moot court memorial

LATE ADV. K.B. KAYASTHA XVTH STATE LEVEL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

IN THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (cri) NO............/ OF 2015

[UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIA]

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 354, SECTION 376 AND SECTION 417 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE (IPC)

1. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 2. MISS. SMITA RADHAKRISHNA KERKAR

… PETITIONERS

Vs. MANESH MADUSUDAN KOTIYAN

… RESPONDANT

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF PETITIONER

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents……………………………………………………... 2 List of Abbreviation…………………………………………………... 3 Index of Authorities…………………………………………………... 4 Statement of Jurisdiction……………………………………………... 6 Statement of Facts…………………………………………………….. 7 Statement of Issues…………………………………………………… 8 Summary of Arguments………………………………………………. 9 Arguments Advanced I.

Whether this Special Leave Petition is maintainable before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India?...............................................................................

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II.

Whether the respondent is punishable for rape or not?................................. 14

III.

Whether the respondent is punishable for cheating or not?..........................

19

Prayer………………………………………………………………..... 21


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LIST OF ABBREVIATION

AIR

ALL INDIA REPORTER

CRI

CRIMINAL

CRILJ

CRIMINAL LAW JOURNAL

ORS.

OTHERS

ORI.

ORISSA

R.I.

RIGOROUS IMPRISIONMENT

SC

SUPREME COURT

SCC

SUPREME COURT CASES

SLP

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION

V.

VERSES

COI

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

IPC

INDIAN PENAL CODE


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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CASES:-

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Arunachalam vs P. S. R. Sadhanantham 1979 AIR 1284 Delhi Judicial Service Association vs. State of Gujarat 1991 AIR 2176, 1991 SCR (3) 93 Ghanshyam Mishra vs. State AIR 1951 ORI 78, 1957 CRILJ 469 Haripada vs. State of West Bengal 1956 AIR 757, 1956 SCR 639 Indira Kaur And Ors. vs Sheo Lal Kapoor (1988) 2 SCC 488, 499:AIR 1988 SC 1074 Mohd. Hussain Umar Kochra Etc vs K. S. Dalipsinghji & Anr AIR 1970 SC 45 , 1969 SCC (3) 429

7. M.V. “Vali Pero” V. Fernanedo Lopez (1989) 4 SCC 671, 675:AIR 1989 SC 2206 8. Pandurang Mahale vs. State of Maharashra 11FEB, 2004 9. P. Bhanumathy vs. Premlatha,(1978) 2 Andh LT 358 (367) 10. Renu Yadav vs. Madhusudan Etawadi 2002 (4) MPHT 437 11. Saleha Khatoon vs. State of Bihar 1989 CRILJ 202 12. Vijayan Pillai vs. State of Kerala SEPTEMBER 27TH 2010

BOOKS:1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Commentary on IPC by Ratanlal & Dheerajlal Constitution of India by V.N. Shukla Constitution of India by P.M. Bakshi Indian Evidence Act by Ratanlal & Dheerajlal. Text book on IPC by K.D. Gaur


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Links

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

manupatra.com highcourt.nic.in supremecourtofindia.nic.in indiatoday.in timesofindia.indiatimes.com indiankanoon.org advocatekhoj.com indpaedia.com


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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has the jurisdiction in this matter under Article 136 of the Constitution of India as follows: 136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court ---

(1) Notwithstanding anything in this chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.

(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed forces.

The Supreme Court has a jurisdiction to entertain and hear appeals by granting special leave against any kind of judgment or order made by any Court or Tribunal in any proceedings and the exercise of this power is left entirely to the discretion of the Supreme Court.


