City Sheriff, Iligan City vs. Fortunado Facts: Respondents Fortunado are the owners of a registered parcel of land. It was mortgaged to Traders Commercial Bank by Arsenio Lopez, jr to secure a loan. Consequently, respondents sought the annulment of the real estate mortgage before the Court of First Instance, which granted the same. However, on appeal, it was reversed by the Court of Appeals which held the said mortgage valid. Traders Commercial Bank assigned its rights to petitioner Angel Bautista, who requested the City Sheriff for the foreclosure of the mortgage. Thereafter, respondent filed a complaint for preliminary injunction of the foreclosure because the mortgage was already extinguished by the payment of the loan. It was granted after motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. We gave due course to the petition and required the contending parties to submit their respective Memoranda on August 31, 1988. On January 30, 1995, respondents, through counsel Ramon A. Gonzales, filed a verified Manifestation informing the Court that the subject real estate mortgage has already been released by the Traders Royal Bank on December 23, 1983 as shown in the certified true copy of the Release of Real Estate Mortgage, 7 and that the petitioner was killed in a robbery in his house. 8 Respondents therefore pray for the dismissal of the petition. On February 20, 1995, this Court required petitioner's counsel Atty. Emilio Abrogena to comment on the said Manifestation. However, the copy of the resolution of the Court addressed to Atty. Abrogena was returned unclaimed after three notices, 9 with the postmaster's remark "moved." In view of this development, the Court considered the resolution as served. Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s counsel violates his duties to the court? Ruling: Yes. However, we take notice of the failure of petitioner's lawyer, Atty. Emilio Abrogena, to inform the trial court of the death of petitioner, a duty mandated by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides in part, to wit: Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. — Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of the counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action. xxx xxx xxx Hence, the proper substitution of the deceased in accordance with the aforequoted provisions of Rule 3 could not be effected. We likewise note Atty. Abrogena's failure to inform this Court of his change of address which accounts for his failure to comment on the manifestation of respondents relative to the death of petitioner and the release of the subject real estate mortgage. Atty. Abrogena should bear in mind that a lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. His duties to the court are more significant than those which he owes to his client. His first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his
client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the profession. 12 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for being moot and academic. Atty. Emilio Abrogena, counsel for petitioner, is hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to inform this Court of the death of petitioner and to perform his duty under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. He is further warned that a repetition of such omission in the future will be dealt with severely. SO ORDERED. Occeña vs. Marquez Facts: The gross value of the estate of the late William C. Ogan subject matter of the probate proceeding in Sp. Proc. No. 423 is more than P2 million. Petitioners, Atty. Jesus V. Occeña and Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, are the lawyers for the estate executrix, Mrs. Necitas Ogan Occeña, and they had been representing the said executrix since 1963, defending the estate against claims and protecting the interests of the estate. In order to expedite the settlement of their deceased father's estate, the seven instituted heirs decided to enter into compromise with the claimants, as a result of which the total amount of P220,000.00 in cash was awarded to the claimants, including co-executor Atty. Isabelo V. Binamira, his lawyers and his wife. Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Payment of Attorney’s Fees in the amount of 30,000 pesos. However, the trial court granted as total payment of attorney’s fee the amount of 20,000 pesos. Thus, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with mandamus arguing that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in making the said decision. On the arguments that he had opposed in the lower court petitioners' motion for payment of partial attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00, and that since petitioners Samuel C. Occeña and Jesus V. Occeña are the husband and father-in-law, respectively, of executrix Necitas Ogan Occeña, the latter cannot be expected to oppose petitioners' claims for attorney's fees, thus leaving the co-executor as the lone party to represent and defend the interests of the estate, Atty. I. V. Binamira, who claims to be co-executor of the Ogan estate, filed with this Court on July, 1967, a Motion for Leave to Intervene, which was granted in a resolution of August 9, 1967. Thereafter, Petitioners have filed petitions for indirect contempt of court against intervenor I. V. Binamira charging the latter of having made false averments in this Court. Issue: Whether or not intervenor Binamira is liable for contempt for making false averments? Ruling: “We conclude that intervenor I. V. Binamira has deliberately made false allegations before this Court which tend to impede or obstruct the administration of justice x x x” (See case for false averments) The foregoing are only some of the twenty-one instances cited by petitioners which clearly show that intervenor had deliberately made false allegations in his pleadings. We find no rule of law or of ethics which would justify the conduct of a lawyer in any case, whether civil or criminal, in endeavoring by dishonest means to mislead the court, even if to do so might work to the advantage of his client. The conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness. It is neither candid nor fair for a lawyer to knowingly make false allegations in a judicial
