National Crisis Management Core Manual 2012

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Cover Page Literature

• The Causal Loop of Global Economic Risks

– Illustrates the virally emergent problems spawning from each crisis. – Shared inter-organizational tribulations; as well as the need for a harmonized crisis response.

• The Chain

– Signifies Interconnected Strength – The unique virtue of shared power where the whole will eventually fall upon its most fragile link.

• The Stylized Paper Dolls

– Collaboration, collective security, accountability and responsibility of the Global Community.

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NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT CORE MANUAL

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Amendment Certificate 1. Proposals for amendment or additions to the text of this manual should be made through the normal channels to the primary proponent, the National Security Council Secretariat/ National Security Adviser. 2. It is certified that the amendments promulgated in the under-mentioned amendment list have been made in this manual.

Amendment List Number

Amended by (Printed Name and Initials)

Date

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

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Date of Amendment

RECOMMENDATION FOR AMENDMENTS ______________________________________ __________________________________ _____________________________ (Originating Agency) SUBJECT:

____________________ (Date)

Recommendation for Changes

TO: _________________________ _________________________ _________________________ The following recommendation is submitted for improvement of ____________________________________________________________________ (Long Title) _________________________________ (Short Title)

_________________________________ Page

_________________________________ Article Para No.

_________________________________ Line Sentence

_________________________________ Figure No.

Comment:

Recommendation:

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PREFACE On March 22, 2011, President Benigno S Aquino III issued a memorandum to the National Security Adviser, to organize an inter-agency working group that would review and revise the 2000 Crisis Management Manual, and would harmonize all government crisis management manuals with the revised manual. Secretary Cesar P. Garcia Jr., NSA, organized a Project Management Team and undertook a series of inter-agency workshops and conferences, researches, interviews with subject-matter experts, and focus group discussions, for the crafting of the National Crisis Management Core Manual (NCMCM) or the Core Manual. Purpose The purpose of the Core Manual is to provide a general framework of courses of actions that will guide government agencies in dealing with emerging and existing threats and crises of varying characteristics. Specifically, it has the following objectives: • To establish uniform terminologies used in crisis management, vis-à-vis RA 10121 (PDRRMC) and other international organizations; • To achieve a uniform Situation Awareness process; • To attain uniformity in the formulation of inter and intra-agency policies, contingency plans and crisis action plans for crisis management; • To identify Post-Action and Assessment activities; • To provide awareness of the principles in building and enhancing capabilities of government agencies for crisis management; and • To identify levels of authority, responsibility, and accountability in times of crisis Scope and Applicability The Core Manual covers all functional areas and phases in government agencies’ crisis management efforts. These comprise strategic context, situation awareness, responses to emerging threats and crises, post-action and assessment, enhancing and building crisis management capabilities and applying Command and Control in crisis management. Given this scope, it is expected that government agencies would align their respective crisis management plans and operational manuals upon promulgation of the Core Manual, without prejudice to specific systems or courses of actions inherent in respective agencies that are deemed vital to their proper functioning. User Information The primary proponent of the Core Manual is the National Security Council Secretariat/ Office of the National Security Adviser through the Crisis Management Support Secretariat (CMSS), which is responsible for its evaluation and revision upon directives of the National Security Adviser (NSA). The Core Manual is the product of inter-agency consultations and research work facilitated by the CMSS. Items in existing crisis management plans/systems from various agencies found useful by the CMSS were adopted and incorporated in the Core Manual.

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Rescission All previously NSC-issued publications and manuals directly inconsistent with the Core Manual are hereby rescinded. In compelling situations or contexts, however, the Core Manual or parts of it can be revised at any given time upon instructions from the Cabinet Cluster on Security through the NSA or from the President of the Republic of the Philippines. Gender The Core Manual adheres to the principle of gender equality in all of its sections and intentions. Unless this publication states otherwise, ostensibly masculine terms and phraseologies do not refer exclusively to “men.”

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GLOSSARY Administrative Control (ADCON) - is a direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations Affectation - disease; morbid symptom; malady; as, a pulmonary affection. To have an influence on or affect a change in; to attack or infect, as a disease Allocation - in a general sense, distribution of limited resources among competing requirements Bayani, bayanihan spirit - ba.ya.ni pd. (pandiwa) Nauukol sa paggawang hindi binabayaran ang gumagawa. sk (singkahulugan): pakisuyo, tulong, bataris, suyuan “bayani” is situated in his or her (the word “bayani” is not gender-specific) relation to the community, and the verb sense, in fact, stresses community spirit-- working for free the way we have always known the “bayanihan” spirit to be “Bayani” as concept and word can have any of these three applications: “bayani” as a person; “kabayanihan” as a heroic act; and “bayani” as a heroic group, community or nation The core value in being “bayani” is recognition of and deference to the interest of what is bigger than the individual, like the group, the community, the nation, even humanity and nature. This deference is conscious even if almost instinctive and habitual. For one to be “bayani” in meeting with various challenges both in daily life and in critical historical moments, he/she must have all or at least most of the following: (1) determination; (2) perseverance; (3) courage; (4) diligence; (5) enthusiasm; (6) humility; and (7) inspiration and effect of inspiring others. Capability-Building - efforts aimed to develop human skills or societal infrastructure within a community or organization needed to reduce the level of risk; includes development of institutional, financial, political and other resources, such as technology at different levels and sectors of the society Capability Components - component parts of capability are leadership; people; coordination, cooperation and communication; organization; training; sustainability; exercises; equipment; community awareness and support Capability Enhancement - required activities for stakeholders who have experienced responding or pre-empting the occurrence of a crisis Capacity - refers to the ability of the people, organizations and society as a whole to prepare for, respond to and recover from the impact of crises or disasters Chain of Command - is the succession of leadership from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised. Also called command channel

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Civil Society Organizations - also known as CSOs, include non-government organizations (NGOs), trade unions, faith-based organizations, indigenous peoples movements and foundations Collaboration Scheme - has the following components: Stakeholders with vested interests in collaboration; Trusting relationships among and between the partners; A shared vision and common goals for the collaboration; Expertise; Teamwork strategies; Open communication; Motivated partners; Means to implement and sustain the collaborative effort; and, An action plan Command Post (CP) - is a unit’s or subunit’s headquarters where the commander and the staff perform their activities. It is the principal facility employed by the commander to control operations Community Resilience – is the sustained ability of a community to withstand and recover from adversity. It may also refer to practices or experiences emphasizing local empowerment and helping minimize the likelihood of chronic dependency by returning individuals to economically productive routines, and helping affected communities participate actively in a substantial amount of rebuilding activities Concept of Operations - (1) is a verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander’s assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in operation plans particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose; (2) is a clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish his mission — describes how the commander sees the actions of each of his units fitting together to accomplish the mission Contingency Planning - is a forward planning process in a state of uncertainty, in which scenarios and objectives are agreed, managerial and technical actions defined, and potential response systems put in place in order to prevent or better respond to an emergency or critical situation Coordination - is an exchange of information to inform and integrate, synchronize, and de-conflict operations. Coordination is not necessarily a process of gaining approval but is most often used for mutual exchange of information Coordination, Cooperation, Communication - known as the 3Cs in Crisis Management; the mechanisms pursuing common goals needed to be established at the lowest levels, to close in any gaps in any short fall of capabilities when needed and avoid turfing issues, and the inconsistencies in the overall crisis management/ emergency operations and contingencies Course of Action (COA) - (1) is a plan that would accomplish, or is related to, the accomplishment of a mission; (2) is the scheme adopted to accomplish a task or mission Crisis - a crisis or emergency is a threatening condition that requires urgent action or response Crisis Action Planning - is based on current events and conducted in time-sensitive situations and emergencies using assigned, attached, and allocated forces or units and resources

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Crisis Capabilities - capability to anticipate potential crisis and prepare for them; provide accurate information; pre-empt situations; and, if this fails, provide timely response; and determine long-term solutions Crisis Management - involves plans and institutional arrangement to engage and guide the efforts of government, non-government, voluntary and private agencies in comprehensive and coordinated ways to respond to the entire spectrum of crisis needs Crisis Management Council - is a governing body that takes decisive actions to resolve crisis or emergency. It is primarily concerned with the formulation of crisis management policies, integration and orchestration of government and public efforts towards the control of crisis Critical Incident - is any incident/event, whether man-made or natural, that requires the implementation of special tasks by one or more of the urgent services of the Philippine government Critical Success Factors - the following should be considered during the Pre-Crisis, During and Post-Crisis Phases: application of early warnings and alert levels; situation assessment & crisis determination; authority to act; leadership and business/ community awareness and support; establishing a foundation for identifying community resilience-building activities; and community resilience

For Pre-crisis, consider the following: dissemination of operational responsibility; program and response priorities; crisis management organizations (teams, mandate, participants, roles, designated backups, team leaders); operational policies; application of principles of crisis management in accordance to the Core Manual; pre-crisis response planning; and, geographical implementation and organizational-wide implementation

During the Crisis, consider the following: decision making during the crisis; documentation of event during the crisis; tools to support teams and in-crisis processes; process during the crisis (threat assessment until the resolution of the crisis); and crisis command centre operations (including Risk Communication utilizing external media stakeholders)

For Post-Crisis Phase, consider all of the above and operational integration with other stakeholders.

Culture of preparedness - for a community to believe they have the wherewithal to “create an orderly arena within a chaotic environment” would be the essence of a culture of preparedness; preparing for an effective response to a large-scale disaster Disaster - a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council - this pertains to the DRRMC from national to local level. Its powers and functions are defined in Republic Act 10121 also known as the “Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010”

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Documentation - a record of contingency, emergency or crisis management plans, equipment maintenance, skills training as well as risk and vulnerability assessment for review and future reference; studies of successful sustainable crisis and recovery efforts focus on three broad approaches -- local empowerment, organization and leadership, and planning for sustainability Drivers - are variables that influence or propel an event’s occurrence Emergency Planning - is decision-making prior to an actual crisis or disaster including the consideration of resources required to manage and resolve the event. The plan must also include the necessary steps during and after the crisis is resolved Emerging or Weak Signals - either influence the enfoldment of one underlying process or another, or be a symptom of this evolution. It also signifies the appearance of new processes Equipment - should not only comprise an inventory of equipment but rather an assessment of the condition, availability, maintenance and use for inter-operability to properly perform in a crisis Exercises - exercises must be done constantly to test the capabilities of equipment and the personnel familiarization of its use. These include interfacing between or among agencies in order to assist in determining deficiencies and needs for additional or updated equipment or skills enhancement, especially in the area of an integrated or inter-agency response First Responder - any person or unit who arrived first at the place of incident and endeavours to render assistance to the victim and to protect and secure the incident scene Foresight - defined in several ways but that which essentially means a process of anticipation of future probabilities and options for actions. For the Strategic Foresight Group, it is forecasting plus insight, requiring deep understanding of a particular subject (Kousa, 2010). It is a systematic, participatory, future-intelligence-gathering and medium-to-long-term vision-building process aimed at present-day decisions and mobilizing joint actions (Lavoix, 2010)

Foresight means going beyond the “usual suspects” and gathering widely distributed intelligence on current and emerging threats (Kousa, 2010), identifying and creating opportunities, assessing vulnerabilities and strengths

Gap Analysis - a technique for determining the steps to be taken in moving from a current state to a desired future-state; also called need-gap analysis, needs analysis, and needs assessment. Gap analysis consists of (1) listing of characteristic factors (such as attributes, competencies, performance levels) of the present situation (“what is”); (2) cross listing factors required to achieve the future objectives (“what should be”); and then (3) highlighting the gaps that exist and need to be filled Growth Stage - is the period when the system imports material and energy to enable it to survive and meet growth needs/goals. Each stage of growth is marked by a beginning and an endpoint

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Hard Target - one which is guarded or has considerable security; this means that a terrorist attack runs the risk of being intercepted often with potentially lethal force. Examples of ‘Hard’ targets would include military bases, and political organizations and high ranking politicians and heads of state such as Presidents Hazards - defined as dangers and are widely used in the case of natural dangers; Hazard is a potentially damaging phenomenon that may cause the loss of life or injury Incident - an event or occurrence Incident Command System (ICS) - a set of personnel, policies, procedures, facilities, and equipment, integrated into a common organizational structure designed to improve emergency response operations of all types and complexities Incident Commander - is the single person who commands the incident response and is the decision-making final authority on the ground Inhibitors - are variables that have negating effect Inter-agency Contingency Planning Process - is a procedure in the formulation of a contingency plan involving more than one department, bureaus or units of the executive branch and other stakeholders. An inter-agency contingency plan (IACP) includes three essential elements: Situation Awareness, Strategy, Command and Control Interagency Operations - any action which combines the human and material resources of two or more independent organizations, be they governmental, international, or private, in prosecution of a common objective Interoperability - the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together Leadership - a Crisis Manager, a person who has the ability to direct a team towards the achievement of a specific goal within a timeframe using available resources, to gather information, to establish priorities, and to define crisis management plans Local Disaster Risk Reduction Management Fund (LDRRMF) - not less than five percent (5%) of the estimated revenue from regular sources shall be set aside as the LDRRMF to support disaster risk management activities such as, but not limited to, pre-disaster preparedness programs including training, purchasing life-saving rescue equipment, supplies and medicines, for post-disaster activities, and for the payment of premiums on calamity insurance. Of this amount, thirty percent (30%) shall be allocated as the Quick Response Fund (QRF) or stand-by fund for relief and recovery programs so that the situation and living conditions of people in communities or areas stricken by disasters, calamities, epidemics, or complex emergencies may be normalized as quickly as possible Loss and Damage Control Management - preventing or controlling incidents by protecting the overall safety of people, equipment, material and the environment

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Mass Casualty - any large number of casualties produced in a relatively short period of time, usually as the result of a single incident such as a military aircraft accident, hurricane, flood, earthquake, or armed attack that exceeds local logistical support capabilities Mission - the commander’s expression of what the unit must accomplish and for what purpose. The who, what, when, where, and why that must be accomplished Mission Statement - a short paragraph or sentence describing the task and purpose that clearly indicate the action to be taken and the reason therefore. It usually contains the elements of who, what, when, and where, and the reason therefore, but seldom specifies how Mob Rule - characterized by anarchy/chaos, blatant violation of law due to breakdown of the administration; a situation in which a crowd of people control a place illegally Multi-Year Development Plan - planning that should be based on medium to long-terms, using Futures Research and/or Horizon Scanning methodologies (refer to Situation Awareness) to meet desired level of capability, so that the long-term development projects can be properly scheduled and funded On-Scene Commander - is an individual in the vicinity who temporarily assumes command of the incident Opportunities - a chance or opening offered by circumstances Order - a communication, written, oral, or by signal, that conveys instructions from a superior to a subordinate Organization - a clear and responsive structure that supports a hierarchy which is neither too unstructured that it fails to support the 3Cs system of Crisis Management, or too rigid that it disables stakeholders from responding at all People as Human Resources - includes both leadership and support staff that mean not only having the right number, but also the appropriate skills and competencies. Perform - is the actual implementation of contingency plans when a crisis occurs, despite the pro-active measures undertaken Policy - describes the intention of the government and provides the principles that govern the action towards certain ends. In the context of crisis management, policy directs and becomes the consideration from where responses to crises or disasters are derived Risks - the chance or possibility of danger, loss, injury or other adverse consequence; the combination of the potential negative impact of an event, determined by combining the likelihood of the event occurring with the impact should it occur. Risk is characterized by both the probability and severity of a potential loss that may result from the presence of an adversary or a hazardous condition Risk Analysis - organized ways to identify and evaluate the threat or hazardous conditions, and to

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take actions to eliminate, reduce or control the risks posed by such conditions; risk analysis approach can identify the requisite response activities, and a logically ordered sequence for their implementation; generally accepted to consist of risk assessment, risk management, and risk communications Risk Assessment - evaluation of a recognized dangerous condition to determine the risk or threat they present; identify the dangers it may pose to people or equipment (lower risk, serious injury/damage, or death/destruction); See also loss and damage control management Risk Communication - the communication of clear, accurate and understandable information on the risks to the public; Essential for informing the public of preventive measures that are available to minimize the risk of exposure in a clear and rapid manner Risk Management - the process of identifying, assessing and controlling risks arising from operational factors, and making decisions that balance risk cost with benefits; encompasses all those activities that are required to reach and implement decisions on risk reduction or elimination. Once a risk has been identified and characterized, an informed decision can be made as to what control measures can be applied, if any, to reduce the risk or eliminate the hazard. Usually, control measures involve reducing the probability of occurrence or severity of an incident Risk Management And Acceptable Risks - all activities that are required to reach and implement decisions on risk reduction or elimination; an informed decision can be made as to what control measures can be applied, if any, to reduce the risk or eliminate the hazard. Usually, control measures involve reducing the probability of occurrence or the severity of an incident

“Acceptable risk” - a conscious decision must be made at the proper level whether the remaining risk is acceptable; everyone accepts a degree of risk in order to accomplish something beneficial

Semaphore - an apparatus for visual signalling (as by the position of one or more movable arms). It is a system of visual signalling by two flags held one in each hand Situation Awareness - the ability to identify, detect and anticipate incidents or risks that can turn into a crisis; should be done throughout the phases and stages of the Crisis Management Framework Soft Target - one which has little or no military protection or security and hence is an easy option for a terrorist attack. This includes commercial shopping centres, power stations, and leisure facilities such as football grounds and sports stadiums Stakeholders - stakeholders are persons or entities who may have an interest in or who may be affected by a particular policy Stakeholders’ Relationship - fostering stakeholders’ relationship achieves a comprehensive integration of crisis management planning among communities, people’s organizations, and civil society organizations (CSOs), and between the local and national policy making and operations systems

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Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) - are routine duties or recurring actions not needing the commander’s involvement aimed at enhancing effectiveness and flexibility Sustainability - a high level of capability for an extended period of time; capabilities can only be sustained through planning at the short, medium and long-terms, skills enhancements, and equipment procurement Target hardening - target hardening is the use of strategies to make it harder for a crime to be committed and reduces the gains of crime. Target hardening increases the efforts that offenders must expend in the commission of a crime and is the most established approach to crime prevention. It is directed at denying or limiting access to a crime target through the use of physical barriers such as fences, gates, locks, electronic alarms and security patrols Task - the specific activity to be performed by the unit while conducting a form of tactical operation or a choice of manoeuvre. It is the minimum essential effects to accomplish the purpose Threat - an indication of something undesirable coming; a person or thing as a likely cause of harm; refers to people, phenomena, situations and trends in the environment that could adversely affect the welfare and well being of the people Threat Analysis - a multi-disciplinary activity, with inputs from a range of stakeholders; aims to identify the kind of threat, the potential perpetrators, the means that may be used and the circumstances under which they may be used Training - aims to enhance specific agencies tasked for Crisis Response; comprised of individual and collective training, where individuals must be prepared to be part of an integrated, inter-agency operations; should also address the operational and strategic needs of the stakeholders Triage - the evaluation and classification of casualties for purposes of treatment and evacuation. It consists of the immediate sorting of patients according to type and seriousness of injury, and likelihood of survival, and the establishment of priority for treatment and evacuation to assure medical care of the greatest benefit to the largest number TTP’s (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) • Tactics – the art and science of employing available means to win battles and engagements • Techniques – the methods used by troops and/or commanders to perform assigned missions and functions, specifically, the method of employing equipment and personnel • Procedures – the standard and detailed courses of action that describe how to perform a task Turning Point - the point at which a very significant change occurs; a decisive moment Volunteer Service Organizations - a local or foreign group that recruits, trains, deploys and supports volunteer workers to programs and projects implemented by them or by other organizations or any group that provides services and resources, including but not limited to, information, capability building, advocacy and networking for the attainment of the common good

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Vulnerability - the characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard; is a set of conditions resulting from physical, social, economic and environmental factors which increase susceptibility to losses from impact of hazards Vulnerability Analysis - identifies the level of threat that exists, given the potential vulnerability of the community or area concerned; identification of potential scenarios as well as weaknesses in the system that may come into play for an incident to escalate Weak Signals - are phenomena, trends, issues, factors, or forces that may initially have negligible impact but are too important to be totally ignored Wildcards - are low-probability, high-impact events that can drastically alter situations and assumptions, and catch everyone by surprise should they occur

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Amendment Certificate Preface Glossary Table of Contents List of Annexes List of Figures and Tables

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Introduction 1 Strategic Context 4 National Policy Guidelines 7 Key Principles in Crisis Management 9 The National Crisis Management Framework 12 Chapter 1: Crisis Management Organizations 14 1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 1-7

Crisis Management Committee Incident Command System Working Synergy National Level Crisis Management Committees Local Level Crisis Management Committees (Regional, Provincial, Municipality/City, and Barangay) Crisis Management Organizations Abroad Crisis Escalation Protocol

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Chapter 2: Situation Awareness

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2-1 2-2 2-3

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Chapter 3: Crisis Prevention Measures 46

3-1 3-2 3-3

Policy Process in Crisis Management Inter-Agency Contingency Planning Crisis Action Plan

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Chapter 4: Building and Enhancing Crisis Management Capabilities

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4-1 4-2 4-3 4-4

Strategic Situation Awareness Operational Situation Awareness Tactical Situation Awareness

Principles in Capabilities Building and Enhancement Principles in Conducting Needs Assessments/ Vulnerabilities’ Assessment of Capabilities to Determine Effective and Efficient Crisis Management Principles in Capabilities Enhancement or Building Plans Principles in Sustaining Capability

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4-5 Principles in Prevention and Mitigation of an Incident from Becoming a Crisis 4-6 Principles in Evaluating Crisis or Emergency Operations 4-7 Principles in Making Multi-Year Capabilities Development Plan 4-8 Principles in Annual Capability Development Increment 4-9 Principle for Capability Resource Management 4-10 Principles in Fostering Stakeholders’ Relationships Chapter 5: Applying Command and Control In Crisis Management 5-1 Fundamental Principles 5-2 Command and Control System

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Chapter 6:

Post-Action and Assessment 74

6-1 6-2

Conclusion 78

References 158

Activities in Post-Action and Assessment Handover of Responsibility

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75 76

LIST OF ANNEXES A

Summary of AFP/DND International Agreements

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B

Other relevant Policies related to Crisis Management

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C Sketch on Incident Command System Deployment at Scene of 91 Incident C-1 ICS of the NDRRMC

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D Government Media Platforms 106 E Steps in conducting Situation Awareness (SA) 108 F

Sample Checklist for Tactical Situation Awareness (SA)

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G

Inter-Agency Contingency Planning Toolbox

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H

Inter-Agency Contingency Planning Format

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I

Summary of Principles Arranged According to the Components 137 of the Crisis Management Framework

J Recovery and Redevelopment Experiences based from 139 International Disasters K Command and Support Relationship 153 L Proposed Action and Assessment Report 156

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LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES Fig. 1-1

Ideal Composition of a Crisis Management Committee at Any Level

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Fig. 1-2.1

ICS Basic Organizational Structure

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Fig. 1-2.2

Organizational Structure of PMAG within the ICS

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Fig. 1-4.1

ONSA-PSR-CMSS-EXECOM Command Relationship

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Fig. 1-7.1

Conditions/Trigger Points in the Handover of Responsibilities

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Fig. 2-1.1

SA at the Strategic, Operational and Tactical Levels

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Fig. 2-1.2

SA Processes at the Strategic, Operational and Tactical Levels

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Fig. 3-1.1

Policy Process

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Fig. 3-1.2

Policy to Contingency Planning Flowchart

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Fig. 3-2.1

Inter-Agency Contingency Planning Flowchart

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Fig. 3-3.1

Crisis Action Planning Procedure

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Fig. 3-3.2

Guide to Making a Tentative Operational Plan

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Fig. 4.1

Principles of Building and Enhancing Capabilities

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Table 1-1.1

Role of the C, CMC

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Table 1-3.1

Delineation of CMC’s and ICS Authority, Responsibility and Accountability

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Table 1-4.1

Components of the EXECOM/NCMC

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Table 1-4.2

Members of the EXECOM/NCMC Designated as C-OPR

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Table 1-7.1

Conditions/Situations with Particular CMC

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Table 1-7.2

List of Available Resources that a CMC may Utilize at its Own Discretion

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Table 1-7.3

Sample Matrix to be Considered in the Relinquishment of Responsibilities

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Table 4-6.1

Critical Success Factors

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INTRODUCTION The 2009 United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) defines crisis or emergency as a threatening condition that requires urgent action. A single crisis may spawn another crisis elsewhere, or several crises could happen in different places at the same time. A complex emergency could also happen where “the cause of emergency as well as the assistance to the afflicted is complicated by intense level of political considerations” (Republic Act 10121 or Philippine Disaster Reduction and Management Act). The National Security Policy recognizes the crises’ adverse effects to society and the environment, to wit: “crises and disasters are being confronted every year which significantly deplete scarce government financial and material resources, including the interruption of critical delivery of basic services.” Worse, mishandling of crisis may even lead to disaster or loss of lives. However, crises may not always “go down” towards “deterioration” or “disintegration” but could also “go up” towards resolution, often temporary, and/or higher order transformation as shown in the following figure:

Crisis Managers are responsible for the entire spectrum. Crisis planners are particularly responsible for activities before the turning point so that instead of “deterioration” the institution rises up and turns the crisis into an opportunity. Incident Commanders, on the other hand, are responsible for events/activities pertaining to and/or leading to deterioration/disintegration. Crisis Managers and Planners, and Incident Commanders all work towards resolution of and recovery from crisis. Managing, resolving and even turning crisis into opportunity was ably demonstrated by General Roy A. Cimatu (Ret.) and the Ambassadors of the Philippine Embassy in the Middle East

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when they placed “out of harm’s way” the millions of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) in the Middle East during the war between the US and Iraq in 2002. Their commitment, preparedness and dedication resulted in zero casualties among OFWs, in having other countries’ embassies relying on the Philippines’ contingency plan for the protection of their countrymen, and in becoming instrumental for the restoration of the Kuwaiti government. Government response efforts to prevent or mitigate the effects of crisis are guided by Article II, Section 4 and 5 of the Constitution, which states that the prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people and that it is essential to maintain peace and order, protect the life, liberty and property, and promote the general welfare of the people. The objective of our overall crisis management effort is embodied in the Preamble of the Constitution. Public leaders, therefore, have a special responsibility to safeguard society from adverse consequences of crises. And since crises almost always emerge and occur within a specific locality, effective crisis management, thus, begins with the lowest political jurisdiction. Crises or emergencies take several forms and have varying extent. The Core Manual is designed to address human-induced crises through a preventive, inter-agency approach. This manual recognizes that threats, hazards, vulnerabilities, and risks in the 21st century security environment are interconnected; with one crisis resulting into another crisis of varying proportions. Thus, an agency/department/unit may need to consider working with other agencies to effectively detect and manage crises and its consequences. Effective inter-agency approach to detecting and managing crisis, however, poses several challenges, one of which is going beyond our individual and organizational biases. Having a uniform way of addressing our roles and functions, and processes and concepts in crisis management, should help us go beyond our ‘silos.’ This Core Manual, with its six chapters, aims to harmonize all crisis management functions of government agencies/departments and stakeholders toward thinking and moving coherently and strategically over any type of crisis. Chapter 1 discusses the prescribed Crisis Management Organizations. It started with the Crisis Management Committee and the Incident Command System and the levels of authority, responsibility and accountability of the two organizations. The National level crisis management organizations and their functions, focusing on human induced incidents, are identified. Local level crisis management organizations from the regional to the Barangay were also recognized. In order to understand when to elevate a crisis level, a crisis escalation protocol is established. Chapter 2 discusses detecting crisis through Situation Awareness (SA) at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. At the strategic level, SA is developing foresight of emerging threats, risks and crises, from primarily scanning the environment and conveying warnings to decision makers. At the operational and tactical levels, SA is analyzing the identified threat and the operating environment so that appropriate response efforts are known and undertaken. Chapter 3 talks about undertaking responses to emerging crises: policy formulation and inter-agency contingency planning—and during crisis—crisis action planning. Chapter 4 discusses enhancing and building capabilities in the long, medium and short terms. A strong and effective capability can prevent and/or limit the damage of a crisis or disaster. These include: thorough assessment on leadership; people; coordination/cooperation/ communication; organizational structure; sustainability; training; exercises; equipment; and

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documentation. Chapter 5 entitled Applying command and control in crisis management covers the principles on command and control system, communication system, computer drives and information system. Chapter 6, “Post-Action and Assessment,” discusses crisis recovery and evaluation efforts. This chapter describes actions and procedures aimed to assist policy and decision makers in improving or refining crisis response efforts.

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STRATEGIC CONTEXT The 21st security environment, in which crises of varying forms and proportion are expected to emerge, is said to have evolved from a purely military concept to a more comprehensive, multidimensional idea shared by sectors outside the military establishment. Security, therefore, is now perceived to be more complex and wide-ranging. It has veered away from mere security of the state to the more comprehensive and complicated security of communities/individuals. In global, regional, and national security settings, a multitude of perspectives must be employed to capture the intimate interrelations of one issue/threat to others. This manual intends to proceed with national crisis management mindful of the nature, dynamics, and interrelation of 21st century threats. This chapter aims to briefly showcase a number of security threats that could abruptly or gradually give rise to a plethora of crises, which the government and the people should be capacitated to deal with.

Dynamics and Interrelations of 21st Century Security Threats. This figure is lifted from a publication of the World Economic Forum in January 2011 entitled Global Risks 2011 Sixth Edition. It is an excellent illustration of a comprehensive and multidimensional appreciation of the security threats of our time. It depicts issues and threats of various natures and how they interact with each other. It identifies economic disparity and global governance failures as the key drivers of risks while also providing insights into perceived likelihood and impact that are very useful in strategic-planning and national crisis management.

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The Security Environment The 21st Century strategic environment poses emerging and re-emerging security threats and concerns at the global, regional, and national levels. These security issues encompass both traditional and non-traditional concerns, involving actors that are not anymore limited to states/ governments. Another key characteristic about these 21st Century security concerns is their dynamic interrelations that put tremendous pressure on the government to be more insightful and creative in the performance of its functions. This validates a more comprehensive and multidimensional conception of crisis and security. Threats at the global arena such as terrorism and militant extremism exacerbate anxieties of world governments towards weapons of mass destruction. The global economic crisis also contributes to rising public/labor discontent towards governments and large corporations, making people more restive. Such restiveness could spell gargantuan shifts in the political landscape as clearly evidenced by the Arab Spring. Cyberspace is also fast becoming an arena of great insecurities as more and more aspects of humanity’s day-to-day affairs are hinged upon this technology. The most “global” perhaps of all threats is climate change, which threatens all fabrics of humanity’s existence. Yet, the global arena remains largely a stage of interactions between and among states, whose geostrategic interests sometimes clash. The regional environment (East Asia/Asia Pacific), meanwhile, lays witness to a very gradual yet steady thrust towards community-building. However, countries in the region are faced with many transnational problems, and quite numerous of these predicaments are sea-borne. Border disputes between and among states are still high in the agenda, making their military establishments perennially alert. Such disputes also highlight to a very acute level the greatpower competition, which smaller countries are very anxious to manage or cushion. The claws of terrorism, coupled with highly porous and disputed borders, present serious strains to the defense and law enforcement policies and capacities of governments in the region. These international dynamics are felt, in varying degrees, at the national level. Exploiting the vulnerabilities brought about by communist insurgency and the Southern Philippines Secessionist Groups (SPSG). The menace of terrorism threatens to worsen the socio-economic and political malaise of the country that gave rise to insurgency and secessionism in the first place. There is also an increasing recognition of the fusion of criminality and terrorism, with one reinforcing the other. Furthermore, natural disasters constitute challenges to the country’s sociopolitical and economic resiliency while overpopulation and over-urbanization take their toll on the government’s capacity to deliver basic social services.

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The figure below attempts to showcase global environment trends vis-a-vis the Philippine situation.

Sample Causal Loop depicting the local security environment in relation to regional and global trends: blue lines for emerging global trends, black for regional and yellow for the PH environment. The colors indicate what dimensions they fall under: Green for environment, Blue for social, Gray for terrorism/political, Beige for geo-political, Pink for techno-scientific and Light Gray for economic. The Red blasts/figures represent factors that contribute to each situation or outcome.

The National Security Policy (NSP) further discusses the 21st security environment in its sections on the external and internal environment and on other strategic issues. The NSP could be viewed at the official gazette: http://www.gov.ph/2011/08/18/national-security-policy-2011-2016. The complexity of the 21st century security environment necessitates a response that should involve all sectors in the community in order to be successful in preventing or mitigating the negative effects of crises. The succeeding section presents the crisis management organizations at the national level and the general principle in organizing the same at the regional down to the barangay level.

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NATIONAL POLICY GUIDELINES Crisis management policies should be anchored in the 1987 Constitution that spells out the ways and means to achieve the end that is embodied in the Preamble. Stated thus: We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the act of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the Common good, conserve and develop our patrimony and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. -Preamble, 1987 Constitution Crisis management policies are further guided by the following: Legislation, a law which has been promulgated (or enacted) by Congress; Executive Proclamations or Orders or Decrees issued by the President; Treaties, a formal agreement between two or more states, as in reference to terms of peace or trade, binding among all parties to the treaty; and Supreme Court decisions. Specifically: 1. SEC 3, ARTICLE II of the Philippine Constitution, which states that the Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory. SECTION 5, ARTICLE II states that one of the prime duties of the Government shall be the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. 2. The National Security Policy, a statement of principles that should guide national decision-making and determine courses of action to be taken in order to attain the state or condition wherein the national interests, the well being of our people and institutions, and our sovereignty and territorial integrity are protected and enhanced. 3. Executive Order 773 series 2009, further reorganizing the Peace and Order Council, with specific responsibilities that include contributing to the strategies of the NSC that would effectively respond to peace and order problems, coordinating and monitoring peace and order plans, providing a forum for inter-disciplinary dialogue and deliberation of major issues and problems affecting peace and order, providing a forum for dialogue and deliberation of major issues and problems affecting peace and order, including insurgency, recommending measures which will improve or enhance peace and order and public safety in their respective areas of responsibility, including anti-insurgency measures, and recommending measures to converge and orchestrate internal security operations efforts of civil authorities and agencies, military and police. 4. Republic Act 8551, Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998 is an act providing for the reform and reorganization of the Philippine National Police and for other purposes, amending certain provisions of Republic Acts 6900 and 75 entitled, “An Act establishing the Philippine National Police under a re-organized department of the interior and local government, and for other purposes”.

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Although RA 8551 mentions the PNP reform and reorganization, it also discusses the relief of the DILG from its responsibility on matters involving the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national security. The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be responsible for matters involving suppression of insurgency and the Philippine National Police will provide support, except in cases where the President shall call on the PNP to support the AFP in combat operations. 5. Republic Act 9372, Human Security Act of 2007, “An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People From Terrorism”, to protect life, liberty, and property from acts of terrorism, to condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous to the national security of the country and to the welfare of the people, and to make terrorism a crime against the Filipino people, against humanity, and against the law of nations. It further states that the State recognizes that the fight against terrorism requires a comprehensive approach, comprising political, economic, diplomatic, military, and legal means duly taking into account the root causes of terrorism without acknowledging these as justifications for terrorist and/or criminal activities. Such measures shall include conflict management and post-conflict peace-building, addressing the roots of conflict by building state capacity and promoting equitable economic development. 6. Treatise – A summary of International Agreements involving the DND/AFP are found in Annex A. Other policies related to crisis management can be found in Annex B. Crisis managers are encouraged to strengthen existing and future crisis-related policies or laws, identify crucial linkages (or perhaps incompatibilities) among these statutes, and reflect on the comprehensive and multi-dimensional approach of crisis management.

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KEY PRINCIPLES IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT The key principles in crisis management are rooted in the 1987 Constitution, our cultures and values, and the best practices that were honed by years of governance. These principles also recognize that our country, being an archipelago, shaped the differences not only of the physical environment but also of the people residing in them. These eight (8) key principles are: a. Whole-of-nation approach; b. Strengthened inter-agency collaboration; c. Efficient Situation Awareness; d. Tiered response to incidents; e. Adaptable operational capabilities; f. Unity of effort through Unity of Command; g. Readiness to act; and h. Intensified public information campaign.

A. Whole-of-Nation Approach (WONA)

The whole of nation approach is having leaders at all levels communicating and engaging all stakeholders in identifying emerging or immediate threats, agreeing with solutions, developing shared goals, and aligning capabilities so that no one is overwhelmed in times of crisis. Stakeholders’ participation is critical in order to establish a sense of ownership for response actions. The unique Filipino values of bayanihan and bridging leadership typify the Whole-ofNation-Approach in preventing and/or mitigating the effects of crises.

B. Strengthened Inter-Agency Collaboration

Agencies/Departments have specific mandates and limited resources. Each agency/ department would thus need the support of other agencies/departments to be effective in addressing complex and interconnected threats in the 21st century. In order to be successful, agencies/departments must collaborate with other agencies in detecting and simultaneously addressing all aspects of a crisis - diplomatic, political, military, humanitarian, economic, and social. The goals of a strengthened inter-agency coordination are comprehensive: gain complete situation awareness; formulate integrated government policy guidance; make agency planning activities transparent to other agencies; increase individual accountability for implementation of assigned agency responsibilities; and anticipate and keep pace with events during operations. To accomplish these goals, inter-agency crisis management organizations have been established. Inter-agency functions and processes are likewise prescribed in the succeeding chapters.

C. Efficient Situation Awareness

The importance of an efficient Situation Awareness in the 21st century environment should be emphasized prior to adopting measures to prevent and prepare for emerging and immediate threats and crises. Efficient situation awareness detects threats and crises long before it occurs; analyzes the root causes; and effectively conveys warnings, providing enough lead time to prepare for wide ranging scenarios.

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D. Tiered Response to Incidents

Crises essentially begin and end locally. Local government units must therefore be capable and effective in managing crisis. Crises may require unified response from local government units and other stakeholders, or higher levels of governance. National level organizations should recognize this and should be ready to provide resources or capabilities to support and sustain the responses and initial recovery. National level organization can also hold command over any crisis response effort, if necessary. This conforms to the responsibility and power given to the President by the Constitution. However, it is imperative that all levels are able to prevent and mitigate the occurrence of crisis and anticipate required resources.

E. Adaptable Operational Capabilities

As incidents change in size, scope and complexity, the response should adapt to meet requirements. Therefore, crisis management organizations at all levels should be organized with capabilities for diverse operations. Government agencies must be ready to execute graduated measures to a particular incident, and as needs increase and change, responders should remain alert and adaptable. Similarly, the overall response should be flexible as it transitions from response effort to recovery.

