masikip v. City of Pasig, 479 SCRA 391 (2006)
May an LGU expropriate a property to provide a right-of-way to a specific community? • In this case, a barangay sought to expropriate private lands to secure a right-of-way for residents of a subdivision. • The SC declared that the failure of the subdivision owner to provide an access road does not shift the burden to barangay itself. • To deprive the private persons of their property instead of compelling the subdivision owner to comply with its obligation under the law is an abuse of the power of eminent domain and is patently illegal, which misuse of public funds for a private purpose could amount to a possible case of malversation. • B a r an g a y S i n d a la n , S an F er n a n d o , P am p a n g a v . C o u r t of A pp eals, 518 SCRA 649 (2007)
TAXATION
• Q: Define taxation. • A: It is an inherent power by which the sovereign: • 1. through its law-making body • 2. raises income to defray the necessary expenses of government • 3. by apportioning the cost among those who, in some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and, therefore, must bear its burdens. (51 Am.Jur. 34) • Note: Simply stated, the power of taxation is the power to impose burdens on subject and objects within its jurisdiction.
• Q: In order to raise revenue for the repair and maintenance of the newly constructed City Hall of Makati, the City Mayor ordered the collection of P1.00, called “elevator tax”, every time a person rides any of the high-tech elevators in the City Hall during the hours of 8am to 10am and 4pm to 6pm. Is the elevator tax a valid imposition? • A: No. The imposition of a tax, fee or charge or the generation of revenue under the Local Government Code, shall be exercised by the Sanggunian of the local government unit concerned through an appropriate ordinance [Sec. 132, LGC]. The city mayor alone could not order the collection of the tax; as such, the “elevator tax” is an invalid imposition.
• Q: Who determines the legality or propriety of a local tax ordinance or revenue measure? • A: It is the Secretary of Justice who shall determine questions on the legality and constitutionality of ordinances or revenue measures. • Such questions shall be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction (RTC). (Sec. 187 R.A. 7160)
Is the MIAA subject to real property tax? • NO. MIAA is not a GOCC but an ―instrumentality‖ of the National Government, and, (b) the real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax. • What about the collection of terminal fees and other charges? (Mactan Cebu vs. Judge Marcos, 1996) • ―The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. • ―The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are devoted to public use and thus are properties of public dominion. As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are outside the commerce of man.” • MIAA vs. CA, 495 SCRA 591 (2006)
Is the GSIS a GOCC, therefore subject to real property tax? • NO. GSIS is not a GOCC but an ―instrumentality‖ of the National Government. GSIS‘ capital is not divided into unit shares. Also, GSIS has no members to speak of. • The real properties under GSIS’s name are likewise owned by the Republic. The GSIS is but a mere trustee of the subject properties which have either been ceded to it by the Government or acquired for the enhancement of the system. • This particular property arrangement is clearly shown by the fact that the disposal or conveyance of said subject properties are either done by or through the authority of the President of the Philippines. • GSIS v . City Treasu rer, 23 December 2009 • NOTE. This overturns the ruling in City of Davao v. RTC, 467 SCRA 280 (2005), wher the SC declared the GSIS liable for real property taxes.
LGU Power to Impose Franchise Tax • In this case, Smart, contends that its telecenter in Davao City is exempt from payment of franchise tax to the City, because its franchise (R.A. No. 7294 [1992]) includes the clause ― in lieu of all taxes” ( §9). • Smart alleges that the ―in lieu of all taxes‖ clause in its franchise exempts it from all taxes, both local and national. • The Local Government Code, which allowed the imposition of franchise tax by LGUs, took effect 2 months ahead of Smart‘s franchise. • The SC ruled that the ‗in lieu of all taxes‘ clause applies only to national internal revenue taxes and not to local taxes. • S m a r t C o m m u n i c a t i o n s , In c . v . C it y o f D av a o , 56 5 S CR A 237 (2008)
On The Grant of Tax Incentives • Article 282 of the Implementing Rules of the LGC provides:
• The tax incentive shall be granted only to new investments in the locality and the ordinance must prescribe the terms and conditions that must be complied with; • The grant of tax incentive shall be for a definite period not exceeding one (1) year ; (BLGF Opinion dated 31 January 2003)
On The Grant of Tax Incentives • Article 282 of the Implementing Rules of the LGC provides:
• The grant of tax incentive shall be by ordinance passed prior to the first (1st) day of January of any year; and • Any tax incentive granted to a type or kind of business shall apply to all businesses similarly situated.
