UFPPC (www.ufppc.org (www.ufppc.org)) Digging Deeper CLIII 2011, 7:00 p.m.
Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: York: PublicAffairs, 2011).
March 21,
The Dark Side of Internet Freedom
(New
[Thesis. "To salvage the Internet's promise to aid the fight against authoritarianism, those of us in the West who still care about the future of democracy will need to ditch both cyberutopianism and Internet-centrism," the combination of which Morozov calls "the Net Delusion." (xvii).]
symptomatic of cyber-utopianism (1921). Cyber-utopianism is harmful because it overrates the role of corporations in democracy movements (21-25). Cyber-utopianism has fueled reactionary movements in authoritarian countries (25-28). Policymakers are remiss (28-31).
Introduction. Since 1989, democracy has been in retreat rather than on the march (ix-x). (ix-x). There is no consensus on how to reverse this (x-xii). (x-xii). "Cyberutopians" enamored of "the Google Doctrine" (i.e. technology is liberating per se and companies like Google and Twitter can be enlisted in the struggle for freedom) believe the Internet can usher in a new era of freedom freedom (xiii). (xiii). But their dreams (shared by Morozov until "recently") have proved to be delusional (xiii-xv). "Internet-centrism", "Internet-centrism", the belief that the Internet rather than "the context" can shape "democratic change," is also a source of misunderstanding (xvxvi). We shouldn't shouldn't despair of the Internet, but approach it with realism (xvi-xvii).
Ch. 2: Texting Like It's 1989. Hillary Clinton's Jan. 21, 2010, Newseum speech on Internet freedom warned of "a new information curtain" (33-36). Neoconservatives like Mark Palmer also embraced cyber-utopianism (36-40). This attitude is "widely shared across the American political spectrum" (40; 40-42). Revived Cold War metaphors are being embraced too uncritically and are rooted in "a shallow and triumphalist reading of the end of the Cold War" (47; 42-56).
Ch. 1: The Google Doctrine. The 2009 Iranian Green Movement disappointed cyber-utopians (1-9). The Iranian reaction was followed by similar reactions in other countries countries (9-14). (9-14). The U.S. request to Twitter to delay maintenance in order to facilitate protest in Iran (sent by 27-year-old Jared Cohen, a member of the State Dept.'s Policy Planning staff [22]) was irresponsible (1415). In fact, there were were few (impossible to say how few) Twitter users in Tehran, and it is unclear whether Twitter was really used to organize protests; on this story, media spread rumors rather than investigate facts (15-19). (15-19). This was
Ch. 3: Orwell's Favorite Lolcat. What has happened in the former Soviet bloc suggests that the Internet produces more "digital captives" than "digital renegades" (70; 57-75). The dichotomy dichotomy between Orwell (1984 ( 1984)) and Huxley Brave New World ) is outdated; their insights should be "mash[ed] up and remix[ed]" (79; 75-81). More analysis of of surveillance, censorship, and propaganda strategies needed (82-84). Ch. 4: Censors and Sensibilities. Sensibilities. Analysis of Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and China shows that models based on the Cold War are obsolete, in particular because they assume that censorship is expensive: in fact, it is easy and cheap (85-112). Ch. 5: Hugo Chavez Would Like to Welcome You to the Spinternet. The most that Western governments can do
to help democracy activists is to teach them spin-fighting tools (113-41).
