UNIT 1 EVOLUTION OF INDIA’S WORLD-VIEW Structure 1.1 1.2 1.3
Introduction Sources of Traditional Values Nature of Traditional Values and Themes in the Evolution of World-view 1.3.1
Preference for the Middle Way
1.3.2
Tolerance
1.3.3
Idealist and Realist Traditions
1.3.4
Absence of Imperialist Tradition and Ideals of Freedom Struggle
1.3.5
Approach to International Law
1.3.6
Expressing Positive Ideas through Negative Terms
1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7
British Rule in India The Indian National Congress on India’s World-view Summary Exercises
1.1
INTRODUCTION
The prime objective of this unit is to explain how India’s history, cultural and philosophical tradition and ideals of freedom struggle helped the evolution of its world-view in the post-Independence era. For, after all world-view of any country being a form of social action and its makers being part of the socio-cultural milieu in which they operate, the significance of those values and traditions, especially those transmitted through successive generations, cannot be gainsaid. This is especially true in the case of countries like India, which has been the seat of an ancient civilisation and meeting-place of great cultures. According to India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, who tailored its world-view during the initial phase, two aspects of India’s world-view, namely, the ‘positive aspect of peace’ and the desire to promote ‘a larger degree of co-operation among nations,’ were based on India’s past thinking on the formulation of foreign policy. It is therefore necessary to discuss those socially accepted traditional values, which are expressed either in writings of thinkers or embodied in ancient institutions and customs that inculcate peaceful attitudes and practices notwithstanding imperfections or shortcomings in these ideals and objectives native to India.
1.2
SOURCES OF TRADITIONAL VALUES
The chief sources of India’s ancient values are the scriptural texts like the Vedas; the law books by sages such as Manu, Yajnyavalkya, and Parashar; the Dharmasastras; text of Buddhists and Jains; the great epics, the Ramayana and Mahabharata; the puranas, legends, and chronicles of great national events; and theological treatises and manuals of worship. As a means of popular education in social values, these epics are even more important than the scriptural texts and law books, knowledge of which is generally confined to a very few. 1
It is relevant to remember in this context that the above-mentioned traditional sources of values covered various aspects of human life such as spiritual, social, economic, and political, as ancient Indians did not divide human activities in watertight compartments. Secondly, though these traditional values underwent certain changes due to the impact of the Islamic and Western culture, the works of modern Indian thinkers like Vivekananda, Tagore, Tilak, Aurobindo, Gandhi, and Nehru show that they were very much influenced by ancient Indian thought, which in turn influenced their ideas about shaping the destiny of independent India.
1.3 NATURE OF TRADITIONAL VALUES AND THEMES IN THE EVOLUTION OF WORLD-VIEW Five aspects of India’s traditional values have a bearing on the evolution of its world-view, namely, preference for a middle way, tolerance, idealist and realist traditions, absence of imperialist tradition, and a habit of expressing positive ideas through negative terms.
1.3.1 Preference for the Middle Way A preference for the middle way has been one of the cardinal features of Indian tradition and culture as seen in the Sanskrit saying, ati sarvatra varjayet meaning “Let us eschew excess at all times”. This saying underlines India’s philosophical abhorrence of absolute, of extremes, of the tendency to see things strictly in terms of black and white. It runs like an unbroken thread through Indian culture. The Indian preference for the middle path is reflected in their attempt to synthesise the goals of dharma, (“duties—whether social, moral, spiritual, or ritual”), artha (“capital accumulation”), Kama (“sensual pleasure”), and moksha (“liberation”). Though dharma and moksha are given prime importance, artha and kama are not ignored. This is evident, for instance, from works like Vatsyayana’s Kamsutra, from sculptures like those of Khajuraho, and from sayings like sarve gunah kanchanamasraynti (“all virtues lie in gold”). The BhagavadGita therefore speaks of the divine sanction for all desires, which are not against the moral order and moral law. While there may be disagreement as to how far the Indians have been able to translate their ideals into practice and to arrive at a position in the socio-economic and politico-religious ordering of life that could secure the solace of both the worlds—the here and hereafter, one cannot gainsay the significance of the underlying synergetic impulsions of Indian culture. Michael Brecher, therefore, observes: “The central message of India’s philosophical traditions dating from the Buddha has revolved round the rejection of absolutes, and extreme positions. On the contrary, it has stressed philosophical relativity, intellectual Catholicism and co-existence of good and evil, in short the golden middle path of compromises and tolerance of opposites.” Nehru echoes the same sentiment, when he says: “India has absorbed and harmonised different religions; and even the conflict between science and religion in the past; and maybe it is our destiny to help reconcile the conflicting ideologies of today.” In view of such a cultural-philosophical tradition, it was not surprising that India should prefer the golden mean of the middle way between the two competing international ideologies during the Cold War years—Western liberal democracy and Soviet egalitarianism. With the West, India shared such values as dignity of individual and sanctity of civil liberties, democratic political
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institutions, the rule of law, and modern technology. At the same time, it appreciated the Soviet emphasis on distributive justice and its stand against colonialism and racialism, as also its Asiamindedness. India, therefore, refused to align with any power bloc and resolved to cooperate with both of them in furtherance of its own ideals and interests. Nehru proclaimed this in a language reminiscent of the great Ashoka thus: “We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from politics of groups aligned against one another. The world, in spite of its rivalries and hatred and inner conflicts, moves inevitably towards closer cooperation and the building up of a world commonwealth.” This was the message of friendship that India issued in 1946. This policy of friendship gave India freedom of manoeuvre in a world, which was getting frozen in its divisions. Even the Great Powers, their reservations notwithstanding, found India’s detached stance useful in the Korean, Indochinese, Suez, and other crises. Thus, by becoming a bridge between the two power blocs and by blunting the edges of the ideological conflict between them, India acquired a prominence in the comity of nations far in excess of military strength and economic capabilities.
1.3.2
Tolerance
The aforesaid account of the ancient Indian philosophic attitude of avoiding extremes shows the traditional faith in reason and abhorrence of dogma. As the old Indian saying goes, vade, vade jayate tattvasiddhih: “Enlightenment is achieved through debate.” Ancient Indian tradition believes in the paramountcy of reason. Prajna (“reason”) is an important concept that indicates how one may pursue the three objectives of life—dharma, artha and kama. In the Mahabharata, for instance, there is a clear attempt to relativise dharma by saying that it has to be judged on the basis of experience and reason. This undogmatic approach to duty and rational tradition that does not claim monopoly of truth constitutes the core of Indian culture; from it flows tolerance. This tolerant approach rests on the belief that the human mind, being limited in its range and power, cannot comprehend the nature of reality in its totality. The Rigveda, therefore proclaims, ekam sadviprah bahudha vadanti meaning, “The one truth is described variously by learned”. The Upanishads declare that just as cows of varied colours yield the same white milk, all the different paths lead to the same goal. Tolerance is not just an ideal mentioned in the scriptures: it is a social reality. That is why, when the first Christians came to Kerala in 47 AD, they were not repulsed or hounded but welcomed; and when the first Jews came to Kerala in 70 AD, they too were welcomed and allowed to practise and propagate their faith. Similarly, when the Parsis fled their own country in the face of the advent of Islam and came to India in the 7th Century AD, they were also to practise and propagate their faith. The Ashokan edicts speak highly of tolerance of all the views then obtaining. Though there were religious persecutions during the time of some Muslim rulers, tolerance was conspicuous during the reign of the Emperor Akbar, who adopted a policy of universal harmony (sulh-i-kul). The Muslim poet, Rahim, and the Hindu poet, Tulsidas, were close friends. The eldest son of the Emperor Shah Jahan—Dara Shikoh—translated the Upanishads into Persian. The recurring caste and communal violence in India shows that there is much less tolerance today than there was in the past; we cannot deny that the tradition of tolerance is fundamental to the life of the masses in India. This explains why secularism has been adopted and has survived in India inspite of its aberrations.
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In the sphere of foreign relations, tradition of tolerance made it impossible for India to join any particular bloc and conduct its international relations from the black-and-white perspective of that bloc. The tolerant and pluralistic outlook of the Indian mind made it to react instinctively against the politics of the Cold War characterised by intolerance and against the claims of the two blocs that they alone had the monopoly of truth and virtue. Instead, India chose to purse a policy of peaceful co-existence and friendship towards all countries. This is why, when in the 1950s, the then US secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, and the then US vice-president, Richard M. Nixon, used almost abusive language with reference to the nonaligned countries, Nehru urged them neither to suppress discussion nor to give up tolerance in discussing the external relations of the new countries. He said: “I submit for consideration that Mr. Nixon and Mr. Dulles are saying something opposed to the democratic way of life…. The very basis of democracy is tolerance for differing points of view.” The tradition of tolerance in fact has been the basis of India’s emphasis on the peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiations. The essence of India’s approach has been that, to achieve a lasting result, an attempt should be made to see that neither of the parties engaged in a conflict suffers significant loss. This is how Gandhi tried to resolve India’s domestic tension as well as to secure freedom for India—a modern application of the principle of negotiation so forcefully adumbrated in the Mahabharata. Nehru clarified the essence of this approach on several occasions. For instance, in a speech broadcast from London on 12 January 1951, he said: “If we desire peace we must develop the temper of peace, and try to win over those who may be suspicious of us or who think that they are against us.” The aforesaid approach to negotiation was illustrated in India’s Panchaseela agreement with China in 1954, the premium it put on diplomatic negotiations for a settlement of the border dispute with China even after the situation worsened in 1959, and, its acceptance of the Colombo proposals formulated by certain friendly countries after the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 as the basis for a resolution of the India-China border dispute. Prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee’s visit to Beijing in June 2003 and the sincere attempts made thereafter to move India-China relations forward is in line with India’s traditional approach to negotiation. This approach to conciliation is also reflected in India’s offer of a no-war pact to Pakistan in 1949 and its repeated renewal of the offer in the subsequent years, its willingness to accept a division of Kashmir on the basis of the ceasefire line in the interest of Indo-Pakistani peace. New Delhi’s current peace initiative with Pakistan is the latest manifestation of this negotiating method.
1.3.3
Realist and Idealist Traditions
Two important approaches to inter-state relations have existed in India since the beginning. The positivist approach is advocated, for example, in the Arthasastra of Kautilya, as well as of Bharadvaja, in Manusmriti, in some portions dealing with the teaching of Panchatantra. While these realist thinkers differ over the means to be employed, they generally believe that both defence of a kingdom and aggressive war, if used to conquer the whole country, are just. They hold that war should be undertaken only as the last resort, not because war is immoral, but because it is expensive and troublesome and victory is not certain. Panchatantra, for instance, says that royal policy has peace for its beginning and war for its end. On the other hand, from the times immemorial, a school of philosophy has existed in India, which 4
maintains that penance, self-abnegation and non-injury are the means to get rid of sin and secure salvation. The Upanishads give us the basis of the theory of non-violence. There is one undivided and indivisible spirit, which may be called God or truth. The universe is expression of it, and all beings form part of it. Since perfection consists in realising this truth, any kind of violence would be a repudiation of the truth. The Buddhists and the Jains are most fervent advocates of non-violence although non-violence is expected to be practised rigorously only by monks. On the whole, they discourage Machiavellian politics and deglamourise war. A Mahayana Sutra, the Suvarnaprabhasottama, condemns all warfare as sinful. When Ashoka became a Buddhist and renounced war as an instrument of his foreign policy, he uncovered a new dimension of inter-state relations. He maintained friendly and diplomatic relations with his immediate neighbours and other countries of Europe and Asia and pursued a peaceful, non-aggressive policy throughout his reign. In the modern era, Mahatma Gandhi revolutionised the idea of non-violence by demonstrating first in South Africa and later in India, that it could be employed as a weapon to achieve sociopolitical ends. He wished to use this ideal of non-violence in international relations as well, as according to him, this was the only way to ensure security in the atomic age. Needless to add, the stress on disarmament in India’s world-view derives from this ideal of non-violence. The application of non-violence to India’s world-view meant a deliberate acceptance of a method or approach to foreign policy problems, which emphasised the temper of peace. This was clearly reflected in India’s decision to remain a member of the Commonwealth of Nations after independence although Britain had subjected India to injustice and cruelty. Echoing this spirit of reconciliation, Nehru stated in the Rajya Sabha: “Our approach is not to stress the differences but to stress the similarities.” This idealist method had its limitations as India discovered to its cost during the action in Goa in 1961, the Chinese invasion in 1962, and the Pakistani aggressions of 1965, 1971 and 1999. India attempted the peaceful method of negotiation in each case. From the failure to prevent war it learnt that the reality of power should be taken into account along with the non-violent approach to difficult international problems if the security of the country was to be ensured. In summing up the application of the ideal of non-violence to India’s world-view, Nehru therefore publicly stated: “He drew his inspiration from Gandhi.” He, however, followed the Master only as far as was practicable. The realist component in India’s world-view got strengthened after the Chinese aggression of 1962. As Nehru himself admitted: “In the past our preoccupation with the human problems of poverty and illiteracy was such that we were content to assign a relatively low priority to defence requirements in the conventional sense.” Not surprisingly, India’s world-view after the Chinese aggression has been less doctrinaire and more realistic despite the continuance of its broad ideological moorings.
1.3.4
Absence of Imperialist Tradition
Another distinguishing feature of Indian tradition is the absence of imperialist tradition, including what is called cultural imperialism. No prominent Indian thinker, not even a realist like Kautilya or
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Manu or Bodhayana, advocated the extension of Indian empire beyond the geographical boundaries of Bharat (India), which though varied from time to time, ultimately it came to mean the country stretching from the Himalayas to southern sea and from the western sea to the eastern. Kautilaya’s Arthasastra, or Samudragupta’s inscriptions, for instance, never envisage an Indian emperor’s rule beyond the Indian sub-continent. The Mahabharata too lays down that an Indian empire should not extend beyond the geographical limits of the country. Likewise, the concept of chakravartin (“supreme ruler dispensing justice and maintaining peace”) was envisaged only for the geographically and culturally defined parts of the country. Similarly, though Buddhist literature speaks of a world state “ruled” by one person, such rule should be established by love and not by force. Lord Buddha conceived of himself as chakravartin of this sort. There is, therefore, no evidence of any aggressive war waged by the Hindus and the Buddhists. The Hindus and Buddhists went to Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka as traders and missionaries, not as invaders and conquerors. They did not go there to drain off their wealth. On the contrary, the Indians who ruled in Southeast Asia underwent a process of indigenisation. They did not owe any allegiance to, and were not controlled by, any power based in India. Kanishka’s aggressive war against China and Chola’s conquest of and rule over Indonesia and Sri Lanka were repugnant to the Hindu and Buddhist cultures. They were in fact aberrations, which should not be used to negate the overall anti-imperialistic tradition of India. In fact the Cholas were engaged, not in opposing an alien culture, but in striving for supremacy over dynasties, which belonged to their own culture. Ancient Indian history is, on the other hand, replete with examples of kings who voluntarily relinquished conquered territories. Kalidasa’s Raghuvansam, for instance, mentions kings who won righteous victories but gave up the territories conquered by them. A Gupta conqueror named Baladitya defeated Mihiragula, a Huna, but in deference to his mother’s advice, he not only reinstated Mihiragula but also gave him a royal princess in marriage. Kalhan, in his Rajatarangini, speaks of many more such kings. Hindu kings apart, Ashoka denounced warfare everywhere in accordance with the Buddhist ideology. The desire of the best Muslim and Mughal rulers was also to establish a lasting all-India state and to ignore the world outside India. Rulers like Akbar tried to achieve the unification of India through tolerance, conciliation, and diplomacy. The attention of the Muslim rulers was confined to India: India was their whole world. They fought among themselves and with whoever came as invaders from beyond the Himalayas or from across the sea. There has thus been no deliberate attempt at imperialism at any time in the history of India. This anti-imperialist tradition and sentiments got a boost during the British rule, because of the suffering caused to the people by British imperialism. The leaders of India’s freedom struggle therefore viewed their movement as a part of the overall fight against imperialism and colonialism in the world. With this anti-imperialist tradition and culture, it was not surprising that when India achieved its independence it vigorously pursued the cause of emancipation of colonial and dependent territories and of promotion of racial equality through the policies of non-alignment and panchasheela. The support India gave to the freedom struggles of dependent peoples is now a part of history. To cite only a few examples: Nehru convened a conference in Delhi in 1949 to consider the question
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of securing Indonesia’s freedom from the Dutch; India extended support in the United Nations to the struggle for freedom in Algeria and Tunisia from the French and in Namibia from South Africa. India’s action in returning to Pakistan in 1972 the territories it had wrested from it in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 and in enabling Bangladesh to emerge as an independent nation is in line with the Indian tradition that prohibits an aggressive design by India and emphasises that it should allow other cultures and states to work out their destinies in their own way. Nehru, therefore, declared: “India’s world-view is grounded in ancient tradition and culture of this country.”
1.3.5
Approach to International Law
It was established in theory and practice in ancient India that it is the moral responsibility of a king to safeguard the person of an envoy accredited to his court by other kings. One who kills an envoy is supposed to overstep the limits of dharma and is condemned to hell. Kautilaya’s Arthasastra endorses this view. The Ramayana shows that even Ravana, the ruler of Lanka, has respected the idea of diplomatic immunity by agreeing to his brother’s advice not to kill Hanuman, who had gone to Lanka as an ambassador of Shri Rama. Modern international law too allows certain privileges and immunities to foreign emissaries. However, some countries have violated this well-established law. Pakistan burnt down the US embassy in 1980; Iran held American embassy personnel as hostages for a long period. On the other hand, the Government of India has observed all diplomatic immunities. More remarkable is India’s dealing with the refugees. India granted political asylum to the leaders of the Nepali Congress when they came in the wake of the crackdown ordered by the king of Nepal. It extended hospitality to the Dalai Lama of Tibet although it realised the price it might have to pay both politically and militarily. It accepted the heavy burden of looking after a million and more refugees who came over in 1971 from the former East Pakistan. While quite a number of them have still not returned to their country, the inflow of refugees has also never really stopped. India treated respectfully the prisoners of war who had been captured during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. They were later returned to Pakistan without any conditions. It accepted the responsibility of affording protection to the Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka in the mid-1980s. This modern Indian approach towards refugees in consonance with the dictum of the Mahabharata that says an enemy seeking protection from fear, destitution, or defeat should be cared for as if he were one’s own son. Similarly, the Hitopadesh declares that even if an enemy comes to our house, we should receive him with hospitality. One should be like a tree, which does not hold back its shade from a man even though he may have come to cut it down. It was this ideal that inspired Prithvi Raj Chauhan to always forgive Muhammad of Ghor, despite his repeated invasions. When, however, Chauhan was defeated, Muhammad of Ghor had him immediately killed!
1.3.6
Expressing Positive Ideas through Negative Terms
Indian history, tradition and culture have not only influenced the substance of independent India’s world-view, but also to name the main instrument of Indian world-view, non-alignment. As K P Misra explains: “Even a cursory look at the philosophical and civilisational tradition indicates that the Indians have been fond of noun with negative. It is through negative terms that the Indians have expressed positive and affirmative ideas of profound significance in their social evolution.” Thus, for example, instead of saying “peace,” the Indians say “non-violence” (ahimsa). Instead of saying “defeat”, they use the word “non-victory” (parajaya). Likewise, we are familiar with 7
the use of “non-one” (aneka) as against “many;” “non-idleness” (apramada) as against “exertion;” and “non-grudge” (avaira) as against “tolerance.” We can cite many more words and expressions of this kind, particularly from the literature of Buddhism and Jainism. These negative words have a positive meaning of great significance. Nakamura, therefore, rightly points out: “To other nations, showing the moral precepts in the negative form seemed somewhat powerless and unsatisfactory, but to the Indians, who lay stress on the negative phase and pursue the non-determinant, the negative form of expression has a more positive and powerful meaning.” The formulation of the concept in a negative way reminds us of the fact that one of India’s most far-reaching contributions to world civilisation is the concept of zero and its mathematical use in positive value. Seen from a wider angle, the expression as well as content of non-alignment may similarly suggest a deeper connection with the Indian cultural tradition. For, the word, nonalignment is though negative in expression, it has very positive connotations that include pursuit of an independent world-view, and efforts towards development, disarmament, decolonialisation and democratisation of international relations.
1.4
BRITISH RULE IN INDIA
The British rule in India helped evolve India’s world-view in three ways. Firstly, it gave stimulus to the national movement for freedom, which in turn led to India’s support for the freedom of dependent peoples all over the world. Both merits and demerits of the British rule contributed to the growth of national movement in India. As regards merits, facilitating of communication through setting of communication network, introduction of the English language, laying of railways and encouraging social reforms, and above all, bringing entire India under one administrative umbrella, the British rule contributed to the rise of nationalism in India. On the other hand, their racial arrogance, economic exploitation of Indians and excluding them from the power structure contributed to the rise of national consciousness even among the wealthy class of people, who earlier supported the British rule. This growing political consciousness was translated into mass movement when beginning with the widespread protest against the Partition of Bengal (1905) leaders like Aurobindo Ghosh, Bal Gangadhar Tilak and later on Mahatma Gandhi, began to develop mass contact with their fingers on the pulse of the people. Freedom movement thus became a national movement for freedom and ultimately found its fulfillment in 1947. Under the circumstances, independent India’s support to the freedom movement of dependent peoples all over the world was therefore not at all surprising. “We are particularly interested,” proclaimed Jawaharlal Nehru on 7 September 1946, outlining India’s world-view, “in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples.” Secondly, the humiliation and suffering experienced by Indians due to the British racialism made the leaders of independent India to strongly oppose racialism. Jawaharlal Nehru in his statement on India’s world-view on 7 September 1946, cited above, declared: “We repudiate utterly the Nazi doctrine of racialism, wheresoever and in whatever form it may be practised.” He reiterated this in the Constituent Assembly of India on 16 May 1949 thus: “One of the pillars of our foreign policy is to fight against racial discrimination.” Thirdly, India’s historic association with the British rule obliged independent India not to snap all of its ties with Britain to avoid practical difficulties. Explaining the imperatives of India’s continued association with the Commonwealth of Nations headed by Britain, Jawaharlal Nehru observed 8
in the Constituent Assembly: “The House knows that inevitably during the past century and more all kinds of contacts have arisen between England and this country…. Any marked change in this without something to follow created a hiatus, which may be harmful. Largely our educational apparatus has been influenced. Largely our military apparatus has been influenced by these considerations and we have grown up naturally as something rather like the British Army…. If we break away completely, the result is that without making sufficient provision for carrying on in a different way, we have a period of gap….If we don’t want to pay the price we should not pay it and face the consequences.”
1.5 THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS ON INDIA’S WORLD-VIEW Our discussion on the evolution of India’s world-view would not be complete without a reference to the ideas on nationalism and internationalism championed by the Congress during the struggle for freedom. In fact, the leading members of the Congress, as early as 1921, intended the Congress resolution on international developments to be a guide to independent India’s world-view. Mahatma Gandhi, for instance, declared: “Indeed, while we are maturing our plans for Swaraj, we are bound to consider and define our foreign policy. Surely, we are bound authoritatively to tell the world what relations we wish to cultivate with it.” The Jaipur Resolution of the Congress listed the promotion of world peace, the freedom of all nations, racial equality and the ending of imperialism and colonialism as guiding principles of this organisation. To this may be added one more—the duty of people of Indian origin settled abroad to identify themselves with the people of the country in which they had settled and not exploit them. Resolution after resolution passed by the Congress in its successive sessions clearly outlined India’s world-view after independence on these lines. The Haripur Congress resolution (1935), for instance, outlined India’s world-view thus: “The people of India desire to live in peace and friendship with their neighbours and with all other countries, and for this purpose wish to remove all causes of conflict between them… A free India will gladly associate itself with such an order and stand for disarmament and collective security. But world cooperation is impossible of achievement as long as the roots of international conflict remained and one nation dominates over another and imperialism hold away. In order, therefore, to establish world peace on an enduring basis, imperialism and exploitation of one people by another must end.”
1.6
SUMMARY
The above-account of the evolution of India’s world-view dating back to the ancient period shows that though both idealist and realist approaches to inter-state relations existed in India, the idealist approach advocated by Buddha and Gandhi dominated India’s world-view during the Nehru era notwithstanding the recourse to violence in extreme cases such as India’s military action for liberation of Goa. One may of course argue that Nehru’s policy of non-alignment was as idealist as it appears to be. For, an alternative policy on aligning with any super power would have brought the Cold War to India’s doorsteps and thereby jeopardised India’s pursuit of autonomy and economic development. The policy of non-alignment, for instance, served India’s
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national interest by enabling it to ensure Anglo-American assistance during the India-China war of 1962 and Soviet neutrality. At the same time this enabled India to contribute towards world peace and decolonisation. It is in this sense that the policy of non-alignment reflected both idealist and realist traditions of India. It cannot however be denied that a doctrinaire approach to non-alignment made Nehru to neglect India’s defence preparedness leading to its debacle by the Chinese, which Nehru himself admitted after that traumatic experience in India’s Parliament. India’s world-view turned to be more realistic after 1962. Yet changes in India’s world- view continued to take place only within the overall framework of continuity.
1.7
EXERCISES
1) What are the sources of India’s traditional values? How have these values guided India’s world-view after its independence? Explain. 2) Evaluate the idealist and realist thinking in ancient India. How, and to what extent could Nehru combine both the approaches in his world-view? Discuss. 3) “India’s policy of secularism and non-alignment are two aspects of the same coin, namely, tradition of tolerance.” Comment. 4) Discuss the traditional sources of India’s world-view.
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UNIT 2 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY Structure 2.1
Introduction
2.2
Political Realist and ‘Complex Neo-realist’Approaches to India’s Foreign Policy
2.3
Perspective of Interdependence and Complex Interdependence
2.4
New World Order
2.5
Non-alignment and the Nehruvian Consensus
2.6
Summary
2.7
Exercises
2.1
INTRODUCTION
Literature on Indian foreign policy offers a range of approaches to the study of the subject. They range from traditional approaches based on the theories of realism and neo-realism, interdependence and complex interdependence to approaches that are rooted in the domestic cultural and socio-political ethos centred on the historical experiences and of Indian freedom movement as well as the ideals and aspirations of the leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru of India’s freedom struggle. At the outset two points need to be stressed. In the first place, while each one of the approaches helps us in an understanding, India’s foreign policy can, and need, better be studied from an eclectic perspective. No single approach would suffice for an understanding of the complexities of the making and conduct of India’s foreign policy. Besides, in the available literature there obtains a quality, which is native to the country. Nor for that matter, policy-makers and practitioners have and would ever fit their practices into rigid theoretical framework. A perusal of the varieties of approaches nevertheless offers useful insights to the principles and ideals, mechanisms and instruments, and the actors and forces that have come to frame the objectives and devise appropriate instruments for the formulation and implementation of the country’s foreign policy. It also needs to be borne in mind that India’s foreign policy is not a simple amalgam of responses to the exigencies of international relations. For whatever reasons—size of area, population, economy, leadership, etc.—India has consistently sought to influence the course of international relations in an independent and energetic manner, conscious of its responsibilities and commensurate to its status and capacities in the international system.
2.2 POLITICAL REALIST AND ‘COMPLEX NEO-REALIST’ 1
APPROACHES TO INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY There is some evidence in the argument that, barring perhaps the United States, realism has had its over-riding influence on what could be described as the ‘foreign policy establishment’ or the ‘strategic community’ of India. Echelons of at least six identifiable groups viz., the military, diplomatic corps, bureaucracy including the foreign service, political class, policy experts from the academia and the media, and the community of scientists and technologists of the so called foreign policy establishment, it can be said, help shape India’s thinking on foreign policy matters. The ‘strategic community’ is intertwined closely and shares state power more than others; for example, the business community—although the influence of the business is on the rise in the wake of the economic liberalisation and is evident in the formation of various government-business consultative mechanisms. Also, sectors in the middle echelons of the afore-mentioned six identifiable groups while do not influences they, at best, legitimise policy at the popular level. This should not be surprising. For, foreign policy and diplomacy invariably remain the handiwork of the elite. India’s ‘strategic community’ operates, more or less, within the parameters of political realism or simply realism. The ‘strategic community’ perceives itself as being pragmatic, responsible and experienced, and is oriented to practical problem-solving. The ‘strategic community’ does not function in an ad hoc fashion nor are its responses ad hoc or “knee-jerk” responses. To the contrary, the ‘strategic community’ is conscious of the fundamental goals and means at its disposal for the realisation of foreign policy objectives. Political realism entails the view of power as the basis of inter-state relations, which are seen normally in conflictual modes, with each state seeking to pursue egoistically its own interests. Neo-realism recognises the primacy of politics but concedes that international order based on the convergence of interests among actors, and not conflict alone, is the basis of international relations. With the above in view, at least, three goals can be identified with paramount importance attached to the goal of external national security and internal national unity. The two other goals are leadership at least within the region and at a larger Third World level; and a place in the comity of nation-states appropriate to India’s size, stature and capabilities. Two assumptions underlie the approach: one, security of Indian state is paramount and is, best subsumed, as ‘national interest’. All other elements and goals are subordinate to this basic national interest. It is the leitmotif or the guiding factor of all political and strategic thinking and planning. It is to be noted that the term security is defined essentially in political-military terms. The assumption is that a physically and militarily secure nation-state is a Sine qua non of the well-being and unity of the society. Underlying the supremacy of national security goal is also the belief and the experience of colonialism and foreign domination. Historically, as and when India had a weak or a fissiparous state structure, the country had been prone to foreign domination and rule. The second assumption, and which is related to the first, is that international system is essentially an inter-state system. Non-state and trans-state actors are present but there is no denying the centrality of states in the international system. Legal and ethical norms of international system are and must be followed by all states; but, in the end, it is the great powers that shape the world because they have the power.
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It is a contentious point but power is unambiguously defined as state power. India, it is argued, is potentially a world power. Therefore, it should try to fulfill this potential and its foreign policy should reflect this aspiration and promote its achievement. India’s nuclear and missile development programmes, its space research and its scientific and technological achievements, large and highly professional defence forces under civilian control, a highly competent bureaucracy, and a large pool of highly skilled professionals, and no less a visionary political leadership and Indian democracy—with its national consensus on the above meaning of national interest—are all seen as vital elements in the realisation of national security and a great power status. Skillful diplomacy which was the hallmark of foreign policy under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, military prowess that India began systematically building under Indira Gandhi, and political astuteness to engage all significant powers in political and strategic dialogues that characterises Indian foreign policy since the 1990s are vital capabilities of a great power that India has so consistently demonstrated. It is in such a vein that political pronouncements and analyses often describe India as a great power or potentially a great power. Description of India as a “great” power, an “emergent” power and, at times, as “super” power—some time still with an interrogation mark—have become more frequent in the aftermath of the nuclearisation and the significant achievements made in the field of missile technology since 1998. Is some kind of a pax-Indica possible? Since independence and well up to the 1960s, India’s ‘strategic community’ saw the country as destined to be a future great power of Asia rivalled only by two other Asian powers namely, Russia and China. By the 1980s, Indian realists had a more ambitious view, but argued realistically for India’s regional pre-eminence to be acknowledged by the rest of the world. In other words, the view was to project the country as the leader, if not the hegemon, of South Asia. With the collapse of Soviet Union and the ensuing uncertainties of the post-Cold War era, the idea to view the country as a great power, and that it be so recognised by the international community, has gained firmer grounds. To the idea of regional pre-eminence is appended the desire of a strong and responsible global player. In ‘complex neo-realism’, periods of transition in international relations—such as the one witnessed in the wake of the collapse of Soviet Union—offer significant opportunities for upward mobility to certain intermediate powers. Indian foreign policy in the 1990s including India’s successes in the development of nuclear weapons and long-range missile delivery system is seen as a time-tested approach to enter the concert of great powers on the basis of its military strength. There are certain themes that recur in the Indian realist view of foreign policy. Foremost, and it is seen more or less regularly, is to view China as an actual or a potential strategic rival or competitor of India. The India-China conflict of 1962 and the border dispute have strengthened the view that the two big and strong neighbours are destined to be rivals, at least periodically. Pakistan’s hostility including the dispute over Jammu & Kashmir, tilt towards Soviet Union during Cold War including the 1971 Treaty of Friendship with that country, and the entire gamut of Indo-US relations have always had and continue to have a Chinese dimension. Emergence of China as a great military and economic power would have major repercussions for the security of Asia and the Pacific including the Indian Ocean region. The resulting dis-balancing and re-
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balancing of regional equations would surely impinge on Indian sovereignty and security. A large sized India, second in terms of population, its large GNP and skilled manpower, and with its more than a million strong defence forces has to stand up and possibly emerge stronger in the wake of destabilising effects of China. The view that China is India’s ‘enemy number one’ which the Indian political leadership enunciated just prior to the nuclear experiments of 1998 are a piece of such a realist thinking. The afore-mentioned proposition is precisely the kind of historical notion of inter-state relations and geo-political thinking realists, in general, entertain. (It is also true that many Indian realists do not preclude the possibility of a strong India and a strong China turning into strategic allies or friends at some future date.) It is to counter pointedly the Chinese strategic challenge and put India in the “big power” league that much of the justifications for nuclearnisation have been proffered. Often thus, it has been argued that India’s decision to go nuclear has been independent of its relationship with Pakistan. In such a perception, China-Pakistan relations are viewed as an anti-India strategic alliance. ‘Our rival’s greater insecurity is our security’ is the dictum of competitive security approach, which is sometimes promoted by the realists. Relations with Pakistan consume a good deal of the time and energy of Indian foreign policy planners and analysts. A stable, secure and preferably a democratic Pakistan is in India’s greater national interest than a Pakistan which is jingoistic, authoritarian and on a collusion course with India. There are several problem areas, which are identified in Indo-Pakistan relations. Pakistan’s membership in the Western alliance system had brought Cold War to the doorsteps of India; India had to resort to highly skillful diplomacy to ward off the threat of ‘consummation’ of such an alliance relationship. Since then the Western powers particularly the US have viewed Pakistan in terms of their own global strategic interests. First, it was viewed as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism and its search for ‘warm waters’ in the Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean region that made Pakistan a frontline state in the Cold War calculus of the US. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1978 made Pakistan once again a frontline state—this time as a conduit of arms and money to the mujaheedens—in the grand battle between the East and the West. In the wake of the terrorist attacks in US on 11 September 2001, Pakistan has once again become a frontline state—this time in the US war against international terrorism. Besides, the West in general is looking at Pakistan as a gateway to the grand opening that awaits the exploitation of natural gas and other minerals in Central Asian region. Interestingly, Indian foreign and security policy planners have rarely, perhaps for understandable reasons, taken into account the thesis of a decline in the US power, which many neo-realists had peddled during the Cold War. Yet, another matter of concern has been Sino-Pakistan axis. Pakistan has been the ‘most reliable friend’ of China ever since the latter was in near isolation in international affairs. China’s clandestine support to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile development programmes is an evidence of anti-India axis of their relationship. It is the play of extraneous powers and forces which are intent on creating a sort of military ‘parity’ between Pakistan and India which has remained a matter of great concern to Indian foreign policy planners and leaders. For, India which is several times the size of Pakistan in terms of territory, population, GNP, and military preparedness, the externally induced idea of ‘parity’ is seen as a bid to stymie India’s own great power claim. The convergence of international and regional strategic forces and actors and the dispute over Jammu & Kashmir
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bedevil India-Pakistan relations. Realists point out that Pakistan’s intransigence and pursuit of adversarial relationship are also impinging on national unity. Pakistan is the direct source of many of India’s domestic problems including trans-border terrorism and support for militant groups in Jammu & Kashmir and North-East of India.
2.3 PERSPECTIVE OF INTERDEPENDENCE AND ‘COMPLEX’ INTERDEPENDENCE Another view, and which has gained currency, is that there are deep connections between the domestic factors and foreign policy priorities and conduct of India. A narrow and simplistic view of political-military security is not only static but outmoded also. Writings mostly from the decade of 1990s suggest that Indian foreign policy is undergoing political instability and ideological uncertainty as to the basic goals and means appropriate for the entire gamut of its external relations. A point repeatedly underlined is that international system is much more than inter-state system; and it involves various kinds of non-state and trans-state actors and relations. These include for instance the trans-national corporations, the entire complex of NGOs-INGOs and international financial agencies. In short, it is undeniable that those who influence or have stakes in policymaking include societal forces and non-governmental actors, which are both domestic and international. Besides, it is argued that military-political security is only one of the dimensions of security of a country; and, moreover, such a definition is not only narrow but also takes a static view of state security. Issues related to environmental degradation, trans-border migrations and the networks of international terrorism, crime and illicit finances besides growing poverty in the South and income gap between the North and the South all are matters of security and sovereignty— environmental, economic and social. Even the great powers, notwithstanding their ability to influence the course of international relations, can be unilateral and are facing a world that is increasingly inter-dependent and multi-polar. To face new types of challenges are required new forms of inter-state cooperation and trans-state activity. Inter-dependence is more true of the international relations in the aftermath of the Cold War and with the rapidly integrating economies. Realists’ understanding of security does not take into account problems such as the growing social and economic gap between the developed countries of the North and the developing countries in the South, and within each developing country the growing gap between the elite and the vast multitude of the poor; or population explosion in the developing world and the problem of the migration within and across national borders or, even for that matter, the global environmental degradation. Admittedly, these problems render a realist view of security as of declining importance and somewhat outdated. Inter-dependence underscores the aspect of economic globalisation. In effective terms, it means the rise of new transnational economic agents, mechanisms and institutions. These are transnational corporations, World Trade Organisation (WTO), and International Monetary Fund and the World Bank along with the G-7 countries. Patterns and volume of capital, technology control regimes, economic and increasingly political and social conditions attached to loans and assistance or access to the markets of developed countries, and concerted pressures built by industrialised
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countries importantly US through the WTO on developing economies to open their agricultural, industrial, services, and financial sectors to global financial and economic actors all mean that the notion of economic sovereignty has become outmoded. A number of militarily strong states have experienced economic regression, even collapse in the 1990s. A major challenge for Indian foreign policy is how to intervene in these emerging international economic institutional patterns. In other words, India’s foreign policy in the present and in the future will have a large economic content. Put differently, what should India’s place in the global economy be? The question has become as important, if not, more important than the goal of a great power status. Geoeconomics has taken precedence over geo-politics. National security is today closely related to the prosperity and standard of life of its citizens. In view of the above, it is argued that India better rid itself of the realist framework, and thereby of great power status. In the first place, in our increasingly inter-dependent world, even great powers are not able to influence decisively the course of international relations. This is true even of the US—the sole super power—which perhaps had exercised a greater influence during rather than after the Cold War. Other great powers including Britain, France and potentially Germany and Japan have even less influence today. In the complex inter-dependent world, there is diffusion of power and influence within the international system favouring the emergence of multipolarity and a concert of powers that would include India also. More so, India needs to seize and exploit judiciously the opportunities that economic globalisation is offering. It needs to enter into coalitions of the like-minded countries to advance its economic goals. Indian realists have paid a good deal of attention to China as potentially a great power, even as a future super power. It is suggested that India can advantageously build economic bridges with China while resolving the border dispute in a pragmatic “give-and-take” fashion. In contemporary times, geographical contiguity need not produce a naturally adversarial relationship; on the contrary it can be the beginning of trans-border trade, investment, and integrated production system. The profile of the two-way trade between China and India is presented as proof of the logic of geoeconomics. The realist goal of regional pre-eminence, critics argue, has presented insurmountable problems. In its place, Indian foreign policy should focus foremost on economic cooperation in South Asia. Normally, two aspects of a South Asia-centric foreign policy are stressed upon. In the short and medium term, it is stressed that relations with Pakistan be managed in a tension-defusing manner so as to gradually transform that relationship. India may as well launch a peace offensive towards Pakistan through a series of confidence-building measures, reciprocal arrangements for verification of nuclear and related issues, greater civil society interaction, etc. The second element in this view is to realise the goal of South Asian economic cooperation. In the absence of a robust South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), not only the economic diplomacy to interact with other regional economic forums such as the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) or South American Common Market (MERCOSUR) etc. will bear limited dividend, India’s own search for regional pre-eminence gets pushed that far into the future. Regional economic cooperation is seen as a stepping-stone for an eventual political community in South Asia, which, in the long term, is also necessary to keep extra-regional powers away and out of the region. It is through a complex South Asia-centric policy that some satisfactory and enduring solutions could be found to the disturbing inter-state relations—be it separatism in Kashmir, trans-border terrorism, influx of Bangladesh refugees, or the Tamil issue in Sri Lanka. 6
Inter-dependence calls for a different kind of pragmatism that focuses on issues of trade and economic cooperation. Indications of change are already evident. For instance, the role of economic ministries in the making of foreign economic policies has increased, while the Ministry of External Affairs especially India’s diplomatic missions abroad are playing more the role of a ‘facilitator’. Among the domestic constituencies impacting the foreign policy, the role of corporate sector is on the ascendance. Governments may make policies but it is the corporate world, which is realising those policies. It is a moot point whether India’s corporate sector has become an influential member of the ‘strategic community’. It is to be noted that some of the above analyses are also part of the realist perception, which admit of the metamorphic changes in the international system. Admittedly, Indian strategy is one of ‘muddling through’ without either racing towards total globalisation or relinquishing the conventional political-military dimension of national interest and security.
2.4
NEW WORLD ORDER
Interdependence between rich and poor, and powerful and the weak are bound to create asymmetrical relationship, which enhances the dependence of the poor and weak over the rich and the powerful. Globalisation means among others that the locus of decision-making is shifting beyond the control of national sovereignty. Diminished autonomy in international relations means loss of decision-making powers not only in economic but also in political sphere. Whether it is policies of investment, import of technology or even foreign aid, conditionalities, which are not only of economic but also of political and social nature, are being attached. Conditionalities are intrusive and strain the democratic process of contestation and consensus, rendering governments not only powerless but also unpopular and illegitimate. Equally deleterious are the consequences for societal cohesion and stability. Internally arrived consensus and ideological preferences are being given a go-bye as internationally prescribed uniform and standardised formulae are being adopted in economic, political and social areas by countries one after another. Self-perception and self-confidence of people are on the wane and paving way for bitterness and discontentment leading to outbursts of chauvanism, fundamentalism etc. Diminished status in international system and the pressures coming from the US and other great powers and the IMF/ World Bank are impinging on the domestic economic and democratic processes of India too. Globalisation is singularly the most important dimension of the new hegemonic world order that the advanced capitalist countries led by the US are imposing on the countries of the South including India. One significant consequence witnessed is the rolling back of the Nehruvian framework of the Indian foreign policy. Not only has the international public space for India shrunk gravely, but also the autonomy of action and the ethical dimension of its Non-aligned foreign policy. More dangerously, the US-led New World Order has put the concept of nationstate in the countries of the South in serious crisis. Several states have dissolved; others have been intervened in the name of general well-being and protection of the populations. The New World Order threatens the assiduously built national consensus on an independent foreign policy, national security, national unity and a democratic order. Critics portend the dangers of the New World Order for India; and warn against national goals and aspirations becoming hostage to US unilateralism and conditionalities of international institutions.