Tax on Jeeps and Buses • An LGU cannot impose a tax on the gross receipts/income of public utility vehicles (Section 133-J, LGC);
• However, an LGU can impose a business tax on operators of PUV‘s maintaining booking office, terminal or waiting stations wihin its territory provided that the tax is based on the number of units of vehicles.(BLGF Opinion dated 28 April 2003)
May the Sanggunian investigate the local water district? • Yes. A local water district is a government-owned and controlled corporation. (OGCC Opinion Nos. 2681995). Its employees, however, are covered by the Civil Service Law. • It is an offspring corporation of the local government forming it, to operate basically as a public utility for public service. (LWUA Opinion September 21, 1995).
3% in-lieu shares from the local water district • ―In-Lieu Shares. --- As an incident to the acquisition of the existing water system of a city, municipality, or province, a district may enter into a contract to pay in lieu of taxes on such utility plant, an annual amount not exceeding three (3%) percent of the district‘s gross receipts from water sales every year.‖ (Sec. 30-b, PD 198)
Power of Sanggunian to dissolve local water district • “If the local water district refuses to enter into a contract with the LGU for the payment of in-lieu shares, the Sanggunian may cause its dissolution, thru the LWUA, and the LGU may then take-over its operations.” (LWUA Opinion unnumbered January 19, 1995)
Oversight on Contracts
What are the conditions under which a local executive may enter into a contract in behalf of his government unit? a. The local government unit must have the power to enter into the particular contract. a. Pursuant to Section 22(c) of the Local Government Code, there must be a prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned; b. If the contract involves the expenditure of public funds, there must be an appropriation therefore and a certificate of availability of funds by the treasurer of the local government unit. c. The contract must conform with the formal requisites of written contracts prescribed by law.
• Q: What documents must support the contract of sale entered into by the LGU? • A: • Resolution of the sanggunian authorizing the local chief executive to enter into a contract of sale. The resolution shall specify the terms and conditions to be embodied in the contract; • Ordinance appropriating the amount specified in the contract • Certification of the local treasurer as to availability of funds together with a statement that such fund shall not be disbursed or spent for any purpose other than to pay for the purchase of the property involved. (Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. vs. Municipality of Pasig, G.R. No. 152230, August 9, 2005)
• Q: Can the Annual Budget be used as continuing authority for the LCE to enter into contracts without prior authorization from the Sanggunian? • A: NO. • Sec. 22 of the LGC states: ―Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned.‖ • Should the appropriation ordinance, however, already contain in sufficient detail the project and cost of a capital outlay such that all that the local chief executive needs to do after undergoing the requisite public bidding is to execute the contract, no further authorization is required, the appropriation ordinance already being sufficient. • Quisumbing vs. Gov. Garcia, G.R. No. 175527. Dec. 8, 2008.
Basic Rules on Government Contracts
• The absence of any of the three legal requirements — an appropriation law, a certificate of appropriation and fund availability, and public bidding — renders any contract entered into by the government as void from the beginning. • Sections 46, 47 and 48, Chapter 8, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
First Requisite: Appropriation Law • The Administrative Code of 1987 expressly prohibits the entering into contracts involving the expenditure of public funds unless two prior requirements are satisfied. • First, there must be an appropriation law authorizing the expenditure required in the contract. • Second, there must be attached to the contract a certification by the proper accounting official and auditor that funds have been appropriated by law and such funds are available. • Failure to comply with any of these requirements renders the contract void.
