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Rik Wayne Munson Private Attorney General 218 Landana St American Canyon, CA 94503 To: George Valverde - Director, Department of Motor Vehicles
Office of the Director Department of Motor Vehicles Vehicles 2415 1st Avenue Avenue Mail Station F101 Sacramento, CA 95818 CC: Attorney General Edmund G. Brown Jr. Attorney General's Office California Department of Justice P.O. Box 944255 9 44255 Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 Debra Bowen - California Secretary of State 1500 11th Street Sacramento CA 95814 Dale E. Bonnea Secretary Business, Transportation & Housing Agency 980 9th Street, Suite 2450, Sacramento Sacramento,, California
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THIS LETTER CONSTITUTES LEGAL NOTICE. NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL IS NOTICE TO AGENT
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Notice of default
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Notice of Rescission of California drivers license E0626145
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Notice of Law
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Attachment: DL-142
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Dear Director Valverde, Page 1 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
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First, let me congratulate you on your recent app ointment to head the California Department of Motor Vehicles. Vehicles. Secondly, Secondly, I want to wish you the utmost success in your new endeavor.
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nullum similar est idem :
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Legal maxim that “things which are similar are not the same”.
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Director Valverde, Valverde, I am writing you today to inform you that your predecessor(s) predece ssor(s) have left your office and the Department of Motor Vehicles Vehicles (herein after “the Department”) in an untenable position. I am also writing today to notify you of my rescission of California Drivers License #E0626145 issued in the
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name of misnomer “RIK WA WAYNE MUNSON” a thing the nature of which is entirely unknown unkno wn to me. You are herein notified, as your predecessor prede cessor and the department had been previously noticed, that my correct and proper Christian appellation is Rik Wayne Munson, and that I, Rik Wayne Wayne Munson, am a
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non-resident alien to the federal UNITED STATES. STATES. That I am a sovereign born constituent inhabitant
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domiciled upon the land, on California, the state of the republic, United States of America. I specifically
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reject, deny and refute all claims alleging Rik Wayne Munson to be the all capital lettered idem sonans
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RIK WAYNE MUNSON or MUNSON, RIK WAYNE, the label used by the department to identify me
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in it’s system system of records which it has refused or otherwise failed to correct.
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NOTICE OF BREACH OF FIDUCIARTY DUTY AND
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NOTICE OF DEFAULT
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Director Valverde Valverde on Thursday Thursda y, September 23, 2004 I sent a letter identifiable as CERTIFIED CERTIFIED MAIL # 7003 1010 0003 5137 8612, addressed to the Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles Vehicles in
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which I requested clarification of the nature of my relationship as a licensee with the Department
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wherein I requested specific explanations. I have never received a response to my inquiry.
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Director Valverde Valverde on May 6, 6 , 2006 I sent a letter identifiable as CERTIFIED CERTIFIED MAIL #7003 1010 0003 5137 8582 addressed to the Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles. Vehicles. In that communication I again requested specific information, this time in response to a prosecution regarding issues, which may have been rendered mute by a proper response to my earlier inquiry. I have never received a response to this inquiry.
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Director Valverde Valverde on August 24th 2007 I sent a letter identifiable as CERTIFIED MAIL #7003 1010 0003 5137 8599 addressed to the Director of the show proof of any Department of Motor Vehicles Vehicles in response to a letter demanding proof of financial responsibility. In my reply I made it clear that there Page 2 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
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can be no law compelling me to enter into a contract of Maritime insurance or any similar such thing. In
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that letter I also issued notice of a demand for a state hearing. I have never received a reply to that
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inquiry and I have been denied the requested state hearing. Subsequent to my request for a state hearing
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I received communications from the Department notifying me of the suspension of my automobile registration in pursuance of the above referenced forced maritime insurance racketeering scheme. Please understand Mr. Director that these communications are both letters of inquiry and petitions for redress that constitute legal notice. The right to petition would be meaningless without a corresponding duty to answer. Equal protection of the law requires your agency to provide opportunity
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for an administrative hearing before any action ca n be taken against a driver’s license or an owner’s
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vehicle registration. I have made it perfectly clear that I will not surrender my rights and that I fully
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intend to hold the past and present directors personally and severally liable for any injury I suffer as a
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result of the herein noticed breach of fiduciary duty and that I will hold the department d epartment liable as well.
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Director Valverde Valverde on August 24th 2007 the department was served with a notice of my claim to allodial title to all vehicles registered with the department. I noticed the Department of the legally required 30 days opportunity to respond with an y owner ship interest the state claims to have in m y automobiles. No claim of ownership interest was ever received however, I also sent a copy of my demand to RISK Management from whom I received a reply. RISK Management confirms that they
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only concern themselves with vehicles owned b y the state and that they have nothing to do with the
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conflict between the Department and myself. I accept this as an admission that the state has n o property
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interest in my automobiles.
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I have also been threatened by your agency in regards to what is being touted as “financial responsibility laws” and even though I have paid my registration fees and the payment has b een accepted yet the Department refuses to issue my current registration tags with out my first providing proof that I am contracting for maritime insurance on my private use automobile. Please correct this issue that I do not suffer unwarranted interference with my right to use my property on the public streets and highways.
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NOTICE OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT DANGEROUS TO PUBLIC MORALS, LIVES AND SAFTEY
Mr. Mr. Director there is a matter of utmost conce rn that I bring to your attention. Hosted amongst u s is a standing army of predators. They are prowling our streets and h ighways accosting and interfering Page 3 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
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with the liberty of our Citizens. They do this while being heav ily armed and bearing none or
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questionable insignia, clothed in paramilitary dress and presenting under co lor of lawful authority. authority. They
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have been trained to use the deadly “Use of Force Continuum” against passersby until those travelers
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acquiesce to the demands of these armed gunmen which typically includes a demand for a signature as “promise to appear” in what emerges to be a private court. This court is a place where the proceedings are secreted or forged and where there is clearly no independent record of the proceedings. In these trials the armed paramilitary predator acts as prosecutor even though he is admittedly not a member of the bar and offers no evidence of standing. These are proceedings where neither criminal indictments or information nor civil complaints are
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ever filed nor is discovery answered. It is a thea tre where the supposed neutral finder of facts refuses to
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declare the nature of the action and dismisses unanswered and unchallenged pleadings without findings
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of fact or conclusions of law. It is a theatre where the victims of these assaults are denied counsel and
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denied jury trial and then extorted for valuable v aluable consideration under duress of having their license suspended. These victims are then subject to being imprisoned and/or robbed of their auto if the y attempt to continue to exercise their right of travel without comporting with the demands for said valuable consideration. This is all somehow being legitimized through statutory schemes purporting to address various requirements and penalties attaching to the drivers “license”. How are these kinds of actions justifiable? Many of these armed individuals, whom I refer to, as predators because of their behaviors may
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be well intentioned and motivated people p eople who are highly trained but misinformed and poorly educated.
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Those, of course, that do not meet this description are intentionally misapplying the law for profit. The
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state level office responsible for the misinformed and poorly educated station of its proportion of these
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armed and dangerous individuals is that of o f the Commissioner of the California Highway Patrol.