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STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. The appellant, Manesh and the respondent Smita worked at Virodhi Stationery Shop, Mumbai. The respondent left the job. Then the appellant also quit. They started working at Balaji DTP Xerox Centre. 2. The appellant on one fine day proposed the respondent and she accepted his proposal. 3. On 5.11.09 the appellant informed Smita that it was his birthday. Smita went to meet him at the bus stop. 4. Then they both went to Gorai Beach. They checked into a guest house in Gorai village to cut the cake on the occasion of his birthday. 5. The appellant allegedly informed Smita that he wanted to marry her and on that ground he had solicited sexual favors from Smita. 6. When she refused to oblige, he forced her and had forcible sexual intercourse with her. They did not meet for 2-3 days. 7. The appellant went to Manglore for 1 month. She called him on his cell phone and learnt from the appellant’s brother that he is married and has a son. However, the wife and son did not reside with him. 8. The appellant met Smita accompanied by her mother at Boriwali and confirmed that he was married and has a son and sought pardon from her. 9. On 8.3.2010 Smita realized that she is pregnant and informed the same to the appellant. He promised her that he would obtain divorce after 3 months and then he would marry her. 10. Smita realized that he was ignoring her and lodged an F.I.R. against him under 376, 420 of IPC.

11. High Court has acquitted the appellant under section 376 of IPC and convicted him under 417 and the respondent has filed the special leave petition under article 136 of COI.


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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE I WHETHER THIS SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THIS HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA OR NOT?

ISSUE II WHETHER THE RESPONDENT IS PUNISHABLE FOR RAPE OR NOT?

ISSUE III WHETHER THE RESPONDENT IS PUNISHABLE FOR CHEATING OR NOT?


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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

WHETHER THIS SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THIS HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA OR NOT? It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that this special leave petition is maintainable in this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India against or ina) b) c) d) e)

any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order, in any case of matter, passed or made by any Court or tribunal in the territory of India. in special and exceptional circumstances where there is grave injustice.

WHETHER THE RESPONDENT IS PUNISHABLE FOR RAPE OR NOT? It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that respondent had forcible sexual intercourse with the petitioner. Slightest penetration is sufficient to constitute the offence of rape. The respondent is also liable for sexual harassment as inclusive ofi) ii)

physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures; or a demand or request for sexual favors.

WHETHER THE RESPONDENT IS PUNISHABLE FOR CHEATING OR NOT? It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the respondent is punishable for punishment of cheating under Section 417.A dishonest concealment is a deception within the meaning of this Section.


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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ISSUE I

WHETHER THIS SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THIS HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA OR NOT?

It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that this special leave petition is maintainable in this Court. Article 136 of the Constitution of India reads as follow:-

136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court --(1) Notwithstanding anything in this chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.

(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed forces.

The power of the Court to hear appeals in this article is much wider and general. It vests in the SC plenary jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining and hearing appeals by granting special leave against:(i) (ii) (iii)

any judgment, decree, determination or order, in any cause or matter, Passed or made by any court or tribunal.

The Petitioner in the present case has filed the SLP under article 136 as the High Court has acquitted the accused (respondent) for the offense of rape and hence is maintainable.


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In Delhi Judicial Service Association vs. State of Gujarat1 it was contended by the Supreme Court that:“Under Article 136 there is no room for any doubt that this Court has wide power to interfere and correct the Judgment and orders passed by any court or Tribunal in the country. In addition to the appellate power, the Court has special residuary power to entertain appeal against any order of any court in the country. The plenary jurisdiction of this Court to grant leave and hear appeals against any order of a court or Tribunal, confers power of judicial superintendence over all the courts and Tribunals in the territory of India including subordinate courts of Magistrate and District Judge. This Court has, therefore, supervisory jurisdiction over all courts in India.”

In an another case of Arunachalam vs P. S. R. Sadhanantham2, it was again contended by the SC that:"Article 136 of the Constitution of India invests the Supreme Court with a plentitude of plenary,

appellate power over all courts and Tribunals in India. The power is plenary in the sense that there are no words in Article 136 itself qualifying that power. But, the very nature of the power has led the court to set limits to itself within which to exercise such power. It is now the wellestablished practice of this Court to permit the invocation of the power under article 136 only in very exceptional circumstances, as when a question of law of general public importance arises or a decision shocks the conscience of the Court. But, within the restrictions imposed by itself, this Court has the undoubted power to interfere even with findings of fact, making no distinction between judgments of acquittal and conviction, if the High Court, in arriving at those findings, has acted "perversely or otherwise improperly"."