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First Requisite: Appropriation Law • Section 46, Chapter 8, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
• ―SECTION 46. Appropriation Before Entering into Contract. — (1) No contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefore, the unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is sufficient to cover the proposed expenditure;
2nd Requisite: Availability of Funds • Section 47, Chapter 8, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides: • ―SECTION 47. Certificate Showing Appropriation to Meet Contract. — … no contract involving the expenditure of public funds by any government agency shall be entered into or authorized unless the proper accounting official of the agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into the obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current calendar year is available for expenditure on account thereof …‖
Effect of Non Compliance • Section 48, Chapter 8, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
• ―SECTION 48. Void Contract and Liability of Officer. — Any contract entered into contrary to the requirements of the two (2) immediately preceding sections shall be void, and the officer or officers entering into the contract shall be liable to the Government or other contracting party for any consequent damage to the same extent as if the transaction had been wholly between private parties.‖
• Q: Is Public bidding required when LGUs enter into contracts? • A: Yes, in the award of government contracts, the law requires competitive public bidding. It is aimed to protect the public interest by giving the public the best possible advantages thru open competition. It is a mechanism that enables the government agency to avoid or preclude anomalies in the execution of public contracts. (Garcia vs.Burgos, G.R. No. 124130, June 29, 1998)
• Q: When is there a failure of bidding? • A: when any of the following occurs: • There is only one offeror • When all the offers are non-complying or unacceptable. (Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privatization, G.R. No. 112399 July 14, 1995 )
• Q: Can a municipal contract be ratified? • A: No, when the local chief executive enters into contracts, he needs prior authorization or authority from the Sanggunian and not ratification. (Vergara vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 174567, March 12, 2009)
Oversight on Appointments
What is the period for the Sanggunian to concur on appointments? • When an appointment is presented before the sanggunian for its concurrence, that sanggunian is mandated to act thereon within fifteen (15) days from the date of its submission (Sec. 463, Ibid). • The word "act" in said provision means either expressly to concur or not to concur on the appointment upon determining whether or not the appointee possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for the said office (DILG Opinion No. 40, s. 2000). • For as long as the appointee possesses the required qualifications and none of the disqualifications, it is a ministerial duty which the law enjoins on the part of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to concur your appointment.
When is the appointment deemed effective? • Appointment to a public office becomes effective only once it is completed. • The Supreme Court, in the case of Atty. David B. Corpuz vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 123989 dated January 26, 1998, held that where the assent or confirmation of some other offices or body is required, the appointment may be complete only when such assent or confirmation is obtained.
Hiring of Consultants • Can the Mayor hire consultants for the LGU without prior authorization by the sanggunian? • No. The hiring of a consultant requires the execution of a consultancy contract or MOA with a prescribed payment for the contracted services by the LGU. • Under Section 22 (c) of the LGC, the mayor can neither enter into this contract nor hire consultants without prior authorization from the Sanggunian. (DILG Opinion No. 40-2003 dated 26 March 2003)
Can The Vice Mayor Hire Consultants • Yes. But he must first be authorized by the Sanggunian to enter into the Consultancy contract (Section 22-C, LGC). • Under Section 456 of R.A. 7160, there is no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor. • Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the city is strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting it. • The ordinance is valid only for a specific period and with a specific contract. (ARNOLD D. VICENCIO VS. HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR, ET AL. , G.R. NO. 182069. JULY 3, 2012)
May LGU’s hire elected officials or government employees as consultants? YES. Pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 11 of CSC Memo Circular No. 40 dated 14 December 1998, consultancy services are not considered government services and no employer-employee relationship exists between the LGU and the consultant.
Thus, the position of consultant cannot be considered as an appointment or designation in any capacity to a public office or position. Also the honorarium received from such consultancy agreement cannot be considered double or additional compensation since no employeremployee relationship exists. (DILG Opinion No. 26 s. 2001 dated 16 April 2001)
May LGU’s hire private counsel? In the case of R a m o s v s . C A (108 SCRA 728), the Supreme Court declared that a private lawyer cannot represent a local government unit even if the services rendered was gratis. Moreover, in the case of Edg ar Manc enid o , et. al., v s. C o u r t o f A p p e al s (330 SCRA 419), the Supreme Court stated that an LGU may only hire a private attorney when the provincial fiscal is disqualified. However, the LGU may hire a private lawyer as a legal officer under a consultancy agreement, duly approved by the local sanggunian. Such sanggunian resolution will clothe him with the authority to act as the legal officer of the LGU. (DILG Opinion No. 26 s. 2004 dated 03 February 2004)
Is the rule prohibiting midnight appointments applicable to local governments?
• Sales vs. Carreon 515 SCRA 597 (2007) • Here, what is involved is the appointment of 83 employees by the outgoing mayor during his last month in office. • The incoming mayor revoked such appointments on the ground that they are midnight appointments. • The SC held that the constitutional ban on midnight appointments applies only to presidential appointments and NOT to local governments. • In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.