CURIOUSER AND CURIOUSER!
The matter becomes more perplexing when effort is made to reconcile the above facts with Supreme Court cases like Clearfield Trust vs. U.S. wherein it becomes clear that governments operate in
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two separate capacities, one governmental and one non-governmental. The non-governmental function is
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being called “commerce” or “business”. When governments conduc t business they do so on business
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terms. That is to say they descend to the level o f an ordinary corporation or private individual. In Ryder
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v US the court made it clear c lear that it is the individuals duty when having contact with government to Page 4 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
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ascertain the nature of the interaction and to hold the agent within the limits of the agents authority
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whether the agent knows those limits or not. This letter constitutes just such exercise of duty. duty. The organizational chart for the state government shows the California Highway Patrol to be an
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agency of the executive branch of state government situated, like yours, directly beneath the agency named the Business, Transportation & Housing Agency. Agency. Interestingly the government’s government’s business partner network at bpn.gov shows the California Highway Patrol to be a “for profit” corporation contracting to provide patrolling and security services to the entity conducting co nducting business as the STA STATE OF CALIFORNIA (corporate). (corporate). The individual “patrolmen” of o f the California Highway Patrol call
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themselves officers while holding no known public office of a civil character. There are no public offices
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of a civil character labeled patrolman, policeman, traffic enforcement, policy enforcement or anything
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similar nor are there known corporate offices by any of these descriptions or labels. When these
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“officers” engage in the disruptive behavior described above it is unclear whether they are acting in the
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capacity of government employees, corporate employees, and independent contractors or simply highwaymen and racketeers. This leads to an o bvious question. What office do these armed highwaymen claim to hold? The matter is again complicated by b y several other factors.
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NOTICE OF VIOLATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED FUNDAMENTAL
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RIGHTS.
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The web site for the state Department of Motor Vehicles Vehicles describes applicants for drivers’ licenses
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and vehicle registrations as “customers”. These “customers” as a condition of receiving the “license” or
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“registration” are required to submit sensitive personal and private information. This sensitive personal
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and private information, as the case of Reno v Condon makes apparent, is then sold to private 3rd party interests for private 3rd party purposes. These private 3rd party interests then use that information to assault the serenity of these “customers” private lives by targeting them with political, bleeding heart charity, charity, marketing and other commercial mailing advertisement adv ertisement clutter. clutter. Even more inconvenient and disruptive are the invasive sales and marketing oriented phone calls from these inconsiderate, self-
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interested product marketers who clearly have no respect for the serenity of peoples homes and private
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lives.
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It would appear to be a condition of acceptance of the California drivers License that it somehow leads to this appalling violation of individual privacy as well as to numerous other fundamental rights Page 5 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
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violations. These “traffic” courts, as described above from first hand experiences, clearly violate due
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process. When no one seems to know the substantive body of law in which traffic or any other
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infractions reside Due Process fails in its first principle requirement, which is notice. No promise
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extracted by a gunman on the highway can be said to be voluntary. voluntary. If however, one refuses to sign such promissory instruments they are kidnapped and car jacked un der the pretext of an arrest without a warrant and impound. This all occurs admittedly without a crime hav ing ever been committed nor any a ny injury in fact ever demonstrated. A license is only evidence that one is the holder of a privilege. It is not evidence that one is
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exercising said privilege and it is not evidence of the waiver of any rights. The courts still hold that the
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waiver of a known constitutionally protected right must be a knowing and intelligent act done with
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sufficient knowledge of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences and that it must be
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voluntary. voluntary. I’ve never waived my right to use the highway for non-commercial purposes nor have I
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entered into any contractual agreement, which would relegate such usage to the authority of agencies that license the commercial use of our highways. Research into the archives of our jural system shows without question that the streets and the highways belong to the people and that their use for personal acts of conveyance is a right not a privilege subject to regulation by the state or the local municipalities. Government has never been
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granted the authority to cover the streets and highways with asphalt as a barricade to the free exercise of
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travel. The racketeering by local municipalities under the pretext of “traffic enforcement” is a criminal
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enterprise amounting to treasonous fraud.
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A lie Mr. Mr. Director is a thing in want of more to hide it and silence where there is a duty to speak is fraud. To To date I have received no answer to inquiries addressed to the Department other than a nonresponsive form publication in avoidance of legitimate leg itimate answers. Director Valverde Valverde you are hereby noticed that your office has ha s breached its’ fiduciary duties and is in default. d efault. You You are further noticed that I am not empowered to enter into any arrangement with the department, as I do not recognize the nature of the relationship that is created by the application, a pplication, for a license, the thing governed gove rned under which is entirely unclear, but would appear to be conditional and involving a surrender of rights not expressly stated in the application. I do not choose to waive my right to privacy. a. I invok invokee my right right to privacy privacy..
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b. I object to to having my sensitive sensitive personal personal and and private private information information converte converted d to an item of commerce for the enrichment of strangers, at my expense.
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personal acts of travel.
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a. I invoke invoke my right right to travel travel unregul unregulated ated absent absent a clear clear and present present danger to to public
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safety. 3.
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a. I invoke invoke my right to be secure in my person person and posses possessions sions.. 5.
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I do do not not waiv waivee my my rig right ht not not to to be be a witn witnes esss aga again inst st myse myself lf.. a. I invoke invoke my right right not not to be a witnes witnesss against against mysel myself. f.
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I do not not choo choose se to to waiv waivee my righ rightt to be sec secur uree in my pers person on and and pos posse sess ssio ions ns agai agains nstt ununwarranted searches or seizures.
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I do do not not choos choosee to to wai waive ve my righ rightt to to Due Due Proc Proces esss and and the the rul rulee of of law law.. a. I invoke invoke my right right to Due Due Process Process and and a constitut constitutionall ionally y valid valid jurisdicti jurisdiction. on.
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I do not not choo choose se to to waiv waivee my righ rightt to unli unlicen cense sed d use use of the the stre street etss and and highw highway ayss for for
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I res reser erve ve and and inv invok okee all all of my righ rights ts in perp perpet etui uity ty..
The Department of Motor Vehicles has by stealthy encroachment overstepped its bounds
By stealthy encroachment the state takes away our liberty and sells is back to us as a license. Thanks to the blessings of the federally sponsored campaign of ignorance programming, commonly referred to as “Public Education”, we have evolved into a society of sheep grazing upon the grass of submission, suffrage and servitude having been from childhood trained to call it freedom. The stealthy encroachment process of the corporation/ state against the human depends on time for its success. The corporation/ state has indefinite life. As each succeeding generation of people dies off, the nex t generation fails to remember the lessons and history of the previous generation. The corporation state counts on that. Our laws however, are written in our books and our boo ks remember the way it was and what the law still is. The corporation state, more properly called fascist, counts on this generation to forget that we use the roads as tenants in common - not as licensees! By looking back through our jural record at old disputes regarding roads, rivers, and other ways of passage, we see clearly the view that public property is nothing more than property held in common tenancy for use by the public. pu blic. Being joint tenants in sovereignty we each have an un-divided ownership interest in all that belongs to the pubic. The streets and highways are no exception. Page 7 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
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There is a case that says sa ys that all administrative law is unconstitutional. We We need not be that
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extreme. Certainly there are some things that the Department of Motor Vehicles Vehicles can do lawfully. lawfully. They
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can assist in transferring title of a car, which means in essence “maintain a registry”. They can
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administer a driver test. Even if the state legislature cooperates and passes a “statute” for the motor
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vehicle code, that “statute” is really more like a “regulation” in that even the legislature has no power to
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impede commerce absent compelling state interest.