pleading or to misquote the contents of a document, the testimony of a witness, the argument of opposing counsel or the contents of a decision. Before his admission to the practice of law, he took the solemn oath that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor wittingly or willingly promote or sue any false, groundless or unlawful suit, and conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to courts as well as to his clients. We find that Atty. Binamira, in having deliberately made these false allegations in his pleadings, has been recreant to his oath. The charges contained in the counter-petition for indirect contempt of intervenor I. V. Binamira against petitioners have not been substantiated by evidence, and they must, therefore, be dismissed. We note that no further action was taken on the petition for contempt filed by petitioners against Generoso L. Pacquiao, who executed the affidavit attached to intervenor's Answer to Supplemental Petition, the contents of which petitioners claim to be deliberate falsehoods. The said respondent Pacquiao not having been afforded an opportunity to defend himself against the contempt charge, the charge must be dismissed. WHEREFORE, (1) the petition for certiorari is granted, and the court a quo is directed to hold a hearing to determine how much the total attorney's fees petitioners are entitled to, and (2) Atty. Isabelo V. Binamira, who appeared as intervenor in this case, is hereby declared guilty of contempt and sentenced to pay to this Court within ten (10) days from notice hereof a fine in the sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00). Costs against intervenor. Chavez vs. Viola Facts: In 1966, Atty. Viola assisted Felicidad Alvendia et al in filing a petition against Teodoro Chavez where he sought to have the Alvendias be declared as bona fide lessees in a land controversy. Said petition was dismissed because of nonappearance by the Alvendias. In 1977, Atty. Viola assisted same clients in applying for an original registration of title over the same land in controversy in 1966. In said application, Atty. Viola insisted that his clients were the true owners of said land because they acquired it by sale from Teresita Vistan way back in 1929. Chavez then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Viola. Chavez said that because of the conflicting claims that Viola prepared in behalf of his clients, he had willingly aided in and consented to the pursuit, promotion and prosecution of a false and unlawful application for land registration, in violation of his oath of office as a member of the Bar. Source: http://www.uberdigests.info/2012/09/teodoro-chavez-vs-attyescolastico-viola/ Issue: Whether or not Atty. Viola Chavez violated his duties to the Court? Ruling: Yes. It is evident, then, that respondent has knowingly made a false statement to the court in the land registration case. As proven by complaint, respondent has willingly aided and consented in the filing and prosecution of a groundless, if not false, application for land registration, in violation of his oath as a lawyer and member of the bar. 14 It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. 15 One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the administration of justice would gravely suffer if indeed it could proceed at all. It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their first duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all officers of court sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. 16 In the instant case, respondent Viola alleged in an earlier pleading that his clients were merely lessees of the property involved. In his later pleading, he stated that the very same clients were owners of the same property. One of these pleadings must have been false; it matters not which one. What does matter is that respondent, who, as a member of the ancient and learned profession of the law, had sworn to do no falsehood before the courts, did commit one. It was incumbent upon respondent to explain how or why he committed no falsehood in pleading two (2) incompatible things; he offered no explanation, other than that he had not originated but merely continued the registration proceedings when he filed the Amended Application, and that he really believed his clients were entitled to apply for registration of their rights. Respondent’s excuses ring very hollow; we agree with the Solicitor General and the complainant that those excuses do not exculpate the respondent. It is clear to the Court that respondent Viola violated his lawyer’s oath and as well Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which stated that “[t]he conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness” (now Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prescribing that “[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the courts”). He has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. In his apparent zeal to secure the title to the property involved for his clients, he disregarded his overriding duty to the court and to the law itself. WHEREFORE, finding respondent Escolastico R. Viola guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer’s oath and of the Canons of Professional Ethics (now the Code of Professional Responsibility), the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for a period of five (5) months, with a WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of this Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Chan Kian vs. Angsin Facts: Plaintiff Kian filed a civil complaint against defendant. On the other hand, defendant filed a criminal complaint against plaintiff. As a result thereof, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the civil case. Thereafter, the trial court dismissed the civil case on the ground that, under the rules, after a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted. It was appealed by the plaintiff to the Court of Appeals which transmitted the same to the Supreme Court because only question of law was raised. The Court's examination, motu proprio, of the record of said Criminal Case No. 67752 entitled "People vs. Chan Kian" has shown that the principal issue raised on appeal by herein plaintiff-appellant that the lower court erred in issuing the order dismissing his civil complaint against the complainant in the criminal case on its ruling that the trial of the criminal case should take precedence over the civil case, has become moot and academic. This is so because in the meantime long before this case was certified to this
Court by the appellate court on September 19, 1967, the trial of the criminal case had proceeded and terminated with a judgment of conviction rendered on July 9, 1964 by Judge Kapunan of Branch XVIII, which in turn was reversed on appeal by the Court of Appeals as per its decision of June 18, 1965. Issue: Whether or not the lawyers violated their duties to the court when they failed to notify the court about the finality of the criminal case? Ruling: The Court notes with regret that had the counsels, 10 as officers of the courts, but faithfully complied with their duty to deal with the courts in truth and candor, and promptly manifested to the appellate court the above developments, all by June, 1965, which have made the principal issue at bar moot and academic, 11 this case would then have been disposed of and need not have been certified to this Court, and the time needed by it to devote to the prompt disposition of meritorious cases need not have been thus dissipated. 