Here there has been forcible sexual intercourse with the petitioner and then also the respondent has been acquitted from the offence of rape committed by him. This reckless behavior of High Court clearly proves that the decision was given perversely or improperly. And therefore this petition is maintainable before the Supreme Court of India.

Decided cases, however, establish that the Supreme Court will grant special leave appeal in exceptional cases which are:-

1

2

1991 AIR 2176, 1991 SCR (3) 936 1979 AIR 1284


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

Where grave and substantial injustice has been done by disregard to the forms of legal process, or



Violation of the principles of natural justice or otherwise.

Thus, it is crystal clear from the above mentioned facts that the SC will not grant special leave to appeal u/a 136 of the COI unless it is shown that special and exceptional circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against.

Further, in the exercise of its special leave appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below, unless, of course, the findings are perverse or vitiated by error of law, or if there is gross miscarriage of justice.

The same contention is held in the case of Mohd. Hussain Umar Kochra Etc vs K. S. Dalipsinghji & Anr3 which is:“This Court does not reappraise the evidence unless the findings are perverse or are vitiated by any error of law or there is a grave miscarriage of justice”.

In this case there has been a miscarriage of justice as the accused was acquitted by the High Court despite of the commission of rape. This petition cannot be dismissed and hence is maintainable in this Hon’ble court. The Supreme Court is duty bound to interfere with the findings of fact even if they have been affirmed thrice. In case of Indira Kaur And Ors. vs Sheo Lal Kapoor4, it was held as following:“If and when the Court is satisfied that great injustice has been done it is not only the 'right' but also the 'duty' of this Court to reverse the error and the injustice and to upset the finding notwithstanding the fact that it has been affirmed thrice.” 3

AIR 1970 SC 45 , 1969 SCC (3) 429 (1988) 2 SCC 488, 499:AIR 1988 SC 1074

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In this case also this Hon’ble Court has not only but it is also the duty of the SC to reverse the error and injustice and pass an appropriate, just and equitable order.

In exceptional cases the Court admits appeals under Article 136 even though the appellant has not exhausted all the other remedies, if there are exceptionally sound reasons for such admission.

In case M.V. “Vali Pero” V. Fernanedo Lopez5 it was held that:“This academic exercise is unnecessary in the present case since it cannot be doubted that

irrespective of the question of res judicata, earlier decision on the same point by a Division Bench of the High Court will at least be a binding precedent when the matter is reagitated before the Division Bench hearing the appeal against the final decision in the suit. In such a situation directing the resort to the remedy of an appeal under the Letters Patent against the final decision in the suit will needlessly delay decision of the point by this Court. We are, therefore, of the opinion that, in the present case, it is neither necessary to decide the question of res judicata argued before us nor would it be appropriate to refuse leave and direct the petitioner to first exhaust the remedy of an appeal under the Letters Patent in the High Court. We, accordingly, proceed to decide the point involved on merits. Leave granted.”

In Haripada vs. State of West Bengal6 Supreme Court held that:“No High Court has the jurisdiction to pass on mere questions of fact for further consideration by this Court under the relevant articles of the Constitution. We no doubt possess that power and in proper cases have exercised it under article 136(1). If there has been a gross miscarriage of justice or a departure from legal procedure such as vitiates the whole trial we would certainly intervene and we would also intervene if even the findings of fact were such as were shocking to our judicial conscience and grant in such cases special leave to appeal under article 136(1)”.

In the present case there has been injustice with the petitioner and the petitioner being the aggrieved party seeks justice. Therefore she has approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. Since the case is very sensitive, the petitioner has approached the Supreme Court in order to obtain justice. 5 6

(1989) 4 SCC 671, 675:AIR 1989 SC 2206 1956 AIR 757, 1956 SCR 639


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ISSUE II

WHETHER THE RESPONDENT IS PUNISHABLE FOR RAPE OR NOT?

It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that respondent (Manesh) is punishable for rape as he had forcible sexual intercourse with the petitioner (Smita).