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The Supreme Court said in U.S. v Mersky (1960) 361 U.S. 431: An administrative regulation, of course, is not a "statute." While in practical effect regulations may be called "little laws," 1. 7 they are at most but offspring of statutes.”
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I cite this case only to point out that indeed there is a difference between regulations and statutes.
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Furthermore, not all laws are created equal. A statute that regulates without constitutional authority is a
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nullity even though it be published in the books, recognized by the police and lowers courts, and even though though it be unchall unchalleng enged ed for decades. decades. Such Such is the current current state state of driver driver license license and financial financial
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responsibility laws in these United States. We are in the age of government excess and abuse. Over half
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the working people work for some form of government agency. By manipulating the value of our
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money, by exporting our industry and importing cheap illegal labor, by imprisoning dissenters, by
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owning the stock of public corporations, by deceptive bookkeeping, and by other oppressive fraudulent,
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and malici malicious ous acts, governm government entss have lulled lulled the genera generall popula populace ce into into a belief belief in the presum presumed ed regularity of whatever the government says. I however demand adherences to the rule of law as it is written in our books and I fully intend to hold my servants accountable for any and all violations of their oaths of public office and any and all trespass against my rights.
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Director Valverde Valverde I paid the fees on my private use automobile NOTICE OF RESCISSION OF DL#E0626145
Director Valverde Valverde for reasons cited herein you are hereby noticed of the rescission of California Drivers License #E0626145. Said license is rescinded Nunc pro tunc to the date of the original application. The application was not voluntary but the end result of coercion and fraud by the Municipal Court of Long Beach California. I did not complete the application in question or enter into an arrangement created by it fully informed but rather under duress of coercions and fraud. I have determined that I erred by declaring true that which wasn’t true. I have an obligation to notify DMV, DMV, the Page 8 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
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other party to the contract, so that steps can be taken to correct the fraud. There is no statute of
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limitations on fraud and an agreement does not become valid over the course of time when there are
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elements of fraud found in the inception ince ption of the agreement. It can be easily demonstrated that fraud
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existed at the time of original application and at each subsequent juncture in that: tha t: 1. I was misinformed and unaware that the DMV participated solely in the regulation of intrastate
commerce, an activity I have never engaged in or intended to engage in. 2. I was taught in state sponsored public education that driving was a privilege howeve r, I was
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never told the difference between the word driving in ordinary language and the term driving in
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the legalese dialectic, which is a word narrowly defined as integrally related to commerce.
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3. I was misinformed and unaware that the term "driver" represented one engaged in government
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regulated commercial traffic and transportation activity, activity, an activity I have never n ever engaged in or
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intended to engage in.
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4. I was misinformed and unaware that the term "motor vehicle" described a device used upon the
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highways for commercial purposes, an activity I have never engaged in or intended to engage in.
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5. I was misinformed and unaware that the license issued by the DMV authorizes engagement only
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in privileged government regulated commercial activity, activities I have never engaged in or
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intended to engage in.
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6. I was misinformed and unaware that in order to receive such benefits/privileges, it might be
claimed I had waived constitutionally co nstitutionally secured inalienable rights. 7. I was misinformed and unaware that in order to get the benefits/privileges offered by the DMV I
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might be claimed that I had altered the primary citizenship acquired at birth to that of a second-
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class citizen without access to fundamental rights or their protections unde r the Supreme Law of
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the Land.
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8. I was misinformed and unaware that a party wanting benefits/privileges from the DMV must first
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enter a federal government socialist welfare program called social security when such program
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has always been said to be voluntary. voluntary.
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9. I was misinformed and unaware at the time of my coerced application that it might be claimed
that I had entered into any "irrevocable agreement". Page 9 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
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10. I was coerced and made under threat to believe that I was required to get a license before I could
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lawfully use my property on the streets and highways that I pa y for in legitimate taxes.
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11. 11. I was misinformed and unaware that I could not be compelled to transfer an interest in my
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private property to the DMV or that applying for a license may be claimed to involve doing so.
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Further: The issuing of CDL's (Commercial Drivers Licenses) in the style of a Ces't Tui Que trust, for
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which an applicant is held as fiduciary;
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1) cannot be predicated on forfeiture of protected rights for the sake of ob taining a privilege to engage in
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use of the public domain for commercial conduct,
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2) cannot be seen as a legitimate trust agreement where conveyance of a property property interest remains
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undisclosed,
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3) and where the fiduciary is a member, as joint joint tenant, of the polity which is presumed to be the
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beneficiary thereof,
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4) constitutes a tortuous conversion conversion where terms such as 'registration' 'registration' are replaced by terms such as
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'license' and 'licensing' by legislative committees and regulatory agencies,
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5) constitutes fraud and constructive fraud where government publications advertise advertise statutory and
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regulatory schemes as 'required' and 'requirements' with general and unexceptional application, and
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6) while frustrating frustrating or actively denying implementation of substantive and procedural due process
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protections guaranteed in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
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7) thus manifesting a Remedial Abridgment where agencies charged with duties of administration of
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commercial traffic refuse to respond to requests for, or demands to, correct the record or to a ct in good Page 10 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
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faith to pursue administrative remedy when a citizen seeks relief from ex tant injury or protection from
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imminent or threatened injury and harm,
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8) Satisfies the definition definition of 'Racketeering' under RICO statutes when the actions and policies routinely
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practiced by state and local agencies, agenc ies, officers and employees are taken into account,
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9) Violates Violates Article IV Section 4, guaranteeing to every state a republican form of government where whe re
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those acting under color of lawful authority au thority cooperate to effect an enterprise designed to eclipse
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constitutional government and by obfuscation and usurpation, replace law with policy administered by
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corporate interests,
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10) Justifies charges of treason and sedition where officers bound by oath of office set themselves at
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defiance of law by furthering the financial interests and shielding the disclosure of quasi-governmental
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and non-governmental operations of individuals and organizations involved in the unjust enrichment of
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purported state actors.
16 NOTICE OF LAW
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We the people peo ple are the sovereigns:
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"When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles on which
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they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude
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that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power.