F. Unity of Effort through Unity of Command

Effective unified command is indispensable to response activities and requires a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of participating organizations. Success requires unity of effort, which respects the chain of command of each participating organization, overcoming organizational biases, while harnessing seamless coordination across jurisdictions in support of common objectives. Unity of command is accomplished through the different levels of Crisis Management Committee and the Incident Command System (ICS). The role of the Incident Commander (IC) in providing effective leadership and decision making is critical to the successful resolution of any crisis. Chapter 6 discusses in detail the ICS.

G. Readiness to Act

Effective response to crisis requires readiness to act balanced with an understanding of the risks. From individuals, indigenous groups, private sectors and government agencies, response to a crisis depends on the players’ instinct and ability and readiness to act. Readiness to act or the willingness to do something if and when needed should be encouraged among communities. Readiness to act is ingrained among First Responders and is enhanced through training and planning. Readiness to act may mean readily taking command or being responsible for establishing priorities for the safety of the public and other responders, and for ensuring that adequate safety measures are in place.

H. Effective Public Information Campaign

The government must pursue an effective public information campaign. The public must be informed of the nature of the threat and its effects, and of government actions that prevent the

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occurrence of crisis resulting from these threats. Well-developed public information, education strategies, and communication plans help ensure that lifesaving measures, evacuation routes, threat and alert systems and other public safety information are coordinated and communicated to numerous and diverse audiences in a consistent, accessible, and timely manner. An effective public information campaign against an impending or current crisis also ensures everyone’s support. This manual espouses a comprehensive and multidimensional approach in anticipating risks and scenarios, and preventing or managing crisis. Effective crisis management necessitates continuous participation from a wide variety of stakeholders in order to guarantee the employment of as much viewpoints and core competencies as possible. An effective public information campaign is crucial to achieving this. In compelling situations where the government is confronted with the absence of statutes/ policies to address serious and potentially devastating emergencies and crises, the President is vested with the authority or responsibility to employ his/her constitutional powers in protecting the State and the people, and maintain peace and order in the country or any part of it, within a prescribed period.


THE NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK (NCMF) The National Crisis Management Framework provides a comprehensive approach to understanding the components of a crisis or the 5Ps of crisis management: Predict, Prevent, Prepare, Perform and Post-Action and Assessment. The illustration below shows the escalation of crisis—from convergence of indicators to the occurrence of an incident, critical incident and a full-blown crisis—and the interaction of the 5Ps of crisis management. Although the 5Ps are interrelated crucial components of effective crisis management, these components do not happen in phases, whether sequential or consequential. Addressing complex or multi-dimensional crises require activities under Predict, Prepare and Prevent to happen simultaneously and in a continuous manner even while executing activities under Perform or responding to an ongoing crisis or conducting Post-Action and Assessment activities.

National Crisis Management Framework Appropriate Crisis Management Committee (National, Regional, Provincial, City/Municipal)

Predict – Predictions are attempts to remove uncertainty from the future. The Predict component, as prescribed in the Core Manual, is undertaken through Strategic, Operational and Tactical Situation Awareness processes. Strategic SA is producing foresight and conveying strategic warnings through Horizon Scanning or Strategic Forecasting; It scans the environment, identifying weak signals, drivers, inhibitors, wildcards, threats, hazards, risks, opportunities and vulnerabilities, among others, develops foresight and conveys strategic warnings. Operational and Tactical SA is producing detailed reports against a specified threat, describing the operating environment where a threat or a crisis could emerge; the threat or the crisis itself, its potential of becoming a crisis; and current efforts and capabilities of agencies/departments addressing the threat or crisis.

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Prevent – Crisis prevention is better than cure. Prevention is a deliberate action aimed at avoiding future harm by addressing its causes. It is closely related to mitigation, which accepts that a potentially harmful incident cannot be prevented, but harmful consequences arising from it can be minimized by precautionary measures. Two (2) preventive measures are described in the Core Manual: the first involves a long-term strategy that is expected to yield effects over years; and, the other is operational in nature (e.g. target hardening). Prepare – Preparedness is essential for effective response. It covers six (6) essential activities: Plan, Organize, Train, Equip, Exercise and Evaluate and Improve. The figure below illustrates the preparedness cycle.

The Preparedness Cycle Simulation and desktop exercises evaluate the effectiveness of preparations, bring out flaws and weaknesses, and enable corrections and remedies to be effected, to heighten levels of readiness of systems, procedures, organization, equipment and logistics, to better cope up with actual crisis. Perform – Performance is the actual implementation of contingency plans when a crisis occurs, despite the pro-active measures undertaken. Once a crisis occurs, priorities shift from building or enhancing capabilities to employing resources to save lives, protect property and environment, and preserve the social, economic and political structure of the jurisdiction. Post-Action and Assessment – Post-Action is a component which begins when the crisis has been addressed and the situation is deemed clear. It is in this phase where the organization is returning to business as usual. Post-Action activities seek ways to evaluate and improve prevention, preparation and the actual execution.


CHAPTER 1 CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS Crisis management organizations determine the levels of authority, responsibility and accountability. This manual identifies three characteristics of crisis management that are significant in establishing crisis management organizations. First, the amount of time available for deliberation is comparatively short. Therefore, there must be well-established procedures for producing timely direction and guidelines. A day to day coordination among agencies could accomplish this. Second, decisions concerning the response to a crisis must not only be coordinated at the national level, but also coordinated and implemented in an integrated manner at the local levels (regional, provincial, municipal and barangay or in cases involving OFWs, with the Ambassadors). Consequently, the national level inter-agency organizations must not merely decide on policy direction, but also carry out initial planning for the implementation of those decisions. Third, crisis often involve government agencies and other stakeholders that are not normally party to the national security policy-making structure. Any crisis procedure must not only include these agencies and stakeholders, but must also ensure that their perspectives are adequately integrated into the overall government response.

Section 1-1 The Crisis Management Committee (CMC) The CMC is a governing body that takes decisive actions to resolve crisis or emergency. It is primarily concerned with the formulation of crisis management policies, integration and orchestration of government and public efforts towards the control of crisis or incidents. Members of the CMC are both elected and appointed public officials who have a special responsibility to safeguard society from the adverse consequences of crisis. They are thus concerned with the entire crisis spectrum. The CMC has the five (5) critical tasks of: sense making, decision making, meaning making, terminating, and learning. Sense making may be considered as the classical assessment step in decision making. Decision making is both the act of coming to a decision as the implementation of that decision. Meaning making refers to crisis management as a political communication. Terminating a crisis is only possible if the committee, through its Chairperson, correctly handles the accountability question. Learning refers to the actual learning from a crisis; it is limited but it should be noted that a crisis often opens a window of opportunity for reform – for better or for worse. Ideally, a CMC must comprise of a Chairperson and Point-Persons for medical, legal, logistics, community relations, public safety, and social services, as well as technical advisers as needed. Members of the CMC shall establish procedures for producing timely direction and guideline, coordinate and implement responses to crisis in an integrated manner from national to local levels (in cases involving OFWs, with the Ambassadors), ensure that the perspective of government agencies and other stakeholders are integrated into the overall government response. Other functions of the CMCs are: a. Provide and mobilize available resources through an established inter-agency resource sharing protocol.


b. Coordinate inter-agency crisis management efforts; c. Ensure that operational demands during crisis are met and all actions are coordinated and complementary; and d. Establish an accessible communication lines so that reliable and timely information are received and disseminated to appropriate levels. Once the CMC is activated, they shall now perform their roles and functions in accordance to the authority and responsibility bestowed upon them. They shall be accountable not only to proper authority but also to the people. The following figure illustrates the ideal composition of a CMC at all levels:

Figure 1-1 Ideal Composition of a Crisis Management Committee at Any Level 1-1.1 The C, CMC has a special responsibility to safeguard society from the adverse consequences of crisis. This entails accomplishing tasks under Predict, Prevent, Prepare, Perform and PostAction and Assessment. In this regard, the C,CMC shall designate a specific office to undertake or monitor crisis management efforts (i.e. The Disaster Risk Reduction Management Office may be designated to monitor crisis management efforts). The following are the responsibilities of the C,CMC vis-à-vis the components of crisis management:

CM Component

Responsibility of the C,CMC

Predict

• Responsible for scanning emerging crises and conveying strategic warnings through Horizon Scanning. Likewise, it shall be responsible for monitoring actions taken with regard to warnings issued.


Prevent

• Formulates policy and contingency plan, based on worst case scenarios, which include an appropriate rules of engagement and strategic communication plan, among others, in relation to a warning issued on an emerging crisis and monitors the preparations of the agency/department or units to ensure effectiveness in preventing and mitigating the effects of a crisis.  When appropriate, crafts an operational manual based on the agency/department or unit’s contingency plan prepared in accordance with concepts and processes defined in the Core Manual. • Ensure the participation and assistance of appropriate agencies/ departments during inter-agency/department policy formulation and contingency planning  The inter-agency/department Contingency Plan will identify and define the roles of each agency/department and establish command and control during crisis. • Encourages subordinate offices/agencies/departments/units within the offices/agency/department/units to understand and internalize their roles, both in the intra-agency/department and inter-agency/ department process, in addressing emerging and current threats or crises.

Prepare

• After the formulation of plans, undertake or monitors other “Prepare” activities such as organizing, training, equipping, exercising and evaluating/improving. This includes regular conduct of simulation exercises to test and evaluate contingency plans. • Systematically undertakes capability building and enhancement, such as resource identification/mapping and allocating funds.

Perform

• Identifies the appropriate Contingency Plan that will be implemented in anticipation of an emerging or current threat. • If the emerging or current threat was not addressed by the CONPLAN which resulted to an incident developing into a crisis:  Activate the Crisis Management Committee and initially conducts all-source situation awareness on the incident.  Declare the level of crisis, depending on the situation and the prevailing procedures of the concerned agency/department or unit.  Activate the Incident Command System (ICS) and calls on the pre-designated Incident Commander (IC).


 Issues decisions and guidance to the IC including the Rules of Engagement (for Media, Incident Commanders, Crowd/External Public, etc.).The IC shall:  Report directly to the Chairperson of the CMC for guidance and instructions.  Issue Warning Order to available forces/units within the ICS. Request the CMC for additional forces when necessary.  Formulate a tentative operation plan (See Figure 3-3.2). Review contingency plan, incident action plans and other plans or manuals related to the incident while formulating a tentative plan.  Initiate movement of forces/units which includes establishment of Incident Command Post, Staging Areas and Bases, and Media Centers, etc.  Conduct inspection on the area of operation. At this point the IC may recommend to the C,CMC whether the situation needs to be elevated or he may request for special units needed to accomplish the objective.  Adjust the tentative operational plan if necessary.  Brief and recommend the best Course of Action (COA) to the C,CMC.  If time permits, conduct rehearsal on the forces/units in accordance to the COA selected by the C,CMC.  Implements and executes plan of action.  Ensures compliance of instructions down to the lowest level.  Designates a Public Information Officer (PIO) who shall undertake the following functions:  Coordinates with the Head/s Communication Group with regard to strategic communication (STRATCOM) plan and existing protocols on crisis management.  Reviews strategic communication plan and ensures that protocols are followed.  Shall receive information from the designated IC in relation to the incident.  Seeks clearance from C,CMC prior to the release of information to the public/media.  Coordinates with higher level authority or other agencies, whether local or international, for support, if necessary.  Allocates and dispatches resources to the Incident Commander.  Select and, if possible, affix signature on the selected COA.


 Exercise general supervision over the actions of the Incident Commander.  Provides expert advice to the next higher CMC or to the President and the EXECOM/NCMC.  Informs the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) if incident involves foreign nationals (whether as offender/s or victim/s).  The DFA shall ensure that the Philippine government shall act in accordance with existing multilateral and bilateral understanding or agreements. In the absence of such agreements, it shall ensure that the Philippine government maintains close contact and coordination with the foreign government whose national or property is involved.  The DFA shall also monitor the impact of crisis on the country’s diplomatic relations and international image and implement measures or recommend actions to address issues that may arise.  The DFA, as needed, shall implement measures to generate international support for the Philippines.  Be prepared to receive guidance from higher authorities. Post Action and Assessment

Table 1-1.1

• In coordination with the Incident Commander, relinquishes responsibility to appropriate agency. • Undertake or monitor post action activities. • Systematically provides Post Action and Assessment Reports to the next higher CMC or the EXECOM/NCMC.


Section 1-2 Incident Command System (ICS) The ICS is a set of personnel, policies, procedures, facilities, and equipment, integrated into a common organizational structure designed to improve emergency response operations of all types and complexities. It is based upon a flexible, scalable response organization providing a common framework within which people can work together effectively, since these people may be drawn from multiple agencies that do not routinely work together. ICS is designed to give standard response and operation procedures to reduce the problems and potential for miscommunication on such incidents. ICS includes procedures to select and form temporary management hierarchies to control funds, personnel, facilities, equipment, and communications. Personnel are selected according to standard rules previously sanctioned by legitimate authorities. ICS is a system designed to be used or applied from the time an incident occurs until the requirement for management and operations no longer exist. ICS is interdisciplinary and organizationally flexible to meet the following management challenges: a. Meets the needs of a jurisdiction to cope with incidents of any kind or complexity (i.e. it expands or contracts as needed) b. Allows personnel from a wide variety of agencies to meld rapidly into a common management structure with common terminology c. Provide logistical and administrative support to operational staff d. Be cost effective by avoiding duplication of efforts and continuing overhead e. Provide a unified, centrally authorized, legitimate emergency organization For an overview of the deployment of the ICS at the scene of incident, refer to Annex C. Likewise, a detailed discussion on the Incident Command System of the NDRRMC, as approved by its Executive Committee for implementation through Memorandum Circular Nr. 4, s. 2012, is hereto attached as Appendix C-1 of this Core Manual.

Figure 1-2.1 ICS Basic Organizational Structure

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The ICS organizational structure develops in a modular fashion based on the size and complexity of the incident, as well as the specifics of the hazard environment created by the incident. When needed, separate functional elements can be established, each of which may be further subdivided to enhance internal organizational management and external coordination. Responsibility for the establishment and expansion of the ICS modular organization ultimately rests with the Incident Commander, which bases the ICS organization on the requirements of the situation. As incident complexity increases, the organization expands from the top then down, as functional responsibilities are delegated. Concurrently with structural expansion, the number of management and supervisory positions expands to address the requirements of the incident adequately. 1-2.1 Modules of ICS.

Generally, there are three (3) modules in the ICS organizational structure, and these are: a.

Incident Commander – The ICS Commander or Incident Commander is the single person who commands the incident response, and is the final decision-making authority on the ground. It is the Incident Commander’s role to efficiently and effectively integrate the people and resources to contain the current crisis. He/She is a duly designated individual, responsible for the implementation of the decision of the CMC. His/her designation, thus, should not be made solely by virtue of his present position or assignment. He/She must possess necessary and appropriate knowledge, skills, and ability to manage or handle crisis. An Incident Commander can be: 1) Single Incident Commander – is a single person command 2) Unified Commander – is a person designated to command on larger incidents – usually when multiple agencies are involved; a Unified Command typically includes a command representative from primarily involved agencies and one from that group to act as the spokesman, though not designated as an Incident Commander. A Unified Command acts as a single entity. 3) Area Commander – is a person designated during multiple-incident situations where he has to provide support for Incident Commanders at separate locations. Generally, an Area Commander will be assigned - a single person and the Area Command will operate as a logistical and administrative support. Area Commands usually do not include an Operations function.

b.

General Staff – provides planning and operations direction and supervision, resources procurement and allocation, and support services. They are primarily composed of: 1) The Operations Chief – tasked with directing all actions to meet the incident objectives 2) The Planning Section Chief – tasked with the collection and display of incident


information, primarily consisting of the status of all resources and overall status of the incident 3) The Finance/Administration Section Chief – tasked with tracking incident related costs, personnel records, requisitions, and administrating procurement contracts required by Logistics 4) The Logistics Section Chief – tasked with providing all resources, services, and support required by the incident c.

Technical Staff – provides technical advice to the Incident Commander and they are: 1) The Safety Officer – monitors safety conditions and develops measures for assuring the safety of all assigned personnel 2) A Liaison – serves as the primary contact for supporting agencies assisting at an incident 3) The Public Information Officer – serves as the conduit for information to internal and external stakeholders, including the media or other organizations seeking information directly from the incident or event

1-2.2 The Public Information Officer or the Spokesperson (PIO) To ensure that accurate information and a consistent message is provided to the media in a crisis, there should only be one spokesperson. At times however, there may be more than one spokesperson designated depending on the type of inquiries, and the need for specific expertise to respond to questions or concerns. Whatever would be the set-up and whoever would be designated as spokesperson/s, the following must be clearly understood and applied by them in any crisis:

a.

Functions of the PIO: 1) Provide information openly and honestly – with minimum delay; 2) Contribute to confidence, trust, respect and esteem of the members of the CMC and of the ICS; and 3) Promote a greater understanding of the CMC and ICS and its contribution to the overall effort of restoring peace and order.

b.

Roles of the PIO: 1) Know the media; 2) Engage the media; 3) Tell the story – good or bad – accurately and timely.

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c.

Responsibilities of the PIO: 1) Ensure that all information provided to internal or external audience is accurate; 2) Take appropriate action to correct erroneous information that appears in any medium; 3) Avoid promotional, self-serving releases and events staged solely for publicity purposes; and 4) Protect classified information in the interest of the safety of victims and family and that of national security, including the security of one’s operation.

1-2.3 Role of Public and Media Affairs Group (PMAG) The PMAG plays a vital role in crisis management. As such, failure to consider its role would result in failure in the overall crisis management effort, as in several cases in the past, which brought the country into disrepute. Crises, as well as events that are controversial in nature are often the focus of media attention. However, fear of potentially negative media reports is no reason to refuse legitimate requests for information. It is important to remember that in the normal course of affairs, the media also provides coverage of “good news” items, and in doing so, helps to build the reputation of the CMC involved, the ICS, and the whole of government. In any situation where there is the potential for media attention, the provision of factual information is important, but the safety and well-being of victims including incident commanders and responders are the first priorities in any crisis management. Generally, as the incident develops into a critical incident or into a crisis, a PMAG shall be organized and activated within the ICS. This is to unburden the Incident Commander from answering meticulous queries from the members of press so that his operational focus would not be affected. It is the responsibility of the PIO of the ICS, at any level, to manage and maintain relations with the members of the media. Initially, the PIO of the ICS, once designated, must establish a Media Center to cater to all queries from the media or the public. Within the Media Center , a Monitoring Unit shall be organized to process the influx and outflow of information. On this note, the Incident Commander must issue his critical guidance on interacting with the media and must establish certain protocols or a system: on who should provide the necessary and appropriate information; to whom the information should be directed to; and how it should be disseminated. In other words, sets of media protocol, clearly specifying the “Dos and Don’ts” in reporting, must be in place to address specific type of crisis without necessarily curtailing freedom of information. For security purposes, only accredited and sanctioned media practitioners and outfits shall be tapped to cover crisis.


Figure 1-2.2 Organizational Structure of PMAG within the ICS The PMAG shall be organized by the ICS PIO. Basically, it evolves from the Media Center and it shall be composed of the PIOs from the different government department/agencies involved in the management of the current crisis. Thus, from a mere Media Center, it shall now become a PMAG, which has two (2) sections: the Public Relations Section, which addresses information that comes to and from the general public aside from media; and the Media Relations Section, which is in direct contact with the quad-media personalities. The ICS PIO, aside from being the Command (Technical) Staff of the Incident Commander, heads the PMAG. He may act as the overall Spokesperson or he may designate somebody from among the Media Relations Section members. 1-2.4 National Government Media Platforms As embodied in the Memorandum Order signed by the President on 22 March 2011 with Subject: Amending the Crisis Management Organization as Provided for in the 2000 Crisis Management Manual, the Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office (PCDSPO), more popularly referred to as the Communications Group, is responsible for speaking to the public, for maintaining a constant, coordinated flow of information to the public and the government about the emergency or crisis. It implements the Crisis/Emergency Communication Plan of the government. It also ensures that all other government spokespersons of the respective departments, agencies instrumentalities or bureaus involved in the emergency 1

Media Center is equivalent to the Joint Information Center in the international scene.


shall avoid speaking to the public or media before, during and right after the emergency. It takes responsibility for the messaging during the crisis or emergency and it ensures that the EXECOM, NSC/NCMC and all other government officials or agents involved in the crisis adhere to the Crisis Communications Plan and speak in one voice. This group also ensures the prudent handling of information to and from the media, and that the information disseminated will not prejudice nor hamper on-going operations or the crisis management process. It develops an appropriate Crisis/Emergency Communications Plan which shall be implemented and strictly adhered to by the EXECOM, NSC/NCMC and all other government officials or agents. ANNEX D of this manual lists the media platforms of the government should official pronouncements/statements of the Communications Group are made. For more details on the mandates of the PCDSPO, please refer to EO Nr. 4 series of 2010, Office of the President. 1-2.5

The On-Scene Commander

An On-Scene Commander is an individual in the vicinity of an incident, who temporarily assumes command and institutes immediate emergency procedures, such as the isolation of the incident from the rest of the environment. He/She must have the proper training and the authority to respond. Technically, he/she is part of the second type of First Responders. He/she has the responsibility of applying necessary actions to avoid “greater evil or damage” that may arise out of an existing or developing crisis. In doing so, he/she has to exercise “wise judgment” in the performance of duties and responsibilities. His/her role ends when an Incident Commander has been designated, unless he/she is also selected by the latter to be part of the ICS. 1-2.6

The First Responder/s

There are two types of First Responders: The first refers to those who are on the scene of the incident (anybody who is coincidentally on the scene); and the second refers to certified responders who are on standby for such occurrence (as mandated). The first responder referred to by this manual is of the second type. The First Responder carries out the immediate and timely response needed in addressing an incident. The First Responder’s performance covers that point in time when the level of incident shifts either to a higher level or towards elimination of crisis. The First Responder also secures the scene of incident and conveys the appropriate communication to respective channels, primarily, to an Incident Commander or to the Local Chief Executive. Thus, the response of the First Responder is crucial in crisis management.

Section 1-3 Working Synergy Crisis management resides with the Executive level in an organization. It normally has no direct power, but functions as an adviser or coordinator to ensure that all parts of an organization are focused on the common goal. Effective crisis management relies on a thorough integration of efforts at all levels of the organization. Moreover, there must be clear understanding that crisis must be addressed at the lowest political jurisdiction and that higher level crisis management organizations must be ready to provide assistance and additional resources when needed. table of contents

This section aims to discuss working synergy as a delineation of roles and responsibilities

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between crisis management committee members and the Incident Commanders so that respective tasks and purposes of each element would be clearly understood. One of the primary responsibilities of the local CMC is to organize the Incident Command System (ICS) and to designate its Incident Commander (IC) in accordance to the nature of the crisis. The designated IC shall be reporting directly to the Chairperson, CMC for guidance and instructions. However, on complex situations wherein the need to organize different ICSs is paramount, CMC has the prerogative to create several ICSs with different ICs that addresses specific types of crisis simultaneously. At this juncture, either an Area (Support) Commander or a Unified Commander within the ICS shall be designated to synchronize and to coordinate all efforts of subordinate commanders. The Area (Support) Commander or the Unified Commander shall be reporting directly to the Chairperson of the local CMC for guidance and instructions, or for additional support requirements. It is the joint responsibility of the local CMC and the next higher level CMC to determine the appropriate level of CMC that would best address the crisis. The decision to elevate crisis response should be based on their continuous and thorough assessment of the situation, taking into consideration the severity of the nature of the crisis, the capability of available forces or units addressing the crisis and the availability of resources.

The CMC shall not distract or disrupt the operations of the ICS. Its primary functions are: a. providing for the requirements of the ICS b. coordinating and facilitating support from higher authority; and c. supervising the execution of the plan of action by the members of the ICS once it has been established and operationalized.

The CMC shall intervene in the operation if: (1) actions undertaken by the ICS are not in accordance to those approved by the CMC; or (2) the CMC, during their assessment, finds that capabilities of committed forces or units inappropriate or ineffective. The CMC shall be the overall responsible and accountable unit, whatever the outcome of the conduct of the operations. The Incident Commander has the responsibility of selecting, constituting, and organizing units and members of the ICS. This responsibility implies the prerogative of choosing what unit or agency of the government or private sector should be involved in managing the crisis. Likewise, he/she has the implied responsibility of determining additional assets necessary to accomplish the mission. Considering the immensity of his/her knowledge in the different operational concepts and the diverse tactics, techniques, and procedures in crisis management, the IC has the responsibility of generating options in addressing the crisis and recommending the best option to the CMC. When an option has been chosen and approved by the Chairperson, CMC, the IC now has the responsibility of implementing the plan of action. Corollary to this, he/she must ensure that the mission and intents are disseminated and clearly understood by all elements of the ICS. The IC reports directly to the Chairperson, CMC for guidance and instructions and for purposes of rendering reports on the results of the operation. To this effect, it is his/her


responsibility to recommend to the Chairperson, CMC whether or not the resolution of the crisis should be elevated to a higher response level. To further discuss the two (2) aforementioned elements, the table below delineates the CMC’s and the Incident Commander’s authority, responsibility, and accountability. COMMAND

ELEMENTS CMCs

Incident Commander

 Philippine Laws  Policies, guidance, intents, issuances from higher level

 Designation order  Operations orders  Decisions and guidance of concerned CMC  Knowledge, skills and ability to perform actions

Responsibility

 Incident Commander’s actions, omissions or failures

 Subordinates’ actions, omissions or failures

Accountability

 Accountable to higher authority and to the people

 To the concerned CMC

Authority

Table 1-3.1

Section 1-4 National Level Crisis Management Committees

National level crisis management committees are intra and inter-agency/department organizations at the national level created by law, Executive Orders or Department Orders. These organizations are created because government recognizes that a crisis has implications to national security. This section identifies the national level crisis management organizations and its membership, and enumerates their respective roles and functions in crisis management. 1-4.1

The National Security Council (NSC)

The National Security Council (NSC) is the principal forum for inter-agency/department deliberation of national security policy issues requiring Presidential decisions. The government recognizes that a crisis has implications to national security; thus, policies and contingency plans are formulated and agencies/departments are organized to prevent or mitigate its effects. The NSC is an advisory body to the President. The National Security Adviser (NSA), as Director General of the National Security Council Secretariat, ensures that the policies formulated by the NSC and approved by the President are effectively and efficiently implemented. The function of the NSC in relation to crisis management is “to evaluate and analyze all information, events, and incidents in terms of the risks they pose or implications upon and/ or threats to the overall security and stability of the nation, for the purpose of recommending to the President appropriate responses thereto and/or action thereon.” In effect, the NSC serves as the government’s National Crisis Management Committee, addressing crises or incidents with broad implications on the ‘exercise of sovereignty, integrity of national


territory, maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare of the people’.

National level Crisis Management Committees are structured as follows: A. Executive Committee, National Security Council as the National Crisis Management Committee (EXECOM/NCMC)

The EXECOM, NSC/NCMC is the highest executive policy-making body that addresses man-made crisis at national level. This senior inter-agency/department forum shall resolve policy issues concerning threats and the risks they pose to the populace. In a national level crisis, it shall inform the President of the situation and the initial actions of government agencies/departments. It shall also recommend to the President, as Chairperson of the NCMC, appropriate inter-agency/ department responses to resolve the crisis. The President executes his crisis management plan by way of issuance of policies, guidance, and intents to the EXECOM, NSC/NCMC, who shall, in turn, execute intra-agency/department policies and plans in support of the President’s crisis management plans.

The EXECOM/NCMC is composed of the following: Principal Members

Secondary Members

• President and/or Executive Secretary as Chairperson • Executive Secretary • Secretary of National Defense • Secretary of Interior and Local Government • Secretary of Foreign Affairs • Secretary of Justice • Head(s), Communications Group • National Security Adviser (Secretary of the Committee)

• Secretary of Health • Secretary of Finance • Secretary of Trade and Industry • Secretary of Social Welfare and Development • Secretary of Budget and Management • Secretary of Energy • Chairperson, OPAPP • Other government officials as the President may appoint or designate from time to time.

Table 1-4.1 Certain members of the EXECOM/NCMC is also designated as Cabinet-Officer Primarily Responsible (C-OPR) for certain types of threats/crises/incidents. Member as C-OPR

Types of Threats/Crises/Incidents

Executive Secretary

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1. Terrorism as defined in the Human Security Act of 2007; 2. Crises or emergencies in foreign countries affecting Filipino nationals (Inter-Agency/ Department Response, EO 34, s. 2011, Creation of the Overseas Preparedness and Response Team); and table of contents

3. Border incidents (Inter-Agency/Department Response, EO 57, s. 2011, Creation of the National Coast Watch Council).

Secretary of National Defense

1. Threats to national security, such as but not limited to revolts, mutinies, insurrections, coup d’ etats, war; and 2. Border incidents as Co-C-OPR.

Secretary of Interior and Local Government

Secretary of Foreign Affairs

Threats to peace and order (i.e. civil disturbances, violent labor strikes, riots, anarchy, disorderly mass demonstrations). 1. Crises or emergencies involving OFWs as Co-COPR (Intra-Agency/Department Response); and 2. Border incidents as Co-C-OPR.

Secretary of Health

Threats to public health.

Secretaries of Finance and Trade and Industry

Crises or emergencies involving the economy.

Secretary of Energy

Threats to energy and oil supply

National Security Adviser

Secretariat to the NSC and EXECOM/NCMC.

Table 1-4.2 In cases of crises or emergencies not defined herein, the Chairperson of the EXECOM/ NCMC shall designate the Secretary of the Department concerned to serve as C-OPR for that crisis or emergency situation. The existing departmental manuals or procedures in managing the crisis or emergency shall apply. The Cabinet Officer Primarily Responsible or C-OPR plays a vital role in all the 5Ps of crisis management. Crisis leadership has become a defining feature of contemporary governance, both in the public and private sectors. Citizens expect governments and public agencies/departments to make sense of what is going on and to protect them from real or perceived threats. Effective leadership in crisis management is even more significant with the advent of 24-hour news coverage and technological advances, including rapid growth in the use of social media. B. The Sub-Committee, National Crisis Management Committee table of contents

Directly under the EXECOM/NCMC is the inter-agency/department Sub-Committee,

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NCMC, with the NSA as its Chairperson. This senior sub-cabinet group is tasked to conduct inter-agency/department Horizon Scanning of the PREDICT component of the Crisis Management Framework, monitor inter-agency/department collaboration to manage threats and risks, and identify unresolved policy issues for the EXECOM/NCMC. The Sub-committee, through the NSA, informs the EXECOM/NCMC of emerging crises, and recommends appropriate response and seeks strategic guidance in addressing emerging crises. The Sub-Committee shall then carry out the initial planning based on the policy guidance supplied by the EXECOM/NCMC and monitor implementation of the decisions made. The members of the Sub-Committee are the following: • Undersecretaries or Assistant Secretaries of the Principal Members of the EXECOM/ NCMC • Other Under/Assistant Secretaries of Secondary Members of the EXECOM/NCMC who shall be called upon when needed • Other Departments and Bureaus o Director General, National Intelligence Coordinating Agency/department o Chief of Staff, AFP or representative o Chief, PNP or representative o Chief, PCG or representative o Director, NBI or representative • Other Stakeholders C. Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC)

The ATC was created under Section 53 of the Republic Act 9372 or the Human Security Act of 2007, for the proper and effective implementation of the country’s anti-terrorism policy. It serves as the National Crisis Management Committee in cases of a national-level crisis involving acts of terrorism. The ATC is composed of the following: • Chairperson: Executive Secretary • Vice-Chairperson: Secretary of Justice Members • Secretary of Foreign Affairs • Secretary of National Defense • Secretary of Interior and Local Government • Secretary of Finance • Secretary of Transportation and Communication • National Security Adviser Support Agencies • National Bureau of Investigation • Bureau of Immigration • Office of Civil Defense • Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines • Anti-Money Laundering Council • Philippine Center on Transnational Crime

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• Philippine National Police Intelligence and Investigative elements The Program Management Center (PMC) of the ATC serves as the Support Secretariat of the Council when the ATC is constituted as a National Crisis Management Committee to address crises involving act/s of terrorism. D. Overseas Preparedness and Response Team (OPRT) The OPRT was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 34 dated 06 April 2011, replacing the Presidential Middle East Preparedness Committee (PMEPC) that was created under Executive Order Nr. 159 (s. 2002). The OPRT was set up for the purpose of addressing crises/emergencies in foreign countries that affect Filipino nationals. It serves as the National Crisis Management Committee for crisis involving OFWs. The OPRT is composed of the following: • Chairperson: Executive Secretary Members: • Presidential Adviser on Overseas Filipino Workers’ Concerns • Secretary of Foreign Affairs • Secretary of Labor and Employment • Secretary of National Defense • Secretary of Justice • Secretary of Interior and Local Government • Secretary of Budget and Management The OPRT Secretariat is composed of officials from the OPRT member-agencies/ departments, which provide administrative and related support services to the team. It is headed by a senior official designated by the Executive Secretary and serves as the support secretariat of the OPRT when the latter performs the role of a National Crisis Management Committee for crisis involving the safety of OFWs. E. Inter-agency Energy Contingency Committee (IECC) As provided in Administrative Order No. 6 dated March 3, 2011, the IECC is directed to ensure that the necessary preparations are in place should there be any disruption to the supply of petroleum and other energy sources in the country. This committee is composed of the following: • Department of Energy: Chairperson • Department of Finance • Department of Budget and Management • Department of Justice • Department of Trade and Industry • Department of Agriculture • Department of National Defense • Department of the Interior and Local Government • Department of Transportation and Communications • Department of Foreign Affairs


• National Economic Development Authority • National Security Council F. National Coast Watch Council (NCWC) As provided in Executive Order No. 57 dated September 6, 2011, the NCWC shall be the central inter-agency/department body which shall be in charge of formulating strategic direction and policy guidance for the National Coast Watch System.

This committee is composed of the following: • Executive Secretary: Chairperson • Department of Transportation and Communications • Department of National Defense • Department of Foreign Affairs • Department of Interior and Local Government • Department of Justice • Department of Energy • Department of Finance • Department of Environment and Natural Resources • Department of Agriculture G. Crisis Management Support Secretariat (CMSS) of the ONSA

The CMSS serves as the support secretariat to the EXECOM/NCMC and Secretariat to the Sub-Committee, NCMC. It shall maintain a database for all Inter-agency/department Contingency Plans, After Action Reviews, Assessments, updates on Horizon Scanning methodologies, and other relevant data for crisis management. It is also responsible for advocating inter-agency/ department collaboration and leads inter-agency/department trainings and rehearsals to address threats or crises. The CMSS likewise assists concerned staff of the C-OPR in validating, through inter-agency/department simulation exercises, the inter-agency/department contingency plans. H.

Presidential Situation Room (PSR)

The PSR serves as the National Crisis Management Operations Center for various contingencies and crises. It is managed and operated by the Office of the National Security Adviser through an Executive Director. It performs the following functions: • Monitors events, situations and developments that have national security implications including those with serious diplomatic, political and peace and order ramifications; • Provides current intelligence and crisis support to the President, the Executive Secretary, the National Security Adviser, and the Secretary of the Presidential Management Staff; • Serves as the primary monitoring, coordination and communications center in Malacañang on classified information; • Coordinates the collection, verification and evaluation of highly sensitive information bearing on national security;


• Establishes linkages and coordinates with the various Operations Centers of civil and security agencies of government; Illustrated below is the organizational set-up directly responsible for crisis management at the national level. It shall be headed/chaired by the C-OPR whether through an intra- or inter-agency/department crisis management committee and depending on the nature or the type of crisis. The C-OPR’s designated crisis management office/unit shall serve as the Crisis Management Operations Center. When a crisis escalates or when an information and/or incident demands higher-level decision-making, the EXECOM/NCMC shall be activated upon the advise of the NSA. The PSR becomes the National Crisis Management Operations Center. The CMSS, on the other hand, shall serve as the support secretariat of the EXECOM/NCMC. The C-OPR shall provide expert advice depending on the nature or the type of crisis. The chart below is an illustration of this organizational set-up.

Figure 1-4.1 ONSA-PSR-CMSS-EXECOM for NCM Command Relationship and Degree of Control (Intra/Inter-Agency Crisis Management)

Section 1-5 Local Crisis Management Committees (Regional, Provincial, City or Municipality, and Barangay) As embodied in EO 320 s. 1988 entitled “Reorganizing the Peace and Order Council”, a Special Action Committee/Crisis Management Committee shall be organized within the NPOC to take decisive action in emergency situation. Same EO directs the POCs to organize at the regional, provincial, city or municipality, and barangay levels a similar committee to what is being prescribed at the national level. In the case of Metro Manila, the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) Chairperson or whoever is designated by the President as Chairperson of the Regional POC shall serve as Chairperson of the Regional CMC.


The above provisions simplify efforts in the creation of a CMC at the lower level since POCs have long been established at all levels, and therefore imply no additional cost and time. Just like the National-level Crisis Management Organizations, Peace and Order Councils (at all levels) are well-represented by the different government departments, agencies, and even bureaus. These representatives may be the same people who could form part of the local CMC when the need arises. Both CMCs and POCs are organizations of the government that have a common objective of maintaining or restoring peace and order in society. Sizes of these organizations vary from one level to another but roles and functions are still the same. The only difference is that POCs’ functions cover the whole range of peace and order, while CMCs functions only cover a specific type of situation. Hence, a CMC’s organizational structure depends on: the type of its operation, which is relative to the nature of the threat, hazard, or risk; on jurisdiction; and on available resources. Whatever will be the composition of said organizations (at any level) operational capabilities will not be affected for as long as basic roles and functions of each element remain the same.

Section 1-6 Crisis Management Organizations Abroad The Crisis Management Organization abroad is guided by the “One Country-Team Approach” from the provisions of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as Amended by Republic Act No. 100222. Under the country-team approach, all officers, representatives and personnel posted abroad, regardless of their mother agencies shall, on a per country basis, act as one country-team with a mission under the leadership of the ambassador. This means that during times of crisis, the Ambassador of a particular country becomes the Chairperson, Crisis Management Committee and all personnel posted under him/her become members of the CMC. He/she shall call on the designated Incident Commander among his staffs, preferably the Defense and Armed Forces Attaché (DAFA), when appropriate. Further, as Chairperson CMC, he/she shall initiate crisis management efforts as espoused by this manual. Inter-agency and regional crisis management efforts will be guided by the provisions of the Executive Order 34 series of 2011 creating the Overseas Preparedness and Response Team (OPRT). The OPRT is tasked to draw up strategies and programs and formulate policies to appropriately respond to any crisis affecting Filipinos abroad. It is also tasked to develop and adopt interactive operating arrangements among government agencies/departments to effect maximum coordination. In essence, the OPRT serves as the inter-agency Crisis Management Committee for crisis involving OFWs.