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2.5 NON-ALIGNMENT AND THE NEHRUVIAN CONSENSUS For a long time, particularly during the Nehruvian years, Non-alignment had served as the most significant approach to the study of Indian foreign policy. India never had a more coherent view of the world and of its place therein than during the heydays of Non-alignment during the 1950s and the 1960s. There was a coherence, rather a consonance, of the goals and instruments of Indian foreign policy until nearly the 1970s when the so-called Nehruvian consensus broke down, ironically for the high moral ground that Indian foreign policy had occupied on international issues and precisely for the failure of Non-aligned stance to ensure India’s security (in the wake of the Chinese aggression of 1962) and its great power ambition. It is however undeniable that a Third World solidarity that had infused non-aligned policy continues to enthuse India’s foreign policy in some very significant manner even today. Nehruvian consensus was built around the ideals and principles that had developed in the course of India’s struggle for freedom. The influence of Mahatma Gandhi was profound on the entire course of Indian national movement. What he had struggled for was not mere political freedom but a cultural and moral regeneration of the Indian civilisation. Nehru had combined these Gandhian moral and social imperatives while analysing the course of international relations between the two World Wars. Nehru had found that the two dominant norms in international relations were the politics of power and the threat of force. It were these norms that had caused the onset of First World War, failure of League of Nations, rise of fascism, and the politics of alliance and counteralliance leading to the outbreak of the Second World War. Nehru was very perceptive in foreseeing the working of the same norms behind the unfolding rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. It remains a matter of debate among scholars to view Nehru as an idealist who sought to base Indian foreign policy on certain ideals; or somewhat even as a realist who accorded high importance to diplomacy in order to circumvent the power politics of international system. By placing Indian foreign policy on the precepts of non-alignment, Nehru had simultaneously pushed for normative changes in the international system and thereby secure the perceived national interests of India. How did he reconcile these goals? In the first place, non-alignment was based on securing the independence and freedom of action especially of the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. In that respect, Nehruvian foreign policy was premised on the idea of sovereign nationstates as the units of the international system. Secondly, Nehru sought to upgrade the aspect of inter-state cooperation—in place of confrontation which was inherent in the power politics—in the international system. One can see this pragmatic mix of idealism and hard-headed national interest in at least three important concerns of Indian foreign policy under him. Non-alignment was a response to the threats posed to the international system by the two super powers armed with nuclear weapons who were engaged in encapsulating and subordinating the weaker regions of the world. In this way, the super power rivalry that was beginning to expand beyond the Western world so as to include in its fold the countries of the developing world constituted a direct threat to the international system. In other words, Cold War marked a regression to the evolution of a universal, democratic international society. Non-alignment was a principled and pragmatic step to retain and widen the space for autonomy in the rapidly shrinking international 8
public space caused by the bloc politics. Nehru was very perceptive a realist to have foreseen the course of international relations and exhort India and the other struggling colonies against the dangers of bipolarity as early as 1946. Lack of concern for or importance attached to the national security is often the criticism levelled against the Nehruvian framework of Indian foreign policy. However, the enthusiasts of the nonaligned framework argue cogently that by insisting upon the autonomy of foreign policy decisionmaking and by containing the expansionism of Cold War, Nehru was as well addressing the core issue of national security. That non-alignment was more than idealism was apparent in the context of India’s relations with Pakistan. A non-aligned stance did not close the windows of opportunity towards the West including importantly US, discouraged the formation of Soviet-China axis (who were until at least 1957 close friends) against India, and kept relations with Pakistan and Indian position on Kashmir intact in the face of the fact of Pakistan’s membership in the Western alliance system. The same primacy of diplomacy was evident in the way Nehru sought to tackle Chinese challenge to Indian security; first through panchsheel and Hindi-Chini bhai bhaism and later, building closer relations with Khruschev’s Soviet Union which was beginning to acknowledge NAM as its ‘natural ally’. The military debacle against China notwithstanding, the reliance on skillful diplomacy to keep India as a prominent power while at the same time resetting the norms of international system away from power politics were the hallmark of Indian foreign policy under Nehru. The relevance of Nehruvian consensus remains under debate in the changed circumstance of today. However, one may still argue that the reliance on skillful diplomacy rather than military force was never more relevant than today as India seeks to engage a whole range of powers to work out strategic understandings and economic cooperation. To the contrary is the view that considers Nehruvian consensus as outmoded and largely abandoned. For one, the international public space, which had allowed Nehru, and the Non-aligned Movement in general, autonomy of action has shrunk. Besides, Non-aligned Movement itself has lost its internal coherence and unity of purpose so as to be of any relevance. Apart from putting the Non-aligned foreign policy of India in the larger cultural and historical context of Indian freedom movement, analysts invariably pay glowing tributes to the personal influence of Nehru on the thinking and conduct of India’s foreign policy. Nehru was a keen observer of international affairs and had devoted considerable time to formulating, thinking and position of the national movement on issues of international importance. He was his foreign minister. He continued to formulate the Indian foreign policy practically himself throughout his term as prime minister; and would consult only a very close group of ministers including Sardar Patel, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Dr. Radhakrishnan, and V. K. Krishna Menon and officials such as Gopalaswamy Ayyangar, Sir B. N. Rao, Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai and India’s first foreign secretary K.P.S. Menon-Senior. During the early period of Nehru’s prime ministership, the institutional and structured policy planning mechanisms were either lacking or were weak. J. N. Dixit, India’s former foreign secretary has opined “Jawaharlal Nehru was the perceiver of national concerns and interests, conceptualiser of policies and options to meet them, and the initiator of policies and actions on all aspects of External Affairs. He had the unique advantage of back-up by unqualified national consensus on priorities as well as policies in External Affairs.” He was able to carry the cabinet, the parliament, the political parties and the public opinion along with him on all-important aspects of Indian foreign policy. 9
2.6
SUMMARY
India’s foreign policy combines various influences, factors, goals and mechanisms. It is for these reasons that no single theoretical approach is appropriate for the study of India’s foreign policy. The eclectic approach is perhaps the best to the study of India’s foreign policy. There is an indigenous quality to the writings of Indian foreign policy; and these writings are also responding to diverse forces and factors both — domestic and international. Statesmen and policy planners and practitioners also do not fit their ideas and practices into theoretical frameworks. A perusal of these varieties of approaches nevertheless reveals the principles and ideals, mechanisms and instruments, and the actors and forces that have come to frame the objectives and devise appropriate instruments of foreign policy. And this precisely is the purpose of studying the theme of approaches to the Indian foreign policy.
2.7
EXERCISES
1) Describe briefly the ‘Realist’ view of Indian foreign policy. 2) What do you understand by the term ‘Nehruvian Consensus’? 3) Highlight the points of divergence in the Realist and Inter-dependence approaches to the study of Indian foreign policy.
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UNIT 3 OBJECTIVES AND DETERMINANTS Structure 3.1 3.2 3.3
Introduction India’s Foreign Policy Objectives and Principles Determinants of India’s Foreign Policy 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.3.3 3.3.4 3.3.5 3.3.6
Geography History and Tradition Economic Conditions Nature of Leadership Domestic Milieu International Trends
3.4 3.5
Summary Exercises
3.1
INTRODUCTION
A country’s foreign policy does not emerge from a vacuum; it is guided and shaped by that country’s history and culture, the political system and various other factors. Some of them like geography and the natural frontiers remain unchanged, while others like domestic and external environment frequently and at times unrecognisably change. Elements of continuity and change in a country’s foreign policy can be explained with reference to the important influence of these factors and forces. The influence of these determining factors on foreign policies of countries need not be uniform across the space and time span; it varies from country to country and from situation to situation. The purpose of this Unit is to trace and appreciate the major determinants of India’s foreign policy with reference to its objectives and principles.
3.2 INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY: OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES Any activity is likely to be productive when goals and objectives steer it; so is the case with India’s foreign policy. Without knowing these objectives it may not be easy to appreciate and evaluate the course of the policy. India’s leaders have specified right from the time of Independence those objectives. Besides, many analysts and scholars have highlighted and evaluated these goals in their writings and analyses. Chiefly, India’s foreign policy aims to safeguard and further national interest in terms of protecting the country’s political independence and promoting its external security. As a country that freed itself from colonial rule, India naturally wants to follow such foreign policy that would not compromise on its existence as a free country or give scope to other countries to dictate as to how it should conduct itself. With the help of a successful foreign policy, India would like to prevent or resist threats of military attacks from foreign quarters. India’s need for national security is placed in the wider and wiser backdrop of the need to jointly work for security of the whole world. In other words, it does not want other countries to be insecure while working for its own
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security. India has always desired friendly relations with all countries, especially the major countries as well as countries in its neighbourhood. In short, India’s foreign policy seeks to promote world peace, work for avoidance of dangerous wars like the two World Wars during the first half of the 20th Century. India wants to promote harmony and cooperation between the countries that have ideological, political and other differences. As a country that suffered colonial rule and became free after long peaceful struggle, India’s foreign policy is committed to strive for bringing an end to colonialism everywhere. Accordingly it has supported freedom struggles of the peoples of Africa and Asia. As an extension of this goal, India has been interested to direct its foreign policy towards realisation of equal rights of all peoples and nations without discrimination. Therefore, India opposed the abhorrent policy of apartheid in South Africa; it sought to protect the right to equality under law to all people of Indian origin wherever they are. India’s foreign policy has another important goal, viz. to promote the economic development of underprivileged nations and their peoples. For this purpose, its foreign policy seeks to develop beneficial relationship with the industrially advanced countries with a view to securing necessary assistance. India’s policy aims to cater to not just its own development needs but also those of the newly independent poor countries in the Third World. A more equitable economic and social world order that would help in eventually eliminating disease and deprivations has been a vital goal of India’s foreign policy. It is equally notable that a few laudable principles guide India to pursue the above foreign policy goals. Let us take note of them here. India has tried to stand by the principle of avoiding use of force in settling differences with other countries. Indeed it preferred the peaceful methods like dialogue, negotiation and diplomacy for narrowing differences and easing tensions among countries. India has always actively supported the development of international law to regulate various problematic aspects of world affairs. India has firmly believed in strengthening the United Nations and other global and regional organisations as useful tools for international harmony and cooperation. India believes in working for reduction and final elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction. India’s foreign policy principles as enshrined in Panchsheel (1954) emphasise the imperatives of non-aggression, non-interference, and peaceful co-existence among countries. In short, through foreign policy India wants to be seen as peace-loving, mature, law- abiding and trust worthy country while trying to benefit from friendly contacts with other countries in the society of nations.
3.3
DETERMINANTS OF INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY
There are several factors that have influenced, and continue to influence, the shaping of India’s foreign policy. Some of these factors are of permanent nature while others change with the time. In this section, we will discuss major determinants of India’s foreign policy, viz. geography, history and culture, domestic situation, external environment, etc.
3.3.1
2
Geography
India’s geographical size and location have played vital role in shaping its foreign policy. India is very big in size; it is the seventh largest in the world with nearly 3 million square kilometres of territory. On its north, its boundaries are associated with the world famous Himalayan mountain range. It has 15,000 kms long land boundaries with Pakistan in the West, Bhutan, China and Nepal in the North, and Bangladesh and Myanmar in the East. Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union are in the immediate vicinity of Jammu & Kashmir. Prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee has noted often that one can change one’s friends, but not neighbours. Therefore, India has been keen to have friendly and tension-free relations with all the neighbours. India has 7,500 kms of coastline touched by the waters of the Indian Ocean on three sides of its territory. Most of India’s foreign trade is routed through the Indian Ocean just as the Indian harbours witness dense traffic of merchant ships proceeding from or towards Europe, West Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asian regions; hence geopolitical and geo-strategic significance of the ocean to India’s external relations. As you will recall, the Indian Ocean brought the colonial rule of the French, British, Dutch and the Portuguese to India and East Asia during the 17-19th centuries. Clearly India’s foreign policy has perceived the need to ensure that its northern frontiers along with territorial waters in the Indian Ocean remain peaceful and free from foreign military build up. India’s vast coastline necessitates not only a powerful navy, but also friendly relations with other naval powers present in the Indian Ocean. These include Britain as well as the United States, which have a powerful naval base at Diego Garcia. The location of the country is also notable. Belonging to South Asia, India lies in the heart of the biggest continent, Asia. Although India was victim of Chinese and Pakistani military attacks, it is in its interest that the channels of communication are kept open. India therefore seeks that problems with these neighbours are amicably settled. In keeping with the fact that India is the gateway of both South-East Asia and the West Asia, India’s security and vital interests are closely knit with the peace and stability in the larger region of Asia. As such, India keeps close relations with regional powers such as Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, Vietnam, etc. India has followed the Look East Policy and is developing economic as well as strategic relations with the ASEAN countries.
3.3.2
History and Tradition
India’s foreign policy provides a mirror to its historical heritage. India never mounted aggressive campaigns outside the country for territorial expansion. Indeed it was targeted in a series of invasions and alien rule, although notably the ruling dynasties made the country their home and adapted themselves to local customs and traditions. The British colonial empire was consolidated through deliberate policy of pitting the native kingdoms against one another in battles that bled winners and losers alike. This experience as a victim of wars has turned India’s foreign policy anti-war in nature. Moreover, the legacy of the non-violent freedom struggle launched under the leadership of Gandhi and his lieutenants was bound to be evident in its foreign policy. Not only this, the legacy of an ancient civilisation and culture also helped in foreign policy formulation. The traditional values of Vasudheva Kutumbakam—One World—have come down to the people of India from the ancient scriptures and the spiritual works of great men like Swami Vivekananda. Particularly, the values that have helped in shaping India’s foreign policy are tolerance, non-vio1ence and universal brotherhood. The furtherance of the tradition of non-
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violence in India’s foreign policy, according to A. Appadorai, was “the deliberate acceptance of a method of approach to foreign policy problems which emphasised reconciliation, and the temper of peace, as opposed to a spirit of revenge and hatred.” Most of the leaders of freedom movement were educated in Britain or were exposed to the system of liberal education. They valued liberty, equality and democracy. These ideals are embedded in the Indian foreign policy. While cooperating with liberal democratic countries, India did not oppose the socialist countries either. The policy of non-alignment is not only an outcome of keeping aloof from bloc politics, but is also in accordance with the goals and ideals of freedom struggle cherished by our people. The impact of the British rule in India and the influence of national movement and freedom struggle are clearly evident in the shaping of India’s foreign policy. According to A. Appadorai, the British rule in India had a two-fold impact on India’s foreign policy. Firstly, it gave a stimulus to the national movement for freedom which in turn led to India’s support for the freedom of dependent peoples; secondly, racial inequality that existed during the British rule made India commit itself to root out the evils of racial discrimination. These idealistic notions notwithstanding, the realist legacy left behind by ancient scholars of statecraft like Kautilya too have an important bearing on the country’s approach towards safeguarding its vital interests by coercion if necessary. Leaders of India like Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi candidly acknowledged the limitations of idealism to guide state policy at critical junctures. The action that India took in Goa (1961) and Bangladesh (1971) situations symbolised pragmatism.
3.3.3
Economic Conditions
The possession of raw materials and natural resources and the compulsions of economic development also determine the course of a country’s foreign policy. Low economic profile could impinge on a country’s ability to play an influential and effective role in foreign affairs. India is a storehouse of vast natural resources with great potential for achieving economic heights in development. Its rivers are capable of generating power and providing enough water for drinking and irrigation. Huge deposits of bauxite, coal, copper, manganese and other minerals are India’s assets. Equally notable is the base of its skilled and educated work force. Despite progress made in the fields of agriculture, literacy, science and technology, there is no denying that India lags far behind in development. The bulk of its growing population finds it difficult to cater to basic necessities like food, shelter and clothing. After Independence, it was clear to our leaders that the country needs help from foreign governments in respect of transfer of funds, import of equipment and finished goods, export of Indian commodities and goods, training of technical personnel, etc. In an ideologically polarised world, India needed friendship and goodwill from both the free market economies in the West as well as the Socialist world led by the former Soviet Union. By adopting the policy of non-alignment, India hoped for assistance from both the camps. As a parallel to that external policy, India has adopted a mixed economy approach that combined public sector with heavy state investment in infrastructure areas while a strong private sector flourished in an array of other areas.
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India’s economic linkages with the erstwhile colonial ruler, the United Kingdom guided Nehru to forge friendly contacts with that country both bilaterally and within the Commonwealth grouping. Vast portion of India’s trade involving export of raw materials like cotton, tea and import of heavy machinery and technology has been with the United States and West European countries. These countries have come forward with generous grants and loans for various projects, apart from facilitating multilateral funding through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The former Soviet Union too emerged as a key partner in defence and other aspects of foreign trade on favourable terms. Also notably, heavy dependence on oil for industrial and economic needs has brought special focus on relations with oil-rich Arab countries in West Asia, apart from working for stable supplies and prices of oil in global market. At a different level, the economic conditions of the country provide inputs to India’s foreign policy to argue for easing of economic disparities between the developed and the less developed countries and for greater economic relationships among the developing countries themselves.
3.3.4
Nature of Leadership
The personal qualities of leaders guiding the destiny of a nation at a given time tend to shape that country’s foreign policy in a particular direction. Who can deny the role of, for instance, Woodrow Wilson in shaping the foreign policy of the United States in the early decades of the 20th Century or that of Mikhail Gorbachev in making the Soviet policy in the closing years of the same century? Similarly, in the case of India too, the personality of the incumbent prime ministers has come to be identified in certain measure with a particular flavour given to the country’s foreign policy. The country’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, who steered India’s policy for more than one and a half decades, was widely regarded as internationalist in outlook, with a preference for enlightened, rather than narrow or self-centred, approach to problems. He was indeed regarded as among the tallest of visionaries in his times. Understandably, therefore India’s foreign policy during his tenure was more committed to the collective good of the comity of nations in relation to concerns like world peace and disarmament. Panchsheel was a typical representation of the Nehruvian outlook to approaching problems with other countries. Quite contrasting is the case of the influence of his daughter, Indira Gandhi. By nature she came out as a strong and decisive personality. Her proclivity to be pragmatic and sensitivity to the imperatives of vital national interests left an imprint on reorienting the foreign policy along the lines of realism, more than idealism. This is how India’s policy with reference to the liberation of Bangladesh, non-accession to Non-Proliferation Treaty, and strengthening of ties with the former Soviet Union may be viewed. Again, the reputed qualities as a moderate of Atal Behari Vajpayee are said to have influenced the policy of engagement with Pakistan and the United States.
3.3.5
Domestic Milieu
No country’s foreign policy can be immune from the influence of the dynamics within. Indeed it is an important determinant of foreign policy. The domestic milieu refers to, inter alia, the nature of governing system, the political culture including the policies of political parties, public opinion, etc. tradition, structure of government and enlightened leadership.
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Independent India is a living example of ‘unity in diversity’. Having won freedom from British after non-violent struggle, India chose a democratic system that could offer adequate representation to diversities of all kinds—regional, religious, and cultural. The executive is accountable to people’s representatives who are chosen in periodical exercise of franchise. India’s political system was based (and is still based) on Westminster model of parliamentary democracy. However much the executive would like to view foreign policy as its prerogative, parliamentary control over the executive has opened channels for influencing the country’s foreign policy. In general, fortunately, India’s foreign policy reflected the national consensus cutting across political differences between the ruling side and the opposition. Non-alignment policy is a clear example here. This, however, is not to say that the parliament and prime minister always looked eye to eye on all foreign policy issues all the time. Even during the time of Nehru, who had exercised more discretion than any other prime minister, parliament sought to assert itself in respect of his policy vis-à-vis the boundary dispute with China and the Goa question in the late 1950s. Recently in 2003, again, India’s approach to the Iraq problem was very much dictated by the sentiments articulated in parliament in as much the government agreed to become party in “deploring” the American military action against Iraq. The political parties too at the time of elections take positions on foreign policy matters in their respective manifestoes. There are varied views expressed by the BJP at one end and the Communist Party (Marxist) at the other concerning globalisation, World Trade Organisation and several other issues. Similarly, some of the regional parties like those in Tamil Nadu (DMK, AIADMK, MDMK, etc.), and Jammu and Kashmir (the National Conference) for instance have come to determine the country’s policy toward Sri Lanka and Pakistan respectively. Public opinion ventilated through media and other channels and the activities of interest/pressure groups like the friendship societies or the business associations have gained importance as determinants of India’s foreign policy. The role of ISCUS or of CII cannot be denied, for example in the context of relations with the Soviet Union and the United States respectively. The print and lately the visual media have been influential determinants of the policy. The two most notable examples of the role played by the television and print media in making India respond the way it did related to the hijacking of Indian Airlines plane to Kandahar in 1999 and the official announcement of decision not to accede to the United States request for sending troops to postwar Iraq.
3.3.6
International Trends
The broad currents of international politics at any given point of time have direct bearing on foreign policies. The difficulty in conducting the foreign policy arises because states do not have sure means of controlling the behaviour of other states. During the inter-war period (1919-39), the quest for French security, followed by the rise of Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany and militarism in Japan had their impact on foreign policies. The US changed its policy towards the Soviet Union and recognised it because, in 1933, Hitler’s emergence in Germany posed a threat to the world order created after the War. The Japanese aggression in Manchuria (China) in 1931 provided a common threat to USA as well as USSR in the Far East. The two Powers gave up their hostility. The Cold War era (1945-90) has determined in a big way the foreign policy of most countries.
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The fear of nuclearised United States brought the countries of Eastern Europe under the control of the Soviet Union, with the result that all those countries adopted socialism and came under the Russian wings. The entire policy of containment of communism adopted by the US was evident in its setting up of NATO, SEATO and such other military alliances/arrangements. India’s efforts in expounding the policy of non-alignment were directly a response to this emerging polarisation in the international environment. The Cold War was the defining characteristic of world politics for nearly 45 years. Arms race, especially in the nuclear field, typically represented the height of suspicion and the impending disaster. India’s policy to take up nuclear disarmament emanated from the imminent and perpetual threat to human civilisation if those weapons were to be accidentally or deliberately used. Related to nuclear field, India’s successful testing in 1998 of nuclear weapons was justified as a necessary response to the fast changing international environment that sought to dismiss the demand for nuclear disarmament and sanctify the inequitable hierarchy between the nuclear weapon powers and non-nuclear weapon powers. After the sudden end of the Cold War followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India’s foreign policy underwent appreciable shifts on numerous counts—lack of enthusiasm towards the non-aligned movement, eagerness to accommodate the American concerns, resumption of full diplomatic ties with Israel, emphasis on economic aspects of relations with Europe, Southeast Asia and even South Asia. Again, in the post-cold war era, the increasing sensitivity in international quarters to the issues of terrorism and human rights (along with the widely spread claims of self-determination) impelled necessary adjustments in India’s foreign policy. During the 1990s, the critical observers of India’s foreign policy have noted the government’s preoccupation with the question of Jammu and Kashmir in its contacts with major countries and in global forums. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on American targets in New York and Washington presented new opportunities to India to push its anti-terrorist foreign policy with greater conviction.
3.4
SUMMARY
The multifarious objectives of India’s foreign policy achieve a blend of national and international interests. India has sought to achieve its security and socio-economic advancement while at the same time working for peace, freedom, progress and justice to all nations and peoples. Nonalignment, adherence to peaceful procedures for settlement of differences, support to the initiatives for disarmament, and active participation in international bodies constituted notable principles that flow from the objectives of the country’s foreign policy. As elaborated, among several determinants of foreign policy, the relevance of factors like India’s geographical size, location, its historical experiences and traditions, the state of economy, the nature of political institutions and structure, and the personality of the country’s leadership have played significant role in shaping the country’s policy with countries in its neighbourhood and outside. Moreover, the impact of the changing international environment—be it the cold war politics, or the post-cold war trends—too is something not to be missed while understanding shifts in our foreign policy. All in all, India seems to have done pretty well in formulating and implementing a foreign policy behind which the nation stood united and which projected the country as a peace loving, mature, democratic, and law abiding country in the realm of world 7
affairs.
3.5
EXERCISES
1) Explain briefly the objectives and principles of India’s foreign policy. 2) Explain India’s geography, history and tradition as determinants of its foreign policy. 3) State how the backwardness of India’s economy dictated foreign policy options. 4) Contrast the influences of various prime ministers on identifying the objectives and other aspects of India’s foreign policy. 5) Comment briefly on domestic milieu as a factor in shaping India’s foreign policy. 6) Write short notes on media and foreign policy in India. 7) What has been the influence of changing international trends on India’s foreign policy?
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UNIT 4 DECISION MAKING INSTITUTIONS Structure 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5
Introduction Foreign Policy-making and the Ministry of External Affairs National Security Council Prime Minister’s Office Parliament 4.5.1
4.6 4.7
4.1
Parliamentary Committees
Summary Exercises
INTRODUCTION
India has chosen to follow parliamentary democracy wherein elected representatives form the government. In this system, government is continuously responsible and answerable to the elected representatives of the people. The government, while making foreign policy, has to be considerate of people’s will. Let us see and try to understand how Indian parliamentary government faces the task of making foreign policy. Traditionally, foreign policy-making in European countries was the concern of concerned foreign office and the minister-in-charge. Secrecy was the motto of foreign policy-making. Neither the public opinion was allowed to be formulated nor even national parliaments normally debated foreign policies. But, in a parliamentary democracy as in India decision-making in foreign policy is highly diffused. It is difficult to decide as to who makes a policy decision, and at what level was it decided. Thus, it is necessary for us to know foreign policy decision-making process. When we use the term ‘process’ it can suggest that decision-making is a smooth flow amongst the predetermined participants. But often, foreign policy-making is a zigzag process. All participants do not necessarily participate in all decision-making. Yet it is accurate to say that foreign policy in India, broadly speaking, is finalised by the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister. Cabinet is the inner circle of the Council of Ministers. But even Cabinet is too large a body to take all policy decisions. The Cabinet has a sub-committee called Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), which decides most of the issues affecting vital foreign policy and national security issues. Thus within the government it is this CCS that gives final shape to foreign policy and security related issues. Prime Minister Vajpayee said in the context of India offering to cooperate with the United States (US) in its fight against international terrorism after 11 September 2001 that in policy-making “debates and discussions do take place as they meet. But once we take a position every one falls in line.” It is now agreed that foreign policy is a synthesis of the ends and means of nation-states. Here ends are national interest and means is power. Thus, the interaction between national goals and its resources to be able to synthesise the ends and means is the task of foreign policy-makers, while the simplest way to define foreign policy is: “The way a country handles the outside world”. A more scientific definition is given by Modelski. He says, “… activities evolved by communities 1
for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment.” Here, one may rather use the term ‘regulating’ the behaviour of other states (rather than ‘changing’) so as to serve one’s national interest. But, the essence is always protection and promotion of one’s own national policy. Power is the means, without which effective foreign policy cannot be formulated. In India the political leadership gives final shape to its foreign policy, but it is largely the outcome of inputs from various institutions in the government, the most important instrument being the Ministry of External Affairs. In this Unit you will learn about various organs and agencies of the government, with the Prime Minister at the top, who plays different roles in foreign policy decisionmaking in India.
4.2 FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING AND THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (MEA) Foreign policy making is a highly complex and complicated process. In a domestic policy issue, for instance, like checking the increase in the price of a commodity say onion or potato, one can easily decide the options like buying it from abroad or control its price. But foreign policy requires expert knowledge and its application. The simple reason is that since foreign policy is in relation to another state or states, their behaviour is not under the control of India. The Indian policy makers can only make an intelligent guess about the likely behaviour of another state in a particular case. Thus, should India initiate a dialogue with Pakistan now having steadfastly stated that for negotiations to be fruitful, Pakistan needs to demonstrate its seriousness in checking cross border terrorism? Is the gamble going to pay off dividends? Is the PM right in saying that this will be his final effort or he will retire if he did not succeed? Will that kind of statement influence decisionmaking in Islamabad? What if the Pakistani decision makers calculate to wait for one more year till the next elections in India, hoping that a Congress government might come to power and offer better terms to Pakistan? One can never get a firm answer to these questions. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) is the ministry in the government that is expected to provide intelligent, accurate answers to the questions above as it is supposed to be the storehouse of expert knowledge on foreign affairs. The Minister of External Affairs (sometimes called Foreign Minister) is the head of the MEA. He is the political appointee, member of the Cabinet, not necessarily an expert in foreign affairs decision-making. But, all policy and decisions recommended by the experts in the Ministry are cleared, or modified, by the Minister before their implementation. Several policy decisions cleared by the Minister require final approval of the Cabinet. The Indian Foreign Service (IFS) officials, selected through the competitive examinations conducted by the Union Public Service Commission, primarily man the MEA. The Foreign Secretary is a very senior and experienced IFS officer, and the permanent head of the Ministry. He is an important adviser to the Foreign Minister. There are two other senior officials to assist the Foreign Secretary known as Foreign Secretary (West), and Foreign Secretary (East). These officials normally are very senior persons chosen to head the work in MEA. There are three additional secretaries to assist Foreign Secretary. The work of MEA is divided into 24 2
divisions. A joint secretary heads each division. There are 12 territorial divisions, dealing with a group of countries belonging to a limited region like Canada and America, Latin American and Caribbean countries, Gulf, East Asia etc. There are eleven functional divisions like Protocol, External Publicity, Historical, Policy Planning, and the UN etc. There is one administrative division, which does a kind of house keeping work of the MEA itself. It is necessary for you to be familiar with the work of some of the significant divisions from the viewpoint of decision-making. In the beginning there was no policy planning or any division to think ahead of times and plan to meet any contingencies or conduct research. There was only the Historical Division. It was providing information necessary to the territorial divisions as and when they needed it. But the need to establish a planning and research division was felt after the experience of the Chinese attack in October 1962.When the Chinese attack took place, the MEA did not have much information to support India’s claim for territory over which China had raised the dispute. Then in 1963 East Asia Research and Coordination Division was established. From its very name it is obvious that its jurisdiction was limited to China. However, in 1965 a broad based planning and research division known as Current Research Division was created. In 1966 it was renamed as Policy Planning and Review Division with a Policy Planning and Review Committee. But it was actually used by Mrs. Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi to dump those who could not be accommodated elsewhere. At present there is a Policy Planning and Research Division in the MEA. While the purpose is to have some talented officials to do planning and forecasting, the division is used to place an official till he can get a regular posting. The IFS officials are sent abroad to man the Embassies in different foreign capitals. Besides other functions, the embassies actually act as the official centres for collecting information on developments in the foreign countries. They gather information that may not be openly available in the country. The information collection has also become a specialised job. A person trained as a professional diplomat is not necessarily suitable for collecting information say on military developments or agriculture. Thus within the embassies you will find officials like Agriculture Attaché or Military Attaché who perform specialised job of collecting information in their respective areas like agricultural progress or military development in the country where the embassy is located. In powerful countries like the US or UK one will also find such attache's in other fields like industry, education, science and technology etc., depending upon the needs of India and the known importance of a country where such an embassy is located. In addition to the information collected by the embassies openly by the diplomatic personnel, states also depend on vital information collected secretly by the representatives of the state. Such information is called ‘Intelligence.’ Intelligence is very crucial for policy-making. Often we read in the newspapers that informed public or even policy-makers attribute a failure in policy making to intelligence failure. For instance, the Pakistani soldiers were said to have occupied Kargil peaks long before it came to light only on 6 May 1999. It was then attributed as a failure of intelligence. To gather foreign intelligence there is a special agency called Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of the Cabinet Secretariat. It is India’s equivalent of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the US. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) gathers internal intelligence. Whenever, the policy makers blame intelligence, the intelligence officials tend to feel that they are blamed for the failure of the policy
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makers and they are unable to defend themselves. Intelligence officials, as a result, tend to present all intelligence gathered rather than providing intelligence after proper analysis. This trend defeats the very purpose of having separate intelligence agencies.
4.3
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
The Indian foreign/national security policy-making generally suffers from two main drawbacks. One, it is highly ad hoc and second, it lacks effective policy coordination. Dinesh Singh, who was the Minister of External Affairs under Mrs. Gandhi, said that during his tenure much of the foreign policy involved responding to others rather than determining proactively the Indian policy. For this, the reasons are not far to seek. PMs particularly Nehru, Mrs. Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi thought they had answers to every crisis. However, a Minister can never be an expert like the trained foreign service officers. He must give enough weightage to the views expressed by the Ministry officials. Prime Minister Nehru was a towering personality and during his lifetime he decided national security himself alone; at the most, some times he consulted one or the other confidants on a specific issue. He did not appoint a full time Foreign Minister. Thus for instance in the 1950s he relied on Krishna Menon who was for some time Minister for Defence in his cabinet. Mrs. Gandhi consulted, when she thought it necessary, a few of her trusted men in the government. There has been always, from the beginning, some suggestions for an organised system of foreign/ national security policy making. K. P. Mishra and K. Subrahmanyam were among the earliest to suggest the settingup of a National Security Council. K. P. Mishra mentioned about the need for Expert Advisory Committee and also a need for Policy Planning. But Subrahmanyam had stressed on creating a policy formulating secretariat rather than policy discussing council. This was mainly because the Cabinet system provides for collective policy-making. Then existing Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA) was considered as a counterpart of the National Security Council (NSC) in the US—as a deliberative body. But J. Bandopadhyaya in his Making of India’s foreign Policy pleaded for the creation of a Foreign Policy Council on the American model. But whenever we speak in favour of a NSC for India, we are aware of the fact that ours is a plural executive and already there exists a collective decision-making mechanism. However, the experience shows that, the Prime Ministers, if they so choose, may not hold the meetings of the CCPA. After 1991, then PM Narasimha Rao faced internal challenge to his leadership from Arjun Singh who was then the Human Resources Minister. After 1993, Narasimha Rao did not call any meetings of the CCPA, as he did not wish to have Arjun Singh in it. Thus there was no institutional and organised discussion during the term of Narasimha Rao. Therefore NSC had to be legislated by an act of the Parliament instead of being created by an executive order. As a result of public demand, practically all the political parties were in favour of India establishing a National Security Council for policy-making. Finally the Vajpayee government, in 1998, established it. The National Security Council (NSC) consists of the PM as the chairman and ministers for External Affairs, Defence, Home, Finance and Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission as its members. It includes several experts like the Scientific Adviser to the Defence
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Minister, nominated experts in the field of defence and security strategists, several retired foreign service officers, academics, senior bureaucrats and service chiefs. However, ministers are busy politicians who will not have sufficient time to think in advance regarding problems, which could arise in the security decision-making. Thus there is a Strategic Core Group. This group consists of three service chiefs, Secretaries of principal departments represented in the NSC, and the Chiefs of Intelligence Bureau and RAW. The NSC needs secretariat to be effective but the government has provided the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) to double up as the secretariat of the NSC. Finally, for a NSC to be successful, it needs an official who, in consultation with the PM, would coordinate all inputs in the policy making. The present scheme provides for the Principal Secretary of the PM to act as the National Security Adviser. The scheme also provides for a National Security Advisory Board (NSAB). This Board when set up in 1998 included 27 members. Its members include academics, journalists, defence analysts and key public figures. Among those who constituted the Board were eminent people like K. Subrahmanyam, J.N. Dixit, and many other prominent figures. While National Security Council is headed by Brajesh Mishra, Prime Minister’s Principal Secretary and National Security Advisor, the National Security Advisory Board was headed by K. Subrahmanyam. The first task assigned to the NSAB was to prepare a draft nuclear doctrine. This task was completed when the details of nuclear doctrine were announced in August 1999. The NSC thus created appears to be reluctantly created and sparingly used by the government. Some of its limitations can be mentioned here. First, it is not regularly used in decision-making. After it was created, for the first time it met to consider the Kargil crisis on 8 June 1999 almost one month after the crisis broke out. After Kargil many foreign policy crises have occurred, like, the crisis in Fiji Islands where a Prime minister of the Indian origin was dethroned by a military coup or the continued ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka where the Sri Lankan government tried to seek a military solution to the problem. But it was the CCS, which considered the crisis. Another occasion when the NSC was convened is to consider post-Kashmir election scenario in J & K after the election in October 2002. Some times the explanation offered for not using the NSC is very strange. Often the justification given for not convening the NSC is that it is only an advisory body. The crucial decision on the national security is taken in the CCS, which is a cabinet subcommittee. If the contention that NSC itself is an advisory body, then the question is: Why create a National Security Advisory Board? Incidentally, NSAB has government appointed, mostly retired officials, who were in the Union Government and are residents in New Delhi. The Kargil Committee appointed to study as to what went wrong in the Kargil crisis and suggest ways to improve the decision-making suggested that the work of the NSC must be streamlined. Second, the NSC has to be created by the law of Parliament and not by the executive order on the ground that the NSC must have a reasonable guarantee of survivability. Because the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs which met to decide on foreign and national security policy as stated earlier never met since 1993 during the tenure of Narasimha Rao for three years as Rao did not wish to have Arjun Singh, then Human Resources Minister attend it. Of course, even if NSC is legally established, it may still be not summoned to meet if a PM is determined not to hold
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its meeting. But in such situations at least those who are affected by the PM’s approach could create public opinion against it. Third, for the NSC to be a successful mechanism in policy making, it has to have an independent secretariat. The Joint Inteligence Committee (JIC) cannot perform that function. One thing is that the national security policy is not merely a co-ordinated intelligence. It is much more than that. As it is, past chairmen say that in the JIC meetings, directors of various intelligence agencies do not wish to share raw intelligence data possessed by them. They desire to share it with only the highest policy-makers. In such a situation, it will not be able to coordinate national security policy where inputs from other ministries like Defence, External Affairs, Home etc., needed to be coordinated. Fourth, the NSC needs a full-time National Security Adviser or call him director or by whatever name. The Principal Secretary to PM is itself a full time job. As the former PM, Inder Kumar Gujral said “the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister is always overloaded” with work that he will have no time left to devote to think in terms of coordinated, holistic manner on the issue of national security. The Kargil Committee had also recommended the appointment of an independent National Security Adviser. Fifth, the NSAB is filled with mostly retired Foreign Service and military officials that too based in New Delhi. National security has however, a regional angle as well. Members based in New Delhi will not be able to understand the regional sensitivities in a policy, affecting the people of a region. For instance, if the NSAB is discussing about India’s policy on ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka, it is better that someone represent the regional sensibilities in the discussion. Even if a person belonged to the region if he has been a resident of Delhi, he would be a poor second choice to air his views on the crisis. The problem with any innovative suggestion in the revitalising of the NSC is that the existing bureaucracy is unable to accept any dilution of their individual powers.
4.4
PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE
It is well known that parliamentary government became cabinet government and gradually after the Second World War, it has increasingly become Prime Ministerial government. Since then PM has become very important in all the decision- making processes. Thus, Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) plays a major role in policy formulation including foreign policy decision-making. However powerful a PM is, he cannot decide every issue relating to the foreign policy. Naturally only such issues which a PM thinks is important for India’s security, foreign policy goals or economic development or that is vital to party’s standing in the country and his own power and prestige would be decided in the PM’ office. Lal Bahadur Shastri had set up the Prime Minister’s Secretariat which later became the PMO in 1964 when he became the PM. He was not very well acquainted with foreign affairs. He also appointed a full time External Affairs Minister for the first time. Nehru had retained MEA with himself and therefore it was natural for him to handle foreign policy through his own office. Shastri used the talents of a senior civil servant L. K. Jha to handle the foreign policy.
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This trend of PMO playing a major role became evident only during the tenure of Indira Gandhi. She held MEA with her for a while (1967-1970) but later she appointed separate ministers for external affairs. Her power was at pinnacle during the Bangladesh war in 1971 with Pakistan. She had in her office trusted aides like P. N. Haksar and D. P. Dhar. It was she who conducted talks on the Bangladesh crisis with foreign powers, decided the details of War, and also held delicate negotiations in Shimla after the war ended in the defeat of Pakistan and signed the Shimla Agreement in 1972. The PMO includes large number of joint-Secretaries, deputy-secretaries, OSDs and other officials, each dealing with different aspects of Prime Ministerial functioning. In the present NDA government, PMO is gradually becoming powerful in the policy- making. Normally PM’s National Security Adviser does not get involved in the public presentation of India’s foreign policy. That is the task of the PM or the Minister of External Affairs or the Foreign Secretary. But for the first time, Prime Minister’s Principal Secretary Brajesh Mishra, not only discussed a wide range of foreign policy issues but also made public policy pronouncements on several occasions. He had hinted at important foreign policy decisions on visits to other countries. Thus, while addressing a gathering of American Jews in Washington, DC in May 2003, he said that India, US, and Israel should make a joint effort to fight the menace of terrorism. This also provoked media reaction that National Security Adviser is overshadowing the Minister of External Affairs.
4.5
PARLIAMENT
If the above is the brief description of foreign policy decision-making within the executive branch, what is the role of Parliament? Does the Parliament play a role in the decision making on foreign policy? Parliament is a representative body of the people. Thus, the ultimate control over the government policy-making including foreign policy rests with the Parliament. On several foreign policy-related issues as listed in the Union List, the Parliament has exclusive power to enact legislation. For instance these include, diplomatic, consular and trade representation, war and peace, the United Nations, citizenship, naturalisation etc. The Parliament has the power to approve treaties. But it is the Union Government, which determines the basic contents of treaties and seeks final approval of the Parliament. Thus in the case of the Indo-Soviet Peace and Friendship treaty, Indira Gandhi, then Prime minister, informed the Parliament one hour before it was to be signed on August 9, 1971. Politically it depends upon the majority support commanded by a PM. By and large during her term no one dared to question her decisions. During Nehru’s time, A. Appadorai in Domestic Roots of India’s Foreign Policy discusses in detail how parliament was able to exercise its influence over India’s China policy. It was under the pressure of the Parliament and the President that Nehru was forced to relieve Krishna Menon of his Defence portfolio. Second instance that reflected Parliament’s influence is the issue of government taking high-powered transmitter from Voice of America (VOA) for All India Radio in March 1963 to meet the Chinese propaganda after the October 1962 border war. The agreement had a clause to share time with the VOA. The communist MPs were vehemently against this as they were concerned more with their anti-Americanism than protecting Indian national interest. 7
The government ultimately dropped the whole project. In these examples, it is possible to argue that Parliament was able to assert only after a policy decision is taken. Second, it succeeded in getting rid of Menon only because of the failure of India in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. In normal times, it is difficult for a Parliament to assert such powers. In a coalition government that we are familiar with since 1996, it is prudent for the PM to take people’s representatives into confidence. During the Gulf War II by the US—led alliance against Iraq in March 2003, the NDA government was keen to pursue what Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee called ‘middle path’ of not offending the US by not taking any hard line against the war but at the same time asking Iraq to fully cooperate with the UN in destroying the weapons of mass destruction. However, the Parliament insisted on a resolution condemning/deploring American military intervention in Iraq. Ultimately it took recourse to Hindi language by using ‘ninda’ as a substitute for stronger English word ‘condemn.’ But this is not the first instance of a coalition government facing such an embarrassment in policy formulation. In 1991 during the first Gulf War, Chandra Shekhar was the Prime Minister. As PM, he had given permission to the US Air Force (USAF) planes to refuel in Mumbai airport. However, when this fact became public, members of the Parliament were against it. As the elections were likely anytime then, the Congress Party, which was supporting him from outside, was concerned with the effect on the Muslim voters. Then after discussion in the Parliament, the policy of permitting refuelling the USAF planes was changed. Second, Parliament has control over the money that is spent to run the foreign policy and national security establishments in the country. But parliamentary control over the funds appropriated is perfunctory. The budget and appropriations for individual ministries like External Affairs and Defence are often rushed through in the Parliament. Veteran Parliamentarian Madhu Dandavate once wrote that 85 to 87 per cent of budget proposals are approved without any debate. This is really an appalling situation cutting across the very democratic theory that control over money lends the parliament to control the executive branch. The MPs are not greatly concerned about the financial needs of the nation’s armed forces. During 1959-1960, there was an obvious national security threat from Communist China. But then Defence Minister, Krishna Menon proposed a reduction of Rs. 25 crores from the defence budget. The MPs never protested. On the other hand, the defence budget in 1987-1988 was Rs. 12,512 crores—till then highest ever. But the MPs, while discussing it, were very feeble in questioning the sudden rise in the defence budget. When an MP did question, Rajiv Gandhi, then PM, silenced the member by stating that any one questioning defence budget is anti-national. The third area of parliamentary influence is through debate over the policy issues. All the parliamentary devices of generating a discussion in the Parliament, like calling attention notice, adjournment, questions etc., are also available in foreign affairs to the Members of Parliament. However, the discussion and debates in the Parliament over the foreign policy issues is always perfunctory. There are two main reasons for the lack of interest amongst the MPs beyond their general rural background and lower level of general education in international affairs. One reason is that in reality Parliament is a large body—Lok Sabha consisting of over 500 and Rajya Sabha consisting of 250 people—such a body cannot effectively make policy, let alone decide. If the large number is one reason for the Parliament’s inability to formulate nation’s policy, the
8
second reason is that they do not have basic political interest to pursue foreign affairs and defence matters in the Parliament. The question is by performing good role as an effective MP in foreign affairs, he is not going to get a few additional votes in the next election. On the other hand, if he is effective in getting an arms depot in his constituency or an ammunition-manufacturing factory, he can generate employment for the people and get additional votes from his grateful voters. By and large, the MPs lack knowledge and information necessary to effectively discuss and suggest even alternate policy options to government. This is not an insurmountable problem; if given an expert advice, they can discuss foreign policy effectively. But the political will always seems to be lacking. Yet, Parliament exercises broad influence by determining the general parameters of policy beyond which a government cannot proceed. Occasionally, their influence on the foreign policy directions of the country is much more than that. But for long there was no strong link between the MEA or foreign policy formulation and Parliament despite the fact that the foreign minister is a member of the Parliament. The only link has been through the Parliamentary Consultative Committee on External Affairs. Such a committee also exists relating to Defence.