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Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our
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system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, Sovereignty itself remains
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with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. And the law is the definition
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and limitation of power. power. It is, indeed, quite true that there must always be lodged somewhere, and in
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some person or body, the authority of final decision; and in many cases of mere ad ministration, the
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responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the public judgment, Page 11 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
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exercised either in the pressure of opinion, or by means of the suffrage. suffrage. But the fundamental rights to
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life, liberty, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, hap piness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by those
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maxims of constitutional law which are the monu ments showing the victorious progress of the race in
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securing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous
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language of the Massachusetts bill of rights, the gove rnment 'may be a government of laws and not of
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men.' For the very idea idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the the means of living, or any
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material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in
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any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
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U.S. 356 (1886)
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"[T]he sovereignty of the nation is in the people p eople of the nation, and the residuary sovereignty of each
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State in the people of each State… at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they
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are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects (unless the African [2
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U.S. 419, 472] slaves among us may be so called) and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of
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America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty. ." Chisholm v. v. Georgia, 2
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U.S. 419 (1793),
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General Ancient Libertarian Premise
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Personal liberty, liberty, which is guaranteed to every citizen under our Constitution and laws, consists of the right
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of locomotion - to go where one pleases, and when, and to do what may lead to one’s business or pleasure, only
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so far restrained as the rights of others may make necessary for the welfare of all other citizens.
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One may travel along the public highways or in public places. *** These are rights which existed long
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before our [their Federal] Constitution, and we have taken just pride in their maintenance, making them a part of
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the fundamental law of the land. Pinkerton v. Verberg, Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 584, 44 N.W. 579 (1889).
25 There now exists policies/laws that attempt to prohibit travel in the several states that attempt to prohibit travel
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by way of “driver’s licenses” and taxes, along with other quasi-State laws.
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The two rights of liberty and property which are taken for granted, are extremely important rights and when claimed and asserted should not be taken lightly by the courts.
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This court has consistently held to the view that liberty of the person and the right to the control of one’s own property are very sacred rights which should not be taken away or withheld except for very urgent reasons. In re Guardianship of Collition, 164 N.W. 2d 480, 483; 41Wis. 2d 487 (1969).
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Since the Governors Convention on March 6, 1933 and the bankruptcy of this Nation by the infamous Franklin D. Roosevelt on March 9, 1933, the States have come increasingly more and more aggressive in
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controlling the people and their property, and these States will now not tolerate anyone traveling in their domain without their permission, i.e. license. Just a short time after this bankruptcy, on April 21, 1933, the license law was passed, but not enforced....?
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no obligation to obey it, for it is void from the time it was enacted:
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An unconstitutional legislative enactment, through law in form, is in fact not law at all. It confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Bonnett v. Vallier, 116 N.W. 885, 136 Wis. 193 (1908); Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442.
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Where the people remain ignorant of the law, they will be in bondage. Quoting Thomas Jefferson: “If a people expects to be ignorant and free, they expect what never was and never will be.” The following maxim was often cited in early America to guard against this problem:
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That no free government, or the blessings of liberty, can be preserved to any people but by a firm adherence to justice and virtue, and by a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles. See, Bonnett v. Vallier,
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116 N.W. 885, 136 Wis. 193 (1908); Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442.
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I claim all God given Natural Rights and assert these inherited rights that are unalienable as reinforced in “The Declaration of Independence” (1776). It is not my intention to descend from there now, in the past or in the future, knowingly or unknowingly. unknowingly.
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Some cases that distinguish distinguish the difference between “rights” and “privileges”
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The permission or license is a special right or privilege. Once a license exists only the licensee has he
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right to do the thing the licensor allows. The licensee is privileged over others who do not have a license. It thus is
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a privilege to have the right to do the thing that is licensed. In other words, the right or permission granted by the
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licensor is a privilege since he controls who can and who cannot exercise the right. If the licensor grants the
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licensee a right or benefit, it is called a privilege:
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The word privilege is defined as a peculiar benefit, favor, favor, or advantage, a right or immunity not enjoyed by all, or it may be enjoyed only under special conditions. Knoll Golf Club v U.S. , 179 F Supp 377
8 9
Since the right or permission to do a thing is called a license, and since the right is “peculiar” to the licensee alone, the license is called a privilege. Anything that requires a license is a privilege.
10 11
A license for the sale of intoxicating liquor is a privilege. Chiordi v Jernigan 129 P 2nd 640, 642; 46 NM 396.
12 13 14 15 16
Even privileges must be administered even-handedly. even-handedly. Authority: Equal Protection Clause.
Also, grandfather clauses, and implied clauses, forbid the state to take away a vested right. Those have the right to do something cannot be licensed for what they already have right to do as such license would be meaningless. City of Chicago v Collins (19__) 51 NE 907, 910.
17 18 19 20 21 22
Also, those things which are considered as inalienable rights, which all Americans possess, cannot be licensed since those are not held to be a privilege. The right to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religious worship are not privileges. Douglas v City of Jeannette 130 F 2nd 652, 655. A license bypasses a legal barrier or makes an otherwise unlawful act lawful. The nature of a license
23
allows the licensee to do something he could not otherwise legally do. Thus, a license gives the licensee the right
24
to do something that would otherwise be illegal or unlawful for him to do.
25 26
A license is a mere permit to do something that without it would be unlawful. Littleton v Burgess, Burgess , 82 P 864, 866, 14 Wyo 173.
27 28 Page 14 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
1 2
A license is a right granted by some competent authority to do an act which, without such license, would be illegal. Beard v City of Atlanta (__) 86 SE 2nd 672, 676; 91 Ga. App. 584.
3 4
A licensee is one privileged to enter or remain on land by virtue of the possessor’s consent, whether given by invitation or permission. Wool v Larner , 26 A 2nd 89, 92, 112 Vt. 431.
5 6 7
The licensor has the power to prohibit. Since the licensor is in the position to grant a right or permission it logically follows that he has the power to prohibit the act also. Likewise, having the power to prohibit something from being done, it follows as a corollary that power also exists to permit its use. Taylor v Smith, Smith, 140 Va. 217,
8
235. Thus, where the power to license exists so does he power to prohibit.
9 10 11
The authority to license implies the power to prohibit, such being the meaning of the term. The City of Burllington v. v. Bumgardner, 42 Iowa 673, 674.
12
The power to license necessarily includes the power to inhibit unlicensed persons from doing the acts
13
authorized by license. The power to refuse license necessarily gives the power to limit the issuance of licenses.
14
Ex parte M.T. Dickey, 76 W. Va.576, 585; 85 SE 781.
15 16
A license means leave to do a thing which the licensor could prevent. Blatz Brewing Co. v. Collins, 160 P.2d 37, 39; 69 Cal. A. 2d 639.
17 Since the Motor Vehicles Departments, i.e., licensors, the Motor Vehicles Department(s) can issue or
18 19
refuse to issue a license and thereby permit or prohibit anyone from exercising the right or privilege they have authority over.
20 21
A license carries limitations, restrictions and requirements. Whenever a license is issued the licensee is under certain limitations and requirements established by the Motor Vehicles Vehicles Department (licensor), which may be
22
implied or expressed when the license was issued. These limitations and requirements are often in the form of
23
rules and regulations and may be referred to as the “terms” of the license, which the licensee is subject to. The
24
following decision reveals these characteristics:
25 26
“Licensee,” as used in Pub. St. c. 100, in reference to certain licensees, and providing that no such licensee shall place or maintain any screen, curtain, or other obstruction on the licensed premises, refers to every
27
licensee, and not merely such as have been required by the licensing board to remove a screen, curtain, or other
28
obstruction. Commonwealth v. v. Rourke, 6 N.E. 383, 384; 141Mass. 321.
