Organized Crime Series

Organized Crime in Mexico March 11, 2008 | 2337 GMT

Summary Organized crime in Mexico centers on drug trafficking into the United States and the control of the most lucrative trade routes. As long as the drug trade thrives, organized crime in Mexico will continue. Analysis Related Link 

Mexican Drug Cartels: The Net Assessment MEMBERS-ONLY PODCAST

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Tracking Mexico’s Drug Cartels

Organized crime in Mexico is centered on the transit of illegal drugs into the United States. In essence, Mexican organized crime groups are supply chain entities, competing for suppliers in Central and South America, rapid and low-friction transit routes in Mexico and across borders and consumers in the United States. Competition among the major Mexican cartels is about geography — access ac cess to and control of the most lucrative trade paths. This competition leads to wars between cartels, which can spill over into the civilian population. The cartels generally try to avoid co nfrontations with law enforcement and the military in Mexico and instead seek to mitigate their security risks through bribery, extortion, threats and incentives. The trafficking of illegal drugs through

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Mexico generates billions of dollars a year, and the Mexican cartels launder this money through construction and real estate companies, small businesses and restaurants and hotels and money exchanges. In many ways the cartels are personality-dependent — controlled by family groups and subject to rapid disintegration or disruption when the leadership is killed or imprisoned. However, leadership vacuums are filled quickly as the cartels continue working to take over lucrative drug routes.

History Organized crime in Mexico has a long history. Outlaw gangs with limited power in northern Mexico existed as far back as the nineteenth century. Through the 1960s, the main organized criminal element along the U.S.-Mexico border involved small smuggling operations. These groups had limited reach and resources. As the popularity of cocaine grew in the United States in the 1970s, criminal organizations began to gain much more power and influence on o n a national level. This rise in power accelerated in the 1980s as the United States government moved to shut down the Caribbean smuggling corridor, primarily run by Colombian drug traffickers, which had served as the primary route of drugs into the United States through the 1970s. In response to this move, drug traffickers began using Mexico Mex ico as a transshipment point for U.S.-bound cocaine, as the country represented the path of least resistance to the movement of contraband. It was during this time that Mexican cartels evolved into the powerful organizations they are today. Changes in the cartels’ standing and composition can be described most accurately as a system of shifting and adjusting alliances inside Mexico, though outside factors such as the death or arrest of a leader leade r have also played a role in shaping the fate of individual groups.























Geography Organized crime exists in nearly every corner of Mexico. Small local street gangs involved in a variety of crimes, including robbery, theft, extortion and kidnapping, can be found in every city. However, it is the country’s c ountry’s drug cartels — extended criminal organizations with a monopoly on the drug trade — that hold the real power, and these criminal organizations tend to be concentrated in specific geographic locations. Several cartels have also begun to establish e stablish logistics and criminal networks in the United States in order to facilitate the movement of contraband into and out of Mexico. Mexican cartels have not yet established a significant presence in Central or South America — the former being of only minimal value to the drug supply chain, the latter (i.e., Colombia) already under the sway of South American organized organ ized crime — relying instead on criminal groups in those areas to transport drugs to be moved through Mexico. Mexico’s location between the world’s largest producer and the world’s largest consumer of cocaine makes it a natural n atural transshipment point for narcotics. Mexico’s location became even more important for drug traffickers due to the U.S. government’s increased efforts to shut down air and maritime routes in the Caribbean smuggling corridor. Within Mexico, the areas under cartel control generally g enerally correspond to routes used to ship drugs from South America to the United States S tates and shipment channels for precursor chemicals and pirated goods from China. Whether or not a region is of strategic importance to the movement of drugs is the primary factor determining the likelihood that it will come under the control of o f a major cartel. Areas of cartel concentration concen tration are the area along the U.S. border; coastal port cities on the Pacific Ocean, Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea; and cities and towns located on federal highways between these points. Mexico’s large cartels are not as concentrated in the remainder of the country, including Mexico City and much of the country’s co untry’s central and southern interior.























(click image to enlarge) While some South American drugs come into Mexico on land at the Guatemalan border, most are shipped via air or boat along two main routes. The first route enters the Yucatan Peninsula by either remote airstrips or the port of Cancun and then goes across the border into Texas by land, air or sea along the Gulf of Mexico. The second route enters the country via port cities in Guerrero and Michoacan states and then goes either inland or along the Pacific coast toward the U.S. border. Historically, the largest and most powerful drug cartels in Mexico have been based in northern Mexico, but most importantly, they have all established control over entry points into the United States (which is to say the cartels have established predominance and have bribed police, immigration/customs officials and government officials in towns at these entry points). These groups have based their operations out of large to mediumsized Mexican cities located along the U.S. border: the Arellano Felix Organization in Tijuana, the Juarez cartel in Ciudad Juarez, the Gulf cartel in Reynosa. The one exception has been the Sinaloa federation, which is based out of Sinaloa state, approximately 500 miles south of the Arizona border. Drug cartels that have developed in southwestern Mexico have never achieved achieve d the same amount of power po wer as their northern counterparts, which control the final step in the supply chain of drugs moving north. One way to describe the territorial control of these groups is to divide Mexico into cartel “states.” With its capital city in Reynosa, the Gulf cartel’s territory includes Tamaulipas state, the eastern portion of Nuevo Leon state and much of Veracruz state. It controls two main port cities — Veracruz and Tampico — and shares a land border bo rder with the United States. The Sinaloa federation’s capital city is Culiacan, while its territory includes