4.5.1
Parliamentary Committees
The Parliament has been making use of consultative committees to assist each Minister. The Consultative committee meetings were called whenever the minister thought it fit. They did not have their independent operations. Thus Foreign Minister called the meeting to discuss or clarify an already announced policy. No new issues were taken up in the consultative committee. During Nehru’s time since he himself was the Minister of External Affairs, he used the Consultative Committee as a sounding body or a debating society. But under Indira Gandhi initially the Consultative Committee on external affairs was called to meet more often. But once she consolidated her power after 1971 general elections, she did not pay much importance to the Consultative Committee on External Affairs. One proof of that is the complete lack of discussion on the Indo Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1971. There was no Consultative Committee meeting either before signing it or after signing though the treaty proposal was with Mrs. Gandhi for some years. Similarly the Shimla Agreement was reached on 2 July 1972 and was ratified by India on 28 July the same year. But Bandopadhyaya points that consultative committee met once on 3 July after the agreement has been reached, and again on 28 August—one month after the agreement had been ratified; and on neither of these two occasions was the Shimla agreement “even specifically mentioned on the agenda.” But there have been standing Committees of Parliament with statutory powers, like Estimates Committee, Public Accounts Committee and Public Assurances Committee. These committees can and do examine the issues relating to the working of foreign policy and defence. Thus for instance, the Estimates Committee in 1976-77 under the chairmanship of Atal Behari Vajpayee examined the working of embassies abroad. Similarly other committees like Public Accounts Committee and Public Assurances Committee can examine accounts of the agencies implementing foreign affairs or the assurances given on the floors of both the Houses of Parliament. However, for many years in the 1970s and the 1980s some foreign policy scholars suggested the need to establish standing committees to discuss foreign affairs and defence. But amongst the political class the opinion was that the Parliamentary Committee system is not attuned to
9
parliamentary government but to the Presidential system as in the US. But because of the sustained lobbying by some of the foreign policy experts, the government finally decided to constitute parliamentary committees on foreign affairs and defence. These were finally established in 1991. The role of the Parliament in the making of foreign policy is changing somewhat gradually ever since the establishment of Parliamentary Committees in the area of Foreign Affairs and Defence in 1991. These are known as Select Committees. They are not advisory committees or consultative committees as referred earlier. These committees respectively, have the task of scrutinising the budget of the concerned departments like the MEA and Defence. After the budget is presented in the House, normally Lok Sabha is adjourned. After a month, the Parliament meets again to consider the budget. Equally important is the fact that the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and also Defence study issues which the Parliament considers important, submits its report to the Parliament and Executive. The Executive branch is supposed to submit an action taken report to the parliament. Thus, for instance, the standing committee on the Defence Department has been active in raising important security issues and seek clarifications from the government. Thus for instance, Parliamentary Committee on Defence in 1995 said: “Despite warming relations with China, China is and is likely to remain, the primary security challenge to India in the medium and long terms.” On the basis of the working of the Parliamentary committees it can be concluded that there is a need to strengthen the working of these committees. One reform that could be introduced is to provide the permanent staff to these committees drawn from the regular IFS officials in the middle level. These staff members can study the issues coming under discussion in the Committees and the Parliament. Another possibility is that political parties, in a conscious way, should encourage more and more retired military and Foreign Service officials to join politics and enter parliament. Their in-service knowledge could be of great help to the parliament as an institution to critically assess every issue involved in the foreign affairs of the country. These committees are definitely improving the role of Parliament in foreign/security policy making. But their role needs to be strengthened in foreign policy-making. Two brief suggestions can be made in this regard. One, to increase the functions they perform, and second, give these committees a skeleton of permanent expert staff so that the MPs can effectively perform their roles in these committees.
4.6
SUMMARY
It is the domestic needs, which decide the broad contours of the foreign policy decisions. In the foreign policy-making, political representatives of the people have ultimate control over the foreign policy decisions. But in the Indian democracy, the politically chosen ministers with the aid and advice of the Foreign Service Officers do much of the policy-making. In this unit we have analysed the position of such important institutions as the Ministry of External Affairs comprising several senior and junior officers handling various Sections and Divisions dealing with different countries, regions and organisations. At the bureaucratic level, the MEA is headed by the Foreign Secretaries, whose recommendations are normally accepted by the Minister of External Affairs, who is the political chief of the MEA. The Cabinet Committee on Security, comprising select senior ministers and headed by the Prime Minister, clears policy decisions before they are approved by the Union Cabinet. The National Security Council, and its Advisory Board as well as the Prime 10
Minister’s Office (PMO) are other important institutions that give their inputs in policy-making process. Parliament represents the people, and has final word in the days when foreign policy has been democratised, and is no more secretly formulated by the Foreign Office. As India grows in power, there is a need to improve policy-making mechanisms. Equally true is to streamline control of the Parliament through the Parliamentary Committees on foreign affairs and defence.
4.7
EXERCISES
1) Examine the structure and functions of the Ministry of External Affairs. 2) What were the compulsions in establishing the National Security Council? Critically assess its working. 3) How do you explain the growing influence of the PMO in foreign policy-making? 4) Discuss the role of Parliament in foreign policy-making. How do the parliamentary committees help in enhancing the role of Parliament in foreign policy-making?
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UNIT 5 POLICY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS Structure 5.1 5.2
Introduction Political Parties and Foreign Policy 5.2.1 5.2.2
5.3 5.4
Party Manifestos Public Opinion and Parties
Pressure Groups Media 5.4.1 5.4.2
Print Media Electronic Media
5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11
Social Movements NGOs Business Diaspora Think Tank Summary Exercises
5.1
INTRODUCTION
How is a foreign policy issue placed on the agenda of the formal foreign policy makers in India? It is accurate to say that a majority of issues simply arise because other states interested in a policy take initiative that affects Indian interests. Then India reacts. According to Dinesh Singh, former Minister for External Affairs, under Indira Gandhi between 1967 and 1970, Indian foreign policy was “one of carrying on, merely responding to situations.” Thus, much of foreign policy involves India reacting to actions initiated by other nations. Take for instance, menace of cross border terrorism. Every day newspapers’ headlines highlight that terrorists killed five innocents in one place in Kashmir, another day in Jammu. This goes on, and on. Then government has to react. But even when it reacts in a democracy—political parties, groups of people, media—all comment on it, and make suggestions for effective actions. Normally foreign policy initiative is taken by the government. But occasionally in a democracy that India is, foreign policy initiative emerges from outside the formal apparatus of the government. Jawaharlal Nehru had once told the Constituent Assembly: “External Affairs will follow internal affairs.” Though it is India’s policy in relation to other nations in the world, foreign policy is essentially made keeping in view the interests of the society at large. Hence societal inputs are extremely important in the development of a foreign policy. These inputs come from various sources. People, in a democratic society, are the most important source of foreign policy initiatives. But, views of the people are expressed largely by the political parties and the media—newspapers and other print media, as well as the electronic media. Political parties are mainly concerned with acquiring power. It is in the process of their endeavour
1
to acquire political power, or retain it, that the parties take up foreign policy issues and influence the policy-making process. Besides, India, like other modern democratic societies, has a large number of interest/pressure groups. These groups may be in favour of/against a proposed policy, or they themselves may seek to initiate policy to suit their clients, or constituencies. In addition, media, social activists and movements and non-governmental organisations also contribute to the formulation of foreign policy. They help in regulating India’s behaviour towards the outside world. India has also fairly developed expert groups which may be, for the sake of convenience, described as the Think Tank. These groups study various foreign policy issues and convey their well-considered views to the government. This unit analyses all these institutions in order to help you to understand as to which nongovernmental bodies make valuable inputs in foreign policy making
5.2
POLITICAL PARTIES AND FOREIGN POLICY
In Indian democracy, one or two or many political parties control government of the day. Even when one party controls the government, if it is a two party system, the second party acts as an opposition party and tries to influence nation’s foreign policy. The government also anticipates the opposition party’s reaction and that itself becomes an influence in the policy process. The opposition party’s policy pronouncements also become the policy expectations of the people whenever the opposition party becomes the ruling party. If a party for instance says that it will act to prevent influx of job-seeking people from across Bangladesh, people will hold it to implement the promise when it comes to power. However cynical one might be about working of democracy, the fact is that if a political party fails to fulfil certain important promises, it will lose its credibility sooner than later. This is most unlike the communist regimes where the communist party alone determines the foreign policy. When there are a plethora of political parties as is the case now in India, their influence in the making of policy depends upon their proximity to the seat of power. Then what is the role of political parties in India? Prior to independence particularly since 1930s, political parties did exist; but, since British, as the colonial power controlled the foreign policymaking, Indians as organised into political parties, did not exercise much influence, let alone control over the making of foreign policy. Yet these political parties, as the purpose of their existence indicated, did try to influence broad parameters of India’s external relations. We might say that they acted as pressure groups instead of as vehicles of power. Thus the Congress Party took pro-democratic stand on the global issues while the Socialists were in favour of socialism. But Sectarian parties like Hindu Mahasabha spoke for the Hindus and Muslim League favoured Islamic causes. The communists obviously took pro-communism stance. Despite that, these parties were against imperialism and colonialism, were one in opposing the European control of Asia and were against British policy in South Africa. The Congress Party in the initial years in power laid emphasis on anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and anti-racism. The general foreign policy objectives of the Congress are the same as stated at the 1948 Congress Working Committee session. The foreign policy of India must necessarily be based on the principles that have guided the Congress in the past years. The principles are the promotion of world peace, the freedom of all nations, racial equality and the ending of imperialism
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and colonialism. In particular, the Congress was interested in the freedom of the nations and people of Asia and Africa who have suffered under various forms of colonialism for many generations. It should be the constant aim of the foreign policy of India to maintain friendly and co-operative relations with all nations and to avoid entanglement in military or similar alliances, which tend to divide up the world in rival groups and thus endanger world peace. Maintaining her freedom of action in foreign affairs and in the economic development of the country, India should continue to function as a member state of the United Nations, co-operating with other states in the maintenance of peace and freedom. These principles, it is accurate to say, guided the Congress Party until the mid-1980s. The government, at a given time, belongs to one or the other political party. Since independence until 1977 and again from 1980 to 1996 the Congress Party held sway over the central government. The Congress Party at its plenary meetings invariably discussed important foreign policy issues of the time and passed broad resolutions based on party consensus. The first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru had laid the early foundation of India’s foreign policy. His formulation was non-alignment—India as a newly independent nation would not join either of the two military blocs, then led by the US and the Soviet Union. The Congress Party became the advocate of non-alignment. Most of the other parties could only provide a critique of it or point out variation in non-alignment in practice. The first ever non-Congress government at the central level was one in 1977 led by Morarji Desai under the Janata Government. He was always critical while in opposition of the policy of Non-alignment. But the Janata Party could only add ‘genuine’ before non-alignment as its foreign policy. It continued foreign policy principles as laid by the Congress Party in the past. However, as the years passed, the Congress Party in its party meetings continuously reposed its faith in the policy of non-alignment. There was a question mark on the relevance of India’s policy of non-alignment after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Congress Party in its meeting in Tirupati in 1993 reiterated its faith in the policy of Non-alignment. Narasimha Rao, then Prime Minister, spoke vehemently in its favour. The United Front government that followed after 1996 elections also swore to follow the non-alignment. But the government under the BJPled 12 party alliance, in 1998 did not mention non-alignment in its National Agenda for Governance. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its predecessor—Jan Sangh, have been great advocates of the nation possessing nuclear weapons as an instrument of national security. In its election manifesto of 1991, BJP stated that if it comes to power it would give Indian forces “nuclear teeth.” The party came to power as a main party in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in 1998 with 12 other allies. The alliance issued National Agenda for Governance. The Agenda promised to establish a National Security Council. “This council”, the Agenda said, “will undertake India’s first ever Strategic Defence Review.” There was a close watch on its activities by then only surviving super power—the US to see whether Indian government would go for nuclear tests. In May 1998, the NDA government carried out nuclear tests in Pokharan and declared India as a nuclear weapons state. It was a shock to the US. But the US had probably calculated that the promised Strategic Defence Review would take place before India plunges to test nuclear weapons. But the decision to test
3
the nuclear weapons itself was not suddenly taken by the NDA government. The National Agenda referred above had stated that to “ensure the security, territorial integrity and unity of India we will take all necessary steps and exercise all available options. Towards that end we will reevaluate the nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons.”
5.2.1
Party Manifestos
One of the major ways in which political parties influence details of foreign policy formulation is through their manifestos issued during the elections. Cynics say that party manifesto is like railway platform (in the US, incidentally, manifesto is called a platform) that is used for the specific purpose of boarding the train (in the case of politics, to get into power) and then all forget the platform. But often, crucial issues raised in the manifesto become rallying points to the political activists to create public opinion in favour of it. Thus for instance, the Congress (I) in its manifesto for the 1980 general elections had said that if it were elected to power it would extend diplomatic recognition to Heng Samarin government in Kampuchea then installed by Vietnam. Indira Gandhi was returned to power in January 1980. The Communist Party of India (CPI) also highlighted the same issue. The CPI MPs began to raise the issue in the Parliament to pressurise the government, which eventually led her to extend recognition to Heng Samarin government in July 1980. The BJP, in its manifesto in 1998, had suggested setting up a National Security Council for policy making. The NSC then had found a mention in practically every major political party. As a matter of fact that was one innovative idea introduced by the Janata Dal under the leadership of V. P. Singh in 1989. The intellectuals and security activists then began to demand from the V. P. Singh government that they fulfil the promise. Then in October 1990 for the first time V. P. Singh established a National Security Council. The Congress Party, which had also promised to set up a NSC, did not implement it though it was in power for five years (1991-96). In 1996 when the United Front government came to power, it also did not implement it though it had promised to do so. Then came the BJP led coalition government, which formulated its National Agenda for Governance and promised to “establish a National Security Council to analyse the military, economic and political threats to the nation and also to continuously advice the government.” The pro-NSC groups brought pressure on the government to fulfil its promise to establish the NSC. Then the NDA government led by the BJP’s Atal Behari Vajpayee in November 1998 created an NSC for effective national security policy formulation. Smaller political parties may not lead the government, as they cannot win many seats in the parliament. But these parties can and do lay down the outer perimetres for the governments in power.
5.2.2
Public Opinion and Parties
Another important role played by the political parties in general is of creating public opinion in favour of a particular foreign policy. Rightist political parties for instance like now defunct Swatantra Party, the Congress (O) and the Jan Sangh/BJP were in the forefront of advocating India upgrading diplomatic relations with Israel. Morarji Desai, the leader of the Congress (O) and later the 4
Prime Minister under the Janata Party, even had an unpublicised meeting with then Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Dayan in pursuit of the same policy. Then the Congress (I) Party under Narasimha Rao in 1992 established full diplomatic relations with Israel. Opposition parties of course logically would however, create public opinion in favour of policies preferred by them. In this connection it is necessary to remember that the Muslim League and smaller Muslim parties have been in the forefront to oppose the upgradation of diplomatic relations with Israel as the latter is seen as anti-Islam because of their on going conflict with Palestinian people and authorities in the West Bank. Political parties are primarily interested in capturing power. Parties use their own success in managing the foreign affairs as issues in electoral campaign. But with certain exception, no elections are won or lost by a political party because of its advocacy of a foreign policy issue. But every major political party maintains a cell to pursue policy issues in the arena of foreign affairs, conduct research, hold meetings and prepare campaign materials. Thus goes on the role of political parties in the development of foreign policy.
5.3
PRESSURE GROUPS
The pressure groups are also called interest groups as they function to bring pressure to promote one or cluster of interests. The pressure groups are normally weak in influencing foreign policy in contrast to the domestic policy issues. Yet these groups some time do play a role in influencing foreign policy. There are various interest groups, some visible, while others work clandestinely. There are several societies working for friendship between India and one country or the other. One such society in the past was Indo-Soviet Friendship Society. These friendship societies have their contacts in the Ministry of External Affairs, as well as in the Parliament. These pressure groups work systematically to influence foreign policy-making for or against a country. For example, India delayed establishing diplomatic relations with Israel from 1948 to 1992 due to the activities of certain interest groups.
5.4
MEDIA
Media involves various instrumentalities. First, there is the print media like newspapers, magazines etc. Second, there is the electronic media like Radio and Television. Third, Internet is emerging as an important segment of media in influencing foreign policy. The media plays a role in highlighting the issues that need attention of policy-makers. They also carry the policy decisions of policymakers to the people with their own commentary.
5.4.1 Print Media Let us discuss each of them little more in detail. The newspapers are the oldest. The policymakers do read newspapers and try to understand the issues. Newspaper editorials and the articles published in the newspapers do have influence in the policy-making process. Many newspapers are owned by certain business houses, or their management and editorial officials have links with one political party or the other. They express the concerned policy or ideology which has its impact on the readers. Certain papers and journals often express subjective views
5
at the cost of objectivity. This may colour the thinking of policy-makers and parliamentarians. But it is also true that in general media has limited influence as it has limited access to the information to develop an alternate viewpoint on a policy issue. Thus it prefers to follow the lead given by the policy-makers—at the most by reacting to it either in support or oppose it. To give one example, as long as Indira Gandhi was alive she generally took an anti-US stand on many foreign policy issues. The Times of India, which during the Nehru-Gandhi dynastic rule was known as proestablishment newspaper, then did not suggest the need to improve India-US relations. But once Rajiv Gandhi came to power, with a known pro-West bias, this newspaper’s editor was quick to suggest such a need! The press had some influence in government’s approach to foreign policy crises involving the Soviet Union like their military intervention in Hungary (1956) or Czechoslovakia (1968) or Afghanistan (1979). In the case of Afghanistan, Indira Gandhi, taking cognisance of media criticism, began to privately inform the soviet leadership that their presence in Afghanistan is unacceptable to India. In the recent times, media has become bolder than ever before. The Times of India has begun, for instance, what we can call, a New Journalism—wherein news is provided with instant opinions of the editor so that the reader is subjected to the influence of views in addition to the news. Let me give here two typical examples. First, after the news item informing of India buying certain defence items from Russia, it commented: “The acquisition of the submarines and strategic bombers will complete India’s nuclear triad. However, this will also make it vital that we exercise even greater restraint vis a vis this awesome power.” (Emphasis added). Second example is the news on India’s willingness to even start Lahore Bus Service. Editorial comment just below the news was: “Before buying a Lahore bus for Atalji, Delhi should do better to follow protocol and install our High Commissioner in Islamabad.” The tone and tenor of these two comments obviously does not concede even an iota of commonsense to the foreign policy-makers!
5.4.2
Electronic Media
Electronic media is growing in its influence in the Indian foreign policy making. Literacy being less than fifty percent, the role of electronic media i.e. radio and T.V. is very significant. With the liberalisation of media policy and introduction of private channels in TV, electronic media not only provides foreign affairs related news but also bring to the listeners various points of view including the views of foreigners who are involved in the decision as a second party to the news. The Internet is becoming the latest source of information and news to attentive public. But it is early to assess its impact on foreign policy-making. Private News Channels, like certain journals and newspapers convey news and views that may create prejudices. Policy-makers, howsoever objective and impartial they may be, cannot help sometimes, getting influenced by the media reporting.
5.5
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Indian society is highly fragmented. Each social group, on the basis of its narrow group interest, tries to influence foreign policy. Muslims in India constitute a sizeable segment –around 12
6
percent—of the society. Their activities within the country and in relation to Islamic countries do influence the foreign policy. Taking note of this fact, the Indian foreign policy-makers until 1992 maintained diplomatic relations with Israel at consular level. Indian Muslims tend to be seen as speaking for the Muslim world, particularly in favour of Pakistan. When the US attacked Afghanistan many Indian Muslim groups called for the boycott of popular US products like Coke. This pattern was repeated when the US attacked Iraq in March 2003. This attitude of the Muslim community naturally influences government policy towards the Arab world. The government is restrained from acting against perceived interests of Muslim community world over. These may not involve any concrete gains or losses in real terms but mostly only in terms of perceptions. This is clearly indicated by a statement issued by a Muslim institution called Raza Academy, in Mumbai in May 2003. Brajesh Mishra in Washington, DC during his visit made a statement that India, US and Israel should jointly fight terrorism. But the Academy immediately reacted stating that to “tackle the threat of terrorism India cannot risk taking the help of terrorist themselves.” The academy also held out a threat against the proposed visit by Ariel Sharon, Israeli PM to India stating that it could lead to law and order problems. From this it is clear that though Israelis have in no way harmed Indians, Indian Muslims have internalised Israel’s conflicts with Palestinians as their own. Some American scholars like Theodore P. Wright compare this approach of Muslim community to foreign policy issues to the Jewish lobbies in the US. The approach of the Jews in the US constrains the US foreign policy towards Israel and Arabs. Similarly, Muslim social groups constrain Indian foreign policy towards the Arab world. This tradition of Indians supporting Muslim causes goes to the times of Mahatma Gandhi’s support to Khilafat movement in 1919. After independence, in 1967 then EAM, M. C. Chagla condemned Israel for its attack on Arab countries even before other Muslim countries did so. However, Chagla was otherwise more secular in his approach than many of his peers were. In the last two decades terrorism promoted by Pakistan has created a similar distortion in Muslim attitude to foreign policy issues. The activities, for instance, of the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) in organising bomb blasts in Mumbai and elsewhere at the behest of the Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) should be seen in this context. This leads to the other segments of Indian society looking at Muslims from distorted view, which could harm the social harmony. It is not that only Muslim society and groups look as protectors of Muslim interest outside India. Tamils in Tamil Nadu have been equally responsible for twists and turns in Indian foreign policy towards Sri Lanka since that country also has the largest minority population of Tamils. Though India herself was a victim of terrorism promoted by Pakistan in Punjab then, the Tamil organisations in South dragged the Indian policy-makers in the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka. While certain communities or social groups might constrain Indian foreign policy, others may help to expand the Indian influence in other countries. Such social movements create awareness on the part of the government on the need to pursue certain foreign policy issues. India has given to the world at large, particularly East and South East Asia, Buddhism as their religion. Buddhist organisations in India advocate improved cultural and social ties with the countries, which are 7
predominantly Buddhist. Indian government wants to encourage Buddhist tourist routes. These organisations in India and abroad look to one another to maintain goodwill and understanding which helps to some extent government’s policy making.
5.6
NGOs
In the last fifty-six years after independence, numerous Non-Government Organisations have come up within the country. Many of these can be compared with Public Action Committees (PACs) or single-issue interest groups in the US. These NGOs have a bearing to some extent on the foreign policy development process in the country. These NGOs, while acting as pressure groups in domestic policy, try to link up with similar NGOs abroad and also with foreign funding agencies and influence the funding or the government policy towards a policy. Best example is that of Medha Patkar’s Narmada Bachao Andolan. This group even approached the World Bank against funding the Narmada Sarovar Project. It is difficult to measure the influence of any one group in foreign policy formulation. But such NGOs nowadays are in the forefront on newer issues in foreign affairs. Thus for instance, take the issue of environmental protection. There is the Centre for Science and Environment in Delhi. This issue is anyway interlinked at the national and international level. But most of these NGOs deal with issues, which affect ordinary people in the country like health, education, population, human rights particularly rights of women and several others. There are not many NGOs, which exclusively focus on foreign policy issues. There are numerous friendship associations connecting the two countries and their people. Some of these are Pakistan-India Forum for Peace and Friendship, which strive to bring about improvement in relations between the two countries. While governments quarrel, a strong undercurrent exists amongst the general public in both countries to improve relations. For some years now, private citizens, intellectuals and retired officials have begun Track II diplomacy, i.e. parallel negotiations to government diplomacy. There is also an Indo-Arab society as there is the Indo-Israeli Society. There are many of these societies like Indo-Japanese Society etc. We need not have to mention more such groups. But enough if we say that these act as pressure groups to improve relations by explaining the policies of the host country to the Indians. But their influence in the making of foreign policy is minimal.
5.7
BUSINESS
Business groups and associations, which are involved in foreign trade normally take interest in foreign affairs. These groups desire peace in the countries they trade with. There is a theory, which believes that improved trade relations between any two adverse nations help to improve their political relations. It is this belief that makes many to plead for improved trade relations between India and Pakistan, which should help in improving the political relations. The people involved in business, industry and commerce in India are organised in the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI). The FICCI constantly interacts with the government on a variety of issues relating to trade and industry. While its primary aim is to improve its own business prospects, they also promote goodwill between two countries by 8
keeping in touch with the government especially with the officials of MEA and Commerce. In this respect they use several devices. The oldest is monetary contributions to political parties and politicians. Politicians consider it prudent to give their contributions to all political parties. Indira Gandhi for instance, felt that business community contributed more money to the right wing— Swatanta party in the 1960s, and introduced a ban on business houses contributing to political parties. India has launched economic liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation (LPG) process in 1991. Since then we can boldly say that the role of business and business lobbies in the development of foreign policy has definitely increased. Its early indication came when the former PM Narasimha Rao, while visiting the US, laid a major emphasis on his meeting the business groups in that country. His delegation also consisted of a large contingent of Indian businessmen. Improving business relations was stated as his first priority, second was speaking to the Congress and through them to American people and third priority was to have a working session with President Clinton. He had two meetings with American Chief Executive Officers (CEO) in New York and Houston (Texas) where he was able to generate interest amongst them to invest in India. He was also able to get an ‘India Interest Group’ set up—a group of CEOs from major multinationals like General Electric, AT & T, Coca Cola, Ford and IBM. These groups obviously act as pro-India pressure groups in the US while the US makes its policy towards India, which in turn become inputs in Indian foreign policy. Since then more Indian businessmen and industrialists have travelled with the PM on his foreign travels than any other group of professionals probably barring media men. With the LPG, more issues have come up to be determined by the government in relation to the external world. Since the formation of World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 to regulate international trade, more issues have been brought under the purview of this body. The Western powers have also introduced new issues in relation to international trade and commerce. Thus, negatively the issues like child labour and human rights in a trading partner-country are considered as within the global concern and therefore within the purview of the WTO. The West has introduced the concept of service as a trade and thus subject to regulation by the WTO. Some of these issues put one domestic NGO against another. Those who work in this direction see to it that children below the age of 14 are not employed by certain industries like manufacturers of crackers or blanket weavers. On the other hand, manufacturers of these commodities in a traditional market argue that they provide much needed employment to families; NGOs argue that these children are made to forego their childhood to make a living. Similar arguments are raised regarding human rights. Working conditions in factories, sex-based discriminatory wages etc have become issues as the Western countries find that the labour in developing countries like India is cheaper and are able to compete with the products of developed countries where labour is expensive. Though the issues raised by the West are genuine, the government is required to make policies keeping in view the demands of the NGOs, social compulsions and Western countries.
5.8
DIASPORA
9
There are over twenty million people of Indian origin living in different countries all over the world. They can be considered in two categories: those who went to the foreign countries or were taken as indentured labour by the British, like the people of Indian origin in various African countries or in Fiji Islands are considered as Peoples of Indian Origin (PIO). But those who went voluntarily in the post independence time in search of economic betterment are Non-Resident Indians (NRI). Obviously, in general, the PIOs have a romantic longing for the country of their ancestors while the NRIs have better roots in this country. What should be or could be their role in the foreign policy-making? Nehru, in the beginning of the independence, asked the PIOs to become fully the part of the country of their residence or adoption. This line of thought was repeated as recently as in 1997 by the then PM, I. K. Gujral in the context of PIOs in South Africa. The question of dual citizenship was ruled out. However with the passage of time, with transport and communications breaking distances and LPG demanding more investments, the feeling of belonging to India is getting stronger or being strengthened. Globalisation has made government to think in terms of a new look at the PIOs. In this regard the organisations representing the PIOs play a major role. With the emergence of the BJP, and its emphasis on cultural nationalism, the PIO issue has become a sentimental one to the public. In 2002 a committee was appointed under the chairmanship of L. M. Singhvi to examine the issue of the PIOs. It has been decided to observe the ninth of January every year as Pravasi Bharatiya Divas; prominent PIOs and NRIs will be honoured and the PIO card scheme would be made more attractive. But the larger issue of security needs to be looked into. During the World War II the US had used American citizens of Japanese origin to spy and gather information in Japan. But now NRIs have also become a significant group. The NRIs based in US, for instance, are well organised. They were able to bring about a change in the approach of the US towards India. This is evident in the approach with which Bill Clinton began his administration in 1993 when he used every available instrument of foreign policy and bilateral relations to pressurise India on Kashmir, nuclear weapons and human rights record. However by 2000, he was appreciative of the Indian democracy, security compulsions for which India went for nuclear tests and the terrorist threat from across the borders. Since the NRIs have done something good for India naturally they would expect our government to liberalise certain economic conditions for their investments or visa requirement for their visits to India.
5.9
THINK TANKS
The concept of think tank is new in India. In the US there are many specialised institutions like Rand Corporation, which is funded by the US defence department. There are many others in Washington, DC like the American Enterprises Institute, which is a right wing think tank while the Brookings Institution is a liberal think tank. In New York there is the Asia Society and Carnegie Foundation etc. These conduct studies on various subjects and submit them to the government and influential senators. Asia Society for instance conducted a study in 1994, which asked the government to improve relations with India. India of course has few such think tanks. The most important and visible one is the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis entirely funded by the Defence Department. This conducts studies 10
and research that has direct bearing on the policy options. There are others like the Centre for Policy Research in Delhi. However, now New Delhi has many such centres founded by retired foreign secretaries, generals and academics. But their worth as foreign policy think tank is yet to be evaluated. Seminars often organised by the universities have foreign policy experts, including several former Foreign Secretaries. The views formulated in these seminars also influence policymaking. All these institutions and pressure groups perform more than one role: they do influence the formulation of foreign policy; they also create public opinion in favour or against a policy. They take new policy initiative. Then they create public opinion on the policy issue preferred by them. In this way the policy development process goes on in the country.
5.10 SUMMARY The foreign policy-making process is not merely limited to the institutions involved in the making of policy. In democracy policy reflects the aspirations of the people. Therefore, people organised into various forms—political parties, pressure groups, socio-ethnic movements—try to influence foreign policy as much as businessmen, media, specialised think tanks aim at it. The policymakers cannot consider these as interference in policy making. But they perform their legitimate functions. Such participation by the people through various organised means enlarges the legitimacy of the policy and makes it widely acceptable to the society.
5.11 EXERCISES 1) How do the political parties initiate and influence the making of foreign policy? 2) Do the interest groups play a role in the making of a foreign policy? How does the media help in the making of foreign policy? 3) Discuss the influence of social and business groups’ role in the making of foreign policy. 4) Make a case to strengthen the role of think tanks in foreign policy-making.
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UNIT 6 INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY: AN OVERVIEW Structure 6.1 6.2
Introduction India’s Foreign Policy under Nehru in the Formative Years 6.2.1 6.2.2
6.3 6.4
Foreign Policy after Nehru Indira Gandhi’s Tenure 6.4.1 6.4.2 6.4.3 6.4.4
6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8
6.1
Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1971 Simla Agreement Nuclear Test of 1974 Indira Gandhi’s Second Tenure
Rajiv Gandhi and the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka Narasimha Rao (1991-1996) India- US Relations Foreign Policy Developments and the NDA Government 6.8.1 6.8.2
6.9 6.10
Tilt in Non-alignment India-China Border War
Nuclear Weapons Attempts to Improve Relations
Summary Exercises
INTRODUCTION
We have so far studied policy decision-making at the institutional level in the government as well as shaping of policy at the social and political level. With intense interaction between the government, institutions and socio-political level actors ultimately the Indian foreign policy is made. The outcome of the policy process, “foreign policy” is the concrete policy directed towards a foreign nation or external policy issue. What has been the outcome of policy process in the last fifty-six years after the independence? In India, from an ordinary citizen to the Prime Minister and in abroad from foreign government officials to informed public have been characterising the Indian foreign policy as Non-Aligned. But even today, in the absence of an alternative policy framework, the Indian political class has been describing Indian foreign policy within the framework of non-alignment. In this unit we will know as to how non-alignment policy began, worked and progressed during the period since independence. This unit will also analyse the ups and downs in India’s relations with major world powers as well as neighbours.
6.2 INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER NEHRU IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS Indians secured their control over nation’s foreign policy only after their independence from the 1
British colonial rule in 1947. A newly independent India was plunged into the world affairs when the external environment was of the Cold War between the two super powers—the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR)—both were on the winning side in the the Second World War. Even before the independence in August 1947, an interim government under Nehru’s leadership had been put in place in September 1946. The first prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru was in a dilemma. Though western educated, he was personally attracted to the Marxist thought. But any alignment with the one or the other bloc would have meant loss of newly won independence. Loss of India’s independence in the decision-making even slightly was an unacceptable proposition to him. Thus, he opted to keep India away from both the power blocs, and follow an independent foreign policy. This came to be known as the policy of non-alignment. He had formulated the basic policy outlines in a broadcast from New Delhi on 7 September, 1946 in which he laid out certain foreign policy goals. He was then only an interim prime minister, as independence had not even been announced. These goals included: end of colonialism and racism, independence from power blocs and close ties with China and Asian neighbours. In his own words: “We shall take full part in international conferences as a free nation with our own policy and not merely as a satellite of another nation…. We are particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples, and in the recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities for all races.” Thus, non-alignment with either of the military blocs was Nehru’s answer to the dilemma he and the nation faced. Non-alignment was an intellectual coup on the part of Nehru. It was in a sense learning from history. Soon after the independence the first American president George Washington had asked his countrymen while laying down his office in 1796: “It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world….”. Instead, he advocated that the new Republic should cultivate “just and amicable feelings toward all” nations. Primarily by non-alignment Nehru meant not getting entangled with any military alliances. Soon after the end of the Second World War, there were military alliances floated by the United States and the Soviet Union. The US promoted North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Soviet Union had to counter it by Warsaw Pact. While these were the competing military alliances at the global level, these two super powers also promoted regional alliances to attract the newly independent nations in Asia and Africa. Second, non-alignment did not mean neutrality in world politics. Neutrality has a meaning that is truly relevant during the times of war. But non-alignment is a positive thought; it meant that India retained the independence of decision making on an issue that affected her interests. There was no a priori commitment to support one or the other nation involved in a crisis. Thus, in India’s neighbourhood the US promoted South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in the 1950s. Both these organisations were ostensibly meant to fight against communism exported by the Soviet Union. But India’s neighbour, Pakistan joined the treaty organisations primarily to get military aid from the US to fight against India. The membership of Pakistan of these treaties brought the Cold War to the doors of India aggravating tensions between India and Pakistan. The American weapons and support generated because of their membership of military alliances also complicated the India-US relations.
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This was brought out very clearly over the question of Kashmir issue raised in the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC). Nehru had great faith in the international organisations and their sense of justice. It was Nehru who had taken to the UN the crisis created by Pakistan’s war against Jammu and Kashmir in 1948. He never imagined that the Kashmir question would become a matter seen through the prism of Cold War. The UN ordered a cease-fire and asked Pakistan to withdraw its forces. The Indian PM had then given an assurance to hold a plebiscite to decide as to whether Kashmiris desired to join India or join Pakistan. This brings out the faith Nehru had in the fairness of the UN. But in practice the issue got entangled in the global Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union. Once the issue became part of Cold War rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union, Pakistan with its military alliance with the US, began to raise the Kashmir issue in the UN SC now and then. The SC instead of declaring Pakistan as an aggressor and seeking to vacate its aggression, kept the issue as an instrument to pressurise India politically. Nehru had maintained close ties with the British Commonwealth of Nations by enabling the Indian Republic as a member. But Britain was not interested in finding a solution to the Kashmir crisis. Another power that could have helped India in resolving the conflict over J & K was the US. But during his first visit to that country in 1949, Nehru had disappointed Dean Acheson then Secretary of State. Dean Acheson states in his memoirs: “When finally, I urged Pandit Nehru to help me by a frank discussion of a practicable solution of the trouble over Kashmir, I got a curious combination of a public speech and flashes of anger and deep dislike of his opponents…. I was convinced that Nehru and I were not destined to have a pleasant personal relationship.” Acheson’s successor in office, John Foster Dulles did not turn out to be friendly to India either. By then Dulles had come under the influence of pactomania in promoting military pacts. He desired that India join the military alliances promoted by the US. Nehru’s non-alignment policy was obviously against it. Hence, Dulles said that non-alignment is immoral as it failed to take a firm stand against godless communism. Under these circumstances the Soviet Union came to India’s rescue. It saw an opportunity to befriend non-aligned nations in the predicament faced by India in the UN SC. The US was guided by the British policy of divide and rule; the US, in that early period, went along with Britain on the issues relating to the latter’s erstwhile colonies. Thus, when Western powers like the US and UK began to vote on the side of Pakistan on the question of Kashmir, the Soviet Union exercised its veto power to save the Indian interests from Cold War politics.
6.2.1
Tilt in Non-alignment
The Soviet Union helped India to get over the efforts by the western powers to embarrass India. Now you do not embarrass a friend who comes to your rescue. That is a norm in interpersonal affairs; so is that in international affairs. The test of this principle came during the SC discussion on the Soviet military intervention in Hungary in 1956. There was an uprising against the Soviet domination of Hungary where the people were in favour of democracy. However, the Soviet Union militarily intervened in that country to see that a prodemocracy government was removed and a pro-communist government was installed. The question of the Soviet military intervention came before the UN. The General Assembly discussed 3
the Hungarian crisis. There was a five-power resolution calling upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops. India voted against the resolution. This approach of India was widely disapproved in the country as well as abroad. Was India supporting the Soviet military intervention? Nehru took pains to explain rather unconvincingly that the circumstances and compulsions under which India voted against the resolution. His main ground was that the resolution demanded that “elections should be held in Hungary under the supervision of the United Nations.” That could be later used to demand similar elections in Kashmir. But the fact that India did oppose the military intervention did not miss altogether the world opinion. Thomas A. Bailey in his A Diplomatic History of the American People records that “even ‘neutralist’ states like India were moved to protest against the brutality of the Soviets.”
6.2.2
India-China Border War
The strengths and weaknesses of the non-alignment were also brought out during the next major crisis in Indian foreign policy in the background of the Chinese aggression of October 1962. Peace and friendship with China was a cornerstone of the Indian foreign policy as formulated and executed by Nehru with assistance from his friend and Defence Minister, Krishna Menon. As a matter of fact both of them never envisaged a threat from the Communist China. They mainly focussed on Pakistan’s threat to India’s security. Nehru thought of resolving the territorial crisis by political negotiations rather than by the use of force. He never realised that military strength enhanced the ability to negotiate political settlements amongst nations. This had led him to approach the UN in response to Pakistan’s proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir in 1947-48, when, as a matter of fact, the Indian army was able to throw out invading Pakistani army from the Kashmir. In 1954 he had conceded the Chinese claim over Tibet by accepting its suzerainty over it, when India signed an agreement for trade with the “Tibetan region of China.” India gave up its rights and privileges in Tibet without gaining any reciprocal concessions from China. The first step toward this direction was taken by China by ousting India’s influence in Tibet completely. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army began raids in Tibet, with China declaring Tibet as an integral part of its territory. In continuation of the policy of Indo-Chinese friendship, India signed the Sino-Tibetan Agreement on May 23, 1951, which sealed Tibet’s fate permanently. Chinese troops from then on were stationed on the borders of India, Burma, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, and the adjacent areas, whereas India withdrew all her military, postal, commercial, telephonic and telegraphic services and equipment from the northern borders stationed for over a century. To pacify the Chinese, Nehru concluded the Panchsheel (Five Principles) Agreement with Chou En-lai in 1954, based on the principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and peaceful co-existence. The Panchsheel agreement was a shoddy attempt to hide India’s inability to oppose China’s expansionist designs, and to lure China into a promise to restrain its territorial ambitions. That China had no intention of abiding by this agreement was evident from the build-up of military detachments in the Aksai-Chin area, construction of roads within the Indian territory along the Sinkiang border, and the shelling of Indian outposts intermittently. The Chinese maps were already showing the entire North East Frontier Agency (a part of India) as Chinese territory.
4
Despite China’s military operations, Nehru informed the Parliament in 1957 that there was “not the remotest chance of India coming in to any kind of military conflict with China or the Soviet Union. India is so situated geographically that it would not be easy to attack her.” Within two years, in 1959, Tibet was run over by the Chinese forces and Dalai Lama had to undertake an extremely dangerous and extraordinarily hazardous journey to escape the Chinese assault. Three years later, in October 1962, the Chinese crushed the Indian forces, occupied strategic outposts, and destroyed India’s border defences. The US Ambassador, John Kenneth Galbraith in Ambassador’s Journal described India’s helplessness in resisting Chinese attack: Their (India) air arm is not highly effective. The cities of the Ganges Plain are accessible from the airfields of Tibet. There is no chance that Indians could retaliate to China and there is nothing in Tibet. And there is no technical chance that we could accord them immediately the protection that Nehru asked. Nehru could have exercised flexibility in non-alignment in defence of India’s national interest. Could he not have taken the help of the US, which was, anti-China then and which came to India’s help anyway briefly after October 1962 Sino-Indian war? India took the diplomatic and political help of the Soviet Union over Pakistan’s war in J & K even if it was extended without India soliciting it. If India had solicited the US help in 1954 during the Tibetan crisis, the US help in meeting the Chinese challenge in October 1962 could have been substantially bigger and more effective. It would have given a correct image to non-alignment to prove that it allowed a country to seek assistance from any country when its national security is threatened rather than making India always tilt towards one Super Power—the Soviet Union. These are of course big if and but of history. But this showed limitations of the Indian foreign policy in the formative years of the Indian Republic. Nehru’s reliance on the “doctrine of defence by friendship” vis-a-vis China was a failure. Indians were all surprised at the failure of Nehru’s foreign policy. Nehru himself became a disillusioned man. His Defence Minister, Krishna Menon was forced to resign from the Congress Party. J. Bandopadhyaya in the Making of India’s Foreign Policy concludes: “It was Nehru’s apparently idealistic interpretation of India-China relations that was probably responsible for the absence of… strategic planning.”
6.3
FOREIGN POLICY AFTER NEHRU
In the 1960s one major question that was widely discussed was ‘After Nehru, Who?’ Nehru died in 1964. Lal Bahadur Shastri succeeded him. His tenure was short as he died in Tashkent in January 1966 after signing the Tashkent Agreement with Ayub Khan, military dictator of Pakistan. In India’s foreign policy, Shastri has to be remembered for a major change he brought about in the shifting of emphasis from international events more to the immediate neighbourhood of India. It was Nehru’s personality that made him to think in terms of India playing a major role in international affairs. Nehru perceived a larger role for India in international affairs, rather much bigger than then resources permitted. He played a major role in Bandung (Indonesia) Conference in 1955. He was responsible for introducing newly liberated communist China’s premier Chou en lai. He was in the forefront of getting communist China seated as the legitimate member of the
5
UN in place of Nationalist China, which had fled to Taiwan after the communists captured power in Mainland China in October 1949. It was Nehru who again played a role as a go between China and the US during the Korean War. In contrast Shastri focussed on India’s immediate neighbourhood aimed at improving relations within South Asia. However, his perceived weakness led to conflicts and war in 1965 with Pakistan. First it was in the Rann of Kutch where a dispute was created to claim Indian territory. The dispute was referred to arbitration by mutual consent. The Rann of Kutch is a marshy land between West Pakistan and Gujarat. It was Pakistan’s case that Rann of Kutch was a lake and according to the international law, the boundary should run in the middle of the lake. On the other hand, India claimed that it is a marshy land and the boundaries between Sindh and India were well demarcated. But Pakistan was intruding into the area since 1956. In 1965 hostilities broke out between the two countries in the area. At the intervention of then British PM Harold Wilson, an agreement was reached to refer the dispute to arbitration if both the parties were unable to reach an agreement. Eventually, as the two countries could not agree on a solution, arbitrators awarded 900 square Km to Pakistan—one tenth of their original claim. The perception of a weak India continued; in the meanwhile China had exploded a nuclear bomb in October 1964 without India reacting to it immediately. Instead the non-aligned conference that met in Cairo in 1964 sent a delegation to Beijing to urge upon China to desist from going nuclear. The Chinese authorities even refused to receive the delegation. Another major crisis faced by Shastri was the India-Pakistan War of 1965. The modus operandi of this war was also similar to the first war in 1947-48. Perceived weakness of India, coupled with the hope of Kashmiris rising in revolt against India, made Ayub Khan bold to launch the War. In this war while Pakistan was able to capture some territory in J & K, Indians opened a second front of its choosing by moving towards Lahore. The US was then busy with its war in Vietnam. Hence the Johnson administration did not act beyond imposing an arms embargo against both the countries as they were allegedly fighting with American weapons. However, the Soviet Union was keen to use its good offices in resolving the crisis. It had come closer to India by taking a neutral stand over the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. But the Russian leaders were keen that they be perceived as neutral in the Indo-Pak war. The Russian leaders also desired to befriend Pakistan or at least wean it away from the US. Then Soviet premier Kosygin invited Lal Bahadur Shastri and Ayub Khan to Tashkent to find a solution to the war and both the leaders accepted the offer. After a great deal of bargaining and arms twisting by the Soviet premier, Kosygin, the warring leaders signed the Tashkent agreement. Under the agreement India had to give away the territories captured by the army, which was opposed by the opposition parties.