Page 15 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
1
Those that are licensed under the statute cited above are restricted in their ability to erect curtains,
2
screens, or other obstructions on their premises due to the terms of the license. It matters not where these terms
3
were directly stated to the licensee or stated in the rules and regulations that cover such licensed businesses, the
4
licensee still becomes subject to the terms of the license. There can be no argument that such terms are
5
unreasonable as the licensor is in authority to make any such rules.
6
If a city chooses to grant permission [a license] to individuals to conduct a taxicab business in its streets, it
7
can prescribe such terms and conditions as it may see fit, and individuals desiring to avail themselves of such
8
terms and conditions, whether they are reasonable or unreasonable. Eason v. Dowdy, Dowdy, 219 Ga. 555.
9
Also, any argument that such terms are in violation of one’s rights has no legal standing. When person(s)
10
takes a license, he in effect must waive any rights that would otherwise conflict with the terms of the license. The
11
licensor has the authority over the thing being licensed therefore his term must prevail over the rights of the
12 13 14 15 16 17
licensee and out of respect of the licensor’s right to control the thing or act. Thus, the rights of the licensee are limited by the terms of the license. The rights of a licensee can rise no higher than the terms of the statute or ordinance by which he became the holder. Steves Steves et al. v Robie, 139 Me. 359, 363. The licensee must submit to the rules, limitations, and requirements the licensor sets out as the terms of the license.
18 19
A license is revocable by the licensor. When a license exists, it is within the power of the Motor Vehicles Department(s) (licensor) to revoke the license at any time this entity wishes.
20 21 22
Permits to carry on a liquor business issued under Liquor Control Act are mere licenses revocable as provided in such act. State v. Hawlew, Hawlew, 44 N.E. 2d 815, 820.
23
A license, pure and simple, is a mere personal privilege, and it is revocable at law, at the pleasure of the
24
licensor, licensor, even when mo ney has been paid for it. River Development Corp. v. Liberty Corp., 133 A. 2d 373, 385; 45
25
N.J. Super. 445.
26 27
A license is one to whom an owner of realty has granted a mere right of occupancy, and such license is revocable at the option of the licensor. Caldwell v. v. Mitchell, 158 NYS 2d 868, 870.
28 Page 16 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
1 2
The licensee cannot possibly revoke the license he is the holder of since he did not give himself the permission or license in the first place. Only the licensor can revoke a license.
3 4 5 6
The terms and rules of a license are amendable. Restrictions, limitations, limitations, and requirements can be added, deleting or modified at a future date and become new terms of the license. Here again only the licensor is able to amend the terms and conditions of the license. Thus, when the licensor makes a requirement after the license is issued, the licensee is subject to that requirement just as though it were an original condition of the license.
7 The foregoing characterist characteristics ics of a license license reveal reveal the legal principle principles s that potentially potentially exist whenever whenever
8
licensing takes place.
9 10 11
A license is often found under the law of contracts and apparently shares some attributes of contract. However, However, in its truest sense, a license is not a contract and it has generally been so held.
12
A license is merely a privilege to do business and is not a contract between authority granting it and
13
grantee nor is it a property right, nor does it create a vested right. Mayo v. Market Fruit Co. of Sanford, Fla.,40 So.
14
2d 555, 559.
15
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
16
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal granting it and the person to whom it is granted, and is not
17
property or a property right. American States Water Services Co. of California v Johnson, 88 P.2d 770, 774; 31
18
Cal. App. 2d 606.
19
A license requires that one of the parties have competent authority over the thing or the act
20
involved in the agreement whereas a contract does not. A license can be terminated by one of the parties
21
at any time but a contract cannot. These authorities also show that a license is not property right because
22 23
it is not in itself property. property. Neither is a license a vested right but only a privilege. The streets and highways belong to the people:
24
The first issue that must be established is what is the na ture of a public road or highway, highway, and what are a re
25
the rights of the people thereon. All of your authorities agree that the use of roadways for ordinary travel
26
is a basic and fundamental right:
27 28 Page 17 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
1
"Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a blessing that we have
2
forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and toll roads, and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily
3
administered, the highways may be completely monopolized, if, through lack of interest, the
4
people submit, then they may look to see the most sacred of their liberties taken from them one
5
by one, by more or less rapid encroachment." -Robertson vs. Department of Public Works, 180
6
Wash 133,147
7 8
"Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion -- to go where and when one pleases -- only
9
so far restrained as the Rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The
10
Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by
11
horsed horsedraw rawn n carria carriage, ge, wagon, wagon, or automo automobil bile, e, is not a mere mere privil privilege ege which which may be permit permitted ted or
12
prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
13
happiness. Under this Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his
14
inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly
15
and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another's Rights, he will be protected, not
16
American n Jurispr Jurispruden udence ce 1st. only only in his his pers person on,, but but in his his safe safe condu conduct ct." ." [emp [empha hasi siss added added]] America
17
Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p 1135 .
18 19
"The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either
20
by carriage or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but a
21
common law right which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Thompson
22
v. Smith, 154 SE 579.
23 24
"The use of the highway for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a
25
common fundamental right of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived." Chicago
26
Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169 NE 221.
27 28 Page 18 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
1 2
A highway is a way over which the public have a free right of passage. Yale University v. City of New Haven, 104 Conn. Con n. 610; 134 Atl. 268, 271.
3 4
The essential features of a highway is that it is a way over which the public at large has he right to pass. State v. Pierson, 2 Conn. Cir. 660; 204 A.2d 838.
5 6 7
This right of the people is in the street and highways of the state, whether inside or outside the municipalities thereof, is a paramount right. Light & Coke v. City of Chicago, N.E.2d 777, 781; 413 Ill. 457 (1952).
8 9 10 11 12
It is well settled that the public are entitled to a free passage along the highway. Michelson v. Dwyer, 63 N.W.2d N.W.2d 513, 517; 158 Neb. 427 (1954). Our society is built in part upon free passage of men and goods, and the public streets and highways may rightfully be used for travel by everyone. Hanson v. Hall, 202 Minn. 381, 383.
13 Public ways, as applied to ways by land, are usually termed “highways” or “public roads,” are 14
such ways as every ever y citizen has a right to use. Kripp v. Curtis, 11 P. P. 879; 71 Cal. 62
15 16 17
A highway includes all public ways which the public generally has a right to use for passage and traffic, traffic, and includes includes streets in cities, cities, sidewalks, sidewalks, turnpikes and bridges. bridges. Central Central Ill. Coal Mining Mining Co. v. Illinois Power Co., 249 Ill. App.199.