12 At any rate, it is clear that the civil case filed by plaintiff-appellant should merely have been suspended, not dismissed although without prejudice, by the lower court under the Rule invoked by it. 13 Appellee concedes as much, stating that the dismissal without prejudice is in effect a suspension pending the outcome of the criminal case. Now that the criminal case has already been resolved, the lower court's dismissal of the civil case should be set aside and the case accordingly remanded to it. On March 12, 1969, the Court, upon motion of plaintiff-appellant, issued its Resolution authorizing plaintiff "to sell at the best price obtainable, under the supervision of the Clerk of this Court or his representative, the 400 drums of monosodium glutamate subject of this case, now stored in the bodega of the General Packing Corporation, and to deposit with this Court the proceeds of such sale, after deducting the storage fees and other necessary expenses." As per report of the Clerk of Court, this Resolution has not been implemented to date, due according to plaintiff's explanation of December 9, 1971, to the very low price being offered for the article. With the present disposition of this case, this matter has become moot, without prejudice to plaintiff's refiling his motion anew with the lower court. ACCORDINGLY, for the reasons stated hereinabove, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the lower court for proper trial and disposition on the merits. With costs against defendant-appellee. Casals vs. Cusi Facts: Upon the filing on November 2, 1972 of the petition at bar for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the Court as per its resolution of November 9, 1972 resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require respondents to comment thereon within ten days from notice and to issue a temporary restraining order restraining respondent court inter alia from proceeding with the hearing of the case 1 pending before it below. Despite notice and order of the court, Atty. Delante, as counsel for respondents, had repeatedly failed to file the required comment, specifically, he failed three (3) times to file it. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Delante violated his duties to the court?
Ruling: The Court thus finds unsatisfactory Atty. Delante's explanation for his having allowed his extended period to lapse without submitting the required comment nor extending to the Court the courtesy of any explanation or manifestation for his failure to do so. His inaction unduly prevented and delayed for a considerable period the Court's prompt disposition of the petition. Worse, when this was noted and the Court required his explanation, he gave an explanation that is devious and unworthy of belief since it is contradicted by his own previous representations of record as well as by the "supporting" documents submitted by him therewith, as shown hereinabove. Furthermore, notwithstanding the lapse of over six months which he let pass without submitting the required comment which according to his motion of December 28, 1972 was "already prepared" by him and was only to be typed in clean, Atty. Delante in his explanation still brazenly asked the Court for a further period to submit respondents' comment which supposedly had been readied by him for submittal six months ago. His cavalier actions and attitude manifest gross disrespect for the Court's processes and tend to embarrass gravely the administration of justice. In Pajares vs. Abad Santos 2 the Court reminded attorneys that "There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay" and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action." It should also not be necessary to remind attorneys of their solemn oath upon their admission to the Philippine Bar, that they will do no falsehood and conduct themselves as lawyers according to the best of their knowledge and discretion good fidelity to the courts and their clients. The unsatisfactory explanation given by Atty. Delante as against the pleadings of record in the case at bar evinces a willful disregard of his solemn duty as an attorney to employ in the conduct of a case "such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead" the courts "by an artifice or false statement of false statement of fact or law." 3 The Court has ever stressed that a lawyer must do his best to honor his oath, as there would be a great detriment to, if not a failure of the administration of justice if courts could not rely on the submissions and representations made by lawyers in the conduct of a case. As stated by the Court in one case, "Time and time again, lawyers have been admonished to remember that they are officers of the court, and that while they owe their clients the duty of complete fidelity and the utmost diligence, they are likewise held to strict accountability insofar as candor and honesty towards the court is concerned." 4 Hence, the Court has in several instances suspended lawyers from the practice of law for failure to file appellants' briefs in criminal cases despite repeated extensions of time obtained by them, (except to file the missing briefs), with the reminder that "the trust imposed on counsel in accordance not only with the canons of legal ethics but with the soundest traditions of the profession would require fidelity on their part." Considering, however, that counsel's record shows no previous infractions on his part since his admission to the Philippine Bar in 1959, the Court is inclined to act in a spirit of leniency. ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby suspends Atty. Leonido C. Delante from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months effective from his receipt of notice hereof, with the warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. The clerk of court is directed to circularize notice of such suspension to the Court of Appeals and all courts of first instance and other courts of similar rank.
COMELEC vs. Noynay Facts: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to file an information for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code against private respondents Diosdada Amor, a public school principal, and Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan, both public school teachers, for having engaged in partisan political activities. The COMELEC authorized its Regional Director in Region VIII to handle the prosecution of the cases. Forthwith, nine informations for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election were filed with Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Alien, Northern Samar. In an Order 2 issued on 25 August 1997, respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay, as presiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with the appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that pursuant to Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691, 3 the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not exceed six years of imprisonment. In a motion for reconsideration, petitioner’s counsel incorrectly cited a decision of the Supreme Court in support of said motion: “As a matter of fact, the issue on whether the Regional Trial Court has exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses is already a settled issue in the case of Alberto Naldeza -vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996, where the Supreme Court succinctly held:” The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with mandamus.