Political Structure One or two cartels with the most power tend to control Mexican organized crime at any given time. Currently the Gulf cartel and the Sinaloa federation control the bulk of the drug trade, though this has not always been the case. The Juarez cartel and the Arellano Felix Organization have each occupied the top spot in the past. Both of these organizations lost power after their leaders were captured or killed in fighting with each other or the government, and other groups moved in to take over territory. Occasionally a top-ranking cartel will reach out to its rival to form a truce or an alliance. These agreements are generally motivated by business concerns and are u sually short-lived. The Mexican drug trade simply involves too much money and too many volatile personalities for such agreements to be honored for very long. There is a better track record for mergers and partnerships between small and mediumsized criminal organizations as a way to expand expan d territory. The mergers with the greatest success involve combining organizations with distinct geographic areas of responsibility (such agreements were important in the Sinaloa federation’s formation and rise to power). On a smaller scale, large cartels often establish partnerships with local gang s to assist in the cartel’s mission. These gangs are tasked with a range of duties, including kidnapping, drug distribution, security, intimidation and assassinations. Drug cartels in Mexico have a hierarchical leadership structure, with some of the largest cartels controlled by members of a family. The leadership structure in most Mexican organized crime groups shows sophistication and efficiency. Many criminal activities are compartmentalized, with particular groups focusing on specific duties. Top cartel management is based primarily on geography. High-ranking and an d mid-level members known as gatekeepers take responsibility for cartel activities in a specific c ity or state. There appears to be little oversight as to how gatekeepers choose to manage their territories, as long as they succeed with the overall business plan. The top-down approach makes the cartels vulnerable, however, as the death or arrest of a key leader can collapse the entire chain of relationships. Mexican cartels interact differently with their suppliers and their distributors. One person or a handful of individuals in the cartel with the appropriate contacts handle South American suppliers; the same appears to be true for coordinating ephedra shipments from China. On the other hand, distribution networks involve a relatively larger number of people, though a small number of Mexican organized crime members hand off the shipments to distribution teams in the United States, which have a better understanding of the lay of the land north of the border. The movement of drugs over long distances requires not only a great deal of coordination, but also official complicity. An important part of cartel management, then, involves























Economics Drug trafficking is the most profitable organized criminal business in Mexico. It is estimated that up to $25-$30 billion worth of o f illegal drugs comes through Mexico into the United States each year. A wide range rang e of illegal substances enter the United States from Mexico, though the primary ones are cocaine, heroin, marijuana and methamphetamines (meth). Most cocaine and heroin shipments originate in other countries and pass through Mexico on the way to the United States, meaning that the proceeds must be shared between Mexican traffickers and foreign producers. Marijuana and meth, however, are produced in large quantities inside Mexico, which means that Mexican cartels receive a higher portion of the sales profits. Marijuana crops are cultivated in rural areas throughout western Mexico, while meth is mass produced in large production laboratories, whose operation has been facilitated by bulk bu lk shipments from China of ephedra, a precursor chemical in the production of the drug. Other organized criminal activities are widespread but do not generate nearly as much money as drug trafficking. These activities include kidnapping, extortion, human trafficking, and weapons trafficking. In general, the major ma jor drug cartels do not rely on these activities as a major source of income, but rather use them in a limited way in order to supplement drug profits or as a way to support the overall organization. Smaller organized crime groups often rely on these activities as primary income sources, but their income pales in comparison to that of o f the large drug trafficking organizations. The Arellano Felix Organization, for example, has begun to diversify its criminal activities and rely more heavily on kidnapping for ransom in order to fund itself. After it lost access to Colombian cocaine sources, the cartel continued to move marijuana and meth, but also expanded its activities outside of the drug trade. Drug cartels go to great lengths to conceal the movement of drug money. As drug money makes its way back to the source of supply it passes through a network of money mone y laundering operations which often use front companies compan ies on both sides of the border to cover for the transfer of large sums of money. Popular Pop ular front businesses include real estate companies, hotels, currency exchange houses, ho uses, automotive sales companies, restaurants and other small businesses. In some cases drug traffickers have kept large amounts of money in bank accounts in the United States or Caribbean or European countries.

Security The largest criminal organizations in Mexico employ between 500 and 1,000 well-armed security “enforcers,” who work exclusively for the cartel that hired them. Enforcers are generally well-disciplined fighters with law enforcement or military backgrounds. Many elite enforcer units are capable of deploying dep loying to anywhere within Mexico within 24 hours. Cartels also hire on contract small local gangs to perform specific tasks in a particular

























Cartel enforcers perform several duties, including protective security of high-ranking members, escorting valuable shipments of contraband and carrying out assassinations of rivals or government officials. They are armed primarily with small arms, including handguns, assault rifles, grenades, rocket-propelled grenades and lightweight anti-tank rockets. The majority of weapons for enforcers are smuggled into Mexico from the United States. It is believed that properly outfitting a single enforcer costs between $5 00 and $1,000 annually. Some enforcers are loyal to an individual cartel leader, but most are loyal to their operational commanders. As long as the enforcers e nforcers are paid well, they will continue working for their cartel; however, there have been cases (though rare) of entire enforcer groups switching sides in the middle of a cartel war if the other side offers more money. Currently, the Gulf cartel and the Sinaloa federation are engaged in a war to conquer territory and weaken each other. The two cartels are fairly equally matched, and the fighting has taken place both in disputed areas and in territories firmly under cartel control. There is little that is unique about this situation, as conflict is the nature of the drug business in Mexico. At the same time, the cartels are battling a crackdown by government security forces. This government operation is unique; never before has the Mexican government deployed so many military and federal law enforcement forces on a counternarcotics mission for such an extended period of o f time. The operation has so far had h ad both positive and negative results, including a decreased flow of cocaine into the United States and a record number of killings. Cartels generally engage in warfare by conducting targeted assassinations, both of rivals and of security forces. Most targeted killings are preceded b y surveillance of the target and often involve a kidnapping before execution so that the enforcers have a chance to interrogate the victim. Occasionally a group of cartel en forcers ambush police or army patrols or buildings. Most attacks on buildings have a specific purpose, such as to free a cartel member that has been detained.























connections are an important aspect of Mexican organized crime. Relatives of cartel members are often used to launder drug money, and cartel leaders have been known to provide financial support to the families of members who we re captured or killed while performing services for the cartel. Prison life is another important aspect of cartel culture. Many lasting criminal relationships are formed in prison, and having done do ne prison time in the United States is also an important rite of passage for many organized criminal elements in Mexico.

Dependence on the Drug Trade There are two important conditions for Mexican organized organ ized crime to survive in its current form. The first is the survival of the drug trade — specifically a high demand for illegal drugs in the United States. The second secon d is Mexico’s use as a transshipment point for U.S. bound drugs. There is currently no indication that either of these conditions will change anytime soon, though this second one is likely to change before the first one. Any change in the supply route of drugs toward the United States will have a profound impact on the future of Mexican organized crime. If, for example, the Caribbean smuggling corridor should reopen, Mexican drug cartels would no longer be competing just for control of territory within Mexico; they would be competing aga inst drug traffickers operating alternative routes. Consequently, Mexican cartels will no longer have a corner on the drug market, and will end up losing a great deal of the power that they currently hold. Even in this scenario, organized crime in Mexico will by no means disappear. Other profitable criminal activities such as kidnapping and human trafficking will be around for the foreseeable future. Regardless of how developed develope d these criminal enterprises might become, however, they would not come close to providing the money and power Mexico’s drug cartels currently enjoy.