Section 1-7 Crisis Escalation Protocol (Transitions) Transitions mark the intervals between the on-going operation and the full execution of branches and sequels. In the military, transitions often mark the change from one dominant type of operations, such as offense, to another, such as stability. Commanders consider transitions from the current operation to future operations early in the planning process. Command arrangements, for example, often change. Typically, the command structure evolves to meet

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changing situations. Changes in the strategic situation require adjusting the strength and composition of deployed forces. When the dominant type of operation changes, the types of units originally deployed may no longer be appropriate. As each new force prepares for operations, the force must be tailored to meet mission requirements and environmental constraints. Transitions are the sequels that occur between types of operations. Commanders anticipate and plan for them as part of any future operation. Transitions between operations are difficult, and during execution may create unexpected opportunities for own forces, enemies, or adversaries. Such opportunities must be recognized quickly, developed as branches to the transition operation, and acted upon immediately. Transition between operations may be the most difficult follow-on operation to accomplish. Typically, a role of responsibility can be transferred during an incident for several reasons. First, as the incident grows, a more qualified person is needed to take over as Incident Commander, to handle the ever-growing needs of the incident. Secondly, in reverse where an incident reduces in size, command can be passed down to a less qualified (in terms of level) to make available highly-qualified resources for other tasks or incidents. And thirdly, due to jurisdictional change, when the incident moves location or area of responsibility, or because of normal turnover of personnel due to extended incidents. Whatever the reason, the transfer of command process (transition) always includes a Transfer of Command Briefing, which may be oral, written, or a combination of both that should be attended by key members of the incoming and outgoing CMCs and ICSs. The succeeding table shows conditions or situations in any Crisis Level so that smooth transition of command responsibility is attained. The conditions or situations enumerated below will dictate what particular CMC is appropriate to manage a certain crisis. In effect, these are the trigger points in the handover of responsibilities. It is, likewise, advised that all members of CMCs and ICSs shall familiarize themselves with the conditions or situations that will trigger the handover of responsibilities from local to the national, as stated below. Involved CMC

Conditions or Situations (Ifs and Whens)

Barangay/Municipal/City • Local security forces or law enforces and CMC are in control of the situation • Appropriate resources are available and capable at either Municipal or Barangay level Provincial

• Local security forces or law enforcers at the municipal/city level are unable to resolve the crisis within their capabilities • Barangay/Municipal/City CMC recommends elevation of the crisis level • Situation requires employment of security forces and utilization of resources of the provincial level organizations and beyond • Incident affects two or more municipalities within the same province


Regional

• Situation requires employment of security forces and utilization of resources of the Regional level organizations and beyond • Upon the recommendation of the Provincial CMC or of the C-OPR (EXECOM, NSC/NCMC) of a particular crisis • Incident affects two or more provinces within the same region • Crisis involves foreign national/s, either perpetrators or victims • Crisis affects peace process, national tourism industry, and other major industries

National

• The crisis (issues and demands) requires major decisions of the principal members of the EXECOM, NSC/NCMC. • The President’s decision is required • International commitments are at stake • Crisis entails border issues/conflicts • National Security issues are at stake, such as food, water, energy security, critical transportation and communication structure, and environment are threatened • Incident affects two or more regions within the country • The highest terrorist threat level involving mass casualty attacks has been declared • And, upon the recommendation of the C-OPR of a particular crisis to the EXECOM, NSC/NCMC.

Table 1-7.1 To further give a clear understanding on why a crisis should be handed over to a more appropriate CMC, the table below shows a list of available resources that a specific Crisis Management Committee may utilize at their own discretion: Involved CMC

Available Resources

Barangay/Municipal/City  Local security forces (Detachment of CAAs, Bantay-Bayan, AFP Companies or Teams, etc.)  Local law enforcers (Police, Tanods, SWAT, etc.)  Fire stations  Volunteers  LGU’s Special Response Teams, if there is any Provincial

 Army Battalion or Brigade  Police, Provincial Public Safety Companies (PPSCs)  Provincial Government Units  Provincial Special Response Teams  Departments’ and Agencies’ Provincial Offices


Regional

 Army Division  AFP Unified Commands  PNP DIPO  Police, Regional Public Safety Battalions (RPSBs)  Naval Districts  Coast Guard Districts  Air Force Divisions  Departments’, Agencies’ and Bureaus’ Regional Offices

National

 AFP National Maneuver Units  PNP National Maneuver Units  Coast Guard Special Units  Government Departments, Agencies, and Bureaus  Local and international NGOs  Specially organized, trained, and equipped response units

Table 1-7.2 In aid of analysis or situation assessment, whether a crisis level is to be elevated or downgraded, CMCs at all levels are advised to use the succeeding matrix to identify reasons why they have to relinquish responsibility over a certain crisis. The matrix is answerable by either YES or NO, based on the table below (Table 1-7.3): Prevailing Situation: (A brief (Example): A Kidnap for Ransom Group kidnapped a US description of the existing diplomat in Zamboanga City and brought the victim to the situation) Province of Sulu. AFP JSOG was deployed to rescue the victim. Regional CMC was activated and JTF “Comet” is tasked as ICS. US Embassy has issued Travel Advisory – banning travel to Mindanao to their citizens Parameters

Levels of Crisis I (B/M/C)

II (Provincial)

III (Regional)

IV (National)

Resource Utilization

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Personalities Involved (Victims and Perpetrators)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Geopolitical Boundaries

Yes

Yes

No

No

Diplomatic Issues

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

National Security Issues

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Economic/Tourism Issues

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Affected Infrastructures

Yes

Yes

No

No

Table 1-7.3


Interpreting the above example, the matrix would tell us that, although the prevailing situation only affects the provincial level with regards to geopolitical boundaries and to a certain degree, only affects provincial level infrastructures, there is a need to elevate the situation to the highest level; national level assets are already employed/utilized; the victim is a foreign diplomat with its attendant national security, economic and tourism implication. As situation shifts from one level to another, the chart below illustrates the transition of authority, and the flow of communication:

Figure 1-7.1 Transition of Authority and Communication Flow Chart Crisis management starts at the lowest political jurisdiction. As the incident becomes critical, the local chief executive being the chairperson of the local Peace and Order Council has the responsibility of creating and activating a Crisis Management Committee that will address the existing situation. Corollary to this responsibility is the designation of an Incident Commander. The Incident Commander, on the other hand, has the responsibility of organizing the ICS and henceforth, the ICS shall be placed under the operational control of the CMC, and both (CMC and ICS) shall perform their respective roles and functions as described above. At this point, the CMC is required to render regular updates to the EXECOM, NSC/NCMC through the PSR/CMSS, through appropriate channels. The C-OPR of a particular crisis or his duly designated Crisis Management Officer (CMO), for their part, may proceed to the area to work directly with the CMC and ensure that necessary support is available and higher authority’s intents and guidelines are adhered to. In this case, however, the CMC is not under the command and control of the C-OPR or of the CMO, but they may seek the latter’s advice and guidance, if they find it necessary. To emphasize, the C-OPR or the CMO has no command relationship and control over the ICS.


When the need to elevate the management of the crisis arises, as described in the preceding tables and matrices, the C-OPR has the responsibility and authority to direct the activation of the next higher level CMC. If this happens, the lower level CMC shall be placed under operational command (OPCOM) of the higher level CMC and they shall now start working as one expanded CMC. The existing ICS shall continue with its current mission unless replaced by the higher level CMC through proper procedures as described above. On this note, the lower CMC relinquishes its control over the existing ICS since it (ICS) will now be placed under the operational control of the higher level CMC. It shall then be the responsibility of the higher level CMC to render regular updates to the EXECOM, NSC/NCMC through the PSR/CMSS. Same procedures shall be applied every time there is a need to elevate the level of the crisis. 1-7.1 Special Conditions When a higher level CMC takes control of the situation, it is not necessary for the previously organized ICS to be changed. There are instances that require only additional resources to augment the existing ICS, for the reason that they are more familiar with the nature of the operational environment and of the culture of the people within the affected area. At this instance, the augmented resources (personnel or equipment) shall be placed under the operational control of the Incident Commander. Likewise, there are instances when a more appropriate ICS should be organized because of the nature of the operation, which requires highly trained and equipped individuals or units, but the controlling CMC remains the same. This particular instance requires the incoming ICS to be placed under the operational control of the involved CMC, while the outgoing ICS shall be placed under the operational control of the newly formed ICS to play a supporting role. This is to avoid confusion among members of the response units or agencies. In the event that one of the aforementioned situations happens, it is imperative that the C-OPR (of the EXECOM, NSC/NCMC) of a particular crisis or his appropriate representative establishes physical presence at the local CMC, purposely not to influence or intervene with the decisions and operations of the latter, but to see to it that national level intents are adhered to and national level resources are properly appropriated and employed. When a crisis occurs within an area, which is administered by a semi-autonomous institution such as the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), and other specially protected zones or areas, the administering authorities are responsible in the management of crisis occurring within their area of jurisdiction. But such responsibility ends when the conditions or situations, set at National-Level Crisis in Table 6-6.1 of Section 6-6 of this manual, are present. In this case, the C-OPR of the EXECOM, NCMC shall immediately take control and the national level ICS (augmented by their ICS) shall immediately be organized to respond to the crisis. As embodied in the 1987 Philippine Constitution and as mentioned in the above discussion, the President is the ultimate person responsible for crisis management, because it is his primordial duty to protect the citizens of the state from the effects of threats, hazards, and risks. Hence, the President, at any point in the crisis management spectrum and upon the recommendation of the members of the EXECOM, NSC/NCMC, may intervene with the decisions made by the local CMC and can hold implementation of the plan of actions of the ICS if he finds it necessary. Members of the CMC and of the ICS must understand that there is a need to define clearly the authority, responsibility, and accountability of each member and that, the principle of inter-operability must always be taken with due consideration to avoid confusion that may result in failure. This can only be attained through inter-agency coordination, cooperation, and


communication during planning and execution of operation, which can also be enhanced through continuous conduct of trainings, rehearsals, and simulation exercises. All incidents begin and end locally. But we have to consider also that not all crisis management assets/resources are available at the local level. Therefore, when the need to transfer or elevate the level of management arises, the Incident Commander and the CMC Chairperson must be prepared to relinquish command and control to avoid further loss of lives and limbs and damage to properties. The succeeding chapters will enable planners and analysts at all levels of crisis management organizations to formulate intra or inter agency manuals and contingency and crisis action plans necessary to prevent the occurrence of crisis or at least mitigate its effects


CHAPTER 2 SITUATION AWARENESS Effective crisis management begins with having an effective situation awareness (SA) process. Defined as the ability to extract and integrate information in a continuously changing environment and to use such information to direct future actions, SA constitutes the PREDICT component in crisis management. SA, in this crisis management manual, is an attempt to gradually move away from the traditional concept of ‘managing crisis’ and into the more challenging but imperative notion of preventing crisis from even occurring. This manual prescribes the use of a systems-and-dynamics, diverse, and collaborative scanning and warning process at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels for detecting opportunities, risks, vulnerabilities, threats and potential crises. At the strategic level, SA shall reduce surprises and eliminate potential crisis by confronting “weak signals” and root causes. At the operational and tactical levels, SA shall enable timely preparation, through capability enhancement and effective execution of contingency, crisis action, and crisis recovery plans. SA at the Strategic, Operational and Tactical Levels The 21st century threat environment is described as increasingly complex and uncertain, wherein threats come from multiple sources, are interlinked, and are rapidly evolving. Threat and risk identification, prioritization, handling, and response have become increasingly challenging. Analysts must be able to manage uncertainty and probability, detect potential sources of conflict, assess impact, and correctly judge the efficiency of public policy response. These require an allsource scanning and warning process with improved sense-making capabilities and enhanced inter-agency/department and multi-stakeholder approach at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Section 2-1 Strategic Situation Awareness At the strategic level, SA means generating foresight in crisis management. It is strategically preventing crises. In strategic SA, agencies/departments seek to anticipate not only emerging threats and their adverse consequences, but also opportunities in the short (0-5 years), medium (15 years), and long (25 years) terms. The EXECOM of the National Security Council or the NCMC, the five (5) Cabinet clusters – Good Governance and Anti-Corruption; Human Development and Poverty Reduction; Economic Development; Security, Justice and Peace; and Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation – and the Sub-Committee of the NCMC are ideal platforms for fusing information and generating foresight. Other national level fusion mechanisms such as the National Intelligence Board, the National Intelligence Committee, and the Joint AFP/PNP Intel Committee (JAPIC) shall be employed for this purpose.

Strategic SA consists of the following: a. Detecting What is Happening; b. Analyzing What Seems to be Happening;


c. Interpreting What is Really Happening; d. Determining How Things Could Go (Scenario Building); e. Preparing Warning Products; and f. Conveying Warnings. A more detailed discussion on each of these steps and suggested methodologies could be found in Annex E. Currently at least 30 other methodologies are being explored, to update and enhance the current methodologies being used. Briefly, detecting what is happening means scanning the environment for risks, vulnerabilities and opportunities. Scanning shall be intra-agency or within the agency/department; and inter-agency or with other agencies/ departments, civil society organizations, subject matter experts, and the public. This diverse and collaborative scanning and warning process is premised on the idea that if one has to cope with unpredictability, a detection system should be closely linked to the target – the public – since a threat, adversary or crisis must ultimately attack the target to succeed. Bringing the public on board consequently reduces uncertainties about how a threat, adversary, or crisis shall proceed. This is followed by analyzing the scanned/gathered information. Agencies/departments shall make sense of the links between several variables or indicators – classified as drivers and/ or inhibitors – and how they relate to trends and the agency’s internal and external environments. It is identifying which are the more influential indicators (among the drivers and inhibitors). Influence Analysis, which is explained in detail in Annex E, is one of the methods used to identify the more influential indicators. The links and behavior of the more influential indicators of an identified threat, vulnerability or opportunity is then interpreted against the agency/department’s most current available information, especially its organizational capabilities and weaknesses, plans, and strategies. Threat, risk, and vulnerability analysis is employed at this instance; a detailed discussion is provided in Annex E. The concerned agency/department shall again meet with other agencies to completely explore the relationships and the future direction of these influential indicators. Determining how things could go or scenario building is concretely exploring the future direction of opportunities, risks, threats, and potential crises. Agencies/departments focus on the more crucial variables/indicators, then craft and simulate scenarios, and assess probability and direct/indirect impacts. Warning products are then prepared. Warning reports could come in several forms but they shall consist of Drivers and Inhibitors, Scenarios, Areas of Convergence and Flashpoints, Policy Recommendations, Limitations, Contradicting Analysis, Analysis for further development and End-users. Warning products are then conveyed in the most efficient method. Warning products from strategic SA shall be conveyed to decision makers at the strategic level for the evaluation and formulation of relevant policies. At the operational level, warning products shall be conveyed to decision makers of concerned agencies and departments, and/or local government offices for the preparation and execution of contingency, crisis action and recovery plans. In preparing and conveying warnings, agencies/departments shall dissociate themselves from biases and selfinterests. They shall also monitor weaknesses of the SA process to improve outputs.


The value of warning products in strategic SA is NOT defined by the way they are realized, but by their impact on strategies, decision-making and on future state of affairs. Warning products should draw attention to an issue and lead to decisions that eliminate the threat. They should convince decision makers to allocate resources where the “real risks” are. Strategic SA is a rigorous process. More than the ability to detect and warn of risks, threats, and potential crises, it demands wisdom and skill in identifying and employing opportunities. Strategic SA thus requires intuition and creativity, diverse academic expertise and experience, and competent ability to review and offer alternative views and methodologies. Section 2-2 Operational Situation Awareness Strategic SA shall be complemented with operational and tactical SA. The process of generating operational SA consists of the following: a. Planning and Direction; b. Collection; c. Processing; d. Analysis and Production; and e. Dissemination A detailed discussion on each of these steps is provided in Annex E. In brief, planning and directing is identifying the courses of action to take and how they shall be undertaken when tasked with a specific information requirement. It is listing what we know about the information requirement, what we need to find out and the ways to gather the needed information. Collection is gathering information overtly and covertly, the latter through special collection methods. Processing is evaluating all the gathered information and putting it into an information report. This information could be anything from a translated document to a description of a photo. Analysis and production is taking a closer look at all the information and how it fits together, while answering the initial information requirement. It is assessing what is happening and why, what might occur next, and how it affects the public’s interests and that of the agency’s/ department’s. Threat, risk, and vulnerability analysis, discussed in Annex C, is also employed at this instance. Dissemination is giving our final written analyses to support information requirements identified at the strategic and tactical levels. These may come back with more questions and prompt the start of the whole process again. These written analyses shall confirm, counter, or modify indicators of emerging threats identified in strategic SA. Operational SA thus processes warnings from strategic SA – a top-to-bottom approach – giving warnings form and making them actionable. It identifies the more specific features of emerging threats’ capabilities and vulnerabilities, targets and intents against that of the agency’s/department’s. This is complemented by a bottom-up approach, where operational SA conveys warnings from tactical SA for the disposition/use of operational and strategic SA. This includes coming up with new SA goals. SA at all levels thus needs to be adaptive, facilitative, and dynamic to be able to recognize and advance new SA goals on top of existing ones. Moreover, SA processes at the operational and tactical shall need to work within the political and administrative cycles of three (3) to six (6) years.


Through this entire process of confirming, countering, and/or modifying indicators of emerging threats, operational SA attains its goal of providing information crucial for the agency/ department’s preparation and execution of contingency, crisis action, and crisis recovery plans against diverse threats. Section 2-3 Tactical Situation Awareness At the tactical level, SA is the systematic and continuous process of monitoring an identified threat shortly before a crisis occurs, to eliminate or disrupt an outbreak; during the crisis, in preparing and performing crisis action plans; and post-crisis, to reduce escalation or resurgence and to ensure speedy rehabilitation. Generating tactical SA is similar to generating strategic and operational SA except that it is more deliberate, is aimed against an identified threat or crisis, and is undertaken by units that are near and more familiar to the identified threat or crisis. It also demands superior abilities in pattern-recognition, action-selection, and decision making under severe pressure. Generating tactical SA consists of: a. Defining the Operating Environment of the Identified Threat or Crisis; b. Describing the Impact of the Operating Environment to the Identified Threat or Crisis; c. Evaluating Capabilities/Vulnerabilities of the Identified Threat or Crisis’ and the Agency and Supporting Agencies; and d. Determining an Identified Threat or Crisis’ Probable Direction

Annex E provides a detailed discussion of each of these steps. A sample checklist on specific tactical SA requirements is also provided in Annex F. Figure 2-1.1 sums up SA at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels through scanning and warning and the ends by which these processes are undertaken at the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis intervals.

Short-term (0-5 yrs)

SITUATION AWARENESS (SA)

Strategic Situation Medium-term Awareness (15 yrs) Long-term (25 yrs)

Situation Awareness aiding decision makers in policy analysis, evaluation or formulation leading to prevention or elimination of emerging crisis by confronting weak signals and root causes at earliest possible time and through long-term strategies and costeffective capability enhancement Situation Awareness aiding decisionmakers in identifying indicators of emerging crisis in the next zero to 25 years. Through information requirements levied by Strategic SA to Operational SA, these warnings shall be confirmed, modified and/or ‘given shape and form’


Operational/ Tactical Situation Awareness

Situation Awareness aiding decisionmakers in contingency planning and Several months crisis action planning intended to to two (2) years disrupt or prevent a rapidly evolving or before a crisis near-term outbreak. This ensures highprobability of success in neutralizing may occur perpetrators During Crisis

Post-Crisis

Figure 2-1.1

Situation Awareness aiding decisionmakers in crisis action planning and execution leading to reduced adverse effects of the crisis Situation Awareness aiding decisionmakers in crisis recovery planning and execution leading to reduced likelihood of escalation or resurgence of crises and a smooth and speedy rehabilitation or return to normalcy

The next figure illustrates how SA processes at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels shall proceed altogether.

Figure 2-1.2


It is important that strategic, operational, and tactical SA be undertaken in a dynamic, systematic and sustained manner. Crisis management offices/units of each agency/department shall conduct SA at the national, regional, provincial, city and municipal levels. At the national level, SA reports shall be fused at the Sub-Committee, NCMC, to ensure a cohesive inter-agency/ department and multi-stakeholder response against current and emerging threats and crises at all levels. Existing mechanisms and entities can also be mandated to undertake these functions at the local levels. The CMSS, which serves as the Secretariat to the EXECOM/NCMC, shall be working with crisis management offices/units of different agencies/departments, through the Sub-Committee of the EXECOM/NCMC, in undertaking diverse and collaborative scanning and warning of emerging crises at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Effectively anticipating and preparing for crises is a serious discipline in many governments and private organizations’ policy-making and planning processes. All too often the details on when, where and how a crisis will strike can never be predicted or known. Crises will always take everyone by surprise. Thus, the measure of effectiveness is when agencies/departments, decision-makers, and the public are at an appropriate level of readiness. Through diverse and collaborative SA at all levels, agencies/departments shall have a diverse view of the future. The varied and collaborative ways of: rehearsing how a crisis will play out; analyzing and formulating necessary policies; preparing contingency and crisis action plans; identifying and employing opportunities for preventing and/or changing the course of crises; and building and enhancing long-term and cost-effective capabilities shall ultimately prepare government units for any eventuality.


CHAPTER 3 CRISIS PREVENTION MEASURES

“Crisis prevention is better than cure.” When emerging threats are detected, this chapter presents measures to prevent crises from occurring or mitigate its consequence when they occur, through policy formulation, contingency and crisis action planning. It prescribes uniform processes on these measures in order to harmonize inter-agency efforts in crisis prevention and response.

Section 3-1 Policy Process in Crisis Management Policy describes the intention of the government and provides the principles that govern action towards certain ends. In the context of crisis management, policy directs and becomes the consideration from where responses to crises or disasters are derived. Strong and relevant policies enhance responses to crises and disasters. Policies are formulated by the executive and legislative branches of government. The Congress is the highest policy-making body whose deliberations are made into laws. Other policies in the form of a law are international treaties and juridical decisions. While a policy guides actions to achieve a desired outcome, a law can compel or prohibit behaviors. The 1987 Constitution serves as a guide in the formulation of all laws and policies of the country. It is the responsibility of the Judiciary to declare whether a law or policy is constitutional or not. As mentioned above, policy formulation in government is the responsibility of the Executive and Legislative branches. The President being the head of the Executive Department has formidable legislative powers. The Administrative Code of 1987 provides that the President can issue policies in the form of: Executive Orders, Administrative Orders, Proclamations, Memorandum Orders, Memorandum Circulars, and as Commander in Chief of the AFP, General and Special Orders. Heads of Agencies in the Executive Branch are also empowered to issue policies that will guide the actions of bureaus, offices, units, and individuals for their desired end in relation to the threat or crisis. The Local Government Code also empowers Local Government Units to formulate their own policies. Local Chief Executives can issue executive orders while the Sanggunian at the provincial, municipal or city level, and the barangay level formulates policies for their constituents (e.g. ordinances). 3-1.1 Policy Process With different sectors of the government empowered to formulate policies, this chapter prescribes a policy process for the purpose of crisis management as shown below.

Figure 3-1.1 Policy Process table of contents

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a. Policy Analysis

The first step in policy analysis is recognizing that a threat exists, which could result to crisis if it is not addressed. This is followed by studying the threat and its causes in detail. This stage involves determining how aware the public is of the threat, deciding who should participate in addressing it, and considering what means are available to prevent its occurrence or mitigate its effects. Answers to these questions help policy makers gauge what policy changes are needed, if any, to address the identified threat. The agenda — which problems are addressed — can be set by the public, interest groups, government officials, and other stakeholders.

b. Policy Formulation

This step is typically marked by discussion and debate between government officials, interest groups, and individual citizens to identify potential obstacles and, to suggest alternative solutions, set clear goals and list the steps that need to be taken to achieve them. This part of the process can be difficult, and often, compromises will be required before policies can be written. The following information must be found in a policy formulated for the purpose of crisis management: 1. A clear identification of the emerging threat or crisis; 2. A clear identification of the national goal (end state); 3. Guidance of the President and/or Head of Lead Agency or C-OPR or the Chairperson, local CMC; 4. The concept on how to address the threat; 5. The agency or office primarily responsible in addressing the potential threat or crisis, and the command and control relationship with other agencies; 6. A clear-cut task distribution – identifying the lead and the support roles; 7. A monitoring and evaluation mechanism for activities; and 8. Identification of source of fund or support.

c. Policy Implementation

Crisis management policies are promulgated through official written documents. These policy documents often come with the endorsement or signature of the President or other executive powers to legitimize the policy and demonstrate that it is considered in force. Such documents often have standard formats that are particular to the organization issuing the policy. The approval of a policy for crisis management is generally followed by a contingency plan. Figure 3-1.2 illustrates the nexus of a policy to a contingency plan prescribed by this manual. At the national level, the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) or the Lead Agency/C-OPR undertakes Strategic, Operational and Tactical Situation Awareness to determine emerging threats. The response to emerging threats may be decisions to undertake specific courses or policy recommendations. ONSA monitors the actions taken by lead agencies in addressing an emerging threat. The lead agency, meanwhile, formulates specific guidelines for its units and offices to support decisions and recommendations made. Similarly, local government units shall specify guidelines vis-a-vis the decisions and policy recommendations made by higher authorities.


Inter-agency contingency planning is then conducted among all concerned agencies/ departments and other stakeholders. The following diagram illustrates the nexus of the public policy process and the phases of crisis management – both within the context of drafting a contingency plan.

Figure 3-1.2 Policy to Contingency Plan Flowchart

d. Policy Evaluation

Policy evaluation involves designating an office that shall monitor and evaluate the implementation of the decisions and guidelines, and approved policies and contingency plans. It is through a study of how effective the new policy has been in addressing the threat, which often leads to additional policy changes

Section 3-2 Inter-Agency Contingency Plan (IACP) The UNCHR Handbook for Emergencies defines contingency planning as a forward planning process in a state of uncertainty, in which scenarios and objectives are agreed on; managerial and technical actions are defined; and potential response systems are put in place, in order to prevent or better respond to an emergency or critical situation. Contingency planning

48

table of contents

is undertaken before an emergency and usually in a state of uncertainty. Planning shall involve making assumptions and developing scenarios. Scenarios aid in visualizing and simulating responses by individuals, agencies/departments and organizations, ensuring effective response. 3-2.1 Essentials of an Inter-Agency Contingency Plan An IACP intends to address an emerging threat in a particular time and space, within the capability of participating agencies, following the process prescribed in paragraph 3-2.2. This chapter prescribes three essential components of an IACP: Situation Awareness, Strategy, and Command and Control. a. Situation Awareness is the situation paragraph of the IACP. It constitutes SA products and processes in place. It consists of a concise description of the threat, its operational environment; and the capabilities of participating agencies/departments. b. Strategy is the section in the IACP, which describes the ends, ways and the means of the plan. Strategy connects the ends with the ways, and means of achieving those ends within a particular context. The ends are the goals or strategic objectives of a strategy. The first and most crucial task is to identify the ends. The broad strategic objectives must be properly defined. The ways are the policies, programs, and principles and the corresponding commitment of appropriate resources to attain the strategic objectives. Planners should devise the ways or methods of developing and utilizing the means to attain the ends. The means are the instrument of national power required to achieve the ends. After the “End” and “Ways” are identified, planners must examine the means available to achieve the desired end. Strategy has been described as a “two-actor” art form in which the strategist must consider both his plan of action and the threat. When crafting the Strategy paragraph in the IACP, agencies/departments must also consider the instruments of national power specifically: political, diplomatic, information, military, and economic, in developing the plan of action. c. Command and Control, in the context of crisis management, and one that involves several agencies/departments, is the section in the IACP that describes the exercise of authority and direction by the Crisis Manager over assigned/attached units/individuals to accomplish the IACP’s objective. Chapter 6 of this Core Manual contains a detailed discussion on Command and Control. Agencies/Departments may also refer to: “Contingency Planning for Emergencies,” A Manual for Local Government Units (3rd Edition, October 2007); and Annexes G and H of this Core Manual for the Inter-agency Contingency Planning Toolbox and the prescribed IACP Format, respectively. 3-2.2 Inter-Agency Contingency Planning Process (IACPP) Inter-agency coordination intends to ensure focus on a common goal and appropriate allocation of capabilities and resources. There are four general considerations for inter-agency contingency planning: a. Each agency must determine the scope, nature and end state of their participation. b. Each agency shall ensure that respective roles, capabilities and methods of operations are understood.


c. Each agency shall develop a shared appreciation of mutual needs, develop the fundamental rules to conduct operations, undertake certain activities, and promote confidence in their interdependence. d. Each agency shall establish short-term objectives in the context of the long-term desired end-state in order to assure the value of the operation beyond its immediate conclusion. Having established the necessity for inter-agency coordination for crisis response, the above considerations set the tone for inter-agency contingency planning process. An IACPP flowchart is shown in Figure 3-2.1. The purpose of the IACPP described in this chapter is to create a system by which the agencies and other stakeholders can effectively integrate the operations of all Government Agencies and Other Stakeholders (GAOS) in addressing a specific threat or crisis. While it is true that a contingency plan can be written by an individual or a group of individuals following a prescribed format, going through the process of formulating an IACP is equally important. Although the day-to-day inter-agency process is generally effective in producing coordinated policy options and decisions, the process requires additional coordinating mechanisms and planning tools to cope with the demands of providing coordinated guidance for operations in response to an emerging threat or crisis. Undergoing the IACPP is consistent with the Whole-of-Nation Approach principle and ensures the commitment of GAOS involved in the planning. Through the process, GAOS will understand the nature of the threat and will help formulate the strategy to address it. Capability building and enhancement of different agencies will form part of the continuous preparations, while simulation and desktop exercises increase the alertness and readiness of GAOS for crisis. This whole process ensures effective response to prevent the occurrence of crisis or mitigate its effects.

Figure 3-2.1 Inter-Agency Contingency Planning Flowchart

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table of contents

Section 3-3 Crisis Action Plan (CAP) During a crisis, the situation is dynamic. An adequate and feasible response in a crisis demands flexible procedures keyed to the time available, to communications, and to the use of contingency plans. While contingency planning is conducted in anticipation of emerging threats, Crisis Action Planning is the immediate response to situations completely unforeseen. Usually, the time available to plan for feasible courses of action is short. This section prescribes a Crisis Action Planning (CAP) procedure which can be used by crisis management organizations in planning and executing deployment and employment of units/agencies or groups in time-sensitive situations. These procedures ensure: a. Pursuit of logical procedures that begin with recognizing the problem and developing the solution, and progress to preparing and executing decisions; b. Rapid and effective exchange of information about the situation, its analysis and alternative responses; c. Timely preparation of courses of action for consideration of the appropriate CMC; d. Timely relay of the decisions of the Chair, CMC to the IC to permit effective execution. Crisis Action procedures describe courses of action to be undertaken by the CMC from the time a crisis occurred until it is resolved. The procedures are categorized into three (3) phases: Situation Awareness, Planning, and Execution as shown in Figure 3-3.1.

Figure 3-3.1 Crisis Action Planning Procedure


The Crisis Action Planning Procedure is stated below: 1. The Crisis Manager, acting as Chairperson of the inter- or intra-agency/department’s Crisis Management Committee or local CMC, conducts all-source SA focused on the incident that has the potential of becoming a crisis. 2. The Crisis Manager gathers and assesses the information collected, particularly those coming from the On-Scene Commander (OSC). The Crisis Manager may, at this point, also declare a threat or crisis level, depending on the situation and the prevailing procedures of the concerned department. 3. When an incident is seen as progressing into a full-blown crisis, the Crisis Manager activates the Incident Command System (ICS) and calls on the designated Incident Commander (IC) for that particular crisis (pre-designated in the Contingency Plan). 4. The IC receives instructions and guidance from the C, CMC. 5. The IC reviews the previously prepared contingency plan for suitability or develops an Operations Plan (OPLAN) when no useful contingency plan exists. 6. The OPLAN includes several options or courses of action (COA) which shall be presented to the Crisis Manager or Chairperson, Crisis Management Committee (C, CMC). OPERATION PLAN DEVELOPMENT GUIDE Mission Analysis  Analysis of the Mission  Purpose  Tasks – Specified, Implied, Essential  Constraints  Restated Mission  Terrain/Structure and Weather Analysis  Enemy/Threat Analysis  Forces/Units Available  Risk Assessment Course of Action Development (COA)  Analyze Own and Threat/Enemy Capability  Generate Options  Select Initial Forces/Units  Develop a scheme how to move forces/units  Assign Headquarters  Prepare COA Statement and Sketch COA Analysis  Hasty War Game COA Comparison COA Selection

Figure 3-3.2 – Guide to making a tentative Operational Plan 7. The Crisis Manager selects the COA to be used. 8. The IC further develops the OPLAN out of the selected COA incorporating the support elements of the ICS in the plan. 9. At the command/order of the Crisis Manager, the IC executes the plan. 10. The Crisis Manager supervises the execution of the plan.


These steps could be followed by duly designated crisis managers and incident commanders at any level. The above procedures are flexible and can be scaled down. Their execution is largely determined by the time available to complete the planning and the nature of the crisis. Successful crisis action planning is rooted in constant practice and training of first responders and other stakeholders on their tactics, techniques, and procedures or TTPs. The eight (8) key principles of crisis management underpin the government’s responses to crisis which make the execution of each of these procedures more effective. These principles can strengthen, organize and coordinate response actions across all levels, such as utilizing the “whole-of-nation approach” and through strengthened inter-agency/department coordination. The tiered response emphasizes that a crisis should be handled at the lowest level capable of handling the situation. In fact, majority of incidents are successfully managed at the local level. The success and outcome of responses to emerging threats, risks, and crises are also determined by the policies and contingency plans that have been formulated. As the security environment remains dynamic and complex, the policies and contingency plans must be revisited to maintain relevance, responsiveness, and timeliness. Stakeholders must always be ready to act in times of crisis through a regular preparedness program. Agencies/Departments should promote inter-agency/ department coordination and ensure that capabilities are built and enhanced to support response actions.


CHAPTER 4 BUILDING AND ENHANCING CAPABILITIES Successful crisis management would be the capability to anticipate and prepare for potential crises, provide accurate information, pre-empt incidents, provide timely response, and determine long-term solutions. This is only possible if individuals, families, communities, and organizations have embodied a culture of preparedness and resiliency. Despite a culture of preparedness, one should always assume the worst – a crisis spiraling into other crises. A multi-layered capability would be important, one that addresses different levels of a crisis at any given time. This multi-layered capability consists of principles or commonly accepted doctrines and beliefs, which can be depicted as a cycle or chain with no beginning or end; each one reinforcing the other. These principles are the following:

Figure 4.1 Principles of Building and Enhancing Capabilities

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The multi-layered capabilities shown in Figure 4.1 consist of the following: Threat Analysis and Risk Analysis (Situation Awareness), Conducting Needs Assessment/ Vulnerabilities Assessment of Capabilities; Capabilities Enhancement or Building Plans; Sustaining Capability; Prevention and Mitigation of an Incident from Becoming a Crisis; Evaluating Crisis or Emergency Operations; Making a Multi-Year Capabilities Development Plan; Annual Capability Development Increment; Capability Resource Management at Local Government Unit); National Government Agencies and National Crisis Management Committee and, Fostering Stakeholders’ Relationships. A summary (quick-look) of these eleven (11) principles and how they relate to the 5P’s of Crisis Management can be found in ANNEX I. Section 4-1 Principles in Capabilities Building and Enhancement Stakeholders, in general, require constant capabilities enhancement for Crisis Management. The core of these capabilities rest in an individual or unit’s ability to analyze situations and operate/respond in the short-term. In the long-term, the focus is generally in building and enhancing capabilities to handle unforeseen events. The chart below summarizes the essential activities that stakeholders need to consider before a crisis occurs, during crisis, and post-crisis. Capability Building and Enhancement are likewise premised on these activities: PRE-CRISIS PREDICTION Situation Awareness • Threat Analysis • Vulnerability Analysis Risk Reduction Assessments

DURING CRISIS

PREVENTION/ PRE-EMPTION

PREPARATION

Situation Awareness • Threat Analysis • Risk/ Vulnerability Analysis Risk Reduction Assessments Emergency Plans & Procedures Crisis Management Plans & Procedures

4-1.1

POST-CRISIS

PERFORMANCE POST CRISIS RECOVERY Situation Awareness • Threat Analysis • Risk/ Vulnerability Analysis

Situation Awareness • Threat Analysis • Risk/ Vulnerability Analysis

Emergency Response

Human Capital

Crisis Management Response

Governance & Business

Situation Awareness

As discussed in Chapter 2 of this Core Manual, Situation Awareness refers to the ability to detect, identify, and anticipate incidents or risks that can turn into a crisis. In capability building and enhancement, Situation Awareness refer to building and enhancing institutions and processes for attaining Situation Awareness aimed at preventing or addressing a crisis. The principles of threat analysis and vulnerability assessment, in particular, are crucial processes and methodologies that stakeholders shall need to consider in order to attain complete Situation Awareness. Attaining Situation Awareness, in turn, prepares stakeholders for undertaking other essential activities prescribed in the chain of principles of capability building and enhancement.


Section 4-2 Principles in Conducting Needs Assessments/ Vulnerabilities’ Assessment of Capabilities to Determine Effective and Efficient Crisis Management Knowing one’s capability is important as it recognizes gaps or deficiencies that need to be addressed in order to prevent any failure when addressing the crisis. Stakeholders, therefore, must perform a needs or vulnerabilities assessment and determine the impact of the gaps or deficiencies to the overall mandates, in order to facilitate planning and help in evaluating needs prior to, during, and after a crisis. Needs and vulnerabilities assessments and evaluations must include the following: 4-2.1

Leadership

A leader should have the ability to direct a team towards the achievement of a specific goal within a timeframe using available resources, such as to gather information, to establish priorities, and to define crisis management plans. However, beyond these skills, crisis managers must have sterling qualities that place high value on their psychological make-up in order for them to be decisive at the right moment and take actions with audacity, keeping in mind the great responsibility placed upon them. Crisis managers should know how to propel a multistakeholder and multi-skilled team under an effective collaboration scheme that has the following components: - - - - - - - - -

Stakeholders with a vested interest in the collaboration Trusting relationships among and between the partners A shared vision and common goals for the collaboration Expertise Teamwork strategies Open communication Motivated partners Means to implement and sustain the collaborative effort; and, An action plan. (Refer also to Chapter 3, Section 3-2.5 for the Inter-Agency Contingency Plan and Section 3-2.6 Crisis Action Planning.)

