stability extended beyond Bosnia to the surrounding region, and expressed concern at the escalating ethnic tension in Kosovo. 2.6. Led by the moderate Ibrahim Rugova, who had been elected "President of Kosovo" in unofficial elections in 1992, the Kosovo Albanians pursued a policy of pragmatic non-violent resistance in response to Belgrade’s repression. But this made little progress, and the continued repression by Milosevic’s regime led to the radicalisation of elements of the Kosovo Albanian population, and the emergence of a new organisation, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which resorted to violent means to try to achieve its objectives. 2.7. The KLA’s escalating attacks on the Yugoslav/Serbian security forces brought ever more heavy-handed responses. These had severe repercussions for the local population, sometimes involving direct violence against civilians. Open conflict broke out in 1998 following violent Yugoslav/Serbian security force operations in the Drenica region in late February and early March which left 30 Kosovo Albanians dead. Following this incident, NATO’s concerns were re emphasised in a statement by the North Atlantic Council in March 1998. 2.8. The international community, including NATO, condemned all acts of violence in Kosovo, and sought throughout to take an even-handed approach. The arms embargo imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 1160 in March 1998 applied equally to both the Yugoslav/Serbian governments and the KLA. UN, Contact Group, NATO and EU statements clearly condemned terrorism. Belgrade’s right to respond to KLA acts of terrorism was accepted, but only if this involved appropriate and proportionate action. This did not include the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of tanks and heavy artillery which became the norm, and which rapidly eroded sympathy amongst the international community for Yugoslav/Serbian anti-terrorist operations. 2.9. The international community attempted to put pressure on the KLA, but for much of the crisis the KLA was a disparate organisation, with no clear structure or hierarchy. There was a large amount of weaponry freely available to the KLA in Albania, following widespread looting of armouries in the wake of the collapse of the Albanian Government in March 1997, and widespread local sympathy for their aims in the mountainous border regions. The KLA also appeared able to draw on funds from Kosovo Albanians living abroad, and possibly also from criminal activities. Once the KLA’s political leadership was established, with Hashim Thaqi’s emergence as the key figure at the Rambouillet peace talks, it was possible to make the position of the international community known to the organisation more effectively. 2.10. Throughout 1998, diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful, negotiated solution were led by the Contact Group. Intensive shuttle diplomacy between the two sides was conducted by US Envoy Chris Hill. But continued diplomatic efforts were rebuffed by Milosevic. We had no illusions about the difficulty of persuading Milosevic to engage with reasonable international attempts to resolve the Kosovo crisis. Because of the potential humanitarian and regional implications of continued or accelerated repression in Kosovo, it became clear that military options should be considered by NATO as one part of the wider effort by the international community to find a solution. NATO Defence Ministers therefore decided in June 1998 to task NATO military planners to produce a range of options, both ground and air, for military support to the diplomatic process, and by early August the results had been reviewed by the North Atlantic Council. The options considered included a phased air operation, a ground force to implement a ceasefire or peace agreement and - at the top end of the spectrum - a ground force which could enter Kosovo against