Organized Crime in Russia April 16, 2008 | 1847 GMT

Summary Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian organized crime flourished. Russian industry fell into the hands of corrupt oligarchs who worked with organized criminals to secure their hold on nearly every aspect of the Russian state. President Vladimir Putin has worked to reassert central control over a stronger Russian state, but he realizes that























A Brief History of the Russian Mafia Russia’s history, like that of many other nations with such stature, is largely cyclical. Russia’s historical cycle runs roughly as follows: Catastrophe strikes the centralized state and the social order is shattered; a “white rider” c omes along to pick up the pieces piece s and restore power to the state, only to come up short and yield to a “dark rider” willing to do whatever is necessary regardless of moral implications; and an era of decline follows until the next catastrophe strikes and the cycle c ycle begins anew. Related Links   

Russian Organized Crime The Risks of Operating in Russia Organized Crime in Mexico

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Terrorism/Security Russia

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Putin’s Consolidation of Power The Russian Resurgence

As the power of the centralized state changes during the cycle, other actors a ctors — whether internal or external — prey upon Russia when it is weak and cooperate with Russia when it is strong. Organized crime is just as beholden to Russia’s historical cycle, with its power inversely related to the power of the state. When the Russian state is in a crisis, c risis, organized crime spreads and becomes the functioning arbiter of state affairs. Once power is restored to the state, organized crime never fully disappears but recedes into the background, usually cooperating to some degree d egree with the state, until another catastrophe























infiltrated the highest ranks of the Communist Party. The vory were allowed to buy goods outside of the Soviet Union and operate smuggling routes in return for supplying the Communist Party with foreign luxury items, which were given as rewards for good behavior within the party. By the 1990s, Russia found itself again in a crisis of state authority that nurtured the expansion of organized crime. After the Soviet S oviet system collapsed, organized crime exploded, filling every state and nonstate void. Since laws concerning property and asset control were not enforced following the collapse, those who took advantage of the situation acted with impunity. Organized criminals’ internal and external connec tions from their days of operating under the Soviets ensured en sured they gobbled up the oil, o il, gas, mineral and telecommunications industries; their smuggling routes (later to become supply chains) let them exploit these assets for financial gain. The organized crime bosses and their colluding political contacts from the Soviet Sov iet era helped to create the enormously powerful oligarchs of Russia’s chaotic post-Soviet era. Some oligarchs were former politicians, some were former criminals and some were well-connected businessmen operating in the gray area. The oligarchs worked with organized crime, either because they had to in order to conduct business or because crime was their business strategy. Following the collapse, basic government functions — such as social security, the pension system, some electrical grids, dispute settlement and the distribution and protection of property — either disappeared or were hopelessly ho pelessly inefficient. Government workers were woefully underpaid or even cut from the payrolls. Thousands of ex-KGB officers left the state and joined the organized crime network. This increased the amount of security that Russian organized crime could provide and also gave it access to state assets controlled by the KGB. Without a functioning state police to ensure the well-being of Russia’s citizens and their property, the oligarchs were left to their own devices but — along with their organized criminal associates — profited from the vo id the Soviet Union left behind. In 1994, then-President Boris Yeltsin called Russia “the b iggest mafia state in the world,” referring to “the superpower of crime that is devouring the state from top to bottom.” Enter the white rider again. By the time Putin came to power in 1999, the organized

























Smuggling Routes and International Connections Russia’s unique geographical position is both a boon bo on and a curse for those operating within the country. Russia is at the intersection of Asia, Europe and the Middle East, giving it access to some major markets and producers. The country’s sheer size and position mean that any agent operating within Russia, be it organized crime, railroads or the Federal Security Service, can access a number of strategic areas while staying relatively close to “home base.” On the other o ther hand, its expansiveness also means that Russia is paranoid about its vulnerability on many fronts. The Russian mafia has been able ab le to take advantage of o f Russia’s position in the Eurasian heartland much as the Soviet Union did in the 20th century. The Russian mob (concentrated in Moscow) is able to work with suppliers and clients in East Asia and the opium-rich Golden Crescent through the former Soviet states in the Caucasus Cau casus and Central Asia. It can smuggle goods to and from the Middle East and send commodities to and from the European and American markets ma rkets through ports on the Baltic and White seas. However, its sheer size, location and harsh conditions make Russia difficult to navigate. Any entity that seeks to control this land mass must be very well organized and have a wealth of resources to coordinate on all fronts. Russian organized crime’s resurgence speaks volumes to the effectiveness of its network and its access to resources.























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Korean criminal groups active in rural Korea, dealing in drugs, extortion and illegal fishing; Turkish drug traffickers serving as a gateway for drugs traveling between Asia and Europe; La Cosa Nostra (“Our Thing”), the Sicilian mafia; N’dranghetta, an Italian crime outfit based primarily out of Calabria; Camorra, an Italian criminal organization operating out of Naples and the Campania province; and

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Colombian drug cartels, individual drug trafficking groups that usually focus on cocaine.