Crisis managers as collaborative leaders should be able to: build as well as lead the team; devote to the task; be skilled in the art of compromise; and be committed to the effort. Some leadership styles and skills that could enhance collaboration employ the concept of Principlecentered Leadership and Shared Leadership. This ensures the ability to share or apportion responsibility to optimize various leadership skills of partners or stakeholders in a collaborative initiative. Requirements from leaders will definitely vary during a crisis and while the collaboration progresses. Leaders know when they are not the best choice for a particular role or task because they recognize their personal strengths and weaknesses. Even crisis managers can gracefully decline opportunities that may be better suited to other partners and stakeholders. Strengthen the institution; let it function as mandated. Decentralizing decisionmaking and accountability gives individual officers the authority to solve problems and make operational decisions suitable to their roles. Leadership and initiative is required and rewarded at every level, with commanders, supervisors and line officers held accountable for decisions, and the effects of their efforts at solving problems and helping the community. A good leader

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should develop an incentive program to reward good practices, excellence, and voluntary acts among stakeholders. A flatter decision-making structure also ensures more effective crisis prevention and response. Empowering officers at lower levels may help them feel free to pursue leads or suspected terrorist activity. Imbuing them with decision-making authority and familiarizing them with making and taking responsibility for important decisions could be of value in any crisis. The crisis manager takes on several leadership roles. As the “project shepherd”, he becomes a project officer, an active participant, and a motivator. As “project champion”, he assumes a policy making position and gets support for the collaborative initiative from the community or organization. 4-2.2 People as Human Resources People as human resources includes both leadership and support staff, not only having the right number, but also the appropriate skills and competencies. A collaborative approach means understanding the motivations, in particular, Filipino values and practices, interests, competencies, and resources of all stakeholders in a crisis. Fortunately, the government has crisis partners in volunteers. Here, crises have brought out the best in Filipinos. Instil a Culture of Preparedness linked to Filipino Values. Our national heroes and forbears have handed to us the innate “bayanihan” spirit. This value can propel “unity of effort” that is also invoked by government as a “Holistic Approach,” a “Convergence” towards a common national vision, or “Kapit-Bisig” against poverty and “Bridging Leadership” that encourages stakeholders to work together. All these are forms of crisis management and conflict resolution, and a means to link local security and development planning to solve local complex problems. The executive branch, along with the AFP and the PNP, has recognized that conflicts and crises cannot be militarily addressed alone. Ideally, a civilian local government plan and response should be more proactive, thus having a higher impact and wider outcome. Crisis management starts even before the crisis occurs. The enhancement and building of crisis management capabilities requires a comprehensive approach. This way, there would be cohesion among stakeholders in all phases of the crisis, especially when one or more stakeholders (e.g., frontline or implementing departments, agencies and LGUs who may either be the frontliner or who are beneficiaries of the assistance, as well as their private sector partners) are needed to work together in responding to a crisis. There is a need for stakeholders to work properly and coordinate efforts so that even with scarce resources, they may deliver goods and services where it is needed in real-time. A self-check (through simulation exercises or post-action assessment) would also lead to change, reform, and complete transformation of behaviors and attitudes, that could consequently affect their planned conflict and crisis response positively. Filipinos have proven that synergy is at its highest when civil society organizations, NGOs, and local government executives work with uniformed men and women of the police and the military.


As to leadership, it usually takes an open mind and heart, and an enterprising, creative, integrative and facilitative local leader to address situations of conflict or crisis, so as not escalate and spill over to the next village or barangay; worse, when it snowballs into a national security concern. It entails creativity, full coordination among stakeholders, and a certain openness and fidelity to the goodness of people. Fortunately, most Filipinos have the moral-spiritual consensus about a Supreme Being who stamps His unity all over His creation and professes helping those in need. The bayanihan spirit is kept alive by Republic Act 9418 or the Volunteer Act of 2007. The Filipinos’ democracy has it dividends in very active Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Volunteer Service Organizations who are exemplars of responsible citizenship. R.A. No. 9418 cites that the Philippine National Volunteer Service Coordinating Agency (PNVSCA) has the mandate and shall provide the institutional mechanism to oversee the implementation of the Volunteer Act. In the long-term, the community’s capabilities to respond to crisis and their resilience are the effects of responsible citizenship, volunteerism and bayanihan. In trying to monitor and quantify volunteerism, the National Statistical Coordinating Board (NSCB) writes that, “Helping others and civic engagement including volunteer work build social capital and create a social cohesiveness that has been found to be directly correlated with the efficient functioning of democratic societies”. Volunteerism is in fact, an intrinsic part of social capital; conversely, volunteerism fosters and enhances social capital. For example, if you find NGOs, church groups, self-help groups, youth organizations, etc. conducting volunteer work in one geographical area, it can motivate and inspire others to participate in the activities. Engage the Youth. The Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, United Nations evaluates that the Filipino youth are often identified as partners in school-based partnerships. However, experience shows that even out-of school youth partners are valuable and are an important resource in every community collaboration effort, from planning to problemsolving. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) should play an important role in society as the political and legislative role models and the mechanism to develop the youth (including the out-of-school). If possible, they can help, along with the National Youth Commission, harness the energies of the youth towards crisis preparedness and community resiliency. Start them Young. The Department of Education (DEPED), which oversees elementary and secondary levels of youth education, has issued several disaster preparedness memoranda highlighting the “role of the department in managing the impact of disasters and the need for vigilance by school communities so that the risk from natural and man-made disasters is significantly if not totally reduced.” DEPED, as a long-term policy, should continue to organize the National Literacy Conference aimed at creating public awareness on the role of literacy in attaining a peaceful and sustainable future involving especially for those in the conflict affected areas. Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Citizens’ Army Training, Scout Community Leaders’ Training, the Philippine Red Cross, Fire Volunteer Groups, and other similar entities, have institutionalized self-help or first aid trainings in their curriculum and training programs to harness the youth, young professionals, and business groups. It is practical to develop school manuals and audio-visual aids to advocate and help address the sector’s concerns (e.g., youth–bullying, kidnapping (in human trafficking and organ


harvesting), and sex offenders on the web, prohibited drugs in food, recruitment by criminal and radical groups). Again, it has to be a whole-ofnation approach because all sectors deal with and have children of their own. 4-2.3 Coordination, Cooperation, Communication Known as the 3Cs in Crisis Management, these mechanisms pursue common goals that need to be established at the lowest levels. These aim to close any gaps or shortfall in capabilities when needed, and to avoid ‘turf’ issues and the inconsistencies in the overall crisis management/ emergency operations and contingencies. The importance of communication cannot be overemphasized here. Though it will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, basically communication must be two-way, available between the on-scene emergency/crisis response personnel, their immediate supervisors, to the head of the local Crisis Management Committee, and finally, the National Crisis Management leadership. 4-2.4

Organization

There should be a clear and responsive organizational structure that supports an organization hierarchy, which is neither too unstructured that it fails to support the 3Cs system of Crisis Management, nor too rigid that it disables the stakeholder from responding at all. 4-2.5

Sustainability

The stakeholder can sustain a high level of capabilities for an extended period of time during crisis. These capabilities can only be sustained through planning at the short, medium and long-term, and allows needed skills enhancements, or procurement of equipment. More details under Section 5-4, Principles in Sustaining Capability. 4-2.6

Training and Rehearsal

Aimed at enhancing specific agencies tasked for Crisis Response, this comprise individual and collective training and rehearsal, where individuals must be prepared to be part of an integrated, inter-agency operation. Related to this, stakeholders should be capable of working together using individual skills within their organizations, so that all actors can fulfill their specific roles and responsibilities during a crisis. However, training and rehearsal should also address the operational and strategic needs of the stakeholders. Practice and rehearsal of crisis responses bring familiarity with the Crisis Action Plan, develops assurance in the plan as well as with the crisis management team, and identifies any shortfalls (underperformance) or friction points (conflicting points e.g., in logistics/equipment, language, systems). A training curriculum can be developed by the NDRRMC, NDCP, CMSS, and the ONSA and other local or foreign training institutions in accordance with the overall capability building plan of the local CMC. Training and rehearsal must be conducted regularly since special skills are “perishable”, and therefore the development of these skills should be sustained. 4-2.7

Exercises

Exercises must be done constantly to test the capabilities of personnel and their level of familiarization with the use of available equipment. These include interfacing between or among agencies, in order to assist in determining deficiencies, and needs for additional or updated equipment or skills enhancement, especially in the area of an integrated or inter-agency response.

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4-2.8

Equipment

Fundamentally, this should not only comprise an inventory of equipment but rather an assessment of the condition, availability, maintenance, and use for inter-operability to properly perform in a crisis. 4-2.9

Documentation

This includes a record of contingency, emergency or crisis management plans, successful sustainable crisis and recovery efforts, equipment maintenance, skills training, risk and vulnerability assessment for review and future reference, and a database of trained/skilled personnel and location of materials and equipment necessary for crisis management. 4-2.10 Business, Community Awareness and Support towards Resiliency Leverage Power and Influence. In planning, and even during a crisis, the collaborative initiative will be tested when they reach a point when additional financial resources, publicity, or support from a certain constituency would make a significant difference. Hence, it is important to seek assistance from partners in identifying elected officials, media personalities, business executives, or respected community leaders who could leverage their resources and influence to assist the collaboration. A well-planned crisis management plan or a problem solving project needing a community partnership or multi-stakeholder approach may be of great interest and benefit for these persons, resulting in a valuable win-win situation.

Section 4-3 Principles in Capabilities Enhancement or Building Plans Plans focused in enhancing and building capabilities should be developed in accordance with the identified specific crisis, (i.e., crisis-specific plans), so that stakeholders must be able to determine what, where, and when it is going to occur in order to lessen the risk or effects of the incident concerned. The planning process must consider each function from a multi-layered perspective and the other recommendations from stakeholders to achieve a sense of ownership and fit into the prevention and mitigation efforts of those concerned. Existing plans should be reviewed, evaluated, updated or when necessary, modified to ensure their applicability to all potential threats, and evolving situations. Once the plan has been produced and the resources determined, allocate the most appropriate resources to the incident.

Section 4-4 Principles in Sustaining Capability Once acquired, capabilities should be sustained. Likened to skills, existing capabilities must be continually monitored or it will diminish over time. Plans must be updated, equipment serviced and tested, personnel trained and procedures and systems exercised.

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In areas that do not frequently experience large-scale crisis, plans have to be evaluated and tested. Further test on existing capabilities, under real conditions, with current plans and resources would eventually take place when stakeholders conduct actual crisis management and emergency operations that may arise any time, hence, the basic need for documenting the operations. Garnett, and Moore (2010) writes that Documentation or studies of successful sustainable crisis and recovery efforts focus on three broad approaches -- local empowerment, organization and leadership, and planning for sustainability. Three key approaches to enhance sustainability during a crisis and disaster recovery are the following: 1) Incorporation of long-term recovery goals into disaster response and pre-disaster planning; 2) Expansion of the knowledge base, by incorporating research into recovery and harnessing lessons learned from international experiences; 3) Development of an outcomes-oriented approach to disaster recovery planning, including the measurement of community-level outcomes. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2010) advises that greater attention should be on longterm recovery and key underlying principles: individual and family empowerment, leadership and local primacy, preparation for recovery, partnerships and inclusiveness, communications, unity of effort, timeliness and flexibility, and resilience and sustainability. Annex J is a record of lessons learned from practices or experiences of some Developing Countries during and after a crisis or disaster. Although natural in cause, these may also be useful during human-induced or man-made crisis especially to address the common crisis scenarios: chaos, disrupted lives, and livelihood, displaced people living in make-shift relocation sites for weeks and months, no regular food and water and are dependent on relief goods. Some are more scenarios that we should be prepared for: burning, collapsed (blown buildings); looting, and mob rule, due to desperation and panic, contamination of the crime scene, etc. These practices or experiences emphasize local empowerment and help minimize the likelihood of chronic dependency that can restrict recovery of individuals and communities by returning individuals to economically productive routines, and helping affected communities participate actively in a substantial amount of rebuilding activities. Practices included innovative and facilitative organization and leadership which helped overcome typical bureaucratic hindrances to crisis recovery. There were agencies that made timely, adaptive changes to structures and processes making them more efficient and more effective in rebuilding infrastructure and livelihoods. Smart rebuilding standards were advocated through the use of training, capacity building, and properly structured regulatory incentives to ensure that long-term redevelopment of housing and infrastructure was not only sustainable, but that conditions within affected communities were improved beyond those that existed prior to the crisis or disaster. Ultimately there is improvement in long-term development outcomes and community resilience, while reducing or eliminating previous vulnerabilities. There were short- and long-term benefits. The strategies adopted by other countries in their disaster recovery efforts led to a variety of specific, positive outcomes that could be credited to the exemplary practices undertaken by each country.


A good stakeholder analysis and networking plan among NGAs, NGOs, and LGUs will be crucial for pooling of resources. Enabling documents such as a Memorandum Of Understanding or Agreement may be signed before a crisis strikes. Consider also schemes under the Public-Private Partnership and/or Build-Operate-Transfer. Refer to Annex J for samples of MOUs/MOAs in Enhancing Disaster Recovery and Cooperation in Disaster Prevention and Management.

Section 4-5 Principles in Prevention and Mitigation of an Incident from Becoming a Crisis Prevention and mitigation are crucial. Aside from active participation, stakeholders have to nurture pro-active responses to Crisis Management. Priority of resources should be given to prevention and mitigation efforts so that the impact of hazards and threats could be minimized in future, and the elimination of loss and suffering can be maximized. For example, potential targets (soft targets) of terrorists, security threat groups, organized crime syndicates or mentally deranged individuals should be identified through intelligence and historical data in specific areas. Stakeholders being targeted should be informed and protected (target hardening) so that they can help in prevention and mitigation. Results of the prevention and mitigation effort by stakeholders have to be reflected in future hazards, risk and vulnerabilities’ analysis, and capability assessments. The establishment of a Crisis Management or Emergency response system through Emergency or Crisis Management Plans and Procedures is in itself a pre-emptive or preventive risk reduction strategy. Fostering Stakeholders’ Relationship, explained further in Section 5-10, can prove valuable at this point as prevention and mitigation would need decisions and actions by other actors ahead of a crisis.

Section 4-6 Principles in Evaluating Crisis or Emergency Operations The outcome of crisis operations, with the stakeholder acting alone and with other actors, should be analyzed and assessed in terms of actual against required capabilities, based upon the Critical Success Factors reflected in Table 4-6.1. 4-6.1 Critical Success Factors There are Critical Success Factors that cut across the pre-, during and post- crisis. The assessment should be considered in updates of capabilities enhancement and building plans and priorities and future prevention and mitigation efforts. PRE-CRISIS

DURING CRISIS

POST-CRISIS

• application of early warnings and alert levels • situational assessment & crisis determination • authority to act • leadership and business/ community awareness and support • establish a foundation for identifying community resilience-building activities • community resilience, or the sustained ability of community to withstand and recover from adversity (Acosta, Stern, Uscher-Pines, Williams, Yeung, Garnett, and Meredith, NO YEAR)


PRE-CRISIS

DURING CRISIS

• operational responsibility • decision-making during the disseminated crisis • program and response • documentation of event priorities during the crisis • crisis management • tools to support teams and organization (teams, in-crisis processes mandate, participants, roles, • process during the crisis designated backups, team (threat assessment until the leaders) resolution of the crisis) • operational policies • crisis command centre • applied principles of crisis operations (including Risk management in accordance Communication utilizing to the Core Manual external media stakeholders) • pre-crisis response planning • geographical implementation and organizational-wide implementation Table 4-6.1 Critical Success Factors

POST-CRISIS • operational integration with other stakeholders/ actors

It cannot be emphasized more that simulation tools or exercises should be undertaken for evaluation purposes, especially in areas where disasters occur infrequently, to assist in providing realistic responses to the crisis.

Section 4-7 Principles in Making Multi-Year Capabilities Development Plan: Framework for Improving Capability After identifying gaps in capabilities and testing them in relation to an actual crisis, stakeholders may make a Multi-Year Development Plan. The Multi-Year Capabilities Plan, which is part of the Multi-Year Development Plan, should be based on medium (3 to 6 years) to longterm (more than 6 years)2 that can be projected beyond, using the Foresight and Horizon Scanning tools (refer to Situation Awareness) that the stakeholders can avail of to meet the desired level of capability, so that the long-term development projects can be properly scheduled and funded. The Plan should include all crisis management projects and activities, in conjunction with the capability and vulnerability assessment results. This should be used by the LGUs, for example, in addressing the need for improvements that are specific in their areas, and in preventing the use of funds against its intended purpose. At the National Level, this information should be used to develop a National MultiYear Crisis Management Development plan for supporting stakeholder agencies and LGUs that are directly handling crisis management efforts, and for determining priority requirements of financial and technical support from the international organizations, foreign government, ASEAN, and Public-Private Partnerships. Time frame is based on National Economic Development Authority’s, Guidelines for the Formulation of the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan and Medium-Term Public Investment Program, 2010-2016. Accessed from http://www.neda.gov.ph/Plans_and_Reports/ MTPDP/planning_guidelines_oct2010.pdf. For strategic planning, it is also wise to respect the political or electoral process where local and national officials are elected every three years, or six years because crucial political and financial support could come from them (Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 881, December 3, 1985; and the Department of Budget and Management’s Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS).

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Section 4-8 Principles in Annual Capability Development Increment Moving towards desired capability, stakeholders should determine in detail what is to be done for the incoming year in the Annual Budget of the agency concerned, because situations change and these may have not been reflected in the accomplishments the year before. Changes in situations identified should be reflected in modifications to the multi-year development plan and in determining the following year’s annual budget increment. The planning process should provide LGUs and National Government Agencies (NGAs) counterparts with detailed descriptions of what they plan to accomplish in the incoming year, and their requirements for financial and technical assistance in support of these efforts. Because resources are limited, it is imperative to identify and acquire capabilities with multiple-use applications (e.g. whether natural or man-made crisis of various types). For this purpose, the CMSS shall establish a National Capability Resource Management database in conjunction with the NDRRMC, to ensure mutual support between these two mechanisms of government. In addition, departments, LGUs and other agencies of government involved in responding to emergencies shall furnish, through appropriate channels, the CMSS and the NDRRMC, their current capabilities and their planned acquisition for early location and tracking. Departments shall conduct their own resource inventory, in coordination with the Crisis Management Committee. The process of authority and movement of assets to the frontline when needed shall be guided by Figure 3-2.2. (Response Effort Flowchart). CMSS will, in turn, further develop assessment standards and criteria to provide the concerned agencies with further evaluation tools for prioritization of capabilities building support that can be recommended for the Stakeholders’ Multi-Year Capability Development Plan or annual increments. For this purpose, CMSS, ONSA shall be part of the existing mechanisms that looks into the operational readiness of concerned departments and agencies. Hence, CMSS, ONSA shall be part of the operational preparedness evaluation of the agency concerned.

Section 4-9 Principle for Capability Resource Management at the Local Government Units, National Government Agencies, and the National Crisis Management Committee The LGUs and NGAs with their counterparts in different regions and provinces nationwide are expected to contribute to the overall Crisis Management capability of government, as duly approved by the EXECOM, NCMC. Therefore, each project and activity should represent a necessary building block for this. In a Joint DILG-DBM Memorandum Circular 2011-1 issued to all governors, city and municipal mayors, Sanggunians, Punong Barangays, and other concerned officials, projects covered by the 20 percent development fund now include projects to address and respond to natural and man-made disasters and calamities. table of contents

As stated under Section 21, Republic Act 10121 otherwise known as the ‘’Philippine

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Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010”, not less than five percent (5%) of the estimated revenue from regular sources shall be set aside as the Local Disaster Risk Reduction Management Fund (LDRRMF) to support disaster risk management and crisis management activities at all components and/or phases such as, but not limited to, pre-disaster preparedness programs including training, purchasing life-saving rescue equipment, supplies and medicines, for post-disaster activities, and for the payment of premiums on calamity insurance. Of the amount appropriated for LDRRMF, thirty percent (30%) shall be allocated as the Quick Response Fund (QRF) or stand-by fund for relief and recovery programs so that the situation and living conditions of people in communities or areas stricken by disasters, calamities, epidemics, or complex emergencies may be normalized as quickly as possible. Consistent with the Memo from the Office of the President of the Republic of the Philippines dated 22 March 2011, cabinet members or heads of agencies shall provide expert advice, assistance and if necessary, resources to help resolve a crisis or emergency. As long as it is feasible, sourcing of funds in support of these duly approved projects and activities may be done through inter-agency Memorandum of Agreements on Stakeholder Partnerships or Private-Public Partnerships. Certain improvements will be reflected in the capability assessment in an Annual Work Increment to be prepared by agencies concerned. Emergency operations plans should then be revised to incorporate these improvements. Multi-Year development plans should also be modified to reflect these changes and the experience gained during exercises and the conduct of actual crisis operations.

Section 4-10 Principles in Fostering Stakeholders’ Relationships

Rather than regarding crisis management from a “crisis responder-client” relationship in the context of the Defense System of Management, which gives the connotation of a one-way track and payment for services that the Government should provide for free to the populace, what should be developed as a new mind-set is “Stakeholders’ Relationships”. The European Union’s Council of Ministers espouses fostering a Stakeholders’ Relationship to achieve a comprehensive integration of crisis management planning among the local people, people’s organizations and CSOs, and between the local and national policy making and operations systems. This also builds on the existing crisis management plans, systems and capabilities that can be further broadened to the full spectrum (from incident to post-action) of crisis in the country. In this way, the consciousness of Crisis Management does not only come out during a crisis. Having a closer relationship with the populace, Crisis Managers would be able to identify precursors or triggers for crisis, that can be monitored prior to, during and after the crisis. Hence, assessments falling under Situation Awareness would be able to provide prior notification on an emerging incident and in a worst-case scenario, and the incident that occurred when it happens in real time, so that measures can be provided that can prevent the incident from escalating.


These precursors/ triggers can range from conditions of an emerging crisis, and the underlying causes and dynamics of the crisis that includes key actors. Stakeholders would be able to understand these triggers better, through joint assessments and accessing of subject matter experts so that the problems can be analyzed from all angles and that all issues affecting the crisis are covered. Building an information management system, to monitor, process, analyze the information, and to some extent visualize emerging or occurring crisis, are important tools that can be further enhanced with communication technologies. (Refer to Chapter 5, Section 5-7, Significance of Computers and Section 5-8, Public and Media Affairs Group.) Because there is a range of possible incidents or crises, stakeholders may find it valuable to develop foresight and technologies such as Horizon Scanning which can be learned and developed. This ensures that planning and strategies for Crisis Management are kept pro-active. Crisis Management should also build legal capabilities and competencies on Human Rights and related international treaty obligations of the Philippines. However good a crisis management is, this can only be gauged within the ethical and legal standards required in implementing them. In complex, multi-dimensional crises, the interface between crisis management, human rights and development concerns, as well as the criminal justice system, is highlighted. Crisis managers increasingly face non-traditional threats, irregular threats, and organized crime, that it is logical that they boost their legal capabilities. The promotion of the rule of law among stakeholders in order to bring back a community to its feet is of primary importance. This also calls for the strengthening of peace and conflict-prevention measures and shift of focus from military-oriented missions to that of rule-of-law sectors that are beginning to receive wider support in several countries. 1) Hence, stakeholders will achieve more if they involve communities towards seeking the root causes of the crisis or any conflict, and if they remain faithful to their mandates to reduce poverty and create sustainable livelihood, and the strengthening of democracy, rule of law, good governance, human rights and gender equality. The community’s resilience entails their ongoing and developing capacity to account for its vulnerabilities, and develop capabilities that aid them in: preventing, withstanding, and mitigating the stress incident, recovering in a way that restores the community to a state of self, 2) sufficiency and at least the same level of social functioning after an incident; and 3) using knowledge from a past response to strengthen the community’s ability to withstand the next incident. Fostering relationship with partners will not be complete without CSOs and the Media who provide the multiplying factor, for wider public information, education, and training on Crisis Management.

A responsible media could support government in Risk Communication where the


key to success is an entity’s ability to establish, maintain, and increase trust and credibility with key stakeholders. This entails ensuring that while communicating with the general public, the Communicator also guards the security and safety of the victims and the responding units. Article 6 on “Crime and Crisis” of the 2007 Broadcast Code of the Philippines explicitly states that, “The coverage of crimes in progress or crisis, such as hostage-taking or kidnapping, shall consider the safety and security of human lives above the right of the public to information”. Some Filipino values or themes which could be inputted as messages are the following: - - - -

Bayanihan – Teamwork Filipino style! Mas mabuti na maging handa kaysa magsisi. It is better to be prepared than sorry. (Preparedness) Magkaroon ng kamalayan at magbantay. Be aware and vigilant. Nasa Diyos ang awa. Nasa Tao ang gawa. In God is mercy. In People is the Work. (Faith and People’s Work)

Capability enhancing or building on crisis management cuts across all the phases of the Crisis Management Framework. It is ideally done at the national, regional, provincial, municipal, city, barangay, community, organization and family levels. Although the tasks could be daunting, it helps to be aware, to coordinate and collaborate, choose facilitative leaders to head the bayanihan and to trust in the goodness of people (stakeholders). For most Filipinos, it also helps that there is moral-spiritual consensus to call on the Supreme Being to see us through the tough times but there is always work to be done, things to gather and prepare. It pays to plan and be prepared than be sorry.


CHAPTER 5 APPLYING COMMAND AND CONTROL IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT An American advisor to leaders, Anthony Robbins, once said, “to effectively communicate, we must realize that we are all different in the way we perceive the world and use this understanding as a guide to our communication with others.” In the crisis management spectrum, no matter how detailed your plan of action is, for as long as command, control, systems of communication, and handling of information are not clearly defined, the risk of failure is always high. Communication, as an essential tool in Crisis Management, not only requires a sound and responsive structure (command and control) but also a common understanding of principles being applied and terms being used all throughout the process. This chapter encompasses Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information. It intends to eliminate gaps during the PERFORM component of crisis management, to avoid or minimize failure in the overall effort. A definition of some commonly used terms in the command, control, and communication process is offered, a sequential sketch of events when to apply appropriate response in crisis management is drawn, and a simple and understandable process flow chart on attaining synergy among stakeholders is presented.

Section 5-1 Fundamental Principles Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached agencies/units in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander/ma in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling agencies/units and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Crisis Management requires a centralized, responsive, and unambiguous channel of communication structure referred to as the Command and Control structure. In principle, unnecessary layering of headquarters decreases responsiveness and available mission planning time, and creates an opportunity for mission failure. 5-1.1 Command Command is the authority to effectively manage available resources of responding units/ agencies for the accomplishment of assigned missions. A commander is the one who assumes command over all components/units involved in all actions, relative to the crisis. Commanders possess the following: a. Authority – the legitimate power to exercise command and enforce obedience. Authority can be delegated to subordinates subject to laws, rules, regulations or orders.


b. Responsibility – the legal and ethical obligation that a commander assumes for his actions, omissions, or failures. It is the acceptance of burden for the consequences of the commander’s enforcement of decisions. c. Accountability – the state of being liable and answerable under applicable criminal, civil or administrative laws for his actions, omissions or failures. A commander is responsible for what his unit does or fails to do. He can delegate his authority to his subordinate commanders but it should be noted that whatever will be the outcome of his mission, whether success or failure, the responsibility remains in him. A Commander must be able to think clearly and make good decisions quickly during crisis. Speed and decisive actions are essential. He must be bold, aggressive, and a risk-taker. He should issue mission-type orders that impose restrictions on subordinates to assure the coordinated action. In essence, he must be willing to take responsibility and use his initiative, guided by the higher commander’s intent in pursuit of mission accomplishment. He must be in a position where he can monitor the progress of the situation. He must rely on the experience and expertise of his unit and intervenes only when necessary. Staffs must be able to assist commanders in those decisions and translating them into action faster than the threat. Units must be able to respond quickly to changing situations. 5-1.2

Control

Control is the ability of the commander to purposefully direct or suppress, change or adjust, and supervise subordinates’ execution of the commander’s decisions, guidance, and intent to ensure compliance. Control may take place before, during, and after operations, and may be exercised directly or indirectly by directive, plan, or procedure. To make C2 happen, it must be properly organized in functionally operating facilities. Terminologies must be widely understood. Commander-staff relationships must be characterized by mutual trust and respect. They must practice the C2 process regularly so that the procedures are instinctive.

The C2 process comprises of—

• Coordination • Planning • Directing • Controlling

The C2 process is executed through—

• Leadership • C2 facilities • The planning process • Communication

The leadership environment affects the success of C2.

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5-1.3

Command and Support Relationships

In organizing units or agencies to manage an incident, one must always consider that there are instances when we would need to allocate available assets or capabilities to subordinate commanders, while others need to be retained at the higher level for flexibility once opportunities crop up. This process of allocation depends largely on the priorities set by higher commanders. Hence, one must also consider one very important aspect – the establishment of command and support relationships – to avoid confusion among subordinate units or agencies, to create effective working synergy, and to provide mutual support between units or agencies. In short, the inter-operability principle is the primary reason for this. In the absence of commonly accepted command and support relationships, Annex K of this manual are hereby recommended and suggested to be applied when organizing for crisis management. Likewise, it should be noted that terms defined and explained in the said annex are also being used in the succeeding sections of this manual for a more logical sequence in applying command and support relationships.

Section 5-2 Command and Control System Command and control has two components: the Commander, and the Command and Control (C2) System. Communication systems, computer networks and information systems are the components of the C2 system that allow commanders to lead from any point in the crisis. The C2 System supports the commander’s ability to make decisions, delegate authority, and synchronizes all actions. Moreover, the C2 System supports the ability of commanders to adjust plans for future operations, even while focusing on the current crisis. Likewise, staffs work within the commander’s intent to direct units and control resource allocations. They are also alert in spotting crises that require command decisions, and advise commanders concerning them. Through C2, commanders initiate and integrate all functions and systems toward a common goal: mission accomplishment. 5-2.1 Communication System The existence of two-way communications enhances the command and control system. In the absence of communication, commands may not be passed from the commander to subordinates. Likewise, control would be impossible unless feedback in some form could take place. Basic to any control system is the incorporation of a reliable communications network. In reality, the more remote the commander is from the scene of action the more dependent he becomes upon rapid, reliable communications. Crisis management organizations at all levels must prepare communication plans in order to ensure rapid response. They are encouraged to consider in their planning the interoperability of communication equipment and “redundant communication” method. This method simply means back-up planning wherein Communication Plans must have, at the minimum, a Primary and an Alternate means. IT (computer systems) is just one of the means of communication. Others are through radios, telephones, cell phones, etc. In the absence of technology, alternative means of communication are through messengers and semaphore. Members of the crisis management organizations must incorporate into their training basic communication skills, particularly the proper use of two-way radio transceivers and its protocols.

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No matter what type of communication system is adopted, whether through computer systems or through expedient means, one of the essentials in crisis management is that information must be relayed without delay, up to the highest and down to the lowest end-users. 5-2.2 Computers Computers provide capabilities that can help people grasp the dynamic realities of a crisis more clearly and help them formulate better decisions more quickly. The computers referred to in this section are basically, the information technology (IT) system that may help enhance crisis management.

Key Areas of Computer-Enabled Capability a. More robust, interoperable, and priority-sensitive communications. Crisis management requires robust, priority-sensitive communications systems capable of supporting interoperation with other systems. Providing these requires communication networks that are more resilient to disruption than today’s commercial networks, that can last longer without utility power, that can expand capacity to meet emergency needs, that can autonomously reconfigure themselves, that can handle the range of communication needs and environmental conditions that arise in disasters, that have well-defined points of interoperability, and that are able to distinguish between and properly prioritize communications. b. Better situation awareness and common operating picture. Situation awareness is the ability for actors in a crisis—from national coordinators to emergency responders to the general public — to have information about an incident, to understand what that information means in the context of the situation and their goals, and to project patterns and trends. The common operating picture is a shared understanding of a situation by a group of people who need to act together to achieve common goals. The aim is to improve a person’s ability to do his or her job more effectively. c. Improved decision support and resource tracking and allocation. Whereas situation awareness provides decision makers with information relevant to their tasks and goals, decision support focuses on assisting them in formulating prospective actions — helping them understand and assess characteristics and consequences of alternative courses of action and follow up on decisions, closing the feedback loop from decision to result. d. Greater organizational agility for crisis management. The use of IT has enabled and driven changes to organizational structures and processes (e.g., more distributed decision making). Agility is at a premium in crisis because no one type of organization or group of organizations is always best suited for the variety of problems that arise. Related issues with significant IT implications include building rapport among people who do not share a history of cooperation, and more quickly integrating the operations of multiple organizations. e. Better engagement of the public by supplying information and by making use of information and resources through which members of the public can supply. Although


IT is used today to alert and inform the public before, during, and after a crisis, more use could be made of new communications modalities, and information could be better tailored and targeted to the needs of particular populations. More attention should be paid to the information and resources held by the public because members of the public collectively have a richer view of a crisis, may possess increasingly sophisticated technology to capture and communicate information, and are an important source of volunteers, supplies, and equipment. One important factor is how to engage the entire population, given the existence of groups with cultural and language differences and other special needs. f. Enhanced infrastructure survivability and continuity of societal functions. Large crisis or even disasters upset physical infrastructure, such as the electric grid, transportation, and health care — as well as IT systems. IT infrastructures themselves need to be more resilient; IT can also improve the survivability and speed up the recovery of other infrastructure by providing better information about the status of systems, and advance warning of impending failures. Finally, IT can facilitate the continuity of disrupted societal functions by providing new tools for reconnecting families, friends, organizations, and communities. Taking the above-discussed key areas, the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) plays an important role in realizing these. It is advised that in planning and in applying IT (computers) in crisis management, Incident Commanders and CMCs at all levels must always see to it that the DOST is involved and their expertise on these matters are considered. 5-2.3 Information System Data are the raw materials from which useful information are made. Data are meaningless when treated in isolation. They become information when they undergo an accepted process to convey rationality. The purpose of an information system is to process data in aggregation to provide knowledge or intelligence. This information may very well be data for some user on a higher level who may, in turn, process them to produce more comprehensive information and so on, until the final user is served.

Crowdsourcing

Today, peoples’ information dissemination is quicker than the reaction time of trained first responders. Mobile phone users would snap pictures, record videos and text information regarding the emergency long before the first responders even arrive. Additionally, the global media would widely disseminate such images and information, almost immediately engaging the national audience. This can be attributed to the fact that people nowadays are becoming mindful of their roles in promoting security and safety within the community. Through this consciousness, they become more prudent in exploiting technological advancement. Employing crowd support in times of crisis will provide crisis management actors other options in gathering and collecting information essential to the success of the operation. Referred to as crowdsourcing, it is outsourcing of a task to a crowd through platforms or systems established for the purpose. It is a way of communicating or relaying information by providing the collaborative platform for individuals from different segments of society to come together and


work as one. Tools of information that are being used in this concept range from news broadcast to SMS, to e-mails, to Facebook and Twitter blogs, or even a hotline which is connected to the PIO. As a concrete example of crowdsourcing at work is a program named “Ushahidi”, which was created in 2008 in the midst of political violence in Kenya. “Ushahidi” was used as a platform for citizens to send text messages and e-mails. Through mapping software, data were aggregated and helped visualize what was happening on the ground almost in real time, from mapping ongoing violence to providing information on safe havens. Crowdsourcing offers numerous advantages. The trend tends to demonstrate the innate resourcefulness of people, especially with the technology available. Therefore, this whole-ofsociety approach will leverage different access points and will ultimately illustrate assets — instead of deficiencies — that could be built on. However, in applying this concept to crisis management, a caveat on the data collected. With data flooding in, a stringent process must be established in order to capture useful information. In closing, the Command and Control system is essential in an inter-agency effort. It is a system that will enable the response structure in crisis management to work efficiently. As crisis evolves, this system oftentimes requires adjustments or improvisation to be more responsive to the needs of the situation. Command and Control system must focus on roles, rather than rank, and must provide a clear structured mechanism for commanding large scale incidents. But the key to an effective and efficient Command and Control system is the active involvement and participation of all stakeholders through wider collaboration and greater cooperation, which can also be attained through Public-Private Partnerships.


CHAPTER 6 POST-ACTION AND ASSESSMENT The Crisis Management Manual intends to come up with an institutional system of handling complex crises, specifically, for Crisis Managers, ICS Commanders and Senior Policy Makers to undertake synchronized operations and employ standardized planning tools that are necessary for inter-agency crisis response efforts. As part of the Crisis Management process, the Post Action and Assessment (PAA) is the component that begins when the emergency or crisis has been addressed and the crisis deemed cleared. The ICS Commander ensures all necessary Post-Action activities are undertaken to restore normalcy. The end goal of this phase is to ensure recovery and identify the strengths and weaknesses in crisis management procedures, so that those tasked in overseeing the succeeding operations can build on previous successes and/or improve from shortcomings. On recovery and restoring normalcy, post action and assessment (PAA) focuses on planning in anticipation of damage; recognition that resources are essentially limited, thus selecting critical operations; analysis of critical operations and possible effects of crisis to these operations; identification of bottlenecks so that they would be dealt with selectively, to ensure continuity of critical operations; selection of target recovery time; and setting up of one management system and deployment of units/personnel and resources for actual recovery operations. On evaluation and assessment, PAA focuses on the activity or performance standards that enable crisis management teams to identify for themselves WHAT HAPPENED, WHY IT HAPPENED, and HOW TO MAINTAIN STRENGTHS and IMPROVE ON THEIR WEAKNESSES. It centers on providing a comprehensive picture of the crisis from which lessons learned can be extracted. Evaluation and assessment should thus be candid and constructive, focusing on the primary objective of determining how crisis response can be enhanced. Major activities should be undertaken such as INVESTIGATION, LEGAL ACTIONS, REORGANIZATION, HANDOVER OF RESPONSIBILITY and ASSESSMENT. Specifically, evaluation and assessment aims to: 1. Contribute to the attainment of the overall mission of the Crisis Management Committee, by analyzing the team’s strengths and weaknesses from different perspectives in resolving crisis in a timely and coordinative manner among agencies involved in crisis response; 2. Provide an avenue for the CMC to enhance measures and other courses of action that could help an IC process his work in a timely manner to bring a crisis to an end; 3. Provide an avenue for a subsequent investigation and filing of appropriate cases against alleged suspects, and provide assistance to victims of crisis incidents; 4. Prepare appropriate documentation of the various CMC responses, highlighting the lessons learned and the best practices, to include an overall assessment of the CMC’s systems and procedures, equipment, supplies, and personnel training for future crisis response; and 5. Provide guidelines for media and public relations, and for managing press releases to the public


The conduct of evaluation and assessment immediately begins as soon as practicable, while records of events and perceptions are still fresh in the CMCs’ and ICS minds. This helps the CMCs to emotionally depressurize or unburden personnel involved during a response, as well as the rehabilitation of victims of a particular incident. Evaluation and assessment comes after the interventions stage and initiates the reconvening of the crisis management committee involved in the crisis. Most, if not all organizations, prepare evaluation and assessment reports. These reports are prepared at different levels and jurisdictions, depending on the kind of incident and/or crisis and the extent of involvement of an organization. PAA reports are useful inputs to RECOVERY and REHABILITATION in the short and the long terms since they provide valuable information to Crisis Managers in addressing the current and future crises. They serve as initial references or templates in the next round of planning.