6.4
MRS. INDIRA GANDHI’S TENURE
Mrs. Indira Gandhi succeeded Lal Bahadur Shastri as the PM. After Pandit Nehru, Indira Gandhi had the longest tenure, as the nation’s PM. Indira Gandhi, after the 1970 elections, was able to consolidate her power in the country. By any standard of reckoning, the major foreign policy 6
event in her term was the Bangladesh war fought with Pakistan in 1971. To understand this major event in Indian history it is necessary to summarise the background of the crisis. In the only democratic election held in Pakistan in December 1970, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) won a majority (88 out of 144) in West Pakistan while Awami League won an absolute majority in East Pakistan by winning 167 seats. In accordance with the democratic theory, then military dictator in Pakistan Yahya Khan should have invited the leader of Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman to form the government. But the manipulative Bhutto was unwilling to have a Bengali as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Yahya Khan was also unwilling to transfer power to a Bangladeshi. Instead of transferring power, Yahya Khan imposed martial law, appointed Lt. General Tikka Khan as Governor and sent army to quell the movement in East Pakistan in March 1971. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, popular leader of the Awami Party was arrested and imprisoned in West Pakistan. The enraged population of East Pakistan then came out on the streets to denounce military dictatorship. The military indulged in one of the worst human rights violations in the world history. The intellectuals and supporters of the party were massacred; women were raped and there was a systematic genocide of Hindus in East Pakistan. It was a sheer war of hatred. According to the New York Times the Pakistani army painted “big yellow Hs on the Hindu shops” to be attacked and destroyed. As a result over 12 million Bangladeshis, Muslims and Hindus, came to West Bengal, mainly to Calcutta, as refugees. Feeding such large number was an economic strain on India but added to that was the law and order problem for the government in West Bengal. Indira Gandhi, adept in political gamble, went on a tour of Western countries to inform the leaders of the human tragedy in East Pakistan. The US was then secretly engaged in opening up relations with China in which Pakistan had played a crucial role as a go between. At the same time she had also asked the army to prepare for military intervention. The army wanted the intervention to take place in the winter, as the passes in the Himalayas would be snowbound and Pakistan’s ally China could not militarily intervene in the crisis. Pakistan, to pre-empt India and force her to divert troops to west, attacked on 3 December 1971. India intervened in the East in a massive way. The resulting war ended in the liberation of East Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh as an independent country. The Indian forces were at their best when they accepted the surrender of over 90,000 Pakistani troops in the war. The friends of Pakistan, especially the US, were upset over the Indian victory in the war as it considered the Indian victory as that of the Soviet Union. Nixon, according to his memoirs, was keen to save West Pakistan from destruction by India. Thus, to save West Pakistan, he asked nuclear powered warship Enterprise to move to Bay of Bengal. In a well-coordinated move, Soviet Union sent its nuclear powered ship to follow the US warship. The Soviet Union was the main supporter of India in the War often using its veto power in the UN Security Council to nullify the US resolutions condemning India and asking her to withdraw armed forces from East Pakistan.
6.4.1
Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1971
A pro-Soviet tilt had already set in during the Nehru period in the practice of non-alignment. The 1970s were such that globally non-alignment movement had become a force sympathetic to the 7
Soviet Union. Cuba, as a member of the non-aligned movement, even introduced the idea that the Soviet Union is a ‘natural ally’ of the non- aligned nations. This he did at the 1979 NAM Summit held at Havana. The tilt became evident in the Indo-Soviet relations during the period. Before the Bangladesh war of 1971, India signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union. Under the treaty, the two countries agreed on “immediate mutual consultations” in the event of either country facing a military threat and adopt appropriate effective measures. The treaty expressed the Soviet Union’s acceptance of India’s policy of non-alignment. However, the treaty was criticised by the US as an end of India’s non-alignment. But the treaty was India’s answer to then changing global scene. Since 1962 Pakistan and China had befriended each other against India on the theory that enemy’s enemy is a friend. The US was already close to Pakistan with the military alliances binding their relations. Richard Nixon, the US President, was actively working to establish relations with China aimed at balancing the perceived power of the Soviet Union.
6.4.2
Simla Agreement, 1972
The Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 was brought to an end by signing the Simla Agreement between Gandhi and Bhutto. Under the agreement both the countries “resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations.” They also agreed to respect each other’s national unity and territorial integrity and not to assist or encourage any acts, which could affect the maintenance of peace in the region. Apart from these expressions of idealistic thought in concrete terms, Pakistan regained all its territories lost in West Pakistan in the War and also secured freedom for Prisoners of War taken in Bangladesh. POWs were actually released in 1973 after India obtained consent of Bangladesh. India gained assurances of good behaviour, which Pakistan was incapable of in practice. The opposition party, particularly then Jan Sangh-predecessor of the present Bharatiya Janata Party, was very critical of the terms of the Simla agreement. Atal Behari Vajpayee who became the External Affairs Minister in the subsequent Janata Party government under Morarji Desai hinted in April 1978 that the agreement became possible only after “secret and midnight” understanding between Gandhi and Bhutto.
6.4.3
Nuclear Test of 1974
Mrs. Gandhi will also be remembered by the nation for her determination to take nation on the path of a major power. Nehru had an idealistic approach to power. But Mrs. Gandhi was realistic to a great extent. Nehru said in 1954 in the Lok Sabha: “If you peep in the future and if nothing goes wrong—wars and like—the obvious fourth country in the world (after US, Soviet Union and China) is India.” But Gandhi translated his idealism in action. One such act was her conducting nuclear test in May 1974 in Pokharan. Ever since China conducted its nuclear tests in October 1964, there was domestic pressure on the Indian government to conduct nuclear tests. However, Lal Bahadur Shastri was silent on the demand. But his External Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh had said in the Lok Sabha in May 1966 that India had the capability to acquire nuclear capability in a reasonably short time. Apparently, Shastri as the PM in late 1964 had authorised Atomic Energy Commission to work on the bomb 8
design. The test conducted by Indira Gandhi was to demonstrate the Indian nuclear capability though it was claimed to be a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE). Her logic ran like this. During the Bangladesh war in 1971 the US had used its nuclear powered enterprise to blackmail India to desist from attacking West Pakistan. Earlier, when Henry Kissinger, President Nixon’s National Security Adviser was in India, he had informed the Indian policy makers that India should not bank on the US if China intervenes in the likely conflict between India and Pakistan. This was contrary to the prevailing Nixon Doctrine which had promised the US protection if any nonnuclear nation was threatened by a nuclear weapons state, in this case China. Thus Gandhi desired to make India self reliant in her security.
6.4.4
Indira Gandhi’s Second Tenure
Mrs. Gandhi was briefly out of power when the first ever non-Congress government came to power in 1977 under Morarji Desai as the PM. Charan Singh succeeded him for a six-month term in 1979. Mrs. Gandhi replaced him again in January 1980. These two non-Congress governments under the Janata Party had nothing much to contribute to the evolution of the nation’s foreign policy. Though they had promised to correct the tilt towards Soviet Union in the Indian non-alignment and make it a genuine non-alignment, nothing significant happened. A major foreign policy challenge was unfolding while the nation was going through the election process in December 1979 when the Soviet Union militarily intervened in Afghanistan, a nonaligned country on Soviet Union’s southern borders. Then Indian PM, Charan Singh called upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops as early as possible and preserve the non-aligned character of Afghanistan. But when the matter came before the UN for discussion on 12 January 1980, Brajesh Mishra who was then India’s Permanent Representative said that India is opposed to the presence of foreign troops or bases in any state. He also made an interesting statement that the Soviet Union in the case of Afghanistan, had assured India that it would withdraw the troops when the government in Kabul asked for it. He added: “We have no reason to doubt the assurances, particularly from a friendly country like the Soviet Union, with whom we have close ties.” This was totally going along with the Soviet Union amounting to alignment by a non-aligned country. The statement was to trouble the Indian non-alignment policy even after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This was more in tune with what Gandhi would have said than reflecting the approach of the Janata Party government then in power. She, while campaigning, had said in an interview to France’s Europe Radio Station that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was “a danger to India.” Brajesh Mishra’s statement also did not reflect Charan Singh’s earlier position on the issue. This literally brought the US-Soviet Union Cold War to the Indian northwestern borders. The US asked India to help it in getting the Russians out of Afghanistan. The US was interested in performing a Vietnam in reverse in Afghanistan to the Russians. As America was forced to withdraw dishonourably from Vietnam in 1974, the US wanted to force Russians to experience what that dishonour means in a nation’s life. Russians had that experience in 1988.
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Since India did not agree to cooperate with the US against the Soviets, Americans turned to Pakistan for support. Pakistan readily agreed to be a conduit to transfer weapons to Afghan guerrillas (Mujahidins) at a total military and economic aid package of $7.4 billion. This transformed the region into a terrorist hub-terrorism strengthened by religious fanaticism in the name of Jihad ever since then.
6.5 RAJIV GANDHI AND THE INDIAN PEACE KEEPING FORCE IN SRI LANKA As Indira Gandhi inherited Afghan crisis from previous government, her successor Rajiv Gandhi inherited so to say an ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka, which began in a big way in 1983. But Mrs. Gandhi had handled the crisis as a disinterested mediator between Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who were demanding a separate Tamil state in the north-eastern Sri Lanka. But under Rajiv Gandhi the crisis took a turn for the worse. Earlier Rajiv Gandhi had asserted the Indian interest in extending humanitarian aid to the beleaguered Tamils in Jaffna in the North as the Sri Lankan government had imposed an economic blockade on the area. He had sent the food grains by 20 boats but the Sri Lankans did not permit the supply to reach the needy. In June 1987, Indian air force dropped the supply for the people. This made it clear to the President Jayawardane that he needed to understand the seriousness of the purpose exhibited by India. However, as Sri Lanka was facing leftist, JVP threat on the South, Jayawardane requested help from India in maintaining peace in the north. India and Sri Lanka signed an accord in July 1987. Under the accord signed between Rajiv Gandhi and Jayawardane, the Indian troops were to be sent to Sri Lanka to maintain peace in the North and East and also to accept arms laid down by the LTTE. In return, for the militants accepting to return to peaceful life, the accord provided for the merger of Tamil dominant areas in the North and East, holding of provincial elections, and devolution of the powers. But the distrust between the parties did not help in the smooth implementation of the agreement. The Tamils perceived the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) as “Innocent People Killing Force”. There was a demand for the withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka from both sides: Tamils as well as the new president of Sri Lanka, Premadasa. Rajiv Gandhi’s successor, V. P. Singh withdrew the IPKF; India not only lost face but also over 1000 Indian soldiers. There was bad blood between all sides to dispute. As a result, LTTE plotted and a human bomb assassinated Rajiv Gandhi on 21 May 1991. Later the same forces were also responsible for assassinating President Premadasa.
6.6
NARASIMHA RAO (1991-1996)
It goes to the credit of Narasimha Rao to survive as the Prime Minister of a minority government and carry on with the foreign policy for a complete term of five years. He is the first Congress Party PM outside the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty to do so. There were major foreign policy problems faced by Rao government.
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By any account one major problem was of economic readjustment from a mixed economy to a global one. This was not done as a conscious policy decision to move economy by following liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation (LPG). By the time Rao government assumed power, India had an adverse balance of payments under which there was foreign exchange worth only Rs 2000 to Rs. 2400 crores, enough to pay for imports of only 7 days.
6.7
INDIA–US RELATIONS
An economically weak government is always prone to foreign pressure. This situation was taken maximum advantage by the only super power–the United States. The US did arms twisting in pressurising Rao to economically open up the Indian market to the American penetration in areas of computers, IT, and Telecommunications etc. India came under the American pressure to rollback and cap its nuclear programme. India was compelled, under the US pressure, to abandon the nuclear testing planned for 1995. India has been stating that it wanted to retain its nuclear option, which became increasingly difficult since the end of the Cold War. India joined the US in co-sponsoring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Fissile Material Control Treaty (FMCT). India, under Rao, did try in 1995 to conduct tests in Pokharan but could not succeed as it was detected by the US. And Rao had to shelve the programme.
6.8 FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS AND THE NDA GOVERNMENT Atal Behari Vajpayee became the PM in 1998 leading a coalition government consisting of 13 political parties. But the government could not last beyond ten months. In the elections held in October 1999, the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance was elected again to power. This is the first ever coalition government to hold on to power for nearly four years.
6.8.1
Nuclear Weapons
During these ten months, its main foreign policy push came in the area of developing nuclear weapons capability and trying to improve relations with Pakistan. The BJP has been a great exponent of India going for nuclear weapons. Once it came to power, it planned for nuclear weapons tests so that India can declare its status as a nuclear weapons state. On 11 May 1998 India surprised the world by conducting three nuclear tests. Two more tests were conducted on 13 May. Prime Minister Vajpayee declared that India is a nuclear weapons state, and also declared that it would not conduct any more tests as all the necessary data had been collected. India, Vajpayee said, would maintain only minimum nuclear deterrent. It turned out that India was trying to test nuclear weapons in 1982 during Gandhi’s tenure and later in 1995 when Narasimha Rao was the PM. But each time the preparations were made to conduct the tests, the US intelligence was able to detect the Indian plans. Hence, it goes to the credit of the BJP to have planned the nuclear tests and conducting them undetected.
6.8.2
Attempts to Improve Relations
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In 1999 the Indian PM set himself to improve the relations with Pakistan. The first step he took was with a Bus trip to Lahore to meet Nawaz Sharif, PM of Pakistan. During this trip PM Vajpayee made a visit to Minar-e- Pakistan symbolising the Indian acceptance of the creation of Pakistan based on Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s “two nations” theory. As a matter of fact there was no such confirmation ever needed. Because after initial opposition to the creation of Pakistan, the Hindu Mahasabha has become defunct and the Bharatiya Janata Party, as the main ruling party in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), never spoke in terms of undoing the partition. After the meeting in Lahore, the Pakistani PM said that it would be the year of decision on Kashmir. The Indian External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh had said that after fifty years of independence “the time for map-making in the region is over” indicating that there is no question of changing of geography in the region. The month of May 1999 saw the Kargil war between the two nations. As the two PMs were discussing the future of their bilateral relations, the Pakistani Army was preparing for the war. The war is significant as it was the first military conflict between the two nations after they acquired nuclear weapons in May 1998. This was an effort by the Pakistani armed forces to alter the status quo on the Line of Control so that whenever negotiations take place, the Pakistanis could use it as a bargaining chip with India. However, Pakistani Army Chief of Staff, General Pervez Musharraf in a bloodless coup in October 1999, deposed PM Nawaz Sharif. This sent into limbo all efforts to normalise relations with Pakistan. India reacted to the military takeover in its traditional way. India then boycotted the meeting of the SAARC and also saw to it that Pakistan was suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations. India made another attempt at peace when Vajpayee invited Pervez Musharraf for talks at Agra in early 2001. The talks collapsed as General Musharraf was adamant on his terms to discuss the so called core issue of Kashmir. The armed forces of Pakistan have dominated all institutions of the government in that country. The cross border terrorism that has been the bane of the India-Pakistan relations since 1989 has been only aggravated by the military dictatorship. The Indo-Pak relations were further spoilt when on 13 December 2001, Pakistani terrorists tried to attack the Indian Parliament and eliminate our top leadership. Fortunately our alert security forces engaged the terrorists in a forced gun battle just outside the Parliament House, and killed all the five Pakistanis. India withdrew its High Commissioner from Islamabad and snapped air, rail and bus links with Pakistan. The Indian government has perforce moved closer to the only surviving Super Power in the world—the US. Hence the question of the relevance of the Indian Non-alignment is now and then raised. Meanwhile, Pakistan had once again moved very close to the US by promising full cooperation in the American fight against the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. As we have seen, non-alignment was the child of a bipolar world in which two poles were intensely contesting for supremacy at all levels—ideological, economic, and political. But with the end of one pole, the relevance of rival military alliances and competition to enrol every nation on one side or the other is over. However, another facet of non-alignment is the fact that a nonaligned country retains its independence of decision making unlike a nation aligned with a bloc normally toes the line of the leader nation. In this sense India still retains her independence of
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decision-making. In another sense, Indian non-alignment tilted towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War. But now that Russia itself has moved closer to its former rival, there is nothing wrong in India moving closer to the US. Earlier, during the Cold War, it used to be normal response of the policy makers that it is not so much that India is leaning towards the Soviet Union but it is the other way round. Similarly, if the US can be of help to promote the Indian national interest, there is nothing wrong in India working in close cooperation with the US. However, India with other major powers like the EU, and Russia is working towards bringing about a multipolar world. Meanwhile, India adopted the “Look East” policy and swiftly moved to have closer relationship with the ASEAN countries. India also moved closer to the European Union, Japan and Australia. By 2003, Sino-Indian relations had begun improving in a big way.
6.9
SUMMARY
The Indian foreign policy has undergone many radical changes in the last fifty-six years after independence on account of many factors. One is the change in the international environment with the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of the US as the only super power. Second, domestic changes have occurred replacing one party government by a coalition government in the 21st Century. Third, personality of the PMs has also changed as a consequence. Yet, Indian foreign policy is woven within the framework of non-alignment. Though there is, looking at the origin of non-alignment in the bipolar world, reason to question the relevance of non-alignment, its relevance lies in the fact that India claims to retain its right to judge every policy independently and formulate its own policy response. But India works to usher in a multipolar world wherein she can emerge as an independent player along with others.
6.10 EXERCISES 1) Discuss Nehru’s contribution to the foreign policy of India. 2) How did Pakistan try to exploit the perceived weakness of Lal Bahadur Shastri? What was the outcome? 3) “Indira Gandhi laid the foundation to make India a major power.” Justify this statement with concrete examples. 4) Examine Rajiv Gandhi’s achievements and failures in foreign affairs. 5) Discuss the main achievements of India’s foreign policy during the initial years of the 21st Century.
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UNIT 7 USA & EUROPEAN UNION Structure 7.1 7.2
Introduction India’s Relations with the United States 7.2.1 7.2.2 7.2.3 7.2.4 7.2.5 7.2.6 7.2.7
7.3
Evolving Ties under a Cold War Climate Relations after the End of Cold War Beginning of a Change Defence Cooperation Pokharan II & After Relations in the New Millennium September 11 & After
India’s Relations with the European Union 7.3.1 7.3.2 7.3.3 7.3.4
Political Differences Economic Cooperation Economic Limitations Trade Disputes
7.4 7.5
Summary Exercises
7.1
INTRODUCTION
Among the several major powers of the world in the contemporary international system, the United States and the European Union stand apart. The United States is the only superpower of the world after the collapse of the USSR. It has the military capabilities to destroy the entire world and it is also the most affluent country in the world. The European Union (EU) is one of the largest economic blocs in the world. Its combined economy is comparable to that of the United States. It has also two nuclear weapon powers—Britain and France—as its members. So theoretically, the European Union has both military muscle and economic prosperity. What is significant is that many of the members of the European Union have been members of the North Atlantic Treaty. India’s relations with the United States have not been as cordial as was expected of two largest democracies in the world. However, since the end of the 20th Century the two countries have moved closer to each other; though the U.S. continues to be soft towards Pakistan with which India, despite its best efforts, has not been able to establish normal friendly relations. India has gradually developed close and friendly relations with the European Union. Both the sides have shown keen interest to increase their mutual trade, and the India-EU Summits that began in June, 2000 may soon bring the expanding EU and India closer both economically and politically. This Unit analyses India’s eventful relations with the United States, as also growing cooperation between India and the European Union and also between India and the several individual member countries of the EU.
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7.2 PART I: INDIA’S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES India and the United States are widely recognised as the world’s largest and the most powerful democracies respectively. The relationship between these two countries is thus one of the most fascinating interactions witnessed in the relations among nations. The added significant features are marked by the fact that India is one of the oldest civilisations in the world, whereas the United States is relatively a younger civilisation. However, in terms of statehood experience, it is the US, which is considerably older than India. When India took birth as a newly independent country in 1947, the US was already more than a century and a half old. And by the time of Indian independence, it had emerged as a global superpower. Factors related to civilisation, statehood and governance thus made the relations between India and the US as one of the most complex bilateral relations in world history. Soon after independence, India chose not to join any of the two power blocs, and adopted the policy of non-alignment. As and when the US promoted the formation of military blocs and security alliances, India vehemently opposed them. India was particularly critical about the formations of South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). These two organisations brought Cold War to India’s door-steps with Pakistan becoming an active member in them. As the alliance politics conditioned the US thinking on a series of political events and armed conflicts around the world and non-alignment conditioned the Indian thinking, New Delhi and Washington differed on majority of such issues. The Cold War-related political divergences between India and the US were particularly visible and pronounced on issues related to decolonisation of colonial territories, the Korean War, Vietnam War, Suez crisis, Hungarian Crisis, Czechoslovakia Crisis, and the People’s Republic of China’s membership in the United Nations. However, India and the US also strongly differed on certain issues related to India’s national security. These were the Kashmir problem, American arms transfer to Pakistan and the nuclear issues. •
Kashmir Problem: The Kashmir problem began with the Pakistan backed tribal invasion of Kashmir in 1947. As the Maharaja of Kashmir agreed to Kashmir’s accession to India and requested the Indian military help, the first war between India and Pakistan began soon after India’s independence. The US failed to recognise Pakistani aggression, imposed arms embargo against both India and Pakistan and supported the UN Security Council resolution that did not condemn aggression. India complained that the US equated the victim with the aggressor through its policy. The US took a similar stand during the second Pakistani aggression on Kashmir in 1965. The US tilt towards Pakistan in the third round of Indo-Pak war in 1971 was an act of hostility towards India. But after the Indian victory in the war, the US began to support the Simla Agreement, which called for the resolution of the issue through bilateral dialogue. Nonetheless, Washington continued to view Kashmir as a disputed territory and did not accept the Indian point of view that it was an internal affair of India.
•
US Arms Transfer: Six years after the first Indo-Pakistan war, the US signed a Mutual Defence Agreement with Pakistan in 1954. It signed another agreement in 1959 on military
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cooperation. And in between, Pakistan had joined the SEATO and CENTO. Consequently, Pakistan received millions of dollars of military assistance from the United States. A substantial amount of that assistance was spent by Pakistan in procuring advanced weapons from the US. India, time and again, brought to the notice of Washington that its arms transfers policy encouraged arms race in the subcontinent and generated regional instability. Washington assured India that the US-supplied weapons to Pakistan were meant to contain communism rather than to be used against India. However, Pakistan did use those weapons during its war against India. •
Nuclear Issues: The nuclear issue came to dominate India’s relations with the US ever since China went nuclear in 1964. Washington suspected that India would follow China and detonate its own bomb sparking off further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The US, along with several other countries soon started a process to deal with proliferation, which culminated in the signing of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. India refused to be a party and opposed this treaty on the ground of its in-built discrimination against non-nuclear weapon states. It sought to prevent others from going nuclear, while allowing vertical nuclear proliferation by five nuclear weapon states—the US, USSR, Britain, France and China. Disregarding this discriminatory document, India conducted a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974. It created yet another round of political hostility between India and the US, since India did so after about three years of defeating Pakistan in 1971 War and in the midst of American decline indicated by US withdrawal from Indochina.
Notwithstanding the military distance and political differences between India and the US during the Cold War, the two countries had good working relations in other areas. New Delhi and Washington never perceived each other as enemies. In fact, when Sino-US détente coincided with Indo-Soviet friendship and cooperation in early 1970s, the political distance between India and the US further widened. But even this development did not lead to a serious fracture in the bilateral relationship. India had been a recipient of American food assistance during drought and famine and token economic assistance through the Cold War years. The US did use food aid as political weapon occasionally creating resentment in India, but there is little doubt that India benefited from the US assistance as well.
7.2.1
Evolving Ties under a Cold War Climate
India’s entry into the international community of nations as an independent political entity almost coincided with the spread of the Cold War between the two erstwhile superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union. As the two superpowers clashed and competed for spreading their influence around the world, India was faced with a Hobson’s choice to take sides in the Cold War. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru decided against making a choice and announced a policy of Non-Alignment. This policy challenged the ethical basis of the Cold War, aimed at preventing the Cold War and sought to adopt a policy that would facilitate India’s friendly relations with both the US and the USSR. Nevertheless, at times the Indian position was disliked by the U.S. and it went out of the way to support Pakistan and adopted anti-India posture.
7.2.2
Relations after the End of Cold War
Although there was a relaxation in the Cold War since the mid-1980s with the rise of Gorbachev
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to power in the former Soviet Union, the Cold War practically came to an end with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991. India’s relations with the US had considerably improved during the relaxation of Cold War, but the collapse of the Soviet Union brought in unprecedented uncertainties to international relations, including Indo-US relations. With the US emerging as the only superpower in the world, there was little doubt that it would not be able to give attention to its relations with India at this time of great transition in world affairs. Some analysts argued that South Asia was an area of low priority during the Cold War and it was unlikely that it would get any high priority in the new context of the post-Cold War era. In fact, as Bill Clinton became the first post-Cold War US president, India found its relations with that country in doldrums. The new Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel, who was in charge of South Asia, created new irritants in the Indo-US relations by challenging the legal validity of Kashmir’s accession to India. India was also put on the watch list of the US Commerce Department under the Super 301 Clause of the Omnibus Trade Act. The only strategic comfort for India was that both Pakistan and China had lost their strategic relevance to the US in the aftermath of the Cold War.
7.2.3
Beginning of a Change
While the Clinton administration was dealing with the emerging challenges of the post-Soviet world, the American think tanks were aware of the importance of crafting a new approach to US-India relations. The Asia Society and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace brought out reports indicating the need for an intense and cooperative relations between the US and India. Two developments influenced the American debate on India’s policy. First, India had embarked on a policy of economic liberalisation months before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The economic openness was bound to enhance the attractiveness of the Indian market with a huge middle class to foreign business community. The second development was president Clinton’s emphasis on the economic issues in the US post-Cold War foreign policy initiatives. In the backdrop of all these events, the US Commerce Department identified ten big emerging markets in the developing world that would facilitate American trade and investment. India was considered to be one of such emerging markets. Prime Minister Narashimha Rao first took the initiative to reshape India’s relations with the US and visited Washington in May 1994. The economic issues dominated his agenda and he called for enhanced ties in the field of trade and investment between India and the US. In November 1994, the US Undersecretary of Commerce Jeffery Garten visited India to prepare the ground for the visit of US Commerce Secretary to India. Visiting India in the third week of January 1995, Commerce Secretary late Ronald Brown signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Commerce Minister Pranab Mukherjee to create a “commercial alliance” between the two countries. It was to be a super forum for consultation to facilitate closer business ties between the two countries. Chief Executives of 25 big corporations had accompanied Brown who concluded 11 business deals with India in four days of his stay. Since that time, economic factors have brought India and the US together. The US has become the largest source of foreign investment and the largest destination of the Indian exports.
7.2.4
4
Defence Cooperation
The most significant change in the Indo-US relations in the post-Cold War era, however, is the increasing defence cooperation between the two countries. Cooperation in this field was almost a taboo in the Cold War days. The first milestone in this direction was laid by a visit to India by the US Defence Secretary William Perry in early 1995. He signed “Agreed Minutes on Defence Cooperation” with his Indian counterpart paving the way for bilateral security cooperation to deal with the post-Cold War uncertainties. Although it did not signify making of an alliance, it opened up a hitherto closed avenue for cooperation at least in principle. This agreement in the backdrop of US-Pakistan strategic differences was a significant security scenario in the subcontinent. Pakistan had been reeling under the American sanctions under the Pressler Amendment since 1990. Although the Brown Amendment gave a one-time waiver to the Pressler Amendment, Islamabad had lost all its strategic relevance to the US since the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
7.2.5
Pokharan II & After
Increased economic cooperation and beginning of defence cooperation between India and the US did not mean that the two countries had no differences in the post-Cold War era. The Kashmir issue, now complicated by Pakistan sponsored cross-border terrorism, continued to haunt the Indo-US relations. India expected the US to declare Pakistan as a terrorist state. Washington refused to do that despite adequate evidence provided by its own intelligence community and the Indian Government. Simultaneously, some US legislators continued to raise the issue of human rights violation in Kashmir generating unease in India. The differences over the nuclear issues also continued, as the Clinton administration adopted a policy of “cap, freeze and roll back” of nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan. India had broadly four grievances against the US non-proliferation policy. First, Washington kept on providing military and economic assistance to Pakistan in the 1980s amidst intelligence reports about Islamabad’s quest for a nuclear weapon capability. As and when the Pressler Amendment was imposed, it was no punishment since Pakistan had already acquired nuclear weapon capability. The amendment required the US president to certify that Pakistan did not want to possess nuclear weapons (or nuclear weapons technology) before US aid could be released to that country. Moreover, the Clinton Administration was instrumental in the enactment of the Brown Amendment by the US Congress, which diluted the effect of the Pressler Amendment and amounted to rewarding a proliferator. India also accused Washington of inaction in the face of Indo—Pakistan cooperation in WMD programmes. Secondly, Washington, while showing laxity on Pakistani nuclear weapons programme, took a hard line on India’s indigenous nuclear and missile programmes. It scuttled the cryogenic rocket engine deal between India and Russia. Thirdly, the US occasionally made common cause with China to address the South Asian nuclear issue, while India felt that China’s nuclear weapons were part of the problem of proliferation in the region. Finally, the US failed to appreciate the Indian sincerity to back a truly non-discriminatory comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and once again sought to craft a discriminatory document to target, among other things, Indian nuclear programme. In the midst of the perceived discriminatory US non-proliferation policy and nuclearisation of India’s security environment with rising cooperation between China and Pakistan on nuclear weapons programmes, New Delhi conducted a series of nuclear tests in May 1998. Known as 5
Pokharan II tests, it heralded the open nuclear age in South Asia, as Pakistan also followed Indian footsteps and conducted several nuclear tests of its own. The United States imposed comprehensive sanctions against the nuclear tests and Indo-US relations came to pass through a sky of dark clouds. Although India voluntarily declared that it was not going to conduct any more tests, the US continued pressurising India to sign the NPT and CTBT.
7.2.6
Relations in the New Millennium
The dark clouds over the Indo-US relations however, did not have a prolonged existence. It was soon realised by the Clinton Administration that the nuclear developments in the subcontinent could not be reversed. The American sanctions, the Asian economic meltdown and a period of global recession could not prevent the commendable growth of Indian economy. Washington saw positive benefit in engaging an economically vibrant, democratically stable and militarily powerful India. President Bill Clinton visited India in March 2000 and laid the foundation of a new relationship between the two countries. The American position on the Kargil War between India and Pakistan in mid-1999 had removed yet another irritant in Indo-US relations and president Bill Clinton was heartily welcomed in India. New Delhi had appreciated Clinton’s pressure on Pakistan to stop its misadventure in the Kargil Sector of Kashmir in 1999 and Washington had praised India’s restraint in not crossing the Line of Control (LoC) and responsible conduct of the Kargil war. By visiting India for five days and Pakistan for four hours, Clinton made it clear where American stakes lay in the new millennium. The Indian and the American officials signed several cooperative agreements during Clinton’s visit and one of the most significant developments was a joint vision statement on the future course of the relationship. As Bill Clinton came to India at the fag end of his presidential career, some analysts argued that Indo-US relations would once again enter the uncharted waters after the next presidential election. But as history is now witness, the victory of the Republican candidate George W Bush in the 2000 presidential election took the relationship to the new heights. President Bush considered China a strategic competitor and India a democratic strategic partner. India, in his view, is a major world power and the US-Indian relations would be important to maintain Asian and global stability in the 21st century. India’s quick support to Bush’s concept of national missile defence (NMD) surprised the whole world. But it symbolised the birth of a new and more intense strategic relationship between India and the US.
7.2.7
September 11 and After
As Indo-US relations kept improving and the Bush administration was about to lift nuclearrelated sanctions from India and at the same time the US-Pakistan strategic distance was widening, terrorist strike on the US on 11 September 2001 shook the entire world. India declared unconditional support to the US war against terrorism. But when Bush decided to make Pakistan a frontline state in his war against global terrorism, doubts were again expressed about the future cooperative ties between India and the US. The growth of the terrorist strikes in India, especially on Kashmir legislature in October 2001, and the futile attempt by Pakistan-backed terrorists to storm the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001 created complications in the Indo-US relations. 6
Washington considered Pakistan’s support crucial in its war against terrorism and failed to restrain Pakistan from continuing its cross-border terrorism against India. Mobilisation of troops along the border by India and Pakistan in the wake of 13 December event and Washington’s call for Indo-Pak dialogue was interpreted in India as America’s double standard in dealing with terrorism. Meanwhile, India had also snapped air, rail and bus links with Pakistan. However, India decided to pull its troops back and normalise the situation along the border after successfully making the international community aware of cross-border terrorism in Kashmir. This policy also removed an American worry over a full-scale war in the subcontinent, which could escalate into a nuclear war. The developments in Iraq, which led to the American military action against Iraq was another issue that created a little political hiccup in the Indo-US relations. The US did not accept in good spirit the Indian Parliament’s unanimous resolution calling for ending the war and the withdrawal of the US and coalition forces from Iraq. India later refused to send its troops to Iraq for its stabilisation, on the ground that there was no UN request for the deployment of the Indian troops, and that the Indian troops could not function under the command of anybody (meaning US). India would consider the issue as and when the UN called for it.
7.3
INDIA’S RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION
The European Union is today one of the world’s most successful regional organisations. It is the largest trade bloc in the world, accounting for about one-fifth of the global trade. It is a major market for the developing countries and a major source of development assistance for them too. Two of its member states, France and UK, are nuclear powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council. Another country—Germany—is one of the strongest candidates for membership once the Council is expanded. Four EU countries are members of the G-8 and all are among the most advanced economies in the world today. The Treaty of Rome, which established the European Community, in March 1957 finally culminated through a long process of evolution in the creation of, what is today known as the European Union. The European Union was the outcome of European nation’s desire to minimise trade barriers and travel restrictions, and to have a common currency. This may eventually pave the way for a political union. While the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was to take care of military and security problems, the EC (now EU) was to concentrate on economic and commercial cooperation among the member states. However, the two structures were ultimately meant to deal with the issues of the larger Cold War politics. The members of the erstwhile EC were in the US-led Western camp during the Cold War. While the EC struggled for a common political and foreign policy platform, it was clear that neither the organisation nor some of the members individually would forge cooperation with India, which followed a non-aligned foreign policy. Secondly, as long as Britain was not a member of the EC, the then EC members always considered South Asian issues, including that of India as largely an area of British and American influence and took little interest in them. It was only when Britain joined the EC in 1973 that the foreign policy outlook of this organisation encompassed the South Asian and Indian affairs to some extent. It all began with the signing of a Commercial Cooperation
7
Agreement between India and the EC in 1973. Thirdly, India’s mixed economic system and socialist rhetoric and massive economic problems left little for substantive economic interactions between India and the EC.However, India was one of the first Asian nations to accord recognition to the European Community in 1962 while initially, India’s contacts with the Community were limited to economic and commercial links on the basis of the Community’s competence. As the Community took on a political dimension as well, India decided to establish a closer political relationship with it. All the members of the EC were democratic countries and the vibrant Indian democracy had no major problem in interacting with them. Accordingly, in 1983, it was agreed to formally institute the India-EC political dialogue. There are several institutional mechanisms that foster India-EU relations: India-EU Summit Meeting, India-EU Troika Ministerial Meeting, Senior Official Meetings, India-EC Joint Commission, India-EU Joint Working Group on Terrorism, India-EU Joint Working Group on Consular Affairs, India-EU Round Table etc. But as in domestic politics in democracies, there always remain differences over political issues. India and the EU are no exception to it.
7.3.1
Political Differences
There were broadly three areas of political differences between the EC and India till 1993, and between the EU and India since 1993 (it was since 1 November 1993 that the EC came to be known as the EU). They are the Kashmir issue, the Nuclear issue and the issue of Human Rights. During the formative years of the EC, the member states considered the Kashmir issue as a dispute to be handled by the Americans and the British. But subsequently, especially after the conclusion of the Simla Agreement, the EC sought to take an even-handed approach towards India and Pakistan. After the emergence of militancy and terrorism in Kashmir, the EU expresses concern about terrorism, but simultaneously shows its disquiet about the handling of the situation by the Indian security forces. The language of the statement issued by the organisation is carefully crafted to “deplore the continuing violence and abuse of human rights in Kashmir” and to call for resisting the terrorist forces in ways that would not neglect “full respect for human rights and the rule of law”. In other words, it tries to avoid taking a stand that would raise irritants in its relations with either India or Pakistan. But India does not appreciate the lack of adequate EU response to the deadly menace of terrorism and tries to urge the EU to take a stronger position on the issue. The terrorist strike on the US in September 2001 could have awaken the EU to the dangers of Pakistan’s role in abetting terrorism across the border, but Pakistan soon became a front-line state in the US-led war against terrorism. Consequently, India’s appeal to the international Community, including the EU to take a harder look at terrorism in Kashmir appears to have fallen on deaf ears. India and the EU also differ on the issue of the human rights question. The EU often raises the question of violation of human rights in Kashmir in its dialogue with India. India feels that the EU reaction does not take into account the gross violation of human rights by the terrorist outfits and does not take note of the compulsions and limitations of the security forces while dealing with the terrorist violence. The third major area of political differences between the EU and India is on the question of 8
nuclear proliferation. All the members of the EU are signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India considers the NPT a discriminatory document. India and the EU also differ on the question of signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The EU desires India to sign both the NPT and the CTBT. India instead went ahead and conducted a series of nuclear tests and declared its status as a nuclear weapon power in May 1998. The EU strongly condemned the Indian nuclear tests, but unlike the US and Japan, refrained from imposing any sanctions. However, it made common cause with the G-8 and the UN Security Council in urging nuclear restraint in South Asia. Later, however, some individual members of the E U clearly stated that it was India’s sovereign right to decide how to ensure its security.
7.3.2
Economic Cooperation
While the European Union has been striving hard to evolve a common foreign and security policy than its predecessor—the EC and seeking a political role too in international affairs, it is the economic clout of this organisation that is key to its existence and growth. In a globalising world, politics cannot be separated from economics and the EU has realised that it has to have a larger political role even in its economic strategy in the context of the post-Cold War era. Consequently, it has opened up lines of political communications with a large number of countries including India in recent years. The idea is to enhance bilateral understanding and comprehend the complex politico-security issues with those countries the EU members are increasingly interacting with. India’s primary interaction today with the EU, however, is economic and not politico-security issues. India formalised its bilateral cooperation with the EC in 1973 and 1981 and third such agreement was signed in 1994. The 1994 agreement was important in the emerging context of the evolution of the EU and India’s policy of economic liberalisation since 1991. With the new opportunities provided by India’s economic liberalisation and the EU’s search for a new relationship with the Asian countries, Indo-EU economic interactions became very dynamic and vibrant in the 1990s. The EU today is India’s largest trading partner, biggest source of foreign direct investment, major contributor of developmental aid, important source of technology and home to a large and influential Indian diaspora. The EU-India trade has experienced a steady growth in volume and diversity since 1993, with a third of Indian exports reaching the EU destinations. Bilateral trade was approximately Euro 25.02 billion in 2001. It accounts for 26 per cent of our exports and 25 per cent of our imports. However, India is the EU’s 17th largest supplier and 20th largest destination of exports. India’s trade still lies in its traditional exports like textiles, agricultural and marine products, gems and jewellery, leather, and engineering and electronic products. Some sectors like chemicals, carpets, granites and electronics are, however, showing considerable growth since the last five years. Indian imports have been dominated by gems and jewellery, engineering goods, chemicals and minerals. The EU is one of the major sources of foreign direct investment for India, with countries like the UK, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands accounting for a large proportion of the investment. FDI flows from the EU to India amounted to Euro 1.1 billion in 1999 while FDI from India to EU was Euro 69 million.
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On the positive side of economic interactions, the pattern of EU investment in India has shifted towards the infrastructure, mainly power and telecommunications developments. The EU has also a substantial stake in the industrial machinery, transport, electrical and electronics, textiles, chemicals and consultancy sectors. Significantly, the European Commission has a large number of development-oriented programmes in India, with education, health and environment as priority sectors. The main objective is to enhance human development by providing assistance for projects, which benefit the economically weaker and deprived sections of the society.
7.3.3
Economic Limitations
It is nonetheless clear that the European Union is more important for India than the other way around. There are several limitations faced by India in its economic interactions with the EU. •
First of all, there is an asymmetrical trade relationship between India and the EU. Although the EU happens to be India’s largest trading partner, India is yet to become an important target of EU’s trade, especially imports, and accounts for a little over 1 per cent of EU imports.
•
Secondly, the EU is yet to make India an important investment destination. India accounts for less than 1 per cent of EU’s global investments and its investment in India actually got reduced in the 1990s with the rise of the new economies in Western Europe and Central Asia.
•
India has not been able to take advantage of the vast EU market, as more than 70 per cent of its exports are concentrated in only four member countries, such as UK, Germany, Italy and Belgium-Luxembourg.
•
Indian exports, moreover, are concentrated in a few resource-based items such as textiles, leather and pearls.
7.3.4
Trade Disputes
India faces considerable problems in enlarging its exports market in the EU because of a series of barriers imposed by the EU. First of all, Indian exports of items such as textiles, footwear and clothing face double disadvantage in the form of high tariff as well as some non-tariff barriers. Of late, high tariff barriers are being reduced periodically, but protectionism is being practiced through the imposition of several non-tariff barriers. Indian exports to the EU face a spate of non-tariff barriers in the form of health, sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards. Quantitative restrictions under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) have been imposed on Indian textiles since 1972. Technical barriers have also been recently erected in the form of greater harmonisation of technical standards and regulations. There are also labour and environmental standards on goods and anti-dumping measures, which have led to effective protectionist measures in the EU adversely affecting India’s trade.
7.4
SUMMARY
The Indo-US relations during the Cold War were full of stress and strain due to the differing approaches to security issues. The US favoured an alliance strategy, while India followed a nonaligned strategy.
10
The bilateral relations have gone through a period of ups and downs due to Cold War factors, Pakistan’s aggressive policy in the subcontinent and the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region. After the end of the Cold War, the relationship witnessed considerable improvement. The nuclear tests of May 1998 by India created a temporary hiccup in the relationship. But the incident of terrorist strike against the American targets on 11 September 2001 created new opportunities for the two countries to cooperate. India and the US have not allowed their political differences over Kashmir and Iraq issues to derail an improving bilateral relationship. Washington’s support to Simla agreement is agreeable to India. The US also refuses to mediate in Kashmir issue, because India is opposed to the third party involvement. In addition, differences over details of counter-terrorism measures have not prevented India and the US from forging cooperative ties in dealing with the terrorist networks. The Joint Working Group on Terrorism frequently meets and the officials from the US and India discuss the modalities of tackling terrorism. Improvement in the Indo-US defence cooperation is a new development of the post-Cold War era. It has been steadily improving. The two countries are holding joint military exercises involving all the services, sharing defence intelligence information and even working together in developing military doctrines to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. Pakistan’s close relations with the US no longer agitate the Indian foreign policy makers, because the US has also considerably improved its ties with India. Indo-US economic relations are also improving steadily. However, from the US side, India is yet to become an important trade partner or investment destination. It is an asymmetrical relationship, which needs to be addressed. The strength of the future bilateral relations will largely depend on the nature of economic cooperation. Economic ties are generally more durable than defence and security relations. India’s relations with the European Union during the Cold War days were largely economic in nature, since that organisation had little role to play in international political issues. The European Union not only constitutes the largest combined regional market for Indian goods but also is the biggest source for Indian imports. India too benefits a great deal from the economic developmental assistance and foreign investment from the member countries of the European Union. There are some trade related disputes between the EU and India. But these have not been allowed to disrupt the overall friendly relations between India and the EU. India has taken note of the EU’s desire to play larger political role in world affairs since the end of the Cold War. Consequently, it has sought to engage the EU in a series of political dialogue. The bilateral political dialogues aim to address the problems of misperceptions on political issues and to enhance political understanding. The growing importance of the EU as a major player in world affairs has coincided with the increasing importance of India as a major power. The first ever summit meeting between India and the EU started in the year 2000 and has indicated the determination of India and the EU members to elevate the level of political and economic understanding among one another. The summit, in fact, highlighted the opportunities in the emerging areas of energy, telecommunications and information technology where India and the EU can benefit from cooperative arrangements. 11
7.5
EXERCISES
1) Examine the main political difference between India and the US during the Cold War years. 2) Describe the beginning of a new relationship between India and the US after the end of the Cold War. 3) What are the areas of differences between India and the US in the post-Cold War era? 4) What is the significance of the European Union for India’s foreign relations? 5) Describe the main political differences between the EU and India. 6) What are the principal limitations of Indo-EU economic relations?
