Mind and Reality

an articl i n  n  I I I the prese n  n t writer atte mpted a  criticism of certai n  n  modern m odern hypothese hypothesess concerning eality  D e  structive work being much easier than co n structive  s tructive  this second stud study y at atte tem mpts pts with ith some dread dread the task task of conside considerring the  whole subject from another point of view the comfort for the writer l e s i n  n  the fact that the thoughts here to be set forth  are in the mai n n o t  n e w The need seems to be j  st now that  certai n  n  ideas ideas known  but in our age too much neglect  d should b e  n ot o t simply  but ra rather ther reformed reformed to bri n g them  i n  n to t o closer con n e  e xion with modern progress  This This study study will fa  l into two parts  I n  the  th e  fi rst we sha  suppose our whole task to be the suggestion of a plausible  of a simple  adequate  and consistent hypothesis hypothesis about the nature  of ex e rn al a l reality  In the seco n  n d part we sha  consider more  critically the nature of such hypothes  s  In this  fi rst part  then we shall suppose that  by a perfect perfect theory theory of k n owledge  o wledge  the fol lowi n  n g res  t has bee n  n  reached reached Human beings are able to form  i d as that correspo n  n d in some way with a real world outside o  f  themse  v e s  That is  the sequence o  f  huma    huma n  ideas corresponds  corresponds  n   ideas to seque n  n ces c es o  f   extern a  a  events  or to r ela lattions ions of coe x stence  among externa  thi  th i  gs  The  Th e  n ecessary e cessary or u n  i form m conne xions  n ifor of huma n  n  ideas ideas correspo n  n d to regu  ar or to universal connexions  among externa  thi  th i n  n gs  gs  O r in the brief form of  Herbert  Sp e n  n c e r s phraseology  phraseology  to each necessary relatio n  n  i n  n  huma  huma n  n  consciousness  there corresponds a relation B in the external world Suppose  then that all this has been established o n  n e wi  l admit more readi  y tha n  n   the writ  r that this supposi  tion is merely tentative  The theor theory y of knowled knowledge ge is yet to to be  comp  eted and b etwee  etwee n  n  its conception a n d its reali  ation there  aree wide ar ide ocean oceanss of doubt  doubt  shal shall in fact touch ouch upo n  th e  n  the  problems of this theory in the second part of our paper B u t  for the  omen omentt su supppose adm admitt itted what hat scien scientt i fi c thou thougght  generally takes for granted the correspondenc  of inner and outer r lat lations ions in such wi  e that the former are naturally  opies  of the latter And An d o n  this foundation suppose that we intend n  this to consi conside derr what hat hy  othe othesi siss as to  n a  ur uree of the rela relatted terms  a n d  B i n  the externa  w or d i s  on the whole  the most  n  the p  ausi b  b  e  I For the sake o  f  a v  o iding co n  t roversy we  m ay fo r the mo  v oiding n troversy m e n t l eave eave o u t o  f    acco accoun untt tw twoo old old qu quest estio ions  ns  cannot  rea  re a  y escape either a n  fro n  n d both wi  ster y c o n  n fro  n t us before we 

R get i n  at the door of the temple of certainty  But here at the  outset we are playing with hypotheses  and may be absolv d from the responsibility of securing ourselves beforehand from  all possible attacks  The  fi rst is the question of the idealists  How can any reality be conceived unless as implying or includ i n g states of consciousness  For the moment we will waive  the Berkeleya n  contention altogether for we are not now co n  cern e d to p rove by metaphysic  analysis the u  iversal dence of consciousness and reality  wish merely a plausible  hypothesis to be advanced as to the nature of  ha  more  popular thought means by rea  it y  The second que  tion that at  the outset we avoid is the one concerni  g the ground of the  assumed agreement b etween the external and the internal orders  of facts  hether this ground lies i n  a causal determination of  our consciousness by the extern world or in a pre  establi  hed harmony of  b oth  matters not  take our stand then up o n  the admitted facts of popu ar b e lief  Here are feel gs  se  of feelings  thoughts  trains of thought  systems of  scienti fi c  b e lief  all i n t ernal facts  Beyond the consciousness  of these internal facts stretches  so we now assume  a n d only  assume  another world of facts  i n  w ch somethi n g corresponds  to each o n   e o f thes e fe e   ngs  some order of facts to each  sequence of feeling some system of facts and of laws to each  properly constituted system of beliefs  The external order of  the world beyond correspo n d s to the order of this internal world of our consciousness  b u t i s n o t t h  s order plausible  is required as to the  n a ture o  f   this correspond ng e x ternal order any hypotheses have been suggested in answer to this  The doctrine previously  scussed the doctrine of  ind S tu  f  was such an hypothesis  i nd S tu  f was to   be l e i n  nature to consciousness  but by reason of the sim  of its  timate units  ach of these was to be again u n  e  consciousn ss  For consciousness  it was assumed is an gate  u n  t s  each unit by its  lf has only intensive qua  it y  and lacki  g complexity of content  is of course unconsc ious  consciousness  then is employed in rroring the comple x relations in which the unco  scious  ind Stu  el ments outside  of us are i n v olved The usefulness of this hypothesis we have  previously tested But the motives that led to its formation are  nt  resting These motive  were  one may fancy  twofold Th  re was the in fl u ence of Berkeley s argument  reiterated as it  been in so many forms  Accor ng to this argument  ex ternal reality can be consistently conceived only by assimilating it in nature to consciousness  The second motive was the ex presse d  one  formu  ati n g i n   simple terms the phenome n a of 

evolutio n  and of physiologica  psycho  ogy  The tra n s itio n  from  material to the conscious  the connexion of the psychical with the physical cou  d b  st be conceived by supposing the  physical to be but a  sguised or attenuated or very simple form  the psychical The  fi rst motive  if it was really very active  we have decided to omit for the moment from consideration The second and more expr ssly prom  ent motive we shou  d consid r responsible for the most faulty part of the theory  the und fi ned double  sided nature of these hybrid ind Stuff  atoms  the fact that they  to appear among old fashioned atoms as b  ing quite dead enough for all the purpose of me  while they show th  ir ghostly selves at the gates of  psychology  and in very thin voices  with very uncanny  haviour try to convince us that they are after really quite  alive  and qu  te ready to take part in the buildi n g u p o f c o n scious mind The  ind Stuff hypothesis lan d s us in a dilemma  Eithe  our elementary atoms are as dead as those of Democritus  and then the whole problem o f the evolution and physiology of  mind is unsolved or they have such mental life that out of  them complex consciousne  s can b e built up but then they are  onads  minds of more or less clear consciou  nes  And in that  case  following the reasoni  g by which the  ind Stuff theory  itself was reached we are led nat  rally to the hypothesis that  very atom of matter is a little mind not an i n t ensive element  of sensation but a compl x of many elements i n  a conscious  unity of some sort  an apperceptive i n d ividual To s  ch a n  h  pothesis  be it noticed we are led o  y when we accept the method and the  p remisses that led to the  of  ind Stu  and when we free the conclu  ion from  ambi  uity  But the hypothesis in questio n  that for which the  atoms are little conscious souls  with a life of their like our huma n  ives  only simpler will hardly meet very soon with  general f a vour It is in fact complex and not plausible  And why  Though rea  y better than the  i n d Stu  f h  othesis  this other is unacceptable  because it asks us to assum   the existence of a conscious r acting thinki  g being wh  re  no symptom of reaction or of thought or of consci  usn s s  appears beyond the simple behaviour of an atom in the pr sence  of other atoms  Better is this hypothesis  that is  more con sist  nt and adequate than the  ind Stuf  hypothe  is  because  we can form some idea of how a  on can xist  enter into  relations with other like  onads  can unfold its  lf  can even under favourable conditions  develop into a higher ord r of  being become the theatre of a rational conscious life  while  ca n  form  n o  n o tio n  o  f   complex inter e  ations amo n g a b  lu  el y 

