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Military Revolution in Early Modern Japan a
Matthew Matthew Stavros a
University of Sydney Published online: 31 Oct 2013.
To cite this article: Matthew Stavros (2013) Military Revolution in Early Modern Japan, Japanese Studies, 33:3, 243-261, DOI: 10.1080/10371397.2013.831733 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10371397.2013.831733
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Japanese Studies, Studies, 2013 Vol. 33, No. 3, 243 – 261, 261, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10371397.2013.831733
Military Revolution in Early Modern Japan
MATTHEW STAVROS, University of Sydney
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Military changes that took place in Japan during the late sixteenth century bear a striking resemblance to those in Europe at about the same time. This essay argues that the Roberts thesis of military revolution – widely widely applied to Europe – provides provides a useful framework for identifying a series of cascading developments that, once realized, constituted the fundamental elements of a simila similarr revolu revolutio tion n in early early modern modern Japan. Japan. These These includ included: ed: the almost almost univer universal sal adoptio adoption n of �rearms, �rearms, the development of tactics for the effective deployment of those �rearms, � rearms, and �nally, � nally, a change change in the compos compositio ition n and organi organizati zation on of armies armies leading leading to the profes professio sional nalizat ization ion of warfare. Most important, by revolutionizing the way armies were organized and wars were fought, Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi contributed directly to the emergence of new notions of centralized authority that were critical to the creation of a uni �ed �ed and peaceful early modern state.
The Military Revolution thesis, �rst introduced by Michael Roberts in the 1950s, has had a profound impact on early modern European historiography. As a paradigm, it is now thorou thoroughl ghly y integ integrat rated ed into into the canon canon of Europe European an histor history y as a useful useful rubric rubric for 1 contextualizing key developments of the early modern era. According to Roberts and his intell intellect ectual ual succes successor sors, s, a milita military ry revolu revolutio tion n began began with with the broad broad adopti adoption on of rearms and artiller artillery y by late sixteent sixteenth-cen h-century tury European European armies. armies. This development development �rearms was followed in close succession by an abrupt and substantial transformation in military tactics and strategy, and eventually, signi �cant modi�cations in the design of forti �ed architecture. Infantry replaced cavalry as conscription swelled army sizes. Larger battalions underwent extensive drilling to employ novel tactics devised speci �cally for the deployment of the new weapons. Battle �eld conduct was transformed from what, until then, had been little more than mass or brute warfare. The necessity of well-trained and loyal loyal forces forces led to the creati creation on of profes professi siona onal, l, standi standing ng armies armies whose whose member memberss increasi increasingly ngly shared shared a uni �ed politi political cal identi identity ty center centered ed upon upon a comman commandin ding g king king or prince. According to the Military Revolution thesis, these armies were not merely key elements of the infrastructure of emerging nation-states; their establishment, provisioning, training, and effective deployment contributed directly to the creation of political, economic, and logistical institutions that characterized early modern states. Milita Military ry change changess that that occurr occurred ed in Japan Japan during during the late late sixtee sixteenth nth centur century y bear bear a striking resemblance to those of Europe at about the same time. The Roberts thesis provides provides a useful useful framework framework for identify identifying ing a series series of cascadin cascading g developme developments nts that, 1
Repre Represen sentat tativ ive e liter literatu ature re on the the milita military ry revolu revolutio tion n in Europe Europe includ includes es:: Robert Roberts, s, ‘The Military Military European Warfare, Warfare, 1453 – 1815 1815 ; Black, European Warfare, Warfare, 1660 – 1815 1815 ; Revolution, Revolution, 1560 – 1660 1660’; Black, Black, European Black, European Revolution and Political Political Change; Duffy, Military ry Revolu Revolutio tion n and the State, State, Downing, The Military Revolution Duffy, The Milita 1500 – 1800 1800 ; and Parker, The Military Revolution .
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once realized, constituted the fundamental elements of a military revolution. These were: (1) the almost universal adoption of �rearms; (2) the development of tactics for the effective deployment of those �rearms; (3) a change in the composition and organization of armies due to the development of strategy, and most important, (4) the emergence of centralized political and institutional relationships indicative of the early modern order. During the �nal decades of the sixteenth century, three hegemonic warlords – Oda Nobunaga (1534 – 1582), Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537 – 1598), and Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542 – 1616) – effected a striking degree of military and political consolidation through their magisterial melding of martial prowess and political acumen. Each reaching his apogee in succession, these national ‘uni�ers’ brought an end to an age of protracted warfare and political fracture that had plagued the Japanese archipelago for over a century. Established by Ieyasu in 1603, the Tokugawa shogunate superintended a federation of semi-autonomous domains that remained intact and at peace for over two centuries. 2 This striking political achievement was made possible in large part by the military innovations pioneered by Nobunaga and Hideyoshi. By revolutionizing the way armies were organized and wars fought, they contributed directly to the emergence of new notions of centralized authority that were critical to the creation of a uni �ed and peaceful early modern order. Ieyasu ’s military legacy is no less monumental, but discussion of the third uni �er is limited here because, I would argue, the most critical elements of Japan’s military revolution had already reached some maturity by the time he became hegemon in 1600. The Roberts thesis has been applied to Japan, albeit cursorily, once before in Englishlanguage scholarship. In his ground-breaking book, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500 – 1800 , Geoffrey Parker discussed the success of Nobunaga ’s armies in adapting gunpowder weapons to local conditions. 3 The cover of that volume even features a Japanese screen-painting depicting the fateful Battle of Nagashino (1575), where guns were deployed with striking effectiveness. 4 Parker ’s brief comments on Japan are correct and compelling, yet a detailed examination of the social and political implications of military change on the archipelago was clearly outside the scope of his book. This article explores these implications through a close examination of primary textual and pictorial sources. The aim is to provide, for the �rst time, an accessible narrative of the complex process by which guns changed sixteenthcentury Japanese institutions and, in turn, contributed to the formation of the early modern order. A project of this nature cannot begin without some prefatory comments. First, the emphasis placed on the late sixteenth century can give the impression that military organization and methods of warfare were static prior to this period. They were not. Two fairly recent monographs that treat the topic of early Japanese war and warfare both demonstrate that �ghting rationale, methods, and technology evolved throughout the premodern era.5 In particular, the �fteenth century – especially the several decades following the Onin war ( Onin no ran 1467 – 1477) – saw modest but accelerating trends toward a wider use of foot soldiers, larger armies, better command coordination, and novel weapons and tactics. In this respect, �rearms accelerated antecedent changes in 2
Hideyoshi is credited with having established a federated system, but it was Ieyasu and his successors who solidi�ed that system by placing it under the auspices of an imperially sanctioned shogunate. 3 Parker, The Military Revolution , 140 – 142. 4 Nagashino kassenzu by obu, property of Inuyama-j o hakutei bunko. 5 Conlan, State of War ; Friday, Samurai, Warfare and the State.
