Labor Relations Digest 20151221 (67-72)

67 |L A B O R R E L A T I O N S | B O O K V | A r t i c l e 2 2 0 - 2 2 3 : R u l e s o f P r o c e d u r e

Pre p a re d b y: B U E N AVE N T U RA , JAM E S A N D R E W A.

G.R. No. 77042-43 February 28, 1990

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Rules of Procedure: Case No. 7

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE CO., INC., et al., Petitioners vs. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK AND COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. FACTS: Radiowealth, Inc. (RWI) and Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. (RFC) applied for and obtained credit facilities from International Corporate Bank (Interbank). Petitioners Domingo Guevara (Guevara) and D.M.G., Inc., acted as sureties to the obligations contracted by RWI and RFC. The obligations of petitioners were accordingly covered and evidenced by promissory notes, trust receipts and agreements. From 1978 to 1980, petitioners were not able to comply with their obligations on time with Interbank due to subsequent severe economic and financial reverses. Interbank, constrained to seek judicial remedy, through its counsel, lodged before the CFI for collection of sum of money with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment against RWI and Guevara plus penalties, service charges, interests, attorney's fees, costs and exemplary damage. This was followed by another complaint before the same trial court against RFC, RWI and D.M.G., Inc., also with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Petitioners, however, opted to amicably settle their obligations promptly. They, therefore, did not file any answer nor any responsive pleading to the complaints, and instead entered into a compromise agreement with Interbank. Said compromise agreement between the parties was embodied in two Motions for Judgment Based on Compromise corresponding to the separate claims in the said two complaints which were accordingly submitted to the court a quo for approval. These motions did not however, cover the payment by the petitioners of Interbank's claims for attorney's fees, costs of collection and expenses of litigation which were left open by the parties for further negotiations. The trial court approved the parties' corresponding compromise agreement thereto, with the reservation that the decision does not terminate this case because matters respecting payment of attorney's fees, costs and collection. Further proceedings were conducted by the trial court particularly on the issue of the alleged unreasonableness and unconscionableness of the attorney's fees. It appears from the records of the cases, however, that Atty. Quisumbing, counsel for Interbank, was able to adduce his evidence in support for the attorney's fees due to his said client, while Attys. Reyes and Guevara, counsel for petitioners in the trial court, were not given their request for further hearing against the claimed attorney's fees despite some supervening events as alleged in their motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The trial court reduced Interbank's claim for attorney's fees, from the stipulated 10 % to 8 %. Not satisfied with said trial court's order, petitioners appealed the same before the respondent appellate court. The respondent appellate court, however, affirmed in toto the assailed order of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not the court has discretion to modify the attorney's fees previously agreed upon by the parties under a valid contractual stipulation. RULING: The high standards of the legal profession as prescribed by law and the Canons of Professional Ethics regulate if not limit the lawyer's freedom in fixing his professional fees. The moment he takes his oath, ready to undertake his duties first, as a practitioner in the exercise of his profession, and second,



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as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, the lawyer submits himself to the authority of the court. It becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to determine the reasonableness or the unconscionable character of attorney's fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts. The Court has consistently ruled that even with the presence of an agreement between the parties, the court may nevertheless reduce attorney's fees though fixed in the contract when the amount thereof appears to be unconscionable or unreasonable. For the law recognizes the validity of stipulations included in documents such as negotiable instruments and mortgages with respect to attorney's fees in the form of penalty provided that they are not unreasonable or unconscionable.