18 19 20 21
Our courts has stressed he basic right of the transient public and abutting property owners to the free passage of vehicles on public highways and the paramount function of travel as overriding all other subordinate uses of our streets. State v. Perry, Perry, 269 Minn. 204, 206
22
A highway is a public road, which every citizen of the state has a right to use for the purpose of
23
travel. Shelby County Com’rs v. Castetter, 33 N.E. 986, 987, 7 Ind. App. 309; Spindler v. Toomey, 111
24 25
N.E/2d 715, 716 (Ind.-1963). The public have a right of free and unobstructed transit over streets, sidewalks and alleys, and
26
this is the primary appropriate appropriate use to which they are generally generally dedicated. dedicated. Pugh v. City, City, 176 Iowa 593,
27
599, 156 N.W. 892, 894.
28 Page 19 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
1
It is well settled law that every member of the public has a right to use the public roads in a
2
reasonable manner for the promotion of his health and happiness. Sumner v. County v. Interurban
3
Transp. Co., 141 Tenn. 493 500.
4 5
A highway is a road or way upon which all persons have a right to travel at pleasure. It is the right of all persons to travel upon a road. Gulf & S.I.R. Co. v Adkinson, 77 So. 954, 955; 117 Miss. 118.
6 7
HIGHWAY.-A free and public road, way, or street; one which every person has the right to use. Black’s Black’s Law Dictionary, 2d Ed. (1910), p. 571
8 9 10 11 12
The right to travel over a street or highway is a primary absolute right of everyone. Foster’s Inc. v. Boise City, 118 P.2d 721, 728 A right is a passage, road or street which every citizen has a right to use. Ohio, Indiana, & W. Ry. Ry. Co. v. People, 39 Ill. App. 473.
13 Highways are public roads, which every citizen has a right to use. Wild v. v. Deig, 43 Ind. 455, 455 , 458; 14
13 Am. Rep. 399.
15 16 17 18 19
The courts of this land have repeatedly and consistently concurred on the fact that the people have a right to travel on the public roads and highways of this country. But the nature of this right must be determined. What type of right is it questioned here? It is only a statutory right or an inherent right? The cases cited indicate that it is a fundamental, inalienable, inherent and constitutional right. Other authorities verify this to be true:
20 21 22 23
It is settled that the streets of a city belong to the people of a state and the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen of the state. Whyte v. City of Sacramento, 65 Cal. App. 534, 547, 224 Pac. 1008, 1013 (1924); Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1950), 222 Pac. 2d 1, 5, 35 Cal.2d 870 (1950).
24 25 26 27
The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583 (Va.-1930). (Va.-1930).
28 Page 20 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
1
This right of the people to the use of the public streets of a city is so well established and so
2
universally recognized in this country, that it has become a part of the alphabet of fundamental rights of
3
the citizen. Swift v. City of Topeka, Topeka, 23 Pac. 1075,1076, 1075 ,1076, 43 Kansas 671, 674. 674 .
4
The right of a citizen to use the highways, include the streets of the city or town, for travel and to
5
transport his goods, is an inherent right which cannot be taken from him. Florida Motor Lines v. Ward,
6
137 So. 163, 167. Also: State v. Quigg, 114 So. 859, 862 (Fla.-1927); Davis v. City of Houston, 264
7
S.W. 625, 629 (Tex. Civ. App., 1924).
8 9 10 11 12 13
The right to travel, to go from place to place as the means of transportation permit, is a natural right subject to the rights of others and to reasonable regulation under law. Shactman v Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 941 (1955) The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon either by carriage or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but, a common right.@ See Thompson v Smith, 154 SE 579.
14 15
“All citizens of the United States of America have a right to pass and re-pass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in their own state.” See Smith v. Turner, Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 12 L Ed. 702.
16 17 18 19
Every citizen has an inalienable right to make use of the public highways of the state; every citizen has full freedom to travel from place to place in the enjoyment of life and liberty. People v Nothaus, 363 P.2d P.2d 180, 182 (Colo.-1961).
20
Definition of “Passenger: “One who is traveling, as in a public coach, or in a ship, or on foot.
21
This is the usual, through corrupt orthography.” See American Dictionary Of The English Language By
22
Noah Webster, 1828.
23
It is thus well established that the right to travel by an American/ citizen on the public roads is a
24
fundamental and constitutional right and, in fact, inalienable and natural right, one inherent in an
25
American/ citizen and secured by b y the Organic Law of the Land.
26
The Common Law Right to Travel
27 28 Page 21 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
1
The concept that traveling upon the roads is a basis fundamental right of every citizen, i.e.,
2
American, in the land is not a new concept in law. The right of every person to freely travel on public
3
ways is well grounded in the ancient common law:
4
A highway according to the common law, is a place in which all the people have a right to pass.
5
A common street and public highway are the same, and any way which is common to all the people may
6
be called a highway. highway. Skinner v. Town of Weathersfield , 63 A. 142, 143; 78 Vt. 410.
7 At common law every member of the public has a right to use, in a reasonable manner and with 8 9
due care, public roads, inclusive of public bridges. Shell Oil Co. v Jackson County , 193 S.W. 2d 268, 271 (Tex. Civ. App.-1946).
10 11 12
“In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 27 L.Ed.2d 272, 92 S.Ct. 260, Brennan, joined by White and Marshall stated that for more than a century, century, the Supreme Court has recognized the constituti constitutional onal right of all citizens to unhindered interstate travel and that both the existence of this right and its
13
fundamental importance in America has been long been established beyond question.” Also see Dunn v.
14
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 31 Law yer’s yer’s Edition 2nd 272, 92 S.Ct. 995, 56 Columbia L. Rev. 47.
15 16 17
“The rule is firmly established that the right of a citizen of one state to pass into any state of the Union . . . without molestation [restriction] is secured and protected by the United States Constitution.” See 16A Am Jur 2d 607 Page 550-6, Freedom to travel.
18 19 20
It has been held directly in a number of cases that at common law a driver of a vehicle has the right to drive upon any part of the highway. Boyer v North End Drayage Co., 67 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Mo. App.-1934).
21 22 23 24
The common law rule was that a public highway was a “way common and free to all the king’s subjects to pass and repass at liberty,” and this court recognized that the “right to travel a highway belongs to everybody in the state,. . .that a highway belongs to the public, and is free and common as a way to every citizen on the land.” land. ” House-Wives League v. v. City of Indianapolis, 204 Ind. 685, 685 , 688-89.
25 26
In quoting from some old English law books on the common law, the Tennessee Chancery Appeals Court stated the following:
27 28 Page 22 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
1
Under the general law a public street is a public highway, and, if a highway, it is a “road which
2
every citizen has a right to use.” The right of the citizen to pass and repass on it is limited to no
3
particular part of it for, as said in the books, “the public are entitled not only to a free passage along the
4
highway, but to a free passage along any portion of it not in the actual use of some other traveler.” 1
5 6
Hawk. P.C. P.C. 22; Ang. & D. Highways, Highways, ' 226. *** Under the common common law a public highway was “a way common and free to all the king’s subjects to pass and repass at liberty.” State v. Stroud 52 S.W. 697, 698 (Tenn.-1899); Also see, 3 Kent, Comm. 432
7 8 9 10
The complete freedom and common right to travel on the highways is so old and well established that it has never been questioned, until this century. The general recognition of this right is due to its fundamental importance in our civilized society. It thus is a fundamental right that was secured by both Federal and State constitutions.