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Japan much as they did in Europe, where pike-wielding infantry anticipated �rearmtoting infantry. A second cautionary remark relates to the enterprise of comparative history. The Roberts thesis cannot be applied to Japan uncritically and by no means is this study meant to be speci �cally comparative. Here, it serves merely to provide a framework for mapping a sequence of cascading military changes and exploring how those changes impacted social institutions. Despite striking parallels between Europe and Japan, there were also profound differences. First, to name a few, pre-uni �cation warlords (daimy o) possessed notions of territorial distinctiveness that con �icted with overriding ideas about Japan’s imperial and historic unity in a way that had no European parallel outside, perhaps, the Holy Roman Empire. Second, European mercenary companies were �nancially, organizationally, and socially different from local warrior bands ( bushi-dan) in Japan. Further, Japan’s military revolution, while perhaps more concentrated and dramatic at the outset, lasted an exceptionally short time in comparison to that of Europe. Moreover, when it ran its course, the result was the almost total disarmament of the population and the commencement of a period of peace and stability that, for its length and durability, is perhaps unique in world history. The ‘peace’ of Westphalia can hardly be compared.
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The Proliferation of Firearms According to the standard – potentially apocryphal – historical narrative, �rearms �rst arrived in Japan in 1543 when a Chinese merchant s hip carrying Europeans made an emergency landing at the island of Tanegashima. 6 Until then, Japanese warfare consisted mainly of hand-to-hand combat conducted with swords, spears, and a variety of blunt-edged weapons. 7 A minority of well-trained samurai used bows and arrows. The introduction of �rearms, however, transformed fundamentally the nature of Japanese warfare, and the proliferation of guns was as immediate as it was vigorous. Regional warlords with an eye to using the novel weapons to gain a strategic edge over their rivals stationed buyers at the port-towns of Nagasaki and Hirado in Kyushu to intercept shipments of the new weapons that began arriving with increasing frequency from Europe, primarily via India. 8 They snapped up whatever pieces came in, gladly paying exorbitant premiums. Local blacksmiths were ordered to begin forging their own weapons, but initial technical problems were only remedied after �edgling gunsmiths sought the assistance of European tradesmen. 9 Forging techniques improved rapidly, however, and within a few years numerous workshops throughout Kyushu were producing �intlocks on par with their European counterparts. In time, students of the more famous gunsmiths traveled to
6
The earliest recorded use of gunpowder weapons in Japan dates to the late thirteenth century when continental troops invading Kyushu during the Mongol invasions deployed grenades and other explosive devices. Primary pictorial sources that include images of the grenades can be viewed at http://www. bowdoin.edu/mongol-scrolls / 7 See Friday, Samurai, Warfare, and the State, esp. chapter 3. 8 For more detail on the early introduction of �rearms, see Brown, ‘The Impact of Firearms on Japanese Warfare, 1543 – 98’. 9 Shiritsu Nagahama-jo rekishi hakubutsu-kan, Kunitomo tepp o kaji , 26 – 28.
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FIGURE 1. Map of Japan in the Sixteenth Century.
the main island of Honshu to found workshops and schools as far east as the Kanto region (near contemporary Tokyo). 10 In 1549, Oda Nobunaga placed an order for 500 matchlocks with the gunsmiths of Kunitomo, a leading production center of the day. 11 Nobunaga ’s arch-rival, Takeda Shingen, equipped his fortress at Hitachi with as many as 300 of the weapons in 1555. 12 The following excerpt from a series of orders issued by Shingen in 1571 shows a decisive shift in preference for guns over more traditional weapons:
10
See Hora, Tepp o. From Kunitomo tepp o-ki , quoted in Kuroita, Kuroita Katsumi sensei ibun, 238. 12 Kai no kuni My oh o-ji kiroku, quoted in Tokutomi, Kinsei Nihon kokumin-shi , vol. 1, 103, hereafter abbreviated in the style KNKS , 1:103. The record does not specify the type of guns used.
