G.R. No. 160739
FERIA VS COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 122954. February 15, 2000]
July 17, 2013
ANITA MANGILA, Petitioner, MANGILA, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN
Norberto Feria has been under detention since May 21, 1981, up to present present[1] by reason of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide for the jeepney hold-up and killing of a United States Peace Corps Volunteer.
Anita Mangila, petitioner, was charged with seven of syndicated estafa. The complaint against her arose from recruiting and promising employment to private complainants as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada without lawful authority from POEA.
Some twelve (12) years later, when petitioner sought to be transferred from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa it was then discovered that the entire records of the case, including the copy of the judgment, were missing.
By reason of the charged against petitioner, a warrant of arrest was issued against her. She was arrested and detained at the NBI. She then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA alleging that she is deprived of the remedy of a motion to quash or a motion to recall the warrant of arrest because Judge Pangilinan (Judge who issued the warrant) had already forwarded the entire records of the case to the City Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or recall the warrant. CA denied the petition.
Feria filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process.
[5]praying
RTC, where the case was raffled to, dismissed the petition, on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the release of Mangila from detention? RULING: No. Habeas corpus is unavailing.
CA affirmed RTC.
Habeas corpus is a speedy and effective remedy devised to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. Petitioner’s restraint in this case in NOT unlawful. She had been arrested and detained by virtue of the valid warrant issued for her arrest. The objective of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled, however, is that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record.
ISSUE: Whether the writ of habeas corpus is availing. HELD. NO. The writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. excess.[15] Petitioners claim is anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his constitutional right to due process.
Her proper remedy was to bring the supposed irregularities attending the conduct of the (preliminary investigation) and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the attention of the City Prosecutor for appropriate action.
Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the legal basis for his detention. Having shown the legality of dentention, release from confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court which provides that – “If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to iss ue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment."
1
EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R TIJING v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 125901, 8 March 2001
before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No clinical records, log book or discharge order from the clinic were ever submitted.
FACTS: Petitioners are husband and wife, blessed with six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989. In August 1989, Angelita Diamante went to petitioner’s house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Bienvenida was, at the time, on her way to do some errand, she left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child.
Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years together.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there. Three days after, she found out that Angelita had moved to another place. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.
Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of the child. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days after the birth. Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even private respondent had admitted she is a "commonlaw wife".17 This false entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate.
Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., who was already named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do so.
Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Needless to stress, the trial court's conclusion should be given high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover their son. Trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. ISSUES: Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy?
Lastly, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book, discharge order and the signatures of petitioners.
HELD: YES. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child. It must be stressed too that in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person. A close scrutiny of the records of the case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr. First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips, she admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970,
2
LAGMAN VS MEDIALDEA
Thus, by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows judicial review of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the framers of the 1987 Constitution in effect constitutionalized and reverted to the Lansang doctrine.
RULING II. Whether or not the petitions are the "appropriate proceeding" covered by paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required by the Court. c) Purpose/significance Section 18, Article VII constitutionalize the martial law ruling in In the the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang.
d) Purpose Article VII is safeguard against the President on extraordinary powers.
of is to pre-Marcos Matter of
of Section 18, to provide additional possible abuse by the exercise of the
Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of the Marcos martial law, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise to insert the now third paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII. 99 This is clear from the records of the Constitutional Commission when its members were deliberating on whether the President could proclaim martial law even without the concurrence of Congress.
The third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII was inserted by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to constitutionalize the pre-Marcos martial law ruling of this Court in In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang ,92 to wit: that the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question but precisely within the ambit of judicial review.
To give more teeth to this additional safeguard, the framers of the 1987 Constitution not only placed the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus within the ambit of judicial review, it also relaxed the rule on standing by allowing any citizen to question before this Court the sufficiency of the factual basis of such proclamation or suspension. Moreover, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII veritably conferred upon any citizen a demandable right to challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis of said proclamation or suspension. It further designated this Court as the reviewing tribunal to examine, in an appropriate proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis and to render its decision thereon within a limited period of 30 days from date of filing.