The accused allegedly informed the petitioner that he wanted to marry her and on that ground he had solicited sexual favors from Smita. Initially when she refused to oblige, he forced her and had sexual intercourse with her. Under Penal law Rape has been defined under “section 375” which reads as follow:“A man is said to commit “rape” who, except in the case hereinafter excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the six following descriptions:First: Against her will. Secondly: Without her consent. Thirdly: With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt. Fourthly: With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband, and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. Fifthly: With her consent, when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. Sixthly: With or without her consent, when sixteen years of age.


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Explanation: Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape. Exception: Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.”

In Ghanshyam Mishra vs. State7, it was held that:“Even partial penetration leading to the rupture of the hymen is sufficient to constitute rape, even though there might not be deep penetration into the vaginal canal. The girl's evidence was to the effect that she felt severe pain and raised a cry, after which the petitioner desisted from the act. Consequently, from the mere fact that there was no dilation of the vaginal canal it cannot be assumed that the offence was not committed when the injury to the hymen showed clearly that there was penetration by the male organ. The depth of the penetration is immaterial so far as the offence under Section 376 I. P. C. is concerned.”

It is that if consent be obtained by intimidation, force, mediated imposition, circumvention, and surprise it is so to be treated as a delusion, and not as a deliberate or free act of mind.

It is to be noted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that in the present case, the accused wanted to cut the cake on the occasion of his birthday and checked into a guest house which was a surprise for Smita. She was unaware of this fact. After this, the respondent solicited sexual favors from the petitioner on the ground that he wanted to marry her.

Therefore, it is pertinent to note that there was an element surprise in the mind of the petitioner and so her consent was delusional and it cannot be considered as a free consent.

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AIR 1951 ORI 78, 1957 CRILJ 469


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In Saleha Khatoon vs. State of Bihar8, it was held that:“Consent always means free will or voluntary act. In this case consent was obtained on the basis of some fraud and allurment or practising deception upon the lady on the pretext that ultimately she will be married and under that pretext she allowed opposite party No. 2 to have sexual intercourse with her. Therefore, this tainted consent or consent of this nature which is based on deception and fraud, cannot be termed, prima facie, to conclude that it was 'with consent'. It was a fraud that was practiced on her or she was deceived by giving false assurance. Such type of consent must be termed to be consent obtained without her consent. Consent obtained by deceitful means is no consent and comes within the ambit of ingredients of the definition of rape.”

Here also the consent was obtained on the promise of marriage and on the same promise she had allowed other party to have sexual intercourse with her. It must be noted that it was fraud that was practiced on her and also she was deceived by giving false assurance of marriage.

In Renu Yadav vs. Madhusudan Etawadi9, it was contended that:“In the instant case the applicant gave her consent under a misconception and the non-applicant

No. 1 to whom it was given was aware of the existence of the misconception. As the nonapplicant No. 1 misrepresented the fact about his marital status and obtained the consent of the applicant under a misconception of fact, it amounted to no consent as per provisions of Section 90, IPC. In the present case also, the accused had sexual intercourse under a misconception that he would marry her. The consent given under misconception is no consent. The applicant succumbed to the lust of the non-applicant No. 1 on a misrepresentation that he was a bachelor and that he would marry her.”

In instant case also, the respondent misrepresented the fact about his marital status and obtained the consent of the petitioner under a misconception of fact. It amounts to no consent according to section 90 of IPC. It was a consent given under the misconception of fact and hence the respondent must be punished under section 376 of IPC.

8 9

1989 CRILJ 202 2002 (4) MPHT 437


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In Vijayan Pillai vs. State of Kerala10 it was held that:“Every consent to act involves submission but it by no means follows that a mere submission involves consent.” Here in this case, no doubt that the petitioner had accompanied with the respondent and checked into a guest house but it doesn’t mean that she consented him for having sexual intercourse with her. No doubt she submitted herself but every submission is not consent. Hence, the respondent is punishable for rape under section 376 of IPC, 1860.

It must also be noted by this Learned Court that the respondent had also harassed the petitioner.

As per Section 354A.A man committing any of the following actsi) physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures; or ii) a demand or request for sexual favors; or iii) showing pornography against the will of a woman; or iv) making sexually coloured remarks; Shall be guilty of the offence of sexual harassment.