simple and   pure  y i n t e n s ive sensation e  e me n ts  n o r conceiv how out of them a complex and united consciousness can be  formed But u n s atisfactory is this hypothesis  because we are  u n w illing to admit a de fi nite conscious life  individual and voli  l k e  own unless we see some symptom of lif  and of  v o lition more marked than an atom has yet shown Above all the mark of action with a purpose seems wanting in the case of an atom  whose velocity or whose combination with other atoms is  n o t a reaction determined by any  scoverable inner purpose  b u t simply the result of surrounding conditions modi fi ed by the  simple nature of the atom  Arbi  rary then and confounded seems the hypothesis of any de fi nitely conscious  onad atoms  for to explain the  f a cts of experience such an hypoth  sis assumes  a whole world of unk n o wn and unknowable fac  s  the inner life and thought of what seem to us dead atoms  i  f   arbi  the hypothesis is irrefutable  It is  as said preferable to  the  ind Stu  ff   doctrine  and its consistency  not to menti  n its  poetic charm  will always k p it on the verge of speculative  thought  ecognised by a f  nciful f ew a n d ignored or despised by the common sense many  But have we exha  sted the possib  e hypotheses as to the e x ternal foundation of the phenomena of experience  B y n o   means  must indeed pass over those for which the external world is the embodiment of an nco n s cious  ind and that  simply because we shall look in vain among the volumes of glib  writing upon this topic for any clear notion of what people  m ean by  unconscious mind If by unconscio  s mind is  meant what is ge n e rally ca  ed matter we remain j  st where we  were at the outset  with an inquiry  efore us as to what is the  n ature of the external fact to which corresponds our idea of  matter But if unconscious mind means aught else  then the  term seems to be equiv ent to  unconscious consciousness  For no idea of a reason or of a thought can be formed in such  wise as to separate reason and thought from consciousness  Thought is a series of active conscious states  and all the  of generations of Von Hartmanns shall not induce us to  corrupt our peculation with the monstrous marriages of contra  n o tions whereof the Philosophy of the  nconscious  se  ms so proud thus we are not done with hypotheses  Nor we forced to go back the vague and uncritical hypothesis  that only matter inexplicable matter exists outside  of our minds  Of the existence of matter we can gi v e hypo  thetically some little account  At  events there is Berkeley s  hypothesis  which as a mere hypothesis we can examine apart  from any study o  f   Berkeley s phi osophica  arguments for i d e a  m

According to Berkeley there exist conscious bei  gs  more or l ss like our elve  of whom the head and father is  Now xternal to all being besides  there  a real world This  real orld is made up of the eternal system of  od s thoughts  i b l hi i c d y  mi d h m m y  m i d p  ic l mi d p l i h y  h i c i m y  m i d i c h m b y  p  i c i d d h h f  m h mi d h i h y  i i i l b  im m y  p  c i h m li i y  d i d b  f  m y  b  h ld f  m y  pp  d i hil i m ih d h i c d p i i c ily  f  ll h h ic h c mp  h d hi hi b i h m i ch m cc di ch l hi m l f h h d i d b y  m d This so fami iar hypothesis of Berkeley is in part founde d  upon a thought that for the present we have agreed to neglect  upon the notion of the external world as the  of our ternal impressions  Not being caused by myself  my idea  rea  ons Berkeley  must have an external cause  And the only  intelligible cause is an active spirit  for our present pur pose this thought is not important  are not ask ng about  the cause of our conscious states  but about the way in w ch  we can most plau  ibly conceive of an external world correspond ing to these stat  s  The correspondence is assumed Into its  ground b e i t p r e   established harmony or physical i n fl u ence  w e d o n o t j u s t n o w i   quire  Our only criteria of plausi  causal explanation bei n g dropped are therefore adequacy  simplicity  and consistency  Is Berkeley s hypothesis consistent  with itself  and is it the simplest h  pothesis possible  Stripped o  f n on essentia  features  the hypothesis is that there corresponds  to our consciousness another higher and farther reaching con containing all that is abi  g in our consciousness  and much more be  ides  This consc iousness is in form and matter a rational spirit  having de fi nite purposes in the creation a n d education of the various  fi nite  pirits  Th  e purpos  s  quire for their accomplishment that our conscious stat  should within certain limits  ee with this higher consciousn ss  correspond to it in form and a certain extent  This corres  constitutes what we mean by tr th  There is  n o  external world but this other consciousness  To Berkeley  as we k n ow the essential part of t  s doctrine  was the teleological part  That  od s thoughts and our corres  ther to res  t from and express  od s purposes in creating the world t  s was for Berkel y the main poi n t to be  p ro v e n  But if the theologica  ele m e n t of the  d o ctri n e  b e  f o r

the  fi st le  f t out of account  there is another part that we just  wish to hold fast  f this hypothesis has an interest apart from its origi n  and f  om  original use  in philosophy should we be  afraid of doctrine  because th  y have an association with some  dreaded theological dogma  or with some enthusiastic and over sy  tem of the past  About the nature of the external orld have at the outset nothing but hypothese  Before  we test th  m in any very exact way  we may with  afety try to  understand them  Perhaps what seemed the wildest of them  may turn out to be the very best  Because a certain hypo  thesis was put forward rather as a demonstrable and et  rnal truth than as a n   hypothesis  shall we rej ect it without further examination The hypothesis now be  ore us is Berkeley s with the telco  ogical element omitted along with the caus  How this ex ternal consciousness comes to a  ect us  and why it takes just  such forms as it does  we care not  This we  hat is this  supposed external consciousness  How does it correspond to  our own shall not call the supposed consciousness by  question begging names  It is not for us just now either lute  divine  It is simply consciousness  and external The  hypothesis is that truth consists in some kind of correspondence  between our thought and this outer reality  hat kind of cor respondence  Two conscious beings can have correspo nd i ng states o  f  con without havi  g like states  The notes of a melody  co  ld have corresponding to them the variation i n   intensity of  some source of light  The light  or beats would correspond to the notes of music by having the like rhythm  yet there  would be no resemblance in the conte n t  Correspondence may  be  more obscured The dashes on a piece of paper that has  passed under the point of a telegraphic pen the series o  f  characters printed from the press in a do  en angua  es  the  sound of the voice of a reader the series of signals  fl a shed from  shore to a  stant vessel all these dissimilar series of events  might correspond exactly and throughout  if it were their pur pose to convey in various ways the same meaning In order then that my consciousness should correspond to some other consciou  ness  ext  rnal to mine  it is only necessary that for each event or f a ct i n  my consciousness there should exist some  event or fact in the other consciousness  and that some relation exi  ting amo n g my conscious states sho  d b e like or parallel to  relation existing among conscious states e x ternal to  i n e  m or n u m erous the poi n t s o  f   rese mb  a n c e  b e twee n 