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UNIT 8 RUSSIA, CHINA AND JAPAN Structure 8.1 8.2
Introduction Indo-Russian Relations 8.2.1 8.2.2
8.3
India-China Relations 8.3.1 8.3.2 8.3.3 8.3.4 8.3.5
8.4
Tensions after the Collapse of the U.S.S.R. Revival of Close Cooperation Beginning of Friendship Bitterness in the Relationship Freezing and Unfreezing of Ties Increased Momentum Post-Cold War Developments
India-Japan Relations 8.4.1 8.4.2 8.4.3
Immediate Post-War Period Shadow of the Cold War After the Cold War
8.5 8.6
Summary Exercises
8.1
INTRODUCTION
Russia, China and Japan are three major world powers, which can also be called Asian Powers given their geographical location. While China and Japan are Asian countries, Russia is a Eurasian country. These three countries may not individually have the weight of the United States, but Russia has tremendous military capability to threaten the security of the United States. China is also a nuclear power, but its military prowess vis-à-vis the US is limited. However, Russia and China were erstwhile Cold War adversaries of the US, though China had moved closer to the US in 1970s, while China-USSR relations were strained. Japan, on the other hand, has been a close ally of the US. India has had traditionally close security ties with Russia, strategic differences and territorial problems with China and has no inimical relations with Japan, but neither are their relations very close. India today seeks to continue close ties with Russia, normalise relations with China and improve relations with Japan. It is important to examine India’s relations with these three major powers of the world, which have geographical proximity with India.
8.2
INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
Russia as a new country in the modern political map of the globe is a little more than ten years old. It is actually the principal successor state to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), which disintegrated in December 1991. Russia was given the permanent seat in the UN Security Council (with a right to veto) which was held till 1991 by the USSR. Since Russia inherited the lion’s share of benefits and burdens of the USSR, Indo-Russian relations of today must be understood in the backdrop of Indo-Soviet relations.
1
India’s relations with the Soviet Union during the early years of its liberation from the British Raj were not very cordial. In fact, prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru was initially wary of the Soviet Union. Nor was the Soviet Union keen to establish any meaningful ties with the newly independent India. However, the spread of the superpower rivalry around the world motivated the Soviet Union to reexamine its relations with India, which followed a non-aligned foreign policy. India, on the other hand, suspicious of the emerging security ties between the USA and Pakistan, reconsidered its views of and policies towards the Soviet Union particularly in the post-Stalin period. By the mid-1950s India and the Soviet Union appeared all poised to establish closer relations. This trend was considerably strengthened in 1956 when, during a visit to India, Soviet leaders Nikolai Bulganin and Alexei Kosygin referred to Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of India. Kashmir being a core national security issue with India, the Soviet gesture was highly appreciated by the Indian leaders. In response, India voted with the Soviet Union in 1956 in the UN General Assembly, on the resolution calling for democratic elections in Hungary which was then under Soviet occupation. However, it was after the Sino-Indian war of 1962 that the Indo-Soviet relations assumed added importance. Although the Soviet Union did not have strategic relations with the non-aligned India during the Chinese invasion, Sino-Soviet rift had become crystal clear by that time. The refusal of the US-led Western camp to assist India in expanding its military capability led to the establishment of formal military cooperation between India and the Soviet Union. The two countries in 1962 agreed to begin a programme of military-technical cooperation. India was not keen to enter the Cold War politics. For India, the agreement with the Soviets was a commercial one based on economics and the dire necessity to modernise its armed forces after the 1962 debacle. After all, Soviet military contracts usually had favourable financial terms and provided for licensing of production. India’s long term self-reliance in military procurement and search for strategic autonomy guided India’s security cooperation with the Soviet Union. In other words, India did not choose to join the Soviet Camp, it only sought to use the Soviet supplied arms as a stepping stone to achieve strategic autonomy. The Indian non-alignment was, in fact, demonstrated a few years later, when Pakistan agreed to Soviet peace mediation at Tashkent after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War. The seismic shifts in regional geopolitics in the late 1960s and early 1970s culminated in an enhanced Indo-Soviet security cooperation. The US approach to befriend China with the help of Pakistan was interpreted in India as the emergence of a new axis of power consisting of those three countries. The simultaneous political upheaval in East Pakistan adversely affected India’s national security and economy. Before India and Pakistan would fight the third round of war in 1971, the Soviet Union and India signed a historic Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971. Since then the two countries developed a kind of mutual trust and cooperation, which appeared solid and durable until the disintegration of the USSR. India met most of its defence needs from the Soviet Union. By a rough estimate, almost 60 per cent of the Indian army’s military hardware, 70 per cent of its naval hardware, and 80 per cent of air force hardware originated from the Soviet Union. Moreover, the two countries developed a convergence of views and interests on most of the international issues of the Cold War days.
8.2.1 2
Tensions after the Collapse of the USSR
The dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of Russia led to several changes in the traditional foreign policy objectives and goals. As the new Russian Federation began to grope for new principles and practices of its foreign relations, three factors led to the sidelining of India in Moscow’s policy circles. First, president Boris Yeltsin emphasised a need for the “deideologisation” of its foreign policy, which resulted in a “wait and see” policy towards India. The new relationship with India was to be guided by “pragmatism and flexibility” and there was no hurry to devote much time to India. Secondly, Russian political establishment was divided between two groups—“Westerners or Atlanticists” and “Asia first” groups. Both Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin were “Atlanticists” who pinned their hopes on a renewal of the Russian economy with the help of a new version of the Marshall Plan. Thirdly, a school of thought concerning future relations with India, headed by Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev, believed that Pakistan was a more valuable asset in fulfilling Russia’s immediate foreign policy and security concerns. They argued that Pakistan could become an effective middleman for Russia in dealing with Islamic fundamentalism. The views of this group prevailed in the early 1990s. Consequently, the Russian foreign ministry considered Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey as having a higher priority than India. Another school of thought comprising some academics, members of the Duma and the defence industry strongly believed that Russia should maintain its “special” relationship with India. A strong India, in their view, could be a better bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism and the hegemonic status of the United States. But this school failed to influence the course of foreign policy making. As the anti-India school of thought dominated Russian foreign policy-making, a major shift in Soviet/Russian policy towards South Asia took place during transition days. In November 1991— about a month before the final dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow suddenly supported the Pakistan-sponsored UN Resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia. It almost gave a political shock to India, since it would mean that India, along with Pakistan, would have to abandon its nuclear programmes. The support to the Pakistani proposal was partly guided by the desire to get the Soviet prisoners of war released from the “custody of the Pakistan-backed Mujahideen factions.” In December 1991, when the Soviet Union was breathing its last, a delegation of Afghan Mujahideen travelled to Russia. In January 1992, the new Russian government severed all “military supplies, ordnance and fuel for military transport” that were sustaining the war efforts of president Najib’s government of Afghanistan against the Mujahideen. India once again was seriously concerned over the reversal in the Soviet/Russian policy. Another event creating stress in the Indo-Russian relations centred on a contract dispute between the Russian space directorate Glavkosmos and the Government of India for the purchase of cryogenic engines and the related technology. The contract, signed on 18 January 1991, would have helped India gain knowledge of the liquid oxygen propulsion system of Russian cryogenic engines in order to advance India’s geo-synchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV) programme. When the United States threatened to impose sanctions under the MTCR on both India and Russia, president Boris Yeltsin promised that he would not give in to US diplomatic pressure. But 3
when the US actually applied sanctions in May 1992, and threatened further economic measures, Yeltsin in July 1993 agreed to suspend the transaction with India and to alter the nature of the transfer to the sale of only the cryogenic engines and not the technology. In return, Glavkosmos received bidding rights on more than $950 million worth of future US space projects. During the same time yet another controversy, the “rupee versus rouble” debate, negatively affected Indo-Russian relations. India had accumulated a debt of more than $12 billion owed to the Soviet Union for arms purchases. While India was prepared and willing to pay off its debt, a dispute emerged with the new Russian government over the nature of the currency and the exchange rate that would be used. This dispute led to a collapse of trade relations between the two countries in 1991-92. After considerable negotiations, a resolution was reached in January 1993 that called for India to repay Russia $1 billion a year in Indian goods until 2005 and the remaining thirty-seven percent of the debt would be repaid, interest free, over a span of fortyfive years.
8.2.2
Revival of Close Cooperation
Russia realised before long that its hopes of Marshall Plan type assistance from the West were misplaced. The expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the crisis in the Balkans and several other instances of American unilateralism induced Moscow to reprioritise its foreign policy agenda. Those who supported closer ties with Asian powers could vindicate their ideas. In January 1996, when Yevgeny Primakov replaced the pro-Western Andrei Kozyrev as Russia’s foreign minister, Indo-US relations began to change quickly. India once again came under Russian strategic focus. At a time when US president Bill Clinton put pressure on India on the nuclear issue, Moscow sent a new signal to New Delhi by concluding an agreement to build two Russian light-water nuclear reactors (LWR) in India in defiance of a Nuclear Suppliers Group ban. The accord paved the way for the construction of two 1,000 MW light water nuclear reactors at Kudankalam in Tamil Nadu. It seemed that Russia would not succumb to external pressure this time. While Russia did criticise India for its nuclear tests in 1998, it refused to apply any sanctions against India. Besides, Russia fully supported India during the Kargil conflict of 1999, and it called upon Pakistan to pull back its troops on its side of Line of Control (LOC). President Putin has fully supported Vajpayee government’s position on cross-border terrorism, urging Pakistan to destroy its infrastructure of terrorism. India would no longer face the military difficulties it faced after the Soviet disintegration. India’s concern in the early 1990s was its limited supply of spare parts and supplies for its Sovietproduced armaments. Lacking the indigenous capability to produce spare parts and supplies for the Soviet built equipment, India’s military faced an immediate crisis. On the reverse side, Russian inability to continue the flow of military hardware, coupled with the sharp reduction in the Indian military expenditures, “weakened the primary bond that had united India and the Soviet Union during the Cold War”. By the mid-1990s, in fact, the Indian economic growth and the financial needs of Russia’s military-industrial complex quickly mended the “hiccup” in the Indo-Russian military cooperation.
8.3
INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS
India and China are among the oldest civilisations on the planet and have had one of the longest 4
uninterrupted continuations as nations in world history. The cultural, religious and trade links between these two countries are centuries old. Intellectual and scholarly interactions between the Indian and Chinese pilgrims and travellers laid a strong foundation of understanding between these two great civilisations. Among the bestknown Chinese scholars who visited India was Fa Hien, Sung Yun, Hsuan-Tsang and I-Tsung. And well-known Indians, who visited China, were Kumarajiva, Jinagupta, Jinbhadra, and Bodhidharma. Even in the modern history of the world, India and China emerged as independent nation-states about the same time. India became independent in 1947 and China took birth as a Communist State in 1949. However, India-China relations have experienced deep fluctuations over the past five decades ranging from compassionate camaraderie in the 1950s through armed conflict in the 1960s, strategic distances in the 1970s to efforts for normalisation in 1980s. Since the end of the Cold War in early 1990s, however, the two Asian giants have been searching for a new relationship based on conflict resolution, confidence building and cooperative arrangements. By 2003, both countries had decided to move ahead and build friendship without allowing border question to hamper the Sino-Indian relations.
8.3.1
Beginning of Friendship
Soon after independence, India adopted a policy of non-alignment in the midst of a Cold War climate. But China established close alliance with the former Soviet Union. But it did not affect India-China relations, because prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru considered it to be in India’s interest to befriend China. Nehru quickly welcomed the birth of Communist China in October 1949 and advocated that China had a legitimate place in the comity of nations. India was not only the first among the noncommunist countries to have recognised the People’s Republic of China (December 1949) but also promoted with greater zeal its representation in the United Nations. Nehru’s approach to China was marked by warmth and cordiality, despite China’s forcible occupation of Tibet in 1950. India protested, but China rejected the protest saying that it was being influenced by imperialist powers. When the Chinese premier Chou En-Lai paid a state visit to India in June 1954, Nehru accorded him a red carpet treatment. Earlier in April 1954, the two countries had signed an agreement concerning trade between India and “Tibet Region of China”. This agreement also incorporated the five principles of Panchsheel. The two leaders, Nehru and Chou issued a joint statement reiterating Panchsheel—five principles of peaceful co-existence, which later became an important set of principles to guide international relations. After about three months prime minister Nehru paid return visit to Beijing. He underlined the need for a strong relation between the two countries in the interest of Asian peace and stability. In about six months’ time, Nehru and Chou En-Lai once again met at the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian countries in April 1955. Together the two leaders exchanged notes on evolving a common approach of the developing countries to deal with the intricacies of international politics in the midst of Cold War between the two superpowers. Nehru was partly responsible for China’s success in winning the goodwill of the non-aligned countries. As India consistently championed the cause of China’s representation in the UN, so did many other developing countries. 5
Some analysts criticised Nehru for supporting China’s entry into the UN. But others argued that Nehru’s China policy enabled India to manage peace and tranquility on the northeastern borders for at least fifteen years.
8.3.2
Bitterness in the Relationship
The principles of Panchsheel and the spirit of Bandung disappeared by late 1950s. The contention between India and China on the border issue and the status of Kashmir gave birth to a period of bitterness in the bilateral relationship. China suddenly raked up the border issue by arguing that there has been no border agreement between India and China and refused to recognise the McMahon line as the international border between the two countries. Secondly, China also claimed the Aksai-Chin region of Kashmir as an area originally belonging to its Sinkiang province. Thirdly, China reversed its policy and began to challenge Kashmir’s accession to India. Chinese statements on Kashmir indicated two points: (a) it regarded Kashmir as a disputed territory; and (b) it supported the principle of self-determination in Kashmir. The building of a controversial road in the Aksai Chin area and frequent border skirmishes in other sectors finally led to a border war in October 1962, when China attacked India. The Sino-Indian War of 1962 had many consequences. First, it was a blow to Nehru’s image and prestige at home as well as abroad. He was criticised at home for his idealistic foreign policy and his failure to defend the country’s honour. And India’s image as a leader of the developing world got a beating. Secondly, India’s non-aligned policy was compromised and Nehru had to make a personal appeal to the West, especially to the United States, for military assistance. Third, the defeat of the Indian military had an adverse and traumatic impact on the morale of the soldiers. Fourthly, India lost 38,000 square kilometers of its territory to China (35,000 sq. km. in north-eastern part and 3,000 sq. km. in the western sector). In addition, China lays its claim to approximately 95,000 square kilometers of land in India’s eastern sector.
8.3.3
Freezing and Unfreezing of Ties
The Sino-Indian relations were almost frozen for about fourteen years since the 1962 war. Not until 1976 the two countries resumed ambassadorial level diplomatic ties. During the fourteen years, China followed a hostile policy towards India. It established close relations with Pakistan in less than six months after its 1962 military invasion of India. It was in March 1963 that China and Pakistan signed a border agreement. One of the clauses of this agreement made Kashmir an issue involving three countries—India, Pakistan and China, as Pakistan illegally ceded a part of occupied Kashmir China. In 1964, China exploded a nuclear device. Pakistan drew inspiration from China’s India war, its new friendship with Beijing, and new nuclear capability of China and launched its second war against India in 1965. Although there were fears about China’s entry into the war, China did not go beyond giving moral and some material support to Pakistan. Presumably, the growing Sino-Soviet rift and the continuing Sino-US hostility prevented China from joining the war on the side of Pakistan. However, the crushing defeat of Pakistan in the December 1971 Indo-Pakistan war and creation of an independent state of Bangladesh changed India’s power profile in South Asia. Moreover, agricultural and industrial successes and demonstration of its nuclear capability in 1974 made India a self-confident democracy in the region. The end of the Vietnam war and the unification of 6
Vietnam in 1975, moreover, ended the first round of intense Cold War and altered the security scenario of the world. In the backdrop of all these developments, prime minister Indira Gandhi took steps to normalise relations with China. The first step in that direction was the establishment of full-fledged diplomatic relations with that country. The appointment of a senior foreign service officer, K. R. Narayanan, as India’s ambassador to China was more than symbolic. It indicated New Delhi’s sincere desire to normalise relations with China. The process of Sino-Indian normalisation continued during the Janata Party rule at the Centre under the leadership of prime minister Morarjee Desai. Atal Behari Vajpayee, then foreign minister, visited China in 1979 and held dialogues with senior leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. China reciprocated the Indian desire to maintain peaceful relations. The rise to power of Deng Xiaoping in Beijing and his policy of instituting unprecedented reforms in several sectors, including economy, were positive factors that provided political impetus to continuing efforts for improving Sino-Indian relations. The relationship appeared completely unfrozen when in the 1980s several rounds of border talks were held between the officials of the two countries to settle amicably the prolonged dispute. The border talks were actually the result of a fruitful meeting between prime minister Indira Gandhi and the Chinese premier Hua Guafeng in May in 1980. The two leaders agreed to resolve the border disputes and simultaneously supported the idea of improving the bilateral relations for the larger cause of Asian peace and stability. Premier Hua visited India in 1981 and gave a further boost to the increased interactions between the two countries. The seventh round of border talks between 1981 and 1986 completely unfroze the Sino-Indian relationship, although a lasting solution to the contentious issues had not yet been arrived at.
8.3.4
Increased Momentum
In fact, tensions along the Sino-Indian border continued with occasional skirmishes, despite restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries and several rounds of negotiations on the border issues. The Chinese armed incursions into the Indian side of the border at the Sumdorang Chu Valley in 1987 was a notable example of the border tension even after the seventh round of bilateral dialogue. However, by the time Rajiv Gandhi became India’s prime minister, momentous changes were unfolding in the international affairs. With the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev to power in the former Soviet Union, the superpower rivalry was giving way to a period of unprecedented accommodation and cooperation. As the Cold War was receding and the world focus was on the superpowers, India and China also were seeking to reshape their relations. The path-breaking visit by prime minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988—the first prime ministerial visit in 34 years—wide opened the avenues for high-level exchange of visits by Indian and Chinese leaders. During this visit, the two sides agreed for the first time to set up a Joint Working Group to defuse tension along borders. More significantly, the leaders of both the countries agreed on the need to concentrate on establishing and enhancing cooperation in other areas of mutual benefit. Consequently, India and China signed several agreements on scientific and technological cooperation and educational and cultural exchange programmes. The Chinese vice-premier Wu Xueqian’s visit to New Delhi in October 1989 and the Chinese Premier Li Peng’s visit to India in
7
December 1991 accelerated the improvement of political relations between the two countries.
8.3.5
Post-Cold War Developments
By the time prime minister Narasimha Rao visited Beijing in 1993, the entire international milieu had changed. The Soviet Union had disintegrated and the Cold War had ended. Nations around the world were searching for a new definition of their respective foreign policies in the new context of the global political situation. So were India and China. Rao’s visit to China fructified with the signing of a landmark agreement to maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Less than a year later, Chinese president Jiang Zemin paid a visit to India in November 1996 and concluded four agreements in various fields, including a spectacular understanding to institute confidence building measures (CBMs) between the two countries. But the relationship soon turned sour in the aftermath of a series of nuclear tests by India in May 1998. A reported statement by the defence minister George Fernandes characterising China as a source of threat to India infuriated the Chinese. A leaked letter from prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to the US president Bill Clinton justifying the Indian nuclear tests on the ground of China’s expanding nuclear arsenals further annoyed the Chinese government. But India took steps to address the Chinese concern. During his visit to China in July 2000 foreign minister Jaswant Singh reassured the Chinese leaders that India perceived no threat from China. Official interactions soon picked up and culminated in Chinese premier Zhu Rongji’s fiveday official visit to India in January 2002. The prime minister once again conveyed India’s impression that China did not pose a threat to India and went on to emphasise that India did not believe that China regarded India as a threat either. An understanding to create consultative mechanism on counter-terrorism marked the high point of this visit. The leaders of both the countries also emphasised the need to enhance economic cooperation between the two countries. In 2003, first the defence minister, Fernandes and then prime minister Vajpayee paid highly successful visits to China, strengthening the bilateral relations. During Vajpayee visit the two countries agreed to address border questions with care and caution.
8.4
INDO-JAPAN RELATIONS
The relationship between India and Japan is centuries old. During the rein of emperor Kemmei, Japan first came into contact with India. According to one source, Korea in the year 552 AD paid tribute to Japan in the form of an image of Buddha and a copy of Buddhist scriptures. Buddhism was thus introduced in Japan. Several Indian Buddhist monks subsequently visited Japan and brought the two countries together. While the first contacts were based on religion, by the late 19th Century commercial interests connected Japan with India. Although India was under the colonial rule of Britain, Japan viewed with importance India’s role in accelerating the process of its industrialisation. In the mean time, Japanese people developed deep appreciation for Indian nationalism and the Indian leaders came to value Japan’s industrial progress as a source of inspiration for the colonial peoples of Asia. Japan’s victory over Russia in the war of 1904-05 provided a potent stimulus to Indian nationalism, which was dormant since 1857. During the Indian freedom struggle in the early 8
decades of the 20th Century, Japan was one of the countries where some Indian nationalists had developed their political activities to garner support for India’s independence. During the Indian freedom struggle, the Indian National Congress was critical of several Japanese policies, including aggression against Manchuria Province of China. But when the Japanese forces defeated the Western colonial powers during the Second World War, it brought cheers to many subject colonial peoples, including Indians. However, the Japanese connection of some Indian nationalist groups, especially the members of Ghadar Party and the Indian National Army under Subhash Chandra Bose were meant to help India achieve independence. For the Japanese people, India has always been a “country of great charm as a centre of old civilisation with rich cultural heritage and as the motherland of Buddhism.” In the midst of the freedom struggle, a group of Bengali intellectuals led by Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore maintained a close friendship with Japanese intellectuals and artists such as Okakura Tenshin. Moreover, Mahatma Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence attracted many followers and admirers in Japan.
8.4.1
Immediate Post-War Period
A real watershed in the relations between Japan and India came after the end of the Second World War. Japan was a defeated nation. It was under American military occupation and several Japanese were to be tried for their war crimes. Judge Radha Vinod Pal in his dissenting opinion at the Tokyo Military Tribunal questioned the validity of the victor’s justice and won the admiration of millions of Japanese people. Jawaharlal Nehru looked with warmth to the post-war Japan devastated by the atom bombs and under foreign occupation at a time when India itself was able to overthrow the foreign rule. At the moment of Japan’s struggle for survival in the immediate postwar period, India offered to supply Japan with iron ore, which was so vital in the reconstruction of Japan. Nehru also refused to participate in the San Francisco Conference to sign a US-sponsored Peace Treaty with Japan and decided to forego claiming reparation against Japan. India established diplomatic relations with Japan in April 1952 and signed a separate peace treaty in June 1952, waiving all reparation claims against Japan. As Japan began to reshape the country’s polity under a new constitution and took steps to revive its economic growth, India sought to maintain cooperative ties with that country. In November 1955, an Agreement for Air Services was concluded, followed by a Cultural Agreement in October 1956 and an Agreement of Commerce in February 1958. An agreement for the avoidance of double-taxation was signed in June 1960. In February 1966, the Japan-India Business Cooperation Committee was established.
8.4.2
Shadow of the Cold War
The emergence of the Communist China in 1949, the onset of the Korean War in 1950 and the Communist/Nationalist upsurge in Indochina brought Cold War into Asia. The US was forced to co-opt Japan as an ally in the Cold War and all that began to determine the nature of Japan-India relations. As Japan’s foreign policy came to be influenced by its alliance relations with the US and the 1954 US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, India followed a policy of non-alignment. 9
The political divergences of an aligned Japan and non-aligned India were rather too many. To cite a few examples, India and Japan held different views on the Korean and Vietnam wars; and to India’s utter surprise, Japan did not even support liberation of Goa from the Portuguese colonial rule. A country that supported “liberation” of Korea and Vietnam from the clutches of Communists by force failed to appreciate the fact that Goa was liberated without shedding a drop of blood. The growing Indo-US political differences and strategic divergences affected India’s relations with Japan, since the latter’s foreign policy was conditioned by the western, especially American, views on world affairs. Even then some Japanese appeared to have appreciated and regarded India’s non-aligned foreign policy postures and its role in the developing world, since Japan could have followed such a policy but for the compulsion generated by the US influence over post-war Japan. Japan, in fact, viewed India as a rising Asian power and a better alternative model of a developing country than China, despite the political differences on international affairs. The 1962 military humiliation by China of India, however, seemed to have brought some disappointment to Japan and India fell low in the Japanese foreign policy priorities. Diplomatic contacts thereafter became minimal. What was worrisome is the fact that Japan maintained neutrality during the Sino-Indian War of 1962, although the US positively responded to the Indian requests for help. Moreover, at the time of 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, Japan cut off aid and credits to India. As geopolitical developments in the early 1970s culminated in India’s political proximity to the erstwhile Soviet Union in strategic matters, Japan’s political distance from India got widened further. Japan did not support the liberation of Bangladesh nor did it endorse India’s peaceful nuclear explosion. After all, Japan had a territorial dispute with the USSR and perceived a threat to Japanese sea-lanes from the Soviet Navy operating out of Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. Thus Japan’s position on the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War and the 1974 nuclear test by India were coloured by Japan’s own relations with the former Soviet Union and the Cold War factors. If Japan’s sharp reaction against Indian nuclear tests would have been on the basis of that country’s principled stand on the nuclear issue, Tokyo would not have abstained from voting in the UN General Assembly in 1978 when India and some other countries introduced a resolution to declare as a crime against humanity the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the Cold War differences between India and Japan were so intense that there was hardly a substantial issue in the UN where the two countries remained on the same side. While political differences persisted, there was not much of a meaningful interaction between the two countries in the economic field. Post-war Japan soon began to focus on its economic reconstruction and development and was increasingly successful. This was a time when the Indian economy was stagnating. The economic policy of India focusing on the import substitution strategy disillusioned and discouraged the Japanese from engaging in more positive economic relations with India. The trade relations were minimal. So was the case with the investment climate. Although India became one of the first and the largest recipient of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA), the assistance was suspended for years until the mid-1980s when prime minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Japan in the midst of a global political transformation.
8.4.3 After the Cold War The end of the Cold War and the economic liberalisation policy of India brought an unprecedented
10
opportunity for India and Japan to forge a new creative relationship. New avenues opened up for cooperation in the economic area, including the fields of trade, investment, and service, as well as the rapidly expanding field of information technology. Japan soon became one of India’s most important partners in trade, investment and economic cooperation. The total volume of trade between India and Japan expanded from about $500 million in 1970 to roughly $4 billion in 1997. Japan had consistently been the largest bilateral donor for India since 1986 up to 1998 when Indian nuclear tests led to the suspension of the ODA. Japan had committed to India an amount of 1.3 billion US dollars in 1997. In the area of investment, Japanese direct investment in India grew from $3.9 million in 1993 to $53.2 million in 1997. Japan ranked as the fifth largest investor in India by the turn of the new millennium. By that time Japan was fully reconciled to India being a nuclear weapon state. High level exchange of visits between two countries introduced new strategic relationship.
8.5
SUMMARY
The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union brought unforeseen problems in the Indo-Russian relations. India and Russia, however, have once again been able to forge close strategic cooperation. The new strategic convergence of interests between the two countries is devoid of the logic of the Cold War days. The emerging strategic partnership has enabled India to buy considerable number of conventional weapons and military equipment from the Russian military and industrial complex. Moreover, Moscow and New Delhi have a common view on the need for establishing a multipolar world, countering international terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking, and small arms trading. Russia is not opposed to India’s emergence as a nuclear weapon power and Russia continues to give unconditional support to India on the Kashmir question. However, Indo-Russian cooperation remains limited compared to India’s previous ties with the former Soviet Union. People-to-people interactions are extremely limited and only a small number of personnel or academic exchanges take place between the two countries. Civilian trade between the two nations amounts to a paltry sum of $1.4 billion a year and is dominated by the Indian exports of textiles, leather, and pharmaceuticals. India’s close friendship with China in the 1950s soon turned into bitterness when China forced Dalai Lama to flee to India and later when it invaded India in 1962 and occupied a large area of Indian territory. But the bitterness seems to have become a thing of the past in course of time. The two countries have taken several steps since the 1980s to normalise relations. Today, India’s relations with China are much better than anytime in the past. The annual bilateral trade between the two countries has crossed $5 billion mark. Moreover, both the countries have common concern over the continuing terrorist threats to the international community. The political interactions at the highest levels are also continually taking place since early 1990s. The officials of both countries hold periodic meetings to address the border disputes. However, it is going to be long before the two countries are able to resolve the border dispute. India has continued concerns over China’s WMD (weapons of mass destruction)-related
11
cooperation with Pakistan. The North Korea-Pakistan cooperation in missile development is believed to be taking place with the knowledge of the Chinese. China, on the other hand, is uncomfortable about the presence of Tibetan minorities in India. It is also wearily watching the direction of Indo-US relations, particularly defence cooperation. Moreover, China appears to be concerned about India’s open support to the US policy on missile defence. Nevertheless, both China and India had decided by 2003 to leave behind the past and adopt a fast-track in the growing Sino-Indian relations. Although Japan has been one of the important donor countries to India since the 1950s, the politico-security relations between the two countries were marginal throughout the Cold War period. The end of the Cold War brought some positive movement in the interactions between the Indian and the Japanese leaders, but the Pokharan II nuclear tests created tremendous tension between Japan and India. By the time India emerged as a declared nuclear weapon power in May 1998, Japan and India were on the verge of reshaping their political, security and economic relations. The improved performance in the economic area was viewed as miniscule compared to the potentialities. After all, if viewed from the Japanese side, the share of Indo-Japanese trade remained less than 1 per cent of its total trade activities. But the harsh and strong Japanese reaction to the Indian nuclear tests in 1998 almost froze the bilateral relationship for quite some time. However, by early 1999, Taro Nakayama, former foreign minister visited India and handed over letter from the Japanese prime minister to the Indian prime minister. It heralded a new period of relationship between the two countries with the resumption of high-level exchanges. The visit of the Indian defence minister to Japan in 2000 was path-breaking. The conduct of joint exercises by the Indian and the Japanese Navy indicates that the two countries have decided to forge closer political, security and economic ties deep into the 21th Century. As India and the US are increasingly coming together, the likelihood of closer Japan-India relations also rises. The importance of the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and the stability in the Asia Pacific region to both Japan and India is increasingly being realised. Japan today views India as a rising power of Asia. The nature and intensity of Japan-India relations in the 21st Century will be crucial to the maintenance of peace and stability in the world in general and Asia in particular.
8.6
EXERCISES
1) What were the areas of bilateral tension between India and Russia after the disintegration of the Soviet Union? 2) Explain with examples the Indo-Russian relations since the mid-1990s. 3) Why did the initial friendship between China and India turn into bitterness? 4) Describe the process by which Sino-Indian relations were normalised. 5) What are the current trends in the India-China relations? 6) “Cold War events kept India and Japan from meaningfully forging cooperative ties”— Comment. 12
7) Narrate the ups and downs in the Indo-Japan relations in the post-Cold War era.
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UNIT 9 INDIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS Structure 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4
Introduction South Asian Regional State System Emergent Order in South Asia India-Pakistan Relations 9.4.1 9.4.2 9.4.3 9.4.4
9.5
Worldviews Manifestation of Conflict: Kashmir Nuclear Equation Dialogue
India and Other Nations of South Asia 9.5.1 9.5.2 9.5.3 9.5.4 9.5.5 9.5.6
Framework Nepal Bhutan Bangladesh Sri Lanka Maldives
9.6 9.7 9.8
The Formation of SAARC Summary Exercises
9.1
INTRODUCTION
Geopolitically, the region of South Asia is identified as that which lies south of the former Soviet Union and China, south of the Himalayas; bordering in the east by Myanmar (Burma) and in the west by Afghanistan. In a sense Myanmar and Afghanistan are border line states of the regions of South East Asia and South West Asia respectively. The creation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985 represented the recognition of the geopolitical entity of South Asia. The methodologies used for identifying the regional area as consisting of geographically proximate and interacting states sharing some degree of common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social and historical bonds, became the basis of the formation of the association. The countries included in this regional organisation are Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. This unit would discuss India’s South Asian policies in the following format. The first section deals with the framework of analysis. This framework is of the concept of the Regional State System. The subsequent section looks at the emergent order in South Asia with a focus on some of the early trends in Indian policies. The next section deals with Pakistan as the major power of the region. The third section looks at India’s policies towards the small powers of South Asia. The final section looks at the evolution of SAARC as a regional organisation of South Asia.
9.2
SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL STATE SYSTEM 1
The South Asian region consisting of the seven SAARC countries are a homogeneous group in the sense Contori and Spiegel define a subordinate system or a region. Contori and Spiegel describe the interaction of the region in the context of a core sector, periphery sector and an intrusive system. The core sector consists of a shared social, political, economic or organisational background or activity among the group of states which produces a central focus of international politics in that region. The peripheral sector includes all those states which are alienated from the core sector in some degree by economic, organisational, social or political factors. The intrusive sector consists of the extra regional intervention in the international relations of the region. The compactness of South Asia makes the Contori and Spiegel model applicable in a limited sense. The basic characteristics of the South Asian regional state system are as follows: i)
India, by virtue of its geographic size and location, economic and industrial base and military strength occupies a pivotal position in the region. The Indian aspirations for leadership, dominance or hegemony are a product of these geopolitical conditions of the region.
ii) South Asia, minus India, has two kinds of powers. Pakistan is one major power that can limit Indian hegemonic aspirations. Pakistan’s own limitations come from its geographic location and economic and military potentials. Unlike the pre 1971 Pakistan, the present Pakistan without its eastern linkage lies on the border of South Asia. It shares close ideological affinity with the Islamic West Asian State system. Pakistan may be described as a major power of the region and classified as a ‘bargainer’ or a ‘partner’ in the South Asian state system. Pakistan does not have the ability to substitute India as a leader of the region, yet it can bargain with India for partnership in the decision-making of the region. iii) The other type of countries would include the smaller countries like Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives. They can pose problems to the core power through extra regional intervention, or their own internal stability. They can also legitimise the dominance of the core power by acceptance of the balance of power in the region. iv) The major and most active power relationships in South Asia are affected by the intrusive powers. These extra regional powers, like the United States, Russia (formerly USSR), China and others have influenced policies of the region. All the South Asian countries, including India, have sought to use the extra regional powers’ ability to influence to their advantage.
9.3
EMERGENT ORDER IN SOUTH ASIA
The initial impulse of the Asian States on attaining independence was to isolate themselves from the Cold War bloc politics. The Indian approach under Nehru focused on the need to develop an independent understanding of world affairs and a peace policy. The application of these principles came in the series of conferences that took place in Asia that sought to establish the framework of peace through regionalism. The Asian Relations Conference (Delhi, 1947) was the first such conference that gathered the leaders of Asian countries that were still in the process of emerging from the colonial fold. It sought to establish an Asian identity and a common approach to such issues like peace and development. The Conference on Indonesia (Delhi, 1949) sought to create an international public opinion against colonialism and support the freedom movement in Indonesia. The Colombo Conference (1954) and the Afro-Asian Bandung Conference (1955) laid the
2
foundations of regionalism. The former was a conference of South and South East Asian countries and the latter that of Afro-Asian countries. These conferences represented the growth of regionalism in the Third World, especially Asia. The Bandung Conference was to spell out the principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Panchsheel) as principles that should govern the relations between states. The movement towards regionalism did not create any institutional arrangements in Asia. It remained as an effort in identifying the common concerns of post colonial states focusing on the problems of development. Unfortunately, regionalism never became a fundamental concern of the Afro-Asian states. Some of the obstacles to regionalism came from colonial legacies like the presence of large minorities within countries, unsettled borders, clash of elite, etc. The onslaught of Cold War in Asia after the Korean war proved to be the turning point for regionalism in the region. Bandung became the last Afro-Asian conference to be held. Though efforts were made to revive the spirit of regionalism, they remained unsuccessful. The mid-1950s saw a shift away from regionalism towards the development of non-alignment. At one level, nonalignment became a redefinition of the basic principles of regionalism as stated in the Panchsheel formulations, but with a distinct thrust on independence and peace. At another level, it was a redefinition of independent understanding of world affairs within the emergent framework of Cold War rivalry. What is noteworthy is that both, regionalism and non-alignment, made no effort to translate ‘movements’ into a structure or an organisation. At the South Asian level, one can identify two ‘models’ for order in the regional state system. The first was based on the realities of the geopolitical situation of 1947. This model was based more on the potentials of India to be a major power in South Asia, rather than actual power realities. This model appeared to go unquestioned until the 1962 debacle at the hands of the Chinese. The India-China war put into question the Indian claims for a great power status in the region of South Asia. The second model was a product of the 1971 conflict with Pakistan. The creation of Bangladesh and the Simla Agreement (1972) became the basis of this new model. The 1971-72 model was based on the recognition of India’s power status in South Asia. Pakistan’s acceptance of this status was implicit in the signing of the Simla agreement. Both the United States and the Soviet Union appeared to grant legitimacy to the new Indian position in South Asia. New Delhi’s success in opening up a dialogue with China indicated a similar legitimacy from China.
9.4
INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
Certain important historical and geographic compulsions that surfaced at the time of the partition of India in 1947 have had significant bearing on the thinking of both the countries. Islam was considered as a rallying point for national unity of a people who claimed to hold a different national identity. It became a separatist force that was not in line with the national mainstream of anti-colonial struggle. This has been accepted as a root of the creation of Pakistan. There are three important issues these countries face in their bilateral relations: (i) the difference in worldviews, (ii) the dispute over Kashmir and (iii) the problem of nuclear confrontation.
9.4.1
World Views
India and Pakistan, as two core countries of South Asia had different worldviews that determined 3
their foreign policies. During the early years after independence, the Indian worldview had been dominated by concerns about building a regional identity of the post-colonial nations of Asia. One of the important aspects of this policy was opposition to the extra regional intervention in South Asia. India sought to keep the South Asian issues within the ambit of South Asian countries. Opposition to the entry of Cold War alliances in Asia and eventual path of non-alignment is part of this worldview. The period from 1947 to 1971 saw two trends in India’s approach towards South Asia. One was the trend that was initiated by Nehru. It focused on regionalism as the dominant theme. The second emerged during the Lal Bahadur Shastri years. This came in the aftermath of the 1962 war and the need for resetting the Indian worldview keeping in mind its capabilities. Shastri was to stress on bilateralism as the key to foreign policy, especially in relation to South Asian countries. It is in the post-1971 period that India developed a coherent South Asia policy that was to determine India’s approach towards its South Asian neighbours. The base of this policy lay in India’s power status in South Asia. The architecture of the policy rested on a combination of two approaches: regionalism that was now restricted to South Asia and the consequent perception of South Asia as a regional state system; and bilateralism, which was the basis of the Simla Agreement of 1972. Pakistan’s perception of its role emerged from the realisation of two simultaneous forces—the geopolitics of the country that was divided between East and West Pakistan and the Islamic worldview. The former placed Pakistan firmly in the South Asian regional state system while the latter brought it close to the Islamic world of West Asia. Pakistan thus saw itself as a nation with two distinct identities and roles, that of a South Asian power and that of an Islamic West Asian power that was to eventually emerge as an important country of the Organisation of Islamic Conference. One of the dominant security concerns that Pakistan sought to address right from its inception is that of fear of India. The problem of Pakistan’s foreign and defence policy revolved around this central theme of Indian domination and safeguards that were to be instituted to counter this threat. Pakistan’s attempts to establish linkages with the Islamic world, with China and participate in the military alliances of the United States can be understood within this security concern of Pakistan. These links provided an opportunity for Pakistan to counteract India’s desire to dominate in what India considered its sphere of influence.
9.4.2
Manifestation of Conflict: Kashmir
This fundamental diversity in the views of India and Pakistan manifests on the issue of Kashmir, an issue that has come to be identified by Pakistan as the core of the bilateral divide. Kashmir, like Junagadh and Hyderabad, opted to decide its future as to whether to join India or to merge with Pakistan. In case of Hyderabad and Junagadh, the Indian government took steps to ensure that the wishes of the overwhelming local Hindu populace were respected and hastened the process of merger of these two states in the Indian Union. Kashmir had a peculiar problem. It had distinct distribution patterns of its population, with the Ladakh area being predominantly Buddhist, the Jammu region Hindu and the Kashmir valley Muslim. Pakistan sought to force the pace of the decision making on Kashmir by permitting the ‘irregular army’ to enter Kashmir. Maharaja Hari Singh, realising the potential problems, signed the Instrument of Accession with India, thus merging the state of Jammu and Kashmir with the Indian Union. The first Indo-Pakistan war that followed the merger of Kashmir into India left the state partitioned. India took the matter to the United Nations and agreed to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir to ascertain
4
the wishes of the Kashmiris. According to the cease-fire resolution adopted by the UN Security Council, the plebiscite was conditional upon the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from Kashmir and the restoration of the situation to the pre 1947 position. This condition was never met by Pakistan and the plebiscite also never came to be conducted. Kashmir has seen a tumultuous history since the first war of 1948. The new government formed by Sheikh Abdullah, a Kashmiri leader of long standing, came to be dismissed in 1953. Sheikh Abdullah was relieved of his post as his party the National Conference refused to accept the accession to India as final and vaguely talked of the final settlement of the state of Kashmir in the future. Sheikh Abdullah was brought back to head the government in Kashmir in 1975 after he and Indira Gandhi signed an agreement. Now Sheikh Abdullah had given up the earlier separatist demand and had accepted Kashmir to be legitimately a part of India. In 1965, India and Pakistan fought a war over Kashmir. This war, as the Pakistani Air Marshal Asghar Khan put it, was a war to solve the problem once and for all. The Tashkent Conference (1966) also failed to provide any results.Though, the 1971 war was more a war about the future of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh, it had a definite aspect of Kashmir about it. The Simla Agreement of 1972 formalised the emergent situation on Kashmir. The agreement sought to establish some basic principles of Indo-Pakistan interaction. The Agreement specifically refers to bilateralism and acceptance of durable peace as the framework of resolving future India-Pakistan problems. On the very vital issue of Kashmir the agreement states: ‘In Jammu and Kashmir the line of actual control resulting from the cease fire of 17 December 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line’. The Simla Agreement sought to create a new framework of interaction for India and Pakistan and freeze the issue of Kashmir along the Line of Control indefinitely. One understands from the writings of Indian leaders involved in the making of this agreement that there was an implicit understanding of converting the LOC into a boundary in the eventual future. It is in this context that the return of Sheikh Abdullah became significant. Now India had a Kashmiri leader, heading a Kashmiri party the National Conference, taking the position that Kashmir is part of India. This was tantamount to a plebiscite. This was the test of the right to self-determination that the Kashmiris had been promised by the plebiscite. India could now talk of political legitimacy for the accession of Kashmir to India. Several developments appear to complicate the problem in Kashmir in the 1980s. Global Islamic resurgence came to be a force to reckon with. The growth of fundamentalist Islamic groups and the spread in their activity had become a matter of concern even for the United States. Pakistan was in a unique position in those days. Given its relatively liberal Islamic posture and the possibility of emergent democratic governments in Pakistan led it to retain a relatively close relationship with United States. On the other hand, it had excellent relations with the core Islamic world. It had an excellent access to the new Afghan government of Taliban and also to other radical Islamic organisations. Pakistan thus appears to have benefited from the then international situation. The post-1975 developments on Kashmir constitute the beginning of an entirely new chapter in its history. Adverse reactions to Sheikh Abdullah rule started in the late 1970s. Partly it was a product of the growing divide between the ruling class in Kashmir and the common populace that
5
remained deprived of the fruits of development that the state sought to create. Partly, it was the product of resultant frustration that came to be created in the minds of the Kashmiri about the utility of Indian rule. One of the significant popular level movements came in the form of the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). As an organisation that had strong Pakistani connections, the JKLF demanded the right to self-determination for the Kashmiris to join Pakistan. The 1980s saw two significant developments that had their impact on the developments in Kashmir. One was the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan that led to the massive arms supply by the United States to the Afghan rebels (Mujahideen) situated in Pakistan. Second was the change in Pakistani strategy regarding Kashmir. The American arms supply to the Afghans had a spillover effect in Kashmir. This was linked to the change in Pakistani tactics in terms of shifting from direct conflict to insurgency. Infiltration and insurgency has been a long pattern in Pakistani strategy on Kashmir. Prior to the 1965 war Pakistan had used this approach with little success. The failure to solve the problem through the use of force in 1965 and 1971 had led to a change in strategy. Now infiltration took the shape of low intensity conflict. Efforts to paralyse the local law and order situation and create uncertainty in the region came to be the tactics of the day. The large scale exit of the Kashmiri pundits from the valley was part of this protracted strategy. This Pakistani strategy was buttressed with a new clarion call of human rights violation. In the early 1990s, concern about violation of human rights had suddenly acquired newly found acceptance. In Bosnia, Chechnya and elsewhere, the world appeared to have suddenly become sensitive to human rights. In Kashmir too, the old paradigm of self-determination was fast replaced by the new paradigm of human rights violation. Suddenly the situation in Kashmir came to be analysed almost entirely along the human dimension. Demands came to be made by the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), followed by the European powers for an on-thespot survey of violation of human rights by the Indian forces. The Indian government was persuaded enough to create a National Human Rights Commission of its own to monitor the problem. It took several years for the international community to acknowledge that terrorist outfits also violate human rights and that the responsibility of violation cannot be that of the Government alone. In 1999 India and Pakistan came into conflict over an intrusion by Pakistan into Kargil. Was the crossing of the LOC by the Mujahideens, and the Pakistani troops a logical culmination of the ongoing approach taken on Kashmir? Did it represent an assessment by Pakistan that time was ripe to exert direct force by crossing the LOC and force India to resolve the Kashmir problem? Several explanations may be given for this Pakistani adventurism. One, that Pakistan must have assessed the time as being ripe for such an action to achieve its goal about accession of Kashmir. The political uncertainty in India and the obvious lack of consensus across the political spectrum in India would have also been one of the considerations. Two, this assessment must have been a military and intelligence assessment based on the active participation of the militant outfits. It was quite likely that the civil government was pulled into this decision after it was in place. If this be true it confirms the pattern of Pakistani politics that is dominated by competing interests of the army, the civilian representative elite, the intelligence units and the Islamic groups. The Pakistani premier’s constant disclaim about the involvement of Government in the Kargil action may not be entirely true. Such actions cannot take place without the knowledge and participation of the
6
government (and that includes the army). But his statement may also indicate the truth that he has very little control over the Pakistan army and militant groups in Kargil. History shows that the creators of such groups eventually cease to control them as they tend to have a momentum of their own. Having committed itself in Kargil, Pakistan appeared to have taken on more than it could digest. The international public opinion has shifted away from Pakistan. Its old and trusted ally China took a neutral position and advised restraint and dialogue. The Pakistani premier was not able to move the United States either. The US visit of premier Sharif proved counter productive. The Americans asked Pakistan to withdraw its troops to the LOC and begin a dialogue with India. Eventually, India did manage to push back the Pakistani infiltration.