11 12 13
There can be no denial of the general proposition hat every citizen of the United States, and every citizen of each state of the Union, as an attribute of personal liberty, has the right ordinarily, of free transit from, or through the territory of any State. This freedom of egress or ingress is guaranteed to
14
all by the clearest implications of the Federal, as well as of the State constitution. It has been said that
15
even in England, England, whence our system system of jurisprude jurisprudence nce was derived, derived, the right to personal liberty did not
16
depend on any express statute, but bu t “it was the birthright of every freeman.”-Cooley’s Const. Lim. 342.
17
This right was said by Sir William Blackstone to consist in “the power of locomotion, of
18
changing changing situation, situation, or of moving one’s one’s person person to whatever whatever place one’s one’s inclination inclination may direct, direct, without without
19
imprisonment or restraint, unless by due process of law.” 1 Bl. Comm. 134 Joseph v. Randolph, 71 Ala.
20
499, 504-505.
21
The use of roads for travel is a very ancient practice. The right to travel upon them has been
22
recognized since the early Roman Empire. This right to freely travel as an attribute of personal liberty
23
was so basic and fundamental in early America that it never became the subject matter of colonial
24
legislation. Not even under the tyranny of King George III was the right to travel suppressed. Liberty
25
was recognized and secured by all of the original state constitutions. When California became a state, its citizens possessed this liberty and right to travel. The Constitution of California (1849 De jure) when
26
adopted secured this inalienable right to liberty, locomotion, or travel on the public ways.
27 28 Page 23 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
1 2 3
Freedom of locomotion, although subject to proper restrictions, is included in the >liberty’ guaranteed by State Constitution. Commonwealth v. Doe, 167 A. 241, 242: 109 Pa. Super. 187. The leading cases regarding the free exercise of the right of travel in general g eneral are:
4 5 6
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)
7 8 9
Zemel v. Rusk , 381 U.S. 1 (1965) United States v. Guest , 383 U.S. 745 (1966)
10 11 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) 12
Oregon v. Mitchell , 400 U.S. 112 (1970)
13 14
Graham v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)
15 16
Automobiles and the Right to Travel.
17
This This inalie inalienabl nablee and constit constituti utional onal right to travel travel on public public roads includ includes es the use use of an
18
automobile as a means of conveyance. Since the invention of the automobile the courts of this land have
19 20
universally recognized the automobile not only as a lawful means of conveyance, but one that has equal rights with other modes of travel using public wa ys:
21
The law does not denounce motor carriages, as such, on public ways.* * * they have an equal
22
right with other vehicles in common use to occupy the streets and roads.* * * It is improper to say that
23 24
the driver of the horse has rights in the roads superior to the driver of the automobile. Both have the right to use the easement. Indiana Springs Co. v. Brown, 165 Ind. 465, 468.
25
The right to make use of an automobile as a vehicle of travel long the highways of the state, is no
26
longer an open question. The owners thereof have the same rights in the roads and streets as the drivers
27 28
of horses or those riding a bicycle or traveling in some other vehicle. House v. Cramer, 112 N.W. 3; 134 Iowa 374; Farnsworth v. Tampa Tampa Electric Co. 57 So. 233, 23 3, 237, 62 Fla. 166. Page 24 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
1 2
Automobiles have the right to use the highways of the State on an equal footing with other vehicles. Cumberland Telephone. & Telegraph Co. v Yeiser, 141 Ky. 15.
3 4
Each citizen has the absolute right to choose for himself the mode of conveyance he desires, whether it be by wagon or carriage, by horse, motor or electric car, or by bicycle, or astride of a horse,
5
subject to the sole condition that he will observe all those requirements that are known as the law of the
6
road. Swift v City of Topeka, 43 Kansas 671, 674.
7 A farmer has the same right to the use of the highways of the state, whether on foot or in a motor 8
vehicle, as any an y other citizen. Draffin v. Massey, Massey, 92 S.E.2d 38, 42.
9 There can be no question of the right of automobile owners to occupy and use the public streets
10 11
of cities, or highways highwa ys in the rural districts. Liebrecht v. Crandall, 126 N.W. N.W. 69, 110 Minn. 454, 456.
12
The automobile may be used with safety to others users of the highway, and in its proper use
13
upon the highways there is an equal right with the users of other vehicles properly upon the highways.
14 15
The law recognizes such right of use upon general principles. Brinkman v Pacholike, 84 N.E. 762, 764, 41 Ind. App. 662, 666.
16
Automotive vehicles are lawful means of conveyance and have equal rights upon the streets with
17
horses and carriages. Chicago Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 205; See also: Christy v.
18 19
Elliot, 216 Ill. 31; Ward v. Meredith, 202 Ill. 66; Shinkle v. McCullough, 116 Ky. 960; Butler v. Cabe, 116 Ark. 26, 28-29.
20
Though, as we have said, automobiles are lawful vehicles and have equal rights on the highways
21
with horses and carriages. Daily v. Maxwell, 133 S.W. 351, 354. Matson v. Dawson, 178 N.W. 2d 588,
22
591.
23
A traveler has an equal right to employ an automobile as a means of transportation and to occupy
24
the public highways with other vehicles in common use. Campbell v. Walker, 78 Atl. 601, 603, 2 Boyce
25
(Del.) 41.
26
There is no distinction made by these authorities (and many others) in the mode of travel a
27
citizen chooses to use on a public way. A citizen has the same inalienable right to travel on a public road
28
by use of an automobile as another citizen does traveling on foot or bicycle thereon: Page 25 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
1
A highway is a public way open and free to any one who has occasion to pass along it on foot or
2
with any kind of vehicle. Schlesinger v. City of Atlanta, 129 S.E. 861, 867, 161 Ga. 148, 148 , 159; Holland v.
3
Shackelford, 137 S.E. 2d 298, 304, 220 Ga. 104; 104 ; Stavola v. Palmer, Palmer, 73 A.2d 831, 838, 136 Conn. Con n. 670
4
Persons may lawfully ride in automobiles, as they may lawfully ride on bicycles. Doherty v.
5
Ayer, 83 N.E. 677, 197 Mass. 241, 246; Molway v. City of Chicago, 88 N.E. 485, 486, 239 Ill. 486;
6
Smiley v. v. East St. Louis Ry. Ry. Co., 100 N.E. 157, 157 , 158.
7 The owner of an automobile has the same right as the owner of other vehicles to use the 8 9
highway,* highway,* * * A traveler on foot has the same right to the use of the public highways as an automobile or any other vehicle. Simeone v. Lindsay, Lindsay, 65 Atl. 778, 779; 7 79; Hannigan v. Wright, Wright, 63 Atl. 234, 236.
10 11
A traveler on foot has the same right to use of the public highway as an automobile or any other vehicle. Cecchi v. Lindsay, Lindsay, 75 Atl. 376, 377, 1 Boyce (Del.) 185.