the two series  states  the closer the corresponde n c e  But  correspondence in the abstract implies o  y  ome one de fi nit  and permanent r semblance found throughout the two s  ri  s  Such being the nature of corre  pondence in general let us  con ider our hypothe  is more in detail Suppo  e  hat the clock yonder has some such reality as t  s hypothe  is suppose  There is  clock with its pendulum beati  g For me now that clock is a combination of sensatio  s  joined with a be  ef in certain possible sensations  For one in the same room  ith me  the clock has a like exi  tence  But suppose that the clock has  apart from my consci  usne  s  apart from the consciousness of  any other human being or animal an e x stence for some other as yet unde fi ned c  nsciousness  Suppo  e that for this consc  ou s  n ss the clock in its whole present condition exi  t  not at all as  a possibi ity of sensations  but sol ly and in all its part  as a  present group of sensible facts  stan n g i n d n i t  relations  Suppose that the sen ible facts that con itute this clock as it is  given to thi  hypothetical consciousnes  are in quality unl ke the  sensations that for me constitute the clock but that i n   their relations  i n  their number in their grouping in their dif ere n c es  from one another these se n sible facts as they are for the hypo  thetical consciousness  gree with the sensations and with the  possibi  ties of sensatio n  that for me constitute the clock Suppose that the clock as it is i n  the hypothetica  consciousness  endures for a considerable time  and is called the real clock Then when I shut my eyes or go away or there exists still the real clock the clock in the hypothetic  consciousness  Though all my fe  ows die there is sti  the re  clock i n d e  pende n t  our c onsciousness  The clock may for a time go on run in g that is  in the hypothetical con ciousness there may  b e a rhythm of sensible events  corresponding to what for me  were I present  would be the rhythm of the pendulu  beats  a n d the movement of the hands  Now suppose t  s hypothetica  consciousness extended so  that it contains facts correspondi n g to my ideas of the ether vibrations that fa  l upon or that are re fl  cted from the face of  this clock Suppose that it further contains facts corre  pond g to each of my ideas of the relative positio n  of thi  clock and of  other obje ct  Suppose at last that the hypothetical consciou  ness is extended to all the facts of what I cal my universe o  f  actual a n d of possible sensation Suppose that each possible or actual experience of each moment i n   my life or in the life of  any other animal is represent  d by  ome actual momentarily  present fact in the hypoth  tical consciou  ness  Then consid r the hypothetical consciousness at any moment  and see what  it  w co n tai n  Every materia  atom  e v e  y wa v e o  f  et h er e v ery 

R point o  f   space  every configuration o  f   materia  b o dies  every  po  sible geometrical relation will be r prese  ted in the hypo  thetical consciousness by some de fi nite fact  The relations of  these facts will be in nature and i n  complexity similar to the  relations among the facts of my actua  or possible sensations  On the other ha n d the lim ts of my possible consciousness at  any moment will be the limits of the actual consciousness of  this suppo  ed universal Knowi n g One  hat it actually knows  I conceivably might now know If it is conscious of a certain series of facts  then I might be conscious  were I now on the  other side of the moon of l ving creatures there  If the hypo  thetical consciousness contains another set of facts  then I might  be unable to  fi nd such  iving bei  gs were I there  An d so with  all facts of possible experience  can easily see how u n d er this suppositio  co n f ormity to  suppos  d universal consciousness will become o n   my part a  goal of e  ort  Kn o wledge of possible experiences is useful to m e  But all possible experiences are or wi  be actual in the hypo  thetical consciousness  If I am standing n e ar a concea  ed pit   f a  am in danger of a  b l ow or i n   danger of death from  poison that fact  translated into u  timate terms  means  we may  suppose  that in the universal consciousness there is  n o w the  knowledge of cer ai n  re  ative p ositions and motio n s of atoms  The sequence of states in the u n i versa  co n s ciousness must  b e  supposed to be a re  ular sequence  subject to  fi ed law But  sequence does  n o t now especially concer us  si n c e we speak o n l y of the  n a ture of this exter al consciousness  It is enough  therefore  to poi n t out that this supposed universa  knowi n g consciousness  this Not   Ourselves  has  under the co n d itio n s  stated all the essential characteristics of a real world It is  yond us  it is independent  us  its facts ha v e a certain corre  to our sensations  nder the suppositio n   that by  nature we tend to be in greement with this consciousness  progress i n  the  and ext  nt of our agreement with it  may be both possible and practically useful This a  reement  ould constitute truth  N other real world need be supposed behind or above this consciousness  ejectio n  of a n   old theory  and acceptance of a  n e w as when the Coper n ic a n   doctrine  places the Ptolemaic  w ll mean the growth of a belief that the  new system of ideas corresponds more  n e arly than the old not  with dead matter but with the seque n c e of states i n   the uni  v e rsal consciousness  The universal co n s ciousness itself wil be  n o i  usory consciousness  It will n o t need a further conscious  n e ss to support it  It will need n o dead matter outside of  Our nature leads u s to  ook up to it as to our  m odel Itself is  attern  ookin u p to  n o other m o d e  Th e  p rp ose o  f   thought 