9.4.3
Nuclear Equation
The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 had generated a great deal of debate on the rationale and implications of these actions taken by both the governments. Much of the debate focused on the security considerations of this action, the regional threat dimensions and internal political compulsions. The Indian articulation focused on the threats from Pakistan and China, while Pakistan targeted India. The central questions raised about the Indian tests had been in the ‘why’ and ‘why now’ category. The debates used two distinct paradigms for analysis, the first using the security rationale and the second, the developmental rationale. The debates based on the first focused on the perceived threats from the regional order as manifested by Pakistan and China. The positions about the exact nature of threats and the methods of tackling these threats would vary from party to party at a political level. In case of the Pakistani tests, the answers would be more specific, in that they would point to India as the central culprit. Further, in both cases there would be very strong internal political compulsions. Now that the tests have confirmed the nuclear weapon capability (or actual weapon status) it may be safe to presume that the nations have achieved whatever minimal nuclear ambitions they had cherished. The Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 represented a demonstration of capabilities—technological and political. Technological capabilities were in the context of the denial of access to advanced technologies that India experienced over the years. The political capability represented the demonstration of political will of the elite to take on the G-7 regime. It is this reassertion of the ability to take independent decisions in face of anticipated sanctions that makes the nuclear test a symbol of a resurgent Third World. It is at that level that both, the Indian and Pakistani tests, demonstrate a commonality of approaches. The Draft outline of Indian Nuclear Doctrine released on 17 August 1999 argued for autonomy in decision making about security for India. It takes the long established Indian line that security is an integral part of India’s developmental process. It expresses concerns about the possible disruption of peace and stability and the consequent need to create a deterrence capability to ensure the pursuit of development. It argued that in the absence of a global nuclear disarmament policy, India’s strategic interests required an effective credible deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability should deterrence fail. It continues to hold on the ‘no first use doctrine’ and the civilian control of nuclear decision-making. The utility of nuclear deterrence (at whatever level) between India and Pakistan may be still
7
unclear. But the Kargil conflict presented a threshold (a ‘glass ceiling’, to borrow from feminist terminology) beyond which the two powers may not be able to escalate their conflict. This threshold, in the form of the Line of Control was adhered to by India and was also imposed by the United States and China on Pakistan. In the short run, one may have to make a distinction between conventional security considerations which include border conflicts and internal security problems on the one hand, and nuclear strategies on the other. Therefore, there is the need to reinitiate the nuclear dialogue of 1985 that sought to create an agreement on not attacking each others’ nuclear installations. This can now be supplemented by a declaration on ‘no-first-use’ policy. Both India and Pakistan would have to stress on the need to develop their peaceful-uses programme for its economic and industrial growth. This may require the two countries to bargain with the developed world for the transfer of advance technology. The threat of sanctions on dual use technologies and the limited room for negotiations make it necessary for India and Pakistan to pool their resources for bargaining with the developed countries.
9.4.4
Dialogue
One must make a specific reference to the various attempts to establish a dialogue between the two countries and discuss their success and failures. India and Pakistan have signed two important treaties after they had fought border wars. The Tashkent Agreement (1966) saw a meeting of Indian prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani president Ayub Khan. The agreement succeeded in freezing the Kashmir dispute but did not resolve the problems. The Simla Agreement (1972) saw an interaction between prime minister Indira Gandhi and foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who eventually went on to become the prime minister of Pakistan. There have been other occasions when the leaders of these two countries have had an opportunity to exchange views. One of these has been on the occasion of SAARC or Non-aligned Movement summit meetings. Such meetings were usually carried on the sidelines of the summits. Perhaps the more well-known recent meetings have been those between prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pakistan premier Nawaz Shariff at Lahore (1999) and Vajpayee’s meeting with General Pervez Musharraf at Agra (2001). The former saw the inauguration of the DelhiLahore Bus service and the signing of Lahore Declaration which reiterated the principle of bilateral approach to Indo-Pak problems, while the latter ended without any significant gains. In 2003 prime minister Vajpayee once again called for a comprehensive dialogue with Pakistan. This initiative saw some forward movement with the exchange of parliamentary delegations and some informal talks that began between the two countries. Both, India and Pakistan share some common post colonial legacies. Both have attempted to address the problems of pluralistic societies and overcome the resistance of feudal tendencies in their efforts at political and economic modernisation. Both have strained their political institutions to accommodate socio-political upheavals. One may argue that the Indian experiment appears to have survived the test of time and that its political institutions have been able to cope with the demands placed on them. On the other hand Pakistan still continues to experiment with its
8
institutions in search of stability.
9.5
INDIA AND OTHER NATIONS OF SOUTH ASIA
9.5.1
Framework
British colonial policies have influenced India’s approach towards the small powers of South Asia. Two important legacies have been carried over in Indian thinking: One, it is the Indian ‘responsibility’ to look after the security needs of the small powers. This ‘responsibility’, in terms of security, is understood in the context of an ‘extended frontier’ or a ‘defence perimetre’ approach. This meant that care would have to be taken to ensure that these countries do not become open to outside intervention. Two, India sought to avoid interference in the internal affairs of these countries except in exceptional circumstances. These circumstances were security considerations as interpreted by India. For example, following the creation of Bangladesh the Indian position has always been that the security and integrity of these states would be of vital national interest to India.
9.5.2
Nepal
Indian policy towards Nepal is determined by the following considerations: (i) the geopolitics of Nepal makes it a landlocked country sandwiched between India and China. Access to Nepal is easier from the Indian side; (ii) historically, both countries have shared a common security perception; (iii) there exists a great deal of cultural affinity between the two countries; Nepal is not only the birth place of Gautam Buddha but is also the only Hindu kingdom in the world. The parameters of bilateral relations came to be defined in the context of two treaties that India and Nepal signed in 1950: The Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the Treaty of Trade and Commerce. The former was a security arrangement that took into account the possible threat of the Chinese from across the border. It provided for a close cooperation between India and Nepal on matters relating to Nepal’s security, thus ensuring that Nepal does not come under the Chinese sphere of influence. The second treaty provided for trade and transit arrangements with Nepal. The terminology of this treaty was subject to several discussions over the years. Since this was a ten year treaty that was to be renewed regularly, the discussions became important. One major change came in the phraseology of the treaty in 1971. The term ‘freedom of transit’ was replaced by ‘right of transit’. Another important change that took place during the Janata Government was the splitting up of this treaty into separate treaties, one for trade and dealing with transit. In 1970s Nepal came forward with a fundamentally new approach to its foreign policy. In a formal announcement in 1975 Nepal proposed the establishment of a Zone of Peace for the region of Nepal. The proposal sought to adhere to the policy of peace, non-alignment and peaceful coexistence. The central purpose of this policy appeared to be the reassertion of Nepal’s sovereignty and its identity that it feared was being submerged by Indian domination. While this proposal still stands as an objective of Nepal’s foreign policy today, India did not accept it. Instead, India favours the entire South Asia as zone of peace. The movement towards restoration of democracy in Nepal began in 1980s. The creation of the new constitution providing for a constitutional monarchy in 1990 was a welcome step in the 9
restoration of democracy. Since 1990 Nepal, like the UK, is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary democracy. The Indian attitude towards Nepal is linked to several factors. One concerns Nepal’s attitude towards China. Nepal has awarded building contracts to Chinese companies close to the borders. Nepal also purchased some armaments from the Chinese. In fact what was of critical concern to India was the reported agreement between China and Nepal for sharing of intelligence. India is also concerned about the open access that Pakistani militant organisations are suspect of getting in Nepal. The highjacking of an Indian Airlines plane from Nepal is just one example of the I.S.I. using Nepal’s territory for terrorism against India. On the part of Nepal, it views India as a dominant neighbour that it would like to balance by making some overtures with China. Nepal has broadly accepted the ‘special relationship’ with India. The strong historical and socio-cultural links ensure that this relationship will continue. However, Nepal is looking for greater economic flexibility from India in its economic/trade related issues.
9.5.3
Bhutan
Bhutan is a small Himalayan Kingdom. It is a sovereign country, though by mutual consent, India is concerned with the security of its small neighbour. Bhutan and India regulate their extremely friendly relations in accordance with the bilateral treaty of 1949. India provides such guidance to Bhutan as the latter may seek in matters of external relations. Both India and Bhutan are the founder members of the SAARC, and seek to promote more meaningful bilateral and multilateral trade relations. The two countries are also closely linked with each other through the policy of non-alignment. Bhutan has been very careful in not taking sides either in the Sino-Indian conflict or in regard to Nepal or Bangladesh. Bhutan had recognised Bangladesh in 1971 even before India did that.
9.5.4
Bangladesh
India had actively participated in the freedom struggle of Bangladesh in the wake of the Pakistani repression of the people of erstwhile East Pakistan in 1971. India also had an interest in ending a ‘two frontier threat’ that East and West Pakistan had posed to it since its independence. The 1972 Indo-Bangladesh Friendship Treaty was an attempt to assert India’s interest in the security and integrity of the new nation. The Treaty stipulated that the two countries would not enter into or participate in military alliances directed against one another. However, the goodwill in IndoBangladesh relations did not stay for long. Between 1972 and 1975, India had a fairly good relationship with Bangladesh. Bangladesh was the largest recipient of the Indian aid. India also concluded various border demarcations that had been pending for long with Pakistan. The agreements involved the incorporation of various Bengali Muslim enclaves into Bangladesh without compensation. Later, in 1982, India agreed to lease the Tin Bhiga corridor to Bangladesh ‘in perpetuity’. But it did not materialise due to Indian Parliament’s refusal to amend the Constitution to lease the Tin Bigha. India’s relations with Bangladesh deteriorated after the killing of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in 1975. There have been three important points of dispute between India and Bangladesh. One concerns the problem over the Farakka Barrage; two is the issue of the New Moore or the Purbasha
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Island and third is the question of the Bangladeshi infiltration from across the borders, especially the Chakma refugees. The construction of the Farakka barrage had started in 1962. The aim of the project was to divert the water from the Ganges to the Hoogly so as to flush out and desilt the Calcutta port. The then government of Pakistan had objected to this as it would have created water scarcity for the area in East Pakistan. In 1972 India and Bangladesh agreed to create a Joint Rivers Commission; however, the talks on the Farakka barrage continued to fail. It was only in 1978 that an agreement was signed between the two countries on the sharing of waters. But it lapsed after five years. Eventually in 1996 a treaty on sharing of Ganga waters was concluded, between India and Bangladesh, for 30 years. It takes care of the needs of water for both the countries during the ‘lean period’. In 1981, the Indian Navy laid claim to the island of New Moore that had been emerging in the mouth of the Ganga delta. This became a bone of contention between the two countries. The island called Talpatty by Bangladesh and Purbasha, by West Bengal is not inhabited. It can be resolved on the basis of the principle of mean line. Bangladesh has also objected to India’s attempts to fence the border to prevent infiltration of Bangladeshis into the North Eastern territories of India. This, besides the flow of the Chakma refugees into India, has created border tensions between the two countries.
9.5.6 Sri Lanka Sri Lanka has both advantages and disadvantages of its geopolitical location. It has the advantage of being an island with a location in an ocean that is of considerable strategic importance. It has also the disadvantage of being a small power in a region that has been facing great power rivalry, added to the fact that there is a dominant neighbour, India. The Indian case is further complicated by the existence of a fairly large Tamil minority in the North and North Eastern region of Sri Lanka that has close links to the Tamil population in India. India has been a supporter of the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace concept that Sri Lanka has sponsored. To India this concept helps to keep this region outside the scope of great power rivalry. Both the countries are members of the Commonwealth, the SAARC and the NAM. Both India and Sri Lanka have had common approaches on such issues as Indonesian independence (1949), Suez crisis (1956) disarmament etc. They have both supported the Zone of Peace proposal and also the attempts to create an Indian Ocean Community in the form of the Indian Ocean Rim land Organisation. At a bilateral level the two countries were able to solve two important issues. In 1964, an agreement was signed about the question of citizenship of Tamil migrants and in 1974, the maritime boundary agreement came into effect. However, it was the Tamil question that continued to create problems on the bilateral relations. In 1981 riots started in the Jaffna province which has a Tamil majority. The initial response from Indians was that of restraint. While India did look at the Tamil agitation with sympathy, it refused to support any demand for a separate statehood of Tamil Eelam. In 1987 India and Sri Lanka signed an agreement of far reaching consequences. India had brokered peace between the Tamils and the Sri Lankan Government and had agreed to send in Peace Keeping forces (IPKF) to implement the agreement. The agreement had provided for autonomy to the Tamil dominated
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regions of North and North East Sri Lanka. However, the internal politics of Sri Lanka and the divisions within the Tamil groups made it impossible to implement the agreement. India was at the receiving end of criticism from both sides. The IPKF also suffered significant casualties. Eventually India withdrew the IPKF in 1990. Today, the Norwegians are playing the role of ‘facilitators’ in the dialogue between the Tamil groups, especially the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the government. By 2003, the Tamils in Sri Lanka appeared to be willing to accept broad autonomy, and give up the demand of Eelam, in the interest of peace in the Island.
9.5.6
Maldives
Maldives is a small republic in the Indian Ocean. Being geographically close to India and Sri Lanka, Maldives is recognised as a South Asian country. It is, like India, a founder member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). It has taken keen interest in promoting regional economic cooperation, has held two highly successful SAARC Summits in its Capital Male, and has taken steps to establish South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). When an attempt was made in 1988, by a group of young military officers, to overthrow the democratically elected government of president Abdul Gayoom in a coup, India immediately rushed its assistance to the Maldives president, and helped defeat the coup attempt. President Gayoom’s civilian government was restored and the Indo-Maldives relations have since been further consolidated. To conclude, the Indian policy towards the smaller powers of South Asia has been more explicitly seen since the Indira Gandhi days. India supports and encourages regional democracies and has sought to tie up its regional primacy through series of regional, and bilateral arrangements, covering a wide range of agreements in the areas of defence, trade and science and technology. Yet difficulties continue to remain in coming to an understanding with India. Divisions and mistrust continues to dominate the region. The commonality of the region leads the small powers to continue to assert their differences so as to regain a sense of identity and independence.
9.6
THE FORMATION OF SAARC
President Zia ur Rehman of Bangladesh visited all the South Asian countries in the late 1970s to advocate the setting up of a regional economic organisation. In November 1980 he sent a ‘Working Paper on Regional Co-operation in South Asia’ to various South Asian countries. Further clarification of the working paper came in a letter from the Bangladesh foreign ministry to the Indian and other South Asian governments. The Bangladesh proposal was clear about the objectives of the forum to be evolved in South Asia. The institutional framework was in conformity to the participating states’ commitment to non-alignment. The proposal exhibited an awareness of the pressing bilateral problems in the region. It therefore sought to take the incrementalist course of action. The areas identified for co-operation were non-political and non-security in nature; they were to include such issues like telecommunications, tourism, agriculture, transport, meteorology, etc. The core issue was the political implications of the proposal. The existing asymmetry of power had to be addressed. There was the need to avoid the possibility of institutionalisation of hegemony by one great power; there was a corresponding need to ensure that the smaller powers did not gang up against the bigger power. It was in fact a historic effort to build a relationship amongst equals. The proposal also did not aim at regionalising bilateral issues. It sought to identify areas of 12
cooperation that were truly regional in character. The key word governing the process was to be mutual benefit. While no rigid time frame was proposed, it was hoped that this proposal would be the nucleus for the beginning of a dialogue on the matter. The decision would obviously be based on consensus. Bangladesh believed that once the climate for trust and cooperation was created, it would be easier to resolve bilateral problems bilaterally, as demonstrated by the ASEAN. The proposal was followed by a series of meetings of the foreign secretaries of the South Asian countries. After an initial reluctance on part of both India and Pakistan, the talks gained progress. Eventually, in 1983, the first meeting of foreign ministers of the South Asian countries was convened at New Delhi. This meeting presented the declaration on South Asian Regional Co-operation (SARC), the signatories being Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The Declaration adequately reflected the concerns expressed during the various meetings of the Foreign Secretaries. The Declaration ignored all issues of bilateral contention between South Asian States as well as problems faced by South Asia as a region. In a sense the Declaration followed the spirit of the Bangladesh Proposal. The objectives kept the boundaries of co-operation to the non-political and non-security field. The declaration accepted the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs and mutual benefit. It specified that all decisions would be taken on the basis of unanimity and that bilateral and contentious issues were to be excluded from deliberations. The SARC declaration followed the Nordic example of co-operation. The basis of co-operation amongst the Nordic countries was threefold: (i) violence of the ‘constitutional’ approach; (ii) understand that the national structure would remain the unalterable political basis for co-operation which would be directed to areas of relatively ‘low’ political content; and (iii) exclusion of areas of ‘high’ political content, such as, national security, from regional co-operation. The SARC declaration was followed up by a continuing dialogue at the level of Foreign Ministers. Finally in 1985, at the first Summit meeting at Dhaka, the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) was created. The SAARC Charter retained all the crucial elements of the SARC Declaration. It kept the new organisation within the non-political and non-security field and retained the incrementalist approach to co-operation. The objectives in the SAARC Charter include: promotion of welfare of people of South Asia and improving their quality of life; accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development; promote and strengthen collective self-reliance; contribute to mutual trust and understanding; promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields and strengthen mutual cooperation. The Charter also sets out the following principles: respect for principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, noninterference in internal affairs and mutual benefit. Such cooperation was not to substitute, but to supplement bilateral and multilateral cooperation and was not to be inconsistent with bilateral and multilateral obligations. The Charter has two important General Provisions that are of significance. One, decisions are to be taken on the basis of unanimity and bilateral and contentious issues are to be excluded from deliberations. The first SAARC Summit was held at Dhaka in 1985. Despite the brief references to some bilateral issues, the Summit kept clear of controversies. There appeared a deliberate effort made
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to ensure that the formation of the SAARC does not come into controversy at its inauguration. The second summit at Bangalore in 1986 sought to continue the efforts at broad based cooperation. Some of the mutual bickering surfaced again. The bilateral issues between India and Pakistan surfaced in indirect references. Indo-Nepal issues also became a matter of debate. On the positive side, the Bangalore Summit decided to establish the permanent secretariat at Kathmandu. The Kathmandu Summit of 1987 took the bold initiative of signing a Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism in South Asia. It was for the first time that a ‘political’ issue had been made the part of SAARC deliberations. These nations pledged to refrain from organising, instigating, and participating in civil strife or terrorist acts in member countries. However, the Convention did not provide for extradition facilities. SAARC also established the South Asian Food Security Reserve and the SAARC Audio Visual Exchange Programme. The Kathmandu Summit also saw the discussion on the possibility of including such issues like money, finance, banking and trade in SAARC deliberations. The fourth summit at Islamabad in 1988 is of particular significance to India as it afforded the opportunity for a direct dialogue between the Indian and the Pakistani Prime Ministers on Pakistani soil. Islamabad Summit suggested the preparation of a regional plan called ‘SAARC 2000’ to provide for basic needs of shelter, education and literacy. The summit took up environmental issues of the ‘green house effect’ for study. It also called for a war against narcotics. Islamabad is known for its action oriented programmes and also because it saw a spread of democratic order in South Asia. The period 1989-90 saw some uncertainty in the process of co-operation in SAARC. The all round interest and enthusiasm that SAARC had been able to generate in the early years was marred by the uncertainty over holding of the fifth summit. Sri Lankan reluctance to hold the summit on account of Indo-Sri Lankan bilateral issues put serious obstacles in the progress of SAARC. Sri Lanka raised the issue of the presence of Indian Peace Keeping Forces as reason for its inability to hold the annual summit. The IPKF, despite having been sent on the invitation of the Sri Lankan government, became a bone of contention. Eventually, the 1989 summit never took place and the fifth summit was then convened at Male in 1990. The Sri Lankan episode appears to have set a kind of a precedent. The subsequent years have seen the cancellation or postponement of annual summits for relatively minor reasons. The Male summit of 1990 took place at the backdrop of an attempted coup in Maldives. India had assisted Maldives in its return to democracy. The major outcome of the Male summit was the signing of the convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. SAARC leaders also decided to initiate a dialogue with the European Union and the ASEAN. The sixth summit was held in Colombo in 1991. The preparations for the summit had witnessed some political bickering. Sri Lanka itself was facing internal political turmoil in the Tamil regions of the north. The uncertainties were further complicated by the lack of consensus on the dates. Eventually the summit came to be held in December 1991. Colombo started the talk on the liberalisation of intra regional trade. The Sri Lankan president, in an interview, stated that his proposal for developing a preferential trading system in South Asia had been accepted. The period from 1991 to 1993 was to eventually see the emergence of trade as the central concern of SAARC. The Seventh SAARC Summit meeting at Dhaka in 1993 reaffirmed the need to liberalise trade as early as possible through a step by step approach. The agreement on SAARC Preferential
14
Trade (SAPTA) was the first step in this direction. A preferential trading arrangement is the first, and perhaps, the mildest form of regional economic integration. The agreement aimed at promoting and sustaining mutual trade and economic cooperation among the states of SAARC through the exchange of various concessions. The New Delhi Summit (tenth, 1995) took this discussion further. The Ninth Summit at Male held in 1997 was concerned about acceleration of economic cooperation in all areas. The leaders noted with satisfaction the progress of SAPTA but stressed upon the need to achieve the goal of free trade by the year 2001. The Indian prime minister Vajpayee announced some major trade concessions at the Tenth SAARC Summit at Colombo in 1998. As a special gesture to SAARC nations, India announced the lifting of import curbs on over 2000 products on a preferential basis. India was also willing to consider bilateral free trade agreements with those countries which were interested in moving faster. In the wake of military coup in Pakistan in October 1999, India refused to attend the next summit. Thus, no summit meeting was held during 1999-2001. Trade relations continued to be addressed at the eleventh summit meeting held at Kathmandu in 2002. But, then again the next Summit meeting proposed for January 2003 at Islamabad could not take place due to India’s reluctance to attend it. Meanwhile, progress was made in the direction of achieving/enhancing free trade (SAFTA) in the SAARC Summit Meeting at Islamabad in early 2004.
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9.7
SUMMARY
South Asia appears to be confronted with several issues that dominate the debate on the emergent order in the region. In a sense these issues run as parallel arguments, yet there is an urgent need to accommodate these issues in the understanding of South Asia. a) The question of hegemony and the legitimacy of the use of force: South Asia has traditionally been analysed within the framework of the regional state system. This approach considered India as a regional hegemony, Pakistan as a bargainer or a partner state, small powers of the region as peripheral dependents and extra regional interests as a fourth constituent. There was an implicit recognition to hegemony and also the use of force to preserve national interest. The Indian actions in Sri Lanka in 1987 and Maldives in 1989 symbolised this legitimacy. The question that is raised today is whether this old model of hegemony is outdated? Or, what is the degree to which hegemony would be acceptable and what form, if any, would it take? b) The issue of bilateralism: The key to the problem of order in South Asia lies in the nature of the relationship that India and Pakistan develop. As two critical powers of the region, they can create or destroy the order and stability in the region. The relationship between these two powers had been dominated by two differing worldviews: India had opposed extraregional intervention and has advocated bilateralism as an approach. Pakistan has, on the other hand, used extra-regional interests to exert pressure on India as a counter to the Indian hegemony and thus has promoted extra-regional participation in the debate on South Asian issues. c) The third dimension is the question of order from the perspective of civil society. This debate revolves around three considerations: One is the breakdown of state centricity through economic considerations; two, is the issue of the evolution of a ‘participatory state’ and three, the question of a common civilisational tie. Civil society is based on the recognition of difference and diversity. Civil Society is not the same thing as liberalism or democracy; modern capitalist economy is also not a guarantee for civil society. But Civil Society makes liberalism and democracy desirable. The argument is in favour of developing a ‘Participatory State’ where segments of society excluded under more hierarchical systems are permitted greater involvement. Public policy is thus to be a product of a dialogue, consultation and negotiation. One consideration also centres around the role of religion, culture, history, etc., on the perceptions of the South Asian elite. Does South Asia have a common civilisational tie? Can we talk of a common social morality of South Asia if ideological/political impediments are lowered and there is free flow of people, information and ideas?
9.8
EXERCISES
1) What are the features of South Asian Regional State System? 2) Discuss the key issues of disputes between India and Pakistan. 3) Highlight the important features of India’s nuclear policy. 4) Write a note on Indo-Nepalese relations. 16
5) What are the irritants in India-Bangladesh relations? 6) Discuss India-Sri Lanka relations with special reference to the people of Tamil origin in the Island Republic. 7)
Describe the main features of SAARC and comment on its prospects.
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UNIT 10 INDIA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA Structure 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9 10.10 10.11 10.12
Introduction Natural Resources Foreign Policy Determinants Contemporary History Japanese Conquests Cold War Era India and ASEAN Trade and Investment BIMSTEC Security Cooperation Summary Exercises
10.1 INTRODUCTION Southeast Asia is comprised of ten countries namely Burma, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. All these countries are members of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Burma (Myanmar) shares a contiguous land and sea frontier with India while Thailand, Indonesia and other countries in the region share common maritime frontiers. Needless to say, that they are India’s close neighbours, with whom its relations date back to time immemorial. The history of the ancient Southeast Asian Kingdoms, i.e. Funan, Champa, Cambodge, Pagan, Dwarabati, Srivijaya and Majapahit indicate India’s intimate cultural ties. The art, architecture, epic and language have had similarities and their origin and growth cannot be understood in proper perspective without understanding their Indian counterparts. Ashoka the Great, had sent his emissaries, Sona and Uttara to spread the gospel of Buddhism in the region of Burma, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia. These nations declared Buddhism as their state religion. The impact of Hinduism still remains as part of their indigenous culture and religion. The ethnic Malays accepted Islam as their religion but the Muslims in Java have not yet disowned their Hindu traditions. Some of them still believe in animism and worship many spirits in different names. Bali remains a Hindu dominated society, and adherents of Buddhism can be found in all parts of the Southeast Asia. Malacca, Sunda and Lombok are the important sea-lanes linking East Asia with the rest of the world. Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand are industrially advanced. Singapore has an effective service sector in the field of finance, airlines, computers and shipping. Mainland Southeast Asia has diverse mountain ranges and rivers running from North to South, and most of them originate in Tibet. The main rivers are Mekong passing through Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. Other rivers are Irrawadi, Chindawin and Salween in Burma, Menam Chao Phraya in Thailand, Song Koi (Red River) and Song Bo (Black Rivers) in Vietnam. These rivers bring rich alluvial deposits regularly to make the land fertile. Most fertile areas created by these rivers are lower
1
Burma, Central Thailand, Tongking and Mekong deltas. Thailand and Vietnam are the largest rice exporting countries in the world. This unit examines various aspects of socio-economic-political features of South-East Asian countries. India’s relations with ASEAN countries are analysed in this Unit.
10.2 NATURAL RESOURCES The Southeast Asian region is richly endowed with natural resources. The region produces 90 per cent of the world’s natural rubber, 50 per cent of tin, 75 per cent of world’s copra, 55 per cent of palm oil and 20 per cent of tungsten. The gold mines are located in the Philippines and Indonesia and rubies in Burma (Myanmar) and Cambodia. Timber and other hard woods are available everywhere in Southeast Asia. Oil deposits are found in Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Burma and South China Sea. The land in Southeast Asia is extremely fertile. Rice, sugarcane, maize, papaya and banana are grown in abundance and the area is an important fishing zone. Soil is mostly alluvial and the climate is tropical. This region is thus richly endowed with fertile nature. The vegetables can be grown even on hilltops.
10.3 FOREIGN POLICY DETERMINANTS India attaches great importance towards pursuing good neighbourly relations with the countries in Southeast Asia. The policy of “Look East” is the strategy of the Indian diplomacy ever since 1991 and its major thrust has been to improve India’s existing ties with the ASEAN region, and promote trade, investment, tourism, science and technology relations. Indian policies are endeavoured to resurrect close historical and cultural ties, which were marred during the colonial period. The Cold War paradigm in the past prevented India to attend various issues in its bilateral relations but the situation changed only after the end of the Cold War. Various initiatives have been taken to rejuvenate our economic, cultural and strategic connections. Total bilateral trade with ASEAN countries has shown increasing trends from 5.98 billion in 1998-99 to 7.98 billion in 2002-03. ASEAN investments which were dismal during the Cold War period, started coming and confidence was displayed on both sides. Various packages for the promotion of tourism were mooted and now it is not limited only to visit Buddhist sites in Bodh Gaya. India is willing to attract investments from the ASEAN region and they have been advocating liberalisation and free trade. ASEAN is trying to reciprocate the Indian gestures. They recognise the importance of India as a great market where they find the existence of middle class people in millions. Besides, they have common historical, religious and security interests. Both of them support the policy of democratisation, liberalisation and free trade. Both are opposed to the rise of fundamentalism and terrorism and both are supporting human rights to be universally respected.
10.4 CONTEMPORARY HISTORY The history of colonisation and de-colonisation of India and Southeast Asia coincided with each other. The European colonial masters scrambled with each other to occupy different parts of India and Southeast Asia. Great Britain colonised India, Burma, Malaya, Sri Lanka, Singapore
2
and Brunei. The Dutch colonised Indonesia and the French occupied present Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as ‘Indo-China’ by the French rulers. Spain and subsequently the US, colonised Philippines and the anti-colonial struggle started after centuries of colonisation. A great chunk of the area in Southeast Asia was considered as part of the Indian subcontinent, which was arbitrarily occupied. Indian people were made to understand that in case of decolonisation, most of the separate areas would rejoin India. Notwithstanding the urge for unity, it was found that India herself was partitioned and lost more territories on Western and Eastern sides as a result of the Mountbatten plan. Together the new country was called Pakistan, which was further formed into two States—Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1971. However, the nationalist leaders understood the importance of a common strategy and struggle for de-colonisation. They supported one another in the crusade for de-colonisation. The Indian National Congress regularly passed resolutions to express solidarity for the support of the freedom struggle in different countries of Southeast Asia. Prominent Indian leaders, and intellectuals, such as Jawaharlal Nehru and Rabindranath Tagore, travelled in the region and spoke about India’s cultural, linguistic and religious ties. On the other hand, Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam), Sukarno (Indonesia), Tunku Abdul Rahman (Malaya) and Bogyoke Aung San (Burma) complemented India and reciprocated the feeling of common solidarity against colonial rulers.
10.5 JAPANESE CONQUESTS The Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia started in the beginning of the Second World War. They occupied Thailand and forced it to sign a military pact in June 1940 and thereafter swiftly moved to Saigon to force the French Governor to permit the use of ports and airports in Indochina. The military action of the Japanese was very meticulous in defeating the British, the Dutch, the American and the French forces in Southeast Asia and gave the slogan of “Asia for the Asians”. The Japanese adopted “the policy of co-prosperity”, and promoted local leaders to govern the country. Thus Sukarno (Indonesia), Phibun Songgram (Thailand), Emmanuel Roxas (the Philippines), Bao Dai (Vietnam), Bogyoke Aung San (Burma) and Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose (India) were groomed to provide leadership to their respective countries. The Indian National Army of Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose had been organised and based in Southeast Asia. Its funding was solely mobilised in Malaya, Singapore, Siam and Burma. The Southeast Asians, with the support of Japan, solidly backed the volunteers and training of the INA. The sympathy and support for the INA volunteers in the Southeast Asia were so deep that none of them were forcibly repatriated even after the defeat of Japan. A large number of INA volunteers from India preferred to stay back in Thailand and Singapore in the postcolonial period. The Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia had exposed the vulnerability of Indian security. The British rulers were alarmed so much that they sent Sir Stafford Cripps to India to find out the constitutional means to grant freedom to India. The Congress Party advocated that the Britishers should “Quit India” without any pre-conditions. They believed that Indian security was interlinked with Southeast Asia and if the latter had fallen, there was every possibility of India meeting the similar fate. The history is a testimony to the fact that when India was colonised, Southeast Asia too was colonised. When Southeast Asia faced Mongol invasion a little earlier, the geopolitical implications on India were substantial. Today if China is assertive of its territorial rights over 3
every nook and corner of the South China Sea, including the Spratlys, it is a matter of concern equally for Southeast Asians and the Indians.
10.6 COLD WAR ERA The end of the Second World War saw the beginning of the Cold War wherein the world was divided into the Western bloc led by the US and the Communist bloc led by the Soviet Union. Greater parts of Southeast Asia were under the influence of the US, which had a substantial military presence in the region. The US had Subic Bay naval base and Clarke air base in the Philippines, Cam Ranh Bay naval base in Vietnam, Sattahip and U-Tapao naval bases in Thailand and several air bases in Thailand and adjoining areas. It was the main destination for military training and the CIA was active in different parts of the Southeast Asia. The US had organised Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO in 1954) and had adopted the policy of containment against communism. It was determined to fight against communist movement in Vietnam and was militarily involved from 1964-75 to crush Communism. It was the main party in Vietnam war and was accused of sabotaging Geneva Accord (1954), and Paris Peace Accord (1973). It was opposed to any solution wherein communists could gain power. India was opposed to the formation of SEATO and the containment drive. It had adopted socialist postures and criticised the American bombing of Vietnam. Although India supported democracy and human rights at the global level, it did not understand the American ethics of fighting communism. Again it was not comfortable with Pakistan, which as a member of SEATO, used the American support in crusade against India. Most of the arms used by Pakistan in its war against India in 1965 and 1971 had been acquired through the US under SEATO arrangements and the US was not ready to address the legitimate concerns of India in the context of impending Indo-Pak war over the independence of Bangladesh. Therefore, India had to sign the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty in 1971. This treaty proved to be a deterrent against US-China support to Pakistan, and solid foundation for India-Soviet cooperation. On the other hand, the US was annoyed to find growing trend for Indo-Soviet relations. It projected India as a satellite of the Soviet Union and constantly worked for isolating India at the global level. As it was influential in the Southeast Asian region, it was substantially successful in isolating India as well as Vietnam. The situation was complicated after the Vietnamese military invasion in Cambodia in 1978. Vietnam overthrew the Khmer Rouge regime and installed a new government led by Heng Samrin. India was one of the few countries, which accorded diplomatic recognition to Vietnamese installed regime in Cambodia. Japan, China, the EU, the US and the ASEAN were critical of the Indian recognition and the United Nations continued to recognise the overthrown Khmer Rouge regime of genocidal Pol Pot. The regional environment was full of polemics and rhetorics against Vietnam, India and the Soviet Union. They were projected as hegemonic powers. On the other hand, although China was a communist country, it was portrayed positively. It was viewed as fighting against hegemonic powers. China utilised this opportunity in its favour by strengthening its naval presence in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean through Burma. It installed military outposts at Coco and Hangii Islands and thus established its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean region. China had never got its foothold in the Indian Ocean, but the political and strategic developments during 1978- 91 helped it to fulfill its strategic objectives. Southeast Asia became fully aware of the 4
Chinese strategies only after the end of the Cold War. They were alarmed, indeed, after the Chinese forces captured Mischief Reef from the Philippines possession in 1992. China further asserted its position by publishing a Chinese map showing the entire group of the Spratlys under its sovereignty, and derecognising the possession of Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and others. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 saw the rise of a new world order in which the preponderance of the US was recognised. The US emphasised the importance of democracy, human rights, free trade and patent laws. Thus new issues emerged and collective regional response was required. The ASEAN subsequently felt the need to cultivate partnership with both Vietnam and India because the global interests of all the third world countries were found to be complementary.
10.7 INDIA AND ASEAN The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was born in 1967 and was aimed at promoting regional trade, investment and joint ventures. It proved to be the nucleus of regional cooperation, was booming and looking for new markets and investment opportunities. It found India and Vietnam complementary, now attracting investment opportunities. It also perceived India and Vietnam complementary for strengthening regional political and security profile. Vietnam had started the process of Doi Moi (Renovation) aimed at liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation. India on the other hand, adopted the policy of economic liberalisation under the stewardship of P V Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh, prime minister and finance minister respectively, in 1991. The new government in India also started initiating the process of liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation. India too announced tax-free incentives for foreign investors. These policies encouraged the ASEAN for further consolidation of its co-operation with India. ASEAN offered sectoral dialogue partnership to India in 1992. Accordingly, four core sectors of co-operation were recognised, namely trade, investment, tourism, science and technology. Sectoral partnership was instrumental in establishing the institutional linkage between India and ASEAN and the partnership proved so useful that the ASEAN upgraded it within two years to full dialogue partnership in 1995. This facilitated the growth of relationship in different areas with economic, security and political implications. India was invited to participate in the post-ministerial conferences of the ASEAN and also in ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the security forum of ASEAN. Subsequently, both India and ASEAN began to talk of a common vision and a shared destiny. ASEAN-India co-operation committee was established to function as a key institutional mechanism to provide substantive content to different sectors of co-operation. ASEAN-India working group was also established to find out the areas for co-operation in science and technology, trade and investment, human resource development and culture. The Joint co-operation committee recognised the Indian expertise in the field of science and technology, especially in biotechnology and IT (Information Technology). Proposals were given to co-operate in food processing, health care, agriculture, engineering, electronics, communication and service sectors. The meeting of the ASEAN-India co-operation committee decided to set up the India- ASEAN fund to develop co-operation in trade, investment, tourism, computer technology, solar energy and environmental protection. This fund was placed at the disposal of ASEAN Secretariat and
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administered by a joint management committee. Joint co-operation committee also agreed to set up an ASEAN-New Delhi committee consisting of the heads of diplomatic missions of the ASEAN countries. The then Indian foreign secretary J.N. Dixit announced the scheme of scholarship and said that each side could offer six post-doctoral fellowships upto six months in the area of science and technology. India and the ASEAN region also started ASEAN lecture series from eminent persons under which prominent ASEAN leaders and intellectuals delivered their lectures in India and vice versa. This has proved useful in the confidence building and objective understanding of the issues in the foreign policy and diplomacy of the ASEAN vis-a-vis dialogue partners.
10.8 TRADE AND INVESTMENT Economic paradigm is the main thrust of co-operation with the ASEAN. India has one billion population of which a major section is comprised of the middle class. As India believed in the socialistic drives and the nationalisation for decades, its relationship with ASEAN was limited. In 1991-92, when India embarked on the policy of liberalisation, the ASEAN group accounted for six per cent of India’s total exports but for ASEAN it was less than 1 per cent of their global trade. This situation started changing in the post-Cold War era. Indian expertise in IT, software development, small and medium enterprises and development of infrastructure, particularly in the area of power generation, transportation and construction were appreciated. Certain areas on the territorial borders of Southeast Asia were planned to be included in the growth areas. These included Andamans and Northeast part of India. Though, these proposals have not been operational so far, the potentials for future cooperation are streamlined. Trade turnover and the growing investments between India and ASEAN display confidence in each other and enhanced scope for closer partnership. India’s trade with Thailand has touched more than $ 1 billion per year. India exports gems, precious stones, cotton and fabric, urea and fertilizers etc. and imports pulses (urad and moong), rubber, synthetic fibre and inorganic chemicals. The two-way trade between India and Malaysia which amounted to $ 772 million in 1994, has also touched billion plus now. India imports palm oil, petroleum, crude rubber and non-ferrous base metals and exports engineering goods, building materials, textile, yarn, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, molasses, fruits and vegetables. India’s trade with Singapore, which accounted for nearly $ 44 million in the past rose to $ 1.5 billion in 1992 and is increasing at the rate of 10 per cent per year. India imports engineering goods, oil rigs, palm oil, organic chemicals, glass and telecommunication equipments and exports textiles, spices, fodders, inorganic chemicals, jute, fruits and vegetables. Trading figures with Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have also shown increasing trends. Burma is also emerging as an important trading partner after the opening of Tamu-Moreh borders. India is supporting a constructive engagement policy vis-à-vis the Burmese military regime and it is treated as an important gateway of trade especially with the ASEAN region. India and Burma signed an MoU on 20 May 2001 agreeing to the maintenance of TamuKalemyo-Kalewa road. Multimode transport projects concerning the upgradation of Sittwe port, navigation on the river Kaladan, and highway development from Kalewa to India-Burma border in Mizoram were other areas of co-operation. Energy related projects including solar, fossil fuel 6
and hydroelectric energy remained items for future co-operation. Bilateral trade figures between India and Burma stood at US $ 7 million, with Indonesia at $ 1,186 million, and with Malaysia $ 1,544 million in 1996-97. The Indian exports to the ASEAN region has been largely in the areas of animal feed, cotton, rice, groundnut, synthetic fibre, machinery and bio-chemicals. There is a great potential for trade in a range of products such as auto parts and components, electronic components, railway equipment, computer and software, synthetic and organics. Indian steel, herbal products, textiles and yarns are in great demand in the region. The bilateral trade with the Indo-Chinese countries is also increasing. In 1997-98, bilateral trade with Cambodia amounted to Rs. 10.3 crores. India donated medicines worth Rs. 5 lakhs for humanitarian assistance and evinced interest in assisting agricultural development. On the other hand, bilateral trade with Laos increased to Rs. 2.9 crores in 1998 compared to Rs. 1.3 crores in 1996. Several Indian companies such as Kirloskar, Tata, BHEL., etc. showed interest in exploring Laotian market. Kirloskar exported irrigation pumps valued at US $ 30 million in 1998. Again bilateral trade with Vietnam registered a marginal increase of 12.5 per cent over the 1996-97 volumes of Rs. 425.2 crores. As far as Indonesia was concerned, bilateral trade amounted to Rs. 4330.3 crores as compared to Rs. 4226.2 crores in 1996-97. However trade with the Philippines showed a downward trend in 1998. India’s export to the Philippines at $ 90 million was down by 31.36 per cent in 1996-97.
10.9 BIMSTEC BIMSTEC is a sub-regional economic grouping involving Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand. This is the first grouping of its kind in which two ASEAN partners have come together with three South Asian Countries for economic cooperation. Established in 1998, this grouping has already identified important areas for cooperation such as communications, infrastructure, energy, trade and investment, tourism and fisheries. Each country has assumed a specific responsibility for coordination and important projects under consideration of the forum have been Asian Highway Link, Asian Railway Network and a Natural Gas Pipeline Grid. Constituted on the Bay of Bengal Rim, BIMSTEC aims at tapping the vast potential of resources, both natural and human in this sub region. BIMSTEC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand Economic Cooperation) is endeavoured to provide an economic forum with both private and public sector participation from member countries to promote a high level exchange of views relating to trade, investment and economic cooperation. The primary emphasis is on the exchange of views on sectors such as textiles and clothing, drugs and pharmaceuticals, gems and jewelleries, horticultural and floricultural products and information technology. Economic and Social Commission for AsiaPolitic (ESCAP) hosted an expert group meeting in March 1998 at Bangkok to promote private sector participation in the BIMSTEC process. There were more than 80 participants at the meeting from all five countries. The meeting urged the private sector to play a key role in enhancing economic cooperation and concluded with a series of general and specific recommendations. A BIMSTEC chamber of commerce and industry was established and decided that there would be annual meetings of BIMSTEC Economic and Trade ministers to follow up on the implementation 7
of economic cooperation initiatives. A BIMSTEC Senior Economic Officials Committee (SEOC) was also established. The responsibilities for the various sectors identified for cooperation were delegated amongst the five countries, as follows: Bangladesh
-
Trade and investment
India
-
Technology
Thailand
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Transport and Communication
Myanmar
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Energy
Sri Lanka
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Tourism and Fisheries.