G.R. No. 81471 April 26, 1989

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CHONG GUAN TRADING, Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JOSE M. CHUA, Respondents. FACTS: AJose M. Chua was employed as sales manager of Chong Guan Trading, a dealer of paper and paper products owned by Mariano, Pepito and Efren Lim. Private respondent started working with the petitioner way back in 1960 but it was only in 1972 that his name was registered by petitioner with the Social Security System. In November 1983, private respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the Labor Arbiter of the National Capital Region charging petitioner with illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay and other benefits provided for by law. The parties filed their respective position papers and agreed to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings. On April 18,1984, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding that there was no illegal dismissal since private respondent was never dismissed by petitioner. No pronouncement on the issue of the alleged abandonment by private respondent was made but the Labor Arbiter ordered the reinstatement of private respondent but without backwages. Private respondent elevated the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. In a resolution promulgated on June 30, 1987, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for being filed out of time. Upon motion of private respondent, the NLRC reconsidered its Resolution and gave due course to the appeal. On December 29,1987 respondent Commission decided in favor of private respondent. From the NLRC decision, petitioner interposed the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of an appeal beyond the10-day reglamentary period within which to file an appeal makes the Labor Arbiter’s decision final and executory thus precluding the NLRC from acquiring jurisdiction to review the decision of the Labor Abiter. RULING: Article 223 of the Labor Code provides for a reglamentary period of ten (10) days within which to appeal a decision of the labor arbiter to the NLRC. The ten-day period has been interpreted by the Court as ten (10) "calendar" days and not ten (10) "working" days. In the instant case, while the appeal was filed within ten (10) working days from receipt of the decision, it was filed beyond the (10) calendar days prescribed by law. Private respondent received a copy of the decision of Labor Arbiter Martinez on May 3, 1984 while the appeal was filed only on May 15, 1984 or twelve (12) days from notice of the decision. It is true that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. However, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the NLRC may disregard the procedural lapse where there is an



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acceptable reason to excuse tardiness in the taking of an appeal. In this case, the appeal was filed out of time because the counsel of private respondent relied on the footnote of the notice of the decision of the Labor Arbiter which stated that "the aggrieved party may appeal ... within ten (10)working days, as per NLRC Resolution No. 1, series of 1977. Thus, private respondent's late filing of the appeal notwithstanding, the Court finds that public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the appeal.



G.R. No. 72096 January 29, 1988

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JOHN CLEMENT CONSULTANTS, INC. and EDI STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and NESTOR A. FLORES, Respondents. FACTS: Nestor Flores was engaged as Managing Consultant by the John Clement Consultants, Inc., (JCCI). He was placed in charge of a division of JCCI, Staffbuilders International, Inc. (SBII). A year or so afterwards, Flores was promoted to the position of Managing Consultant of JCCI's International Division. Flores was assigned in Bahrain. During his tour of duty in that country, he obtained cash advances amounting to P14,211.30. This liability he failed to liquidate even after he returned to the Philippines, an infringement of standing company policy. Upon the return to the Philippines of the JCCI President, Flores met with him and reiterated his desire to resign. His resignation was accepted, and he was told that a written communication to this effect was expected. Flores failed to submit any resignation letter. Flores ceased to come to the company premises; and he failed to appear at the meetings scheduled to discuss the terms of the severance of his ties with the JCCI. He also failed to return the company car assigned for his use, eventually doing so only on July 23, 1980, after receipt of a series of telegrams demanding such return. Three months after his resignation, Flores filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against JCCI and EDI with the Ministry of Labor & Employment. Due proceedings were had on his complaint, inclusive of the submission of position papers by the parties, and the holding of a hearing on the issues. The decision on Flores' complaint was rendered by the Labor Arbiter. It dismissed his complaint for lack of merit. The judgment however declared that there was due to him the sum of P6,671.24 representing his bonus or share in the profits for the period from January to June, 1980, which amount JCCI and its affiliates were ordered to pay within ten (10) days under sanction of automatic issuance of a writ of execution for failure to do so. Notice of the Labor Arbiter's decision was received by Flores on December 29, 1982. Fifteen days later, on January 13, 1983, he perfected an appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission. 2 JCCI filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on January 28, 1983, asserting that it had been filed beyond the reglamentary period of ten (10) days from notice. The motion to dismiss was never resolved. On April 26, 1984, the NLRC, by a majority vote, promulgated judgment reversing the Labor Arbiter's decision, ordering the reinstatement of Flores to his former position and the payment to him of fixed back wages for one (1) year without qualification or deduction from earnings elsewhere during the period of his dismissal, and affirming the Arbiter's award. JCCI's motion for reconsideration filed on May 18, 1984 was denied by Resolution dated August 28, 1985, the NLRC inter alia holding itself to have jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC had jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the Labor Arbiter's decision: the appeal was perfected after the lapse of' the reglamentary period of ten (10) calendar days prescribed under the law. RULING: The petition should be granted. The writ of certiorari will issue in the petitioners’ favor. As the Solicitor General correctly points out, Flores' appeal was indeed filed out of time: and the facts clearly establish that Flores had not been illegally dismissed but had in truth voluntarily resigned, his offer to resign being unconditional and irrevocable, and Flores clearly had acted in bad faith: he deliberately withheld submission of his written resignation in order to retain employment in JCCI while "moonlighting" in a rival enterprise, contrary to JCCI Company policy. In taking cognizance of Flores'