Ch. 6: Why the KGB Wants You to Join Facebook. It is easy for authoritarian regimes to use the Internet for surveillance and to sow anxiety and fear in its users (143-67). Technologies like Tor provide less privacy than people think (167-70). (167-70). Cloud computing computing will will facilitate surveillance (170-73). Mobile devices facilitate surveillance and can easily be shut down (173-78). Ch. 7: Why Kierkegaard Hates Slacktivism. "Slactivism" (politically futile digital activism) is subject to Kierkegaard's criticism of the daily press, which he characterized as "absolutely demoralizing," actually diminishes people's political engagement (184; 179201). "'In terms of their impact impact [on the Arab world, new media] seem more like a stress reliever than a mechanism for political change,' writes Rami Khouri, editor-at-large of Lebanon's the Daily Star, who fears that the overall impact of such technologies on political dissent in the Middle East might be negative" (202 [errare est humanum]). humanum]). Ch. 8: Open Networks, Narrow Minds: Cultural Contradictions of Internet Freedom. U.S. sanctions on Iran and other countries like Zimbabwe actually impede use of the Internet there (205-11). (205-11). Facebook deleted deleted a site site promoting separation of religion and education in Morocco, and "[i]n reality, there is no reason why Facebook should even bother with defending freedom of expression in Morocco" (213; 211-14). Companies' inconsistent policies for policing content (YouTube is more open about its strategies than Facebook) Fa cebook) (21518). While diplomats diplomats promote promote "Internet "Internet freedom," domestic policymakers are advocating regulation of the Internet, but it is hard to see how consensus can be reached in in this area (218-25). (218-25). Before Internet freedom is embraced, the West
should consider "its own need to control and disrupt flows of information under pressing circumstances" (226; 225-29). Schools are emerging: emerging: the Obama Obama administration supports a weak form of Internet freedom (defend freedom of expression = Isaiah Berlin's negative liberty), while neoconservatives in the Hudson Institute, etc., advocate a strong form (promote freedom = Berlin's positive liberty) (229-30). (229-30). The weak weak form, like U.S. foreign policy itself, has internal contradictions (230-34). The U.S. is so dominant on the Internet that other countries' concerns are legitimate; U.S. promotion of "Internet freedom" exacerbates these concerns (234-39). No one knows if the Internet is fostering a healthier politics in the U.S. (239-41). U.S. policymakers should not be so dismissive of the social concerns of authoritarian governments, since in fact they share them (241-44). (241-44).
Ch. 9: Internet Freedoms and Their Consequences. The Internet may foster rather than dissolve religious and cultural differences, including nationalism, (245-52). Decentralization does not necessarily mean diffusion of power, as Jack Balkin of Yale Law has pointed out (252-56). The Internet Internet is being used to promote the darker side of human behavior behavior (256-61). (256-61). It can weaken the state itself, contributing to the problem of failed states (261-66). Internet politics can make policymaking more irrational by making impossible amounts of information available in a climate that demands immediate response (266-70). (266-70). Increasing the ability to acquire data can have the perverse effect of increasing ignorance (270-74). Ch. 10: Making History (More Than a Browser Menu). Social analysts have always exaggerated the ability of technology to change society (275-83). But technology's "essential unpredictability" defies analysis (283-86). It often reinforces old practices and
traditions (287-89). But "technological determinism" is intellectually bankrupt (289-95). (289-95). The notion that "technology "technology is neutral" is also false (295-99).
Bibliography. A 70-page chapter-bychapter bibliography but no footnotes— an extremely lazy and self-indulgent style of documentation.
Ch. 11: The Wicked Fix. Alvin Weinberg argued in 1966 that technology is sometimes capable of simplifying complex social problems and rendering them soluble (301-02). (301-02). But technological technological fixes always come with hidden costs (303-05). (303-05). They can distract from from real social problems problems (305-08). (305-08). In 1972, 1972, Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber argued that outputs have replaced efficiency as efficiency as the criterion by which planning is judged, resulting in interminable ethical investigations (308-10). (308-10). Karl Popper Popper was right to argue for piecemeal social engineering rather than utopian social engineering (311). The technological experts are not well placed to evaluate their own work work (312-15). (312-15). Ethan Zuckerman's rebuttal to Hillary Clinton's January 2010 speech emphasized the need for policymakers to figure out which theory is is guiding them them (315-18). (315-18). A call for "cyber-realism" (318-20).
Index. 14 pp.
Acknowledgments. The Open Society Foundations, Georgetown, students, editors, Steven Coll of the New America Foundation, family (321-23). (321-23).
About the Author. Evgeny Morozov is a contributing editor to Foreign Policy and Boston Review and a fellow at the New America Foundation. He has frequently appeared in mainstream print and broadcast media, has taught at Stanford and Georgetown, and has been supported by George Soros's Open Society Foundation. Additional information. Evgeny [Additional Morozov was born in Belarus. Belarus. His blog, blog, "Net Effect," is on the website of Foreign of Foreign Policy . He has a personal personal website at www.evgenymorozov.com www.evgenymorozov.com but has not updated it since June 2010.] [Critique. Though published in 2011, The Net Delusion asks more questions than it answers and already seems out of date. Julian Assange never appears in the index and the uprisings in the Middle East came after after it went went to press. press. This is a curmudgeonly tome, its chirpy, journalistic style belies its sour message: we are not thinking hard enough about the Internet.]