w be confor ity with this perfect  untrammeled tho  ght  For us there  a little range of actual sensation in the mid t  of a vast ocean of possible sensation For the u n  versal con there are at any moment only actua  data  see  the clock face  and for us the inside  the clock is possible  ensat  on only  For the supposed consciousness the in ide will as much present as the out  ide  For us colours and odour uggest possible sensations  which scienc  interprets as being in the la t analysis the po s  ible sen atio  s known as atom s   motion velociti  s  di  tances  For the universal c  nsciousness  thes  atoms  motions  velocities  and distances  or the ultimate  facts to which these notions correspond are not po  ible but  actual data  There need be then the last analysis  no dead unconscious atoms  yet unconscious little atom  souls  ing ghti  g loving u  ting there need be in the last analysis  o  y a con ciousne  s of fact  cor esponding to what we mean by  motion velocity  extension stanc  impe  etrability  Corr pond ng to the relation in our consciousness there wi  the n  be the external fact A B  whereof so much is supposed to  be known fi rst  that the relation is somewhat like the  ation A B seco n   dly  that the terms A and B  wha  ever their particular character are facts  f o r a c o n ciousness  and nothing but facts for a consciousness  An d the hypothetica  conscious  ness for which these facts  all present  together with  heir manifo  d relations  this we may call a  orld Consciousness  An   illusion for my consciousness wi  l mean a failure to corres  pond with the world consciousness  A truth for my conscious  n ss will be a r lation that corr sponds with some r lation B in the world consciou  ne  s  But for the world conscious  ess itself there will b e no questio n   of its own truth or falsity  It will be for and i n   itself  It wi  not have to create a re  world it wi  be a real world It will not have a Nature as its  own Otherness  over against it  elf  It will be in its own fact  and i n  their sequence a nature  It wi  bear no mystical rela  tion to the i  dividual inte  gences  as if they were its emana  tions or its modes   It wil be in and for it   elf  as  indepe n d ent o  f   them  if they were not  They wi  self  existent  devoid of any such unrea  ty  the mystics like  give them  But their whole busi n ess and purpose wil b e t o   carry out and to  m ake f  l a n d de fin  te that correspondence with  this universal consciousness upon which their existence and their peace depend A certain lack of correspondence with the  universal consciousness on the part of a n y a ni  m  s idea  will be followed by the c essatio n  of that particular grouping of facts  i n  the universal consciousness that is known to us as this ani  m a  s  b o dy  ith the  sso  utio n  o  f   this a n im   a  s  b o dy wi 

ea  e his conscious n e ss  his cha n c e o f   d i sagreei  g i n  states  with the states of the universal consciousness  and therefore  lack of corr spondence  A n    ultimate law of sequence  with  which  as with all causa  connexion we have here nothing to  do  thu  binds the in ividua  beings to the  orld Conscious  n e ss  The whole universe exhibits the phenom  non fi rst  o  f  great consciousness  embracing an of geometrical phy  ical chemical physiological facts  and secondly  of a vast  multitude of individual conscious bei n g whose number and sorts we shall nev r be able to tel who  e destiny  how ver de  mands of all of th  m a more or less imperfect likeness between their states and the relations thereof on the one hand and the  facts of the uni  ersal consciousness on the other hand The  u n  versal consciousness  it noted is so called merely as  cluding in its ken ultimate mathematical and physical facts  Of its nature beyond this we pr tend to suppose nothing An d it does not include withi n  itself the individual conscious beings  hypoth  is is not pantheistic  or theistic  simply sup  pose  N Ourselves that includes  n a tura  knowledge  This is the External eality  have o  tted all r ference to the teleologica  element that  is generally i n t roduced into any theory of a  orld Spirit  So  far i n  fact  our orld Consciousness is not what people  m ean by a  orld Spirit  A Spirit  weaving the livi  g robe of   Deity  our or d Co n  ciousne  s is not  for as so far described it does not  ng it merely looks on It looks at its ow n  states  and these are supposed to be altogether its  given from no  But as to their succe  sion or their worth  their beginning or their end we have  aid n o thi  g This Conscious  ness has t  ese state  but we have supposed them to b e attended by  n o emotion of pleasure or of pain by  n o modif  i  g reactio n  of w l Thi  consciousness is not a Creator it is a Seer As  for the i n d ividual conscious bei  gs  it does not make or unmake  them by an exercise of power They  on the contrary  are made  and unmade according as there arise or disappear in this uni  versal consciousness certain groups of data that  as represe n t ed in our mortal thought  are called organic living bodies  with  tissues  motions  structures  functions  These  roups pass  an d with  hem the individual conscious  ess that coexisted with each  This growth and decay is simply a law of experience  an ultimate  and i n e xplicable sequence  But the  niversal consciousness o  f  n a ture  for which e ach of these groups of physical facts existed that remains  In other words  Each animal body is  sented the universal consciousness  and exists o n  y in so far as it is represe n t ed therein or is known to its posses  or or to  other a n i m a  s  The in    d v i d u  m  n d that coe x ists with t 

body  no representative in the un versal consciousness  b u t  exists and r al for its  lf  ith  group of fact  in the  unive  sal consciou  ness to which  as  say  cor espond our idea of the body  the ind pend nt group of facts called the  a nimal s mind lives and d e s  u  iver l con ciou  ness    the individual mi  ds make up togeth  r the sum t  tal of reality  Continuing to m  ntion the cons  qu  nc  s of our hy  othesis  we see that the w ll known qu  tions so often a  ked of idea  sts  are no longer pu  ling when acc  pt  uch an idea as the fore  going Such que  tions are  hat  xi  ted before th  r was any  conscious life on the planet  In what sense was th  re light or heat  matter or motion b  fore there were eyes to see  tactile  organs to feel animal intelligence to understand these external facts The qu   tion of Kant too about the subjectivity of space  would seem to have been an wered Before there were con scious beings o n  this planet  this planet existed only in and for the u  iv sal consciousnes  In that consciousnes  w re fact  orresponding to all phenomena  or possibilities of  ence  that geological science may declare to have re  ly exi  te d at such a time  h  n the ea  th became  fi lled with life  there  appeared in the u  v rsal consciousness the data known as  organisms  And at the same time  be  id the univer al c on beyond its ken there arose individual con cious  b e ings  whose states were more or less imperfect copi  s of the  univer l c onsciousness in certain of its f  ct s  Eve n  so  empty  space is  n o w existent beyond the borders of  fi nite observation only as a group of sta  e s i n   the world consciousness  Space is  subjective  belonging to the states of the universal conscious  es s  and yet to us objective  since in thinking it we merely  conform ours  lv to the universal consciou  ness  But the con sequences  our hypoth  sis are number e ss  Enough has been said of th  m for the present purpose  ild and airy indeed But why so  ind Stu  w a s a   worse h  p  thesis  because  wh  n you t  i  d to express all its con s  quenc  b  came unintelligible  The ordinary uncritical Atomism is  worse hy  othesis  because we never get from it  le  st notion of how this eternally existent matter may look feel when nobody sees or feels it  The mystical one substance  with two faces  worse  because that is no hypothesis  o  ly a  heap of words  Schopenhauer s  is worse  because it is  only a metaphor The hypothesis that ascribes to the atoms  dependent life an d  vo  tion is no more  dequate th  n   our hypo  thesi  and much le ss simple  The old fashioned panth  i  ti c  of Schelli  g and of the romantic philosophy generally  is more poetic  than our hypoth  sis  but y et wor e for all that  for n o o n e e v e r com  s to understa n d how t  s One Spirit is 

