Threedimensional Labrel Case Digests Part 2
CHRIS GARMENTS CORPORATION vs. HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS and CHRIS GARMENTS WORKERS UNION-PTGWO LOCAL CHAPTER No. 832 G.R. No. 167426. January 12, 2009 2009 Facts: Chris Garments Workers Union-PTGWO, Local Chapter No. 832, filed a petition for certification election with the Med-Arbiter seeking to represent petitioner's rank-and-file employees not covered by its Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Chris Garments Corporation-Solidarity of Union in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (SMCGC-SUPER), the certified bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees. Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition that it has an existing CBA from July 1, 1999 to June 30, 2004 with SMCGC-SUPER which bars any petition for certification election prior to the 60-day freedom period. The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition holding that there was no employer-employee relationship since the union itself admitted that its members are agency employees, the petition for certification election will still fail due to the contract bar rule under Article 232. The Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmed the decision of the Med-Arbiter. The union filed another certification election within the period alleged and thus was still denied by the Med Arbiter and affirmed by the Secretary. On June 4, 2004, the union filed a third petition which the Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition on the grounds that no employer-employee relationship exists. The Secretary of Labor and Employment granted the petition. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which was dismissed due to its failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision before filing the petition. A certification election was co nducted on June 21, 2005 among petitioner's rank-and-file employees where SMCGC-SUPER emerged as the winning union.
decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment shall be final and executory after ten days from receipt thereof by the parties and that it shall not be subject of a motion for reconsideration. In this case, the Decision dated January 18, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment was received by petitioner on January 25, 2005. It would have become final and executory on February 4, 2005, the tenth day from petitioner's receipt of the decision. However, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on even date. Clearly, peti tioner availed of the proper remedy since Department Order No. 40-03 explicitly prohibits the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Such motion becomes dispensable and not at all necessary. 2. No. The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new ac tion must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; ( 3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. The judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. The doctrine of "conclusiveness of judgment" provides that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action. Under this doctrine, identity of causes of action is not required but merely identity of issues. There is no identity of causes of action to speak of since in the first petition, the union has no cause of action while in the third, a cause of action already exists for the union as they are now legally allowed to challenge the status of SMCGC-SUPER as exclusive bargaining representative. (kal)
Issues; 1. Whether or not a motion motion for reconsideration is necessary before a party can file a petition for certiorari from the decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. 2. Whether or not the third case is barred by res judicata. Held: 1. No. It is settled that the filing filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself. This rule, however, admits of exceptions, such as when a motion for reconsideration would be useless under the circumstances. Under Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, 19 the
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Threedimensional Labrel Case Digests Part 2
Acedera et al. v. International Container Terminal Services, Inc., NLRC, & CA GR No. 146073, 13 January 2003 Carpio-Morales, J. Facts: Petitioners are employees of private respondent International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) and are officers/members of Associated Port Checkers & Workers Union (APCWU). ICTSI went on a retrenchment program and laid off its on-call employees. This prompted the APCWU to file a notice of strike which included as cause of action not only the retrenchment of the employees but also ICTSI's use of 365 days as divisor in the computation of wages, even if the employees' work week consisted only of five days as agreed upon in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
Petitioners cite the dismissal of the case filed by APCWU, first by the La bor Arbiter, and later by the CA. The dismissal of the case does not, however, by itself show the existence of fraud or collusion or a lack of good faith on the part of APCWU. There must be clear and convincing evidence of fraud or collusion or lack of good faith independently of the dismissal. This petitioners failed to proffer. (lori)
The dispute respecting the retrenchment was resolved by a compromise settlement, while that respecting the computation of wages was referred to the Labor Arbiter. Subsequently, APCWU, on behalf of its members and other employees similarly situated, filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against IC TSI which was dismissed. Petitioners filed with the Labor Arbiter a Complaint-inIntervention with Motion to Intervene, but the same was denied upon finding that they are already well represented by APCWU. The denial of petitioners' intervention was affirmed by the NLRC. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court which referred the petition to the CA. The CA dismissed the petition. Hence, this present petition. Issue: Whether petitioners have a legal right to intervene and pursue the case Held: No. A labor union is one such party authorized to represent its members under Article 242 (a) of the Labor Code which provides that a union may act as the representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining. This authority includes the power to represent its members for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the CBA. While a party acting in a representative capacity, such as a union, may be permitted to intervene in a case, ordinarily, a person whose interests are already represented will not be permitted to do the same except when there is a suggestion of fraud or collusion or that the representative will not act in good faith for the protection of all interests represented by him.