Also, in this petition, Atty. Balbuena states: 16. This Honorable Supreme Court, in the case of "Alberto -vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr.," 245 SCRA 286 involving the same issue of jurisdiction between the lower courts and Regional Trial Court on election offenses, has ruled, thus: Issue: Whether or not in incorrectly citing a decision of the Supreme Court counsel of petitioner violated his duties to the court? Ruling: Yes. If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known that the correct name of the complainant in the case referred to is neither Alberto Naldeza as indicated in the motion for reconsideration nor Alberto alone as stated in the petition, but ALBERTO NALDOZA. Moreover, the case was not reported in volume 245 of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) as falsely represented in the paragraph 16 of the petition, but in volume 254 of the SCRA. Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and the petition, Atty. Balbuena deliberately made it appear that the quoted portions were findings or rulings, or, put a little differently, our own words. The truth is, the quoted portion is just a part of the memorandum of the Court Administrator quoted in the decision. Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 14 mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.
Montecillo vs. Gica Facts: Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation against Montecillo. The latter was acquitted in Criminal Case No. R-28782, and in Civil Case No. R-13075, the Cebu City Court found that Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid". Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-13075 to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by Hon. Santiago O. Tañada but the Court of First Instance upheld the decision of the City Court. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals by petition for review by petitioner Francisco M. Gica and it was docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 46504-R. The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the Hon. Magno S. Gatmaitan and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr. (promulgated on Sept. 27, 1972), reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu; ruled in favor of petitioner Gica on the ground that the preponderance of evidence favored petitioner Francisco M. Gica on the principle that positive must prevail over the negative evidence, and that "some words must have come from Montecillo's lips that were insulting to Gica". The appellate court concluded that its decision is a vindication of Gica and instead, awarded him five hundred pesos as damages. It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as counsel for Montecillo, he moved for a reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision with a veiled threat by mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and "judgment rendered through negligence", and the innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed itself to be deceived. When the Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration in its Resolution of October 24, 1972, it observed that the terminology of the motion insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an unjust judgment, that it abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished Atty. del Mar to remember that threats and abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant reconsideration. Respondent del Mar persisted and in his second motion for reconsideration, filed without leave of court, made another threat by stating that "with almost all penal violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines, particularly Articles 171, 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of martial law, the next appeal that will he interposed, will be to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines." Issue: Whether or not Atty. Quirico Del Mar by making threats to the Court of Appeals’ Justices violated his duties to the court? Ruling: Yes. To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice. It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude (People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572). As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (In re Sotto 82 Phil. 595).
As We stated before: We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility. ... To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive (Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer G. R. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967; 20 SCRA 441, 444-445) SMRB vs. Cloribel Facts: The case involved two contempt cases, to wit: 1st Contempt case: After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co., the Solicitor General brought to our attention statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar, with the suggestion that disciplinary action be taken against them. On November 21, 1968, this Court issued a show-cause order. The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set forth in the memoranda personally signed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto: a. They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have made these false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur International. Such efforts could be accurately called "scattershot desperation" (Memorandum for Respondents dated March 27, 1968, pp. 13-14, three lines from the bottom of page 13 and first line page 14). b. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum Brief, dated April 13, 1968, p. 16, last two lines on bottom of the page). c. The herein petitioners ... opportunistically change their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum,Ibid., p.17, sixth, seventh and eighth lines from bottom of the page). MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor General points out, contain the following statements: d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). e. ... Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by
vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 — after judgment herein was rendered — and signed by Vicente L. Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala and Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vicepresident of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex partepreliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states "[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case." The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that "unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in favor of "petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision." The "incidents" cited are as follows: (a) said decision is in violation of the law, which law has not been declared unconstitutional. (b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above-entitled case. (c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the right to adduce evidence as is the procedure in all previous cases of this nature. (d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first place when the appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss was and is neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to a wholesome development of the law but — only served to delay respondent for the benefit of the favored party. (e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the status quo but destroyed it, and the conclusion cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for a reason, not for no reason at all. (f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said decision which the Honorable Supreme Court has refused to correct. (g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise in previous decisions, and the main issue "right to reject any or all bids" is being treated on a double standard basis by the Honorable Supreme Court. (h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme Court knows better and has greater understanding than the said decision manifests. (i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred million dollars by said decision — without an effort by the Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the facts through presentation through the trial court, which is elementary.