Quirog vs. Aumentado, GR No. 163443, 11 November 2008
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Outgoing Bohol Provincial Governor Rene L. Relampagos made 97 permanent appointments, including Liza M. Quirog as Provincial Government Department Head of the Bohol Provincial Agriculture Office on 28 May 2001 (two weeks after he lost the elections and 30 days before the end of his term). Incoming Governor Erico Aumentado revoked all the appointments on the ground that they were null and void for being midnight appointments. The CSC and the CA affirmed the revocation on the ground that CSC Resolution No. 010988 specifically prohibited outgoing local chief executives from making appointments after the elections and until the end of their term.
Quirog vs. Aumentado, GR No. 163443, 11 November 2008
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WAS THE REVOCATION VALID? NO. The Supreme Court held that there is no law prohibiting outgoing local chief executives from making appointments after the elections and until the end of their term.
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The said CSC Resolution No. 010988 was issued only on June 4, 2001. Evidently, the appointments made prior to said date should not have been subjected to the requirements under said resolution, as its application is against the prospective application of laws. Having no provision regarding its retroactive application to appointments made prior to its effectivity, CSC Resolution No. 010988 must be taken to be of prospective application.
Nazareno et al. vs City of Dumaguete G.R. No. 181559. 2 October 2009 • Petitioners Nazareno et al. (103 employees) were appointed and promoted by the out-going Dumaguete City Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo in June 2001, after he had lost the May 2001 local elections and 30 days before he vacates the office. • On 2 July 2001, the newly-elected Mayor Agustin R. Perdices announced that he would not honor the appointments made by former Mayor Remollo, instructing the City Administrator Dominador Dumalag Jr. to direct the Asst. City Treasurer Erlinda Tumongha to refrain from making any cash disbursements for payments of petitioners‘ salaries and salary differentials. • On 1 August 2001, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Field Office in Dumaguete City revoked and invalidated the petitioners‘ appointments and promotions for being in violation of CSC Resolution No. 010988 dated 4 June 2001.
Nazareno et al. vs City of Dumaguete G.R. No. 181559. 2 October 2009 • WAS THE REVOCATION VALID? • Yes. The Supreme Court held that while there exists no constitutional prohibition against mass appointments by defeated local government officials prior to the end of their term, being the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has the statutory authority to establish rules and regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism. • In order to ―discourage, nay, even preclude, losing candidates from issuing appointments merely for partisan purposes thereby depriving the incoming administration of the opportunity to make the corresponding appointments in line with its new policies‖.
BUDGET Oversight
Who prepares the budget? • The Local Development Council (LDC) prepares the Local Development Plan (LDP) (Section 109, LGC); • The sanggunian will then approve or disapprove the LDP thru a Resolution (Section 114, LGC); • The LDP will then be submitted to the mayor, who may approve or veto the same (Section 55, LGC); • The approved LDP will then be submitted to the Local Finance Committee (LFC) for budget preparation (Art. 410, IRR, LGC); • The proposed budget will be submitted by the local chief executive to the sanggunian for enactment into an ordinance. (Section 316, LGC) (DILG Opinion No. 1372003)
Can the Sanggunian reduce the proposed budget? • Article 415 of the IRR states that: "the local sanggunian may not increase the proposed amount in the executive budget nor include new items except to provide for statutory and contractual obligations but in no case shall it exceed the total appropriations in the executive budget". • Considering that the only prohibition is against any increase, the sanggunian may reduce the executive budget proposed by the LCE, provided, however, that the requirements as well as the general limitations in the use of govt funds provided for under Sections 324 and 325 of the Code are complied with.
Is there any penalty for an LCE who fails to prepare and submit the annual budget on time?
• Yes. Pursuant to Sec. 318 of R.A. No. 7160, an LCE who fails to submit the budget on or before October 16 of the current year shall be subject to such criminal and administrative penalties as may be provided by the Local Government Code and other applicable laws.
What is the period for enactment of the annual budget • Under Section 323 of the LGC, If the sanggunian fails to enact the annual budget after ninety (90) days from the beginning of the fiscal year, the ordinance authorizing the appropriations of the preceding year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the ordinance authorizing the proposed appropriations is passed by the sanggunian concerned. • However, only the annual appropriations for salaries and wages of existing positions, statutory and contractual obligations, and essential operating expenses authorized in the annual and supplemental budgets for the preceding year shall be deemed reenacted and disbursement of funds shall be in accordance therewith.