11
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From now on, guns will be what we need most. From this day forth, you are to choose skilled soldiers and have them carry guns. When mustering the troops, test their � ring [ability] then select them according to their skill. Those not well trained with either the bow or the gun should absolutely not be brought along [into battle].13 Toyotomi Hideyoshi was equally dedicated to the procurement and deployment of �rearms. His insatiable enthusiasm for the new weapons is con �rmed by records detailing his preparations for the subjugation of Kyushu in 1586. 14 In an account from that year, a diarist from the province of Satsuma explained that Hideyoshi ’s army had ‘amassed several thousand guns’.15 In 1590, in what was to be the last of his domestic wars, Hideyoshi mobilized over 250,000 troops to march on H ojo Ujinao’s fort at Odawara. A contemporary record refers to extensive H ojo preparations, including the rigging of three muskets and one cannon at each of the castle ’s parapets.16 Despite this, the document explains, Ujinao continued to be anxious that Hideyoshi might unleash an arsenal of ‘several tens of thousands of guns ’.17 Despite the eventual failure of Hideyoshi ’s brazen and ultimately doomed campaign to subjugate Korea (1592 – 98), early victories on the peninsula were likely due to the overwhelming number of muskets the Japanese forces commanded in the �eld. In preparation for the invasion, Hideyoshi ordered the Shimazu house, lords of S atsuma, to arm 1,500 soldiers with muskets, 1,500 with bows, and 300 with spears. 18 With armies from over ten other provinces having been called up in much the same way, the total number of Japanese gunners might well have exceeded 10,000. In the �rst Korean land con�ict, advanced divisions were met by a Korean force of comparable size, but according to Taiko-ki , ‘the curtain of arrows thrown up by the defenders was wiped out by [Japanese] gun �re’.19 Hideyoshi’s forces captured the Korean capital within 20 days of the initial landing. 20 The priority placed on guns over other weapons during the Korean campaign is apparent in the following requisition for supplies. Sent from the Korean front by Shimazu Yoshihiro to Hishijima Kiinokami, an ally in Satsuma, the note conveys an acute sense of urgency as well as an unmistakable �xation on �rearms:
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Prepare guns and ammunition. We have absolutely no use for spears. It is vital that you arrange somehow to obtain a number of guns. You should see to it that those persons being deployed [to Korea] understand this situation. The arrangements for guns should receive your closest attention. 21 The use of guns was in no way limited to any one particular �ghting class. To the extent that there existed at this time dogmas prescribing the sword as a samurai ’s ‘proper’ weapon, such notions eroded rapidly under the changed circumstances. The 13
Takeda Shingen directive, Genki 2 (1571)/8/?, quoted in KNKS , 10:384. See Kusaka, H ok o ibun, 77 – 113; and Taik o-ki , in Kondo, Shiseki sh uran, vol. 6, ch. 29, 203. 15 From Katsube Hy oemon kikigaki , quoted in KNKS , 5:287. 16 H oj o godaiki , in Kondo, Shiseki sh uran, vol. 5, ch. 26, 60. 17 Ibid., 59. 18 A directive from Hideyoshi to Shimazu, Tensho 19 (1591), in Asakawa, The Documents of Iriki , 332 – 335. 19 Taiko-ki , in Kondo, Shiseki sh uran, vol. 6, ch. 29, 309. 20 For a detailed study of Hideyoshi ’s Korean campaign, see chapter 8 of Berry, Hideyoshi . 21 Letter from Shimazu Yoshihiro to Hishijima Kiinokami, Bunroku 1 (1592)/9/28, in KNKS , 10:380. 14
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following document from 1598 shows how little status mattered when it came to armaments: When troops come from the province of Kai, have them bring as many guns as possible. No other equipment is needed. Give strict orders that everyone, even the samurai, is to carry guns. 22
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The performance of early �rearms left much to be desired. A well-trained archer could discharge ten arrows a minute with reasonable accuracy at ranges of up to 200 meters. In striking contrast, an harquebus could take several minutes to reload and was accurate only up to about 100 meters. Nevertheless, the gun remained attractive because its use required virtually no training. Whereas a few days and a skilled instructor might suf �ce to prepare a team of reasonably good harquebusiers, many years and a whole way of life were needed to produce a competent archer. 23 Eventual re�nements in musket design and construction improved circumstances signi�cantly. Newer weapons could throw a two-ounce lead shot with enough force to penetrate a plate of armor 100 meters away. The � rst phase of Japan’s military revolution, a revolution in weapons technology, was �rmly underway by 1560. The implementation of the new weapons, however, was not a smooth process. In fact, guns presented signi �cant complications to uninitiated armies. They demanded a degree of coordinated deployment entirely foreign to traditional modes of Japanese warfare. New battle methods were needed to realize the full potential of �rearms. This necessity led to the advent of the second phase of Japan ’s military revolution: a revolution in tactics and strategy.
The Emergence of Tactics and Strategy The late sixteenth-century revolution in military tactics and strategy was brought on by efforts to solve persistent and widespread problems experienced by armies deploying �rearms amid old �ghting modes. In Japan, as in Europe, these included: how to combine missile weapons with close action; how to unite hitting-power, mobility, and defensive strength; and �nally, how to minimize casualties resulting from friendly �re. The reforms pioneered by Oda Nobunaga addressed all these issues. He reorganized armies from the unwieldy, brute masses typical of medieval times into tightly arranged, highly coordinated linear units. Nobunaga discovered that smaller units arranged into stacked formations were more capable of deploying multiple weapons simultaneously. 24 By alternating shooting cycles, gunners could maintain a continuous stream of � re for as long as ammunition lasted. This tactic alleviated the problematic ‘loading lag ’ of early muskets while providing a means for advancing troops without occasional pauses. Before the introduction of �rearms, Japanese methods of waging war had remained largely unchanged for centuries. 25 Whether we examine, for example, the battles that 22
Order from Asano Yoshinaga to Asano Nagamasa, Keich o 3 (1598)/1/11, from Asano monjo, quoted in KNKS , 10:379. 23 Parker, The Military Revolution, 17. 24 According to screen paintings of the battle, Nobunaga employed a double-rank gunner formation. This is in contrast to the Dutch volley- �re scheme of six ranks. Parker, The Military Revolution, 19. 25 Methods for waging war might have remained largely unchanged but by no means did military organization, command and technology remain static. See Friday, Samurai, Warfare and the State, esp. chapter 2.