On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and Graciano Regala and Associates, in writing pointed out to this Court that the statements specified by the Solicitor General were either quoted out of context, could be defended, or were comments legitimate and justifiable. Concern he expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his clients. It was stressed that if MacArthur's attorney could not plead such thoughts, his client would be deprived of due process of law. However, counsel sought to change the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing on line 7, paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion, which in full reads: 6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in contempt of court — seemingly totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved — and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an accused who is also his correspondent in two other cases. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral? Second Contempt Case: A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969, respondent MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised, and contained the following paragraphs: 4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case — which condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court — Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part. — ... . only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..." This requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the member who penned the decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo. xxx xxx xxx 6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and /or to the United States Government, either its executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of law — and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or compensation is made.
This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to show cause within five (5) days from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court." Issue: Whether or not the lawyers in this case violated their duties to the court? Ruling: 1st contempt case: The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are thus called upon to repeat what we have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows: "By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become common place. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.' That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good fidelity ... to the courts.' Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.' " A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." 1 His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice."2 Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people."3 Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."4 It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of his client. A client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients' success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 5 As rightly observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his position, lacks the power to defend himself and it is the attorney, and no other, who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbent of the judicial position. 6 From this, Mr. Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience to the court. It may happen that counsel possesses greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides over the court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and selfrestraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly administration of justice."7 The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the
Rules — against improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice 8 — is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court. 2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze the statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur." He brands such efforts as "scattershot desperation". He describes a proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face", laying bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners." He charges petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before which it is made. It is no excuse to say that these statements were taken out of context. We have analyzed the lines surrounding said statements. They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of offensive language in the pleadings. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession." 9 It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged." 10 Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the accused convicted of murder made use of the following raw language in his brief : "The accused since birth was a poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in his own name. Now, here comes a chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life. A simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and that would transform him into a new man. Once in a small nipa shack, now in a palatial mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth, protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed." We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar and an affront to the court." It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may not be considered offended parties in this case. This Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. There should be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for contempt under the circumstances. For, inherent in courts is the power "[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto." 11 We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties; and that he too has committed, under Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice. He is, therefore, guilty of contempt. 2nd contempt case: We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. The fourth motion for reconsideration is, indeed, an act of contumacy. First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation has been made why this has been done. Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows: "Justices; who may take part. — ... only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..." However, the provision in its entire thought should be read thus — SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. — All matters submitted to the court for its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members of the division of the court at the time when such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether such Justices were or were not present at the date of submission; however, only
those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication, if the parties or either of them, express a desire to that effect in writing filed with the clerk at the date of 12 submission. Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not attempt to explain this point. Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation came about — the portion left out was anyway marked by "XS" which is a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote." While Morton Meads is admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being foisted upon this Court. There was a qualification to the rule quoted and that qualification was intentionally omitted. De Gracia vs. Warden of Makati Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus. He was charged for frustrated homicide, which later amended to a lesser offense of serious physical injuries. To this charge, petitioner pleaded guilty. After serving his sentence, he, however, was not released on the ground the prosecutor opposed it because the victim already died; therefore, making him liable to homicide. With these circumstances, petitioner filed the said petition. The Supreme Court issued a resolution resetting the hearing to another date. Meanwhile, it was manifested by the public respondents that petitioner was already released. On the date of the hearing, petitioner and his counsel failed to appear, but left a manifestation that petitioner was already released, and consequently, the petition is now moot and academic. Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s counsel violated his duties to the court? Ruling: Yes. It would appear, therefore, that with the release of petitioner, the matter had indeed become moot and academic. That disposes of this petition, except for one final note. There was a lapse in judicial propriety by counsel Salvador N. Beltran who did not even take the trouble of appearing in Court on the very day his own petition was reset for hearing, a lapse explicable, it may be assumed, by his comparative inexperience and paucity of practice before this Tribunal. It suffices to call his attention to such failing by way of guidance for his future actuations as a member of the bar. Buenaseda vs. Flavier Facts: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandumas to prevent the Ombudsman from suspending them. The Supreme Court resolved to require respondents to maintain the Status Quo. On September 29, 1992, in a pleading entitled "Omnibus Submission," respondent NCMH Nurses Association submitted its Comment to the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent Supplemental Manifestation. Included in said