What is the period for the review of the budget?
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The LGU budget should be reviewed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within 30 days upon receipt of the appropriation ordinance from. (Section 56, LGC)
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If no action is taken, the ordinance is deemed approved.
• Action taken means approval or disapproval. Referral to a committee is not a proper action. •
DILG Opinion No. 17-2004 (09 February 2004)
Effectivity of Budget • Section 320 of the LGC, provides that: • The ordinance enacting the annual budget shall take effect on the ensuing calendar year. • An ordinance enacting a supplemental budget, however, shall take effect upon its approval or on the date fixed therein. • The review of the budget by the sangguniang panlalawigan is not a requisite for validity or effectivity. (DILG Opinion No. 90-2000 dated 21 August 2000)
Supplemental Budget • No ordinance providing for a supplemental budget shall be enacted except: • (a) when supported by funds actually available as certified by the local treasurer, which shall refer to the amount of money actually collected during a given fiscal year that is over and above the realized estimated income of that year; or • (b) in times of public calamity by way of budgetary realignment to set aside appropriations for the purchase of supplies and materials or the payment of services which are exceptionally urgent or absolutely indispensable to prevent imminent danger to, or loss of, life or property, in the jurisdiction of the LGU or in other areas declared in a state of calamity by the President. (Art. 417, IRR).
Intelligence Fund • Section 325(h) of RA 7160 provides in part that ". . . annual appropriations for discretionary purposes of the local chief executive shall not exceed two percent (2%) of the actual receipts derived from basic real property tax in the next preceeding calendar year. • Pursuant to DILG Memorandum Circular No. 99-65 to determine the amount to be utilized for intelligence and confidential purposes, it shall be based on the: (a) 30% of the peace and order allocation, or 3% of the annual appropriations, whichever is lower. "
Budget Limitations • For LGUs, the budget limitations for Personal Services (PS) is provided under Section 325 (a) of the Local Government Code (RA No. 7160), which sets the limit of 45 percent, in case of first to third class provinces, cities and municipalities; • And 55 percent, in case of fourth class or lower, of the total income from regular sources realized in the next preceding fiscal year.
• Q: What is the difference between the suability and liability of the Local Government? • A: Where the suability of the state is conceded and by which liability is ascertained judicially, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to satisfy the judgment or not. (Municipality of Hagonoy Bulacan vs. Hon. Simeon Dumdum, G.R. No. 168289 March 22, 2010)
• Q: May LGU funds and properties be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy judgments against them? • A: No, The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. • Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriations as required by law. • The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects. (Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68514, December 17, 1990)
• Q: What is the exception to the above stated rule? • A: The rule on the immunity of public funds from seizure or garnishment does not apply where the funds sought to be levied under execution are already allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the money judgment against the government. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes. (City of Caloocan v. Allarde, G.R. No. 107271, September 10, 2003)
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS OF THE SANGGUNIAN
• Q: Where should an administrative complaint against elective officials be filed? • • A: A verified complaint shall be filed with the following: • Office of the President – against elective official of provinces, HUC, ICC, component cities. • Sangguniang Panlalawigan – elective officials of municipalities; and • Sangguniang Panglunsod or Bayan – elective barangay officials. (Sec. 61, LGC)
What are the grounds to discipline local officials? • 1. Disloyalty to the Republic; • 2. Culpable Violation of the Constitution; • 3. Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty; • 4. Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor; • 5. Abuse of Authority; • 6. Unauthorized Absences for 15 consecutive days (3 consecutive sessions); • 7. Acquisition of foreign citizenship or status of an immigrant in another country; • 8. Such other grounds. (Section 60, LGC)
Power to Discipline • A Sanggunian may only discipline erring subordinate officials. • A council cannot, by mere resolution, remove a local chief executive. Such power is exercised by a higher council. (DILG Opinions Nos. 281-1993; 38-1995) • A vice-mayor, despite his/ her unauthorized absences, remains to be vice-mayor and may not be disciplined by his own Sanggunian. (DILG Opinion No. 179-1994)