"In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law or constitutional provision, the history of the times out of which it grew and to which it may be rationally supposed to bear some direct relationship, the evils intended to be remedied, and the good to be accomplished are proper subjects of inquiry."93 Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. (Fr. Bernas), a member of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution, explained: The Commander-in-Chief provisions of the 1935 Constitution had enabled President Ferdinand Marcos to impose authoritarian rule on the Philippines from 1972 to 1986. Supreme Court decisions during that period upholding the actions taken by Mr. Marcos made authoritarian rule part of Philippine constitutional jurisprudence.The members of the Constitutional Commission, very much aware of these facts, went about reformulating the Commander-in-Chief powers with a view to dismantling what had been constructed during the authoritarian years. The new formula included revised grounds for the activation of emergency powers, the manner of activating them, the scope of the powers, and review of presidential action.94 (Emphasis supplied)
e) Purpose Article VII is to the powers of the President.
of curtail
Section the extent
18, of
The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment of the extent of the powers of the Commander-inChief. This is the primary reason why the provision was not placed in Article VIII or the Judicial Department but remained under Article VII or the Executive Department.
To recall, the Court held in the 1951 case of Montenegro v. Castaned a95 that the authority to decide whether there is a state of rebellion requiring the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is lodged with the President and his decision thereon is final and conclusive upon the courts. This ruling was reversed in the 1971 case of Lansang where it was held that the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question and is within the ambit of judicial review. 96 However, in 1983, or after the declaration of martial law by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the Court, in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile ,97 abandoned the ruling in Lansang and reverted to Montenegro. According to the Supreme Court, the constitutional power of the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not subject to judicial inquiry.98
During the closing session of the Constitutional Commission's deliberations, President Cecilia Muñoz Palma expressed her sentiments on the 1987 Constitution. She said: The executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines elected by the people for a six-year term with no reelection for the duration of his/her life. While traditional powers inherent in the office of the President are granted, nonetheless for the first time, there are specific provisions which curtail the extent of such powers. Most significant is the power of the Chief Executive to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law. The flagrant abuse of that power of the Commander-in-Chief by Mr. Marcos caused the imposition of martial law for more than eight
3
years and the suspension of the privilege of the writ even after the lifting of martial law in 1981. The new Constitution now provides that those powers can be exercised only in two cases, invasion or rebellion when public safety demands it, only for a period not exceeding 60 days, and reserving to Congress the power to revoke such suspension or proclamation of martial law which congressional action may not be revoked by the President. More importantly, the action of the President is made subject to judicial review, thereby again discarding jurisprudence which render[s] the executive action a political question and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to adjudicate.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.
For the first time, there is a provision that the state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution nor abolish civil courts or legislative assemblies, or vest jurisdiction to military tribunals over civilians, or suspend the privilege of the writ. Please forgive me if, at this point, I state that this constitutional provision vindicates the dissenting opinions I have written during my tenure in the Supreme Court in the martial law cases.101
Considering the above discussion, the Court finds it imperative to reexamine, reconsider, and set aside its pronouncement in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroy o108 to the effect that:
c) Re-examination Court's pronouncement President Macapagal-Arroyo
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the scope of the extraordinary powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief and the review of the said presidential action. In particular, the President's extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and imposing martial law are subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress. The the
judicial power congressional
to power
Fortun
the v.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.109
III. The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is independent of the actions taken by Congress.
a) versus revoke.
of in
xxxx If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the proclamation or suspension within the short time expected of it, then the Court can step in, hear the petitions challenging the President's action, and ascertain if it has a factual basis. x x x110
review to
By the above pronouncement, the Court willingly but unwittingly clipped its own power and surrendered the same to Congress as well as: abdicated from its bounden duty to review. Worse, the Court considered' itself just on stand-by, waiting and willing to act as a substitute in case Congress "defaults." It is an aberration, a stray declaration, which must be rectified and set aside in this proceeding.111
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."106 On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court which does not look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.
We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its power to review. IV. The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration of the President's decision of which among his graduated powers he will avail of in a given situation.
In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.