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appeal, notwithstanding the recorded actuality that it was filed 15 days after notice of the judgment sought to be appealed and therefore, beyond the 10-day period of appeal set by law, the NLRC had acted without jurisdiction, in deliberate disregard of this Court's holding in the afore cited Vir-Jen case that the ten-day period of appeal set out in Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, meant calendar and not working days. This Court is also satisfied, after a thoroughgoing review of the record that the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter are warranted by the evidence, and the rejection and reversal thereof by the NLRC was without justification, and was therefore whimsical and capricious.



G.R. No. 109166 July 6, 1995

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HERNAN R. LOPEZ, JR., Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FOURTH DIVISION, CEBU CITY, and DOMINADOR AMANTE, Respondents. FACTS: Private respondent Dominador Amante filed a complaint against petitioner before the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Cebu City for illegal dismissal, reinstatement with backwages or separation pay, and wage differentials. In a Decision dated June 23, 1992, the labor arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action against the petitioner. Private respondent appealed to the NLRC. On December 10, 1992, the NLRC reversed the appealed decision and granted private respondent's prayer for reinstatement and payment of "backwages, separation pay, and wage differentials" all computed at P19,542.50. It found that private respondent was illegally dismissed. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that there is no substantial evidence that would support the finding of the respondent commission that petitioner allegedly re-employed respondent Amante considering that the payrolls where it based its findings were only presented for the first time on appeal and therefore not substantial evidence to support said finding. ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC can admit evidence presented by the appellants for the first time on appeal, contrary to the rules of evidence prevailing in the courts of law. RULING: There was nothing wrong when public respondent admitted the May 1990 payrolls of Hacienda Colisap proving the re-employment of private respondent although they were presented only on appeal. Article 221 of the Labor Code provides that "in any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling." It further mandates the NLRC to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure. Thus, in Bristol Laboratories Employees Association v. NLRC, the Court upheld the NLRC when it considered additional documentary evidence submitted by the parties on appeal to prove their contentions. Too long settled is the rule that technicality should not be permitted to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.