Contempt Powers of the Sanggunian • A sanggunian cannot cite in contempt a person who fails to appear before it since there is no law which authorizes local legislative councils from doing so. (DILG Opinion No. 3-1994) • Neither can it issue compulsory processes. Thus, a local legislative council cannot compel attendance in committee hearings. (DILG Opinion No. 212-1993)
How should the Sanggunian try disciplinary cases? • Cases involving barangay officials must be commenced by filing a formal notarized complaint before the Sanggunian. • The appropriate Committee will conduct a preliminary study and its report will then be heard by the whole Sanggunian. • The Sanggunian will then conduct hearings. • A Decision will then be prepared containing a summary of the facts and the issues resolved. (Malinao vs. Reyes G.R. No. 117618 March 29, 1996)
Procedures in disciplinary cases? • Within 7 days after the complaint is filed, the Sanggunian shall send a Notice to the respondent requiring him to submit his answer within 15 days from his receipt of the Notice; • The Sanggunian will then commence the investigation within 10 days from receipt of respondent’s answer. (Section 62, LGC)
Abuse of Authority as a ground for disciplinary action • Local government officials who pass ordinances or resolutions which are contrary to law may be disciplined for abuse of authority. (DILG Opinion No. 90-1994)
• Local officials are presumed to be knowledgeable of existing laws. (OGCC Opinion No. 093-1996 March 29, 1996)
• Incurring excessive cash advances constitutes abuse of authority and/ or dishonesty. (DILG Opinion No. 60-1994)
Gross Negligence as a ground for disciplinary action • Refusal of a mayor to honor and enforce ordinances duly enacted by the Sanggunian is gross negligence.(DILG Opinion No. 181-1994) • Failure to attend council sessions due to members’ drinking sprees amounts to gross negligence. (DILG Opinion No. 157-1994)
Gross Negligence as a ground for disciplinary action • The members of the sangguniang panlalawigan may be disciplined if they fail to act, on review, the ordinances enacted by the sangguniang bayan. (DILG Opinion No. 157-1994) • A vice mayor who refuses to sign ordinances approved by a majority of the sanggunian is guilty of gross negligence or abuse of authority (DILG Opinion dated 28 June 2011).
Absences as a ground for disciplinary action. • Absence for more than 15 consecutive days without the filing of a formal leave of absence constitutes a ground for disciplinary action. • Travel abroad without due notice to the council constitutes unauthorized absence. (DILG Opinion No. 24-1993)
May the Sanggunian suspend a sanggunian Secretary or other appointive official?
• No. The power to discipline appointive officials is lodged with the Civil Service Commission only. • However, the local chief executive, as head of agency, may impose disciplinary sanctions on appointive officials after due process. (DILG Opinion No. 132-2003)
Preventive Suspension • This is not a penalty. • This may be imposed by the Sanggunian on any elected subordinate official immediately upon filing of the complaint even before the answer is filed; (DILG Opinion No. 132-2003)
Procedures for Preventive Suspension
• This may be imposed by the mayor / governor upon recommendation by the Sanggunian; • Maximum of 60 days per case but not exceeding 90 days suspension in one year; • The suspended official is deemed automatically reinstated after the period of suspension (Section 63, LGC)
Preventive Suspension • The authority of the local chief executives (Governor/Mayor) to impose preventive suspension is purely ministerial since the disciplinary authority over erring municipal or barangay elective officials is the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan, as the case may be. • Hence, after the sanggunian shall have determined the necessity to warrant the imposition of preventive suspension, the same only need to be implemented by the local chief executive concerned. (DILG Opinion No. 56-11, Sept. 2, 2011)
Salary During Preventive Suspension
• An elected official preventively suspended from office shall receive no salary during such suspension; • But upon reinstatement, he shall be paid full salary including all emoluments accruing during such suspension. (Section 64, LGC)
Penalty of Suspension • An elected official may be suspended by the Sanggunian for a period of not more than six (6) months; • This can only be imposed after due notice and hearing; • The investigation must be terminated within 90 days from the start of the proceedings. • The sanggunian must decide the case within 30 days after the case is submitted for decision. (Section 66, LGC)
C an a l o c a l s a n g g u n i a n r em o v e an e lec te d o f fi ci a l o f t he L G U?