12 13 14 15 16 17
To further qualify the right to travel on the public roads by way of an automobile, several courts have made the obvious connection between its use and that of a constitutional liberty or as an individual right. This could only be the natural conclusion: If traveling per se is an inalienable and constitutional right, and if the automobiles has “equal rights” with the older forms of travel such as on foot or horseback, the logical deduction here is that traveling by way of an automobile on a public way is a constitutional, inalienable, and fundamental right:
18 19
The use of the automobile as a necessary adjunct to the earning of a livelihood in modern life requires us in the interest of realism to conclude that the right to use an automobile on the public
20
highways partakes of the nature of a liberty within the meaning of the constitutional guarantees of which
21
the citizen not be deprived without due process of law. Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A.2d 869, 872; 87 R.I.
22
226, 231 (1958). (195 8). See also: Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d P.2d 136, 140; 93 Ariz. 273 (1963).
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The right to operate a motor vehicle [an automobile] upon the public streets and highways is not
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a mere privilege. It is a right of liberty, the enjoyment of which is protected by the guarantees of the
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federal and state constitutions. Adams v. v. City of Pocatello, 416 P.2d P.2d 46, 48; 48 ; 91 Idaho 99 (1966).
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The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways* * *includes the right in so doing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day; and under the existing modes of travel includes the right to drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon, or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and Page 26 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
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ordinary ordinary purposes of life and business.* business.* * *The rights aforesaid, aforesaid, being fundamental, fundamental, are constituti constitutional onal rights. Teche Teche Lines v. Danforth, 12 So.2d 784, 787 (Miss.-1943). See also Thompson v. Smith, supra.
3 4
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
5
Happin Happiness ess-Th -That at to secure secure these these rights rights,, Govern Governmen ments ts are instit institute uted d among among Men, Men, derivi deriving ng their their just just
6
powers from the consent of the governed... The Declaration of Independence-1776.
7 The office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of government activity. It 8
thus proclaims, safeguards and preserves in basic form the pre-existing laws, rights, mores, habits and
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modes of thought and life of the people as developed under the common law and as existing at the time
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of its adoption to the extent and as therein stated. Dean v. Paolicelli, 72 S.E. 2d 506, 510; 194 Va. 219
11
(1952).
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Hence, it may be said with great propriety, that a constitution “measures the powers of the rules,
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but it does not measure the rights of the governed;” that is not the origin of rights, nor the fountain of
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law-but it is the “framework of the political government, and necessarily based upon the pre-existing
15
condition of laws, rights, habits, modes of thought.” Cooley Con. Lim., 37 Atchison & Nebraska R.R.
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Co. v. Baty, Baty, 6 Neb. 37, 41.
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The rights of the individual are not derived from governmental agencies, either municipal, state,
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or federal, or even from the Constitution. They exist inherently in every man, by endowment of the
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Creator Creator, and are merely reaffirme reaffirmed d in the Constitution, Constitution, and restricted restricted only to the extent that they have
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been voluntarily voluntarily surrendered surrendered by the citizenship citizenship to the agencies of government. government. The people’ people’s rights are not not deriv derived ed from from the the gover governme nment nt,, but the the gover governm nment ent’’s auth author orit ity y come comess from from the the peop people. le. The The Constitution but states again these rights already existing, and when legislative encroachment by the
22
nation, state, or municipality invade these original and preserved rights, it is the duty of the courts to so
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declare, and to afford the necessary relief. City of Dallas et al. v. Mitchell, 245 S.W. 944, 945-46 (Tex-
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1922).
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There is nothing primitive about a State Constitution. It is based upon the pre-existing laws,
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rights habits, and modes of thought of the people who ordained it, * * *and must be construed in the
27
light of this fact. Commonwealth v City of Newport News, 164 S.E. 689, 696 (1932).
28 Page 27 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
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The purpose and intent of a written constitution is to preserve the ancient rights held at common
2
law, and constitutional provisions are to be so interpreted (See, American Jurisprudence, 2nd Ed., Vol.
3
16, ' 321). It thus becomes plain that all rights that the people inherently possessed when Connecticut
4
was a Colony, were secured by the Constitution of Pennsylvania when adopted. That the right to freely
5 6
travel, by what ever means available, on public ways had existed at that time cannot be doubted. The people who adopted the Constitution certainly did not “surrender” their liberty to freely travel by becoming citizens and/or residents of Connecticut. In fact they made sure that the Constitution would
7
“secure the same to ourselves and our posterity.” This is the main reason why the Constitution was
8
“ordained and established” (I bid).
9 10
This principle, along with the broad meaning of “liberty,” were evidently not understood by the trial court. Defendant would have prohibiting the State from restricting his right to travel via licensing.
11
Thus, the trial court believes that if a right is not exactly spelled out in the Constitution (such as the right
12
to travel), then it constitutionally does not exist. It has been held by a sister State, Minnesota Supreme
13
Court that citizens possess such rights whether they are enumerated in a constitution or not:
14
The rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens exist notwithstanding there is no specific
15
enumeration thereof in state constitutions. These instruments measure the powers of rulers, but they do
16
not measure the rights of the governed.* * *The constitution of Minnesota specifically recognizes the
17 18 19
right to “life, liberty or property,” but does not attempt to enumerate all “the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof” It, however, significantly provides: “The enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained by and inherent in the people.” Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley Valley,, 217 Minn. 218, 225; 14 N.W. N.W. 2d 400 (1944).
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It should be quite obvious from the forgoing authorities that a Citizen does have an inalienable and Constitutional right to travel on the public highways, which includes the use of an automobile as a means of conveyance. This means the State Legislature cannot impair or suspend this Constitutional right or prohibit me from exercising it.
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We realize that the police is elastic to meet changing conditions and changing cha nging needs, yet it cannot be used to abrogate abroga te or limit personal liberty or property rights contrary to constitutional sanction. City of
26
Cincinnati v. Correll, 49 N.E. 2d 412, 414; 141 Ohio St. 535.
27 28 Page 28 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
1
By the expression “constitutional right,” as just used, we mean a right guaranteed to the citizen
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by the Constituti Constitution on and so guaranteed guaranteed as to prevent legislative legislative interference interference with that right. right. Delaney v. v.
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Plunkett, 91 S.E. 561; 146 Ga. 547.
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The Undersigned now brings to light in what manner can a license be used when controlling the acts of individuals that are regarded as “natural rights,” or in exercising “constitutional rights.”
6 7 8 Respectfully __________________________ Rik Wayne Munson 9 10 11 12
Notary Statement State of Cal California
13 14
) )
County of Napa
SS )
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Before me, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared
17 18
_______________________________________________________________ (Affiant Signature)
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Known to me or proved to be the person whose name na me is subscribed to in the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she executed the same for the purposes and consideration therein expressed.
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Affiant is:
___ Personally known to me, or
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___ Has produced Identification. ID# _____________________________________
I certify under penalty of Perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.
28 Page 29 of 30 DMV LETTER OF RECISSION
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Given under my hand and seal and executed this ________ day of ________________ , 2003.
3 4 ____________________________________
5 6
(Seal)
Notary Public for the State of California
7 8 9 10
My commission expires ________________________________
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