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accompanied the Mongol invasions of the late thirteenth century or the well-documented con�icts of the Hosokawa and Miyoshi families during the mid-sixteenth century, what we �nd is essentially the same: a cluttered and frenzied �ghting mode that apparently lacked centralized command, uni �ed organization, or any signi �cant troop discipline. 26 Larger armies usually consisted of conglomerations of independent bands that allied temporarily for the sake of achieving �nite objectives with pre-determined rewards. These highly autonomous groups rarely comprised more than several dozen people.27 Medieval naval � eets – such as they were – were assembled by commandeering �shing vessels and using them to transport armies to within bow or sword range of enemy vessels. Early battles, whether on land or sea, were merely colossal fencing matches. Immortalized in Tales of the Heike, the following account of the twelfth-century battle at Mizushima between the military houses of Taira and Minamoto captures well the state of pre-�rearms warfare: 4 1 0 2 y r a u r b e F 3 0 7 1 : 4 0 t a ] 0 9 1 . 0 3 . 4 9 1 . 0 8 1 [
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Both sides shouted battle cries, released arrows, and brought up their �eets to attack. Those who were distant made use of bows. Those who were close used swords. Some captured others with rakes, and some suffered capture … Each man fought in his own way. The Taira had lbrought saddled horses in their boats. They rowed to shore, unloaded the horses, sprang onto their backs, and charged with fearsome yells. The Minamoto, with their commander-in-chief dead, �ed desperately in haste.28 Very little collective organization is apparent in this or any accounts of pre-sixteenthcentury Japanese warfare. 29 Things change dramatically, however, with the introduction of �rearms. To be sure, the tactics pioneered to deploy �rearms effectively rapidly rendered former battle methods obsolete. The Battle of Nagashino ( Nagashino no tatakai ), fought between Nobunaga and Takeda Katsuyori in 1575 (and dramatized in the 1980 �lm by Kurosawa Akira, Kagemusha), marked a turning point in the history of Japanese warfare and the advent of the second phase of the military revolution. 30 Accounts of that famed battle capture vividly the nature of Nobunaga ’s tactics and help explain why his side enjoyed a decisive advantage. The following extended excerpt from Shincho koki is representative. Note, in particular, the high degree of troop discipline and strategic organization:
Upon arriving at Nagashino, Lord Nobunaga set up a base at Gokurakuji temple on a mountain in the village of Shitara.
26
Ishii contrasts the independent nature of Japanese soldiers with the apparently collective orderliness of the invading Yüan – Kory o forces in his ‘The Decline of the Kamakura Bafuku’, 138 – 140. Also, see Conlan, In Little Need of Divine Intervention. 27 Takezaki Suenaga, who fought the Mongols during the invasions of 1274 and 1281, was rewarded by the shogunate for ‘being capable of leading �ve men into battle’ (italics mine). Conlan suggests this number was typical for the period. See Conlan, In Little Need of Divine Intervention, 2. 28 Sato, Heike monogatari , dai 8 maki, gekan, 35; McCullough, The Tale of the Heike, 270. 29 See Conlan, ‘The Nature of Warfare in Fourteenth-Century Japan ’ . On battle cries and self-introductions (nanori ), see Friday, Samurai, Warfare and the State, 145. 30 The Battle of Nagashino is also the setting for several Sony Playstation video games, including Koei ’s ‘Kessen III’ and ‘Samurai Warriors ’.
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The village of Shitara was located on land slightly lower than its surroundings. About 30,000 soldiers could take up position there and avoid detection from the enemy army of Takeda. Lord Tokugawa Ieyasu established camp on Mt Takamatsu. Takigawa, Hideyoshi and Niwa made camp at Arumihara. Altogether, the forces allied with Nobunaga were arranged so as to surround the enemy, Takeda Katsuyori. Nobunaga thought, ‘With Takeda so close and backed up against a great river, this �ght is a blessing from heaven. We must destroy them all! ’ Calling Sakai to his side, Nobunaga pulled about 2,000 archers and skilled gunmen from Ieyasu ’s troops. He placed these men in Sakai ’s charge. Just after six o’clock in the morning, troops [of Nobunaga] having reached the top of the mountain raised their �ags and shouted battle cries. Watching the enemy from atop Mt Takamatsu, Nobunaga issued orders not to take action until his signal was given. He then ordered about a hundred infantry gunners into formation so as to receive the approaching enemy.
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In the �rst wave, an enemy general, Yamagata, gave the signal and hit the drum, sending his troops charging forth. They were all either immediately cut down or sent �eeing by gun �re. A second wave of [enemy] infantry troops advanced. Again, in accordance with Nobunaga’s order, �re rained down, forcing more than half to retreat. In the third wave, � ghters from Nishi K ozuke sallied forth. Kant o soldiers tend to be skilled horsemen. They sallied forth, pounding their drums. Here too, Nobunaga ’s gunners remained in formation, well hidden, awaiting the approach. Each wave of �re would bring down more than half the charging enemy. The rest �ed.
In this way, Nobunaga’s troops remained stationary despite the assault, answering each attack with �erce gun�re. The Takeda army was overwhelmed by this [tactic], left with no choice but to retreat.
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The fourth wave came from the forces of Banba Minonokami, again sounding their drums. But again, Nobunaga ’s lines remained tight, answering the assault with gun�re. Most [of the enemy] were cut down. From sunrise until about two o ’clock in the afternoon, �ghting continued in the east-northeast. The Takeda army was wrecked until only a few remained. Finally, the various bands gathered around Katsuyori and �ed…31 The tactics employed at Nagashino departed dramatically from former modes of warfare. Primary pictorial sources such as the ‘Folding Screens of the Nagashino Battle ’ ( Nagashino kassenzu by obu) con�rm that the forces of Nobunaga’s allied army were arranged into tight, linear formations, situated behind stockades. When Takeda ’s men charged, they were cut down by a continuous barrage of gun �re made possible by what appears to have been a well-choreographed regime of volley �re. Evidence suggesting Nobunaga employed volley �re in 1575 is signi �cant when comparing the progression of military innovations in Japan with those of Europe. It is generally accepted that volley �re was �rst employed in Europe by Lord William Louis of Nassau (1538 – 1574) who
31
Translated by the author, from Ota, Shincho k oki , maki 8,
‘Sanshu
Nagashino kassen no koto ’.
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FIGURE 2. Nagashino kassenzu by obu (detail), property of Inuyama-j o hakutei bunko.
drafted his famous ‘countermarch schematic’ in the mid-1590s. That is more than a decade after its earliest deployment (with striking effectiveness) in Japan. 32 What took place at Nagashino was the meeting of old and new �ghting methods during that exceedingly brief historical window between the introduction of � rearms and their almost universal adoption. The troops allied with Takeda took to the �eld intent upon engaging Nobunaga’s men in hand-to-hand combat. While they might have expected an initial round of gun�re, they could not have anticipated the restraint of Nobunaga ’s lines – a critical sign of discipline – or their ability to sustain continuous 32
Parker, The Military Revolution, 19.