Section 6-1 Activities in Post-Action and Assessment

The essential activities to be undertaken in post-action and assessment may include, but is not limited to the following: - - - - -

INVESTIGATION LEGAL ACTION REORGANIZATION HANDOVER RESPONSIBILITY ASSESSMENT

For other types of crisis i.e. health, economy or those involving OFWs, possible courses of action may include but is not limited to local or foreign policy review and formulation, and evaluation of responses and support systems. 6-1.1 Investigation Investigations include the collection of facts, and evidences for prosecution. The investigation must seek to establish specific offenses that have been committed; how, who, where, when and why the offenses were committed. 6-1.2 Legal Action Legal Action is providing legal advice and assistance to CMCs and aims for the prosecution of the perpetrators. 6-1.3 Reorganization Reorganization is enhancing the previous system, and responding to a future crisis in a much improved manner. Reorganization reinforces the previous crisis management system, making it more effective and efficient, by realigning the available resources whether human, financial or technological. Aside from personnel and other resources, reorganization in crisis management also includes the gathering of data and information to further improve the system, by shifting to a stronger approach in achieving effectiveness and efficiency. It also completes the

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cycle of continuity in Crisis Management by implementing proactive measures, learning from the lessons of the past, and reinforcing the identified weaknesses. 6-1.4 Assessment Assessment is a comprehensive process of analysis, interpretation, evaluation and review of all applied systems and procedures used by the CMC/ICS, taking into account recommendations on potential actions that shall be prioritized in the hand-over stage. It is designed to provide the CMC with independent and authoritative evaluations of the CMC/ICS’ initial response to the resolution of the crisis, and assist them in their long-term planning efforts. It is intended to provide better focus on program areas in which an improved crisis response can be achieved, and assure the most efficient use of available resources in future crisis. All reports generated by the CMC in the entire crisis management process shall be an integral part of the final and comprehensive assessment report, which shall be submitted to the decision makers and/or to REHABILITATION AND RECOVERY managers. The fully detailed and documented report on the actions/response/decisions of the CMC in handling the crisis incident is based on the accounts provided by the responders who handled the crisis event. Typically, the PAA report is not accomplished immediately. Due to the amount of detail that is needed for the PAA report, it takes a significantly longer amount of time to complete the report. To establish a uniform system of reporting that will capture all the required information for assessment, a template of the Comprehensive Assessment Report is attached as Annex L for reference. It contains the following: - - - - - - - - - - - -

Planning Mission Description of the Affected Area Legal Information Operation Public Response Crimes and Arrests Death and Injuries Property Damage Personnel Deployment of Crisis Management Personnel Logistics

Section 6-2 Handover of Responsibility Handover of responsibility is the transfer of responsibility by the CMC to an appropriate organization or entity for the recovery and rehabilitation phase. The process requires preparation and the procedures are as follows: 1. Understanding/describing the crisis/emergency that transpired. Know the needs and

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priorities that should have been addressed, and the consequent issues that may have hindered resolution, and the skills and knowledge used in addressing the crisis, i.e. the supposed system that was adapted from this manual; 2. Knowing the most appropriate agency, department or organization that is most capable of taking over the responsibility; 3. Providing information briefings to the accepting agency/department on background of the case and key areas of responsibility; 4. Explaining the scarcity and availability of resources experienced during crisis and how to avoid a recurrence, as well as how communication between agencies or departments flowed; 5. If necessary, endorsing the accepting agency or department to other working partners; and 6. Stepping back and being a shadow to the accepting agency/department; When the accepting agency or department is capable, and all information and communication is in place, the Handover is considered complete. The possibility of maintaining communication even after the handover is essential. Post-Action and Assessment is essentially a guided discussion of on-going or near- end operation that enables its responders to discover for themselves what went well, what did not, and why while recovery efforts are ongoing. The generated information from the discussion and assessment can be utilized to validate current procedures and/or to propose for better processes.


CONCLUSION The National Crisis Management Core Manual offers, by far, the most expansive and organized approach in dealing with emerging and existing crises that threaten to harm national interests and diminish public confidence in the government. It covers a wide range of crucial areas of responsibilities that demand serious attention from officials and operators who will be tasked to deliver on such functions. The components of an effective crisis management (each of which is discussed in this manual by a designated chapter) all put significant emphasis on the compelling imperative for inter-agency cooperation. This approach to crisis management is a general theme that runs through all the discussions in the CORE MANUAL. In cognizance of the challenging limitations in human and material resources, and even in time, the CORE MANUAL advocates maximum interface among relevant government entities for this is believed to have a significant (but often underestimated) multiplier effect on whatever precious time and resources are available to crisis managers. Quite a number of previous crisis management failures could well be attributed to poor situation awareness, poor planning and poor inter-agency cooperation, aside from lack of needed resources. These are the challenges that this CORE MANUAL seeks and hopes to surmount. The first step, however, is for crisis managers to revisit prevailing mindsets, overcome wellentrenched biases, and consider new and better ways of doing things. “No single agency could ever claim monopoly of knowledge and capabilities on crisis management” – this lesson could be a good starting point for a compelling inter-agency collaboration and convergence.


ANNEX A

SUMMARY OF AFP/DND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT I. RP-US DEFENSE RELATIONS AGREEMENT / TREATY / MOU

SCOPE OF COOPERATION

Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951

ACTIVITIES / COMMITMENTS

Mutual defense of each countries territory Bilateral exercise, VIP visits, ship visits, against attacks on its armed forces, public symposiums, workshops, exercise related vessels, and aircraft in Pacific territory. construction projects, MDB meetings, planning conferences, strategic war gaming etc.

Date Signed: 26 June 1953 Signatories: RP: Acting Sec Felixberto M Serrano, DFA US: Amb Charles E Bohlen

OVERSEEING ORGANIZATION

REMARKS

The Council of Foreign Ministers with RP-US MDB serving as the machinery for consultations between the two countries’ Armed Forces under the MDB are Executive Committee as follows: Plans and Policy, Training and Operations, Intelligence, Logistics and Civil-Military Operations.

MDB Executive Committee Meeting, 12-15 March 2003, Honolulu, Hawaii MDB Meeting, 5-7 June 2003, Manila State Partnership Program Meeting, 7-11 July 2003, Guam

JUSMAG-Phil for the US and RP MDB committees oversee the functions and the obligations of this agreement. The MDB at the same time serves as the forum for discussion on matters related to this FY 03: Establishment of a Joint United States Military agreement. Mobility Advisory Group (JUSMAG); transfer of Excess PA: $4.6 M United States assistance in terms of Defense Articles (EDA) from US military institutions PN: $6.0 M education and training logistics and technical for RP. AIK support for operations of JUSMAG. PAF: $6.0 M assistance and the attendant obligation of the DSCA Holdback: $1.5 M Philippines. TAFT: $1.9 M

1953 Military Assistance Agreement Date Signed: 26 June 1953 Signatories: RP: Acting Sec Felino Neri, DFA US: Amb Raymond A Spruance

This agreement outlines the rules and regulations governing the temporary status of the US Armed Agreement between GUS and GRP regarding Provisions on the respect for law, entry/ Forces the treatment of US Armed Forces visiting the departure, driving, and vehicle registration, Philippines criminal jurisdiction, importation and exportation and movement of vessels/aircraft. Date Signed: 10 February 1998 Signatories: RP and US Representatives Equipment Loan Agreement Pertaining to Provision of SY -71E Communication Equipment and Services (STU-II) between the Department of Defense of the USA and the Ministry of Defense of the RP Date Signed: 25 April 2000

FMF: $ 50 M (Projected) Normal FMF (Mobility Maintenance Plan): $19.8M CT Assistance: $ 30M

The US shall loan SY-71E equipment and technical IAD, OJ5 oversees this arrangement and controls/ To assist in the establishment of a secure documentation, and provide initial training and monitors utilization of the equipment voice and data network to protect classified maintenance regarding the procedures required sensitive information transmitted between US to safeguard, control and manage this equipment. and RP

Signed by: ANGELO T REYES, SND, DND, RP ADM, Dennis Blair USCINCPAC LTGEN MICHAEL V HAYDEN, Dir., National Security Agency. US Dept of Defense

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RP-US Mutual Logistics Support Agreement Facilitation agreement for the reciprocal provision (MLSA) of logistics support, supplies and services between the AFP and the US military. Date Signed: 22 November 2002 It is intended to further interoperability, readiness Signed by: RP: RADM Ernesto H De Leon and effectiveness of the two countries military (PN), DCS for Plans, J5 forces through the increased logistics cooperation in accordance with the MDT, VFA or MAA. US: COL Mathias R Velasco (US Army) CDRPACOM Rep-Phil

Provides for reciprocal logistic support whereby All activities under the MLSA shall be approved On 21 Jan 2003, a concrete test case in the one party may request logistics support, supplies by RP and US governments. implementation of the MLSA took center stage and services which the other may provide for the when 501 pieces of body armor were loaned by duration of an approved activity.. the US for use of AFP personnel involved in Project Bayanihan. The US agreed to use the Equal Value Exchange (EVE) as mode of payment for the body armor.

II. ASEAN COUNTRIES A. MALAYSIA AGREEMENT / TREATY / MOU




REMARKS

Second Protocol (1994) to the 1967 Agreement Border Patrol and Border Crossing Annual meetings scheduled or unscheduled joint Philippine-Malaysian Border Patrol Coordinating BPCG is an inter-agency body composed of reps from DFA, Group (BPCG) under the supervision of the Joint DND-AFP, DENR, OPAMA, DOJ, and Bureau of Fisheries. on Anti-Smuggling Coop between the Govt of RP Cooperation in designated border coordinated border patrol operations. Committee on Border Cooperation areas between the Phil and Malaysia and Malaysia The RP-Malaysia SOP Outlining the conduct of border patrol operations has been finalized. Date Signed: 29 March 1995 The 10th BPCG Pre-Planning Conference in Cebu was recently concluded last 23 -26 March 2003.

Signatories: GRP and Malaysian Representatives

MOU on Defense Cooperation Date Signed: 26 April 1994 Signatories: RP: SND Renato De Villa Malaysia: Minister of Defense Dato Seri Muhamad Najib Tun Razak

Military Cooperation, Equipment and Exchange of trainees and instructors, exchange of Technology Cooperation Between information joint training and exercises. Joint use Defense Industries of both countries. of training facilities, maintenance and procurement of defense material and equipment as well as development of both countries’ defense industries.

Joint committee on defense cooperation assisted by the following working groups. Working group on Information Exchange, Working Group on Logistics and Defense Industry Cooperation. The working group on military cooperation is chaired by J3.

Previously proposed status of forces agreement between RP and Malaysia still await result of DND review. It has been noted that RP has been inactive with its bilateral defense industry working group with Malaysia since 1999. There is also a proposed SOFA between RP and Malaysia Combined Committee last September 27, 1996. Visit to CSAFP of ADMIRAL DATUK MOHD RAMLY BIN ABU BAKAR, Chief of the Royal Malaysian Navy on 27 Feb 03. Visit to CSAFP of GEN DATO ABDULLAH, Chief of Royal Malaysian Air Force on May 2003.


B. INDONESIA AGREEMENT / TREATY / MOU


Agreement on Border Patrol and Border crossing system for control of Border Crossing traffic of each country’s nationals, goods, and vessels. Measures to suppress Date Signed: 11 March 1975 illegal activities in the border areas. Signatories:



Annual committee scheduled and unscheduled RP-RI border committee assisted by liaison joint coordinated border patrols, repatriation officer to serving as Chairperson’s rep in the of apprehended nationals, and maintenance territory of the other party. of border crossing stations. At an average, the bilateral border committee meets twice a year.

REMARKS As results of the 22nd RP-RI Border Committee Chairperson’s Conference the following AFP recommendations have been approved by the DND RP’s participation in the 23rd RP-RI Border Committee Preparatory (Vice Chairpersons’s) Conference and turnover of the Border Crossing Station (BCS) at Bongao, Tawi-Tawi to Indonesia upon its completion. RP position paper on the reduction of PN personnel manning the Indonesian Border Crossing Stations is being routed for approval. COMSOUTHCOM has made a special report on the North Sulawesi incident that led to the apprehension of 49 Filipino fishermen and the sinking of their boats. The fishermen have already been deported. RP-RI Border Committee will convene for the 24th Chairpersons’s Conference on June 2003 in Indonesia.

Agreement on Cooperative Activities in Development of bilateral relations between the defense agencies and the the Field of Defense and Security promotion of cooperative activities in the field of defense and security. Date Signed: 27 Aug 1997 Signatories: DND Sec Renato De Indonesian counterpart

Villa

Joint/combined training and exercises, exchange Joint defense and security of visits, attachments, and info exchange, coommitte (to be established) interoperability in operations and logistics, defense technical activities, logistics support system.

cooperation Some of the training and exchanges of personnel between both countries are already conducted under this arrangement. RP inputs on RP-RI TWG on Maritime and Ocean Concerns (MOC) a sub-committee set up under the JDSCC. AFP recommends a positive stance on the establishment of an ASEAN Security Community in reaction to Indonesia’s non-paper entitled “Towards an ASEAN Security Community.

and

C. SINGAPORE AGREEMENT / TREATY / MOU Agreement on Military Cooperation Date Signed: 05 May 1995




Training Development of a mutually beneficial Army-to-Army exercise “Anoa-Singa” series; Adhoc Committee organized per activity basis program for joint training and exercises Navy-to-Navy Exercise “Dagat-Singa” Exchange between the two countries. of Student/Trainees.

Signatories: RP: DFA Sec Roberto Romulo

REMARKS Activities were suspended pending conclusion of a status of forces agreement. Visit of LTGEN LIM CHUAN POH, Chief Defense Force, Singapore Armed Forces on 05 March 2003.

Singapore: Amb Tan Seng Chye


D. THAILAND AGREEMENT / TREATY / MOU MOU on Military Cooperation Date Signed: 20 August 1997 Signatories: RP: SND Sec Renato De Villa Thai: Defense Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh




Promotion of military cooperation in the fields of military education and training, exchange of information, military exercises, sports, and exchange visits.

Exchange of students and instructors, exchange of information on defense security through documents, observation, conferences, and study visits, military exercises, sports activities, such as CBT shooting, golf, skydiving, and exchange of visits.

REMARKS

Joint committee (to be established) – Activities in pursuance of this MOU has yet to be developed. this joint committee may be assisted Previous to this, Thailand has already been sending students by working groups whenever deemed to PMA. necessary. Relevant to this MOU is the AFP’s participation as observers in the US-Thai-Singapore Cobra Gold Exercises. Visit to CSAFP of ADM DAWEESAK SOMABHA, Commanderin-Chief, Royal Thai Navy on 21 Feb 2003. Visit to CSAFP of MGEN PIPAT DEKEAW, Deputy Superintendent, NDC Thailand on 04 June 2003.

E.

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

AGREEMENT / TREATY / MOU



MOU on Defense Cooperation signed on 22 Promotion of defense cooperation in Military Training and Exercises, exchange of August 2001 at Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei accordance with international laws and personnel, exchange of information (Security Darussalam. regulations in the field military. and Defense issues, Training related-matters, technical info on defense products, research and development on defense related products) and exchange of visits.

OVERSEEING ORGANIZATION Joint Working committee.

Committee

REMARKS

and

sub-working Pursuant to the goals of this MOU, the RP-Brunei Seagull Training Exercises was successfully convened last 7-14 April 2003. The exercise involved the Navies of both countries. The committee shall meet alternately between the RP and Brunei and shall be Co- chaired by a senior defense official of the DND and Senior Defense of Brunei. The committees for the management of this cooperation have yet to be established.

III. OTHER COUNTRIES A. SOUTH KOREA AGREEMENT / TREATY / MOU




REMARKS

Implementing Arrangement for the Mutual Procedures for the request of government quality Activities dependent on contracts negotiated Under the supervision of the joint committee on Applicable to procurement contract that may be Acceptance of Government Quality Assurance assurance and responsibilities of the requesting between one of the parties’ defense industries logistics and defense industry cooperation. negotiated with South Korea. Provides greater and the issuing parties confidence for the procurement of quality materiel Date Signed: 26 Jul 97 and equipment. Signatories: RP: DND Usec Feliciano Gacis S. Korea: Deputy Minister ching Nam Lee.

South Korea continues to participate in the AFP Modernization


B. FRANCE AGREEMENT / TREATY / MOU


Arrangement Related to Defense Cooperation

Develop bilateral relations between defense and armed forces and cooperate in the field of defense equipment.

Date Signed: 14 SEP 94 Signatories: RP: SND France: Minister of Defense



JDCC meetings as agreed upon Joint Defense Cooperation Committee exchange of trainees and instructors; military training and exercises; exchange of info on training and maintenance matters; exchange of visits of defense armed forces officials; cooperation in the field of defense equipment.

REMARKS The Joint committee has met three times since the signing of the MOU, the last was held on 13 May 99 at CGEA, QC. Since 1995, RP had already asked for France’s aid in the AFPMP. In response to this, France has offered their AVISO A69 (which RP declined) and conducted a study on PAF airbases (which is considered by PAF). Visit to CSAFP of VADM HERVE GIRAUD Deputy Director, DAS France on 28 Feb 03 Visit to Deputy J5 of Chief Engr JEAN Pierre Buleon, French Regional Armament Attache on 11 Feb 2003 The 4th JDCC Meeting in Paris, France on 23-24 Apr 03 pushed through.

C. AUSTRALIA AGREEMENT / TREATY / MOU




MOU on Cooperative Defense Activities Cooperative activities between defense Mutual access to each other’s defense facilities; Joint Defense Cooperative Committee organizations joint training and military exercise; exchange of students and instructors; exchange of information Date Signed: 2 Aug 95 on defense matters; cooperation in defense science and technology matters; identification Signatories: of common or similar requirements for defense RP: DFA domingo Siazon goods and services. Australia: amb Robert Francis Ray MOU on Combatting Terrorism

MOU enumerates possible areas of cooperation which include: information and intelligence; money laundering Date Signed: 04 March 2003 and financing of international terrorism, Signed by: Foreign Affairs Secretary smuggling and border control issues; Blas F. Ople and Australian Minister for illegal trafficking in weapons, ammunition, Foreign Affairs Alexander Downing explosives and defense cooperation relating to international terrorist activities.

Forms of cooperation stipulated under the agreement include intelligence exchange, joint training exercises and activities, capacitybuilding initiatives and regional and multi-lateral consultations on issues relating to international terrorism and transnational organized crime.

REMARKS Australia actively provides support to training needs of the AFP. Visit to CSAFP of Assistant Sec BEN COLEMAN, Australian Department of Defense and Party last Apr 2003 To update and improve the existing RP-Australia Defense Programs, they engaged in Strategic Policy Talks last 06-07 May 2003 MOU was signed in lieu of recent terrorist attacks that victimized Australians in Bali as well as Filipinos in various areas in the Philippines. Close cooperation between the two governments are underway Visit to RP of Hon Nick Warner, Australian Ambassador to Counter-Terrorism last 19 June 2003.


D. UNITED KINGDOM AGREEMENT / TREATY / MOU MOU on Defense Cooperation Date Signed: 03 Jan 96 Signatory: RP: SND Renato De Villa UK and Northern Ireland: Sec of State for Defense Michael Portillo

SCOPE OF COOPERATION Develop bilateral relations between both government’s defense and armed forces and promote cooperation in the field of defense equipment and services.



Joint Committee/Working Group Meetings; Joint Joint Defense Cooperation Committee training and military exercises; exchange of visits/ trainees/instructors; and cooperation in the field of defense equipment and services.

REMARKS As the last RP-UK Joint Defense Cooperation (JDCC) in November 2001, there was discussion on the UK proposed “Jurisdiction MOU”. This was in the light of the precedence set by the RP-US VFA. The absence of a SOFA with UK was raised in lieu of the feasibility of RP-UK exercises that may be hindered. Other issues discussed include RP-UK on terrorism and updates on UK’s Military Training Assistance to RP. Visit to CSAFP of AIR VICE MARSHALL GAVIN MCKAY RAF, Senior Military Adviser to the Head of the Export Services Organization, UK Ministry of Defense on 04 June 03

E. KINGDOM OF SPAIN AGREEMENT / TREATY / MOU MOU on Defense Logistics Cooperation Date Signed: 16 March 1998 Signatories: RP: SND Fortunato Abat Spain: Amb Delfin Colome

SCOPE OF COOPERATION Promote cooperation between both armed forces in logistics support defense systems and strengthens relations between logistics agencies.



Joint committee meetings, establish direct Joint committee contact and cooperation in such areas as supply, maintenance, transportation, services and other areas of sub systems between the two armed forces and logistics agencies.

REMARKS There was a planned visit to Spain by PGMA in September 2002 but was cancelled due to the RP deficit. Proposed discussion on the succeeding steps to operationalize the agreed issues in the RP-Spain 1st bilateral meeting. These include TOR for MOU, that agreement on quality assurance etc and additional issue could be the enhancement of the AFP’s R & D capabilities have been set aside due to the cancellation. Courtesy call of Spanish Ambassador IGNACIO SAGAZ TEMPRANO to CSAFP on 24 Apr 2003

IV. MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS: A. BRUNEI, INDONESIA, MALAYSIA AGREEMENT / TREATY / MOU




REMARKS

IMOU on Oil Spill Response Action Plan on 20 Cooperation on oil pollution Mutual visit by skilled personnel, joint exercise Focal point ASEAN_OSRAP located in Parties conducted marine pollution exercises (MARPOLEX); Japan has May 93 in Tokyo, Japan preparedness and response and training on oil pollution combating measures, Jakarta, Indonesia indicated interest in cooperating re ASEAN-OSRAP; Annual meetings are techniques and equipment; facilitate the mobility likewise conducted to monitor the advancement cooperation and checking the of personnel materials and equipment in cases of maintenance on the OSRAP equipment. emergency No development at present.


B. INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, CAMBODIA & THAILAND AGREEMENT / TREATY / MOU


Agreement on information exchange and Cooperation among the parties Establishment of Communication Procedures in the exchange of info and the establishment of communication Date Signed: 7 May 2002 procedures in activities at the common border areas of the 3 RP: DILG SEC Jose Lina, Sr. countries Indonesia: Foreign Min. N. Hassan Wirajuda Malaysia: Foreign Min. Datuk Seri Hamid Albar



To cooperate among themselves to prevent the Joint Committee illegal utilization of their land-air-sea territories for the purpose of committing or furthering any or all of the following activities: Terrorism, Money Laundering, Smuggling, Piracy/Robbery at Sea, Hijacking, Intrusion, Illegal Entry, Drug Trafficking, Theft of Marine resources, Marine Pollution, and illicit trafficking in Arms

REMARKS Joint Committee shall convene its inaugural meeting on a date and at venue acceptable to the Parties, as may be determined through diplomatic channels. By July 2002, Cambodia signified to become party to this agreement and by November 2002, Thailand did as well.

V. COMMITMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTALITIES A. UNITED NATIONS AGREEMENT / TREATY / MOU




Invitation to Participate in Peacekeeping The Philippines as a member state Sending troops for PKO Operations (PKO) from Sec Gen of the UN of the UN may participate in PKO subject to agreement between RP and UN for the purpose.

UN department for PKO (UNDPKO)

REMARKS As of 23 April 2002, Executive Order 97 Approving and Adopting the Policy Framework and Guidelines for Philippine participation in UNPKO To date, RP is looking over the draft MOU on the activation of the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). The Draft MOU will reinvigorate the UNMISET, among the many efforts under the UNPKO.

B. TOKYO DECLARATION AGREEMENT / TREATY / MOU Tools declaration on port state control The Philippines is a signatory to this declaration

SCOPE OF COOPERATION Cooperation between members to standardize port state laws and regulations, uplift technology and techniques on port state control



Compliance to agreed system and standard Tokyo Secretariat operation procedures as well as the safety measures on port state control operations, council meetings

REMARKS The Philippines, particularly the Philippine Coast Guard, is an active member of this organization.


D. UNITED KINGDOM AGREEMENT / TREATY / MOU MOU on Defense Cooperation Date Signed: 03 Jan 96 Signatory: RP: SND Renato De Villa UK and Northern Ireland: Sec of State for Defense Michael Portillo

SCOPE OF COOPERATION Develop bilateral relations between both government’s defense and armed forces and promote cooperation in the field of defense equipment and services.



Joint Committee/Working Group Meetings; Joint Joint Defense Cooperation Committee training and military exercises; exchange of visits/ trainees/instructors; and cooperation in the field of defense equipment and services.

REMARKS As the last RP-UK Joint Defense Cooperation (JDCC) in November 2001, there was discussion on the UK proposed “Jurisdiction MOU”. This was in the light of the precedence set by the RP-US VFA. The absence of a SOFA with UK was raised in lieu of the feasibility of RP-UK exercises that may be hindered. Other issues discussed include RP-UK on terrorism and updates on UK’s Military Training Assistance to RP. Visit to CSAFP of AIR VICE MARSHALL GAVIN MCKAY RAF, Senior Military Adviser to the Head of the Export Services Organization, UK Ministry of Defense on 04 June 03

E. KINGDOM OF SPAIN AGREEMENT / TREATY / MOU MOU on Defense Logistics Cooperation Date Signed: 16 March 1998 Signatories: RP: SND Fortunato Abat Spain: Amb Delfin Colome

SCOPE OF COOPERATION Promote cooperation between both armed forces in logistics support defense systems and strengthens relations between logistics agencies.



Joint committee meetings, establish direct Joint committee contact and cooperation in such areas as supply, maintenance, transportation, services and other areas of sub systems between the two armed forces and logistics agencies.

REMARKS There was a planned visit to Spain by PGMA in September 2002 but was cancelled due to the RP deficit. Proposed discussion on the succeeding steps to operationalize the agreed issues in the RP-Spain 1st bilateral meeting. These include TOR for MOU, that agreement on quality assurance etc and additional issue could be the enhancement of the AFP’s R & D capabilities have been set aside due to the cancellation. Courtesy call of Spanish Ambassador IGNACIO SAGAZ TEMPRANO to CSAFP on 24 Apr 2003

IV. MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS: A. BRUNEI, INDONESIA, MALAYSIA AGREEMENT / TREATY / MOU




REMARKS

IMOU on Oil Spill Response Action Plan on 20 Cooperation on oil pollution Mutual visit by skilled personnel, joint exercise Focal point ASEAN_OSRAP located in Parties conducted marine pollution exercises (MARPOLEX); Japan has May 93 in Tokyo, Japan preparedness and response and training on oil pollution combating measures, Jakarta, Indonesia indicated interest in cooperating re ASEAN-OSRAP; Annual meetings are techniques and equipment; facilitate the mobility likewise conducted to monitor the advancement cooperation and checking the of personnel materials and equipment in cases of maintenance on the OSRAP equipment. emergency No development at present.


B. INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, CAMBODIA & THAILAND AGREEMENT / TREATY / MOU


Agreement on information exchange and Cooperation among the parties Establishment of Communication Procedures in the exchange of info and the establishment of communication Date Signed: 7 May 2002 procedures in activities at the common border areas of the 3 RP: DILG SEC Jose Lina, Sr. countries Indonesia: Foreign Min. N. Hassan Wirajuda Malaysia: Foreign Min. Datuk Seri Hamid Albar



To cooperate among themselves to prevent the Joint Committee illegal utilization of their land-air-sea territories for the purpose of committing or furthering any or all of the following activities: Terrorism, Money Laundering, Smuggling, Piracy/Robbery at Sea, Hijacking, Intrusion, Illegal Entry, Drug Trafficking, Theft of Marine resources, Marine Pollution, and illicit trafficking in Arms

REMARKS Joint Committee shall convene its inaugural meeting on a date and at venue acceptable to the Parties, as may be determined through diplomatic channels. By July 2002, Cambodia signified to become party to this agreement and by November 2002, Thailand did as well.

V. COMMITMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTALITIES A. UNITED NATIONS AGREEMENT / TREATY / MOU




Invitation to Participate in Peacekeeping The Philippines as a member state Sending troops for PKO Operations (PKO) from Sec Gen of the UN of the UN may participate in PKO subject to agreement between RP and UN for the purpose.

UN department for PKO (UNDPKO)

REMARKS As of 23 April 2002, Executive Order 97 Approving and Adopting the Policy Framework and Guidelines for Philippine participation in UNPKO To date, RP is looking over the draft MOU on the activation of the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). The Draft MOU will reinvigorate the UNMISET, among the many efforts under the UNPKO.

B. TOKYO DECLARATION AGREEMENT / TREATY / MOU Tools declaration on port state control The Philippines is a signatory to this declaration

SCOPE OF COOPERATION Cooperation between members to standardize port state laws and regulations, uplift technology and techniques on port state control



Compliance to agreed system and standard Tokyo Secretariat operation procedures as well as the safety measures on port state control operations, council meetings

REMARKS The Philippines, particularly the Philippine Coast Guard, is an active member of this organization.


ANNEX B Other relevant Policies related to Crisis Management 1. Policies for Threats to National Security a. United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). b. Republic Act 10121 “Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010” – An act strengthening the Philippine disaster risk reduction and management system, providing for the national disaster risk reduction and management framework and institutionalizing the national disaster risk reduction and management plan, appropriating funds thereof and for other purposes.

It designates the Secretary of National Defense as head of the NDRRMC.

RA 10121 also states mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction into the peace process and conflict resolution approaches in order to minimize loss of lives and damage to property, and ensure that communities in conflict zones can immediately go back to their normal lives during period of intermittent conflicts.

Above mentioned law states that not less than five percent (5%) of the estimated revenue from regular sources shall be set aside as the Local Disaster Risk Reduction Management Fund (LDRRMF) to support disaster risk management activities such as, but not limited to, pre-disaster preparedness programs including training, purchasing life-saving rescue equipment, supplies and medicines, for postdisaster activities, and for the payment of premiums for calamity insurance.

Of the amount appropriated for LDRRMF, thirty percent (30%) shall be allocated as the Quick Response Fund (QRF) or stand-by fund for relief and recovery programs so that the situation and living conditions of people in communities or areas stricken by disasters, calamities, epidemics, or complex emergencies may be stabilized as quickly as possible.

c. Republic Act No. 7077, the “Citizen Armed Forces or Armed Forces of the Philippines Reservist Act” and its implementing guidelines and AFP circulars provides for emergency preparedness of military reservists down to the barangay; and d. Republic Act No. 9163, the National Service Training Program Act of 2001 and its implementing guidelines and circulars prepared by a Tripartite Committee (Commission on Higher Education, CHED; Technology Education and Skills Development Authority, TESDA; and, DND, which implements the Civic Welfare Training Service (CWTS), Literacy Training Service (LTS), and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC). CWTS and LTS graduates become part of the National Service Reserve Corps under the Office of Civil Defense; ROTC graduates become military reservists.


2. Policies for Peace and Order a. Republic Act 8551 b. Executive Order 110 – Directing the Philippine National Police to support the Armed Forces of the Philippines in internal security operations for the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national security. 3. Policies for Crisis on OFWs a. Republic Act No. 10022 – An Act amending RA No. 8042 otherwise known as The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended, further improving the standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families and overseas Filipinos in distress, and for other purposes. b. Executive Order No. 34 - Creating the Overseas Preparedness And Response Team And Replacing The Presidential Middle East Preparedness Committee. 4. Policies for Crisis on Health a. Presidential Decree No. 1096, National Building Code of the Philippines b. National Structural Code of the Philippines, 2001 c. Philippine Electrical Code of 2000 d. Presidential Decree No. 1185, Fire Code of the Philippines e. Republic Act No. 8495, Philippine Mechanical Code of 1998 f. Republic Act No. 344, Accessibility Law g. Republic Act No. 9275, Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 h. Republic Act No. 9003, Ecological Solid Waste Act Management of 2001 i. DOH Administrative Order No. 155 series of 2004 – Implementing Guidelines for Managing Mass Casualty Incidents During Emergencies and Casualties. j. DOH Administrative Order No. 168 series of 2004 – Subject: National Policy on Health Emergencies and Disasters. k. DOH Administrative Order No. 0029 series of 2010 – Subject: Policies and Guidelines on the Establishment of Operation Center for Emergencies and Disasters. l. DOH Administrative Order No. 2008-0021, Gradual Phase-out of Mercury in All Healthcare Facilities and Institutions 5. Policies for Crisis on Economy a. Republic Act No. 7581 “An Act Providing Protection to Consumers by Stabilizing the Prices of Basic Necessities and Prime Commodities and by Prescribing Measures


Against Undue Price Increases During Emergency Situations and Like Occasions”. 6. Other policies are: a. International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights b. Republic Act 8042 “National Water Crisis Act of 1995” – An act to address the National Water Crisis and for other purposes c. Republic Act 9513 “Renewable Energy Act of 2008” d. Republic Act 9729 “An Act Mainstreaming Climate Change into Government Policy Formulations, Establishing the Framework Strategy and Program on Climate Change, Creating for this Purpose the Climate Change Commission, and for Other Purposes” e. Republic Act Number 9418 “Volunteer Act of 2007” - Section 2 of the Declaration of Policy states that - “It shall be the policy of the State to promote the participation of the various sectors of the Filipino society, and as necessary, international and foreign volunteer organizations in public and civic affairs, and adopt and strengthen the practice of volunteerism as a strategy in order to attain national development and international understanding. The inculcation of volunteerism as a way of life shall rekindle in every Filipino the honored tradition of bayanihan to foster social justice, solidarity and sustainable development.”


ANNEX C Sketch on Incident Command System Deployment at Scene of Incident

Legend: ICP – Incident Command Post ICS – Incident Command System AMP – Advanced Medical Post


ANNEX C-1


In the Philippines, the NDRRMC, through the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), took the lead in the implementation of the ASEAN-US Cooperation on DM. Partner agencies are the Department of Local Government - Bureau of Fire Protection (DILG-BFP), Department of Health (DOH), Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Philippine National Police (PNP), Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine Red Cross (PRC), Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Fire National Training Institute (FNTI), Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), the City Government of Olongapo, Davao City Rescue 911 and Amity Public Safety Academy (APSA). Among the activities that were conducted in the country under Phases 1 and 2 of the Program include the following: • Phase 1 (2003-2005) – Introduction of ICS to selected NDCC (now known as NDRRMC) Member Agencies; initial adaptation initiatives to the Philippine Disaster Management System context and ICS course material adaptation; Training of Trainers on ICS and Pilot Testing of adapted course materials • Phase 2 (2009-July 2012) – ICS Inception Workshop; ICS Instructor Development through the conduct of six (6) ICS Courses, namely: 5-day ICS Basic/Intermediate Course ( July 19- 23, 2010), Integrated Planning Course (Oct. 11-21, 2010), Administration and Finance Section Chief Course (Feb. 28-Mar. 1, 2011), Operations Section Chief Course (Mar. 3-4, 2011), Logistics Section Chief Course (Mar. 4-7, 2011), and Incident Commander Course (Mar. 8-11, 2011). Thirty-two (32) participants from partner agencies have successfully completed the above courses and certified as ICS National Cadre of Instructors by the NDRRMC-OCD and United States Department of Agriculture – Forest Service (USDA-FS). They are now constituted as the core of the NDRRMC Incident Management Team (NIMT) who can be mobilized by the National Council, as necessary, to assist in on-scene disaster response and management in affected areas of the archipelago. On December 24 2009, the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) was ratified by the ten AMS and called on the Member States, among others, to prepare standard operating procedures for regional cooperation and national action such as regional standby arrangements and coordination of disaster relief and emergency response. Moreover, RA 10121, s-2010, otherwise known as An Act Strengthening the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management System, Providing for the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Framework and Institutionalizing the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes, has reposed on the Office of Civil Defense the primary mission “to administer a comprehensive national civil defense and disaster risk reduction and management program by providing leadership in the continuous development of strategic and systematic approaches as well as measures to reduce the vulnerabilities and risks to hazards and manage the consequences of disasters”. Section 9 of the said law provides the functions / operational directions that OCD shall undertake to effectively implement its mission. One of these functions is “to formulate standard operating procedures for the deployment of rapid assessment teams, information sharing among agencies and coordination (underscoring supplied) before and after disasters at all levels.


Further, Rule 7 (h), Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 10121, has expressly provided for the establishment of an Incident Command System (ICS) as part of the country’s on-scene disaster response system to ensure the effective consequence management of disasters or emergencies. Hence, in line with the objectives of AADMER and RA 10121, the Government of the Philippines through the NDRRMC, hereby adopts and integrates the Incident Command System (ICS) as an on-scene incident management mechanism within the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management System (PDRRMS). Towards this end, regular conduct of ICS training for disaster managers and responders at all DRRMC levels, non-government organizations and private sector agencies and organization of Incident Management Teams for disaster response and management at the on-scene level should be pursued and integrated in the ICS development and capacity building program of all DRRMCs and other agencies concerned. II. OBJECTIVES This Memorandum Circular is aimed to provide guidance to all DRRMCs and other agencies concerned from both government and private sectors on the institutionalization and proper use of Incident Command System (ICS) as a tool to organize on-scene operations for a broad spectrum of disasters or emergencies from small to complex incidents, both natural and human-induced. III. SCOPE AND COVERAGE This Memorandum Circular shall apply to all DRRMCs and other agencies concerned, whether government or private, that are responsible for all-hazards incident management in their respective areas of jurisdiction. It shall specifically cover on-scene management of emergency response operations from disaster impact to the immediate emergency response phase of an incident, with priority objectives of saving lives, ensuring safety of responders and others, protecting property and environment, and incident stabilization. IV. DEFINITION OF TERMS Agency Administrator/Executive or Responsible Official - the official responsible for administering policy for an agency or jurisdiction, having full authority for making decisions, and providing direction to the management organization for an incident; he is normally the Chairperson of the DRRMC or Agency Head or their duly authorized representative. All-Hazards – any incident, natural or human-induced, that warrants action to protect life, property, environment, public health, or safety and minimize disruptions of government, social or economic activities. Area Command - an organization established to oversee the management of multiple incidents that are each being handled by a separate Incident Command System organization or of a very large or evolving incident that has multiple Incident Management Teams engaged. An agency administrator/executive or other public official with jurisdictional responsibility for the incident usually makes the decision to establish an Area Command. It is activated only if necessary, depending on the complexity of the incident and incident management span-of-control considerations.