pleadings were the motions to hold the lawyers of petitioners in contempt and to disbar them (Rollo, pp. 210-267). Attached to the "Omnibus Submission" as annexes were the orders and pleadings filed in Administrative Case No. OBM-ADM-0-91-1051 against petitioners (Rollo, pp. 268-480). The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of petitioners with: (1) unlawfully advising or otherwise causing or inducing their clients — petitioners Buenaseda, et al., to openly defy, ignore, disregard, disobey or otherwise violate, maliciously evade their preventive suspension by Order of July 7, 1992 of the Ombudsman . . ."; (2) "unlawfully interfering with and obstructing the implementation of the said order (Omnibus Submission, pp. 50-52; Rollo, pp. 259-260); and (3) violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of unprofessional and unethical conduct "by foisting blatant lies, malicious falsehood and outrageous deception" and by committing subornation of perjury, falsification and fabrication in their pleadings (Omnibus Submission, pp. 52-54; Rollo, pp. 261-263). Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s counsel violated their duties to the court? Ruling: The Motion for Contempt, which charges the lawyers of petitioners with unlawfully causing or otherwise inducing their clients to openly defy and disobey the preventive suspension as ordered by the Ombudsman and the Secretary of Health can not prosper (Rollo, pp. 259-261). The Motion should be filed, as in fact such a motion was filed, with the Ombudsman. At any rate, we find that the acts alleged to constitute indirect contempt were legitimate measures taken by said lawyers to question the validity and propriety of the preventive suspension of their clients. On the other hand, we take cognizance of the intemperate language used by counsel for private respondents hurled against petitioners and their counsel (Consolidated: (1) Comment on Private Respondent" "Urgent Motions, etc.; (2) Adoption of OSG's Comment; and (3) Reply to Private Respondent's Comment and Supplemental Comment, pp. 4-5). A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause. The language of a lawyer, both oral or written, must be respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in the profession (Lubiano v. Gordolla, 115 SCRA 459 [1982]). The use of abusive language by counsel against the opposing counsel constitutes at the same time a disrespect to the dignity of the court of justice. Besides, the use of impassioned language in pleadings, more often than not, creates more heat than light. The Motion for Disbarment (Rollo, p. 261) has no place in the instant special civil action, which is confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of procedure for the discipline of members of the bar separate and apart from the present special civil action. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Status quo ordered to be maintained in the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Santos vs. Cruz Facts: In a sworn-letter complaint dated November 16, 1972, addressed to the then Secretary of Justice, the complainant, PrimitivoSantos charged Municipal Judge Arturo E. Cruz of the Municipal Court of Bulacan with partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge for having intervened with and/or prevented the complainant in filing cases in the Municipal Court of Bulacan. 1
The then Secretary of Justice referred to Municipal Judge Arturo E. Cruz the complaint of Primitivo Santos for immediate comment. 2 In his comment dated November 22, 1972, the respondent Judge denied the charges. the transcript of the stenographic notes shows that during the formal investigation conducted on February 9, 1973 6 the respondent judge, while cross-examining the witness, Alberto T. Cano, lost his temper and said: "You can go to hell I don't care or where do you want to go Mr. Cano". Issue: Whether or not respondent judge violated the code of professional responsibility? Ruling: This language of the Judge is unbecoming of a municipal judge and deserves administrative penalty. WHEREFORE, the respondent Judge is hereby EXONERATED of the charge of partiality but is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge by uttering intemperate language during the trial of the case. The respondent judge is hereby imposed a penalty of a fine equivalent to one (1) month salary and warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. People vs. Taneo Facts: Appellant Teofilo Taneo was charged 1 and convicted of the crime of rape and accordingly sentenced by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5 of Cebu City 2 to suffer "the penalty of death" and "to indemnify the offended woman, Mencina Taneo, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, as a deterrent to other fathers from sexually molesting their own daughters; and to pay the costs." 3 On automatic review, appellant assigns as errors the following: I THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESS MENCINA TANEO WHICH IS HIGHLY INCREDIBLE AND CONTRADICTORY. II THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING IN EVIDENCE THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DRA. GEMMA MACACHOR AS CONDUCTED ON THE PERSON OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MENCINA TANEO AND IN INCORRECTLY ADOPTING ITS OWN BIASED INTERPRETATION OF THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHICH CLEARLY IS BEYOND ITS ADJUDICATIVE POWER TO DO SO. Issue: Whether or not counsel of appellant violates his duties to the court? Ruling: Yes. It is unfortunate that counsel for appellant has made a hasty accusation against the trial court for the above pronouncement as "taking a partial and biased position" 17 and having adopted "its own biased interpretation of the physical evidence." 18 We do not find any cogent and valid ground in the records of this case which could justify such a grave imputation upon a member of the bench who merely
performed his function and expressed his observation on the conduct of the examination. Counsel should be reminded of his duty to observe and maintain the respect due the courts of justice and judicial officers. 