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The Takeda army was easily overwhelmed. 33 With Nagashino, the rules of engagement had changed. Warfare and armies were never to be the same. The tactics employed at Nagashino soon became the standard. We see them used by both sides in 1583, for example, when Hideyoshi and Shibata faced off at Shizugatake. Each general entrenched his respective forces and waited for the other to initiate hostilities. Hideyoshi �nally succeeded in provoking one of Shibata ’s more daring deputies to break ranks and attack, a move that triggered the advance of Shibata ’s main lines. In the end, the entire Shibata side was wiped out by the more disciplined troops of Hideyoshi ’s army.34 Historians of Japan tend to cast Hideyoshi as the uni �cation era’s most gifted tactician. Indeed, his campaigns exhibited a degree of strategic aptitude unparalleled by his predecessors and contemporaries alike. Hideyoshi ’s warcraft in general was a methodical science that resulted in consistent victory. But it was in the realm of siege warfare that his military legacy was most outstanding. After the introduction of �rearms and development of defensive tactics, the primary venue of battle shifted from the �eld to the castle. In the rare subsequent cases when armies met on the battle �eld, stubborn adherence to defensive strategies and a general refusal to initiate attack often resulted in stalemates. Castles sprang up throughout the archipelago, but Hideyoshi quickly devised ways to overcome the defenses of these early, rudimentary forti �cations. He pioneered and mastered the art of siegecraft, �rst through the use of heavy artillery, then later through isolation tactics. Early artillery was crude and inef �cient. In order to lob heavy lead shot far enough to be useful, cannon had to be raised onto hills or makeshift turrets or stages to be �red with a downward trajectory. 35 Elevating the weapons mitigated the effects of gravity, but the effort involved spoiled any possibility of a surprise attack. The capture of Kanki castle in 1582 was representative of Hideyoshi ’s employment of elevated bombardment, his �rst and most aggressive form of siege warfare: �re.
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Korezumi Gorozaemon and his soldiers from the province of Wakasa were assigned to the eastern gate of Kanki castle. First, [Lord Hideyoshi] had two high towers erected onto which cannon were mounted. The castle moat was �lled in and arti �cial mounds were made. From these [mounds] the castle was attacked. Takigawa Sagon moved from the southern to the eastern gate where [Hideyoshi] had his laborers erect towers from which the walls and citadel were bombarded with cannon. The citadel caught �re and burned down. 36
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The use of heavy artillery increased with the proliferation of forti �cations. Hideyoshi, for example, in preparation for the campaign on Odawara castle in 1589, requisitioned 20 cannon.37 The defending Hojo prepared similarly. 38 In this particular case, however, con�ict was avoided when Hideyoshi had his forces surround the site, completely
33
According to Ota, Shincho k oki , prior to Nagashino, Nobunaga had commanded troops in over 22 battles or engagements to quell uprisings. In that record, never once had he used a similar tactical deployment before. 34 The textual materials relating to the battle of Shizugatake were compiled during the seventeenth century under the title Shizugatake kassen-ki . See Kondo, Shiseki sh uran, vol. 13, 350 – 355. 35 Such apparatuses included tsukejiro ( 付城) and toride ( 取出, or 砦). See, among others, maki 11 of Ota, Shincho k oki . Also, Asao, ‘16 seiki k ohan no Nihon’, 20. 36 Ota, Shincho k oki , maki 11, ‘Harima Kanji-jo no koto’. 37 KNKS , 6:94. 38 H oj o godaiki , in Kondo, Shiseki sh uran, vol. 5, ch. 26, 60.
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choking off its supply lines. When provisions were exhausted, defenders were forced to capitulate. Isolation, in fact, was the second most common of Hideyoshi ’s siege tactics.39 The fall of Miki castle in 1580 is a grisly example of its effectiveness: Inside the castle, troop rations were low and people were beginning to suffer greatly … Then, all provisions ran out. [They began] killing horses and tearing open mice for food. They had become so weak that in an attempt to mitigate their hunger, they were licking the [plaster] walls. Many [soldiers] lay collapsed at the base of the walls, just below their parapets. 40
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Seventeen days after the siege had begun and without a single shot �red, the defenders began taking their own lives. Hideyoshi employed the isolation tactic frequently, and in almost every case victory was claimed with little or no bloodshed. In light of how often the isolation tactic was used and despite a signi �cant body of documentation suggesting otherwise, it might seem that Hideyoshi preferred bloodless victory over violent confrontation. Consideration of one more new-fangled siege tactic supports this view, illustrating the lengths to which Hideyoshi went to force his opponents to surrender without con�ict. This tactic was the famed mizuzeme, or ‘water assault ’. The water assault was not so much an exercise in strategic genius as it was a striking example of Hideyoshi ’s capacity to command tremendous human and material resources. Similar to the bombardment strategy, water assault involved extensive preparations, including surveys of the local topography and civil engineering projects. The �rst time it was used was in 1582 during the siege of M ori Terumoto’s fortress at Takamatsu in the province of Bitch u (the western part of modern Okayama Prefecture). It was the end of 1581 when Hideyoshi received word of M ori’s rebellion and his subsequent entrenchment at Takamatsu. At the time, Hideyoshi was returning from a campaign in Iwami province where his isolation tactic had forced the submission of the army of Bessho Nagaharu (Tottori castle). According to Taiko-ki , Hideyoshi immediately determined to confront M ori despite his forces being gravely outnumbered. 41 The main keep of Takamatsu castle was located at the center of a marshy basin, surrounded by mountains to the north, east and west. The Ashimori river �owed briskly to the south. The topography made it impossible for Hideyoshi ’s men to approach the site close enough to isolate it effectively and, with inferior numbers, taking M ori by force was inconceivable. A plan was devised to �ood the basin by damming and diverting the �ow of the Ashimori. Kuroda kafu, a �rst-hand textual account, explains:
Examining the character of this castle, its topography is low with nearby mountains on two sides. Because there is a river running through the middle, there was no choice but to dam the river and perform a ‘water assault ’. A dam was built around the castle ’s perimeter of 20,032-span. 42
39
European historians often call this tactic ‘besiegement ’. Ota, Shincho k oki , maki 13, ‘Banshu Miki rakkyo no koto ’ (1580). 41 Hideyoshi was traveling with a reduced �ghting contingent of about 27,000. See Shin Nihon koten bungaku taikei, Taik o-ki , 54 – 55. 42 Kuroda kafu , quoted in Miyamoto, Kenchiku-ka Hideyoshi , 33. 20,032 spans is equal to about 36 square kilometers. I assume, therefore, this �gure is referring to the entire basin in which the castle stood. 40
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When the basin �ooded, the elevated central keep became stranded at the center of an impassable lake. The water assault, therefore, was a variation on the isolation tactic. It was novel, however, in terms of the extent to which it required human and material resources. The author of Taiko-ki notes the tremendous logistical and technical dif �culties involved in damming the fast- �owing Ashimori river. Several architectural historians have speculated as to how the task might have been accomplished. Some describe complex wooden apparatuses attached to stone-laden boats and sunk at either side of the river. Others propose that Hideyoshi may have ordered as many as 2,000 soldiers to wade in the river so as to stem its �ow long enough to construct a dam. 43 No matter which of the several explanations, all agree that the water assault was time- and labor-intensive, and that it required a degree of planning and organization never before seen. The fact that such a strategy was possible is indicative of the extent to which martial leadership had evolved by Hideyoshi ’s time.