The President as the Commander-in-Chief wields the extraordinary powers of: a) calling out the armed forces; b) suspending the
4
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and c) declaring martial law.112 These powers may be resorted to only under specified conditions. a) Extraordinary President distinguished.
powers
of
And third, the matter of declaring martial law is already a justiciable question and no longer a political one in that it is subject to judicial review at any point in time. So on that basis, I agree that there is no need for concurrence as a prerequisite to declare martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. x x x135
the
VII. The Scope of the Power to Review. Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign and involves ordinary police action.114 The President may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he power to call is fully discretionary to the President;"115 the only limitations being that he acts within permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of discretion.116 In fact, "the actual use to which the President puts the armed forces is x x x not subject to judicial review."117
a) The scope of the power of review under the 1987 Constitution refers only to the determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus. To recall, the Court, in the case of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang ,160 which was decided under the 1935 Constitution,161 held that it can inquire into, within proper bounds, whether there has been adherence to or compliance with the constitutionally-imposed limitations on the Presidential power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas 162 corpus. "Lansang limited the review function of the Court to a very prudentially narrow test of arbitrariness."163
The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law may be exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety requires it. The 1987 Constitution imposed the following limits in the exercise of these powers: "(1) a time limit of sixty days; (2) review and possible revocation by Congress; [and] (3) review and possible nullification by the Supreme Court."118
Lansang, however, was decided under the 1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution, by providing only for judicial review based on the determination of the sufficiency of the factual bases, has in fact done away with the test of arbitrariness as provided in Lansang.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution eliminated insurrection, and the phrase "imminent danger thereof' as grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law.119 They perceived the phrase "imminent danger" to be "fraught with possibilities of abuse;"120 besides, the calling out power of the President "is sufficient for d) The Constitution not to decision-making President.
framers intended interfere a process
of
the the priori of
b) The basis test".
1987 Congress in the the
"sufficiency
of
factual
Similarly, under the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, the framers of the 1987 Constitution are presumed to know the prevailing jurisprudence at the time they were drafting the Constitution. Thus, the phrase "sufficiency of factual basis" in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be understood as the only test for judicial review of the President's power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, rather it only needs to determine whether the President's decision had sufficient factual bases.
The elimination by the framers of the 1987 Constitution of the requirement of prior concurrence of the Congress in the initial imposition of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus further supports the conclusion that judicial review does not include the calibration of the President's decision of which of his graduated powers will be availed of in a given situation.
We conclude, therefore, that Section 18, Article VII limits the scope of judicial review by the introduction of the "sufficiency of the factual basis" test.
Xxx MR. NATIVIDAD. First and foremost, we agree with the Commissioner's thesis that in the first imposition of martial law there is no need for concurrence of the Members of Congress because the provision says 'in case of actual invasion or rebellion.' If there is actual invasion and rebellion, as Commissioner Crispino de Castro said, there is a need for immediate response because there is an attack. Second, the fact of securing a concurrence may be impractical because the roads might be blocked or barricaded. x x x So the requirement of an initial concurrence of the majority of all Members of the Congress in case of an invasion or rebellion might be impractical as I can see it.
As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only on facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension, which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past
Second, Section 15 states that the Congress may revoke the declaration or lift the suspension.
5
events. As to how far the past events should be from the present depends on the President.
Hence, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in this case. Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and the written report are not enough reasons for the Court to invalidate the declaration and/or suspension as long as there are other facts in the proclamation and the written Report that support the conclusion that there is an actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or suspension.
Past events may be considered as justifications for the declaration and/or suspension as long as these are connected or related to the current situation existing at the time of the declaration. As to what facts must be stated in the proclamation and the written Report is up to the President.165 As Commander-in-Chief, he has sole discretion to determine what to include and what not to include in the proclamation and the written Report taking into account the urgency of the situation as well as national security. He cannot be forced to divulge intelligence reports and confidential information that may prejudice the operations and the safety of the military.