Crime and Business: From Black Market to ‘Free Market’ Russian organized crime has interests in virtually every market and sector. Many factors contribute to organized crime’s expansiveness in Russia, but the way in which it developed is what makes it a ubiquitous economic force in the country. The Soviet system stifled competition and allowed the politically connected criminals to thrive; the post-Soviet system opened up endless possibilities for free-market-thinking criminals in Russia. Since they already had dozens of years of experience supplying the Soviet elite with illegal goods and operating illegal private businesses, b usinesses, and since the smuggling























business (represented by the oligarchs) and organized crime did not properly exist. That is why, once the dust of the 1990s privatization bonanza settled, assessing blame and accountability was (and remains) so difficult. Members of the government and civil services and organized crime bosses used their power and wealth to secure Russia’s lucrative assets — thus forming the Russian oligarchy that controlled the fledgling private sector. Oil, gas, minerals, telecommunications, weapons systems (thanks to the KGB) and many other state-owned assets were sold off to oligarchs who had special relationships with the government and who were linked to organized crime. The oil industry, Russia’s most promising money maker, was corrupted by oligarchs who cheated c heated investors (including the Russian government, Western countries, the International Monetary Fund and many more) by selling oil at below-market prices to holding compa nies that they owned, which then turned around and sold the oil abroad at market prices. Such deals enriched private businessmen at the expense of the Russian government, tipping the balance of power away from the state. With the Russian state all but bankrupt, organized crime bosses and networks aligned themselves with the new holders of Russian power: the oligarchs. Organized crime continued to grow, thanks than ks to the activities of the oligarchs operating in a legal gray area. Overall, organized crime began focusing more on financial crimes, which were more profitable and less damning than violent crimes. The United States and Europe Eu rope were very attractive markets. Organized criminals set up front companies and formed partnerships with foreign banks to defraud investors and launder their earnings. They























The marriage of business and organized crime is illustrated in the case of Semyon























percent for additional “services,” such as physical protection of their prope rty and even suppression of competitors in the area. Cooperating with an organized crime entity to do business is illegal, but without cooperation, there is no business; choosing not to pay the mob can lead to very draconian punishments. punishments. In 2000, an estimated 80 percent of businesses in Russia paid protection fees to the Russian mob. This type of parallel state regulatory system scares many foreign businesses away and has hurt foreign investment in Russia, giving Putin a major incentive to go after organized crime.

The Structure of the Mob The term “Russian organized crime” is a loose one. It comes from the fact that the primary node of the criminal network’s modern incarnation is the Moscow mob. The Moscow mob is a highly politically connected umbrella organization that oversees a network of criminal groups bound together by at least one of the following factors: ethnicity, family ties and geography. These disparate groups receive support from the Moscow mob in the forms of political cover, money and organizational oversight. It is not like traditional Italian mafia groups that have a clear, delineated hierarchy; rather, it is a network of influential kingpins, semi-autonomous bosses and gangs willing to contract their services. Organized criminals often lose or gain power depending on political conditions in Moscow, making it difficult to identify a “head” of Russian organized crime. At the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian Interior Ministry estimated that there were 100,000 criminals working for 5,000 to 8,000 Russian organized crime gangs operating throughout the world.

























neighborhoods. Other gangs rule entire cities, such as the Uralmash boys who ruled over the southern city of Yekaterinburg, 900 miles southeast of Moscow. This group essentially took over the Ural Machine Factory (from which it got its name) and from there expanded into telecommunications, utilities and co pper processing. The Uralmash boys took over a great deal of the Yekaterinburg economy and eventually went into politics. Those involved in Russian organized crime c rime are usually very highly educated. In the early e arly 1990s, the state was unable to retain the brightest in the country because it simply did not have the money. However, organized crime outfits did have the money to employ these highly skilled professionals. Many organized criminals hold master’s degrees or doctorates and are very rational thinkers. They do not choose crime because they are necessarily bloodthirsty or power hungry; in Russia during the 1990s, crime was simply the most lucrative business.























dependable protection from politicians was no longer available, so the organized criminals and oligarchs had to protect themselves. The most efficient and effective form of security came from organized crime, thanks in large part to the involvement of former KGB agents. Security itself became a commodity that organized crime could provide to those who could afford it. And, eventually, nobody could afford not to have mob provided security. The mob used its monopoly on security as extortion. This led to the existing situation in which businesses pay the mob for protection.

Putin’s Crackdown on the Mafia The Russian organized crime network derives much of its protection and success from political patrons in the Duma. Organized crime in Russia strengthened with Soviet political cooperation, and, with the exception exc eption of some turbulent years during the 1990s, it has remained a group effort. However, while the politicians were firmly in control during























unwilling to invest in or cooperate with Russia due to the lack of transparency and uneven regulatory standards that are the result of rampant organized crime. Without investment from foreign companies, regardless of energy windfalls, Russia faces a bleak future. Putin is seeking to restore domestic and foreign trust in Russia’s institutions and economy and reassert control over traditional responsibilities of the state such as security, tax collection and control over o ver the borders. By reasserting control over the state and strengthening it, Putin can regain control over the state’s assets and correct the imbalance that has favored organized crime recently.

The Mob’s Vulnerabilities As powerful and pervasive as organized crime is in Russia today, it faces challenges that stem from its rapid growth. Russian organized criminals’ international activities have













































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Organized Crime in Russia Organized Crime in Mexico

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Italy

Editor’s Note: This piece is part of an ongoing series on organized crime worldwide.

Italy is as famous for organized crime as it is for its cuisine. The main organized criminal groups in Italy are dominated by powerful families and alliances a ssociated with specific regions. Despite the unending competition between families and alliances that hampers

























In the face of global war, the threat of organized crime lost significance. In fact, the Allied forces were aided by underground organized crime members when they landed in Sicily in 1943. After the invasion, the Allies placed Sicilian organized criminals in positions of power. By the end of the war, organized criminals were the only substantial social force without ties to communists or fascists. As a result, they reasserted their social













































faces a double threat; competing for territory with LCN (despite its drop in power, it still controls large swaths of Sicily) and eluding a smarter, less corrupt police force. Whether the ‘Ndrangheta and La Stidda can retain a low-profile and avoid the mistakes that afflicted the LCN and Camorra remains to be seen.













































the heart of business resides in their home region. This is where each group’s power base lies, and due to inter-family rivalries, it is also where each group’s g reatest threat resides. Maintaining power as an Italian organized criminal requires vigilance not just over the complex trafficking arrangements and the flow of money, but also over the threats back