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New Armies, New Commands, and New Kinds of Soldiers Guns led to profound changes in the composition and organization of armies. First, cavalry (which had long been in decline) was almost completely displaced by infantry. Japanese horses of the premodern period were small, equivalent in size to the contemporary pony. The average horse had a height of only about 1.5 meters at the shoulder; the smallest stood at a mere meter. 44 The usefulness of such animals on the battle �eld was limited. In 1573, Takeda Shingen ’s army included approximately one cavalryman for every two infantrymen. 45 Two decades later, Hidey oshi ordered the whole of Date Masamune ’s army to be supplied with only 30 horses. 46 The importance of mounted horsemen had clearly waned with the advent of gunpowder warfare. The second major change amounted to a fundamental rethinking of traditional troop formations. First-hand accounts, battle schematics, and pictorial sources from the latter half of the sixteenth century all con�rm the emergence of a new and increasingly uniform formation structure. 47 In general, gunner companies were placed in the front ranks, followed by rows of archers who were backed by spearmen and swordsmen. 48 At the center of the army rode the commanding general on horseback, �anked by his closest retainers and attendants. They, in turn, were surrounded by additional companies of gunners, archers, and spearmen. Ancillary staff, horses, and infantry guards were placed at the rear. By the 1580s, Japanese armies had adopted deployment schemes very similar to those of post-Military Revolution Europe. Long-range weapons were placed in the vanguard where they could initiate hostilities as soon as an enemy came within range. Archers followed the gunners because they could provide support at a somewhat 43
For details on the various problems and suspected solutions to the dam-building project at Takamatsu, see Miyamoto, Kenchiku-ka Hideyoshi , 32 – 33. 44 Hayashida, Nihon zairaiba no keit o ni kansuru kenky u, 109 – 120. Friday, Samurai, Warfare and the State, 97. F. Brinkley wrote in 1902, ‘The Japanese never had a war-horse worthy to be so called. The misshapen ponies which carried them to battle showed qualities of hardiness and endurance, but were so de�cient in stature and massiveness that when mounted by a man in voluminous armour they looked painfully puny.’ Quoted in Cooper, They Came to Japan, 147. 45 K oy o gunkan, in Koji ruien kank okai, Koji ruien, vol. 29, 181 – 182. 46 Date nikki , in Zoku gunsho ruiju kansei-kai, Gunsho ruiju , vol. 13, 1064. 47 Koji ruien kank okai, Koji ruien, vol. 29, 44 – 72. 48 Hideyoshi instructed his generals in the �eld to keep gunners in the vanguard. Directive from Hideyoshi to Kobayashi and others, Bunroku 1 (1592)/12/6, in Kusaka, H oko ibun, 404.
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shorter range. Spearmen and swordsmen were moved to the front only when hand-tohand combat became imminent. On the whole, therefore, armies came to be composed of interrelated units that could be maneuvered to maximize the effectiveness of new weapons and modes of warfare. Thus, military advantage came to lie with armies possessing a strong, centralized command structure capable of coordinating complex strategic maneuvers executed by disparate �ghting units. The development of �rearm tactics had already necessitated stricter army training and drilling which, as discipline and organization in the �eld became increasingly important, contributed to greater command centralization. What occurred, essentially, was a transformation in the way larger armies were led and, more important, a shift from military alliances based upon feudal obligations and promises of direct and immediate rewards, to armies with a shared sense of collectivity, bound together by a uni �ed political identity. Evidence that new notions of authority were emerging comes with the appearance in the late 1580s of two new types of war articles: the jinchu-j omoku, or ‘Troop Register ’, and the jindatesho, or ‘Troop Deployment Schematic ’.49 Both these documents were profoundly different from their medieval counterparts, which in terms of their objectives and assumptions were characteristic of the feudal environment that generated them. Earlier war articles institutionalized conditional and temporary alliances, predicated upon vague ideas of �liality and, more importantly, promises of reward. Furthermore, by their v ery nature they implicitly guaranteed a high degree of autonomy for constituent armies.50 Following the collapse of the Kamakura shogunate in 1333, wars tended mostly to be fought by small troop units, assembled temporarily and often voluntarily. Service had to be requested instead of demanded, ‘armies ’ being little more than aggregate assemblages of individuals. 51 But as the nature of warfare changed with the introduction of �rearms, so too did the nature of wartime alliances and the centralization of command and control. The appearance of the ‘troop registers ’ and ‘troop deployment schematics’ is a dramatic indication of this transformation. The earliest known use of these new documents was in 1584 at the battle of Nagakute where the forces of Maeda, Mori and Ikeda had allied under the command of Hideyoshi to 52 Preparations for war began with �ght the combined armies of Ieyasu and Oda Nobuo. Hideyoshi issuing a ‘troop register’ in which he enumerated the duties expected of each of the several armies under his command. This act unequivocally established Hideyoshi ’s supreme command over the coalition forces while at the same time negating the individual command prerogatives of his allied generals.53 Unlike previous articles of war, which tended to be either requests for military assistance by powerful generals on the one hand or the volunteering of troops by local bands eager for reward on the other, Hideyoshi ’s troop register was a direct requisition of military service, a compulsory enlistment to � ght. Once troops were committed, a ‘troop deployment schematic ’ was drawn up. As its name implies, this document was a highly contrived tactical war plan: an attack schematic which, among other things, took into consideration available forces, weapons, terrain, and enemy resources. The document reproduced in Figure 3 depicts a major
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49
For a full discussion on these two documents, see Miki, ‘ Jindatesho no seiritsu o megutte’. For detailed information on medieval articles of war such as the chakut oj o or the gunchuj o, see Sato, Komonjo ny umon, 242 – 251. 51 For discussion, see Friday, Samurai, Warfare and the State, 53 – 62. 52 There is no evidence daimy o drew up tactical �ghting plans prior to this. Theoretical tacticians did, however, devise highly theoretical plans based on battle accounts in Chinese classical texts. Nagakute is also known as the battle of Komaki-Nagakute. 53 Miki, ‘ Jindatesho no seiritsu o megutte’. 50
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FIGURE 3. Earliest known jindatesho , issued in 1584 by Hideyoshi at the battle of Nagakute. Reproduction published in Toky o teikoku daigaku shiry o hensanjo, Dainihon shiry o, vol. 11, book 6, 377.