In sum, the Court's power to review is limited to the determination of whether the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had sufficient factual basis. Thus, our review would be limited to an examination on whether the President acted within the bounds set by the Constitution, i.e., whether the facts in his possession prior to and at the time of the declaration or suspension are sufficient for him to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are included in the written report, cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since these happened after the President had already issued the proclamation. If at all, they may be used only as tools, guides or reference in the Court's determination of the sufficiency of factual basis, but not as part or component of the portfolio of the factual basis itself.
VIII. The parameters for determining the sufficiency of the/actual basis/or the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. a) Actual invasion and public safety requirement.
In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and therefore impede the process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate the President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to him within a period that only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate. Such a scenario, of course, would not only place the President in peril but would also defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him, that is, to borrow the words of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun, to "immediately put an end to the root cause of the emergency".166 Possibly, by the time the President is satisfied with the correctness of the facts in his possession, it would be too late in the day as the invasion or rebellion could have already escalated to a level that is hard, if not impossible, to curtail.
or
rebellion,
Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such power."170 Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the President's declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck down. As a general rule, a word used in a statute which has a technical or legal meaning, is construed to have the same technical or legal meaning.171 Since the Constitution did not define the term "rebellion," it must be understood to have the same meaning as the crime of "rebellion" in the Revised Penal Code (RPC).172 b) allowable President.
Probable standard
cause of
is proof
for
the the
In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being committed.176
Besides, the framers of the 1987 Constitution considered intelligence reports of military officers as credible evidence that the President can appraise and to which he can anchor his judgment,167 as appears to be the case here.
To summarize, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.
After all, the Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at hand during the declaration or suspension; subsequent events do not have any bearing insofar as the Court's review is concerned. In any event, safeguards under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution are in place to cover such a situation, e.g., the martial law period is good only for 60 days; Congress may choose to revoke it even immediately after the proclamation is made; and, this Court may investigate the factual background of the declaration.169
IX. There is sufficient factual declaration of martial law and the writ of habeas corpus.
6
basis for the the suspension of
X. Public safety requires the martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao.
declaration the privilege the whole
of of of
G.R. No. 197597, April 08, 2015 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO
There is concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion AND requirement of public safety.
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang.7
XI. Whole of Mindanao Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest.
Valid for all of Mindanao. Executive constitutional prerogative.
g) The Court the confines of its power.
must
stay
within
Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name. There, he explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not have participated in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time.
The Court can only act within the confines of its power.1âwphi1 For the Court to overreach is to infringe upon another's territory. Clearly, the power to determine the scope of territorial application belongs to the President. To reiterate, the Court is not equipped with the competence and logistical machinery to determine the strategical value of other places in the military's efforts to quell the rebellion and restore peace.
He was nevertheless arrested and eventually detained at Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig. On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus 16questioning the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty. 17 He maintained that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang.18
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
In the Resolution19 dated September 21, 2010, the Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making the Writ returnable to the Second Vice Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice).20 Thus, in the Decision dated Octo ber 29, 2010, the trial court granted Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered his immediate release from detention. On appeal37 by the Warden, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's Decision.38 According to the Court of Appeals, Salibo's proper remedy was a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.41
ISSUE: Is the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus availing. RULING:
Yes.
Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally detained.
7
MISON VS JUDGE GALLEGOS (2015)
disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9851,43 to wit:
On 23 December 2013, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) of Seoul, Republic of Korea sent a Notice to Interpol Manila requesting assistance in the location and deportation of respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) for arbitrarily spending money allotted as reserve fund of Phildip Korea Co., Ltd.
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and (d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.44
Hence, Siegfred Mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), for the immediate arrest and deportation of Ku to Korea for being an undesirable alien. Special Prosecutor Maria Antonette Bucasas-Mangrobang charged Ku for being a risk to public interest pursuant to Sec. 69, Act No. 2711. BI officers, with the assistance of the Manila Police District-Warrant and Subpoena Section, arrested Ku. Upon arrival at the BI detention center, Ku was detained. On 17 January 2014, the Republic of Korea voided Ku’s passport.