G.R. No. L-69628 October 28, 1987

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PEDRO B. NARAG, Petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and AIRBORNE SECURITY SERVICES, INC., Respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Pedro B. Narag filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission, National Capital Region, Manila, against his employer, Airborne Security Services, Inc., for illegal dismissal, non-payment of legal holiday pay, violations of PD Nos. 525, 851 and 1123, and for reimbursement of cash deposits. Labor Arbiter Valenzuela promulgated a decision in favor of Narag, finding that complainant Narag was constructively dismissed without a valid cause for which respondent Airborne Security Services, Inc., through its responsible officials, should be, as it is hereby, ordered to reinstate him to his former position, and pay him one (1) year backwages, the least amount amenable to complainant which he conveyed to respondent's counsel and representative when undersigned made a last ditch effort to settle the same before promulgation of this Decision. As admitted in its 'Partial Appeal.' filed by Vice-President Sabado, respondent security agency received on April 30, 1984 a copy of the aforementioned decision of the labor arbiter. And, on May 11, 1984, respondent security agency filed its aforesaid 'Partial Appeal from the decision of the labor arbiter to the respondent Commission, claiming in the main that complainant Narag was only placed under headquarter's disposition on July 16, 1982; he was never dismissed from the service of respondent security agency. On December 27, 1984, respondent Commission promulgated its decision on the appeal, finding that complainant Narag was not dismissed nor suspended from his employment hence, he should be, as it was so ordered, reinstated to his former position but without any backwages. Believing that the foregoing decision of respondent Commission virtually set aside the labor arbiter's decision in this labor case, complainant Narag filed the instant petition for review before this Honorable Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal filed on the eleventh (11 th) day, much less modify the decision appealed from, the same having become final and executory after the lapse of the ten (10) days reglementary period. RULING: It is too late in the day for private respondent to insist that an award, order or decision by the Labor Arbiter may be appealed to the NLRC within a period of ten working days from receipt, discounting Saturdays and Sundays. May 10, 1984 is a Thursday. If it were a Sunday or holiday the filing of the appeal the following day would have been allowable. The shortened period of ten (10) days fixed by Art. 223 of the Labor Code contemplates calendar days and not working days. Considering that the appeal by private respondent from the decision of the Labor Arbiter was filed on the eleventh day after receipt of the said decision, it was one (1) day late of the ten-day reglamentary period which terminated on May 10, 1984. Consequently, the decision of the Labor Arbiter had already become final and executory. Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal as required by the Rules has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory.



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Moreover, a careful review of the records of the case show that the petitioner was effectively and illegally dismissed from the service by the private respondent. After he was relieved of his duties allegedly temporarily, he continued to report for duty but he was never given any assignment. And when on July 30, 1982 he asked for his salary at the accounting department of private respondent he was told that there was none and that he had already been laid off. No doubt the decision of the labor arbiter which was sought to be appealed is supported by the evidence and the applicable law.



G.R. No. 111905 July 31, 1995

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ORIENTAL MINDORO ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and OSCAR NITURAL, Respondents. FACTS: On February 20, 1989, private respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch, Regional Office No. IV, NLRC, a complaint against ORMECO for illegal suspension, nonpayment of half of his 13th month pay and non-payment of his salary differential pay. After due submission of the position papers and other pleadings of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision on July 10, 1990 in favor of private respondent Nitural. Both parties appealed said decision to the Third Division of the NLRC. On May 20, 1993, the NLRC promulgated its decision dismissing ORMECO’s appeal for failure to file the required bond, even as it really lacks merit, and granting Nitural’s appeal insofar as his prayer for reinstatement is concerned. Consequently, ORMECO was directed to reinstate complainant to his former or equivalent position without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages. On June 6, 1993, Nitural filed a motion for recomputation and to include his 13th month pay therein. On July 3, 1993, petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the Secretary of Labor and, on July 9, 1993, a motion for extension of time to file an appeal memorandum. On July 28, 1993, a resolution was issued by the NLRC denying the recomputation sought by Nitural for being filed out of time and likewise denying the notice of appeal with extension of time filed by ORMECO for being "untenable, as this is not provided for by our existing law on the matter. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the NLRC may be appealed with the Secretary of Labor. RULING: Petitioner failed to reasonably seek relief from the decision of the NLRC in the proper forum and within the prescribed period. ORMECO's attempt to appeal the NLRC's decision and resolution to the Secretary of Labor was erroneous. Parenthetically, Article 223 of the Labor Code formerly granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from a decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor. PD No. 1391, however, amended said Article 223 and abolished appeals to the Secretary of Labor "to insure speedy labor justice." Since petitioner's appeal to the Secretary of Labor was not authorized in law, it did not toll or affect the period for seeking relief from the decision and resolution of the NLRC through a petition for certiorari. In fact, petitioner did not even file a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC for purposes of such a petition. Petitioner as well failed to file the requisite appeal bond in its appeal to the NLRC from the decision of the labor arbiter. The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by



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the employer is underscored by the provision that an appeal by the employer may be perfected "only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond." The word "only" makes it perfectly clear, that the lawmakers intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the exclusive means by which an employer's appeal may be perfected. That requirement is intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to satisfy their employees' just and lawful claims.

Labor Relations Digest 20151221 (67-72)

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