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Threedimensional Labrel Case Digests Part 2
CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL CORPORATION, BENJAMIN CHUA JR., VIRGILIO AGERO, and LEONARDO VISORRO, JR. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CAPASCO UNION OF SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES (CUSE) and ENRIQUE TAMONDONG III G.R. No. 164561. August 30, 2006. FACTS: Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation (CAPASCO), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing steel products. Tomondong was the Assistant to the Personnel Manager for its Cainta.Thereafter, he was promoted to the position of Personnel/Administrative Officer, and later to that of Personnel Superintendent. The supervisory personnel of CAPASCO launched a move to organize a union among their ranks, later known as private respondent CUSE. Private respondent Tamondong actively involved himself in the formation of the union and was even elected as one of its officers after its creation. Consequently, CAPASCO sent a memo to Tamondong requiring him to explain and to discontinue from his union activities, with a warning that a continuance thereof shall adversely affect his employment in the company. Tamondong ignored said warning and made a reply letter invoking his right as a supervisory employee to join and organize a labor union. Thereafter CAPASCO terminated the employment of Tamondong on the ground of loss of trust and confidence, citing his union activities as acts constituting serious disloyalty to the company. Tamondong challenged his dismissal for being illegal and as an act involving unfair labor practice by filing a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practice before the NLRC. Though he admitted his active role in the formation of a union composed of supervisory personnel in the company, he claimed that such was not a valid ground to terminate his employment because it was a legitimate exercise of his constitutionally guaranteed right to self-organization. CAPASCO contended that Tamondong's position as Personnel Superintendent and the functions actually performed by him in the company makes him a managerial employee, thus, under the law he was prohibited from joining a union as well as from being elected as one of its officers. The LA ruled in favor of Tamonding finding CAPASCO guilty of UPL and Illegal dismissal. On appeal, the NLRC only modified the ruling by dismissing the complaints for UPL and Illegal dismissal and also the award for damages but ordered the payment of backwages to Tamondong. Petitioners filed a Motion for Clarification and Partial Reconsideration, while, Tamondong filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said NLRC Decision, but the
NLRC affirmed its original Decision. On petititon, the Court of Appeals granted the nullification of the decision of the NLR. Hence, this present Petition for Certiorari. ISSUE: WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal and UPL? RULING: No.The special civil action for Certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal o ffice is only to keep the in ferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the case, petitioners failed to meet the third requisite for the proper invocation of Petition for Certiorari that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. They simply alleged that the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion which amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the assailed Decision and Resolution. They did not bother to explain why an appeal cannot possibly cure the errors committed by the appellate court. Where the issue or question involves or affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision, and not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision, the sa me is beyond the province of a petition for certiorari. In any event, granting arguendo, that the present petition is proper, still it is dismissible. The Court of Appeals cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in annulling the Decision of the NLRC because the findings of the Court of Appeals that private respondent Tamondong was indeed a supervisory employee and not a managerial employee, thus, eligible to join or participate in the union activities of private respondent CUSE, were supported by evidence on record. Tamondong may have possessed enormous powers and was performing important functions that goes with the position of Personnel Superintendent, nevertheless, there was no clear showing that he is at liberty, by using his own discretion and disposition, to lay down and execute major business and operational policies for and in behalf of CAPASCO. (avril)
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Threedimensional Labrel Case Digests Part 2
S.S. VENTURES INTERNATIONAL, INC. vs. S.S. VENTURES LABOR UNION (SSVLU) G.R. No. 161690
July 23, 2008