ated to the many i nd i vidua  min d s  They are parts o  f  him  or else apart from him  In the one case their invincible con fi dence  that they really exist and are not  things in his dream  is  founded the other case his all embracing unity is destroyed In our hypothesis nothing is wonderful but the one miracle of a  series of orderly conscious states  fo  owing through all time  according to  fi xed laws  Beyond that all is clear That there  should be a consciou  ness containing ideas of  material rela  tions  is  n o hard to beli  ve than it is to believe in the ordinary  unintell gible world of at  ms  That beside this consciousness  and in fi xed relation to its facts there should exist a great number of di  rent series of conscious states  each series being called an individua  this is no harder to bel ve than are the ordinary  facts of nervous physiology  In reality this hypothesis gives us  a simple expression easily intel gible  for all the facts and aws of physics  of nervous physiology  and of consciousness  Take  as a  fi na  example  the man looking at the candle  In the  world co n s ciousness there is the group of stat  s  That is the real ca  dl e  In the world conscio  sness there is  so the group o  f   states  That is the cerebra  image  of the candle  a physiological f a ct  Fi n ally  according to the  aws of reality  the existence in the world consciousness  of the facts  grouped as th  y are  has  existent  with it the group of ideas C in the man s mind This group  C corresponds more or less completely to the group  as that group exists beyond the man s  nd in the world con The group C is  man s idea of the can e  Such  is our hypothesis in a nut shell rge for the moment  only this in its favour that it is simple  inte  igib  e  plausible  A f t er all it is but a n h y pothesis  II But of wh at u se   these hypotheses  They are  n o t  philosophy  but at best merely the sca  olding of ph  osophy  Ontology is play  Theory of Knowledge alone is work is the child blowi  g soap  bubbles  Philosophical sis is the miner digging for gold A n d yet not quite that  is ontology  Not all play this occupation of mankind for so  many centuries  Ontology  to speak quite carefully about it  is  n o t philosophy  b u t an education of the  spirit  Had we but the foregoi n g hypothesis to o  e r this article should n e ver have bee n   written have suggested and developed the hypothesis merely that in a pure and somewhat simple form  we might express the  n a ture of human thought about reality  This  n a ture o  f   thought o n c e graspe d  our hy p othesis a b o ut 

R rea  ity will become transformed i  to a philosophical theory of  reality  A dogmatic statement prepares us for a critical a n a lysis  The  fi rst impressi  n of one that has fairly comprehend d the  for going hypothesis as to the nature of reality will that  if  an idealistic hypothesis  t  s one is at all events as ethically  unsatisfactory as the coldest materialism  Of the aims  of the  wi  of the worth of this universal consciousne  s we have bee n  able to say not  ng It was not a Spirit  It was not a product  of human desire  It was the material world imply transformed into ideas  All the cold and deadness of inexplicable eternal law in the succession of phenomena was there  unr l eved by  any trace of an emotional element  It was mind but inhuman in Sc  l e r s  mi n d reca  n g the address to the  f ch d ch ch l i m h ll i b  li c h f  h l This fact is noticed to ward o  ff   the suspicion of any ulterior designs h dden by t  s our hypothesis  The meaning of the  fact may appear before we  fi nish  But now the philosophic  task of testing our hypothesis  Every belief about an x rnal wor d is a n  active assumption or acknowledgment of something more than the data of our con hat is directly given in consciousness is not  external direct data are internal facts  and in the strictest  ense all data are dir ct  Suppose a merely passive acceptance  of what is in consciousness  and you have no belief in an ex ternal world A n   addition to the data of consciousn s  a more  or less clearly voluntary reaction is  ecessary to the idea of  extern reality  The truth o f this principle appears when our b  lief in any particular extern thing is called in question I hold that I see yond r a snowy mountain companion sists that beyo n d the wide misty vall y there is to be seen only  a grey cloud I reassert my belief  and the reass  rtion feel more de fi nitely than at  fi rst the active addition of my own belief  to the meagre data of  ense  The addition existed however in my  fi rst asse  ion Or again one man tryi  g perchanc  in sport  to make anoth  r doubt the exist  nce of  aterial objects  There is no external reality  says the  fi rst  Ther are but  these states of consciousnes  in our minds  Nothi  g beyond them corresponds to them  The second maintai n i ng the posi  tion of the ma n  of common sense  retorts sharply Doubtless  I cannot refute altogether your spun arguments  but they  are neverth  less non ense  F o r I p   rsist in believi  g i n   this  world of sense  live in it  I work for it  my fellows believe i n  it  our hea  s are bou n d up i n  it  our success depe n d s upon our

faith  Only dreame  s doubt it  I am not a dreamer Her is  a sto n e  I hit it  Here is a precipic  I fear and shun it  strongest conviction is concerned with the exi  t  nce of thi  world of sense  Do your worst  I am not afr aid of talk Thus then by every device of the active spirit  by reminding himself of his most ch  ri  hed interests  of his a  ections and hatreds  by arousi  g his social sentiments  by bo  ily acts  the  practical ma n  pre  erves himself from fantastical sp  culation hen better trained thinkers call the belief in an ex ernal reality a natural conviction to be retained until we are com  to abandon it  or a convenient working hypothesis  to  be rec   iv d on the testimony of consciousness  testimony  assumed to be trustwo  hy until the opposite is proven what  are these  similar practical considerations  appeals to the  wi  l Concerning data of immed ate consciousness such  marks would wholly out of place  That I see a certai n  colour at this moment is  n o t a convenient working hypothesis  Is consciousness merely a presumably trustworthy witnes  when it testi fi es to the pang of toothache  Nobody coul d  balance evidence as to the r ality o  f   his sensation sensation when consciousne  s is  fi ll d with the sound of a street organ Sound colour pang these are data  n o t merely things b  lieved i n  But the external world that is actively accepted as b  ing symboli  ed or indicated by the present consciousness  not as  being given i n the present consciousness  In short  every assertion of an external world bei n g an asser tion of somethi n g beyond the present data of consciousness  m ust spri  g from an activity of judgment that does more tha n  me  ely reduce present data to order Such an assertion must  be an active construction of non data  do  n o t receive i n  our senses  but we posit through our j u  ment  whatever ex ternal world there may for us be  All theories  all hypotheses as to the external world ought to  face this ultimate fact of thought  If  istory of popu  r speculation on the  topics could be written how much of  cowardice and shu  fl i ng would be found in the behav our of the  natural i n d before the  timate question How do  t thou  kn o w of an extern a l rea ity  Inst  ad of simply and pl inly  answering I know the extern world only as something that  I accept or demand that I po  it  post  ate  actively construct on the basis of sense  data  the  n a tural man gives us  kinds of  vague compromise answers  I believe in the external reality  ith a reasonable degree of con fi dence  the experience of ma n  k n d r nders the existence of external reality ever more and more probable the Creator cannot have intend d to deceive u s  i t i s u n  n a tura  t o d o u b t a s t o e x  tern a  re  ity  only yo  n g