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Both major street-gangs-cum-drug-syndicates operated much like a corporation. The Firm (founded by Colin Stanfield) and the Americans (founded by Jackie Lonte) built themselves up during the 1980s and 90s, merging with, swallowing up or simply stamping out the competitive local gangs. Their business plans called for them to be wholesalers; they both knew that the real money and power in the drug business lay in providing the drug dealers with product and a nd forging partnerships with international drug producers. Stanfield grew his operation and organized its drug activities into sectors, creating a system of what the Institute for Security Studies called “generals” to control areas like Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town and any other market of significance. Local gangs had already taken over many of o f these areas, but instead of battling resistance, Stanfield essentially bought them out. He promised to provide the local gangs with a steady supply of drugs in return for their allegiance (ISS). In this wa y, Stanfield could grow The Firm quickly and pragmatically — invariably making enemies along the way, but getting his way largely through pragmatism. As a testament to his popularity in the Cape Town community, thousands of people from all over Cape Town attended his funeral in 2004; the locals there saw him as more of a community leader and hero than tha n a criminal. While a neat separation into two gang alliances facing off over the control of drugs in South Africa certainly plays well for the media, in reality it was not that simple. When drug wars erupted, allied gangs were expected to cover each other according to their Numbers alliance, but personal and economic interests often overcame national allegiances. Territories and drug shipments were still fought over, and the ephemeral nature of street gangs (very few gangs outlived their the ir creator) made South African crime groups much more complex than the 26s versus the 28s. Furthermore, Stanfield’s death from cancer in 2004 contributed to the instability in South Africa’s 21st-century organized crime environment. The SAPS estimates that there are 10-15 major crime bosses in charge of the street gangs and drug syndicates of South Africa. Another important element of South African organized crime is heist gangs. These holdup and theft gangs might be associated with one of the larger drug dealing syndicates, but for the most part they too are ephemeral. The fierce competition among heist gangs has led to a kind of heisting h eisting elite. The most successful (and thus richest) heist leaders display their wealth conspicuously — wearing nice clothes, drinking drinking expensive imported whiskey and driving nice cars. According to the book Gentlemen or Villains, Thugs or Heroes? by Jennifer Irish, an organized crime expert from the South African Institute of International Affairs, heist gang leaders will advertise their success to show other potential heist members that they are successful and worth building a team around. Lifestyle is a resume in the organized crime world and the more successful one looks, the more others want to work for him and be associated with him.























members may have to put up several thousand dollars each, a barrier that can keep unestablished operatives from joining in. Due to the high security that the heist teams have to overcome, operations (especially those against cash-in-transit trucks) usually involve excessive violence, according to Irish’s book. Expert drivers will run trucks off the road, then someone trained in explosives will blast open the truck while others stand back to provide cover fire. Guards Gu ards are shot and often killed in an effort to get the money. Ironically, more security features have meant more violence. Before major security companies like Chubb and Brinks came to South Africa, cash transits were done in regular cars, and personal vehicles typically did not have ha ve anti-theft systems. But cash now travels in armored trucks, and anti-theft systems come standard with most cars. The result is that criminals now use more violent measures to get their prize. Whereas before, heist gangs could overwhelm a cash-in-transit c ash-in-transit car with handguns and the threat of violence, they now use assault rifles and explosives, a nd many more bystanders are killed as a result. In the case of private vehicles, security systems have led to an increase in carjackings since the criminal now needs the occupant in order to get the car. Measures meant to increase property security have actually decreased p ersonal safety in South Africa, according to Irish’s book. Economically, carjacking, cash-in-transit heists and cargo theft do not compare to the business of drugs. While the drug market puts South Africa on the global radar for heroin he roin and cocaine producers and sellers around the world, the direct effects of heists usually stay closer to home. Stolen goods and money obtained from heists act primarily as currency in the informal markets in Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Botswana discussed above. Heists are also relatively rare. While over 100,000 drug related crime deals took place on the corners all over South Africa in 2007, according to the SAPS, there were 144 bank robberies, 395 cash-in-transit heists and 14,201 carjackings in 2005. But heists are much more visible, violent and perceived as random among the general population. While most heists take place without shots being fired, there are plenty of stories of people being dragged from their cars and shot on the sidewalk as the perpetrator (usually an amateur, for professionals rarely have to use force) drives off to cash in. Both the drug syndicates and the heist gangs are loosely organized and alliances (while generalized by the media into the 26s and 28s) are very amorphous. The low-level, local street gangs are very territorial and will not hesitate to kill people who violate their territory, but mid- and upper-level leadership often coordinate and share resources when needed. Heist gangs are even more nebulous.

Geography Organized Crime in South Africa benefits from the country’s geography on three levels. Globally, South Africa’s position between the Indian Ocean basin and the Western























region. Finally, within South Africa, the legacy of apartheid a partheid shapes the geography of race there. The high levels of inequality inequa lity created a powder keg that went wen t off after the fall of apartheid.

Global Geography South Africa sits rather conveniently at the nexus of the global drug trade. Heroin producing countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Thailand in Asia lie along the Indian Ocean basin to the east of South Africa, while the cocaine producing countries of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia in South So uth America lie to the west. When these two regions trade their wares, South Africa stands to benefit as a middle man. As evidence of South S outh Africa’s popularity among international criminals (and terrorist organizations, too), South African passport forgery is a booming business. In 2004, British authorities uncovered a passport forgery operation in London along with boxes of thousands of forged South African passports. Additionally, South Africa’s colonial past gives it connections to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, two very lucrative drug markets and gateways to the rest of the wealthy countries of Western Europe. South Africa supplements shipments of foreign produced cocaine and heroin to Europe with its own domestically and regionally grown marijuana. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC), southern African countries accounts for 10 percent of global marijuana production. South Africa provides the majority of marijuana to the United Kingdom and is responsible for a large share of marijuana consumed in Europe. Eu rope. Worldwide, South Africa’s share of the marijuana market is growing. The UNODC estimates that a gram of marijuana in South Africa will fetch around $0.20 whereas the same amount will fetch $10-$15 in Western Europe; thus there is financial pressure to export marijuana.























(click image to enlarge) Of course, the Indian Ocean-South American-European trade triangle does not only handle drugs. All kinds of contraband, from stolen cars to abalone (a mussel considered a delicacy in China) follow these routes. Understaffed ports and lack of strict oversight make South Africa even more attractive to transnational criminal groups operating out of China, Russia, Italy, the United States and Colombia.