contingent of Hideyoshi ’s coalition army deployed at the battle of Nagakute. The forces are illustrated in horizontal formations arrayed between the enemy base at Komaki in the south (top), and the Hideyoshi base at Mount Inu in the north (bottom). Of greatest signi �cance is the way inscriptions show that Hideyoshi juxtaposed soldiers from different origins and deployed them in mixed formations. No longer were troops grouped according to local, historical or familial alliances. This type of schematic, the earliest known of its type, suggests Hideyoshi conceived of his coalition as a uni �ed force in
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which traditional identities, while perhaps still extant, were functionally subordinated to the objectives of the whole. He exercised direct command and expected uni �ed, integrated cooperation. 54 The document also shows, through consideration of which groups were teamed together into single formations, that he was able to ignore (and force others to ignore) historical rivalries. In battles like Nagashino, fought only nine years earlier, the several participating armies took orders from Nobunaga yet maintained physically separate and functionally independent formations. By the time of Nagakute, such battle practices had become outmoded. Greater centralized command had led to the emergence of more uni �ed battalions of allied armies. First Nobunaga ’s, then to a greater extent Hideyoshi ’s, preeminent military and political power enabled and promoted a broad convergence of military identity. No matter what his former af �liations, even the lowest ranking soldier who joined Hideyoshi ’s coalition, for example, was transformed into an integral element of that leader ’s army. Never before, even in the days of strong military oversight by the Kamakura or Muromachi shoguns (thirteenth to �f teenth centuries) had centralized martial prerogative superseded local feudal bonds. 55 What was taking place was a transformation in the very fabric of military identity. Berry equates this change to what occurred in Europe at about the same time: a paradigmatic shift from gemeinschaft to gesellschaft – from the ascendancy of private and privileged corporations (local barons) to the ascendancy of the ‘state’.56 Military historians of Europe often relate the c onsolidation of regional armies and military authority to the origins of national armies. 57 While in early modern Japan the same conclusion cannot be reached precisely because a national army was never created, there are some important parallels. During the uni �cation period, the number of regional hegemons was more than cut in half. Those who remained eventually allied either through physical uni �cation or pacts of non-aggression. Armies of enormous size emerged that were distinct from earlier armies in the way command prerogative resided with a single individual, the shogun or a daimy o warlord. Such was the case with Ieyasu ’s army at the decisive battle of Sekigahara in 1600 and Matsudaira Nobutsuna’s army at the revolt of Shimabara (1637 – 1638). Larger battalions, more centralized commands, and better coordination became hallmarks of early modern Japanese armies. The consolidation and monopolization of martial authority came to �nal fruition through sweeping legislation promulgated by Hideyoshi in 1587. The so-called ‘Peace Orders ’, heiwarei , proscribed regional warlords from using violence as a means of resolving disputes, effectively endowing the hegemon with a monopoly on war. 58 Rights to defend or expand a domain with arms, to resolve quarrels through con �ict, to attack neighbors on the pretext of defending honor – de�ning features of medieval warrior justice – were summarily revoked. This dramatic change, in the view of Nagahara Keiji, eviscerated regional warrior autonomy and, in one breathtaking historical moment, effectively nationalized military authority. 59 After the establishment of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1603, the only justi �able inter-domainal violence was that which took place expressly at the behest of the central military regime itself. Despite
54
Miki emphasizes that the jindatesho signaled a change from ‘individualized ’ Ibid. 55 See Kawai, with Grossberg, ‘Shogun and Shugo’. 56 Berry, ‘Public Space and Private Attachment ’, 238. 57 See Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy , introduction. 58 Fujiki, Toyotomi heiwa-rei to sengoku shakai , 75 – 76. 59 Nagahara, Nihon ch usei no shakai to kokka , 192 – 93, also 245. ‘group’ �ghting.