people and fa n t astic persons doubt the exis  ence of the external world no man in senses doubts the external reality of the  world science would be impos  ible were there no external world morality  undermin d by doubts  to the ext  rn l world the immovabl confi dence that we all have i n   the pri n  of causality i  plies the  of our belief in an external cause of our sensations  here shall these endless turnings  and twistings have a n  end The habits of the law courts  condensed nto rules of evidence  the traditional rules of de  bate  the fashion appeali n g to the  good s  n se  of honourable  g ntlemen opposit  motiv s of shame and fear the dread of  b  ing call d fantastical Ph  l stine de  ire to thi n k with the  ajority  Phi  istine terror of all revolutionary suggestions  the  fright or the anger of a man at  fi nding some metaphysician try  ing to question what seem to be the foundations upon w ch  one  s breadwinn  n g depends  these lesser motives are  p  aled to  and one ultima  e motive is neglected The  ultimate motive is the will to have an extern world hat  ever consciou  ness contains  reason will persist  spon addi  g the thought  But there sha  be something beyond t  s  The b e  ond can never be proven because never v  ri fi ed Veri fi cation is transformation of non data i n t o data  The extern a l reality as suc  the space beyond the  arthest  star any space not accessible  even wha  ever is not at any  moment given in so far as it is viewed f  om that moment  particular every past  vent  is never a datum  But the very  nature of the postulate of external reality both forbids and renders needless the actual veri fi cation co n s truct but do  n o t receive the external reality  Th e  immovable certainty  is not such a dead passive certainty as that with which we  a pain or an electric shock The certainty of an external world is the  fi xed determi n a tion to make one  now and hence  forth  But we make  b e it  n o ticed only when we have material with  which to make  The sense datum at any time suggests what  external reality we sh  l at that moment conceive  But with  out the spontaneity  sens  datum would be no i n d ication to  u s o f an    xternal fact  This bei  g the general truth  there  arises the specia  question so often discussed hat r la  ion does the external r ality bear to the sen e  datum  Do we con this extern rea  ity as being p  imarily the cau  e of our consciou  n ss  or as being primarily the  xternal counterpart of  consciousn s  If the  firs t  the external re  ity  n e ed not  semble consciousn ss  if the second this reality must be con resembling consciou  n s  odern thought seems at  fi rst sight to have decide d  th 

question once for all The ether waves that cause but that do  not resemble colour sensations  the molecular vibrations that  have no like n e ss to the feeling of heat  seem decisive of the  whol matter But if these instances indicate a disposition to  regard external reality as the cause of consciousness  and as  therefore possibly wholly unlike con ciousness  they also equally  indicate a disposition to regard our thought  as de  tined to  op y  more or less perfectly a n  ext  rnal reality  I have a sensation supposed to be caused by the wholly unlike molecular vibra  tion V  But of the external fact V I have an idea  this idea is supposed to resembl the external thi n g is not  the direct cause of  but only of  re  embles  The  resembla n c e o  f  and is that k n ow n  through the postulate of  Doubt  ess the answer wi  be ma d e that the resembla n c e of  and is  n o wn   or believed by means o  f   a course of reasoning that throughout d pends on the postulate of causality  If  some one may say  I assumed no external cause for I should never reach the idea of this cause as being the particular group  of molecular vibrations or of ether waves known to me as V  and conceived b y means o f the idea B ut   on the other hand we may rejoin if I conceived of the external reality solely as the  cause of  not as having any necessary lik ness to any idea  that I might form  how should I ever rend r de fi nite my idea of  the cause of  The ex e r al reality wo  d remain what it was  at the outset  an unknown postulated cause of our conscious  states  No labour would ever make it knowable  At every  step of the process by which I proceed from the sensation to  the de fi ni  e idea  of its cause V  d pend for my progress on the assurance that exter al rea ity is with me  not m  rely as the  unknow n   cause  but as the counterpart of my conscious states  This whole process involves  for example  constant accum  ation classing a n d sifti n g of experiences  Any text  book on Heat  on Optics  on Physiologic  P  ychology  will lustrate suf fi ciently  what is meant  But how is the accumulation of experiences  possible  O  y through constant backward reference in con and so only through constant assumption that present  conceptions are adequat  representatives of past experience  Now we are serious with ourselves  we shall fi nd that tr y  past experiences  of whatever kind are as much truly  xternal facts  when viewed from the present moment  as are the  odium  and hydroge n   in the sun or the buttons on our neighbour s  coat  The past is  n o t a present datum  otherwise it wo  d be past  but present  The past is postulated as an externa  rea  ty  Now this or that past event is indeed a cause of  p rese n t consciousness of some eve n t  b u t  m y co n fi de n c e that 

b e combined wit h   the greatest simplicity of co n c eption The  of consciousness s eems to be to combi n e the greatest rich  n e ss of content with the gr atest  of organisation This character of our activity in for ng our notion of r ality  implies the subordination of the causal postulate to other motives  In the scienti fi c  fi eld the postulate of Causal ty is predomi  ant  b e cause there the notion of a world of u n i form sequences in time an d   in space has b een already po  tulated and what remains  is to  out the picture by discoveri n g the particular sequences  But if I try to banish altogether from my notion of external reality the idea that it is an adequate counterpart of my sub  states of co  sciousness  what will remain Simply the  n o tion o f an utterly unknowable ext  rnal cause of my sensations  Of t  s  n o thing w be said but that it is  Science  experience  serious re fl e ction about reality will utterly cease  I shall have  rem  ining a kind of  eali  m  where the r a  wi  be  a n   unknowable  as unreal as possible  But reintroduce the  omitted p o  tu  ate  admit that reality is conceived as the counter part  consciousness  and then the principle of causa  ity ca n  be  fruitfully applied Then indeed experience  lead us to con the external reality as un ike this or that suggestive s  n sa  tion u  l ke this or that provisional idea  But we sha  be  to new conceptions  and shall be able to mak de fi nite progress  so long as we postu  ate some s o  of  ike n e ss betwee n  inner and outer I n b r ief  as causality means uniform sequence  the acceptance  of any causa  relation as real invo  ves a conception of the uni  form sequence that is to be accepted he n fi na  y accepted the sequence in question is conceived as a real fact  wholly or partially external to present consciousness  but like our present  idea of itself  Causal sequence cannot th  refore b e placed fi rst  as giving us a totally und fi ned notion of an external reality  but s econd as enabling us to develop in d tail the id a that  reality is like our own states of consciousness  Of course to  prove by actual v ri fi cation that the external reality is like our states of consciousne  s  this we can never accomplish  But  from the outset we have seen that veri fi cation is in t  s  ield impossible  The whole of externa  reality  past  present  future  all that is outside of what one now sees and f  el s  all space  time  matter motion l fe beyond this immed ate experience  all that  f o r e a c h o n e a p o   tulate  a demand an assertion never a  datum  never as a whole veri fi able  Sinc  we believe in this  external reality  if exp  rience suggests with suf fi cient force the  idea that some causal sequence is real our post  ate that such  suggestion hav their counterpart in an external world l ads us  to regard t h e concei v e d causal seque n c e a s a n     extern a  ly real