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Assistant - title for subordinates of principal Command Staff positions. The title indicates a level of technical capability, qualifications, and responsibility subordinate to the primary positions. Assistants may also be assigned to unit leaders. Base - the location at which primary Logistics functions for an incident are coordinated and administered. There is only one Base per incident. (Incident name or other designator will be added to the term Base). The Incident Command Post may be co-located with the Base. Branch – the organizational level having functional or geographical responsibility for major aspects of incident operations. A branch is organizationally situated between the section and division or group in the Operations Section, and between the section and units in the Logistics Section. Branches are identified by the use of Roman numerals or by functional area. Camp - a geographical site within the general incident area (separate from the Incident Base) that is equipped and staffed to provide sleeping, food, water, and sanitary services to incident personnel Chain of Command - series of command, control, executive or management positions in hierarchical order of authority; an orderly line of authority within the ranks of the incident management organization Chief - The Incident Command System title for individuals responsible for management of functional Sections: Operations, Planning, Logistics, Finance/Administration and Intelligence/ Investigations (if established as a separate Section) Command - the act of directing, ordering, or controlling by virtue of explicit statutory, regulatory, or delegated authority Command Staff - Consists of Public Information Officer, Safety Officer, Liaison Officer, and other positions as required, who report directly to the Incident Commander. They may have assistant or assistants, as needed Common Terminology - normally used words and phrases-avoids the use of different words/ phrases for same concepts, consistency Community - consists of people, property, services, livelihoods and environment; a legally constituted administrative local government unit of a country, e.g. municipality or district. Coordination - bringing together of organizations and elements to ensure effective counter disaster response. It is primarily concerned with the systematic acquisition and application of resources (organization, manpower and equipment) in accordance with the requirements imposed by the threat of impact of disaster. Delegation of Authority – a statement or instruction given to the Incident Commander by the Agency Executive or Responsible Official delegating authority and assigning responsibility. The Delegation of Authority can include objectives, priorities, expectations, constraints and other considerations or guidelines as needed. Deputy - a fully qualified individual who, in the absence of the superior, can be delegated the


authority to manage a functional operation or perform a specific task. In some cases a deputy can act as relief for superior, and therefore must be fully qualified in the position. Deputies generally can be assigned to the Incident Commander, General Staff and Branch Directors. Disaster - a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources; an actual threat to public health and safety where the local government and the emergency services are unable to meet the immediate needs of the community; an event in which the local emergency management measures are insufficient to cope with a hazard, whether due to a lack of time, capacity or resources, resulting in unacceptable levels of damage or number of casualties. Disaster Response - the provision of emergency services and public assistance, during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected. Disaster response is predominantly focused on immediate and short-term needs and is sometimes called “disaster relief’. Emergency - unforeseen or sudden occurrence, especially danger, demanding immediate action; an actual threat to an individual’s life or to public health and safety which needs immediate response Emergency Management - the organization and management of resources and responsibilities for addressing all aspects of emergencies, in particular, preparedness, response and initial recovery steps; a management process that is applied to deal with the actual or implied effects of hazards Emergency Operations Center - the physical location at which the coordination of information and resources to support incident management (on-scene operations) activities normally takes place Finance/Administration Section - the ICS functional section responsible for approving and tracking all expenditures and spending related to the incident. Function - refers to the five major activities in the Incident Command System: Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance/Administration. The term function is also used when describing the activity involved (e.g., the planning function). A sixth function, Intelligence/ Investigations, may be established, if required, to meet incident management need. General Staff - a group of incident management personnel organized according to function and reporting to the Incident Commander. The General Staff normally consists of the Operations Section Chief, Planning Section Chief, Logistics Section Chief, and Finance/Administrative Section Chief. An Intelligence/Investigations Chief may be established, if required, to meet incident management needs. Hazard - a dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihood or services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage; any potential threat to public safety and/or public health; any phenomenon which has the potential to cause disruption or damage to people, their


property, their services or their environment, i.e., their communities. The four classes of hazards are natural, technological, biological and societal hazards. Incident - an occurrence or event, natural or human-induced that requires an emergency response to protect life or property. Incidents can, for example, include major disasters, emergencies, terrorist attacks, terrorist threats, civil unrest, floods, hazardous materials spills, nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, tropical storms, tsunamis, war-related disasters, public health and medical emergencies, and other occurrences requiring an emergency response. Incident Action Plan (IAP) - an oral or written plan containing general objectives reflecting the overall strategy for managing an incident. It may include the identification of operational resources and assignments. It may also include attachments that provide direction and important information for management of the incident during one or more operational periods. Incident Command - responsible for overall management of the incident and consists of the Incident Commander, either single or unified command, and any assigned supporting staff Incident Commander (IC) - the individual responsible for all incident activities, including the development of strategies and tactics and the ordering and the release of resources. The IC has overall authority and responsibility for conducting incident operations and is responsible for the management of all incident operations at the incident site. Incident Command Post (ICP) - the field location where the primary functions are performed. The ICP may be co-located with the incident base or other incident facilities Incident Command System (ICS) - is a standardized, on-scene, all-hazard incident management concept; allows its users to adopt an integrated organizational structure to match the complexities and demands of single or multiple incidents without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. ICS is non-permanent organization and is activated only in response to disasters or emergencies. ICS National Cadre - group of individuals who successfully underwent the National Training of Trainers on Incident Command System, didactic and practicum, covering the six (6) ICS courses conducted by the US Department of Agriculture – Forest Service in the Philippines from March, 2010 to July, 2011, under the ASEAN – US Cooperation on Disaster Management, ICS Capability Building Program, Phase 2. Incident Management Team (IMT) - an Incident Commander and the appropriate Command and General Staff personnel assigned to the incident. IMTs are generally grouped in five types. Types I and II are National Teams, Type III are Regional Teams, Type IV are discipline or large jurisdiction-specific, while Type V are ad-hoc incident command organizations typically used by smaller jurisdictions. The ICS National Cadre referred to above shall be initially constituted as a National IMT of the NDRRMC. IMTs shall be organized as one of the response teams of DRRMCs and other agencies concerned that can be readily mobilized to assist in affected areas. Incident Objectives - statements of guidance and direction needed to select appropriate strategy(ies) and the tactical direction of resources. Incident objectives are based on realistic expectations of what can be accomplished when all allocated resources have been effectively deployed. Incident objectives must be achievable and measurable, yet flexible enough to allow


strategic and tactical alternatives. Interoperability – allows emergency management / response personnel and their affiliated organizations to communicate within and across agencies and jurisdictions via voice, data, or video-on-demand, in real time, when needed and when authorized. Jurisdiction – a range or sphere of authority. Public agencies have jurisdiction at an incident related to their legal responsibilities and authority. Jurisdictional authority at an incident can be political or geographical (e.g. town, city) or functional (e.g. law enforcement, public health). Liaison Officer - a member of the Command Staff responsible for coordinating with representatives from cooperating and assisting agencies or organizations. Logistics Section - the section responsible for providing facilities, services, and material support for the incident. Preparedness - measures taken to strengthen the capacity of the emergency services to respond in an emergency Tactics - refers to those activities, resources and maneuvers that are directly applied to achieve goals; deploying and directing resources on an incident to accomplish the objectives designated by the strategy. Unified Command (UC) - an Incident Command System management option that can be used when more than one agency has incident jurisdiction or when incidents cross political boundaries/ jurisdictions. Agencies work together through the designated members of the UC, often the senior person from agencies and/or disciplines participating in the UC, to establish a common set of objectives and strategies and a single Incident Action Plan. Unity of Command - the concept by which each person within an organization reports to one and only one designated person. The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective; principle of management stating that each individual involved in incident operations will be assigned to only one supervisor. V. BASIC ICS CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES To ensure the standard use and application of ICS, the following basic concepts and principles for on-scene disaster operations are hereby adopted: 1. FOURTEEN (14) MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF ICS ICS is based on fourteen (14) proven management characteristics, each of which contributes to the strength and efficiency of the overall system. These are as follows: a. Common Terminology The use of common terminology in ICS will allow diverse incident management and support organizations to work together across a wide variety of incident management functions


and hazard scenarios. This common terminology applies to the following: 1) Organizational Function Major functions and functional units with incident management responsibilities are named and defined. Terminology for the following organizational elements is standard and consistent, namely, Command, Planning, Operations, Logistics and Administration and Finance. 2) Resource Descriptions Major resources—including personnel, facilities, and major equipment and supply items—that support incident management activities are given common names and are “typed” with respect to their capabilities as follows: “Assigned”, “Available” and “Out-of-Service”. This is to help avoid confusion and to enhance interoperability. 3) Incident Facilities Common terminology is used to designate the facilities established in the vicinity of the incident area that will be used during the course of the incident. b. Modular Organization The ICS organizational structure develops in a modular fashion based on the size and complexity of the incident, as well as the specifics of the hazard environment created by the incident. Responsibility for the establishment and expansion of the ICS modular organization ultimately rests with Incident Command, which bases the ICS organization on the requirements of the situation. c. Management by Objectives Management by objectives is communicated throughout the entire ICS organization and includes: a. Knowing agency policy and direction. b. Establishing incident objectives. c. Developing strategies based on incident objectives. d. Establishing specific, measurable tactics or tasks for various incident management functional activities, and directing efforts to accomplish them, in support of defined strategies. e. Documenting results to measure performance and facilitate corrective actions. d. Incident Action Plan Centralized, coordinated incident action planning should guide all response activities. An Incident Action Plan (IAP) provides a concise, coherent means of capturing and communicating the overall incident priorities, objectives, strategies, and tactics in the context of both operational and support activities. e. Span of Control Manageable span of control is key to effective and efficient incident management. Supervisors must be able to adequately supervise and control their subordinates, as well as communicate with and manage all resources under their supervision. f. Incident Facilities and Location Various types of operational support facilities should be established in the vicinity of an


incident, depending on its size and complexity, to accomplish a variety of purposes. The IC will direct the identification and location of facilities based on the requirements of the situation. ICS facilities should include Incident Command Posts, Bases, Camps, Staging Areas, mass casualty triage areas, point-of- distribution sites, and others as required. g. Resource Management Maintaining an accurate and up-to-date picture of resource utilization is a critical component of incident management and emergency response. Resources to be identified include personnel, teams, equipment, supplies, and facilities available or potentially available for assignment or allocation. h. Integrated Communications Incident communications should be developed through the use of a common Communications plan to ensure interoperability and connectivity between and among operational and support units of the various agencies involved. Preparedness planning should therefore endeavor to address the equipment, systems, and protocols necessary to achieve integrated voice and data communications. i. Establishment and Transfer of Command The command function must be clearly established from the beginning of incident operations. The agency with primary jurisdictional authority over the incident designates the individual at the scene responsible for establishing command. When command is transferred, the process must include a briefing that captures all essential information for continuing safe and effective operations. j. Chain of Command and Unity of Command At all times during disaster operations, chain of command and unity of command shall be observed. This is to ensure clarity in reporting relationships and eliminate the confusion caused by multiple, conflicting directives. k. Unified Command In incidents involving multiple jurisdictions, a single jurisdiction with multiagency involvement, or multiple jurisdictions with multiagency involvement, a Unified Command approach should be applied to allow agencies with different legal, geographic, and functional authorities and responsibilities work together effectively without affecting individual agency authority, responsibility, or accountability. l. Accountability Effective accountability of resources at all jurisdictional levels and within individual functional areas during incident operations is essential. To this end, Check-In/Check-Out, Incident Action Planning, Unity of Command, Personal Responsibility, Span of Control, and Resource Tracking must be adhered to within the ICS. m. Dispatch/Deployment Resources should respond only when requested or when dispatched by an appropriate authority through established resource management systems. Resources not requested must refrain from spontaneous deployment to avoid overburdening the recipient and compounding accountability challenges.


n. Information and Intelligence Management The incident management organization must establish a process for gathering, analyzing, assessing, sharing, and managing incident-related information and intelligence. 2. INCIDENT COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF The Incident Command, which comprises the Command and General Staff, shall be responsible for overall management of the incident. The Command and General Staff are typically located at the Incident Command Post (ICP).

a. Incident Command The command function may be conducted in one of two general ways:

1) Single Incident Command Single incident command maybe applied when an incident occurs within a single jurisdiction and there is no jurisdictional or functional agency overlap. Overall incident management responsibility rests on the appropriate jurisdictional authority. In some cases where incident management crosses jurisdictional and/or functional agency boundaries, a single IC may be designated if agreed upon. . 2) Unified Command (UC) UC for incident management may be applied when a disaster or emergency affects several areas or jurisdictions or requires multiagency engagement. Unified Command, as an incident management option, provides the necessary guidelines to enable agencies with different legal, geographic, and functional responsibilities to coordinate, plan, and interact effectively. As a team effort, UC allows all agencies with jurisdictional authority or functional responsibility for the incident to jointly provide management direction through a common set of incident objectives and strategies and a single IAP. Each participating agency maintains its authority, responsibility, and accountability. b. Command Staff In an incident command organization, the Command Staff typically includes a Public Information Officer, a Safety Officer, and a Liaison Officer, who report directly to the IC/UC and may have assistants as necessary. Additional positions may be required, depending on the nature, scope, complexity, and location(s) of the incident(s), or according to specific requirements established by the IC/UC. 1) Public Information Officer The Public Information Officer is responsible for interfacing with the public and media and/or with other agencies with incident-related information requirements. Whether the command structure is single or unified, only one Public Information Officer should be designated per incident. Assistants may be assigned from other involved agencies, departments, or organizations. The IC/UC must approve the release of all incident-related information. In large-scale incidents or where multiple command posts are established, the Public Information Officer should participate in or lead the Joint Information or Media Center in order to ensure consistency in the provision of information to the public.


2) Safety Officer The Safety Officer monitors incident operations and advises the IC/UC on all matters relating to operational safety, including the health and safety of emergency responder personnel. The ultimate responsibility for the safe conduct of incident management operations rests with the IC/UC and supervisors at all levels of incident management. The Safety Officer is, in turn, responsible to the IC/UC for the systems and procedures necessary to ensure ongoing assessment of hazardous environments, including the incident Safety Plan, coordination of multiagency safety efforts, and implementation of measures to promote emergency responder safety as well as the general safety of incident operations. The Safety Officer has immediate authority to stop and/or prevent unsafe acts during incident operations. It is important to note that the agencies, organizations, or jurisdictions that contribute to joint safety management efforts do not lose their individual identities or responsibility for their own programs, policies, and personnel. Rather, each contributes to the overall effort to protect all responder personnel involved in incident operations. 3) Liaison Officer The Liaison Officer is Incident Command’s point of contact for DRRMC/other government agency representatives, NGOs, and the private sector to provide input on their agency’s policies, resource availability, and other incident-related matters. Under either a single-IC or a UC structure, representatives from assisting or cooperating agencies and organizations coordinate through the Liaison Officer. 4) Additional Command Staff Additional Command Staff positions may also be necessary, depending on the nature and location(s) of the incident or specific requirements established by Incident Command. 3. GENERAL STAFF The General Staff is responsible for the functional aspects of the incident command structure. The General Staff typically consists of the Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance/ Administration Section Chiefs. The Section Chiefs may have one or more deputies assigned, with the assignment of deputies from other agencies encouraged in the case of multijurisdictional incidents. a. Operations Section This Section is responsible for all tactical activities focused on reducing the immediate hazard, saving lives and property, establishing situational control, and restoring normal operations. Lifesaving and responder safety will always be the highest priorities and the first objectives in the IAP. The Operations Section Chief is responsible to Incident Command for the direct management of all incident-related tactical activities. The Operations Section Chief will establish tactics for the assigned operational period. An Operations Section Chief should be designated for each operational period, and responsibilities include direct involvement in development of the IAP. The Operations Section is composed of the following:

1) Branches Branches may be functional, geographic, or both, depending on the circumstances of the


incident. In general, Branches are established when the number of Divisions or Groups exceeds the recommended span of control. Branches are identified by the use of Roman numerals or by functional area. 2) Divisions and Groups Divisions and/or Groups are established when the number of resources exceeds the manageable span of control of Incident Command and the Operations Section Chief. Divisions are established to divide an incident into physical or geographical areas of operation. Groups are established to divide the incident into functional areas of operation. For certain types of incidents, for example, Incident Command may assign evacuation or mass-care responsibilities to a functional Group in the Operations Section. Additional levels of supervision may also exist below the Division or Group level. 3) Resources Resources may be organized and managed in three different ways, depending on the requirements of the incident. • Single Resources: Individual personnel or equipment and any associated operators. • Task Forces: Any combination of resources assembled in support of a specific mission or operational need. All resource elements within a Task Force must have common communications and a designated leader. • Strike Teams: A set number of resources of the same kind and type that have an established minimum number of personnel. All resource elements within a Strike Team must have common communications and a designated leader. The use of Task Forces and Strike Teams is encouraged, when appropriate, to optimize the use of resources, reduce the span of control over a large number of single resources, and reduce the complexity of incident management coordination and communications. b. Planning Section The Planning Section collects, evaluates, and disseminates incident situation information and intelligence to the IC/UC and incident management personnel. This Section prepares status reports, displays situation information, maintains the status of resources assigned to the incident, and prepares and documents the IAP, based on Operations Section input and guidance from the IC/UC. As shown in the ICS organization below, the Planning Section is comprised of four primary Units, as well as a number of technical specialists to assist in evaluating the situation, developing planning options, and forecasting requirements for additional resources. Within the Planning Section, the following primary Units fulfil functional requirements: • Resources Unit: Responsible for recording the status of resources committed to the incident. This Unit also evaluates resources committed currently to the incident, the effects additional responding resources will have on the incident, and anticipated resource needs. • Situation Unit: Responsible for the collection, organization, and analysis of incident status information, and for analysis of the situation as it progresses. • Demobilization Unit: Responsible for ensuring orderly, safe, and efficient demobilization of incident resources. • Documentation Unit: Responsible for collecting, recording, and safeguarding all documents relevant to the incident.


• Technical Specialist(s): Personnel with special skills that can be used anywhere within the ICS organization. 4. The Incident Command System Organization The ICS organization, as an on-scene level command and management structure, should be located at the ICP, which is generally located at or in the immediate vicinity of the incident site. It is not a permanent structure nor will replace existing DRRMCs / other similar organizations in public and private agencies or entities. It is designed to enable effective and efficient incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure. A typical ICS organization and DRRMC-EOC and ICS Organization interoperability are depicted in Annexes “A” and “B”, respectively, which form an integral part of this Circular. VI. POLICY STATEMENTS 1. In line with the policy of the state to develop, promote and implement a comprehensive National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP) that aims to strengthen the capacity of the national government and the local government units (LGUs), together with partner stakeholders, to build the disaster resilience of communities, and to institutionalize arrangements and measures for reducing disaster risks, including projected climate risks, and enhancing disaster preparedness and response capabilities at all levels, an all-hazards Incident Command System is hereby established and institutionalized in the PDRRMS as an on-scene disaster response and management mechanism at all levels of DRRMCs, including public and private sector agencies. 2. As part of this ICS institutionalization process, all concerned shall endeavour to carry out capacity building programs for their ICS organization through the conduct of ICS training, organization of an All-Hazard Incident Management Teams (IMTs), development of stand-by arrangements and protocols for IMT notification, activation, deployment and deactivation and other related activities. The National ICS Cadre defined under this Memorandum Circular shall take the lead in undertaking the ICS capacity building and development program under the leadership of the Office of Civil Defense. 3. All incidents are expected to be managed locally through their Local DRRMCs by using their own emergency response teams/personnel, such as Search and Rescue, Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment and Incident Management Teams, as well as material resources based on the following criteria:

3.1 The Barangay Development Committee (BDC), if a barangay is affected; 3.2 The city/municipal DRRMC, if two (2) or more barangays are affected; 3.3 The provincial DRRMC, if two (2) or more cities/municipalities are affected; 3.4 The regional DRRMC, if two (2) or more provinces are affected; 3.5 The NDRRMC, if two (2) or more regions are affected

4. The NDRRMC and intermediary Local DRRMCs shall always act as support to LGUs which have the primary responsibility as first disaster responders to any incident occurring within their jurisdictions. For this purpose, the National Council and intermediary local DRRMCs shall continue to provide support functions to the affected LGUs to ensure that tactical objectives at


the field level are achieved, and immediate emergency response operation is coordinated to assist in the transition from on-scene emergency operations to early recovery and rehabilitation operations to be undertaken by the regular member agencies / humanitarian assistance clusters of DRRMCs in affected areas. 5. An NDRRMC Incident Management Team (NIMT) is constituted to be composed of members of the National ICS Cadre as defined under this Circular. As such, the NIMT is expected to serve as one of the emergency response teams of the National Council to carry out on-scene incident management functions based on the above criteria or whenever the situation warrants. VII. IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS The DRRMCs at all levels shall serve as the mechanisms to ensure the effective implementation of this Memorandum Circular. Partner agencies in the ICS Capability Building Program, namely, DILG, BFP and PNP, DOH, DSWD, MMDA, FNTI, PRC, SBMA Fire Department, City Government of Olongapo, Davao Rescue 911 and Amity Public Safety Academy are enjoined to work closely with OCD, as the Lead Agency, to attain the desired results thereof. VIII. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE Should any of the provisions herein be declared invalid or unconstitutional by the appropriate authority or courts of law, the same shall not affect the other provisions’ validity, unless otherwise so specified.


ANNEX D List of Government Media Platforms for Official Pronouncements/Statements of the Communications Group: a. Presidential News Desk (PND) functions as the newsroom of Malacañang. It gathers and disseminates information, such as press and photograph releases, and official statements from the Palace, on a daily basis. The PND operates from Sundays to Saturdays, 5:00 AM to 7:00 PM. b. Philippine Information Agency (PIA) was the product of a Executive Order No. 100, which was promulgated on December 24, 1986 that abolished the Marcos-era Office of Media Affairs-National Media Production Center. The PIA is organized into 11 divisions, 15 regional information offices, 74 provincial information centers, 911 community development information centers (CDIC). c. Bureau of Communication Services is the attached agency of the OPS that is tasked to provide materials and services related to various functions of the OPS and its bureaus, such as policy formulation, communication planning, and project development. It also produces information materials for state events such as the anniversary of the People Power Revolution, Araw ng Kalayaan celebrations, and others. d. Presidential Broadcast Staff - Radio TV Malacañang, which was created under Executive Order No. 297 on July 25, 1987 is tasked to provide the necessary media services (video and audio) to the incumbent President, to document all official engagements and to make available to the public accurate and relevant information on the activities, programs and pronouncements of the national leadership. The agency is involved in television coverage and documentation, news and public affairs syndication of all the activities of the President, either live or delayed telecast through government or private collaborating networks. e. Television and radio networks. There are three government-run television networks. These are the National Broadcasting Network (NBN-4), the Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13) and the Radio Philippines Network (RPN-9). The government also operates the Philippine Broadcasting Service (PBS), which is a radio network. f. National Printing Office (NPO) was established by Executive Order No. 285 on July 25, 1987 and is mandated to print forms, official ballots, public documents, and public information materials. g. News and Information Bureau aims to provide efficient, effective, productive, and economical services relating to the development and formulation of a domestic and foreign information program for the Government in general, and the Presidency in particular, including the development of strategies for the dissemination of information on specific government programs. h. OP Web Development Office or commonly referred to as the President’s New Media Team is responsible for the establishment and management of the President’s Official Website and Official Presence on Social Networking Channels such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.

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It is also partly responsible for the feedback mechanism of the President wherein it receives the comments, concerns and suggestions through the Contact Us section of the President’s website. It is also responsible for the President’s Social Media engagement and in maximizing the use of new technologies to further the President’s agenda, policies and programs.


ANNEX E Strategic SA

STEP 1 – Detecting What is Happening

The SA process primarily aimed at strategically preventing crisis or STRATEGIC SA formally begins in this phase, by scanning the environment for risks and vulnerabilities or indicators of potential crisis. Scanning, as prescribed in this manual, shall be made in two (2) fronts: intra-agency or within the agency/department and inter-agency or in close collaboration with other agencies/departments, and stakeholders, such as civil society organizations (CSOs), subject matter experts, and the general public, who shall increasingly bear the impact of and share the responsibility for managing highly complex and interlinked 21st century crises. Ideally, these sectors shall be engaged at the earliest possible time and in a systematic and sustained manner. At the intra-agency level, information on potential crises shall be scanned from published or unpublished material conveyed in print, audio, video or in web formats. Scanning also includes reading periodic reports of the agency/department and those of other agencies/departments (i.e. daily/monthly/annual information briefs). In all scanning procedures, the appointed authority responsible for STRATEGIC SA shall provide appropriate attributions for and evaluation of all references and sources. Information is then depicted into several variables. Variables are movements, structures, processes, phenomena, ideas, or belief systems whose dynamics, decisions, behavior, power, inclinations, tendencies, directions, etc. can determine a certain outcome or change. Variables can either be drivers, inhibitors or both. Drivers are those whose behavior/dynamic significantly propels the occurrence of a crisis. Inhibitors are those that counteract/counterbalance the occurrence of a crisis or the influence of drivers. These variables shall be organized according to Political (P), Economic (E), Sociological (S), Technological (T), Environmental (E) and Security (S). These variables shown below in Figure 2-3, are expressed as elements of national security stated in the country’s current National Security Policy: socio-political stability (SP), economic solidarity (ES), ecological balance (EB), cultural cohesiveness (CC), moral-spiritual consensus (MPS), peace and harmony (PS). Identification and classification of these variables are thus made on the basis of their implications and consequences to the country’s national security interests. Figure 1 shows an example of set variables organized according to PESTES when preparing a foresight report on the future of transnational crime (used as an example in this manual) in the next 10 years.


Variables for Future of Transnational Crime in the Next 10 Years

Figure 1 (Source for list of variables: S6017 Theoretical and Practical Approaches to the Future: Strategic Foresight and Warning, RSIS, NTU, Singapore. 2010.) Scanning to detect and warn of potential sources of crises entails more than knowing the what, why, when, where, who and how of, for instance, a report on a planned bombing or on massive protests. It seeks answers to such questions as: what does the increase/decrease in bomb plots or in massive protests mean or be an indication of? What are its implications in the near, medium and long terms? Scanning to detect and warn of potential sources of crises is making sense of all relevant information on a potential crisis. It is drawing from an extensive pool of information views of an emerging crisis and its probable direction. In order to achieve this, other agencies and stakeholders shall be consulted. Agencies/departments shall confer with other agencies/departments and compare notes on the scanned information at all levels. They shall adopt existing fusion centers for this purpose. In scanning at an inter-agency level, the SWOC Analysis (Figure 2) is useful in illuminating strengths/opportunities as well as challenges faced by the agency in relation to the identified variables.


Figure 2 Agencies/departments shall also confer with subject matter experts. The Delphi Method, developed by RAND Corporation, is one method used on the premise that experts are more likely to be correct about questions in their field (Gordon, 2009). Experts are identified through literature searches, recommendations from institutions and other experts. Most studies use panels of 15 to 35 experts through group meetings or in-depth interviews (Gordon, 2009) with questions on: forecasts on the occurrence of future developments or crises; desirability of some future state or questions on judgments about whether an event should occur, and the basis of the recommendation; and means for avoiding a future crisis or achieving a future state (Gordon, 2009). Non-government organizations (NGOs) and private entities are likewise consulted. NGOs are important providers of both early warning and response by both location and activity. Agencies/departments, through their appointed units responsible for undertaking strategic SA, shall develop mechanisms of cooperation with NGOs and private entities, particularly, in the production of quality pre- and post-crisis situation assessments. Probably the most important provider of early warning and response for human-induced crises is the general public. Agencies/departments can benefit from the technological advances that enable citizens to capture and convey details of a developing or ongoing crisis or emergency. Agencies/departments can, for example, establish a platform for mapping human-induced crisis in a given timeframe (crisis mapping) and/or a crisis advisory system. Agencies/departments shall identify ways in establishing and sustaining mechanisms for engaging the general public, NGOs, subject matter experts, and the general public according to their specific intents. It is hoped that through these consultations and mechanisms, preliminary information on a potential crisis is confirmed, modified, and/or created at this earliest stage of


the SA process at the strategic level. A particularly challenging aspect throughout the entire SA process at the strategic, operational and tactical levels is in identifying information that is truly significant.

STEP 2 – Analyzing What Seems to be Happening

Step 2 is analyzing the extensive information gathered in STEP 1. Agencies/departments make sense of the links between variables and how they relate to trends and to the agency’s internal and external environments. There are several sense making tools. The agencies/ departments shall choose which tools to use and/or make modifications according to their specific intents. The following tools only provide a generic guide: a. PESTES Analysis (Figure 3): This tool examines the multi-dimensional features of a given force/driver by describing its two-way behavior in each dimension.

Figure 3 b. Influence Analysis (Figure 4): This tool helps in illuminating relationships, causes leading to, influence, networks of and dynamics among variables. It begins with identifying variables, sorting them into PESTES dimensions, assigning states/outcomes6 for each variable and linking them (Lavoix, 2010). This tool helps identify the most influential and most influenced variables. Figure 4 illustrates the influence of the variable, economic growth, to another variable, unemployment, which was given a value of -3, indicating how economic growth essentially relates to unemployment in an opposing manner/direction. The value that an analyst places to depict how one variable relates to another shall be accompanied by appropriate and authoritative references. Assigning values and identifying variables shall also be made in consideration of the given timeframe of a particular foresight study or report. Figure 4 also demonstrates how the variables, unemployment, extreme poverty and relative deprivation, are your drivers from among 80 other variables in your foresight project on the future of transnational crime in the next 10 years. States/outcomes are categories that define variables in ranges expressed in quantitative form i.e. Corruption (Widespread, Nil, Contained expressed as -1,0,+1)

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Figure 4

STEP 3 –- Interpreting What is Happening

After analyzing the information in Step 2, agencies/departments interpret information in Step 3. Not all information will be interpreted. Rather, the more crucial drivers and inhibitors of crises will be identified, their links and behavior interpreted against the more immediate information, whether published or unpublished, and the agency’s organizational capabilities and weaknesses, plans and strategies. In both instances, agencies/departments are expected to interface with other agencies to completely explore relationships and the future direction of these crucial drivers and inhibitors, and to illuminate such problems as: a. faulty understanding of the situation and issues and trends; b. emerging areas where a crisis seems to be brewing, but which the agency may have overlooked or de-emphasized; c. difficulty in the agency’s pursuit of identified national interests; d. incompatibilities between the agency’s plans/strategies and the existing or emerging problems; and e. the agency’s incomplete self-perception vis-à-vis its environment;

STEP 4 – Determining How Things Can Go

Step 4 is exploring concretely the future direction of these more influential drivers and inhibitors of potential crises identified in Step 3. This stage begins with agencies/departments


focusing on these drivers and inhibitors direct and indirect (second-or third-order) impacts by answering the following: a. How does this issue or potential crisis positively or negatively impact the identified national interests? Is the agency capable of resolving or mitigating the impacts of the identified issue or potential crisis? b. Given the need to resolve an issue or potential crisis and the limited capabilities and resources, how would certain courses of action negatively or positively affect the agency’s other responsibilities? c. Is the agency capable of coping with a given possible/hypothetical sudden turn in the direction of an issue or crisis? 4.1 Crafting Scenarios. Agencies/departments shall proceed to crafting scenarios based on all accumulated information from previous steps. A scenario storyline usually consists of 5 to 8 paragraphs of possible dynamics of key drivers using impact-likelihood matrices (Figure 5). Likelihood and Impact Assessment - a likelihood assessment Almost certain

Probability above 85%

Probable or highly likely

Probability between 70% and 85%

Likely


Improbable


Highly unlikely, negligible

Probability below 20%

- an impact assessment Severe

Exceptionally high costs with wide ranging implications

High

Considerable and highly visible costs

Medium

Tangible costs

Low

Localized and limited costs

Nil

Not a discernible threat, negligible costs

(Tables from Services Canadien de Renseignements Criminels (SCRC/CISC), Alerte Stratégique aux Fins De Renseignement Criminel: Cadre Théorique Et Méthodologie Sentinelle; 2007)

Figure 5

Scenarios are also created for possible surprises and wild cards. For the purpose of crisis management, scenarios should have the following characteristics: a. creative narratives of alternative future outcomes of identified drivers, risks/impacts over a 5-, 15-, or 25-year time period; b. should discuss how identified national interests are affected; c. attempt to experiment on identified wild cards and worst-case situations, which can significantly alter and influence other drivers and the agency in the future; and d. should simulate the progression of existing, emerging, or possible crisis situations, leading from the simple to the very difficult that can complicate stages of the crises.

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4.2 Simulating Scenarios. Simulating a crisis is taking scenario-building at an interagency level more concretely. The agencies/departments shall now experiment on the ways in which a given crisis could: a. commence (given various factors); b. develop in an extended period of time; c. give rise to another crisis; d. affect other existing crises; e. be affected by wild cards f. or surprises and their “entry points”; and g. complicate inter-agency cooperation. At the level of inter-agency consultation, the agencies/departments must concisely document how each agency believes a certain crisis could behave or evolve. Taking into account various inter-agency viewpoints on a given crisis puts more value to the information and analysis that the agencies/departments would be able to extract from the process. The process also promotes the habit of communication and collaboration among agencies. STEP 5 – Preparing Warning Products Warning products are SA reports that sum up information from Steps 1 to 4. Generally, good and usable SA reports are: succinct but comprehensive (details as annexes); reader-friendly; straightforward; relevant to the functions of the end-users; updated; and well researched. Warning products need not be detailed, but rather a concise yet comprehensive initial evaluation or overview that should allow decision makers to have a brief insight into issues of current or future interest to their organization. This manual recognizes the diverse nature of potential threats and risks and the manner by which an agency or department intends to respond to them. This manual, thus, will not prescribe any strategic SA report formats. However, in order to guide agencies/departments in the presentation of their data to the end-users, this manual recommends the inclusion of the following elements: a. Abstract. The abstract contains the issue statements, which briefly says how a certain driver/force, phenomena, trend, or dynamic is currently contributing or can lead to a crisis, issue or concern. Three to five sentences would be enough to encapsulate the general idea of the issue to be discussed. b. Drivers and Inhibitors. Drivers are variables that influence or propel an event’s occurrence. Inhibitors are variables that have negating effects. c. Influencing Factors and Indicators. Briefly discuss the elements or phenomena that affect the behavior of the identified drivers, as well as the indicators of the tendencies or movement of the identified drivers. The indicators, which are essentially the basis for warnings, also become the basis for further or deliberate information collection efforts for SA at the operational and tactical levels d. Weak Signals. Phenomena, trends, issues, factors, or forces that may initially have negligible impact but are too important to be totally ignored.


e. Wild cards. Low-probability, high-impact events that can drastically alter situations and assumptions, and catch everyone by surprise should they occur. f. Prognosis or Scenarios. Brief storylines [similar to synopses of movies] that narrate how certain crises could possibly unfold in the future, with elaborations of second and third-order effects on a wide array of aspects. g. Areas of convergence. Geographic or thematic areas where prospects of or actual interagency cooperation is substantial. h. Flashpoints. Issue areas where possible inter-agency conflicts or misunderstanding might occur; they could also refer to geographic/issue areas which no one seems to be in charge of. i. Policy Recommendations. Options that seek to convince decision-makers of the need to adopt, abandon, revise, rethink policies/strategies vis-à-vis emerging, impending, or imagined crises. j. Scope of Coverage, limitations, contradicting analysis, analysis for further development and the end-users, specifically, those who are supposed to act on emerging issues raised in the reports and how regularly they need the reports, are also specified. To do so, the agencies/, departments should refer to the mandates and the authority that created them. STEP 6 – Conveying Warning Products A warning not conveyed is not a warning (Grabo, 2004). Warning reports should be conveyed at the most appropriate time and in the most efficient manner. Warning products from strategic SA shall be conveyed to decision makers at the strategic level for the evaluation and formulation of relevant policies. At the operational level, warning products shall be conveyed to aid in the preparation and execution of contingency, crisis action and recovery plans. They shall, in particular, provide the necessary context by which better estimates of operational and tactical details of a threat or impending crisis, such as timing, location, perpetrators, impact and consequences, could be drawn. In preparing and conveying warnings, agency/departments shall dissociate themselves of biases and self-interests, and consider the possible response to be generated by warning reports. Trainings in managing cognitive biases, among other training needs, should be made available to agencies/departments. Safekeeping warning reports and feedback and response should be enabled. Agencies/departments shall also constantly monitor the relevance and use of the SA process and their reports in the overall decision-making and function of the agency. Analyses and forecasts about emerging issues and crises, including the weaknesses of the SA process itself, must be regularly reviewed in order to rectify gaps in the methodologies and improve the quality of outputs. Evaluation, experimentation and further research on SA tools and methodologies provide insights into how SA units/practitioners piece together vast information to form a coherent picture and subsequently warn of a current or impending crisis. It also allows for the continuous upgrading of abilities at addressing SA challenges as data overload, non-integrated data, automation, complex systems that are poorly understood, excess attention demands and several others. This shall be done not only at the strategic level but also at the operational and tactical levels of SA.


Figure 6 sums up the entire strategic SA process.