VELASCO, JR., J.: Facts: Petitioner S.S. Ventures International Inc is in the business of m a n uf a c t ur i n g s p or t s s h o e s . Respondent S.S. Ventures Labor Union is a labor o r g a n i z a t i o n r e g i s t e r e d w i t h t h e D OLE. On March 21, 2000, the Union filed with DOLE a petition for certification election in behalf of the rank-and-file employees of Ventures. Five hundred forty two signatures, 82 of which belong to 2008 terminated Ventures employees, appeared on the basic documents supporting the petition. OnAugust 21, 2000, Ven tures filed a Petition to cancel the Union's c e r t i f i c a t e o f r e g i s t r a t i o n i nvoking the gro unds set forth in Article 239(a) of the Labor Code. The Union denied committing the imputed acts of fraud or forgery. In its supplemental reply memorandum filed on March 20, 2001, Ventures cited other instances of fr aud and misrepresentation, claiming that t he “affidavits” executed by 82 alleged Union members show that they were deceived into signing paper minutes or were harassed to signing their attendance in the organizational meeting. Ventures added that some employees signed the “affidavits” denying having attended such meeting. In a decision, Regional Director of DOLE-Region III found for Ventures. It resolved to cancel Certificate Registration No. (RO30000-02-UR-0003). Aggrieved, the Union interposed a motion for reconsideration, a recourse which appeared to have been forwarded to the BLR. Although it would later find this motion to have been belatedly filed, the BLR, over the objection of Ventures which filed a Motion to Expunge, gave it due course and treated it as an appeal. Despite Ventures' motion to expunge the appeal, the BLR Director rendered a decision granting the Union's appeal and reversing the decision of Dione. Ventures sought reconsideration for the above decision but was denied by the BLR. Ventures then went to the •
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CA on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The CA dismissed Ventures' petition. Ventures' motion for reconsideration met a similar fate. Hence, this petition for Re vi ew under Rule 45. •
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Issue: Whether or not the inclusion for the 82 employees in the list of attendees to the January 9, 2000 meeting is an internal matter within the ambit of the worker's right to self-organization and outside the sphere of influence of this office and the petitioner
Held: The petition is denied. The right to form, join, or assist a union is specifically protected by Art. XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution and such right, according to Art. III, Sec. 8 of the Constitution and Art. 246 of the Labor Code, shall not be abridged. Once registered with the DOLE, a union is considered a legitimate labor organizat ion endowed with the right and privileges granted by law to such organization. While a certificate of registration confers a union with legitimacy with the concomitant right to participate in or ask for certification election in a bargaining unit, the registration may be canceled or the union may be decertified as the bargaining unit, in which case the union is divested of the status of a legitimate labor organization. Among the grounds for cancellation is the comm ission of any of theactsenumerated in Art. 239(a) of the L abor Code, such as fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the adoption or ratification of the union's constitution and like documents. Whatever misgivings the petitioner may have with regard to the 82 dismissed employees is better addressed in the inclusion-exclusion proceedings during a pre-election conference. The issue surrounding the involvement of the 82 employees is a matter of membership or voter eligibility. It is not a ground to cancel union registration. (eileen)
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Threedimensional Labrel Case Digests Part 2
ATTY. ALLAN S. MONTAÑO, petitioner, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO C. VERCELES, respondent. [G.R. No. 168583. July 26, 2010.] DEL CASTILLO, J p: FACTS: - Atty. Montaño worked as legal assistant of FFW Legal Center. Subsequently, he joined the union of rank-and-file employees, the FFW Staff Association, and eventually became the employees' union president. He was likewise designated officer-in-charge of FFW Legal Center. - During the 21st National Convention and Election of National Officers of FFW, Atty. Montaño was nominated for the position of National Vice-President. The Commission on Election (FFW COMELEC) informed him that he is not qualified for the position as his candidacy violates the 1998 FFW Constitution and By-Laws. Atty. Montaño thus filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration praying that his name be included in the official list of candidates. Election ensued in the National Convention. Despite the pending motion for reconsideration with the FFW COMELEC, and strong opposition and protest of respondent Atty. Ernesto C. Verceles (Atty. Verceles), a delegate to the convention and president of University of the East Employees' Association (UEEA-FFW) which is an affiliate union of FFW, the convention delegates allowed Atty. Montaño's candidacy. He emerged victorious and was proclaimed as the National Vice-President. - Through a letter to the Chairman of FFW COMELEC, Atty. Verceles reiterated his protest over Atty. Montaño's candidacy which he manifested during the plenary session before the holding of the election in the Convention. Atty. Verceles sent a follow-up letter to the President of FFW requesting for immediate action on his protest. - Atty. Verceles, as President of UEEA-FFW and officer of the Governing Board of FFW, filed before the BLR a petition for the