fact  Not however do we  fi r t co n c ei v e of the exter al rea ity  as cause  and then in the  econd place o n  y  fi nd it  be or not  to be  counterpart of present c onsciousn s  All our thinking is based on the postulate that the external reality is a counter part and not merely a cause  If with time  we drop anthropo  morphic conceptions of external real ty  we do so o  y because  in the pre  ence of a larger and fu  ler experi  n c e  we no longer fi nd old conceptions  founded largely on lower forms of emotion and on narrower experience  adequate to our notion of the  external counterpart of con ciousness  For demons and entities  we substitute atoms and therial media  not because we abandon the p ositio n  that external r ality resembles our ideas  but because  ider experience is found to be b  st reduced to u n i ty by the  latter not by the former ideas  The atoms and the media are  themse ves only pro v i  ional notions  since more experience may  be better reduced to u  ity  for we yet know by some other ideas  But through out remai n s the postulate  externa  reality  is somewhat  ike our ideas of its nature  have been betrayed by the doctrine that we have com  bated in o forms of speech that do not adequately express the  Critical notion of reality  h  ste n  to comple  e our conceptio n  by adding the omitted elements  External reality is like our co n c eptions of it so much  we have seen is universa  y postu  ated postu ated be it  n o ticed not directly experienced n o t  forced upon us  f rom without  But the kind of l keness still remains to be de fi ned Can the extern reality b e conceived as  being though in nature like our conscious states  yet i n  no  n ecessary re  atio n   to consciousness  as being neither a conscious  ness  n o r for a consciousness The answer is the whole struggle  of idea  stic thought  the whole progress of p   ilosophical a n a lysis in modern times  O n e cannot go over the  fi eld again and again for ever The state of the controversy can be roughly  stated thus  he n  the  n o tion of external reality is based solely upon the application of the  n o tion of cau  ality  all degrees  of  ikeness or unlikeness between thought and th  gs are assumed according to the t  stes o  f   individual thinkers  External reality  is once for absolved from the condition of being inte  igible  and becomes capable of being anyt  g you please  a dead atom  an e  ectric  fl u id a ghost  a devil an nknowable  But if the sub  ordi n a te character this postulate of causal ty is once under stood the conception reality is altered hat is rea  must b e  not o n ly vaguely correspondent to an ill postulate  but  in a de fi nite relation of like n e ss to my present consciou  ness  That this is the actual postulate of human thought is  hown by  those systems them  e  ves t  at ignore the postulate of likeness  a n d has  b e e n  i  trated i n  the foregoi n g But what  f or m s  d o es 

this postulated likeness take For the  fi rs t  the postulate d  ike  ness betwe  n my idea and the external reality may  a likeness  between my present con cious state and a past or future state of  my own or between this present state and the conscious state of  another being The whole social consciousness implies the  postulate of a likeness betwee n  my ideas and a n  actual conscious  ness externa  to mine  fa  hioned in my own   image  But the  second generally recognised form in which the postulate of the  likeness of internal and external appears  is the form accord ing to which I postulate that a present idea of my own is not  ike one of my own past or future states  not like any actual past or future state in another being of my ow n   kind but like a  possible experience  That our id as can adequately express  possibilities of sensation that are actually  n e ver realised either in ourselves or in any other known creature  this is a familiar postulate of natural science  laws of nature are generally  as is admitted by all what  ewes called ideal tions  expres  ing experiences for us  n e ver realised but per pos  ible  And so extended is the use of the concept  of p ossible experience  that  as we know ill in o n e of his most  interesting chapters  gave permane n t possibility of sensation as an adequate de fi nition of matter Now the positio n   of modern phe n ome n i sm is  that by these  two postulates or forms of the one postulate o  f  ikeness  the  whole  n o tion of e x ternal reality is exhausted The external world means  according to this po sitio n  the  possible a n d actua  present  past  future content of conscious  ness for all beings  And this resu  t of modern phenomenism we  accept  As for the detailed proof  we cannot go over that well beaten battle  here  ore or less purely the position is  maintained by the whole army of moder n   idealists  The positio n  is maintained in and other shorter philosophic essays  less clearly  we think though much  more at length  in the two larger expositions of the  in the Hegelian in chopenhauer s  in Ferrier s  in Shad in S  ill s  in worth Hodgson s  and i n   lesser books innumerable  i n   Prof  Baumann s  in the  fi rst chapter in Prof  i n   Prof  Bergmann s R Not of course that  this multitude of thi  kers  di  erent in method i n  ability  in aim  i n  every  hing but in the fact that they are post  Kantian idealist  would accept the foregoing statement as a f  rly compl te  co  of t h eir d o  tri n  s  So m e o  f  t h e m wou  d  augh at the 

simplicity of our t  rms  But  we maintain in substance they  all agr e about one fundamental truth  that thought  when it inquires into  own meaning can never r st  atis fi d with any idea of external reality that makes such reality other than a datum of consciousness  and so material for thought  ensualism and the most transcendent  speculation agree  in coming at last to  fl e e in ceaseles  unrest from every support  an external reality that may seem to o  r itself beyond the  bounds of con ciou  ness  This phenomenism of post  Kantian speculation we acc  pt  All extern al reality is then postulated as being not merely  like conscious data  but in truth an act  al or a possible datum  of s om e pr sent  pa  t  or future consciousness  But th  re  remains i n  this d fi nition of the postulate still one obscure p oint  hat is meant by possible consciousness  hat can there be  for consciousness beyond the grand total of  actual pa  t and future states of consciousness in all b  ings For what purpo  e  and by what right shall we build a world of possibility above or beside the world of actual experience Th s question seems too  little appreciated and too much evaded by mo  t thinkers  he n ill cal ed matter a  permanent po  sibi  ty of sen ation he  ft room open for the pu  ling question But what is this  creature called a possibi  ty I s it an actu   fact Th en wh at   actual fact If not actual then i n    being a mere possibi ity  matter is non existent  This scholastic character of the ab  tract nou n    possibility  was remarked and criticised by Prof  ller in an article  in III shall not  fi nd in most writers on this subj  c t  less scholastic or better de fi ned terms for naming the same  asp  ct of the postulate of external reality  In fact  we  suppose that one surveys the whole range of actual conscious  ness  past  present  and future  and postulates no facts that  are  n o t for and in consciousness  i t i s   to see what  wi  be the mea n i ng of any added possible reality  Possible  for the  fi rst  is anything that one conceives  i n  so far as one co n  it at all I could possibly have wings and a long tail an hundred eyes  a n d a mountain of gold All that is possible  but  i n  what sense I n   this sense  that I d o actually imagi n e myself  as possessing these th  n gs  Empty possib  ties  or h