Guided by the parameters of R.A. No. 9851, we can readily discern that Ku’s circumstance does not come under the statutory definition of an enforced or involuntary disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by agents of the BI, but there was no refusal on the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was there any refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Ku. Neither can it be said that the BI had any intention to remove Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged time.
Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies. Judge Gallegos, in an Order dated 22 January 2014, issued a Writ of Amparo. Also, Judge Gallegos issued the first assailed Order granting the motion for issuance of TPO, entrusting Ku’s custody to the Philippine National Red Cross and/or its Chairman CEO Richard Gordon, and directing the Philippine National Police-Police Security and Protection Group (PNP-PSPG) to protect Ku and his immediate family
More importantly, there was no attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his whereabouts. In the Return of the Writ, petitioner readily disclosed to the trial court that Ku was in the custody of the BI pursuant to a Warrant of Deportation and a Summary Deportation Order.50
ISSUE: Whether the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly granted in the case at bar.
Contents of Petition of AMPARO WRIT: SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. – The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege the following:
RULING: NO.
Nature of WRIT of AMPARO (2007) (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner; (b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation; (c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits; (d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report; (e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and (f) The relief prayed for.
SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are ‘killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or where about s of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law."40
As such, it can readily be discerned that the RTC’s grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo was improper in this case as Ku and his whereabouts were never concealed, and as the alleged threats to his life, liberty and security were unfounded and unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the fundamental function of the writ of amparo is to cause the disclosure of details concerning the extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of an aggrieved party. As Ku and his whereabouts were never hidden, there was no need for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo in the case at bar.
As to what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico42 enumerated the elements constituting "enforced
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RODRIGUEZ VS MACAPAGAL-ARROYO (2015)
In this regard, the Separate Opinion of Justice Conchita CarpioMorales in Rubrico is worth noting, thus:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to confess to his membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo.
That proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or administrative liability should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility. Taking Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo and Razon v. Tagitis in proper context, they do not preclude the application of the doctrine of command responsibility to Amparo cases.
ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo cases (and habeas data cases). This Separate Opinion was reiterated in the recently decided case of Boac v. Cadapan ,[83] likewise penned by Justice Carpio-Morales, wherein this Court ruled:
RULING: YES. The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner.[61] It serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.[63] It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.[64]
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.
Third issue: Command responsibility in amparo proceedings
Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government agency. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo. As we held in Rubrico:
As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any.[81] (Emphasis supplied.)
a. Command Responsibility of the President Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings, it must now be resol ved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.
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To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain:
RULING: NO The Court in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroy o[34] had the occasion to expound on the doctrine of command responsibility and why it has little bearing, if at all, in amparo proceedings:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; b.
the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and
c.
the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof .[84]
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words , the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed .
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. [86] forces,[85]
(Nota Bene) Subsequently, we have clarified that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. Commanders may therefore be impleaded not actually on the basis of command responsibility but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.
On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through circumstantial evidence. [87] In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive knowledge. b. Responsibility and accountability of the former president arroyo
In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court defined responsibility and accountability as these terms are applied to amparo proceedings, as follows:
The next question that must be tackled is whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his abduction. We rule in the negative.
x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability , on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. x x x
BALAO et al vs. GMA (Exec Sec, DND, DILG, AFPCS, PNP Chief etc) G.R. No. 186050 December 13, 2011 FACTS: The siblings of James Balao, and Longid (petitioners), filed with the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in favor of James Balao who was abducted by unidentified armed men in 2008. James M. Balao is a Psychology and Economics graduate of the UPBaguio. In 1984, he was among those who founded the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), a coalition of NGOs working for the cause of indigenous peoples in the Cordillera Region.
According to witnesses’ testimony, James was abducted by unidentified men, saying they were policemen and were arresting him for a drugs case and then made to ride a white van.
(DISPOSITION) 1. Assessing the evidence on record, we find that the participation in any manner of military and police authorities in the abduction of James has not been adequately proven. 2. PGMA immune from suit.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo. RTC granted it ruling as well to deny respondents petition to drop PGMA from among the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether PGMA and the high-ranking officials are liable by virtue of command responsibility.
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