19 Arguments, written or oral , should be gracious to both the court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another. Urbina vs. Maceren Facts: the verified Joint motion for suspension and/or to declare respondent and Atty. Marcial Esguerra in contempt of court" filed by complainant Gaudencio S. Urbina on December 27, 1973 for allegedly having made through said complainant's former counsel, Atty. Marcial Esguerra, grave threats against complainant's life if he (complainant) did not withdraw his complaints against respondent (a criminal complaint for unjustly rendering judgment; footnote also shows: Complainant-movant Urbina submitted two affidavits executed at Manila on December 14, and December 16, 1973 relating that a person identifying himself as Atty. Esguerra made two telephone threats against him, saying "Mr. Urbina, mag-withdraw ka sa iyong habla laban kay Judge Maceren; kung hindi, ipaliligpit kayo namin," and followed up with a personal visit to his residence saying that "ikaw naman ay hindi siyang talagang kalaban ni Judge, kundi si Atty. Gesmundo; kaya't kailangang-kailangan ni Judge Maceren na magwithdraw ka sa iyong dalawang habla sa kanya: Pag-kinalaban ninyo ang Judge, nanganganib kayo;' but that on all occasions he flatly replied that it was his right to complain and he would not withdraw his complaints.) Respondent did admit that in a chance meeting in the courthouse with Atty. Esguerra, he requested the latter should meet his former client (Urbina) who alone filed the criminal complaint for "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" to inform Urbina that "respondent bears no ill will against him and if he feels aggrieved by the decision why not limit his action to an ordinary appeal to the higher courts as he has already done." Respondent categorically denied having made any threats whatsoever against Urbina, directly or through another, confident as he was (although harassed) that the criminal complaint would ultimately be, as in fact it was, dismissed by the fiscal for being without basis in law and in fact. Respondent further submitted the corroborative affidavit of Atty. Esguerra, stating that he merely telephoned Urbina to suggest that the pending appeal rather than the criminal complaint for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment was his proper recourse against respondent's adverse decision, and unqualifiedly stating that he never made any threats nor went to Urbina's house and that "The statements I allegedly made as stated in the affidavit of Gaudencio Urbina did not come from my lips." Issue: Whether or not respondent judge violates his duties to the court? Ruling: While there are thus conflicting factual averments on the part of complainant and respondent, the Court is satisfied from the factual background of the administrative complaint which it has already dismissed previously for not making out a prima facie case and from the baselessness of the criminal complaint for allegedly "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" which has also been correctly dismissed by the fiscal, that the complainant's charge of threats cannot be sustained, resting as it does flimsily on complainant's bare assertion as against the respondent's categorical denial supported by Atty. Esguerra's affidavit. In the light of ordinary human conduct and experience, it is difficult to give any inherent credence to the complaint for it would have been extremely foolhardy and pointless for respondent to have asked Atty. Esguerra to make the alleged threats against complainant. The Court finds respondent's comment to be satisfactory and will not subject respondent to further needless harassment and distraction if it were to give due course to the complaint-motion, as insisted by complainant in his reply to comment.
It is appropriate to enjoin complainants and members of the bar who file administrative complaints against judges of inferior courts that they should do so after proper circumspection and without the use of disrespectful language and offensive personalities, so as not to unduly burden the Court in the discharge of its function of administrative supervision over inferior court judges and court personnel. The Court has meted the corresponding disciplinary measures against erring judges, including dismissal and suspension where warranted, and welcomes the honest efforts of the bar to assist it in the task. But lawyers should also bear in mind that they owe fidelity to the courts as well as to their clients and that the filing on behalf of disgruntled litigants of unfounded or frivolous charges against inferior court judges and the use of offensive and intemperate language as a means of harassing judges whose decisions have not been to their liking (irrespective of the law and jurisprudence on the matter) will subject them to appropriate disciplinary action as officers of the Court. The Court has consistently held that judges will not be held administratively liable for mere errors of judgment in their rulings or decisions absent a showing of malice or gross ignorance on their part. As stressed by the now Chief Justice in Dizon vs. de Borja, 37 SCRA 46, 52, "(T)o hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position unbearable." Much less can a judge be so held accountable where to all indications, as in this case, his verdict complained of (and now pending review on appeal) is far from erroneous. ACCORDINGLY, complainant Urbina's "joint motion" is denied. Castaneda vs. Ago Facts: Petitioners filed a replevin suit against respondents Ago. A decision was rendered in favor of petitioners. The court where the said suit was filed issued a writ of possession upon finality of the suit, sale to petitioners at a public auction and failure of respondents to redeem the property. However, the execution of the judgment was prevented by respondents when they filed for an annulment of the auction sale of their property. They also applied for a writ of preliminary injunctions. Respondent filed several petitions to prevent the execution of the judgment. The execution of the judgment was prevented for fourteen (14) years. Issue: Whether or not counsel for respondents violated his duties to the court? Ruling: Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court). We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice. 6 Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable. Austria vs. Masaquel Facts: The facts that gave rise to the incident in question are not disputed. Petitioner was one of the plaintiffs in the above-mentioned Civil Case No. 132581 against Pedro Bravo for the recovery of three parcels of land — one parcel being located at Bayambang and two parcels in San Carlos, in the province of Pangasinan. On April 19, 1963, after trial, respondent Judge rendered a decision declaring the plaintiffs the owners of the three parcels of land in question and ordering the defendant to vacate the lands and pay the plaintiffs damages only with respect to the land located at Bayambang. The plaintiffs filed a motion for the immediate execution of the judgment — which motion was granted by respondent Judge on May 31, 1963 — and, upon the plaintiffs' having posted a surety bond in the sum of P2,000.00, the sheriff placed them in possession of the lands located at San Carlos. On May 23, 1963, Atty. Mariano C. Sicat, a former assistant or associate of respondent Judge when the latter was still in the practice of law before his appointment to the bench, entered his appearance as the new counsel for defendant Pedro Bravo, vice Attorney Antonio Resngit. On June 14, 1963, the defendant, through Atty. Sicat, filed a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the judgment, and on June 20, 1963 respondent Judge granted the stay of execution, over the objection of plaintiffs, and ordered the sheriff to restore the possession of the lands in San Carlos to the defendant. The petitioner likewise had asked for the appointment of a receiver over the parcel of land located at Bayambang, which prayer was granted by respondent Judge on July 8, 1963; but upon the filing of a bond by the defendant for the non-appointment of a receiver, the order receivership was set aside. On August 24, 1963, pending the approval of the defendant's amended record on appeal, Atty. Sicat filed a motion for new trial and to set aside the judgment and, over the vigorous objection of plaintiffs, the respondent Judge granted the said motion on November 7, 1963. The hearing on the retrial was finally set for February 10, 1964. Before the opening of the court's session in the morning of February 10, 1964, Atty. Daniel Macaraeg, counsel for petitioner and his co-plaintiffs, saw respondent Judge in his chamber and verbally transmitted to him the request of petitioner that he (the Judge) inhibit himself from further hearing the case upon the ground that the new counsel for the defendant, Atty. Mariano C. Sikat, was his former associate. The respondent Judge, however, rejected the request because, according to him, the reason for the request of his inhibition is not one of the grounds for disqualification of a judge provided for in the Rules of Court. Petitioners were held liable for contempt of court. Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be held liable for contempt of court?