Figure 6


Operational SA STEP 1 – Planning and direction is planning the courses of action to take and how they shall be undertaken when tasked with or acting on a specific information requirement. It consists of the following: a. Defining the situation is describing the situation/s surrounding the information requirement and listing what we initially know about it and what we need to find out. b. Determining Mission, Purpose and Objectives is specifying the mission of the information collection plan, the purpose, and the general and specific objectives. Mission is defined as a long-term end result or achievement. Objectives are the ends toward which effort and action are directed or coordinated in attaining the mission. c. Determining Concept of Operations is coming up with a concept of how information collection shall be carried out in order to accomplish the mission and objectives. It describes the different phases of information collection. This also refers to how communication shall be made; how the security of those carrying out the information collection plan shall be ensured; and the type of reports or outputs that are to be submitted. d. Determining Specific Information Collection Tasks is describing in detail the tasks to be carried out and the individuals or units/agencies responsible for such tasks. Partner entities, their roles and functions are also identified in consideration of the agency’s SA requirements and goals and given the broad trends of emerging crises in the next 2-5, 15 or 25 years. Identifying surprises and how they shall be dealt with shall also be considered. e. Determining Appropriate Timeframes for Information Collection is identifying appropriate and workable timeframes for information collection. It is describing specific tasks to be done and when they shall be done. It is important that political and administrative cycles be considered. This is to ensure a wide-ranging support in attaining goals and objectives. f. Determining Resource Allocation is identifying funds and resources requirements and availability for the specific information collection activities. Preparation of a summary of funding requirements and seeking approval for funding directive shall also be made. g. Identifying Lead and Partner Agencies/Entities is identifying and making necessary arrangements for collaboration with other agencies/departments, CSOs, the public and private sector entities. It is determining common objectives and requirements, specifying their roles/functions and the outputs expected from them. It is determining ways and means to ensure the optimum inter-agency collaboration. This includes identifying possible friction points, identifying and carrying out ways by which these are managed or kept to a minimum. STEP 2 – Collection is carrying out specific collection tasks deliberated in Step 1. Specifically, it is the process of gathering information overtly and discreetly, the latter through special information gathering methods, in consideration of all of the factors outlined in the planning and direction stage. STEP 3 – Processing is taking all the gathered information and putting it together into a coherent report. This gathered information could be anything from a translated document to a


description of a photo. Special information gathering activities and outputs shall consist of the following: a. Situation/Background b. SA Goals and Objectives c. Concept of Information Gathering d. Specific Task Allocation e. Timeframe f. Resource Allocation g. Partner Entities h. Effectivity and Approval i. Limitations, contradicting analysis, analysis for further development STEP 4 – Analysis and Production is taking a closer look at all the information and determining how it fits together, while concentrating on answering the initial information requirement. It is assessing what is happening, why it is happening, what might occur next, and how it affects the public’s interests as well as that of our agency/department. Threat, risk and vulnerability analysis, which are also employed at the strategic and tactical levels, but is considered more deliberate at the operational level, are given due attention at this instance. Threat analysis is a multi-disciplinary and multi-stakeholder activity and is aimed at identifying types of threats, the potential perpetrators, the means that may be used and the circumstances under which they may be used (WHO, 2009). However, it will only be rarely possible to identify the likelihood or the precise nature of the threat. General preparedness measures in security, health, sanitation, delivery of basic goods shall therefore be made while the probability of the incident occurring and its consequences are being evaluated. Vulnerability Analysis identifies the level of threat that exists, given the potential vulnerability of an agency or department to respond to it, or targeted community or area concerned.9 It is identifying potential scenarios as well as the inherent and resultant weaknesses of a particular system. This primarily includes determining the current ability to respond to and manage a crisis or emergency. Agencies/departments and stakeholders thus assess their needs and capabilities to efficiently respond to incidents and scenarios as well as identify and address deficiencies. Risk analysis is an organized way of identifying and evaluating threats or hazardous conditions, taking courses of action to eliminate, reduce or control risks (FEMA, US). Risk analysis shall therefore identify the requisite response activities, and a logically ordered sequence for their implementation. As such, the risk analysis generally consists of risk assessment, risk management, and risk communications. 1) Risk Assessment is assessing threatening or hazardous and/or dangerous conditions ideally before--but also during and after-- they cause injury, loss and damage to critical infrastructure, equipment and/or the public. Risks are judged whether they carry negligible, improbable, likely, probable and almost certain probability of occurring and whether they carry Nil, Low, Medium, High or Severe impact (Figure 5: Likelihood and Impact Assessment). 2) Risk Management encompasses all activities required to reach and implement decisions on risk reduction or elimination. Once a risk has been identified, an informed decision

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can be made as to what control measures can be applied to reduce the probability of occurrence or the severity of an incident. Risk management also involves making a deliberate decision as to whether an inherent or resultant risk is acceptable. In essence, everyone accepts a degree of risk in order to accomplish something beneficial. For example, if a risk could result in a minor injury, it might be appropriate for an incident commander to accept the risk and to proceed without further hazard control measures. A fundamental principle applies when addressing “acceptable risk”: The number of people exposed to a hazardous and/or dangerous condition, the amount of time for which they are exposed, and the level of the hazard and/or danger to which they are exposed to shall always be kept to the minimum when carrying out threat or crisis response. If, for instance, the ICS commander is not be able to handle a situation, the responsibility must clearly be turned over to a higher authority, who would be in a better position to identify and assign better control measures, to reduce or eliminate risks (ILAGAN). 3) Risk Communication to the Public. Because of the potential widespread fear and panic, the communication of clear, accurate and understandable information on the risks to the public is essential. If preventive measures are available to minimize the risk of exposure, the public must be informed clearly and rapidly. In case of severe exposure, the public must be assured that relief and services are available. (See also Section 3-10 on Risk Communication through the Media.) STEP 5 – Dissemination is giving our final written analysis to support information requirements identified both at the strategic and tactical levels. Questions could prompt the start of the whole process again. These special projects and information reports, which could come in several forms, shall confirm or counter, modify and/or supplement indicators of emerging threats identified and prioritized in SA at the strategic level. Operational SA thus processes warnings from strategic SA – give them form and make them actionable – by identifying the emerging threats’ capabilities and vulnerabilities, targets and intents and contextualizing these according to the agency’s functions, capabilities and vulnerabilities. Figure 7 sums up the entire operational SA process.

Figure 7


Tactical SA STEP 1 – Defining the Operating Environment of the Identified Crisis

Since undertaking tactical SA occur shortly (0 months to 2 years) before, during and postcrisis, the appointed individuals within agencies/departments in close collaboration with other agencies or departments, shall first define the operating environment of the identified threat or crisis, and appraise the head of the agency/department. It is crucial that the appointed individuals for undertaking tactical SA be closely coordinating with those tasked to undertake strategic and operational SA within the agency/department. Undertaking tactical SA or deliberate information collection activities need to be fully grounded on an extensive view of the operating environment. Defining the operating environment of an identified threat or the drivers of a identified threat or crisis consists of: a. Identifying the identified crisis’ environment; b. Determining significant characteristics of the identified crisis’ environment in terms of factors that can propel or inhibit its emergence; c. Analyzing the agency/department’s mission against the identified crisis. This entails knowing the potential crisis’ probable targets, its impact and consequences in the near, medium, and long terms. d. Establishing the limits of agencies/departments’ areas of interest; e. Determining information gaps, shortfalls, and priorities; and with direction and approval, the specific information required to fill gaps in the agency/department’s knowledge of the identified crisis’ situation; and f. Collecting information and submitting requests for needed information to support further analysis. The same individuals within agencies/departments appointed to undertake this first step of this tactical SA process shall be responsible for undertaking the subsequent steps. STEP 2 – Describing the Impact of the Environment to the Identified Threat or Crisis

Step 2 evaluates the effects of the environment, which the identified threat or crisis must contend with. Limitations and opportunities that the environment offers on the identified threat or crisis as well as the general capabilities of the agency or inter-agency mechanism are identified. This assessment of the environment shall include an examination of characteristics of the following factors: politics, civilian press, local population, demographics and framework needed for the functioning of systems, cities, or regions. In cases of terrorism or kidnapping, an area’s terrain, weather, infrastructure, such as facilities, equipment shall be identified. At any rate, Step 2 essentially aims at: a. Developing a systems perspective of the threat or crisis environment, in terms of factors that propel and inhibit the identified crisis; and b. Describing the impact of the identified crisis’ operating environment to the agency and supporting agencies’ capabilities and broad courses of action.


STEP 3 – Evaluating Capabilities/Vulnerabilities of the Identified Threat/Crisis’ and the Agency and Supporting Agencies STEP 3 is evaluating the adversary or the identified crises by updating or creating models of the identified crisis’ capabilities, vulnerabilities, links and associations. Current and previous reports are referred to. In the case of an identified human-induced crisis, which does not necessarily involve armed elements, relevant data are gathered to attain the same objectives. The analyst, essentially, considers the following in this stage: a. Visualization or graphical portrayal of the emergence of an identified threat/crisis, in order to identify important details b. Identification of roles and functions that the lead agency and the supporting agencies should accomplish during the inter-agency effort of disrupting or eliminating the threat/ crisis. The written narrative can be expressed either in paragraph form or in a matrix, which shall detail the lead agency and supporting agencies’ tasks and the time duration for accomplishing each of these tasks. c. Identification of critical drivers of an identified threat/crisis for disruption/elimination. In cases of human-induced crises involving armed elements, answers shall be sought to the question “what are the tactical systems that the threat depends upon?” In other cases of human-induced crises, answers are sought to the question “what are the factors that influence the potential crisis and allow crisis to thrive leading to its eventual emergence?” d. Identification of and ensuring support to the lead agency and supporting agencies’ tactics and capabilities for disrupting or eliminating an identified threat/crisis and its impact. This is to enable unity of effort in how best to attain the lead agency’s objective. Operational and tactical crisis management manuals prepared by each agency/department/office in reference to this strategic manual shall discuss this in detail. Regardless, models of identified threat/crisis are generalized procedures and should be modified by the specific crisis environment.

STEP 4 – Determining an Identified Threat/Crisis’ Courses of Action

Step 4 integrates the results of the previous steps into a meaningful conclusion. It is integrating all SA related information on an identified threat/crisis to aid in the successful planning and execution of contingency, crisis action and crisis recovery planning. When undertaking disruption activities against an identified human-induced crisis involving armed elements, tactical SA shall seek information regarding a threat agent’s likely objectives and the courses of action available to it. In other cases of human-induced crises, tactical SA shall seek information regarding the identified crisis’ probable direction and its impact and consequences. In Step 4, the units/agencies designated to undertake tactical SA, in collaboration with other agencies, shall choose from among several threat course of action (COA) models, prepare event templates that detail how the threat/crisis shall emerge, and matrices that direct information collection to better identify which COA the threat will execute or which direction the identified threat/ crisis will take.


The crisis direction models developed in Step 3 are the products that shall be enhanced and used as basis to portray the threat in the decision making and targeting processes in STEP 4. These models, aimed at effectively predicting the threat/crisis direction, thus, shall only be made after a good foundation during the first three steps has been achieved, specifically that: a. The supporting agencies’ tasks are adequately analyzed; b. Every characteristic of the crisis environment or the opportunities and constraints it offers to the threat/crisis and the agency’s support infrastructure and stakeholders are identified; and c. The capabilities of the identified threat/crisis and its probable direction, if unconstrained, shall be identified.

Other considerations are: a. Identification of the likely objective and desired end state of the perpetrators of an identified threat/crisis, in cases of human-induced crises involving armed elements; b. Identification of the full range of an identified threat/crisis’ probable direction since one crisis model may generate a number of probable directions. c. Evaluation and prioritizing of each scenario depicting an identified threat/crisis’ probable direction; and d. Failure option statements i.e. How will the crisis unfold if its initial direction is stymied? What will perpetrators of a kidnapping do if their course of action begins to fail?

Operational and tactical crisis management manuals prepared by each agency/department shall discuss in detail the above considerations and other requirements for tactical SA. Figure 8 sums up the entire tactical SA process.

Figure 8 table of contents

122

ANNEX F For Military/Paramilitary Types of Crisis

URBAN OPERATIONS Operations in an urban environment require a more detailed mission analysis as there are certain conditions that should be considered and addressed prior to the execution of mission. Therefore, intelligence/information gathered must be timely, detailed, and accurate. The following categorized list of Requests for Information (RFIs) should, at the minimum, be answered by the intelligence unit/agency supporting the JSOG operations. MCT Commanders, MCT Intelligence Elements and OSOJ2 Coordinators must therefore establish rapport with other intelligence units and military/PNP units in the AO at all times. PEOPLE:  What is the public and local government’s attitude towards conflict? Would the local populace support or oppose the tactical deployment of our unit?  Would the local government support or allow the operation? If so, up to what level and what form of support would they extend?  Could the local government cope with the situation? What motivates them?  How would the local government parry with the media?  Is Conflict Management Team available in the area? What is their crisis management procedure?  Are there local reaction forces available in the area? What are their capabilities and limitations? Would they provide support to our operations? If so, what form of support? (Could they seal-off the objective area?)  Hostages: - What are the physical descriptions of the hostages? (Ages, sex, built, height, hair color, tattoos, etc.) - Positive identification of the hostages? (Full-name, nicknames, social security numbers, passport numbers, etc.) - What are the potential problems concerning the hostages? (Physical disability, medical conditions, emotional state, physical features that may resemble those of hostile forces, etc.) - Are the hostages allowed to roam around? Are they segregated? What are their messing hours? WEATHER:  What is the prevailing weather condition in the target area? Temperature? Humidity? Wind direction and speed? Sunrise and sunset time? BMNT? EENT? Moonrise and moonset? Illumination? Visibility? Cloud ceiling? High tide/Low tide hours? Precipitation?  What would be the weather condition for the next seventy-two (72) hours?


ENEMY:  What is the size of the enemy? How are they arrayed? (Main Effort? Supporting Efforts? Reserve?) When are they going to commit their reserve force? Who are their leaders?  What is the enemy doing? What would he be doing for the next seventy-two (72) hours, if no action is taken against them? What is their Most Probable Course of Action? What is their Most Dangerous Course of Action?  Where is the enemy located? (Type of Structure? Sketches/Aerial photographs/ Images?)  What is the enemy unit identification? Individual profiles of enemy forces? Photographs/ Pictures? Biographies/Summary of Information (SOIs)? Other distinguishing marks of enemy unit?  What kind of training does the enemy have undergone? (Unit/Individual skills trainings, Basic Trainings, and Specialization Trainings) How many are trained in highly specialized courses? Do they have snipers? (Where are they positioned?) Demolitionist/Engineers? Do they have military background? Languages spoken and level of proficiency?  What are their basic equipment and armaments? Crew-served weapons? Anti-armor Weapons? What type? (How many and where are they located? ME/SEs/Reserve). Special equipment? (NVGs, Range finder, Sniper scope, etc.) Do they have IEDs? (Where are they located?) What is their primary/alternate means of communication? Do they have signal intercepts/jammers? Do they have individual radio sets?  Do they have NBC capability?

TERRAIN: (In addition to Obstacles, Avenues of Approach, Key Terrain Features, Observation and Fields of Fire, and Cover and Concealment factors, which can, basically, be obtained during IPB process, the following needs to be verified and clarified through intelligence networking.)  Type of Terrain? [Established road-nets (traffic-ability), traffic nets, point of references, chokepoints, traffic lights, enemy strong-points, defilades, etc.]  Enemy escape routes? (Sketches, city or urban maps, images, etc.)  Enemy reinforcement routes? (Sketches, city or urban maps, images, etc.)  Entry and egress points? (Primary, alternate, contingency, emergency)  Landing/Drop zones? (Primary, alternate, contingency, emergency)  What means of communication fitted in the AO? Are there cell-sites in the AO?

FRIENDLY TROOPS IN THE AREA:  What AFP/PNP/Law Enforcement Units/Agencies are available in the local area? (Size, identification, location and disposition)  What are the significant strengths and weaknesses of the local forces? (Weapons/ armaments, special equipment, communication means available, discipline, and loyalty)  Who are the leaders/commanders of the local forces?  Would local forces provide reinforcements if ever our own troops is outmaneuvered? Could they seal-off the target area before, during, and after the execution of our own mission? What size of troops can they readily provide and what is its capability? Where


would they possibly come from? (Avenues of approach/Axis of advance/Routes of Advance)  How fast could reinforcing troops react? (Reaction time)  Do friendly troops use EW equipment? If so, what type and what is the frequency range? DETAILS OF THE TARGET: (For Close Quarter Combat Planning)  Structure: Bus? Building (Residential/Commercial)? Plane? How many? (Blueprints, sketches, imagery, floor plans, etc.)  Structural design: Concrete? Made of light materials? Number of storey? Dimensions of rooms, hallways, doorways, windows, stairways, stair landings, beams, trusses, posts/columns, walls, dead spaces or blind spots inside the structure, and other target openings. Locations of Master’s Bedroom, Living Room, Comfort Rooms, Storage Rooms, Dining Room, Kitchen, Fireplace, etc.  Door types: Push door or pull door? Swinging left or right? Sliding left or right? What type of materials used? Dimensions? (Length, width, and thickness) Locks used? (Door knobs, chains, alarmed locks, etc.) Always open or locked?  Window types: Jalousies, glass, wooden, grills, etc. Dimensions? (Length, width, and thickness) Swinging left or right? Sliding left or right? Always open or locked?  Power/Generator lines: Switches (Main/auxiliary/breaker); Location of spotlights and other lighting devices.  Cables: CTV, internet, telephone, etc.  Water supply and sewer lines? Firefighting equipment?  Where are the most probable insertion or extraction points? (Sewers, tunnels, utility service entrances, rooftops, shafts or air-conditioning systems, secret entry and exit points, fire or disaster emergency exits, etc.) JUNGLE OR GREEN OPERATIONS The lack of available intelligence assets/networks and the difficulty of finding an “opportunity for contact” (servicing) to our agents especially in jungle operations are, more often than not, the causes of intelligence gaps. In this situation, users of this checklist must, at the minimum, satisfy the following list of RFIs so as to come-up with a sensible and reliable intelligence package:  What are the current strengths, locations, dispositions, and activities of the enemy?  Where are the possible location of enemy booby traps, crew-served weapons, observation posts, and listening posts?  Where are the locations (Grid Coordinates) of the enemy’s main effort and supporting efforts? What are their capabilities?  Where is the location of possible enemy reinforcement or, where are the areas of possible massing-up of enemy reinforcements? What is its size? How fast could the enemy reinforcement react?  Are there enemy sympathizers along our axis/route of advance? Would they reinforce their beleaguered comrades?  Are there other armed groups in the area sympathetic to the enemy? What are their strengths, location and disposition? (Grid coordinates)


               

Are there areas where populace is non-sympathetic to the enemy? Is the local political body sympathetic to the enemy? Does the enemy have NVGs or NVS or anything that can aid them to see at night? What is the road condition towards the objective area (during dry and wet season)? What type of transportation means could be possibly used? Could it be availed of? Are there trails going in and out of the target area? Could we be provided with imagery of the objective area and the target personalities? Where are the possible Landing/Drop Zones, and Insertion and Extraction Points? (Primary, alternate, contingency, emergency). How far are they from the objective area? Are there possible cache points from LD/LC towards objective area? (for EPA planning purposes) What is the travel time from ISOFAC to LD/LC? (Air or land) How many choppers can the LZ accommodate? Are there other troops operating around the AO? Where are they located and what radio frequency are they using? What is the friendly troop’s reaction time? Are they trained for air insertion? (Heli-borne or fries) Do they have NVGs or NVS? What Fire Support system available in the supported unit? Where are they located? What are their radio operating frequencies? How many targets are allocated for our own troops for interdiction fires? How many aircrafts available for CAS? MG520s? OV-10s? UH1Hs? Are they night capable? What water infiltration assets are available with the supported unit? What type and what is its combat loading capacity? What troop can assist during water infiltration? Where are they located and what is their radio operating frequency? Are they capable of conducting BLS Recon?


INTER-AGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANNING TOOLBOX

ANNEX G

A. PREPARATION 1. Coordinate and prepare for the process Organizing and effectively managing inter-agency contingency planning from the outset is essential. The Chairperson, Crisis Management Committee is responsible for providing overall leadership to the inter-agency contingency planning process. All members of the Committee, in particular those designated to represent their agency, are expected to fully participate during the planning process and provide inputs in relation to their agencies/organizations’ capabilities and protocols. 2. Define the scope of participation Participation

Scope

Planning in advance of a crisis allows participants time to think through and address some critical questions including: • What could happen? • What would be the impact on the people affected? • What actions would be required to attain the objective? • How would agencies/organizations work together? • What resources would be required? • What can agencies/organizations do to be better prepared?

Contingency planning is most effective when it is a participatory process that includes all those who will be required to work together in the event of a crisis: • Establish working relationships • Develop common understanding • Reinforce coordination • Clarifying roles and responsibilities • Put in place measures that enhance preparedness

3. Establish Working Groups (Steering Groups and Technical Working Groups) Steering Groups

Technical Working Groups

A steering group of senior decision-makers can The Technical working group will manage the help to ensure a balance between participation practical planning process. and effective management. It will ensure that agency/organization and Existing coordination mechanisms such as sector/cluster response plans are in line with the Peace and Order Council and Crisis the overall planning framework. Management Committees will typically perform these functions. It will consolidate the results of different elements of the planning process and ensure that cross-sector/cluster issues are addressed.


This group will be responsible for providing overall strategic direction and guidance to the contingency planning process and ensuring that adequate resources are available to keep the process active.

Appropriate representation is essential and should include representatives of agencies/ organizations, sector/cluster groups and at the national level the Crisis Management Support Secretariat.

The steering group will approve the interagency contingency plan and monitor implementation of the preparedness actions identified. 4. Structure the process (agree on timeline, work plan and outputs) Map out the inter-agency contingency planning process, articulate key timelines, meetings and outputs so that progress can be monitored by all participants. 5. Ensure Facilitation The primary responsibility for contingency planning rests with agencies/organization designated as lead in the resolution of specific kinds of crisis or emergency. Should assistance in facilitating the contingency planning process be required, facilitators with contingency planning experience can be drawn from planning offices at the regional, provincial and municipal levels. Experience has found that facilitation teams composed of staff from more than one agency/ organization are more effective as they bring a range of perspectives, experience and knowledge of different systems. B. SITUATION AWARENESS This section consists of a more detailed assessment of current and emerging threat. It essentially provides details of the broader situation awareness process discussed in Chapter 2. 1. Identify Participants Participants in the situation awareness process in formulating a contingency plan possess analytical skills honed by education, training and experience. 2. Analyze the Operational Environment Brainstorming Guide Where will the implemented?

contingency

Contingency Plan Checklist plan

be Summarize the information on the area of operation. • People (Demography, politics, sociocultural, etc) What are the vulnerabilities and anticipated • Weather (Climate) consequences to the populace of the threat? • Terrain (land, internal waters, etc.) What are the areas which will affect or has effect on the contingency plan?


3. Analyze the Threat Brainstorming Guide

Contingency Plan Checklist

In relation to the broader situation awareness process undertaken in the strategic level (Chapter 2 of the Manual), how will the threat affect the area of operation? What is the most likely scenario?

This section describes and analyzes the threat in relation to the area of operation. Threat assessment will be spearheaded by the lead agency. • Nature of the threat. • Most likely scenario. Conduct risk assessment

4. Who are the participating agencies? Brainstorming Guide


What agencies will be involved? What are their capabilities? What are the experiences of the government agencies in addressing the threat? How did they involve the people and other stakeholders to address the threat?

Summarize the agencies that will be involved in the contingency plan • Specific names and their contact numbers • Organizational and Operational readiness of the agency • Experiences of the agency • Local and foreign contacts

5. What are the assumptions, constraints and limitations? These refer to operational assumptions, constraints and limitations informed by and in relation to the broader strategic situation awareness process discussed in Chapter 2. C. FORMULATE STRATEGY Strategy defines what constitutes success or “victory” (ends) and allocates adequate forces/units and logistics (means) to achieve strategic objectives. The operational approach (ways) of employing capabilities to achieve the ends is for agencies to develop and propose. Define strategic objectives and end state The President, C-OPR, and Chairpersons, Crisis Management Committees provides strategic guidance. In general, this guidance results to long-term as well as intermediate or ancillary objectives. Establishing common strategic objectives helps to ensure that all sectors/ clusters and agencies/organizations are working towards the end state.


Concept of Operation Brainstorming Guide


Intent What is the intent/guidance of the Chairperson, Crisis Management Committee? This section outlines the Concept of Operation to attain the objectives. How will the lead agency address the threat? • Concept to achieve objectives. What are the identified options or Courses of Action? What is the best option or COA? Course of Action

Sector/cluster operational objectives What are the specific cluster objectives? Concise summaries of the sector/cluster What are the provisions in place for immediate response plans should be included in the response? Inter-Agency Contingency Plan. Some critical issues to include in sector/cluster summaries Tasks to Agencies are: • Outline of participation in sector/clusters What will be the roles or tasks of agencies in • Objectives and response actions relation to the cluster? • Cluster/sector arrangements, including designated lead agencies. What actions will be taken as an immediate • Outline of the roles and responsibilities response to the situation? Who does what and of agencies. when? • Operational roles, responsibilities and accountabilities of different agencies. What are the limitations of agencies to achieve • Internal arrangements their tasks? How will these be addressed? • Immediate response mechanisms How long will the assistance from other • Coordinating mechanisms agencies be required? • Information management. • Media strategy. Coordination • Safety and security arrangements. Limitations of agencies to accomplish their How will coordination among members work? tasks should be addressed as recommended What are the coordination arrangements in Chapter 5. between the government, civil society, private sector and other stakeholders? What will be the coordination arrangements with foreign counterparts? Have the cluster/sector leads been identified? Have the reporting procedures be agreed?


Brainstorming Guide


What joint activities will be undertaken: Assessment, monitoring, programming? Information Management How will information/data be collected? How will information flow between the various levels (national, regional, provincial, municipal and baranggay) and vice-versa? What report formats will be used? Safety and Security What are the security coordination arrangements at all levels? Are there specific security training needs? What are the security plans? Who is responsible for them? Who maintains a central list of names and locations of all members? Media Strategy What will be the public information strategy? How should media relations be coordinated? What will be the information strategy? Concept of Support Brainstorming Guide


What are the necessary resources required Based on the concept of operation, this part to support the response: Transport, logistics, of the plan highlights what management personnel? and coordination mechanisms have been established to support the responses. Can staff and material be shared? • Cross cutting issues • Common services Area Required


D. ESTABLISH COMMAND AND CONTROL In order to ensure unity of effort among agencies, the Local Chief Executive, being the elected official accountable to his constituents, is responsible in the crisis management operations in his area. He may relegate the authority but not the responsibility. The Incident Command System is prescribed in establishing Command and Control in a crisis situation. The levels of authority, responsibility and accountability of different personnel involved in crisis management are discussed in Chapter 6. E. CONSOLIDATE AND REVIEW PLANNING OUTPUTS Lead Agency, through the technical working group, will ensure that other agencies will submit their supporting plans. It will be reviewed if the plans are consistent or aligned with the concepts presented. F. IMPLEMENT PREPAREDNESS 1. Consolidate and implement follow up actions Contingency Planning should not be a theoretical exercise; its main objective is to ensure that agencies/organizations develop a level of preparedness that is sufficient to respond to an anticipated crisis. Prioritizing and implementing preparedness actions and monitoring agreed early warning indicators that would trigger a response, convert intentions into action. 2. Consolidate preparedness, assessment, response actions and division of responsibilities Brainstorming Guide


Who is responsible for the This section documents the preparedness actions that update and maintenance of the agencies/organizations have agreed to undertake in contingency planning document? order to strengthen their preparedness. It also describes the arrangement for the continuation of the contingency When and how will the plan be planning process. updated and tested? • Priority preparedness actions identified • Preparedness levels • Equipment needed Have specific preparedness • Resources (human, cash, material) on stand-by. actions be agreed on for sectors/ • Preparedness action to be taken clusters and agencies? • Arrangement and responsibilities for monitoring of early warning indicators. What follow up actions are • Training/capacity strengthening required. required? • Development of initial assessment formats. • Stand-by capacities to be activated • List of agency or sector/cluster level of preparedness (staff, stocks, programs etc) • Workplan for regular review and updating of contingency plan


3. Review, test and update plan Contingency plans should not be considered to be instruction manuals to be strictly followed in an emergency. Their value is in establishing key working relationships, coordination mechanisms and agreeing on common standards - in short, solving potential problems ahead of time. (The preparedness actions identified should contribute to strengthening emergency response systems which will be activated at the time of an emergency.


ANNEX H INTER-AGENCY CONTINGENCY PLAN (IACP) FORMAT SECTION A. INTRODUCTION Below is a sample that agency planners can use as guide when developing an interagency contingency plan. The exact format and level of detail may vary somewhat among agencies, based on their specific requirements and other factors. However, interagency contingency plans will always contain the basic three paragraphs: Situation, Strategy and Command and Control. SECTION B. NATIONAL CONTINGENCY PLAN FORMAT a. Copy Number: b. Issuing Agency: c. Place of Issue: d. Date of Issue: e. INTERAGENCY CONPLAN: (Ex. REPATRIATION OF OFWS IN THE MIDDLE EAST) f. References: (List any relevant documents deemed essential to comprehension of the plan) 1. SITUATION a. General. (This section briefly describes the conditions that would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the contingency plan. It should identify the threat and summarize the event/s that could lead to a crisis. State the country’s policy and outline political decisions to successfully address the threat). b. Area of Concern (1) Operational Area. (Describe the area where the IACP will be used) (2) Area of Interest. (Describe the area of concern, including the area of influence, and areas adjacent thereto. This area also includes areas where the threats originated and if addressed could help in the attainment of the objective) c. Risk. (Risk is the probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. List the specific hazards that the group may encounter during the execution of the plan. List risk mitigation measures.) d. Threat. (This section should provide the information essential to a clear understanding of the magnitude of the threat.) e. Agencies (This section analyses the capabilities of different agencies to undertake their given tasks.) f. Assumptions. (List all reasonable assumptions for all participants contained in the IACP or other tasking on which the contingency plan is based. State expected conditions which the planners has no control. Include assumptions that are directly relevant to the development of the plan and supporting plans. Include both specified and implied assumptions that, if they do not occur as expected, would invalidate the plan or its concept of operation.)

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table of contents

(1) Threat Warning/ Timeline (2) In-place units (3) Legal Considerations (List those significant legal considerations on which the plans is based) (a) Rules of Engagement (ROE) (b) International law, including the law of armed conflict (c) Other bilateral treaties and agreements 2. STRATEGY a. Strategic Objectives (State Strategic Objectives, President’s intent and guidance and the end state of the strategy) b. Concept of Operations (CONOPS). (The CONOPS of lower member agency- regional, provincial, municipal- could be taken from the mother agency and developed according to their areas of operation. Otherwise, it will be developed as a result of the COA selected by the Chairperson, CMC during COA development. The concept should be stated in terms of who, what, where, when, why and how. (1) C, CMC’s Intent. (This should describe the Chairperson’s intent (purpose and end state) overall and by phase. This statement deals primarily with the conditions that lead to mission accomplishment, so the Chairperson may highlight selected objectives.) (2) General. (The CONOPS states how the C, CMC plans to accomplish the mission including the agencies or units involved, the phasing operations, and the general nature and purpose of operations of operations to be conducted. It should be sufficiently developed to include an estimate of the level and duration of conflict to provide supporting agencies or units a basis for preparing an adequate supporting plan) (3) Tasks. (List the tasks assigned to each supported and supporting agencies/units in separate sub paragraphs. The task assignment should encompass all key action that subordinate or supporting elements must perform to fulfil the CONOPS.) (4) Coordinating Instructions. (Provide instructions necessary for coordination and synchronization of the interagency operation that apply to two or more elements of group.) c. Concept of Sustainment. (This should provide broad guidance for the sustainment concept of the operations with information and instructions broken down by phases. It should cover functional areas of logistics, transportation, personnel policies, and administration) (1) Logistics. (This paragraph should address sustainment priorities and resources. Identify the priority and movement of major logistic items for each option and phase of concept) (2) Personnel. (Identify detailed planning requirements and subordinate taskings. Assign tasks for establishing and operating interagency personnel facilities, managing accurate and timely personnel accountability and strength reporting, and making provisions for


staffing them. Discuss the administrative management of participating personnel, the reconstitution of forces, replacement and rotation policies, and required interagency augmentation to the interagency operations center and other operational requirements) 3. COMMAND AND CONTROL a. Command (1) Command Relationship. (State the organizational structure expected to exist during plan implementation. Indicate any changes to major command and control organizations and the time of expected shift. Identify all command arrangement agreements and memorandum of understanding used and those that require development.) (2) Command Centre (List the designations and locations of each agencies/units involved in the execution of the contingency plan.) (3) Succession of Command. (Designate in order of succession the commanders responsible for assuming command of the operation in specific circumstances.) b. Interagency Communications System Support (Provide a general statement concerning the scope of communication systems and procedures required to support the operation. It also establishes an interagency operations center.) [Signature] [Name] Chairperson, Crisis Management Committee [Signature] [Name] Department Head Member [Signature] [Name] Department Head Member [Signature] [Name] Department Head Member Annexes:


ANNEX I PRINCIPLES ARRANGED ACCORDING TO THE FRAMEWORK/SPECTRUM OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT PRE-CRISIS PREDICTION

DURING CRISIS

PREVENTION/ PREVENTION/ PRE-EMPTION PRE-EMPTION

PREPARATION

PRINCIPLE 1:

PRINCIPLE PRINCIPLE 3: 3:

PRINCIPLE 4:

(Situation Awareness) a) THREAT ANALYSIS

Needs/ Needs/ Vulnerabilities Vulnerabilities Assessment Assessment of of Capabilities Capabilities

Capabilities Enhancement/ Building Plans

PRINCIPLE 2: (Situation Awareness) b) RISK ANALYSIS

1. 1. Leadership Leadership 2. People 2. People 3. Coordination, Cooperation, and Communication

1. Risk Assessment & Loss 4. Organization 3. Coordination, Cooperation, and Damage Control (Safety and Communication 5. Sustainability Management) 6. Training 2. Risk Management 4. 7. Organization Exercises 3. Risk Communication to the 8. Equipment 5. Sustainability Public 9. Documentation -Refer to attached checklist of Key Critical Success Factors under Principle 7

10. Community awareness and support PRINCIPLE 4:

Sustaining Capability - Acquire and allocate the most appropriate resources - Update Plans - Test and maintain equipment - Update Plans

PRINCIPLE 5: Sustaining Capability

- Test and maintain equipment - Train personnel - Exercise procedures and systems; Simulate or exercise to evaluate capabilities - Conduct crisis and management operations Exercise actual procedures systems; Simulate or exercise to evaluate capabilities - Document operations for review Conduct actual crisis management operations -- Refer to attached checklist of Key Critical Success Factors under Principle 7 PRINCIPLE 8: Make a Multi-Year Capabilities Development Plan - Refer to attached checklist of Key Critical Success Factors under Principle 7 - Make a medium to long-term capabilities plan or schedule of projects - Use results of intelligence reports, foresight and horizon scanning tools to anticipate risks and vulnerabilities

Capabilities Enhancement/ Multi-Year Capabilities Development -Make LGUsa should improve capabilities specific toPlan the needs in their areas, using the appropriated funds Building Plans - Crisis-specific capabilities enhancement/ building plans - Review and modify existing plans PRINCIPLE 6:

Prevention and Mitigation of an Incident - Nurture pro-active responses

- Develop a National Multi-Year Crisis Management Capabilities Development Plan to support stakeholders and LGUs at the frontline (esp financial - Make a medium to long-term capabilities plan or schedule of projects and technical support)

POST CRISIS RECOVERY PRINCIPLE 7:

-Refer to attached checklist Evaluating Crisis or Emergency of Key Critical Success Operations Factors under Principle 7 -Analyze and assess actual performance against required capabilities (use attached checklist of Key Critical Success Factors) - Consider updates on capabilities enhancement and build plans and priorities as part of prevention and mitigation PRINCIPLE 10: Capability Resource Management at the LGU, Natl Govt Agency (NGA), and Natl Crisis Mgmt Committee - Incorporate changes/ improvements in capabilities in the Annual Work Increment/Plan of agencies and MultiYear Devt Plans - Revise Emergency Operations Plans or Crisis Action Plans to incorporate improvements

PRINCIPLE 9: Annual Capability Development Increment -Review and modify existing plans - Determine the activities and projects that has to be done for the incoming year in the Annual Budget of your agency/ locality - Modify the plan reflecting the changes needed in financial and technical support requirements - LGUs and Peace and Order Councils submits annual reports to the DILG; the AFP to the DND; DILG and DND shall submit to CMSS, NSC for assessment and recommendation of the Crisis Management Capabilities Building (CMCB) to the Crisis Management Committee (CMC) PRINCIPLE 9: - CMC shall track the overall crisis management capabilities development efforts under a National Capability Resource Management (NCRM)

- Inform and protect soft targets (target hardening)

- CMSS will further develop assessment standards, criteria or evaluation tools to prioritize capabilities building support which will be recommended Annual Capability Development Increment Development Plan or Annual Increments for the Stakeholders’ Multi-Year Capability

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- Identify financial and technical support needed; make enabling mechanisms and documents with international organizations (like the United Na- LGUsforeign shouldgovernments, improve capabilities specific to the needs in their areas, usingPartnerships the appropriated funds tions), ASEAN, and local schemes like Public-Private

- Identify soft targets through intelligence work, forecasting, other analysis tools

- Identify hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities; capability assessment

POST-CRISIS

PRINCIPLE 10: Capability Management at the Natl Govt Agency (NGA),Budget and Natl Mgmt Committee - Determine the activities andResource projects that has to be done for LGU, the incoming year in the Annual of Crisis your agency/ locality - LGUs, NGAs are expected to contribute to the overall Crisis Mgmt capability of the govt, as approved by the Standing Comm on Natl Crisis Mgmt (SCNCM)


- Write an emergency or Crisis Management Plan with Procedures - Establish a Crisis Management or Emergency Response System - Expand network - foster stakeholders’ relationship - Refer to checklist of Key Critical Success Factors under Principle 7