Regional Geography Regionally, South Africa is an attractive base of operations o perations for criminal groups in nearby Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo and, farther away, Nigeria. Even by world standards, South Africa is an advanced economy with reliable financial and telecommunications services and a redundant transportation infrastructure. Compared to the rest of the countries co untries in sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa has an infrastructure and relative stability that makes the country an economic magnet. While plenty of legitimate businessmen and traders flock to South Africa to run their operations, criminal organizations are attracted there, too. South Africa’s transportation and telecommunications infrastructures and financial services outstrip neighboring countries’. Africa’s busiest seaport is in Durban, and Johannesburg has the busiest airport on the continent. South Africa has redundant road, telephone and high-speed Internet networks that, while not quite as reliable as North America’s or Western Europe’s, far outstrip its neighbors. The biggest international banks operate there, too, and while Barclays, Deutsche Bank and JPMorgan operate all























essential market — both in carrying out their criminal activities and in spending their wealth. Besides the fact that South Africa has become bec ome a regional business and trade hub for subSaharan Africa, migration to the country spiked after apartheid ap artheid when the borders opened up and trade increased as South Africa returned to the international community. There are hundreds of thousands of Nigerians there illegally, and nearly three million Zimbabweans have come to South Africa seeking a more stable home. Certainly not all of these people are criminals, but often low-skilled, impoverished immigrants turn to crime early on and then build upon it, with the successful ones making a career out of it. South Africa’s success has created regional inequality, which has led to a boom in organized crime.

Local Geography Just as South Africa has had to deal with the unintended consequences of regional inequality, it has also had to deal with the very intentionally created domestic inequalities. The geography that was created during 50 years of apartheid has created very wealthy, white neighborhoods next to squalid townships where blacks were forced to live. The policy of apartheid created 10 “Bantustans” — territories declared independent states and set aside by tribal identification by the apartheid South African government, aimed to be a homeland and destination for surplus black labor — that were designated as blackonly areas similar to the U.S. system of Native American reservations. This rigorous segregation was enshrined in the 1950 “Groups Areas Act” that essentially barred blacks and whites from living in the same area. Leaving the Bantustans was tightly restricted by the police, and blacks had to have the proper paperwork in order to leave the area; anyone caught without the requisite “pass book” would end up in jail. Along with the Bantustans were districts and townships. Two of the biggest and most commonly referred to districts are the Cape Flats (the black-only area on the outskirts of Cape Town) and an d Soweto (short for South Western townships), situated accordingly outside of Johannesburg. Inside these zones, the living conditions were miserable. Whole families lived in shelters constructed of mud and whatever materials they could salvage. Education, medical and law enforcement services were well below standard, and blacks were disenfranchised from the political system. In some Bantustans, residents technically even lost their South African citizenship (a measure which was overturned by the ANC when it came into power). In stark contrast, whites lived in comfortable suburbs, and their movements were not restricted. In the townships, poverty fueled high crime rates and indifference from the national police created a demand for security within the townships. Street gangs provided security to youths and used their collective power to steal from others, creating a kind of

























United States; local bars known as shebeens sprouted up all over the townships, initially peddling illegal alcohol. By the 1980s, the role of shebeens expanded and they became much like speakeasies, where locals could come to socialize and get other illegal goods like marijuana and credit. The evolution ev olution of shebeens into the business of credit solidified their illicit nature. Once cash entered the mix, shebeen owners found it necessary to employ street gangs in order to collect their debts and keep other shebeens from encroaching on their territory. Thousands of shebeens existed ex isted throughout the townships in South Africa and, although they existed illegally, police did not always intervene, as they were more concerned with stamping out political opposition, not enforcing alcohol restrictions. The Bantustans created during apartheid in South Africa created a parallel society in the country, and when apartheid ended, ende d, the social effects that came with reintegration mirrored the economic reintegration that occurred in Germany Ge rmany after the fall of the Berlin Wall or the shock that Russia went through after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The magnitude was smaller in South Africa, but years of segregation had shaped the country’s coun try’s geography and demographics and all of that came crashing down when the ANC came to power in 1994 and abolished the Bantustans. All of a sudden, impoverished and angry blacks were free to go wherever they pleased.

International Activity Certainly not all residents in the Bantustans were criminals, and the shebeens by no means had a monopoly on organized crime. White South Africa had its fair share of criminal activity as well. Organized criminals were relied upon to work around the sanctions that were placed on South So uth Africa because of their apartheid policies. La Cosa Nostra boss Vito Palazzolo was offered sanctuary in South Africa after escaping from a Swiss prison in 1986. He helped the South African government bust sanctions and in return was allowed to conduct his criminal activities (largely money laundering) from within the country. Also, members of the government and especially members of the state police were involved in the illegal trades of precious stones from neighboring countries, ivory, weapons and marijuana to support state coffers and supplement their own salaries. By the end of apartheid, few aspects of South African society were not involved in some























was chased out of the country, he supplied weapons from the Soviet Union to arm conflicts in Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone. Once the criminal world in Moscow really got heated up in the mid-1990s, Russian mobsters saw South Africa as an ideal place to launder their earnings. Russians there bought up property and used u sed car dealerships and traded in precious p recious stones. In fact, Bout often accepted precious stones as methods of payment for his arms deliveries, seeing as how many of the countries c ountries he supplied were rich in them. It is likely that he went on to sell these stones to fellow Russians in Johannesburg or Cape Town as a step in their money laundering activities. In the early 1990s, the Indian criminal c riminal boss Dawood Ibrahim was interested in South Africa as a source of cheap labor. In Misha Glenny’s book McMafia, Ibrahim’s network is said to have recruited men from South So uth Africa and put them to work wo rk on the construction sites in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Doha and other oil-rich cities on the Arabian Peninsula. Pe ninsula. Going the other direction was heroin harvested in Afghanistan and Pakistan and shipped out from Karachi, where Ibrahim’s network had considerable power. This trade relationship was not quite slavery (South Africans signed up to go and were paid — not well, but paid nonetheless) but the hopeless situation for blacks in South Africa made this arrangement particularly sinister. Triads, the criminal groups that work out of China, have an interest in the South African abalone supply (and poached products in general). Abalone has been over-harvested in the waters near China, and Chinese suppliers have been forced to look further and further abroad to find stocks of the delicacy. South Africa’s waters still have abalone (for now, at least), and so Triad gangs are attracted to the market there. Neighboring countries coun tries also provide poached products like ivory, shark fins and endangered hides to gangs tied to the Triads operating in South Africa. Nigerians make up a large proportion of criminals in South Africa. While there is disagreement over exactly how they got involved, the relative stability of South Africa was the underlying factor for their success there. Nigerians started trickling into South Africa during the 1980s, but once the restrictive border was opened up after apartheid, ap artheid, immigration from Nigeria boomed. There is even a district of Johannesburg named