Ruling: Certainly, any person is entitled to his opinion about a judge, whether that opinion is flattering to the judge, or not. It would be different if a person would deliberately and maliciously express an adverse opinion about a judge, without reason, but simply to malign and discredit the judge. In the case now before Us We believe that petitioner did not mean to malign or discredit respondent Judge in answering as he did. It can be said that petitioner was simply moved by a desire to protect his interests in the case pending before the court, presided by respondent Judge. A citizen of this Republic is entitled to expect that our courts of justice are presided by judges who are free from bias and prejudice — and it should not be made a count against the citizen if he so expresses himself truthfully, sincerely, and respectfully. A judge, as a public servant, should not be so thin-skinned or sensitive as to feel hurt or offended if a citizen expresses an honest opinion about him which may not altogether be flattering to him. 10 After all, what matters is that a judge performs his duties in accordance with the dictates of his conscience and the light that God has given him. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties. And a judge should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise. It is worth mentioning here that numerous cases there have been where judges, and even members of this Court, were asked to inhibit themselves from trying, or from participating in the consideration of, a case, but scarcely were the movants punished for contempt even if the grounds upon which they based their motions for disqualification are not among those provided in the rules. It is only when there was direct imputation of bias or prejudice, or a stubborn insistence to disqualify the judge, done in a malicious, arrogant, belligerent and disrespectful manner, that movants were held in contempt of court. 11 And this liberal attitude of the courts is in keeping with the doctrine that "The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail." 12 The power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.13 Wherefore, the order of respondent Judge dated February 10, 1964, in Civil Case No. 13259 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring petitioner in direct contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P50.00, is hereby annulled and set aside; and it is ordered that the sum of P50.00, paid under protest by petitioner as a fine, be refunded to him. No costs. It is so ordered. Martelino vs. Alejandro Facts: This case presents another aspect of the court-martial proceedings against the petitioner, Major Eduardo Martelino, alias Abdul Latif Martelino, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the officers and men under him, for violation of the 94th and 97th Articles of War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor. It appears that at the hearing on August 12, 1969 the petitioner Martelino sought the disqualification of the President of the general court-martial, following the latter's admission that he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident. They allege that the adverse publicity given in the mass media to the Corregidor incident, coupled with the fact that it became an issue against the administration in the 1969 elections, was such as to unduly influence the members of the court-martial. With respect to peremptory challenges, they contend that they are entitled to eleven such challenges, one for each specification.
On August 29, 1969 this Court gave due course to the petition, required the respondents as members of the general court-martial to answer and, in the meantime, restrained them from proceeding with the case. In their answer the respondents assert that despite the publicity which the case had received, no proof has been presented showing that the court-martial's president's fairness and impartiality have been impaired. On the contrary, they claim, the petitioner's own counsel expressed confidence in the "integrity, experience and background" of the members of the court. Issue: Whether or not there is a trial by publicity in this case? Ruling: No. In contrast the spate of publicity in this case before us did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a "massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the accused from massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial 16 either by a failure to control the release of information or to remove the trial to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have subsided. Indeed we cannot say that the trial of the petitioners was being held under circumstances which did not permit the observance of those imperative decencies of procedure which have come to be identified with due process. At all events, even granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the petitioners here do not contend that the respondents have been unduly influenced but simply that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that the suspension of the court-martial proceedings has accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by postponing the trial of the petitioner until calmer times have returned. The atmosphere has since been cleared and the publicity surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated that we believe the trial may now be resumed in tranquility.