nullification of the election of Atty. Montaño as FFW National Vice-President. The BLR rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. While it upheld its jurisdiction over the intra-union dispute case and affirmed, as well, Atty. Verceles' legal personality to institute the action as president of an affiliate union of FFW, the BLR ruled that there were no grounds to hold Atty. Montaño unqualified to run for National Vice-President of FFW. Atty. Verceles filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the BLR. Atty. Verceles thus elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari, arguing that the Convention had no authority under the FFW Constitution and ByLaws to overrule and set aside the FFW COMELEC's Decision rendered pursuant to the latter's power to screen candidates. The CA set aside the BLR's Decision. -Believing that it will be prejudiced by the CA
Decision since its legal existence was put at stake, the FFW Staff Association, through its president, Danilo A. Laserna, sought intervention. The CA issued a Resolution denying both Atty. Montaño's motion for reconsideration and FFW Staff Association's motion for intervention/clarification. Hence, the present petition. -In their brief, petitioner contended the Court of Appeals seriously erred in upholding the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations over the intra-union dispute as well as the collateral attack on the legality of FFW as a legitimate labor organization. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not BLR has jurisdiction over the intra-union dispute (2) Whether or not Atty. Montano can run legally and validly for the said position.. HELD: (1) YES, it has jurisdiction over such. Section 226 of the Labor Code clearly provides that the BLR and the Regional Directors of DOLE have concurrent jurisdiction over inter-union and intra-union disputes. Such disputes include the conduct or nullification of election of union and workers' association officers. There is, thus, no doubt as to the BLR's jurisdiction over the instant dispute involving member-unions of a federation arising from disagreement over the provisions of the federation's constitution and by-laws. TDCAIS We agree with BLR's observation that: Rule XVI lays down the decentralized intra-union dispute settlement mechanism. Section 1 states that any complaint in this regard 'shall be filed in the Regional Office where the union is domiciled.' The concept of domicile in labor relations regulation is equivalent to the place where the union seeks to operate or has established a geographical presence for purposes of collective bargaining or for dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment. The matter of venue becomes problematic when the intra-union dispute involves a federation, because the geographical presence of a federation may encompass more than one administrative region. Pursuant to its authority under Article 226, this Bureau exercises original jurisdiction over intra-union disputes involving federations. It is well-settled that FFW, having local unions all over the country, operates in more than one administrative region. Therefore, this Bureau maintains original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of its constitution and by-laws. (2) NO, he cannot. To begin with, FFW COMELEC is vested with authority and power, under the FFW Constitution and By-Laws, to screen candidates and determine their qualifications and eligibility to run in
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Threedimensional Labrel Case Digests Part 2
the election and to adopt and promulgate rules concerning the conduct of elections. Under the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, the Committee shall have the power to prescribe rules on the qualification and eligibility of candidates and such other rules as may facilitate the orderly conduct of elections. The Committee is also regarded as the final arbiter of all election protests. From the foregoing, FFW COMELEC, undeniably, has sufficient authority to adopt its own interpretation of the explicit provisions of the federation's constitution and by-laws and unless it is shown to have committed grave abuse of discretion, its decision and ruling will not be interfered with. The FFW Constitution and By-laws are clear that no member of the Governing Board shall at the same time perform functions of the rank-and-file staff. The BLR erred in disregarding this clear provision. The FFW COMELEC's ruling which considered Atty. Montaño's candidacy in violation of the FFW Constitution is therefore correct. We, thus, concur with the CA that Atty. Montaño is not qualified to run for the position but not for failure to meet the requirement specified under Section 26 (d) of Article VIII of FFW Constitution and By-Laws. We note that the CA's declaration of the illegitimate status of FFW Staff Association is proscribed by law, owing to the preclusion of collateral attack. We nonetheless resolve to affirm the CA's finding that Atty. Montaño is disqualified to run for the position of National VicePresident in view of the proscription in the FFW Constitution and By-Laws on federation employees from sitting in its Governing Board. Accordingly, the election of Atty. Montaño as FFW Vice-President is null and void. (badz)
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