Economy Since the fall of apartheid and the incorporation of South Africa back into the international system in the early 1990s, other avenues of prosperity besides crime have opened up to the population. But many in the generation of blacks brought up in the townships under apartheid and illegal migrants from neighboring po or countries still see crime as the easiest way to earn money. Top criminals can pull down hundreds of thousands of dollars a year in a country co untry where the per capita gross domestic product is around $5,400. South Africa’s top criminal c riminal boss — The Firm’s Stanfield — was a millionaire many times over, with investments (both legal and illegal) all over the country. The economy of organized crime in South Africa also requires investment into the community. Criminals who have the support of a township or a whole city (like Stanfield did in Cape Town) are in a much more powerful position than criminals who are simply seen as drug dealers. People who turned out at Stanfield’s funeral in 2004 praised the man for paying their utility bills and providing food and water when times were hard. By paying attention to those who were largely neglected neg lected by the government, Stanfield ensured that when the government came looking for him, it was not likely to get any help from the people he assisted. Stanfield was eventually arrested on tax evasion charges but was only in prison a short while before being diagnosed with cancer and released shortly before his death. Building up the kind of community support that Stanfield had took money. Granted, he was only providing the most basic of services, but he did so for many people. In the end, he earned more money selling drugs than he paid for people’s support, but buying bu ying support most likely cost him a large percentage of o f his holdings. Of course, Stanfield could not just deposit his net ne t earnings at the nearest bank branch and go about his business; laundering the money mone y is the second job that every organized organ ized criminal must take after becoming successful enough to draw attention from law enforcement agencies. Virtually any business venture can be converted into a money laundering operation, but the most attractive outlets are ones that do not attract too much attention and have a high rate of cash turnover so as not to raise suspicion from























base to not raise suspicion. Criminals can also use contacts within credit and debit card facilities in Johannesburg to move cash electronically across borders into secure, offshore accounts. However, the most effective form of hiding illicit economic activity is to rely on the informal economies that make up much of Africa’s economic activity. Like Bout’s weapon/diamond/cash business arrangement, many criminals in South Africa simply trade in illicit goods to get what they need. ne ed. Stolen cars or other goods good s are turned in for illicit drugs which in turn are traded for weapons which buy diamonds which are then sold to indiscriminate jewelers from Tel Aviv, New York and London. By the time cash is handed over for the diamond, the link to the stolen goods is virtually v irtually untraceable.

The Future In February, the ruling ANC moved to disband a special anti-organized crime police force known as the Scorpions. They had been chartered in 1999 as a tool to fight against the country’s raging crime wave and proved successful in their mission. But high-level investigations have led to allegations that the Scorpions have become more of a political tool than crime fighting tool. Their mission will continue, but they will be weakened as a result of being incorporated into the SAPS.























But this does not necessarily mean that organized crime will return to the way it was in the 1990s. Many of the underlying unde rlying factors for the crime wave then are not as potent now. The police force has been integrated and, while still battling corruption, is moving away from its oppressive legacy. Security technology and more private security firms are working to prevent crimes so that the police p olice can focus more on investigating inve stigating and solving crimes. Finally, the inequalities that apartheid created, while certainly not erased, are being corrected. The shock of desegregation after apartheid will take at least a generation to absorb. On the other hand, geography — something South Africa can not change — will remain. While the local level of apartheid geography ge ography discussed earlier does not play as serious a role anymore, global and regional position certainly ce rtainly still do. South Africa’s position between the heroin-producing Indian Ocean basin and cocaine-producing Andes will not change. As South Africa grows richer, domestic demand for drugs will likely increase. As long as there are drugs in South Africa, domestic and foreign gangs alike will be attracted there. Regionally, South Africa still lives in a bad neighbo rhood. The situation in Zimbabwe in particular threatens to stimulate organized criminal activity. Political instability, racial discrimination and a dismal economy all make up u p ingredients for a healthy informal economy run by organized crime groups. South African organized crime groups are positioned well to benefit from the situation, further strengthening their position in southern Africa. Where it can improve the situation, South Africa is certainly taking steps to stem organized crime, but there are still too many factors that are largely out of South Africa’s control that will enable organized crime there to flourish.

























Organized Crime in China August 19, 2008 | 1327 GMT

Summary STRATFOR’s seventh in-depth look at organized crime focuses on China. Unlike in Italy, Russia and Japan, Chinese organized criminal groups have not broken out on the national stage, and instead are extremely localized. Hemmed He mmed in domestically, organized criminal























group from rivaling the central government in any way. Beijing has shown its ability to crush religious, political and militant movements, and has succeeded in preventing organized crime from becoming a nationwide force. Because of this, organized crime in China Ch ina is extremely localized. Groups can control criminal activity in townships by relying on corrupt local politicians. But as soon a s the groups begin to outgrow their localized area, the central government cracks down on them with arrests and harsh penalties. Hemmed in domestically, organized criminal groups in China are forced to go abroad to grow. Their influence is increasing everywhere from the United States to South Africa to the Philippines. These groups traffic drugs, smuggle human cargo and run criminal activities in Chinatowns across the globe.

The History of Chinese Organized Crime Chinese organized crime originated in localized secret societies of rural China. The southeastern province of Fujian was — and is — one such hot spot. It is thought to have been the birthplace of the Heaven and Earth Society — a secret group of Buddhist monks who banded together in the mid-1700s to defend against an emperor who thought the group was too powerful. In Western countries, this group became known as the Triad — a name that reflects the triangular symbol of the Heaven and Earth Society but is now a generic Western label labe l for























During the 1800s, these local gangs entered the opium trade and expanded into other areas of China. Due to the physical size of China, the central government had (and still has) trouble exerting its control over the entire country. Efforts by the central authorities to stamp out criminal groups tended only to scatter the gangs –- ironically, helping spread their influence well outside Fujian. By the early 20th century, the most successful criminal organizations were operating in Shanghai.























jurisdictions, the Green Gang and Du operated op erated all over the city. His universality in the city was an important strength that made governments an d businesses beholden to the Green Gang. In 1923, Du allied the Green Gang with Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist movement to put down communist forces in Shanghai. He also helped Chiang defend Shanghai against the Japanese when they invaded in 1937. But, ultimately defeated by the communists, the Green Gang scattered. Mao Zedong’s takeover in 1949 sealed the fate of a great majority of organized criminals in China. Criminals fled Shanghai and China for Hong Kong and Macau, while some followed Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan, where they re-established their criminal enterprises. None of these successors reached the level of organization, wealth or influence of the Green Gang attained during the early 20th century in Shanghai.