It is remarkable that the economic ministers agreed that BIMSTEC should aim and strive to develop into a free trade arrangement. The new sub-sectors were added to the aforementioned five sectors for future cooperation and they were the following: i)
Commodities such as rubber, tea, coffee, coconut and spices.
ii)
Automotive industries and parts thereof.
iii) Processed food. BIMSTEC Ministerial meeting in Dacca on 19 December 1998 stated: “We emphasise the need for establishing a BIMSTEC economic forum which will work as an important engine of greater economic cooperation and progress within the BIMSTEC sub-region. We reiterate our resolve to take all necessary steps to making the BIMSTEC economic forum operational for convening at the next ministerial meeting”. It stated further that, “conscious of the important role that can be played by transport and communication linkages in enhancing commercial, industrial, cultural and social interaction and tourism, we reiterate the emphasis that we place on developing rail, road, multi-modal transport, shipping and air-linkages. This would reinforce complementarities arising out of the Bay of Bengal rim identity of BIMSTEC”. The BIMSTEC meeting in Myanmar in December 2001 emphasised the desirability of strengthening linkages among the think tanks of the member countries. They also agreed to explore external financing of Mekong-Ganga Co-operation (MGC), a programme of action involving India and Indo-China states. It was hoped that the flexible nature of the co-operation agenda, ranging from culture and tourism to transport and communication could enable speedy progress. MGC involves India with five ASEAN countries, namely Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam and Thailand. It is endeavoured to build a road linking Thailand to India through Myanmar. MGC wants to go a long way in developing the infrastructure for transnational trade involving India’s northeast border, Myanmar, Mekong region and beyond. Located between India and China, Mekong region is very important for India’s security, peace and trading with East Asian countries. The first India-ASEAN Summit, which took place at Phnom Penh in November 2002, had focused attention on relations with the countries in the Mekong region. Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee on this occasion spoke about the common visions and designs with the ASEAN. India extended $ 10 million credit to Cambodia and signed three agreements in the areas of trade, technical education and maintenance of the 1000-year-old Tam Pram Temple. India also accorded/ granted greater tariff concessions to Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia. It was considered as an important gesture towards the ASEAN. 8
10.10 SECURITY COOPERATION Security cooperation between India and Southeast Asia had started during the Second World War. The Indian National Army of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose had been strongly backed by the Southeast Asians and the INA headquarters were based in Singapore. The INA volunteers infused a sense of patriotism and independence and it had a great appeal in mobilising the people in anti-colonial struggle. The INA had conquered territories near Assam and Megalaya but it had to withdraw after the disappearance of Netaji and the defeat of Japan. Had INA been successful in its objectives, the strategic ties with Southeast Asians would have been impregnable. When India became independent, it signed defence treaties with Burma and Indonesia. Accordingly, the defence forces of Indonesia and Burma were given advanced training in India and it was reciprocated. But defence relations with both Burma and Indonesia were halted in 1957-58 and thereafter they could not be revived due to Cold War paradigm. When ASEAN was born, it was viewed as an anticommunist organisation and therefore India was not ready to associate with the ASEAN activities. The ASEAN countries also did not want to involve India in defence matters. India-ASEAN relationship began to improve only after the end of the Cold War, when the Indian Navy was invited to join in the joint exercises with the ASEAN countries. Southeast Asia has been facing substantial threat to its security and its stability. Security threat in the past was posed by the threat of communist subversion but now the threat of fundamentalism and terrorism are substantial. The external threat they perceive emanates from the northern region. Japan had invaded Southeast Asia during the Second World War and now the threat of China is underlined. China has a presence in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean and its Navy is impregnable compared to the ASEAN states. It is keen to fill up vacuum in case of the American withdrawal and in that endeavour, it has established Naval installations at Pescadores (Pengshu), Pratas (Dongsha), Paracels (Xisha), Spratlys (Nansha), Coco and Hangii. The ASEAN states are afraid of China and willing to strengthen security profile by allowing the United States to retain their bases in the region. Malaysia offered Lumut Naval Dockyard, Thailand offered Sattahip Naval Base and similarly Singapore, Indonesia and Philippines offered strategic facilities to the United States. In this context, ASEAN countries prefer to collaborate with India. Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore also looked for security connections with India. Initially India agreed to give training to the Royal Malaysian airforce pilots on MIG-29 aircraft. The Malaysian Navy showed interest in buying Indian fast petrol craft boats. ASEAN states were ready to share Indian expertise in Marine Commando training, postal surveillance, and anti-piracy operation, weather observation, coastal search and rescue operation, defence of ports and harbours and shallow water mining etc., India also offered to provide coastal surveillance radars and L-70 guns. India took part in UNTAC activities in Cambodia along with the ASEAN countries and the subsequent participation in strengthening defence system in Southeast Asia proved to be effective
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in confidence building. Therefore, India became a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The objective of the ARF has been promotion of confidence building, development of preventive diplomacy mechanism and conflict resolution mechanism. ARF has 24 members in which ASEAN has the leading role. It is mainly aimed at resolving political and security problems. The style of ARF is musyawarah dan Mufakat (consultation and consensus). ARF has promoted track -1 and track –2 diplomacy to resolve regional security problems. Track–1 is conducted at institutional levels such as ARF, ASEAN or individual ASEAN governments but Track –2 aims at mobilising non-governmental organisations, business groups and strategic institutions in the region. In Track2, preventive diplomacy is preferred so that the belligerent is restrained. The principal objective of the ARF as stated earlier was to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on the political and security issues of common interest and concern. India was associated with this organisation so that it could contribute to regional understanding, confidence building, and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific. India has been supporting the regional consensus and constructive engagement policy with Myanmar. It has invited ASEAN for joint exercises in the Andamans and attached importance to China despite border problems. The ARF achievements are not impressive so far. The much talked about transparency in the defence matters has yet to change. Many members of the ARF do not publish defence white papers and those who do so, reveal nothing. At the same time, official defence spending figures are not trusted. The earlier plan to create a regional arms register for conventional arms transfer has remained only on paper. It has done nothing to curb drug trafficking or rapid spread of light weapons to the criminal and rebel groups. Again it failed to take any initiative on the issue of East Timor and the rise of terrorism. The problem of terrorism is substantial in the region and they are of different types. First of all, Southeast Asia is the biggest producer of opium and opium related products. There are connections between drug peddlers and insurgent groups in the Northeastern part of India, comprising Assam, Meghalaya, Arunachal, Nagaland, Manipur and Tripura. The drug peddlers have a network and collusion with politicians, terrorists and police and they supply narcotics inside and outside the region. The American President, Bill Clinton, had highlighted the threat of narco-terrorism before the UN General Assembly by saying that “no one is immune, not the people of Latin America or Southeast Asia, where drug traffickers wielding imported weapons have murdered judges, journalists, police officers and innocent passerby”. Cox Bazar provides an important market for the sale of M-16, different types of Kalashnikovs, Ak47, and Chinese guns. The weapons left by the insurgents during the Vietnam War and the Cambodian civil war are cheaply available through arms dealers in Southeast Asia. The insurgents in the region are in liaison with arms merchants and rebel groups in Aceh, Ambon, Mindanao and West Irian are constantly getting their supplies. This problem has been very chronic, which eludes an effective solution. Islamic terrorist outfits cause the most important and immediate threat to the Southeast Asian security. They are spread in different parts of Southeast Asia and have linkages with the terrorist organisations at the global level. Al Qaeda has supporters in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines and they have their secret cells in Singapore, Bangkok, Jakarta and other areas. Islamic terror groups are striving for Darulah Islamiah Raya (DIR) aimed at the creation of a 10
union of the Malay world. The areas comprising DIR are Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Burma, Mindanao and Patani. They have trained militants and acquired modern weapons. They want to overthrow the existing order and establish Taliban type of regime in the region. Thus unity in diversity (Bhinekka Tunggul Ekka) and Panchshila principles, which were the guiding principles of governance in Indonesia, have been threatened. Brunei and Malaysia are constantly reviewing their policies to cope with the demands of the terrorist groups. Although both Brunei and Malaysia had to declare Islam as the state religion, it was not sufficient to please the terrorists. A new history of terror and bloodshed started in Indonesia on 12 October 2002, when Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) bombed the tourist resort at Bali. This event had international ramifications. In this bombing 190 people died and 300 were injured. Majority of the victims were from Australia, Britain, France, Germany and Sweden. India was alarmed and it was one of the first countries to express its anguish. The American ambassador in Jakarta, Ralph Boyce met president Megawati and told her to wrap up the terrorist cells, block them and demonstrate that they were serious. The US emphasised that Indonesia has been a terrorist haven after the bombing in Bali and ordered 350 Americans connected with the US embassy to leave the country. A terrorist strike took place in a 5-Star hotel in Jakarta in July 2003, killing a number of innocent people in a car bomb explosion. The US denounced the Bali bombing by calling it a despicable act of terror. Abu Bakar Bashir was projected as the main leader of the crime and JI was declared a terrorist organisation. Hence it is a crime to contribute funds to JI. Members of JI were debarred to enter the United States. The terrorist outfits are disliked because of their inhuman attitude. They are propagating Jihad for their adversaries and they kill their fellow Muslims for offering opposite opinion. They do speak of Shariat laws and Islamic ethos for governance but it is theocratic in nature. India is also facing the threat of Islamic terrorism in Kashmir. Over two lakh Kashmiri Pandits have been driven out of their homes and their properties have been usurped. The terrorists are killing innocent people in the valley regularly and the terrorist outfits are strongly backed by Pakistan and some other Islamic countries. The Government of India has been trying to resolve the dispute but the bloodshed and dispute remain as before. However, the experiences in Indonesia show that terrorism thrives even under one religion. Islam, by all means, has been given due importance in Indonesia, but the Islamic terrorist organisations are not ready to recognise this reality. They talk of Darul Islam, or Islamic raya or Al-Qaida. Thus both India and Indonesia are facing similar problems and they have many common ideas to share for conflict resolution and peace making. Other partners in the ASEAN have expressed much concern for political developments in Indonesia especially after the Bali massacre. They have arrived at a consensus to fight terrorism and enlist the cooperation of India to the extent possible.
10.11 SUMMARY India’s relation with Southeast Asia has been deep-rooted and integrated with one another. The Indian influence in Southeast Asia is visible to such an extent that some Indians commit the error of projecting them as Indian territories. 11
India’s relations with Southeast Asia were disturbed during the Cold War period because of three factors. Firstly, it opposed the American policy of containment and the formation of SEATO. Secondly, it expressed its solidarity with the communist forces in Vietnam. It upgraded its diplomatic relations with North Vietnam in 1972 and exchanged ambassadors. But it did not offer the same privilege to South Vietnam. Another issue, which came in the way, was India’s diplomatic recognition to Vietnamese installed regime in Cambodia in 1979. The ASEAN was unhappy with India’s decision. Thirdly, India became friendly with the Soviet Union and Vietnam, which were disliked by the Americans and the pro-American leaders in the Asia-Pacific. The adversarial environment changed only after the end of the Cold War. India became a Sectoral partner of the ASEAN in 1992 and a dialogue partner in 1995. It was thereafter that the relations began to improve. The core sectors that were identified for cooperation are trade, investment, tourism, science and technology, IT, biotechnology and human resources. India is a member of the ARF and thus India and ASEAN are cooperating in security matters. India has been participating in the ASEAN post-ministerial meetings and the ARF meetings and has contributed to confidence building and peace making. When Pokharan-II was conducted in 1998, America, Japan and Australia displayed great anger but some of the ASEAN countries expressed appreciation of India as a nuclear power. India and ASEAN have similar views on the threat of terrorism. They believe that terrorists are inhuman, who have no respect for religion or human ethics. The ASEAN countries have displayed better understanding of India’s problem in Kashmir and the seven states of the Northeast. Unlike during the Cold War period, they are not supporting polemics against India. To conclude, India’s endeavours at conducting good neighbourly relations with Southeast Asia are paying dividends in the economic and strategic terms. This has the support of the Indian Parliament and of all the countries in the region, so that Asia-Pacific might emerge as an important centre for democracy, free trade and globalisation.
10.12 EXERCISES 1. Define Southeast Asia and its geopolitical connections with India. 2. Why did India fail in promoting India-ASEAN ties during the Cold War? 3. Discuss the achievements of India’s dialogue partnership with the ASEAN. 4. Analyse India’s security connections with Southeast Asia in view of its association with the ARF. 5. Examine the prospects of cooperation under BIMSTEC and its achievements. 6. Evaluate the thrust of “Look East” policy and its impact on India.
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UNIT 11 INDIA AND CENTRAL AND WEST ASIA Structure 11.1 Introduction 11.2 Central Asia: A Background 11.2.1 11.2.2 11.2.3 11.2.4
Geographical Setting Economy Polity and Society Geo-Strategic Importance
11.3 India and Central Asia 11.3.1 11.3.2 11.3.3 11.3.4
Historical ties India’s Security Concerns Bilateral Contacts and Visits Economic Cooperation i) Energy ii) Pharmaceuticals and Health Care iii) Other areas of Cooperation iv) Obstacles to Economic cooperation
11.4 West Asia: A Background 11.4.1 11.4.2 11.4.3
History Politics and Society Geo-Strategic Situation
11.5 India and West Asia 11.5.1
11.5.2
India’s Economic and Security Concerns i) Oil Supplies ii) Remittances iii) Religious Extremism iv) Commercial Links and Trade Routes Evolution of India’s Policy i) Palestine Issue ii) Israel iii) Iraq Crisis iv) Iran v) Gulf Cooperation Council
11.6 Summary 11.7 Exercises
11.1 INTRODUCTION Central Asia and West Asia are important regions in the present day world. The two regions together possess more than two thirds of the world’s proven oil reserves and a considerable amount of natural gas, which are vital for the functioning of modern industrial society. Oil imports account for nearly two thirds of India’s oil consumption and more than half of this comes from
1
this region (mainly the Persian Gulf). Hence, this area is crucial for India’s energy supplies. Geographically, the two regions connect the Asian landmass to Europe and Africa and major trade routes crisscross them. Historically, they have been the entry point for people and cultures that have deeply influenced our civilisation and added to its rich tapestry. In recent times, this whole area is considered vulnerable to the rise of religious extremism and terrorism. This has serious implications for India in view of our 130 million Muslim populations and the ongoing militancy in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan’s attempt to increase its influence in these countries adds to our concern. In view of their geographical proximity and historical linkages, the two regions are often referred to as India’s extended neighbourhood. In spite of many commonalties, Central Asia and West Asia are two distinct regions and should be dealt with separately. This Unit examines India’s relations with the two regions in several important aspects.
11.2 CENTRAL ASIA: A BACKGROUND 11.2.1
Geographical Setting
Central Asia mainly consists of the five republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (which will be the focus of the present unit), though geographical contiguity and ethnic\cultural affinities prompt some people to include Afghanistan, Mongolia and the Tibet and Xingjiang provinces of China as well. The above-mentioned five states emerged as independent entities on the international scene as a consequence of the Soviet disintegration in 1991. They have a total area of about 4 million square kilometers, which is considerably larger than India. But their combined population is just 55 million.
11.2.2
Economy
Apart from oil and natural gas, the region has been a major producer and exporter of agricultural products like cotton, wool, meat, animal skins and leather goods. It also has considerable deposits of minerals such as uranium, gold, silver, iron ore, coal, copper, zinc, lead and manganese among others. As part of the Soviet Union, the area witnessed impressive socio-economic progress. But the economic system was centralised and closely linked to the mainland Russia. The disruption of these ties and the emigration of experienced and trained managers, engineers, technicians and other professionals, who were mainly Russians, have created problems. All these countries are transition economies and going through the difficult process of liberalisation and privatisation. They welcome external participation in the region in terms of skilled manpower, technology and investment.
11.2.3
Polity and Society
A strong presidency, with a weak legislature and judiciary, dominates the political systems of all these countries. Press and political opposition are mostly ineffective. Democracy is yet to take roots. All the five states are grappling with the problem of national identities. There are attempts to create new identities based on religion or language. The region has witnessed a general revival of Islam. Except Tajikistan, all other states are Turkic speaking. But these Pan-Islamic and PanTurkic movements are resisted because the present leadership would like to preserve the existing boundaries and the modernity acquired during the Soviet period. The countries of Central Asia went through more than a century of Tsarist Russian and then the Soviet rule. The preservation 2
of their newly acquired independence and territorial boundaries is the foremost priority for each one of them.
11.2.4
Geo-Strategic Importance
Because of its geo-strategic location at the crossroad of Russia, China, West Asia and Europe, and its hydrocarbon and other mineral resources, the region is witnessing an intense rivalry for influence among important global and regional powers, namely, the United States, Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, India and Pakistan. This is often referred to as the “New Great Game”. Lack of an outlet to the sea makes these states vulnerable to intimidation from their neighbours, especially Russia, through which most of the existing trade and transit routes and oil pipelines pass. Search for alternative transit routes to minimise their dependence on Russia induces them to look towards their other neighbours. And the desire to reduce the influence of these neighbours, apart from the need of an economic and technological assistance, persuades these states to welcome the US and other Western powers.
11.3 INDIA AND CENTRAL ASIA 11.3.1 Historical Ties India’s contacts with Central Asia go back to the Indus Valley civilisation, which had links with the ancient civilisation of Turkmenistan. The Aryans, according to one-school of historians, came to India from Central Asia. Buddhism was the dominant creed in the area before the advent of Islam and afterwards its influence can be seen on the Sufi tradition which took roots in Central Asia and percolated back to India. The ancient Silk Route, which connected China with the European markets, passed through this region. India was also linked to this trade route. Many of the ruling dynasties of India, including the Greeks, Shakas, Kushans, Huns and the Mughals, came from or via Central Asia. Central Asian influence can be seen in areas, such as, architecture, music, cuisine and literature. This ceaseless flow of people was interrupted in the 19th century when the British colonised India and the Russians conquered Central Asia. The rivalry between the two empires is generally known as the “Great Game”. After the Russian Revolution of 1917 and India’s independence in 1947, these contacts were partly restored. India was among the very few countries that were allowed by the Soviet Union to have trade and cultural contacts with this area. Indian consulates were opened in Tashkent and Almaty, the capital cities of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan respectively. Indian films and music were very popular throughout Central Asia. India enjoys considerable goodwill among the people of the region, which is reflected in the speeches and the writings of Central Asian leaders and writers alike. This “cultural capital” is India’s natural advantage in dealing with these states.
11.3.2
India’s Security Concerns
After September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States, there are mounting international concerns about religious extremism and global terrorism. Countries in and around Central Asia have been particularly affected by it—India in Kashmir, Russia in Chechnya, China in Xinjiang and Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in the Ferghana valley. Tajikistan endured a long drawn civil war between the government and Islamic militants and the Uzbek president Islam Karimov barely
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escaped an assassination attempt in February 1999. Afghanistan under the Taliban, supported by Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda and Pakistan, was thought to be a safe haven and training ground for these Islamic militants. Hence, the Central Asian States readily joined America’s war against terror. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have offered military bases, and Kazakhstan has given other facilities to the US. The Taliban have been overthrown but the war is far from over. There are reports that they are still strong in some areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan and are trying to regroup. Apart from religious fundamentalism and cross border terrorism, there are other problems, like drugs and arms trafficking, which affect India and Central Asia besides other neighbouring states. India has formed joint working groups on terrorism with a number of countries including the US, Russia, China, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. India’s prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Kazakhstan in June 2002 to take part in the summit of the “Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia”. The signing of the Declaration on “Eliminating Terrorism and Promoting Dialogue among Civilisation” has been a major gain for India.
11.3.3
Bilateral Contacts and Visits
The leaders of the Central Asian Republics visited India within months of their becoming sovereign states. For the Uzbek and Kazakh presidents, it was their first official visit abroad. In fact, president Karimov of Uzbekistan came in 1991 even before the formal declaration of independence and again in January 1994 and May 2000. President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan came in February 1992, again in December 1996, and then in February, 2002. The Kyrgyz president Akaev visited New Delhi in March 1992 and April 1999. President Niyazov of Turkmenistan was in India in April 1992 and February 1997. Because of the Civil war, the prime minister of Tajikistan could come to India only in February 1993, followed by the Tajik president Rakhmanov in December 1995 and in May 2001. The Indian prime minister, Narasimha Rao paid return visits to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in May 1993 and Kyrgyzstan in September 1995. There have been innumerable visits of officials, business and cultural delegations, and scientists and scholars from both sides.
11.3.4
Economic Cooperation
Both India and Central Asia have economic complementarity in terms of resources, manpower and market. India’s main exports to Central Asia have been drugs and pharmaceuticals, tea, machinery and instruments and readymade garments. Major imports from the region are iron and steel, gold and silver, non-ferrous metals and fibres. India can provide its skilled manpower and expertise in fields like banking, insurance, construction, technical education and financial management. Following are the major areas of cooperation. i)
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Energy: India has emerged as the sixth largest energy consumer in the world and according to one study, its energy consumption is growing at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. The country imports nearly two thirds of its petroleum requirements. Central Asia and the Caspian region are emerging as an alternative source for the supply of oil and natural gas. The main oil and gas deposits in Central Asia are found in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The Oil and Natural Gas Commission of India is preparing to participate in the prospecting of oil in Darkhan and Kurmangazi exploration blocks in the periphery of the Caspian Sea in Kazakhstan. India would also bid for a presence in the Asibekmola and Kozhasai natural
gas fields. Turkmenistan, which has considerable gas reserves, is keen to build a gas pipeline through Pakistan to India. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have enormous hydel resources. In Tajikistan, each sq. km. of the territory has up to 2 million KW hours of hydel resources, which is a huge figure. The government of Kyrgyzstan has an ongoing programme to develop small and medium size hydel power stations. The country looks towards India as a future source of finance and technology in this effort and above all as a large market for supply of hydel energy. In the times to come, India will be one of the biggest consumers of energy. In this respect, the idea of creating an Asian energy community has been floated which aims at bringing together the main producers and consumers of oil, gas and energy resources. ii) Pharmaceuticals and Healthcare: Another key area of cooperation between India and Central Asia is pharmaceuticals and healthcare. Mainly due to its efficiency and cost advantage, India has a competitive advantage in the global market in this field. Some of the Indian companies exporting pharmaceutical products to Central Asia are Claris Life sciences, Ranbaxy, Dr Reddys Labs, Lupin Laboratories, Unique Laboratories and Aurobindo Pharma. Some of these companies are planning to set up manufacturing units in Central Asia itself. The pharmaceutical factory of the Kazakh-India joint venture Kazakhstanpharma is in the process of completion in Almaty. iii) Other Areas of Cooperation: Information technology (IT) and technical training are the areas where India can make substantial contribution to the Central Asian states. Already there are agreements in this regard with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. India is building a software technology park in Kazakhstan. A memorandum of understanding has been signed between Kyrgyzstan and the Indian company Edurite Technologies for cooperation in the field of IT education. Under the ITEC programme India has allotted slots to all Central Asian countries for the training of their candidates in selected Indian institutes. Tourism, space-technology, defence cooperation, food and cotton processing, environment, disaster management and telecom are other emerging areas of cooperation. iv) Obstacles to Economic Cooperation: Despite considerable potential, the level of actual trade and investment between the two regions has been very low. The entire Indian exports to Central Asia is less than two per cent of its total exports while the imports account for only 1.5 per cent of the total Indian imports on an average basis. One of the main hindrances in the way of economic cooperation between India and Central Asia has been the non-availability of hard currency and the lack of conversion facility services. To overcome the scarcity of currency India has extended credits to each of the Central Asian states. But it has either not been fully utilised or is considered insufficient. Lack of proper information channels and mechanisms has also been one of the impediments in furthering cooperation. However, absence of direct rail, road or sea link has been the most important obstacle in India’s relations with Central Asia. The existing route through Black Sea is time consuming and costly, though time tested and reliable. The shortest and most economical route for India would be through Iran. Iran has fairly good networks of road and railway, which are directly linked to Central Asia through Turkmenistan. India signed an agreement with these two countries in February 1997 to enable the movement of goods from Indian ports to Bandar Abbas in Iran and then on to 5
the Central Asian regions by road and rail. The route is already in operation. Some problems that have cropped up are likely to be tackled in course of time. Another transit route, which is being discussed these days, is from Ladakh in India through the Xinjiang province of China to Kyrgyzstan. But India does not have a road-link from Ladakh to Xinjiang as yet. To sum up, despite its historical and cultural ties, coupled with common security concerns and considerable potential for economic cooperation, India has not been able to make its presence felt in Central Asia.
11.4 WEST ASIA: A BACKGROUND 11.4.1
History
West Asia is the most volatile and conflict prone region in the world at present. In the past it witnessed the birth of three great religions—Judaism, Christianity and Islam—and some of the greatest civilisations in human history. The region saw high watermark of achievement under the Babylonian and Iranian Empires in the ancient times and the Abbasid and Ottoman Empires in the medieval times. The decline of the Ottoman power during the 19th and early 20th centuries led to an increase in the influence of British, who considered it as the “western flank” in the defence of India. However, with the discovery of oil in Iran at the beginning of the 20th Century, followed by more substantial finds around the Persian Gulf, the region became the focus of interest for the old as well as emerging great powers.
11.4.2
Politics and Society
Although Islam is the religion of majority of the people of West Asia, the region has significant sectarian and ethno-cultural diversity. Broadly speaking, there are four distinct ethno-cultural entities in the region, namely, the Turks, Persians, Arabs and Israelis. The first two account for the states of Turkey and Iran. The Arabs are spread over more than 20 states across West Asia and North Africa. Israel is a Jewish state that came into existence in 1948. While the Shias dominate Iran, the Sunnis are preponderant in all the Arab States, except Iraq and Bahrain, which have Shia majority under Sunni rule. These divisions have led to tension and conflict in the region. There have also been rivalries within the Arab world. After the Second World War, the secular, anti-colonial and pro-Soviet forces led by Nasser’s Egypt and Baathist Syria and Iraq dominated Arab politics. Their defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, coupled with the oil price hike in 1973 strengthened the position of the oil rich conservative Gulf monarchies that were closely allied with the West. The main conflict in the region is on the question of the Arab-Palestinian demand for independent statehood. This is opposed by Israel that accuses them of terrorism. The US is generally considered sympathetic towards Israel. Arab defeat in the1967 and 1973 wars and the failure of IsraelPalestinian negotiations are regarded by many to be the root cause for the rise of terrorism and religious extremism in the region. There are other factors, such as rising population, socio-economic stagnation, and absence of mechanism for popular participation in majority of the states that have led to popular alienation. The dominant US presence in this region (particularly in the Muslim Holy places) has been deeply resented by the people here. This has prompted the US to withdraw its forces from Saudi Arabia. 6
11.4.3
Geo-Strategic Situation
The United States increased its presence after the British withdrawal from the region in 1971. Initially, the US tried to build up Iran under the Shah as the guardian of Western interest. The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 brought a staunchly anti-West regime into power. It was considered a grave threat to the pro-West Gulf monarchies. This, along with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan during the same year, gave a pretext to the US to increase its physical presence in the area. Under the ‘Carter Doctrine,’ the US claimed the right to military intervention. The Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and Central Command (CENTCOM) were strengthened for this purpose. The end of the Cold War and the Soviet disintegration led to an absolute US preponderance in the region. This was clearly manifested during the Kuwait crisis of 1991. The US led forces not only militarily defeated Iraq and expelled it from Kuwait, but also placed it under strict United Nations mandated economic sanctions. Since then Iraq and Iran were considered the main threats to Western interest in the region. This culminated in the second Gulf war and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime as a result of the US-UK military action for regime change, in March-April 2003.
11.5 INDIA AND WEST ASIA West Asia is important for India because of its geographical proximity and historical-cultural affinity, as well as present day security concerns and economic interest.
11.5.1 i)
India’s Economic and Security Concerns
Oil Supplies: Uninterrupted supply of oil at reasonable prices is vital for India’s economic health in view of its heavy dependence on imports from the region. Any conflict in the region, such as the Arab-Israeli war, Iran-Iraq war and Kuwait crisis, is likely to contribute to the disruption of oil supply and/or price hike, imposing additional burden on the Indian economy.
ii) Remittances: There are more than 3.5 million Indian migrant workers in the Gulf region. Their annual remittance is to the tune of a few billion dollars and is among the highest foreign exchange earners for the country. Their well being is a major concern for India. Any tension in the region, or in India’s relations with these countries, may have negative consequences for these migrant workers and also for the Indian economy. iii) Religious Extremism: The ascendancy of conservative religious elements in the region is a cause for grave concern to India in view of its large indigenous Muslim population and the militancy in Kashmir. Pakistan, under the slogan of Pan-Islamism, tries to exploit the situation. It is evidenced by the growing sympathy shown by the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) with Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir issue. iv) Commercial Links and Trade Routes: India has substantial trade with West Asia. The liberalisation of the Indian economy has given further boost to these commercial links. The region accounts for more than 20 per cent of our imports, mainly hydrocarbons, and 10 per cent of our exports, which include wheat, non-basmati rice, textiles, and engineering and manufactured goods. The Indian construction companies have got some contracts in the region and there are ample opportunities in view of the reconstruction work in Iraq. The
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Persian Gulf and Suez Canal are the main waterways through which bulk of India’s trade is carried out. Hence, the safety of these routes is vital for the country. In the age of air travel and transport, West Asia has become an integral link in India’s westbound air service. Iran is emerging as an important transit route in our interaction with Central Asia, as we have already discussed.
11.5.2
Evolution of India’s Policy
After its independence, India under the policy of Non-Alignment extended a hand of friendship to the countries of West Asia that were resisting the Cold War pressure to join rival military bloc. This led to close relations with Nasser’s Egypt and Baathist Iraq (after1968). Incidentally, Pakistan, along with Britain, Turkey, Iran and Iraq, became a member of the US supported Baghdad Pact in 1955 (renamed as CENTO after Iraq withdrew following the Revolution of 1958). India’s consistent support to the Palestinian cause created a favourable image of the country among the Arab States. This, coupled with the historical ties and the vigorous commercial links, has helped India build vibrant relations with almost all the countries of the area. i)
Palestine Issue: India has extended moral and political support for the creation of a viable state of Palestine alongside Israel. India shares the perception that the question of Palestine is at the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict. India became the first non-Arab State to recognise the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” and allowed it to open its office in New Delhi in January 1975. The PLO Office in New Delhi was accorded full diplomatic recognition in March, 1980. India accorded recognition to the State of Palestine in November 1988 and the PLO Office in New Delhi started functioning as the Embassy of the State of Palestine. In the wake of establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), India opened its Representative Office in Gaza on June 25, 1996, for ensuring effective co-ordination with the PNA. India has supported the Middle East Peace Process since its launch with the Madrid Conference in 1991. It has also endorsed all the subsequent peace agreements between Israelis and Palestinians. The Palestinian leadership has been frequent visitors to India. President Yasser Arafat was in New Delhi in August 2001. India has extended financial and technical assistance for development works in Palestine areas. The country offers scholarships to Palestinian students under ICSSR Scheme and slots for training courses under the ITEC Programme.
ii) Israel: Although India had recognised the Jewish State of Israel way back in 1950, it established full diplomatic relations only in 1992. Since then there has been an upswing in the relations between the two countries in view of the common concerns about religious extremism and global terrorism. Israel and India have developed close “cooperation” in intelligencesharing and “counter-insurgency” operations. India has become a major buyer of Israeli armaments. There is a considerable potential for Indo-Israeli cooperation in the field of science and technology, particularly in areas such as dry land farming. There has been a spurt in high level bilateral visits in the recent times. In 1999, the National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra visited Israel and met prime minister Ehud Barak. Home Minister, L K Advani and foreign minister, Jaswant Singh followed him the next year. The Israeli prime minister visited India during the month of September 2003 and both the countries decided to strengthen bilateral relations at the regional and global level to fight terrorism.
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iii) Iraq Crisis: India and Iraq established close political and economic relations during the 1970s and 1980s. Incidentally, both concluded Friendship Treaties with the erstwhile Soviet Union—India in 1971 and Iraq in 1972. At one point of time, Iraq was the source of 30 per cent of India’s oil needs and home to 90,000 Indians working there. It was the only Arab country that consistently supported the Indian position on Kashmir. Indian firms got some of the biggest contracts in the country. Hence, the1991 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait presented a difficult choice for the Indian foreign policy. The consequent oil price hike put serious strain on India’s balance of payments position. India favoured a peaceful political settlement, but ultimately went along with the UN Security Council Resolutions 661 and 678—condemning Iraq and authorising the use of force against it. Throughout the decade after 1991 Gulf War, India has maintained that “unwise and unjust” UN sanctions against Iraq should be lifted and has been sensitive to the suffering of the Iraqis. During the 2003 Iraq crisis also, New Delhi expressed its concern about the US military action because of its likely human and material implications and its possible impact on oil prices. India wanted that any military action should have UN authorisation. Neither supporting the United States nor openly criticising it for its aggression against Iraq, the Indian government has taken a middle path. However, the two Houses of Indian Parliament in unanimous resolutions (April 2003) deplored the military action taken without the UN authorisation. iv) Iran: Geographically, historically and culturally Iran has been closest to India, among the countries of West Asia. India enjoyed friendly relations with Iran during the Shah rule, which weakened after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. During the 1990s, India and Iran (under its reform-oriented and pragmatic leadership) have taken steps to build a multifaceted relationship. There has emerged a large consensus between the two countries on various global and regional issues. Incidentally, India’s perception of Iran is in congruence with the Russian position, which differs with the US characterisation of Iran as a ‘rogue state’ or ‘axis of evil’. Iran is emerging as India’s most viable transit option for trade with Central Asia and even Russia. New Delhi, Moscow and Teheran signed an agreement in St. Petersburg on 12 September 2000 for sending Indian Cargo to Russia via Iran through a ‘North-South Corridor’. There are several bottlenecks yet to be cleared, but once this new corridor becomes fully operational it could boost Indian trade with Central Asia as well as Central Europe. India and Iran have exchanged regular high level visits. India’s prime minister visited Tehran in April 2001 and the Iranian president was in Delhi in January 2003 to enhance their bilateral relations. v) Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): The GCC was formed in May 1981 by the six Gulf monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Bahrain and Oman. It emerged in response to the challenges posed by the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979). These states are conservative Islamic monarchies, and have come under increasing pressures from extremist Islamic groups and terrorists. This has created a common ground between these countries and India. The GCC has also been among India’s top two trading partners. According to the Reserve Bank of India, exports from the GCC to India have increased from US$ 1.5 billion in fiscal year 1987/88 to an estimated US$ 6.0 billion in 1999/2000. India’s exports to the GCC rose from US$ 0.5 billion in 1987/88 to about US$ 3.0 billion in 1999/2000.
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11.6 SUMMARY Central Asia and West Asia have close geographical, historical and cultural links with India. India has vital political, strategic and economic stakes in the region. The area has emerged as an arena of intense rivalry among major global and regional powers. It is also witness to an upsurge in religious extremism and international terrorism. These have serious implications for India’s security. In economic terms India is heavily dependent upon oil imports from this region. Remittances from Indian migrant workers have been an important source of foreign exchange. High consumption levels in the countries of these regions (particularly the Gulf) and India’s growing export in the age of liberalisation and globalisation have created immense opportunities for Indian business and industry. India’s presence and influence in this region would be a crucial step in the direction of becoming a global player.
11.7 EXERCISES 1) Explain the geo-strategic importance of Central Asia. 2) Explain India’s historical ties with Central Asia. 3) Write a short note on India’s policy towards the Palestine issue. 4) Discuss the emerging India-Israel relationship. 5) Comment on India’s response to the Iraq crisis. 6) What is the significance of Iran for India’ relations with Central Asia? 7) Comment on India’s security concerns in Central Asia. 8) What are the major areas of economic cooperation between India and Central Asia? 9) Identify the main obstacles in India’s economic interaction with Central Asia. 10) What are India’s main security and economic concerns in West Asia?
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UNIT 12
INDIA AND LATIN AMERICA-CARIBBEAN (LAC)
Structure 12.1 12.2
Introduction Political and Diplomatic Initiative 12.2.1 12.2.2
12.3
Overview of Indo-Latin American Economic Relations 12.3.1 12.3.2 12.3.3 12.3.4
12.4 12.5
Antecedents of Indo-LAC Relations Cultural Dimension Analysis of Trade and Investment Relations Focus LAC: Meaning, Scope and Evaluation Needed Strategy Implication of Regional Integration for India’s Trade
Summary Exercises
12.1 INTRODUCTION In India’s foreign policy formulation, Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region remained a relatively low priority area for a long time. This is despite the fact that i) India has had no complicating factors to inhibit the development of friendly relations with this region; and ii) India enjoys tremendous amount of goodwill for its art, literature and culture in this region. On its part, Latin America looked more towards Western countries to rejuvenate its economy in the post-war years. Colonial heritage and neo-colonial economic and political interests of USA and UK dominated the regional process of development in the post-war years. However, over the years, the Latin American and Caribbean countries took initiatives to identify themselves with the Third World in terms of their processes of economic and social development. Further, many countries in this region witnessed alternating periods of military and civilian regimes during 1930-80. However, democratic regimes had been restored in most of the countries of the region since early 1980s. Along with India, the Latin American countries also have their membership in various multilateral institutions and regional organisations. These countries also shared many of the socioeconomic and colonial experiences of India. Some of the major countries in the region have gone through the parallel processes in economic development and international outlook. Presently both India and Latin America play an increasingly important role in international as well as regional organisations and have commonality of interests for the welfare of their people in their respective regions.
12.2 POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES Tracing the historical development of Indo-Latin American and Caribbean relations, we may recall that the Spanish/Portuguese navigators who set out for India in their search for Indian riches, reached the Latin American and Caribbean shores by accident. However, this has had a very positive effect to open the trade windows between the two regions nearly 500 years ago.
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Not only the exchange of goods took place in the distant past, there were also exchange of ideas, say for self-reliant community settlements based on the shared experiences of one region to be replicated in another one. Although Latin America got its independence from the colonial powers in the beginning of the 19th Century, it remained as an economic appendage to Britain and the US over a long period. Before India’s independence in 1947, the leaders of both regions had met in Brussels in 1927 at the International Congress against European imperialism. Leading the Indian delegation as representative of the Indian National Congress, Jawaharlal Nehru was aware of the common colonial experiences and the community of interests shared by India and Latin America.
12.2.1
Antecedents of Indo-LAC Relations
In the post-war years, India became the architect of its own foreign policy; in the transition period, India no doubt retained some of the British perceptions and overtures. However, given the exigencies of the evolving world economic and political developments, India started carving its own views on the foreign policy matters in the Cold War era. As far as Latin America is concerned, while Nehru’s visit to this region in 1961 initiated the friendly cooperative dialogue to develop economic, social and political relations, Indira Gandhi’s maiden voyage in 1968 to the lands of Inca, Maya and Aztec civilisations strengthened the relations further between the two regions. At the time of these visits, the LAC region was witnessing important political developments: Cuba’s revolution in 1959 and the resurgence of nationalism; identity with the Third World countries and the launching of various economic integration projects such as Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA), Central American Common Market (CACM) and ANDEAN Community. However, in the aftermath of Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), many Latin American countries began to seek and search appropriate policy alternatives to thwart the hegemonic designs of the USA in the Western hemisphere. For instance in the early 1960s, the crises in Brazil and Mexico made these countries to take initiative in developing their relations with Asia and Africa. Further, since 1960s, the process of the Caribbean decolonisation started and the small republics began to acquire a new identity with the Third World countries. India also began to interact with Latin America in various international fora such as UNCTAD II meeting in Chile in 1968. As a founding member of the Non-Aligned-Movement (NAM), India generated lot of goodwill and attracted many Third World countries to this movement. To begin with, Cuba was a lone member of NAM at Belgrade Summit in 1961. NAM attracted considerable attention of the LAC only in the 1970s largely on account of the fact that the organisation transcended its narrower scope of dealing with issues relating to Cold War tensions and colonialism in Asia and Africa. NAM broadened its scope and it started responding to some of the critical economic problems confronting the entire developing world. As a measure of its popularity, as many as seventeen Latin American countries participated as full members and ten as observers by 1983. Even LAC institutions such as Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean (ECLAC), Latin American Economic System (SELA) and Latin American Energy Development (OLADE) took keen interest in the deliberations of NAM. Successive summits of NAM devoted increasing attention to the issues and problems of Latin America. During the decade of 1970, the world economic crisis of international monetary system, oil price hikes and recessionary conditions, hit severely the non-oil producing developing countries. Many of the Latin-American countries such as Brazil faced unprecedented balance of payments (BOP)
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crisis. It is in these critical circumstances, the South-South cooperation emerged as a new powerful vista to resolve the problems of the developing world including non-oil producing Latin American countries. In this spirit, and on the initiative of NAM, Mexico and Venezuela along with other countries such as Africa, moved a resolution in the UN General Assembly special session in 1974 on the Declaration for the Establishment of New International Economic Order (NIEO), and an action programme on NIEO. Although this period witnessed the emergence of commodity agreements as in case of copper, iron ore and bauxite, some of the Latin American producers and exporters got temporary reprieve to resolve their economic crisis situations. Subsequent to the second oil price hike in 1979-80, the world economy witnessed high interest rates in the Western countries along with deflationary phase and protectionist regimes affecting adversely the debt repayment capacity of heavily indebted Latin American countries. Along with severe debt crisis in the early 1980s, the region witnessed the restoration of democratic regimes such as Argentina (1983), Brazil (1985) and Chile (1990). While, for Latin America, it was a lost decade, India however managed to cross the Rubicon (growth rate of 3.5 per cent during 195080) by recording a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of 5.6 per cent per annum during 1980s. By the beginning of 1980s, India adopted selective bilateralism replacing multilateral approach to strengthen its economic and political relations with major Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. India signed the first formal trade agreement with Argentina in 1981.Restoration of democracy in Argentina (1983) and Brazil (1985) paved way for elected civilian governments in the region. Both India and Brazil have had similar experience in economic development and they have been making efforts to build two-way relations. It may be recalled that both the countries signed two agreements as early as 1968 to deal with issues concerning i) trade and ii) peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However these agreements were further strengthened by establishing Joint Commission, which reviews their progress periodically, and other issues of mutual interest for both countries. The 1988 Treaty on Integration, Cooperation and Development between Argentina and Brazil— long time rivals in Latin America—reflected an attempt at stimulating regional economic development by simultaneously focusing on the broader political and social issues. Significant issues involved were, inter alia, the consolidation of democratic values, respect for human rights, and the reduction of tensions including confidence-building measures in the military strategic area, particularly in the nuclear field between the two major countries. Since 1990s, democratisation, integration and globalisation are the three forces driving Latin America to integrate with the world economy. Democracy has come to stay all over the region firmly and irreversibly. Privatisation has gone in a big way in the region. This region has the highest percentage of countries that have privatised their national telecom systems at 70 per cent compared to 55 per cent for Europe; 46 per cent for Asia-Pacific and 28 per cent for Africa. In case of Venezuela, telecom sector is 100 per cent privatised. The region was able to attract FDI to the tune of $67 billion per annum, on an average, during1997-2001. In the beginning of new millennium, Latin America witnessed a leftist wave gripping many countries. The most significant development was the election of “Lula” of Workers Party as president of 3
Brazil in 2002, followed by Ecuador electing leftist candidate Lucio Gutierrez as president. Venezuela has a leftist president while Chile has a socialist one. Argentina has also tilted towards left with Peronistas. These election results show the disenchantment with market liberalisation and voters demand for greater government attention to social concerns such as income distribution, employment generation and poverty eradication. Further, neo-liberalism has come under scathing attack and sustainability of the existing development model has been questioned seriously. High unemployment, massive cut in social spending and economic stagnation have created social tension that undermine domestic governance and the continuation of economic reforms a difficult proposition. Venezuela witnessed political instability in 2002 and this assumed serious proportions because of the involvement of a large section of the population including the entire opposition. Thus some analysts argue that if the last decade of the 20th century could be termed as a decade of economic reforms, the first decade of this century is going to be decade of political and social reforms. However, the contrary view is that this was because of economic liberalisation that the continent could extricate itself from the serious traumatic situation of 1980s and could revert to the growth trajectory in 1990s. One glaring example is of massive FDI, which major Latin American countries could attract, and the region as a whole maintained a high export growth rate during 1990s. In the field of environment, the Rio Conference of 1992 reminded the world community of the limited resources and the imperatives of sustainable development in the future. The new conceptual legitimacy to the question of development emanated from the global issue perspective rather than confining to the regional focus, particularly to Latin America. Ever since the Brazilian government signed Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1998, Argentina and Brazil are no longer considered ‘threshold states’ at the global level.