- References for funding and resources for man -made or human-induced disasters and calamities are the following: Joint DILG-DBM Memo -Circular Modify No. the plan 2011-1: reflecting projects thecovered changes byneeded the 20%indevelopment financial and fund technical include support thoserequirements to address and respond to natural and man-made disasters and calamities...; Rep Act No. 10121, “Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010; Memo of the President dated March 22, 2011, cabinet members or heads of agencies ...shall provide expert advice, assistance and... resources to help resolve a crisis or emergency. - LGUs and Peace and Order Councils submits annual reports to the DILG; the AFP to the DND; DILG and DND shall submit to CMSS, NSC for - Standing Committee shall be involved only when necessary assessment and recommendation of the Crisis Management Capabilities Building (CMCB) to the Crisis Management Committee (CMC) - If feasible, sourcing of funds for projects and activities be done thorugh inter-agency Memo of Agreement/s under a Stakeholder Partnership or Public-Private Partnership schemes - CMC shall track the overall crisis management capabilities development efforts under a National Capability Resource Management (NCRM) - Incorporate changes/ improvements in capabilities in the Annual Work Increment/Plan of agencies and Multi-Year Devt Plans Revise will Emergency Operations Plans orstandards, Crisis Action Plansortoevaluation incorporate improvements - CMSS further develop assessment criteria tools to prioritize capabilities building support which will be recommended for the Stakeholders' Multi-Year Capability Development Plan or Annual Increments PRINCIPLE 11: Foster Stakeholders' Relationships PRINCIPLE 10: -Capability Integrate Resource crisis management planning among stakeholders: local(NGA), residents, people’s organizations, civil society groups; local and national policyManagement at the LGU, Natl Govt Agency and Nat’l Crisis Mgmt Committee making and operations systems/planners - LGUs, NGAs are expected to contribute to the overall Crisis Mgmt capability of the govt, as approved by the Standing Comm on Natl Crisis Mgmt - Instill awareness of crisis management before it happens (SCNCM) Request/Assist stakeholders in the following information: -- References for funding and resources for man -made or human-induced disasters and calamities are the following: Joint DILG-DBM Memo Circular No. 2011-1: projects coveredofbycrisis the 20% development fund include those to address and respond to natural and man-made disasters and - identify precursors or triggers calamities...; Rep Act No. 10121, "Philippine Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010; Memo of the President dated March 22, 2011, - measures to prevent an incident from Disaster escalating cabinet members or heads of agencies ...shall provide expert advice, assistance and... resources to help resolve a crisis or emergency. - building an information system to monitor, process, analyze information; visualize the emerging or occurring crisis - Standing Committee shall be involved only when necessary - Develop the use of foresight, forecasting and horizon scanning tools to be pro-active - Build legal capabilities and competencies on Human Rights, related international treaty obligations of the Philippines - Strengthen peace and conflict-prevention measures; shift focus from military-oriented missions to rule-of-law sectors - Seek root causes of crisis or conflict; remain faithful toyour mandate to reduce poverty, crate sustainable livelihood, and strengthen democracy, rule of law, good governance, human rights, and gender equality - Foster relationship with media and civil society organizations to provide a wider public education and training on Crisis Mgmt


ANNEX J The following pages were lifted from this document: Garnett, Jeffrey D. and Moore, Melinda (2010) “Enhancing Disaster Recovery: Lessons from Exemplary International Disaster Management Practices,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Article 40. DOI: 10.2202/1547-7355.1711 Available at: http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol7/iss1/40 ©2010 Berkeley Electronic Press. RECOVERY AND REDEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCES FROM INTERNATIONAL DISASTERS Mexico - earthquake (1985) On September 19, 1985, Mexico City experienced an 8.1-magnitude earthquake that caused tremendous damage to much of its physical infrastructure, especially the poorly constructed public housing for low-income families. In addition to at least 9,500 deaths, the earthquake damaged over 3,400 buildings, mostly residences, and left 100,000 people displaced from their homes. Economic losses were estimated at $4 billion. Time-sensitive agency mandate. Mexico’s government established an autonomous agency to spearhead rebuilding of housing under a two-year mandate and quickly staffed the agency by transferring senior planners and engineers from other ministries. With the clarity of a time-limited mandate, government officials worked quickly and constructively under a shared organizational culture that involved consultation and close cooperation with affected communities and emphasized the time-sensitive nature and importance of the agency’s performance goals. The effectiveness of this policy is evidenced by the rapid completion of more than 45,000 homes within the agency’s two year mandate – an average of 3,220 dwellings per month – and contracts with 1,200 private companies and creation of 175,000 jobs (Kreimer and Echeverria, 1990). Bangladesh – flooding (1998) In 1998, a major flood struck Bangladesh, covering up to 68 percent of the country’s total land area for ten weeks. While annual flooding in the country is necessary for cultivating crops and increasing the supply of fish, this excessive flooding caused 918 deaths and affected 31 million people through damage to roads, housing, infrastructure, and crops. In addition to the scarcity of food and water, annual rice production dropped by 10.5 percent, leading to price spikes and a loss of income. Re-establishing livelihoods. The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) was the largest non-governmental organization (NGO) working in the country when the flood hit. Normally focused on long-term development projects, BRAC responded to the housing and economic consequences of the flood by diverting staff and resources from its normal operations to assist people in getting back into their homes and returning to their regular income-generating activities as quickly as possible. In some cases, BRAC provided in-kind aid to enable restoration of livelihoods rather than cash donations, such as donating seeds to local farmers – helping them

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to avoid purchasing supplies in a disrupted local market and move ahead to plant grains and vegetables more quickly. Focusing on activities such as agriculture, forestry, farming, fisheries, sanitation, and shelter, BRAC ultimately invested $680,000 in recovery assistance to 850,000 households, representing 55 out of 64 districts in Bangladesh. BRAC applied its institutional orientation and assets to disaster recovery and helped mitigate the economic impact of the floods, thereby preventing many of those affected from sinking further into long-term poverty (Beck, 2005). Private sector involvement and food security. Bangladesh’s liberalization of trade in rice in 1994 also provided the country with a distinct advantage in recovering from the 1998 flood as compared to the floods a decade earlier. By 1997, private sector imports of rice had grown to about five percent of Bangladesh’s total annual rice production of 18.9 million metric tons. Building from this degree of trade integration, Bangladesh was able to rely on private sector imports to compensate for the loss of approximately 0.3 million metric tons of the aus (summer) crop and 1.7 million metric tons of the aman (fall) crop rice in the 1998 flood. In response to the removal of a 2.5 percent tax on rice imports and the expedited processing of these imports through customs, the private sector imported more than 2.4 million metric tons of rice imports, or 85 percent of the total volume imported, between July 1998 and April 1999. The private sector was also able to import this rice and other grains faster than the government, with private sector imports arriving in the country within two to three weeks, while government imports took three to four months to arrive (Beck). Honduras – hurricane (1998) Honduras, one of the poorest countries in the Americas, experienced six hurricanes between 1969 and 2001. The most damaging of these was Hurricane Mitch, which struck in 1998, leading to 5,757 deaths, 441,150 displaced, and 1.5 million affected. Destruction of 35,000 houses, loss of crops and livestock, and damage to other infrastructure such as buildings, hospitals, ports, highways, and bridges, contributed to a total of $3.6 billion in economic losses, equivalent to 74 percent of the country’s annual GDP. Local hiring. In response to the need for recovery of housing and infrastructure on a massive scale, the National Fund for Social Investment (Spanish acronym - FHIS) worked with local contractors to begin rebuilding, often expediting projects to conduct immediate hiring on site. The use of local labor helped to speed rebuilding efforts, contributing to the completion of 2,200 projects within the first 100 days after the hurricane. In addition, this generated close to 35,000 person months of employment each month, and covered 30 percent of the country’s reconstruction needs in infrastructure – adding up to $40 million in value. The employment of displaced people in the rebuilding of their own communities – those most affected by the hurricane – helped support individual community members in maintaining their income in the early stages of the recovery. The final value of projects identified or appraised was $57 million – including an additional 2,500 projects contracted through local labor. This also ensured that funded projects had sufficient labor, while vocational training helped stimulate long-term opportunities throughout the later stages of redevelopment (Telford, 2004). Community consultation. Local communities were directly included in planning and decisions dealing with their redevelopment. Community members expressed greater satisfaction with the process when they were more involved in the design, reconstruction and redevelopment efforts.

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Further, community members cited quicker completion of projects, greater responsiveness to their needs, and fewer cases of corruption or profiteering (Telford). Decentralized agency authority. In response to the scale of reconstruction required, the Honduras government allowed for FHIS to temporarily decentralize its operations by deploying most of the senior staff to temporary regional offices. Forming into emergency response teams within the most heavily damaged areas, agency staff consulted with local communities and municipalities to rapidly determine needs for shelter, potable water, sanitation, and rebuilding of roads. Team members were granted a special authority to act on location, allowing them to rapidly develop plans and initiate projects. This rapid decentralization allowed the agency to adapt to the situation by placing senior decision makers within the devastated areas, allowing them to better ascertain needs and move quickly into project funding and implementation (Moore, Trujillo, et al.). Expedited project cycle. In addition to the swift deployment of senior staff, FHIS also expedited its routine project cycle, reducing the number of necessary steps from 50 down to eight. This facilitated an accelerated timeline for launching vital reconstruction projects, and FHIS project officers utilized their authority to hire local contractors on site and approve immediate commencement of work. As described above, the result of these agency adaptations and other successful practices helped FHIS complete 2,200 projects within the first 100 days after the hurricane (Moore, Trujillo, et al.). Vietnam – flooding (1998, 1999) Vietnam’s growing population is increasingly moving into exposed coastal areas subject to flooding, raising the level of vulnerability to harms caused by typhoons that strike each year. Vulnerability to floods was exacerbated by recent trends in which modern houses were being built with less disaster-resistant materials, such as brick or corrugated iron. Flooding was especially heavy in both 1998 and 1999, when a series of tropical storms caused the worst flooding in more than two decades. The 1999 floods caused 800 deaths, and 55,000 people lost their homes. The agricultural sector suffered the loss of 60,000 hectares of paddies. Competitive housing redesign. As the FHIS did in Honduras, the Red Cross in Vietnam attempted to involve local labor and materials in rebuilding houses for those left homeless by the floods, while realizing the need to ensure houses were constructed to meet high standards for withstanding future disasters. To achieve both of these objectives, the Red Cross sponsored a housing competition to identify the best locally developed designs for disaster-resistant housing. After introducing a housing design with concrete foundations and a stronger roof, among other features, the Red Cross arranged a competition that attracted the involvement of 15 major local companies. The competition was adjudicated by experts from government, engineers, and aid workers. The panel ultimately decided on a design that successfully replicated that introduced by the Red Cross and could be easily constructed by those intending to rebuild a home for themselves. The concept of sponsoring a competition to induce local participation effectively met the goal of empowering local communities, while at the same time creating incentives to improve the sustainability and resilience of new housing (IFRC, 2001). Sustainable rebuilding. Although some traditional buildings in Vietnam are resistant to typhoons and floods, many families had turned to building their homes with less resilient materials due to cost. As a result, many residences were left chronically vulnerable to destruction, due to the

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frequent recurrence of water related disasters. The International Federation of the Red Cross partnered with the Vietnamese Red Cross to reverse the decline in disaster readiness of housing after the 1998 floods. Their effort to introduce disaster-resistant house-building practices included designs able to better protect lives, food, and valuable belongings necessary to their livelihoods. With the construction of 7,400 homes using these designs, the agencies provided sustainable, resilient houses to the most vulnerable individuals. The value of these homes was proven when all but one structure withstood collapse during a subsequent flood. Following this, the Red Cross and Vietnamese government built 2,000 additional flood-resistant houses in 16 provinces. The Red Cross also began partnering with Vietnamese companies to construct similar homes, as described above (IFRC, 2001). Training to improved standards. The efforts to expand sustainable housing served as a catalyst for further innovation among civil society actors, by providing an opportunity to offer regular training to local communities. To capitalize on the ongoing initiatives sponsored by the Red Cross, one locally-based nongovernmental organization offered training to communities in disaster resistant construction, as well as other types of assistance in strengthening their homes. It combined practical demonstrations with attitude-influencing activities, helping to sustain and institutionalize the process of local capacity building. These programs helped capture long-term benefits for the local community by promoting awareness about the value of disaster-resistant construction, as well as creating institutional knowledge on proper construction techniques (IFRC, 2001). Mozambique – floods (2000, 2001) In 2000, southern Mozambique suffered from heavy rains and a series of tropical storms that simultaneously flooded several rivers and, for the first time in recorded history, left submerged an area nearly the size of Belgium and the Netherlands combined. More than 500,000 people were forced to leave their homes and relocate to over 200 sites. One year later, the central provinces of Mozambique were hit hard by prolonged and intense rains. The death toll of the 2001 floods was lower than in 2000 because of the slower onset of the disaster and because water discharges from the local dams could be adequately controlled (IFRC, 2002; Wiles, Selvester, et al., 2005). Combined, the 2000 and 2001 floods killed over 800 people and displaced almost 800,000. Economic losses amounted to $470 million. Reducing prior vulnerability. The flood damage and resulting loss of life in southern Mozambique prompted the government to initiate flood-zoning studies and increased regulation of prospective areas for resettlement of flood victims. Following the floods of 2000, the government resettled 43,400 families to areas less vulnerable to floods, ensuring a more secure environment for the population affected. Besides guiding resettlement of flood victims, the government forbids shelter assistance for those who do not resettle in areas certifiably safe from future floods. By setting guidelines and policies to govern the resettlement process, the government provides sustainable solutions for populations to recover from displacement and disruption due to flooding (Wiles, Selvester, et al., 2005). Cuba – hurricanes (1998–2005) Cuba experiences hurricanes on an almost annual basis, five of which reached a strength of Category Four or Five between 1996 and 2005. The known impacts of these five storms ranged from 0-16 deaths, 712,000 to 1.5 million persons evacuated and $87 million to $1.4 billion in


economic losses. The regularity of hurricanes, including severe ones, and potential for physical damages of this magnitude results in an almost ongoing need for massive rebuilding efforts. Community involvement. With such a regular occurrence of damage to personal and public property, Cuba relies on extensive involvement of local communities in all aspects of rebuilding. By ensuring broad-based engagement at the local level, the reconstruction of houses, schools and other facilities begins immediately. Community members’ work is supported by specialized brigades in restoring power, communication and water supplies. In the case of one hurricane, these were restored within a month after the storm’s destruction occurred (Thompson and Gaviria, 2004). India – earthquake (2001) In 2001, a strong earthquake struck the Indian state of Gujarat, causing 20,000 deaths and injuring 300,000. In addition, 344,000 homes were destroyed, and 888,000 damaged. Economic losses were estimated at $3.5 billion, with the greatest damages occurring in the district of Kutch. Standardized house sizes. The Indian government adopted a new policy to allow NGOs to rebuild houses of equal size for each family irrespective of the size of their destroyed homes. The government’s policy on housing recovery initially required house reconstruction in three different sizes, depending on the size of the houses before the earthquake, which slowed recovery efforts (Sadasivam, 2001). Self-built reconstruction. Seeking to apply lessons learned from a prior earthquake several years earlier, a district-wide network of NGOs encouraged households to rebuild their own homes and make use of local labor and materials, similar to the actions taken in Honduras. In addition to promoting economic recovery following the disaster, this effort helped develop local capacity for communities to rebuild their own homes (Sadasivam). Training and capacity building. The network of NGOs also provided training in earthquakeresistant design techniques to selected members of each village, who then trained others back in their villages. This accelerated the spread of skills needed to rebuild safer homes – 8,000 people were trained in masonry skills in total. In addition to empowering those affected by the earthquake to participate in reconstruction, the training-of-trainers strategy enabled more self-rebuilding of homes and was proven to be highly cost-effective in comparison to the option of directly allowing the NGOs or other contractors to do reconstruction on their behalf. Moreover, 97 percent of people who rebuilt their houses themselves reported being happy with their homes, whereas only 48 percent of people who were relocated to other houses were satisfied (Sadasivam). Disaster-resistant model housing. To help disseminate technical skills for reconstruction, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) supported the construction of 1270 demonstration houses in 74 different villages. Demonstration homes provided useful models that villagers could use to replicate while rebuilding their own homes. The model homes demonstrated the proper retrofitting of new homes, allowing owners to learn the techniques and retrofit their own homes. UNDP understood that reconstruction of homes should meet high building standards to withstand future earthquakes, but a key barrier to the success of this strategy was the lack of trained engineers and masons to aid in meeting these standards. UNDP addressed this by sponsoring the quick construction of seismically safe demonstration houses for use as models to the


villagers. The emphasis on building disaster-resistant homes was a vital component in ensuring the long-term sustainability of the recovery efforts, and served as an effective complement to the strategy of self-construction and training of villagers promoted by UNDP. To further incentivize proper construction techniques, villagers had to incorporate the seismic safety standards into their reconstruction designs to receive financial compensation from the government. The overall strategy was highly cost-effective, relative to previous cases in which homes were relocated or rebuilt by outside contractors. It also conferred multiple benefits on the security of those affected: sustainable homes were successfully rebuilt by villagers, while villagers gained needed support and added capacity to do the rebuilding themselves (Sadasivam). Iran – earthquake (2003) The city of Bam, Iran suffered a devastating, 6.7-magnitude earthquake on December 26, 2003. Since most of the city’s buildings were constructed with mud brick materials, the infrastructure was ill-suited to withstand such a large force, leading to the collapse of 85 percent of all buildings. Out of a population of 120,000, almost all survivors were left homeless. Communication. After the initial response and rescue efforts, the UNDP initiated publication of a bi-weekly community newsletter to disseminate critical information about the recovery activities to all those affected by the earthquake. This included feedback for authorities and donors on the current needs of the community, and responses from the community regarding prospective projects relating to the recovery. The newsletter was instrumental in providing information on the job opportunities, shelter availability, entitlements for victims, tips to promote safety and reduce risk, and information on health services. Community members also used the newsletter as a forum to express concerns about redevelopment. Further, UNDP trained 52 local volunteers in reporting and journalism, then involved them in the process of production and distribution. The newsletter’s production was later taken on by the local municipality. Other community organizations were motivated to start up their own newsletters to cover the earthquake recovery efforts. The creation of the newsletter greatly facilitated the flow of information in the aftermath of the earthquake, while both training local residents in journalism and creating a way for the community to express itself. These factors promoted the overall engagement and empowerment of the local population in its recovery from the disaster (UNDP, 2005).


PROTOCOL OF INTENTIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING COOPERATION IN DISASTER PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as “The Participants;” DESIRING to further expand and enhance the existing friendly relations between their Peoples, on the basis of equality, mutual respect and benefit; RECALLING the discussions and coordination activities of the Office of Civil Defense of the National Disaster Coordinating Council of the Republic of the Philippines and the Federal Emergency Management Agency of the United States of America; and DESIRING to further cooperative activities in disaster prevention and management through a framework of collaboration that facilitates the exchange of expertise, knowledge, and information, and the transfer of new technology in emergency management.

HAVE REACHED THE FOLLOWING UNDERSTANDING: ARTICLE 1 General Cooperation Objectives

The Participants intend to pursue cooperative activities in disaster prevention and management, including: 1. Designing and initiating prototypes of cooperation that aim to strengthen the emergency management linkages between the Participants as well as enhancing the emergency management capabilities of the National Disaster Coordinating Council of the Philippines; 2. Organizing the exchange of emergency management professionals and practitioners in order to facilitate the development of programs and activities, including the sharing of expertise, experience, and information as well as the transfer of new technology in emergency management; and, 3. Proposing the conduct of forum and training seminars, reciprocal visits, and disaster management exercises to be participated in by representatives of the Participants. ARTICLE 2 Cooperation in Emergency Preparedness and Response Training Exercises In the field of emergency preparedness and response training and exercises, the Participants may: 1. Facilitate the exchange of emergency management experts and instructors for the development

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of training modules and instructional materials that promote best practices in emergency management; and 2. Participate in emergency management training programs, seminars, workshops, and simulation exercises. ARTICLE 3 Exchange of Information and Scientific and Technical Cooperation In the field of information exchange, scientific and technical cooperation, the Participants plan to: 1. Facilitate the exchange of emergency management information and transfer of technology for effective disaster management and prevention, and emergency preparedness and responses; 2. Exchange information on lessons learned from emergency responses of the Participants to natural and man-made disasters, including technology-related emergencies; and 3. Facilitate the exchange of knowledge and information on natural and man-made hazards and risk management. ARTICLE 4 Implementing and Subsequent Arrangements 1. The Participants should directly communicate through the Office of Civil Defense, as the Executive Agency of the National Disaster Coordinating Council of the Republic of the Philippines and the Federal Emergency Management Agency of the United States of America, and should initiate meetings to plan and develop annual program activities. 2. Subject to authority and the availability of funds and resources, the Participants may decide to formulate and implement, on the basis of subsequent arrangements between them pursuant to this Protocol of Intentions, work plans for the annual program activities. ARTICLE 5 Amendment The Participants may, by written agreement through diplomatic channels, decide to amend or revise any provision of this Protocol of Intentions. The activities under any such amendment or revision should commence in accordance with the provisions of Article 6. ARTICLE 6 Commencement of Activities Activities under this Protocol of Intentions commence on the date of the latter written communication by the Participants through diplomatic channels, indicating compliance with their respective domestic legal requirements.


ARTICLE 7 Validity This Protocol of Intentions should remain valid for a period of three years from the date of the commencement of activities and should remain valid for subsequent periods of two years, unless either Participant notifies the other Participant, through diplomatic channels, of its intention to terminate the same in writing. Such termination should take effect after three months following the receipt by such other Participant of the said notice. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, have signed this Protocol of Intentions. DONE at Washington, on the 20th day of November 2001, in duplicate, in the English language. FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

(Signed) (Signed) ALBERTO DEL ROSARIO ELIZABETH L. DIGREGORIO Ambassador of the Republic of Chief of Staff for the Federal The Philippines to the Emergency Management Agency United States of America of the United States of America

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SWISS FEDERAL COUNCIL ON COOPERATION IN THE EVENT OF NATURAL DISASTER OR MAJOR EMERGENCIES The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Swiss Federal Council, Considering that Swiss aid in the event of disaster is an integral part of Switzerland’s policy of international solidarity, Convinced of the need for cooperation between the two states in order to facilitate assistance in the event of natural disaster or major emergencies have agreed on the following provisions: ARTICLE 1 Object The aim of the present agreement is to define the detailed procedures under which the Swiss Government may put at the disposal of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, at its request, the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit (hereinafter the SHA), if the territory of the Republic of the Philippines is struck by natural disaster, major emergencies, or similar catastrophes.


ARTICLE 2 Definitions

In terms of the present agreement, the following expressions shall mean: “Requesting state”

The contracting state whose competent authorities request from the other state assistance such as that mentioned in Article 1

“Sending state”

The contracting state whose competent authorities agree to a request for assistance from the other state such as that mentioned in Article 1

“Aid units”

Any specialist(s) sent by the SHA directly or through specialized institutions pursuant to Article 5

“Equipment”

Materials, telecommunications and personal equipment intended for aid units

“Aid supplies”

Equipment and materials intended for distribution to the population affected

“Operational requirements”

Materials and supplies obtained locally which are necessary for the operation of the equipment, as well as supplies for the aid units, in particular, and in agreement with the requesting state, vehicles, fuel, water, etc.

“Territory”

Comprises the requesting state’s archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the requesting state has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the requesting state. ARTICLE 3

3.1 The authorities specified below shall be competent to execute the present agreement: a) for the Government of the Philippines, the Chairman, National Disaster Coordinating Council and the Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs. b) for the Swiss Confederation, the Delegate for Humanitarian Aid and Head SHA (hereinafter the Delegate). 3.2 The authorities mentioned above may communicate directly with one another or communicate with each other through diplomatic channels. 3.3 The parties shall communicate through diplomatic channels the addresses and telephone, fax and email numbers of the authorities mentioned above, as well as those of any authorities which may have appointed for the execution of their responsibilities. The list of those persons responsible with their respective addresses is set out in Annex 1 of the present agreement. The annex shall be updated by the two parties as often as is necessary.

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ARTICLE 4 4.1 The deployment of the SHA on the territory of Philippines, as defined in Article 2, shall be decided by mutual agreement between the parties. 4.2. The deployment of the SHA shall be made on the basis of a formal request by the Government of the Philippines, accompanied by a list of urgent requirements in calamity-stricken areas to guide the sending state on the nature of assistance to be extended to the Philippines. This request shall be addressed to the Swiss diplomatic post at Manila, or in case of emergency, directly addressed to the Humanitarian Aid and SHA in Berne. 4.3 In accordance with the requirements of Article 8, the head of the team shall immediately or at the earliest opportunity, provide the appropriate authorities of the requesting state, a comprehensive list of aid units, crew, equipment, dogs, aids supplies and allowable personal effects. ARTICLE 5 5.1 The assistance mentioned in Article 1 of the present agreement shall be provided by the SHA directly, or indirectly by institutions made available by the SHA, such as the Swiss Rescue Team (hereinafter the aid units) and, where necessary, by other appropriate means. The aid units sent to locations of disaster or major emergencies shall have received special training, in particular in fire-fighting, technical assistance, medical and health assistance, rescue work and other emergency work. 5.2 The aid units are generally supplied with rescue dogs, to be maintained by sending state, and equipment needed to achieve the objectives laid down. Where necessary and by agreement, this assistance may also be provided in a different way. ARTICLE 6 Aid units and their dogs, equipment and aid supplies may be sent by surface, by air, or water, at the expense of the sending state. ARTICLE 7 7.1 The assistance supplied by the Swiss Government shall be free of charge. 7.2 If the needs of the operation require it, at the request of the SHA, and upon the agreement of the requesting state, the requesting state shall, at its own cost, make available to the aid units the operational requirements necessary for the realization of their mission for the duration of the latter’s stay on the territory of the requesting state. ARTICLE 8 8.1 The parties shall take all measures necessary to guarantee the effectiveness and necessary rapidity if the assistance. 8.2 To this end, the competent authorities of the requesting state shall undertake: • To facilitate rapid transport to the location of the disaster the aid units, their dogs, equipment and aid supplies. To this end, their entry into the territory of the requesting state shall take place in an organized manner, on the basis of a list of persons taking part. The persons shall be in possession

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of valid identity cards, and the dogs be covered by valid vaccination certificates. The requesting state shall waive all veterinary formalities including quarantine for the admission of dogs used in operation especially in saving lives during emergency situation. • To facilitate the entry, storage, use and re-export of equipment, aid supplies and personal effects of the SHA, aid units and crew. Importation and exportation of equipment, dogs, aid supplies and other articles for official use of the SHA, aid units and crew, shall be allowed tax- and duty-free release within the purview of the last paragraph of Section 105 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines as amended, and Section 109q of Republic Act 8424, on the condition that the goods shall not be sold, leased, rented, traded or otherwise disposed of in the requesting state. Provided, that, the privilege may be granted only upon specific instructions of the Secretary of Finance in each instance which will be issued only upon the request of the Chairman of the National Disaster Coordinating Council furnishing a copy to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. • Not to consider in the framework of the present agreement, the import of narcotics or the re-export of any quantity unused, as import or export within the meaning of the international agreements on narcotics. Narcotics may be imported only in the context of urgent medical needs, and used only by medical personnel qualified according to the legal standards of the contracting state of origin of the aid units mandated to use them. • To guarantee overflight in the airspace of the territory of the requesting state, and landing and take off, even outside customs airports, of aircrafts used by the SHA for the purposes of the mission referred to in the agreement. For the duration of the aid, the aircraft used by the SHA shall be admitted to the territory of the requesting state under the temporary admissions system. The intention to use aircraft during a mission shall be communicated immediately by the SHA to the requesting state with as precise as possible an indication of the aircraft’s type and registration number, flight crew, load, times of takeoff and landing, intended route and place of landing. • To facilitate the activity of the SHA in all its phases, including the entry, stay and movement, individual or collective, of the aid units on the territory of the requesting state, and to take all necessary measures, including the provision of adequate facilities, to enable the aid units to carry out their duties. • To facilitate the use by the aid units of existing telecommunication systems or the use of special frequencies, or both, or the establishment by the aid units of an emergency telecommunications system. • The provision of the above paragraphs shall also be applicable to persons having to be evacuated. The identity of these persons must be communicated afterwards to the competent authorities. ARTICLE 9 9.1 The coordination and management of aid missions shall be the responsibility of the authorities of the requesting state. The distribution of relief supplies such as food, medicine, clothing, temporary shelter and others, among the disaster or emergency victims shall be done in accordance with the laws and regulations in force in the requesting state and on such conditions and other requirements as may be imposed by the competent authorities in the requesting state. 9.2 When making a request for aid, the authorities of the requesting state shall specify the tasks which they are to entrust to the aid units, with or without stating the details of their implementation.


9.3 Any directives addressed to the aid units by the requesting state shall be delivered only to the heads of the teams, who shall issue instructions accordingly to their subordinates. 9.4 The authorities of the requesting state shall provide protection and assistance to the aid units of the sending state. ARTICLE 10 In the framework of the present agreement, the requesting state undertakes to assume responsibility for any damage caused by the aid units in carrying out their mission, unless such damage has been caused intentionally, or through gross negligence. ARTICLE 11 The provisions of the present agreement shall not affect the provisions of any multilateral agreements concerning disaster relief which are in force or shall enter into force in relation between the parties. ARTICLE 12 The competent authorities designated in Article 3 shall conclude a manual of operations achieving particular specific measures aimed at facilitating the provisions of the aid mentioned in the present agreement. The competent authorities designated in Article 3 shall and may conclude special agreements, in particular with the aim of: • Enhancing early warning system, and preventing and overcoming the consequences of natural disasters or major emergencies by the exchange of relevant experience and information. • Exchanging information about the dangers and damage which may occur in the respective territories of the parties. • Seeking out and identifying persons and goods damaged during aid missions, pursuant to the current legislation of the parties, and enquiring into the causes of any accidents occasioned by the activity if the aid units. ARTICLE 13 The parties undertake to resolve through diplomatic channels any differences relating to the interpretation of the terms of the present agreement or the execution of the services referred to in it. ARTICLE 14 The present agreement shall enter into force one month after the date of the later written notification by the parties, through diplomatic channels, indicating compliance with their respective domestic requirements for its entry into force. Any amendment or revision to the text of this Agreement shall be done by mutual consent of the Parties. This amendment or revision shall enter into force in accordance with the provision on entry into force. This Agreement shall remain in force and effect, unless one of the Parties officially notifies


the other, through diplomatic channels, of its desire to suspend or terminate this Agreement. In such a case, the Agreement shall remain valid until 30 days after the date of the notice for suspension or termination. Signed in Berne on this 6th day of December 2001 in English language. FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FOR THE SWISS FEDERAL COUNCIL

(Signed)

(Signed)

REFERENCE: Foreign Service Institute, Philippine Bilateral Agreements (2001-2002)


ANNEX K Command and Support Relationships Command relationships establish the degree of control and responsibility a commander has for units/agencies operating under him. These are: a. Operational Command (OPCOM) – the authority granted to a commander over subordinate commanders through which he can assign missions or tasks, deploy units, reassign forces, and retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control to his subordinate units if he finds it necessary; it does not in itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. b. Operational Control (OPCON) – the transferable command authority that may be exercised by a commander through which he can organize and employ units or agencies augmented to his organization, direct these units or agencies for its inherent mission/task, assign tasks, and designate objectives and give authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission; operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of operations and joint/inter-agency training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. However, operational control does not, in itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training; commanders exercising operational control of a unit or agency cannot reassign forces and assign separate employment of components. c. Tactical Command (TACOM) –the authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to units or agencies that were augmented to his organization, for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him by higher authority; however, commanders exercising this cannot alter the mission of the augmented units or agencies, he cannot reassign its forces, and he cannot assign separate employment of components d. Tactical Control (TACON) – the command authority over the augmented units or agencies which were made available for tasking; this is usually for local direction and control of movements necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned; tactical control is inherent in operational control; when subordinate units are under tactical control, controlling commanders may deploy these units or agencies and direct them for their inherent mission/ task; however, commanders cannot assign missions and tasks, reassign forces and assign separate employment of components of said units or agencies. e. Attached – the placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary, or the detailing of individuals to specific functions where such functions are secondary or relatively temporary. Table 1 vividly portrays the inherent responsibilities of each command relationship. Command responsibilities, responsibilities for service support, and authority to organize or reassign component elements of a supporting unit or agency remain with the higher headquarters or parent unit unless the authorizing commander specifies otherwise.


DEGREES OF OPERATIONAL AUTHORITY OPCOM

OPCON

TACOM

TACON

Assign Mission

YES

YES

NO

NO

Assign Tasks

YES

YES

YES

NO

Direct Force for its assigned Mission/Task

YES

YES

YES

NO

Deploy Units

YES

YES

YES

YES, Local Direction

Reassign Forces

YES

NO

NO

NO

Assign separate employment of components

YES

NO

NO

NO

Admin responsibility If Specified If Specified If Specified If Specified Table 1 (Source: CSAFP Letter Directive – dated 05 Nov 04, with Subject: Interim Definition in Command Relationships). Support relationships establish specific relationships and responsibilities between supporting and supported units/agencies. These are: a. General Support (GS) refers to the support which is given to a unit/agency or organization as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. b. Direct Support (DS) is a mission requiring a unit/agency to support another specific unit or organization, and authorizing it to answer directly the latter’s request for assistance. c. Reinforcing (R) implies that a particular unit augments the capability of another unit that has similar functions as his, and that augmented unit has the jurisdiction over the area where the operations are being conducted; example: A rescue team from Makati City reinforcing a rescue team of Quezon City that is primarily tasked or is currently conducting rescue mission in Quezon City area. d. General Support Reinforcing (GSR) applies when a unit, with specific capabilities, is given a mission of providing support (in relation to his capabilities) to the force as a whole and of providing support for another specific unit, which has the same capabilities as his and is within the same command. This generally applies when a Unified ICS (See Section 6-2.1a2, Command and Control System) is established and is given an additional unit (with specific capabilities) to fast track operations. The primary purpose of applying this support relationship is to prioritize utilization of resources with respect to the needs of the operational and tactical elements; for example, an international rescue team arrives in the country and offers their capabilities to a Unified ICS through the CMC; when the Unified ICS Commander, during his assessment of the situation, finds that the different ICS under his OPCON have the same requirements for rescue support but the said international rescue team can only provide support to one subordinate ICS at a time, the Unified ICS Commander has this option of placing the augmented international rescue team under his control but shall provide rescue support to any of his operationally controlled subordinate ICS; in other words, the


international rescue team will be providing support to the overall operations of the Unified ICS but when the need arises, that he has to focus his support to a particular subordinate ICS, he can immediately shift his support to the latter. The above-discussed support relationships refer to units/agencies providing support but are not actually attached to or not under the command of the unit or agency where they are providing support.

Table 2 vividly portrays the inherent responsibilities of each support relationships. INHERENT RESPONSIBILITIES

S U P P O R T

Has Command Relationship With:

May Be Task Organized By:

Receives Logistic Support From:

Is Positioned By:

Provides Liaison:

Establishes/ Maintains Communications With:

Has Priorities Established By:

GS

Parent Unit

Parent Unit

Parent Unit

Parent Unit

As Required By Parent Unit

Parent Unit

Parent Unit

GSR

Parent Unit

Parent Unit

Parent Unit

Parent Unit

As Required by Parent Unit and Reinforced Unit

Parent Unit and Reinforced Unit

1st: Parent Unit 2nd: Reinforced Unit

R

Parent Unit

Parent Unit

Parent Unit

Reinforced Unit

Reinforced Parent Unit Unit and Reinforced Unit

1st: Reinforced Unit 2nd: Parent Unit

DS

Parent Unit

Parent Unit

Parent Unit

Supported Unit

Supported Unit

Supported Unit

Table 212

Parent Unit and Support Unit

Source: Figure F-1. (Command and Support Relationships and Inherent Responsibilities) of Appendix F of US FM 1015, Staff Organization and Operations, 31 May 1997.

12

155

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ANNEX L Proposed Post Action and Assessment Report REPORT SECTION

DESCRIPTION

Table of Contents

Provided to assist the reader in locating specific information

Introduction

Composed of two parts: an overview of the crisis event, and significant incidents including number of officers injured, pertinent statistics and findings of any subsequent investigation

Background

Prior related crisis events in the same general area, which may have some relationship Background information received prior to the incident Warnings of an impending crisis or other events leading to the beginning of the crisis event Information concerning groups and their leadership that participated in or who assisted in the management of the crisis Information and opinion of experts from occupations related to the particular crisis.

Planning

When applicable, include department planning for the event and information obtained from planning sessions with concerned agencies, and crisis managers of the event Include plans for security, assembly area, and traffic routes, fire and health responders’ vehicles, perimeters and identification of possible looting targets

Mission

Includes the mission and the plan to accomplish the mission This section also includes the mission outcome and conclusions/recommendations and comments

Description of Involved

Described commercial, residential, ethnic, economic, and social composition Identify location of Crisis Management Command Post, staging areas, assembly areas and perimeters; utilize photographs, diagrams, and maps when applicable

Legal Information

Identify all laws and regulations invoked specifically for the control of the incident

Operations

Chronological narration of the entire incident emphasizing the department’s activities


REMARKS

Public Response

Statements of witnesses Letters from citizens Response meeting from volunteers

citizen

groups/

Crimes and Arrests

Information on all crisis event related crimes and arrests categorized by type, sex and age Suspect logs with all personal information on suspects, including criminal background, police/military background and other pertinent information

Death and Injuries

A statistical summary of the total number of crisis event related deaths or injuries

Property Damage

Information on all crisis events related property damage, listing city property separately A monastery estimate of all damage

Personnel

Number of participating responders whether uniformed or civilian

Deployment of Crisis Cost of deployment Management Personnel Logistics

A list of the entire organization/department equipment and supplies used during the crisis event The cost incurred in the use of organization equipment The cost of expended logistical items


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COPRs AND CONTACT NUMBERS COPR Office of the ES Secretary of DND Secretary of the DILG Secretary the DFA Secretary of DOH Secretary of DOF Secretary of DTI Secretary of DOE Office of the NSA

CONTACT NUMBERS 784-42-86 loc 4643/736-10-08-DL and fax 911-61-93/911-62-13 925-03-30 to 31/925-03-32-Fax 834-73-74/832-15-97-Fax 743-63-93, 711-95-02 to 03/743-18-29Fax 523-92-15/526-84-74 899-06-36, 890-93-33/899-55-18-Fax 840-22-86, 840-21-92 CMSS 928-26-97

OTHER EMERGENCY NUMBERS AGENCY Emergency/Crime/Fire Office of Civil Defense National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council Bureau of Fire Protection (NCR Regional Center) Lifeline (Ambulance) Philippine Coast Guard Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency Armed Forces of the Philippines Philippine National Police PNP-CIDG PNP-EOU PNP-FED National Bureau of Investigation Metropolitan Manila Development Authority Philippine l Center for Transnational Crime Bureau of Immigration (National Operations Center)

CONTACT NUMBERS 117 911-50-61 to 65 911-14-06, 912-26-65, 912-56-68 723-16-42 16-911 527-84-81/527-84-81 loc 6291 920-07-35-Hotline 911-60-01 723-04-01 722-89-83 725-31-79 724-87-12 523-82-31 to 38 136-Hotline 724-23-62, 723-04-01 to 20 loc 4295 & 4395 523-50-81, 523-66-15, 524-37-69


National Crisis Management Core Manual 2012

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