In the present case the respondent told the petitioner that he wanted to marry her and on that ground he had solicited sexual favors from Smita. Initially when she refused to oblige, he forced her and had forcible sexual intercourse with her.

In Pandurang Mahale vs. State of Maharashra11, S.C. held that:“The essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive.

10 11

SEPTEMBER 27 11FEB, 2004

TH

2010


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Modesty in this Section is an attribute associated with female human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex. The act of pulling a women, removing her saree, coupled with a request for sexual intercourse, is such as would be an outrage to the modesty of a woman; and knowledge, that modesty is likely to be outraged, is sufficient to constitute the offence without any deliberate intention having such outrage alone for its object. The word 'modesty' is not defined in IPC. But the act of pulling a woman, removing her saree, coupled with a request for sexual intercourse, is such as would outrage to the modesty of a woman; the knowledge, that the modesty is likely to be outraged is sufficient to constitute the offence without any deliberate intention having such outrage alone for its object.”

The respondent in present case solicited sexual favors from her and had sexual intercourse with her. In spite of her resistance he forced her and harassed her. This act of respondent also outraged her modesty which is the most valuable part of any female. The accused must not be acquitted and his act must be punished by this Hon’ble Supreme Court as all the acts by the accused are fulfilling the criteria of the definition of Rape mentioned in section 376 of IPC.


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ISSUE III

WHETHER THE RESPONDENT IS PUNISHABLE FOR CHEATING OR NOT?

It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that respondent is liable for punishment for cheating under Section 417.

Cheating is defined in section 415 of IPC which reads as follow:415. Cheating— Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”. Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section. The essentials ingredients of cheating are:(1) Deception of any person (2) (a) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person(i) To deliver any property to any person, or (ii) To consent with any person any person relating to any property; or (b) Intentionally inducing that person to do which he would not do or omit to do, and that the act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm, to that person in body, mind, reputation or property.

In P. Bhanumathy vs. Premlatha12,(1978) 2 Andh LT 358 (367) it was held that:“dishonest concealment is a deception”.

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(1978) 2 Andh LT 358 (367) MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF PETITIONER

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In the present case, the respondent allegedly informed the petitioner that he wanted to marry her and on that ground he had solicited sexual favors from Smita. Initially when she refused to oblige, he forced her and had forcible sexual intercourse with her. Thereafter they did not see each other for 2-3 days. The respondent had been to Manglore for one month.

When the petitioner tried to contact him on his cell phone, his brother received the phone and she came to know from him that the respondent was a married man and having a son. However, the wife and son of the respondent were not residing with him.

All the above facts point out clearly that the respondent kept the petitioner in dark as he had not disclosed the truth of his marriage and that he had a son. The petitioner came to know about it from the brother of the respondent. The respondent never disclosed the reality on his own.

This amounts to dishonest concealment on part of the respondent as when he was already married and had a son and the divorce proceedings were going on. It was the same time during which the respondent requested sexual favors from the petitioner.

He later assured the petitioner, that he would marry her only after 3 months, when he would obtain divorce from his wife. She informed the respondent about her pregnancy. It must be noted that divorce cases take time to be deposed off. Such a promise was not based on reality.

The behavior of the respondent shows that, he only gave mere assurances to the petitioner. However he did nothing substantial to prove that he actually wanted to marry the petitioner. She became anxious as she was pregnant and the ignorant attitude of the respondent was persistent.

So the reputation of the petitioner was at stake as she was not married. Also he ignored her calls and gave evasive answers. So the intention of the respondent was not clear to the petitioner. He kept her in delusion and is therefore liable for dishonest concealment, i.e. cheating.


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PRAYER

It is hereinafter most humbly prayed before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that in the light of issues raised, arguments advanced, authorities cited and pleadings made the Hon’ble Court may be pleased to; 1. Grant the Special Leave Petition (SLP) under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 2. Respondent should be punishable for the commission of cheating and crime under section 417 and 376 respectively. 3. Any other just and equitable order may be passed in the favor of the petitioner. AND/OR

Pass any other order that it deems fit in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.

For This Act of Kindness, the Petitioner Shall Duty Bound Forever Pray.


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