Economy Organized crime in China virtually disappeared under Mao’s rule. Any rival to the central state was unacceptable, and most experienced criminals had fled China and were now operating on its periphery. The opium trade dried up, gambling was outlawed and subversive groups were disbanded under the threat of death. China under Mao closed up, and having been burned b urned by foreign involvement in the past, p ast, removed itself from foreign dependencies. By 1975, starvation and economic stagnation led to plummeting living standards. The stability that Mao had intended to impose on China from the center via various isolationist measures began to unravel and produc e destabilizing forces. Poverty and starvation now trumped foreign interference as the major threat to the government.























townships take responsibility for their economic activities. The result was an economy less regulated by the central government, but still very connected to politics on the local level. Furthermore, special economic zones (SEZ), several of which opened up in Fujian — the historic birthplace of Chinese organized crime — allowed individuals to set up their own businesses. Entrepreneurs and local politicians saw the opportunity to make money and quickly drove a wedge through this crack in economic regulation and started enterprises in anything they could get their hands on. The legal code was convoluted, contradictory and — as long as politicians and party officials were making money off of the dubious enterprises — largely went unenforced. The economic liberalizations allowed enterprises to experiment with new business models, and many of the enterprises pushed the envelope of legality. Some ambitious businessmen partnered with companies from Taiwan, Macau and Hong Kong, where organized crime had a strong economic representation. For a few, the combination of murky business operations in China along with criminal partnerships in Taiwan, Macau and Hong Kong resulted in outright illegal operations. As entrepreneurs started dealing in narcotics, human smuggling and extortion, cooperation coo peration with local authorities grew more and more important. Entrepreneurs depended on local economic bureaucrats and law enforcement officials for protection, and local officials in turn depende d on the entrepreneurs for money, business ties and their efficiency. As long as the new enterprises did not flaunt their illegal activities, the authorities turned a blind eye.

























By the late 1990s, domestic drug consumption co nsumption became a destabilizing force that Beijing Be ijing had to address. It reformed the PLA by increasing its budget — thus removing the need n eed to moonlight in the drug trade — and stationing troops along the Myanmar border to slow the drug trade into China. Crackdowns did slow down the heroin trade (though the difficult terrain along China’s border with Myanmar ensures that smuggling will never be stopped altogether), which in turn increased demand for methamphetamines.























not limited to the Chinatowns of New York and San Francisco; they have gone to Europe, South America, the Middle East and anywhere else they can find work. In one instance, 58 illegal Fujianese immigrants suffocated in the back of a truck travelling from the Netherlands to the British port of Dover in June 2000. China’s snakeheads charge between $50,000 and $70,000 per person to be smuggled abroad. This exorbitant fee by Chinese standards requires requ ires the pooled resources of an entire family, if not an entire town. Snakeheads Snakehea ds commonly smuggle individuals on credit, letting them work off the smuggling fee once they have reached their new home. This indebtedness often leads to indentured servitude for the illegal immigrant once he or she arrives at the target country. Once in the hands of the snakeheads, illegal immigrants are treated as a commodity, traded and sold for labor in underground economies from San S an Francisco to Belgrade. Snakeheads use physical and psychological intimidation tactics to detain immigrants. Immigrants are threatened with death after their harrowing trip across























International Activities Exports, not domestic consumption, traditionally have generated wealth in China. Chinese organized crime, too, has sought sough t to export itself to raise revenue while maintaining a low profile at home. Direct international activity involving mainland-based Chinese organized crime has tended to stay close to home. Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau have been busy locales for Chinese organized crime, and Myanmar, Thailand and Central Asia have become key drug d rug suppliers. Staying close to home allows Chinese criminals the advantage of using the Special Administrative Regions (SARs) of Hong Kong and Macau. These two SARs lie along the coast of Guangdong province, and they officially are Chinese territory but have their own autonomous law enforcement agencies. Communication between law enforcement agencies has tended to be poor, something criminals have exploited to border-hop in























frontier , more roads, rails and transfer stations are going into the province. But improved Chinese infrastructure helps drug traffickers as much as it does law-abiding citizens. As Xinjiang province’s infrastructure improves and more links to Central Asia are developed, the routes between Xinjiang’s cities of Urumqi and Kashi to coastal cities such as Guangzhou will be able to handle greater shipments of illegal drugs.

Structure Unlike most organized criminal syndicates around the world, Chinese groups tend to remain relatively small. While organized criminal groups have been successful at infiltrating local governments and agencies, there is no evidence to suggest that any one o ne group has spread all across China. Groups tend to limit membership to between 50 and 200 people. Some government gov ernment officials say there are more than 30 million members of underground societies, with around 4,200 known groups operating in China. Thousands























such as police and fire departments, and must ensure that economic growth continues along at breakneck speed. All too often, politicians rely on shadow governments — the local power brokers not necessarily tied to the CPC and most likely plugged into an organized criminal network — to make ends e nds meet. Organized crime is attractive in China because it is so efficient. Criminal groups linked to politicians can provide muscle to deter opponents and provide a measure of deniability when an opposition group gets roughed up by an organized gang. When protests over sensitive issues such as land reform and water pollution come up, local officials often send organized criminal groups — instead of the local police or military — to shut down the protests, thus allowing the state to escape from a potentially incriminating situation. There are also cases in which organized criminal groups have purchased equipment, such as cars and radios, for local police forces outright or paid their salaries. Presented in the

























many opportunities — and so are more likely to enter organized crime. This is not to say that Han Chinese are not involved in organized crime, just that the split between ethnic majority and minority in China often is a catalyst for groups forming to defend their interests in the face of a majority group.























Fujian is also a center of Chinese industry. But Beijing keeps the province on a much shorter leash because of its ties to Taiwan (both geographically and culturally). It would be devastating for China if Fujian were to grow too close to the contested island of Taiwan. As Mao consolidated power in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek (who enjoyed the support of the Green Gang in Shanghai) S hanghai) fled to Taiwan along with many members of the

Organized Crime Series

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