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R as o n e wou  d  are  f a cts of co n s ciousness i n  so far forth as they are imagined and they have  n o other existence  The world of truth is not enriched by these possibilities  whose  whole existence is in the actual conscious idea of them  But  not in this sense is matter to be a  permanent possibility of  sensation The icebergs i n  the polar seas are to be real not i n  so far as I now imagine them  but i n   so far as there exists or holds good the law that were I present  I should see them  were  I to touch them I should fee  them  and that both seeing and fee  ing would be determined in c  rtain ways beyond the control of my will The pages of that closed book the bones inside the  body of that cat  my own brain the molec  es of the oxygen that  I am breathi  g all these  in so far as they are not now actually  in any consciousness  are to be still real as  possible experiences  But what ki n d of unreal reality is this potential actua  ity  If we inquire into  motive that leads us t o postu ate these  possible experiences  we shal fi nd it to be at least in part the  e  ort to apply the postulate of u  formity to our confused actual experience  Our actu  experience is not always governed by  obvious laws of regular sequence  But i n  postulating c o n s cious  own immediate data we are  by a certai n  n e ss beyond prejudice i n  favour o  f   unity and simplicity  to postu ate that the  real successions of fact  are uniform  whatever may be the case  with the fragme n t s of r ty that fa  withi n  our i n d ividual e x I see a n   apple fal and no more than that  But I postulate that  I could have had experience of  the facts  I shoul d   have observed a series of materia  changes in the twig on which the apple hung that would have su  ced to restor the  broken uniformity and co n tin ity of my experiences  I n   this  way it is that  as remarked above  the conc  ption of causa  sequence does  n o t create  but orga  ses a n   d perfects our notio n  of external rea  ity  There is something beyond our experience  another experience that is the  fi rst postulate  Experiences  form an uniform and regular whole of laws of sequence  That  is the other post  ate  subordi  ate to the  fi rst  This post  ate  helps to form for us our idea of the materi  world beyond indi  vidu  consciousness an idea that science accepts for its  uniformity  without inquiring f u rther into its nature  w e a  more critical re fl e ction declares that the facts assumed as existent  beyond the range of i n di vi  dua  conscious beings are  possible  experie n c es  If we try to express the nature of this assu  ption of possible  experiences  we must therefore take account of the fact that  they are a  sumed to satisfy the secondary and subordinate postu  late of unifor ity  by  filli n g up the breaks and gaps in the  post  at  d  actua e xperie n c es of ourse  v e s a n d  o  f  our f el ow

bei  gs  They lead us therefore to the conception of one uniform  absolute exp  ri  nce  This absolut  experi  nc e  to  ch  facts would exhibit th  mselves in their conn xion as unifor y  subject to  fi x d law is conceived as possible  But once  again what do  s that m  an Is the meaning only the empty  tautology that if all the gaps and irregularities of in vidual experience were got rid of by means of connecting links and additional experience  these gaps and ir egularities would di  appear Is the meaning o  y th  s  that if there were an ab  olute experience of an absolu  ly regular series of facts  this  expe  ence wo  ld be absolute and uniform  Or again is it  enough to say that any possible exp  rience  a n   iceberg in the  polar sea  my brai n  the inside of yonder bo ok exists for me o  y  as my r presentation Of course  I know of it only what  I conceive of it  yet I postulate that it has some reality beyond my representation This postulate is for us in this  scussion an ltimate fact of which we want to know n o t the just  fi catio n  for ther is none higher than the fact itself of the postulate  but the m eani  g I know of my fel ow only what I conceive of  him  I postulate that my conception of him is like  whereas I do not postulate that my conception of a dragon is  like any real a  imal ust s o I postulate that my conception of  the possible experience call d an atom or the North Pole  is  v a lid beyo n d my experi  n ce  and beyond the actual xperience  of any known a ni  mal But I do  n o t postulate that my  tion of the possibil ty that future  might have wings and ta  s is like any future r a  ity whatever or in any way valid b e yond my conception Here then is our dilemma  atter as a mere possibility  experienc  is more than any a  imal s known actual experience  And yet this matter is to be re  for consciousness  Nor is it  to be real for consciousness simply in so far the possibl ex is repre  ented or conceiv d The reality con ists not  m rely in the representation in present consciousness of a  po  ible experience  but i n   the add d postulate that this con is valid beyond the present consciousness  How is this  postulate to be satis fi ed us sum up the cond tions t o which our notion of external reality is subject  External r ality is something po  tulated not  give n  it is for us because we will it to be  To a portion of our conscious  tates we ascribe a validity beyo  d the present  This  asc  iption of validity is the source of our whole knowledg of  external world of our belief in our own past and future  states  in our nei  hb  ur existence  and in xistence of space  of matter and of motion ext  rnal reality is always con as  m ore or ess completely the co  n t erpart of our idea o  f 

it and hence  as  nature  ke the  f a cts of our consciousness  The idea that we at any moment form of the reality beyond our selves is the expression of  e  ort to reduce to unity  present sense  data and the present conception of our own past  experience  T s reduction to unity takes place in certain forms  Thus we conceive the external reality as i n  space and i n  time  and in the seco n d place  as in causal relation to ourselves  The conception of causal relations thus projected into the  external r ality becom  s  when comp  eted the conception of a  completely united and uniform whole of facts  conceive  the external reality as subj  ct to  fi xed laws of sequence  certainly  existent  even though  in our limited experience  they b e undis  coverable  As subject to such laws the externa  reality is a  whole  possessing o  ganic unity  But the external reality is also  conceived as being real for consciousness and re  only for con The extern reality  being an org nic whole  must  therefore be conceived as the object of an abs  lute experience  to which all facts  known and for which all facts are subject  to u n  versal But there th  s arises an obscurity in our theory of reality  The real is to  only for consciousness  Consciousness is  however postu  ated only as existent in our fellow beings  An d yet   postulated reality is to be an organic whole  containing seri  s of facts that to these beings  are known o  y as  p ossible  not as actual experiences  are then in t  s position To complete our theory  we  want a hero  Not  to be sure  a D o n uan but an hypo  the  ical subject of the  possible experiences  This hypo  thetical subject we shall postu  ate o  y as an hypothesis  That  its existence is not a necessary res  t of the postulate that  there is an external reality  One can form other hypotheses  But this hypothesis h as the advantage of being simple and ade  quate  oreover to assume a consciousness for which the  possible experiences are present facts  is to do no more than our theory seems to need whereas any other hypothe  is  Berkeley s theologic  hypothesis  for exampl in origin form  seems to assum  more than is demanded by our purely  theoretical conception of reality  For the sake then of ex pressing one aspect  our fundamental postulate  we shall suggest what of course  n ever can be proven that all the con possible experiences  are actual in a Consciousness of  which we suppose nothing but that it knows these experiences  or knows facts corresponding in number and in other relations  to these experiences  This Consciousness is the  niversal Con o  f  the  fi rst part of our paper The cold and deadness of this universal Knowing One is thus  expl ined do not endow it with  ife and with will and

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