�ghting
to more uni �ed,
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the relative political autonomy of domains and their inherent military preparedness throughout that period (1603 – 1868), martial force remained the monopolistic prerogative of the ‘state’, a term that, while not parallel to European notions, is frequently applied to the Tokugawa polity. In Japan, as in Europe, such authority – along with a monopoly on foreign affairs, taxes, and control over food supplies – was a hallmark of the early modern state. 60 At the same time the revolution was transforming armies and their command structures, so too was it reshaping the occupation of war. What occurred was the professionalization of �ghting men, the creation of a full-time �ghting class. The ultimate manifestation of this change was Hideyoshi’s passing of legislation in the late 1580s that froze society into four hereditary, hierarchical, and occupation-based status groups: samurai, peasants, artisans, and merchants. 61 Until that time, peasant conscripts who were extracted from villages to �ght, usually during winter months, comprised a considerable portion of Japanese warrior bands ( bushi-dan). As the frequency and intensity of war increased in the late sixteenth century, forced conscription of otherwise noncombatants became increasingly common. While undoubtedly unpleasant for many, military service could be a useful vehicle for social mobility, as is apparent from this 1567 post-battle commendation: ‘The peasant, having served loyally as an inf antry soldier, should be rewarded well. In terms of status, he shall be made a samurai. ’62 Two decades later, a general from the H ojo house demanded all villagers within his domain between the ages of 15 and 70 take up arms and bring to the �ght ‘whatever weapons they had, including bows, spears, or guns ’. After threatening to take the head of any village elder unwilling to cooperate, the document concludes with this promise of reward to those who render loyal service: ‘No matter whether one be a samurai … or a peasant, recompense will be made according to their wishes. ’63 The wording suggests that while by this later date status might have become somewhat less malleable, it clearly did not yet dictate occupation (or vice versa). Hideyoshi ’s status laws, promulgated the following year, changed those circumstances decisively. From then on, peasants were peasants and samurai were samurai. By the end of the century, new weapons, a greater level of military organization, and �nally law, had made war the unambiguous domain of professionals. At about the same time Hideyoshi was articulating the status system, he issued nationwide decrees ordering the con �scation of swords, bows, pikes and guns from all noncombatants.64 Guns in particular were considered the most egregious contraband. Like his counterparts in Europe, Hideyoshi had clearly sought to secure his hegemony by limiting the potential for popular insurrection as well as social climbing through military service. That said, on this particular topic the differences between Europe and Japan are striking and profound. Hideyoshi’s aggressive disarmament campaign, coupled with a proscription on warfare, led to what might accurately be called a military ‘counter revolution’ wherein the dizzying technological and tactical advances of the recent several decades were �rst outlawed, then abandoned entirely. Once having mastered the
60
White, ‘State Growth and Popular Protest in Tokugawa Japan ’, 2; Berry, ‘Public Peace and Private Attachment ’, 245. Read the views of Charles Tilly on the articles of statehood in Ravina, Land and Lordship, 24. 61 On the Tokugawa status system in general see, for example, Asao, Mibun to kakushiki , and Howell, Geographies of Identity in Nineteenth-century Japan. 62 From Kaitei shinhen s osh u komonjo, quoted in Asao, Mibun to kakushiki , 17 – 18. 63 Ibid., 17. 64 On the ‘Sword Hunt’ (katanagari-rei ) of 1588, see Berry, Hideyoshi , 102 – 111.
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production and deployment of guns in battle, Japan essentially gave them up. 65 Such an example of military retrogression is remarkable in world history, if not unique.
Conclusion
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Weapons technology, tactics, and army composition in Japan changed profoundly between about 1580 and 1600. Textual and pictorial sources narrate a series of developments that in a remarkably short period of time altered fundamentally the nature of war and warfare. These developments alone are signi �cant, but the impact of military changes went well beyond matters of �ghting. As was the case in sixteenth-century Europe, these related and often complementary developments had a revolutionary impact on social and political institutions. The introduction of gunpowder weapons necessitated the development of new tactics. These tactics required a high degree of discipline and organization that could only be accomplished by a professionalized �ghting force. Full-time soldiers came to belong to a single, centralized order led by an individual who exercised direct command over vast and complex military, political, and economic institutions. Japan ’s military revolution, like that of Europe, had material and political repercussions that extended well beyond the realm of warfare. To be sure, in terms of the emergence of notions of identity and centralized authority, they contributed directly to the articulation of key elements of Japan ’s early modern order. Acknowledgements This article began life as a brief essay used for teaching at the University of Sydney. Since then, it has undergone signi �cant expansion and countless re �nements, thanks in large part to the input of many bright student readers. Several colleagues have also provided valuable advice, including Olivier Ansart, Elise Tipton and Eddy U. I am grateful to Carolyn Stevens for ushering the �nal manuscript through the anonymous review process and to David Kelly for providing useful suggestions. Thanks are due the University of Tokyo Historiographical Institute and the Hakutei Archives of Inuyama Castle for granting permission to publish images. References Asakawa, Kan’ichi, ed., The Documents of Iriki Illustrative of the Feudal Institutions of Japan . New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1929. Asao Naohiro, ed., Mibun to kakushiki [Status and Prestige] (Japan ’s Early Modernity Series). Ch uo K oronsha, 1992. Asao Naohiro, ‘16 seiki k ohan no Nihon: togo sareta shakai e’ [Japan in the Late Sixteenth Century: Toward a Uni�ed Society], in Iwanami koza Nihon ts ushi vol. 11 (Kinsei 1), 1 – 68. Iwanami Shoten, 1993. Berry, Mary Elizabeth, ‘ Public Peace and Private Attachment: The Goals and Conduct of Power in Early Modern Japan’, Journal of Japanese Studies, 12:2 (1986), 237 – 271. Berry, Mary Elizabeth, Hideyoshi . Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1989. 815 . London: UCL Press, 1994. Black, Jeremy, European Warfare, 1660 –1 Black, Jeremy, ed., European Warfare, 1453– 1815 . New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999.
65
See Perrin, Giving up the Gun. David Howell more recently has shown that hunters and farmers continued to use guns throughout the Tokugawa era. See his ‘The Social Life of Firearms in Tokugawa Japan’.
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Shiritsu Nagahama-jo rekishi hakubutsu-kan, ed., Kunitomo tepp o kaji [Smithing of the Kunitomo Gun]. Nagahama: Shiritsu Nagahama-j o rekishi hakubutsu-kan 1991. Tokutomi Iichiro, ed., Kinsei Nihon kokumin-shi (KNKS) [People’s History of Early Modern Japan], multiple volumes. Min ’y u-sha, 1935. Toky o teikoku daigaku shiry o hensanjo, comp. Dai Nihon shiry o [The Great Historical Records of Japan]. Toky o teikoku daigaku shuppan, 1901 – . White, James W., ‘State Growth and Popular Protest in Tokugawa Japan ’, Journal of Japanese Studies, 14:1 (1988): 1 – 25. Zoku gunsho ruiju kansei-kai, ed. Gunsho ruiju [Collected Documents], 18 vols. Zoku gunsho ruiju kansei-kai, [1932] 1991.
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