• NO. The Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the removal of an erring elective barangay official from office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this power under Section 60 of the Local Government Code. • THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BARANGAY DON MARIANO MARCOS vs. MARTINEZ, G.R. No. 170626 March 3, 2008
• Q: What is the Doctrine of Administrative Condonation? • A: • The rule that public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer‘s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefore. • Note that this has no application to pending criminal cases. (Aguinaldo v. Santos, G.R. No. 94115, Aug. 21, 1992)
• Q: When is subsequent re-election considered a condonation? • A: If the decision of the administrative disciplinary authority penalizing the respondent local elective official had become final and executory before the election, then the principle of condonation for a misconduct during a prior term will not apply. • On the other hand, if the said adverse decision against the respondent was not yet final and executory on the day of election as for instance there was a timely and pending appeal on said date, then the principle of condonation will apply. (Malinao v Reyes, GR 117618 Mar.29, 1996) • Note: Subsequent re-election cannot be deemed a condonation if there was already a final determination of his guilt before the re-election. (Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120905 March 7, 1996)
May the Sanggunian continue hearing a case even after the respondent has been re-elected to office? • No. An administrative case becomes moot and academic as a result of the expiration of term of office of an elective barangay official during which the act complained of was allegedly committed. • Further, proceedings against the respondent are barred by his/ her reelection. (Malinao vs. Reyes G.R. No. 117618 March 29, 1996)
May the Sanggunian hear a case involving acts committed in a prior term?
• No. A public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term since his re-election to office operates as a condonation or forgiveness of his previous misconduct. (Aguinaldo v. Santos) (DILG Opinions Nos. 177-1992; 42, 107 - 1995)
May the Sanggunian hear a case when the respondent already resigned?
• No. A Sanggunian loses jurisdiction over administrative proceedings against a barangay official who has already resigned since official relations have been terminated by such act. (DILG Opinion No. 323-1992)
Signature of the Mayor • The decision of the Sanggunian to suspend a brgy. Official DOES NOT REQUIRE THE SIGNATURE OF THE MAYOR TO BE VALID; • The mayor, however, will be the one to implement the penalty of suspension; • The mayor cannot sit on the decision or refuse to implement the suspension. • If he does, he can be charged with abuse of authority or dereliction of duty. (DILG Opinion No. 14-2002; Opinion No. 9-2004)
May the Mayor veto a decision of the sanggunian? • The decision of the Sanggunian to suspend a brgy. Official IS NOT A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THEREFORE IT IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE VETO POWER OF THE MAYOR. • The power to discipline brgy. officials is an exercise of quasi-judicial power that is exclusive to the sanggunian. (DILG Opinion No. 19-2002; Opinion No. 9-2004)
Q. Is appeal available in administrative disciplinary cases? A: It depends on the penalty imposed: Appeal is available if the penalty is: Demotion, Dismissal, or Suspension for more than 30 days or fine equivalent to more than 30 day salary (P.D. 807, Sec.37 par [a]). Appeal is not available if the penalty is: Suspension for not more than 30 days Fine not more than 30 day salary Censure; Reprimand; or Admonition Note: In the second case, the decision becomes final and executory by express provision of law.
M o t i o n f o r Rec o n s i d e r at i o n
• A brgy. Official suspended by the Sanggunian may file a motion for reconsideration – but this will not stay the execution of the suspension. • The decision of the sanggunian in disciplinary cases is immediately executory even pending appeal. But the reviewing authority may issue a stay order pursuant to its review authority. • The decision of the sanggunian bayan may be appealed to the sangguniang panlalawigan. (Section 66, LGC)
S tay o f E x ec u t i o n • The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an "appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory." • As worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision. • There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed order. • The execution of decisions pending appeal is procedural and in the absence of a clear legislative intent to remove from the reviewing officials the authority to order a stay of execution, such authority can be provided in the rules and regulations governing the appeals of elective officials in administrative cases. • Berces v. Guingona, G.R. No. 112099. February 21, 1995.
Q. Will the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration or an appeal stay the execution of a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case?
Answer: No. Appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases do not stay the execution of the penalty imposed. This is pursuant to Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman which explicitly states that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. No vested right is violated because pending appeal the appellant is considered as preventively suspended and will be paid backwages in case he wins in his appeal. (Fac u ra, et al., v . CA , GR No . 166495, Feb . 16, 2011)