12.2.2
Cultural Dimension
India enjoys considerable goodwill in the LAC region. The Indian philosophy, yoga and teachings of Gandhi have had an indelible imprint in the minds of many Latinos in the region. The Indian spiritualism and yoga have acquired preeminence with thousands of professionals, and businessmen. They have developed respect and admiration for Indian culture and values. Across Latin America, there are thousands of followers of Sai Baba, Brahma Kumaris, Hare Krishna sectarian religious movements and dozens of other spiritual gurus of India. Some of these followers make pilgrimage to India in groups from time to time. Not only this, they have also started taking keen interest in the Ayurvedic and natural products of India. Gandhi and his practice of non-violence have generated renewed interest among academics, political opposition leaders and NGOs in the region. These countries have named more than 500 institutions, schools, libraries, streets and squares after India and its leaders. Gandhi’s busts and statues have been installed at important places in various countries of the region. More recently, the University of Londrina in Brazil unveiled the bust of Gandhi, which was gifted by the ICCR to the Centre for Afro-Asian Studies of the same University. At the institutional level, India has entered into cultural agreements and cultural exchange programmes with 14 countries of the region. Indian artists and academics have been sponsored by ICCR. Another important aspect of India’s cultural relations with the Caribbean region is that some of these countries have sizeable Indian ethnic community. Not only they have high regard for their cultural heritage but they also
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continue to celebrate festivals like Diwali, Holi and Eid with great gusto. Technical assistance under the ITEC programme for students, academics and technical personnel for training and study tours in India is another important mechanism by which it forges mutually beneficial relations with these countries. An important component of India’s bilateral relations has been the mechanism of bilateral consultations at the foreign ministry level. Over the years, India had signed MoUs on this subject with ten countries from the region and a few more are under consideration. The regular reviewing of bilateral relations has facilitated a better understanding of the potentials and concerns of the dialogue partners and led to improved coordination on multilateral issues of mutual interest. Various official visits and the technical assistance have complemented the Foreign Office level consultations. In the economic and trade arenas, there has been growing interaction at the private sector level giving depth to the bilateral relationship. Economic liberalisation and consolidation of democracy in the face of globalisation forces became the mantra of Latin American countries in the decade of 1990. India also initiated sweeping economic reforms in 1991. With the liberalisation of many economies in the region, there is a growing interaction both at the public and private sector levels. While India has signed trade and economic cooperation agreements with seven countries of the region and set up business councils with some others, a number of accords have also been signed between the private sector and apex trade and industrial bodies of the region. In this regard, The Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report of 1999-2000 focused strongly on the aspects of economic relations between the two sides. As stated in the Report “The thrust of our policy towards the Latin America and Caribbean region is to strengthen and widen the already existing relationship and to give more economic content to it”
12.3 OVERVIEW OF INDO-LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS India’s economic relations with the Latin American and Caribbean countries cover a wide spectrum of linkages—trade, investment, science and technology and institution while economic liberalisation has unfolded many opportunities to strengthen these linkages between the two regions. Thanks to the worldwide competition, they have to create a niche in each other’s market. Further, with the onset of globalisation, there has been increasing role of private sector on both sides in trade and investment areas. Innovative institutional mechanism such as Focus-LAC programme of the Ministry of Commerce of the Indian government have been conceived and implemented with a view to further involve Indian Export Promotion Councils (EPCs), trade and industry bodies to cement the economic links between the two regions. The present section will briefly review the performance and progress of trade-investment relations between the two regions.
12.3.1
Analysis of Trade and Investment Relations
India’s trade with the Latin American and Caribbean countries (LAC), during 1990s and beginning of the new millennium presents many interesting as well as disquieting features. India’s overall trade (exports plus imports) with LAC rose from $ 473.7 million in 1991-92 to $1138.60 million in 1994-95; $1280.25 million in 1997-98 and $ 1705.8 million in 2000-01. While India’s total
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exports to the region went up from $ 124.0 million in 1991-92 to $981.8 million in 2000-01 (nearly eight times) its imports slightly more than doubled i.e. $ 724.0 million in 2000-01 compared to 348.3 million in 1991-92. Unfortunately, during the decade of 1990s, India continued to maintain trade deficit with this region. At the beginning of the new century i.e., in 2000-01, India could achieve trade surplus of $ 257.8 million. Viewed in terms of Latin American and Caribbean total trade, it accounts for about 5 per cent of the world trade. India’s share of the region’s imports remains very low, although its target is to reach at least 1 per cent of the total imports of LAC in the near future. This may not be difficult since India’s share of the Brazilian imports crossed 1.2 per cent in 2002. Another noteworthy feature of India’s trade with LAC is revealed in its concentration of trade with select countries of the region. For example, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are major trade partners of India, accounting for more than 90 per cent of India’s imports from the region and constituting around 84 per cent of India’s exports to the region. India’s trade gap with this region arises primarily on account of its trade concentration in a few countries; its potential for expanding trade with the rest of Latin America and Caribbean nations has remained untapped, till as late as 1990s. It is also important to recognise that, at the turn of the new millennium, Chile and Venezuela have emerged the major suppliers to India, although their imports from India show marginal increase. It is also important to know the composition of India’s export basket to these countries. Unlike the past, major items of India’s exports to this region include bulk drugs, pharmaceuticals and vaccines, chemicals; equipment and machinery for printing, packaging, plastic and rubber industries; hospital and medical equipments and suppliers; hand tools and machine tools; diesel engines, pumps and bearings, automobile parts and electronic parts and components, construction machinery and materials; Optic fibres, readymade garments, computer software, electrical items, leather goods, plastic items, handicrafts, spices, essential oils and Ayurvedic and herbal products. Apart from these items, recent market surveys suggest that there is considerable scope for export of defence equipments, boilers, turbines and various types of inputs for sectors such as telecom, railroad, and water and sewage systems. India’s major imports from LAC are petroleum, minerals, metals, agro products, leather, steel products, auto parts, timber, paper pulp, raw wool, precious and semi-precious stones. Venezuela and Mexico have started supplying oil to India since 2000. One of the prospective items of import identified recently is ‘orimulsion’ as boiler fuel from Venezuela for the use of power generation stations and fertilizer plants in India. India faces competition from the Latin American countries in respect of the following commodities in third country markets: wheat (Argentina); tobacco (Brazil); spices (Guatemala, Brazil and Mexico); cashewnuts (Brazil); oil meals (Argentina and Brazil); sugar (Cuba and Brazil). There is a need for working out a common strategy in third country markets in respect of these commodities between the two regions. As far as investment and joint ventures are concerned, there is a considerable scope for joint ventures in pharmaceuticals, chemicals, engineering products, software, petroleum and mining. Bajaj scooters, Ranbaxy, RITES, ONGC are well known names in these countries to invest and
6
start joint ventures. The Non-Residents of India have invested $1.6 billion in Mexico in some 55 joint ventures and ISPAT group is the leading investor. Both Argentine and Brazilian firms have set up some joint ventures in India.
12.3.2
Focus LAC: Meaning, Scope and Evaluation
The Ministry of Commerce initiated regional focus by launching Focus LAC in 1997 for the Latin American region. The obvious reason for the choice of this region was that they have stabilised politically and their economies started firming up. The Indian assessment was that the multinational companies mostly serviced this region. They provided these goods and services to the region mostly by procuring products from countries like India. India’s share in their trade, thus, was insignificant, but to a large extent the economies on both sides were complementary. Some of the major components of Focus LAC have been as follows: macro analysis of imports and exports of the different countries of region to identify important countries and analysis of bilateral trade agreement between countries; dissemination of information about LAC markets in India and about Indian capabilities and LAC markets through conferences, trade fairs and visits of delegations; integration of activities of different Export Promotion Councils (EPCs) with the Ministry of Commerce to make Indian presence felt in each of the selected markets; special measures include separate fund for market development ,special arrangement for banking and line of credit and rating for insurance; identification of countries to Professional Trade Arrangements for promoting investment; inviting buyers from LAC to India and support for learning languages of LAC by exporters and their staff. Under Focus LAC programme, the share of the Indian exports to LAC in total has gone up from 1.43 per cent in 1996-97 to 2.21 per cent in 2000-01 .The value of these exports jumped from $478 million to approximately $1 billion during the same period. As a follow up to the Focus LAC programme, participation by EPCs and Business houses in international exhibitions in that region have helped dissemination of valuable information on Indian tradable and technological advancements. Concerted efforts have been made to overcome the barriers of distance and languages.
12.3.3
Needed Strategy
Latin America is a market of 508 million people with a GDP of $1.6 trillion and per capita income of US$ 3300. World Bank has rated majority of the Latin American countries as upper middle economies. Latin America is a fast-growing market. Its imports increased three times from $113 billion in 1991 to $332 billion in 2002.Its share of world imports went up from 3.7 per cent in 1990 to 6.1 per cent in 2001.The pharmaceutical market of the top seven countries of Latin America is expected to reach total sales level of $29 billion in 2005 from $20 billion in 2000. Brazil and Mexico, the biggest markets, offer different platforms for entry in the region and they have become part of the global value chain for the Multinational Corporations. Integration has become an important driving force of the Latin American markets. All the countries are part of one or the other trade blocs or are signing Free Trade Agreements with the other countries and blocs. Mercosur remains a symbol of a new South American presence in the post-Cold War era. Both Mercosur and Andean Community are negotiating to form South American Free Trade Area by
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December 2003. The 15 member Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is working towards the achievement of Caribbean Single Market and Economy by 2005. USA and Chile finalised a free trade agreement (FTA) in December 2002 and the former has initiated negotiations for FTA with CACM to be concluded by December 2003. Mexico has largest number of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with 32 countries, having market access. Above all, the US sponsored Free Trade Area of Americas is being negotiated and is likely to be concluded by December 2003. India need not worry about the adverse impact of the regional integration on its exports to Latin America. The ‘trade diversion’ is compensated by the ‘trade creation’ which has enhanced the scope for India’s exports. In any case, the intra – Latin American trade is under 20 percent and it is a fact that external trade has increased significantly despite regional integration. Our exports to Latin America have increased eleven times from $124 million in 1991-92 to $ 1.45 billion in 2002-02. Exports to Brazil increased from $12 million in 1992 to $573 million in 2002. In the case of Colombia, our exports increased from one million dollars in 1992 to $ 73 million in 2001. India’s target is to get a one percent share of the total imports of Latin America. It has already achieved this in the case of Brazil in 2002. Its share is 1.2 percent of the total imports of $ 47.2 billion of Brazil. If it can achieve this in the most challenging market, it can surely do so in other countries of Latin America .The enhancement of India’s image by its achievements in Information Technology (IT) and the successful entry of Indian pharmaceuticals into Latin America have made the job of marketing of other products easier. The Indian exporters should have a four-pronged marketing strategy for Latin America towards i) Mercosur ii) Andean Community, iii) Mexico iv) Central America and Caribbean. The Indian exporters need to focus more on Mexico, the largest trading nation of Latin America, whose total imports were over $170 billion in 2001. Indian exporters should also draw inspiration from the Chinese whose exports to Latin America presently exceed ten billion dollars and their investment of over one billion US dollars. Their exports to Uruguay (which is considered as a small market!) in 2000 were $243 million and their exports to Mexico in 2002 were $ 6.2 billion. The Government of India should pursue preferential trade agreements with the key countries such as Brazil and Mexico as well as with Mercosur and Andean Community.
12.3.4
Implication of Regional Integration for India’s Trade
Indian exporters are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the supplier countries from within trade blocs/ FTAs. For example, Indian exports of rice to Brazil become less competitive vis-a-vis Uruguay whose rice goes duty-free. The Indian government has recently initiated negotiations with Colombia and Venezuela for FTAs and further plan for Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTAs) negotiations with Chile, Mexico, Brazil and Uruguay. Apart from this, the institutional cooperation agreements with Mercosur and Andean Community are on the anvil.
12.4 SUMMARY In the present phase of globalisation, foreign policy formulation is being dictated more by pragmatism rather than ideology. India’s low priority for Latin American region has had both political and economic consequences. However since 1990s, considerable efforts have been made to strengthen these relations for the mutual benefit of both the regions. Priority for Indian foreign policy has
8
been to increase the level of interaction through the strengthening of institutional mechanisms for improvement in the Indo-LAC relations. While bilateralism replaced multilateral approach, it will be better if the middle level countries are given more attention in the future strategy.
12.5 EXERCISES 1) Discuss briefly the antecedents of Indo-LAC relations in the post-war years. 2) Explain the significance of economic factors in the relationship between India and Latin America. 3) Elaborate the needed strategy to expand India’s relations with the middle level countries of Latin America.
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UNIT 13 INDIA-AFRICA RELATIONS Structure 13.1 Introduction 13.2 Historical backdrop to India-Africa Relations 13.2.1 13.2.2 13.2.3 13.2.4
Gandhi’s Role in South Africa Concern for Worldwide Liberation Fortifying Humanitarian Considerations: 1947-64 Non-Aligned Movement and India-Africa Relations
13.3 India-Africa Economic Cooperation in the New Millennium 13.3.1 13.3.2
India’s trade with Africa India’s imports from Africa
13.4 India-South Africa Relations 13.4.1
13.4.2 13.4.3 13.4.4 13.4.5
Areas of Cooperation 13.4.1.1 Economic Cooperation 13.4.1.2 Defence Cooperation Exchange of Visits Training in Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Areas of Discord
13.5 Summary 13.6 Exercises
13.1 INTRODUCTION People of India have always felt certain sympathy for Africa, for the dreams and aspirations of its peoples, respect for the often forgotten fact that Africa is a cradle of human civilisation, a desire to participate in all of Africa’s struggles—against colonialism, apartheid, against poverty and disease. Both India and the countries of Africa have a shared historical experience, both have had common goals and visions, both have fought for noble common causes, have suffered for similar aims, and both have triumphed over similar odds. Both India and Africa have now embarked together upon a journey towards economic emancipation. In the international arena both India and Africa have common interest in building a new world order which will be more responsive to the aspirations of the developing countries. The continent of Africa, embracing one fifth of the world’s land area, encompassing fifty-four independent nations and sustaining a population of about 510 million, has for many decades been a pre-eminent concern of India’s foreign policy. Africa is also home to quite a few expatriate Indians. Africa, which accounts for nearly half the membership of the Non-Aligned Movement and onethird of the United Nations, with vast human and natural resources and enormous economic potential, occupies a prominent place in India’s foreign policy and diplomacy, more particularly in the context of South-South cooperation. India-Africa cooperation at various levels dates back to centuries. Africa being a close neighbour across the Indian Ocean attracted Indian settlers 1
even before the Christian era. Over the last few decades, India and Africa have been close allies in the struggle against colonialism and racial discrimination and have been privileged partners in the growth and evolution of the Non- Aligned Movement. The two regions have undergone similar kind of socio-political and economic transformations, including the liberalisation of their economies. As members of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth, G-15 and the newly formed Indian Ocean Rim initiative, India and Africa share common views on most international issues. The regions share a common commitment to the ideals of peace, non-alignment and economic justice.
13.2 HISTORICAL BACKDROP TO INDIA-AFRICA RELATIONS India’s relations with the countries of Africa, going back to the Vedic period, are evidenced by a parallelism between the Egyptian thought and Vedic ideology embodied in the scriptures. Both Egyptians and Hindus adopted the varnashrama system (the division of the castes on the principle of nature of works) on more or less the same basis, of learned (Brahmins), warriors, traders and agriculturists. Even the religious symbols found on the shores of the Ganges and Nile are similar. In both countries, the lotus flower symbolises the sun. Symbols of the immortality of the soul are also found in both countries. Regular trade relations existed between India and Egypt in the eighth century BC. During the second century BC Abyssinian and Somali traders took from India ebony, cotton goods and silk cloth in which Egyptian mummies were wrapped. During AD 100 Christianity came to North Africa. During AD 1503-08 cotton goods and silk products were exported from ports of Gujarat and Bengal to Berber and Ethiopia. In 1657, Emperor Aurangzeb of India received an emissary sent by the King of Abyssinia. During 1692-93 there was considerable increase in Ethiopia’s trade with India. In 1860 the Indian government made owning or trading in slaves a penal offence. Indian indentured labourers were brought to Natal sugar plantations. In 1880 the telegraphic line between India and Zanzibar was completed. In 1882, the Indian navy undertook submarine operations for the removal of obstructions in the Suez Canal. In April 1893, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi reached South Africa to represent a client in commercial transaction but on being subjected to racial indignities, decided to remain to defend the rights of his compatriots. Gandhi took up the cause of Natal Indians and founded the Natal Indian Congress. In 1895, building of Kenya-Uganda Railway began. Inauguration of the railways encouraged the immigration of “passenger” Indians who fanned out as shopkeepers and construction workers. In 1906, Gandhi led Satyagraha or passive resistance campaign against the press laws in Transversal. In 1907, Gandhi launched his passive resistance campaign in order to halt the erosion of the rights of Indians in South Africa. In 1909, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, then president of the Indian National Congress, organised a South African Passive Resistance Relief Fund. In 1912, Gokhale undertook a personal tour of investigation in South Africa. During this period, the agency for recruitment of indentured labour in Bombay was terminated. In 1914, the Gandhi-Smuts 2
agreement was concluded. In 1926, the South African National Congress and the INC held a round table conference. This conference resulted in the Cape Town Agreement, which recognised Indians as potentially equal citizens. In 1932, Kunwar Maharaj Singh was appointed as the agent of the Government of India in South Africa. Independent India’s Africa policy could be traced back to the beginning of the recruitment of Indian indentured labour for the whites-owned mines and plantations in South Africa. For the sake of convenience it can be divided in four phases as follows: 1) Gandhi’s Role in South Africa 2) Concern for Worldwide Liberation 3) Fortifying Humanitarian Considerations: 1947-64 4) Non-Alignment Movement and India-Africa Relations
13.2.1
Gandhi’s Role in South Africa
The first indentured labour from India arrived in Natal in 1860, and that marked the beginning of an extensive Indian settlement in the interior region of the southern and eastern seaboard of Africa. Indians went under the immigration arrangements designed under various agreements between the British colonial government of India and the colonial administration of the British southern and eastern African colonies. The restrictions imposed on the Indian immigration and the social system that developed on racial lines soon emerged as a highly contentious issue. By the time Gandhi arrived in South Africa in 1893, simmering discontent and resentment was widespread among the Indian immigrants there. He soon experienced the humiliating discrimination himself and sensed the need for organised protest. Soon, thereafter, Gandhi assumed the leadership of the Indians’ struggle for equality. Meanwhile, he founded a newspaper, Indian Opinion, and systematically corresponded with sympathetic leaders both in Britain and India for the redress of grievances of Indians in South Africa. During his visit to India in 1901, Gandhi addressed the Indian National Congress, Indian Chamber of Commerce and other interested organisations to rouse Indian sympathy for their brethren in South Africa. In 1907, he successfully demonstrated that the British Government had turned a deaf ear to their protests though blatant racial discrimination prevailed in South Africa. It was such a situation that gave birth to Gandhi’s heroic Satyagraha movement and he carried out the movement in South Africa for six years (1907-13) and demonstrated that it could be a powerful weapon for use by the oppressed peoples of the world who were initially non-entities, politically subjugated and economically insignificant. This period therefore could be viewed as the first phase in the evolution of India’s policy towards Africa. By then, India had awakened to the plight of its nationals abroad not only in South Africa but also in East Africa.
13.2.2
Concern for Worldwide Liberation
The second phase of relations between India and Africa belongs to the period 1914-47. Whereas in the earlier period the Indian interest in Africa was mainly concerned with the problems of the
3
Indians in Africa—a purely nationalistic concern—the next phase was marked by wider considerations. The worldwide “liberation” factor since then guided the course of freedom struggle. The Indian agitation for equality in East Africa was intensified after the First World War. The East Africa Indian National Congress was formed in 1918. The Indians of East Africa soon realised, under the guidance of Indian leadership, that they too must underscore the significance of “native” interests and native welfare. Srinivasa Sastri, a member of the British Indian Legislative Council, at the instance of C.F. Andrews – a British missionary and educator, and Gandhi, impressed upon the Indian community that India was not interested in having a colony in German East Africa; that India stood for freedom of all the people of the world; that, what the Indians in East Africa demanded should be related to equality of status of all races before law. Meanwhile, ties between India and Africa were strengthened by the same nationalist upsurge. After 1915, Gandhi had emerged as a symbol of liberation of oppressed peoples everywhere in the world and especially of those in Africa. He was as much a Mahatma to the Africans as to Indians. As early as 1919, he was described as “Gandhi the Great of the whole of Africa”. In later years, many African leaders visited him to seek his guidance and inspiration.
13.2.3
Fortifying Humanitarian Considerations, 1947-64
In 1927, Nehru attended the Brussels Congress of Oppressed Peoples where he met nationalist leaders from several other countries. That year the Indian National Congress, for the first time, passed a resolution that categorically denounced the retention of colonies. In 1929, Nehru urged the Congress to have a comprehensive foreign policy. “India could ignore the rest of the world only at its own peril,” he declared. He further argued that the freedom of other oppressed people of the world depended to a degree on India’s gaining independence. In the 1936 session of the Indian National Congress he declared: “We are fighting not for the cause of India alone but of humanity as well. India freed means humanity saved.” By the time of India’s independence in 1947, India’s relations with Africa were thus related to two dominant factors. Beginning with the Indian leaders’ concern for the welfare of Indians in South and East Africa [1860-1914] and Gandhi’s and Sastri’s thinking on issues like African paramountcy, Nehru was alive to such issues and added to these was his sincere concern for the total liberation of Africa. Independent India’s direct interest in African affairs could thus be traced as far back as 1948. Apasaheb Pant – India’s Commissioner General in Kenya and representative to the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa in 1948—expressed in no uncertain terms India’s deep concern for African liberation and its call on the Indian community to make no mistake in joining the Africans in their freedom struggle. In 1952, the All India Congress Committee passed a resolution on South Africa. In the first resolution it called for the removal of all remaining forms of colonialism from Asia and Africa; and in the second, it called on Indians in Africa to underscore African interests, and went on to urge on both communities to cooperate in non-violence. In 1953, the Congress again denounced colonialism in all its forms and spoke of Satyagraha as a major means to seek social equality and end of apartheid system in South Africa. The Central African Federation, which was formed in 1953, was denounced as a new form of colonialism. The Mau Mau Movement in Kenya was recognised as a liberation struggle, although India 4
pleaded for the use of non-violent means in the struggle. The Indian government also welcomed self-government in Nigeria and the Gold Coast (Ghana). Thus, the Indian National Congress demonstrated a definite “humanitarian” interest in Africa. It was far different from the earlier nationalistic outlook. It was again during these years that the Nehru Government neatly laid out the postulates of India’s Africa policy, and worked out the modalities of its role in the Africans’ struggle for independence. India denounced all forms of colonialism, including the one as pronounced under Britain’s “multiracial” Federation in Central Africa. At the same time, India turned its attention to country specific relations with the emerging nationstates of Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanganyika, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. In 1956, in the wake of the Suez crisis when many Indians were in favour of India’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth, Nehru argued that, from within the Commonwealth, India could better serve the cause of the newly emerging African nations. In 1960, Nehru, while addressing the AICC again urged the Indians in Africa to refrain from exploiting “the people of the soil.”
13.2.4
Non-Aligned Movement and India-Africa Relations
The emergence of Non-Aligned Movement during the post-World War II period became an important factor in bringing India and the countries of Africa closer. The first Afro-Asian Conference, popularly known as Bandung Conference (1955), which laid the foundation of the Non-Aligned Movement, made Nehru and Nasser intimate friends. Later President Tito of Yugoslavia joined them and then supported by Sukarno and Kwame Nkrumah, they paved the way for the first NAM summit in Belgrade. Prior to Bandung, Nehru had stated in the first Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi in 1947: Asia stretches out her hand in friendship to Europe and America as well as to suffering brethren in Africa. We of Asia have a special responsibility to the people of Africa. The freedom that we envisage is not to be confined to this nation or that or to a particular people but must spread out over the whole human race. India in the first Non-Aligned summit welcomed the liberation movements of several African colonies but frankly discouraged the Afro-Asian military action against colonialism. India continued to persuade France to grant freedom to Algeria, and Britain to Cyprus. India criticised Portugal for its indifference towards the freedom of its dependent peoples. The remarks made by Prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri in the second NAM conference in Cairo in September 1964, attracted all African leaders. Clasping his hand at the airport, Nasser requested Lal Bahadur Shastri to keep in touch. At the third NAM conference, held at Lusaka in 1970, prime minister Mrs. Gandhi was given a red carpet welcome. Breaking protocol, president Kaunda came to the airport to receive the Indian prime minister, who was elected one of the six vice-chairpersons of the movement. Extending India’s support to the brave freedom fighters of Africa, the Indian prime minister said: We can feel the vibrations of the struggle against the minority government in Zimbabwe, against the apartheid policies of the racist regime in South Africa and the national movements in Namibia and Guinea Bissau. These freedom fighters are engaged in the same battle as we were engaged only recently. They are sacrificing their lives for the 5
same principles that we hold dear. The role-played by India in Algiers, Colombo and Havana NAM conferences brought African countries closer to it. During India’s Chairmanship of NAM, special attention was drawn to the situation in Africa, particularly towards apartheid in South Africa. Efforts were also made to help the freedom fighters of Namibia. The visit of the Indian prime minister as Chairperson of the Non-Aligned Movement to Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola and Tanzania in May 1986 was welcomed as a timely gesture of solidarity with the front line states and support for their relentless struggle against apartheid regime.
13.3
INDIA-AFRICA ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
Africa occupies an important position in India’s trade. According to the IMF (Direction of Trade), India’s trade with Africa was US$4.1 billion in 1997, representing a growth of more than four times over the 1990 figure of US$999 million. The balance of trade is not in favour of India because of large import of crude oil, especially from Nigeria. There was an increase in Africa’s share in India’s exports from 2.59 per cent in 1991 to 4.45 per cent in 1996. Africa’s share in India’s imports increased from 4.66 per cent in 1991 to 6.94 per cent in 1997. The India Africa trade figures are given as under: Africa's Share in India's External Trade India's Total Imports US mn
India's Imports from Africa US$mn
Africa's Share in India's imports %
2.59
19509
910
4.66
616
3.33
23227
1417
6.1
20259
607
3
21225
1241
5.85
1994
24196
801
3.31
25477
1254
4.92
1995
30537
1338
4.38
34484
1576
4.57
1996
32325
1440
4.45
36055
2503
6.94
1997
33289
1452
4.36
38911
2615
6.72
India's Total Exports US$mn
India's Exports to Africa US$mn
1991
17873
463
1992
18500
1993
Year
Africa's Share in India's Exports %
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade, Year Book 1998.
In Africa, India’s exports are mainly to South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Sudan, Ghana, Uganda, Libya, Mozambique and Zambia, and India’s imports are mainly from Nigeria, South Africa, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Zambia, Tanzania, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Libya, Zaire and Guinea Bissau. South Africa has emerged as a major source of and destination for India’s imports/exports. After resuming economic linkages with South Africa in 1993, there was a tremendous increase in the bilateral trade. India-South Africa trade rose from a mere US $1.70 million in 1992-93 to US $866 million in 1997-98, which has now crossed US $2 billion.
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13.3.1
India’s trade with Africa
•
Drugs, pharmaceuticals and fine chemicals
•
Engineering goods
•
Transport equipment and vehicles
•
Project goods
•
Machinery and instruments
•
Small and medium scale industrial machinery
•
Plastic and linoleum products
•
Wheat
•
Consultancy services
•
Cotton manufacturing
•
Chemicals and allied products
•
Iron and steel manufactures
•
Tobacco, spices and tea
•
Non-basmati rice
•
Cotton yarn, fabrics
•
Rubber manufactured products
•
Jute manufactures
13.3.2
India’s Imports from Africa
•
Hides and skins
•
Leather
•
Petroleum crude
•
Pearls, precious and semi-precious stones
•
Dyeing, tanning, and colouring materials
•
Wood and wood products
•
Raw cotton
•
Iron ore
•
Primary steel, pig-iron based items
•
Non-ferrous metals
•
Organic and non-organic chemicals
•
Fertilizers (crude)
•
Cashew nuts
13.4 INDIA-SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS The overwhelming election victory in June 1999 of South Africa ruling African National Congress
7
(ANC) and the exit of Nelson Mandela from domestic politics has brought to power Thabo Mbeki as the president. In the post-apartheid era President Nelson Mandela and subsequently president Thabo Mbeki have emphasised on the historic bonds of friendship with India and the potential for mutually beneficial cooperation. They have time and again appreciated India’s role in the anti-apartheid struggle and expressed gratitude that India came to their aid in the words of president Mandela, “when the rest of the world stood by or gave succour to our oppressors”. As a step towards cementing these ties the two countries signed a strategic partnership agreement in 1997. Both South Africa and India, in their dialogue over the last six years have shown concern at the uneven impact of globalisation on the developing economies and agreed to coordinate their efforts for the development of South-South cooperation.
13.4.1
Areas of Cooperation
The present day relations between the two countries derive their sustenance from the strategic partnership agreement signed between the two countries in 1997. The words “strategic partnership” to define the relationship between India and South Africa were first used by the then deputy president Mbeki during his visit to India in 1996. It was during president Nelson Mandela’s visit to India in March 1997, that a declaration was made at the historic Red Fort in New Delhi for the launch of a strategic partnership between the two countries. This basically involves enhancing bilateral cooperation and collaborating in the international fora. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in November 1993, India and South Africa have signed around 15 agreements/MoUs (Memorandum of Understanding) on various spheres including economic, defence and cultural cooperation. Around 10 agreements/MoUs were under consideration in 2003. A joint commission was set up between the two countries in January 1995. Its first meeting was held in Pretoria (July 1995), co-chaired by the minister of state for external affairs, Salman Khurshid and South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad. The second meeting was held in New Delhi (December 1996) co- chaired by external affairs minister, I.K. Gujral and Aziz Pahad. The third meeting was held in Pretoria on December 4-5, 1998. It was co-chaired by Ms Vasundhara Raje, minister of state for external affairs and Aziz Pahad. The joint session consists of five committees: political, economic, trade and technical cooperation, education and culture, health and science and technology.
13.4.1.1
Economic Cooperation
The reasons for developing economic ties with South Africa are many. South Africa is technologically and economically one of the most advanced countries in sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa’s economy is nearly four times as large as the eleven members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) combined. It is therefore in a position to set up joint ventures and provide technological and technical know-how to the Indian companies in areas of its specialisation such as coal mining technology, refurbished power equipment and mining machinery etc. South Africa is also seen as a springboard to cater to the markets of the nearby African countries such as Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and the Indian Ocean States. It is also seen as a transit point to Latin American countries and could open up possibilities to enter the markets of Latin America. In the economic sphere the total trade between India and South Africa has risen by leaps and bounds in the last few years. India is the seventh largest investor in South Africa. From US $ 575.6 million in 1995-96 to about US$ 2.5 billion in 2000, it is expected to reach the 4 billion 8
mark by the end of 2003. South Africa has shown interest in the exchange of expertise in developing small scale and cottage industries. The main items exported from India are textiles, leather hides, skins, chemicals, machinery and equipment, and vegetable products. Major imports from South Africa are–base metal and products, chemicals, wood pulp and paper and mineral products. The Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) has also signed MoUs for future cooperation with the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB) in 1994, with the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry (NAFOC) a predominantly black chamber as well as the Afrikaanse Handles Institute (AHI) - predominantly Afrikaner Chamber in 1996. A number of Indian companies viz. NSIC, EEPC, TEXPROCIL, CII, TATA, UB Group, DCM, SRF, Liberty Shoes, Ranbaxy, Torrent Pharmaceuticals, Thapar Group, Shriram Industrial Enterprises and a host of other small companies have already opened their offices in South Africa. While the Exim Bank and the State Bank of India have opened their offices in Johannesburg, Bank of Baroda has done so in Durban.
13.4.1.2 Defence Cooperation There is a significant potential for defence trade and joint ventures between India and South Africa. South Africa has, over the years, built a strong defence industrial base with the emphasis on land systems and aerospace; the naval sector is minor with no military ships built since 1987. South Africa is the only major arms manufacturer and exporter on the continent. In defence cooperation a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the field of defence equipment was signed between the two countries during South African deputy president Thabo Mbeki’s visit to India in December 1996. At the time of prime minister Inder Kumar Gujral’s visit in October 1997, the South African defence minister Joe Modise announced that the two nations would “enhance and intensify defence cooperation”, with South Africa offering a whole range of military hardware to India. Specifically, the agreement was to supply ammunition for the 155 mm Bofors guns as well as avionics and night vision equipment. In 1998 Gen. Ved Prakash Malik, India’s Chief of Army Staff announced that India had bought 90 Casspir mine protected armoured personnel carriers from South Africa Reumech OMC. South Africa supplied 155-mm gun ammunition worth $ 47 million at very short notice during the Kargil conflict in 1999. There has been keen interest shown by both sides towards maritime cooperation. An exchange of visits of naval ships between the two countries has taken place. INS Gomati and INS Kukhri visited South Africa in December 1994. SAS Drakensberg paid a courtesy call to Bombay in March 1995. India was a key participant in Exercise Blue Crane with South Africa and other SADC countries. This exercise took place at the SA Army Battle School Training Area in the Northern Cape Province of South Africa from 7 - 30 September, 1999. It consisted of six stages involving approximately 4000 members from the SADC countries of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The other participants such as military observers were approximately 500 in number. Exercise Blue Crane was one of the largest peace support operations ever undertaken. It was of particular significance to Southern African countries wishing to evaluate their combined peace support capability.
13.4.2
Exchange of Visits
Ties between the two countries were strengthened by a number of visits exchanged by dignitaries 9
at all levels. At the highest level, the former prime minister Inder Kumar Gujral visited South Africa in October 1997. It was the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to South Africa. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee has visited South Africa twice–once during the Non Aligned Summit in 1998 and the second time during the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in November 1999. In June 1999, Shri Jaswant Singh, the then external affairs minister visited South Africa. Similarly President Mandela visited India twice, in 1995 and again in 1997. The South African vice president visited India in December 1996. There have also been a number of ministerial level visits exchanged between the two countries.
13.4.3
Training in Peacekeeping Operations
In the last six years South Africa has been under lot of pressure from the Western countries and other African countries to share the responsibilities of peacekeeping in the continent. This was primarily under the rubric of “African solutions for African problems”. The idea of participating in the UN peacekeeping operations was a thoroughly debated issue in South Africa. It was only in October 1998 that the South African Cabinet approved the white paper on peacekeeping where the rules of South African participation in the international peace keeping missions were established. The South African National Defence Force was going through a process of transformation and integration, a task that got completed by the end of 1998. It is in the latter field where India could assist the South Africans. India has been involved in a number of peacekeeping operations during the 50 years of its independence mainly in Africa. These include ONUC, MONUC (Congo), UNTAG (Namibia), ONUMOZ (Mozambique), UNITAF, UNOSOM II (Somalia), UNAMIR (Rwanda), UNOMIL (Liberia), UNAVEM, MONUA (Angola), and the most recent UN Mission in Sierra Leone. In the post-Cold War era, the burden of UN peacekeeping has fallen on the developing countries. The Indian contributions in terms of numbers rank first in the world today and are spread in three continents.
13.4.4
Cooperation in the Indian Ocean
The Mbeki Government has renewed its interest in the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation (IOR-ARC). India and South Africa, along with Australia, Mauritius, Oman, Singapore and Kenya are founder members of the Indian Ocean Rim Initiative. The IOR-ARC was formally launched in Mauritius in March 1997. Both India and South Africa have played a leading role in the formation of the organisation. In fact the concept of an IOR-ARC was first seriously mooted in November 1993 by Pik Botha, the then South African Foreign Minister, during his visit to New Delhi. He identified the IOR as an area of great mutual importance to both South Africa and India. In January 1995 during a visit to New Delhi, president Nelson Mandela put forward the proposal to form the Indian Ocean trading alliance that was enthusiastically received. During president Mandela’s government the two countries had held extensive bilateral discussions on the proposed charter and objectives of the organisation. Both India and South Africa were in general agreement that security issues should be kept out of the scope of the IORARC.
13.4.5
Areas of Discord
In the post-apartheid era the joint initiatives taken by the respective governments have set the bilateral relations on a sound footing. One of the persistent problems in the relationship is the
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nuclear issue. South Africa is the world’s first state to have voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons. It is also party to a host of nuclear arms control regimes including the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). They would like India to be a party to these treaties too. India is not ready to sign the treaties in their current format as it finds them discriminatory. South Africa’s nuclear policy in the post-apartheid era has emerged as a constant irritant in the relations between the two countries. India had hoped that the inauguration of President Mandela’s government in South Africa would give a fillip to its effort towards achieving universal nuclear disarmament. The African National Congress (ANC) in the past had been quite vocal in its support to nuclear disarmament. It “shared the commitment of the United Nations to general and complete disarmament under effective international control as resolved by the General Assembly at the special session on disarmament in 1978”. In recent years however, there has been a dilution in the stance of South Africa and it has drifted more towards the Western approach towards nuclear arms control. This was quite visible during the negotiations of the 1995 NPT Review Conference and the CTBT. After facing years of destabilisation the establishment of the ANC government had brought forth an era of peace and stability in southern Africa, therefore, the continuance of the nuclear weapons programme and not signing the NPT and the CTBT could have given the wrong signals. The good news is that against the backdrop of the Indian nuclear tests, South Africa has enhanced the efforts towards global nuclear disarmament. In the last two years it has been part of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), which originally consisted of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden. The NAC had responded to nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 by calling for a new approach to non-proliferation and disarmament. In their joint declaration (in June 1998) the members of the NAC put forward a new agenda in an effort to rejuvenate the deadlocked talks at Conference on Disarmament (CD). India and the other members of the G-21 have in the past called for the establishment in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to start negotiations on a phased programme with the eventual aim of eliminating nuclear weapons within a time bound framework. South Africa, while appreciating India’s position, does not agree with its time bound programme of nuclear disarmament. They appear to favour a step-by-step approach (incremental) without a firm time frame being defined. However, after the Pokharan nuclear tests in May 1998 India has moved away from its time bound position as propounded in former Prime minister Rajiv Gandhi’s Plan for Nuclear Disarmament, tabled at the UN in 1986. Although India still favours the phased process of disarmament, it has dropped the emphasis of it being bound to a certain time frame. Thus it appears that India and South Africa have an almost similar position on this issue and apparently are on the same side at the CD.
13.5 SUMMARY From the above discussion it is apparent that India and Africa are important potential partners. And that has been the case since time immemorial. Over a period of time the quantum of cultural, political, strategic and commercial exchanges and the volume of trade between India and Africa have grown. Both regions have been engaged in a wide variety of mutually beneficial programmes in the past.
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It is noteworthy that the main tenets of India’s Foreign Policy as well as India’s Africa Policy were further reinforced by India’s emphasis on “non-alignment” as its major foreign policy precept and as an instrument of collective self-reliance. From that period, Afro-Asian countries have been united in a common foreign policy based on “Panchsheel” doctrine (non aggression, noninterference, recognition of sovereignty and integrity of a country, mutual respect and peaceful coexistence). Nevertheless, compared to our considerable mutual strength in human and natural resources, the realistic levels of bilateral trade and economic cooperation does not reflect the real potential. This needs to be explored further. India and Africa can derive greater mutual benefits by working together, sharing resources and technology at a far more economic rate as compared to the developed world. In the new millennium, many avenues remain to be explored by the peoples of these two continents for cooperation, apart from diplomatic channels, at a people-to-people level, such as in trade, joint ventures, consultancy in agricultural development, joint struggle against fundamentalism, terrorism, and HIV - AIDS. India and the countries of Africa can do a lot in the field of information technology for mutual benefit. The new millennium should afford both India and the countries of Africa a better prospect for South-South cooperation.
13.6 EXERCISES 1. Explain Mahatma Gandhi’s role in the freedom movement of South Africa. 2. What is Africa’s contribution to the Non-Alignment Movement? 3. What are the areas of cooperation and discord in the India-South Africa relations? 4. Explain the role of India and South Africa in the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation. 5. Describe India’s trade with the African continent.
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UNIT 15 ECONOMIC ISSUES Structure 15.1 15.2
Introduction International Trade and Investment 15.2.1 15.2.2
Patterns of International Trade Patterns of Trade and Investment
15.3 Role of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) 15.3.1 15.3.2
Impact of MNCs on Host Nations Impact of MNCs on the Home Countries
15.4 Regional Cooperation 15.4.1 15.4.2 15.4.3 15.4.4 15.4.5
ASEAN SAARC IOR-ARC APEC European Union (EU)
15.5 Summary 15.6 Exercises
15.1 INTRODUCTION The importance of international trade and investment as well as the role of multinational corporations (MNCs) and the growing regional cooperation is characterised by several problems of adjustment between the rich countries of the North and poor countries of the South. Not only this, but it has also become the vital aspect of the contemporary international relations. As a whole, this dimension of international relations has come to be described as the issue of relations between the rich and the poor, the desire of the rich nations to trade and invest in the third world countries of the world. In a nutshell it can also be called global interdependence reflected through international trade and investment by the rich nations in the economies of the poor countries. And when it came to analysing the investment pattern of the rich countries and the kind of trade they are carrying with the poor countries of the world, the rise of several powerful transnational profit making economic organisations popularly called the multinational or transnational corporations cannot be ignored. An investment by individuals of one country in the economic system of another country is not new but since World War II, the volume of direct investment abroad through multinational corporations is phenomenally staggeringly big. This development has given rise to a new process of internationalisation of production and monopolisation of wealth. To counter the challenge of these (MNCs) and the pernicious dependence of the poor countries of the south upon the rich nations of the north, the birth of a large number of regional organisations along with the United Nations and other international institutions was bound to occur and this development could legitimately be described as the most important event in the international relations since 1945. Now nations regard regional associations like SAARC, ASEAN, EU, APEC, etc. as necessary and helpful instruments for conducting institutionalised relations and for promoting regional cooperation for development.
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15.2 INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 15.2.1
Patterns of International Trade
The pattern of international trade and investment makes it abundantly clear that a big gap exists between the economies of the developed and the under-developed countries (and there is a considerable global interdependence). Data generated for the last 20 years show that per capita gross national product (GNP) rose significantly in the industrialised and rapidly new industrialising countries. Though industrialisation has increased in low-income countries, the disparity in income levels between the rich and poor countries has widened. The poverty situation has worsened despite a surge of world economic growth and notable social progress made by many developing countries. The developed countries find themselves dependent upon the under-developed countries for selling their goods and for purchasing raw materials. The under-developed countries continue to depend upon the developed countries mainly for (i) securing economic and technological aid, (ii) selling their commodities, and (iii) securing access to advanced technology. But there is no denying the fact that the pattern of trade and investment has resulted in a big gap between the economies of the developed and under-developed countries consequently and the global interdependence has increased. Both the developed and the under-developed countries today find themselves in a stage of increased interdependence. This global inter-dependence continues to be exploited by the rich for strengthening their economic conditions. Backed by three powerful weapons—technological, political and military power—the developed countries have maintained successfully their control and superior role over the international trade even in the contemporary era of global interdependence. This has been a source of great disadvantage for the developing countries. The concept of interdependence excited the prospects of an increased and active participation of the developing countries in the international decision-making; however, much to their disappointment, they, today, find themselves playing a secondary role in this era of economic domination by the rich over the poor. The need of the hour is that the developed countries should fully realise the importance and absolute naturality of global interdependence and must come forward to work for securing a more beneficial and equitable world economic and trading system. The developing countries are not only keen to secure development but also restructure the entire international economic system with a view to make it a fair and just system as a total necessity. For this, they want a comprehensive North-South dialogue and agreement. The developed countries, however, are not yet fully prepared to reconcile. They prefer to reform the existing economic institutions and instruments for somewhat accommodating the view of the developing countries. But still there is no word on the part of developed countries to change the trade and investment pattern vis-à-vis the developing countries of the world.
15.2.2
Pattern of Trade and Investment
Another pattern that emerged out of the changing scenario of international trade and investment is an excessive exploitation of world income and resources by the developed countries. Under multifarious disguises, the stronger and the rich countries are successfully maintaining the appropriation of world resources to the detriment of the poor and the weak countries. Being technologically and industrially advanced, the raw material markets and what practically amounts to a monopoly over manufactured products and capital equipment, they have been able to proceed at will in fixing the prices of the raw materials that they take from the developing countries. Consequently, they are in a position to drain the resources of the Third World through several 2
means to their own advantage. In an IMF meeting, the US sponsored a proposal, which sought to link the 50 per cent increase in its quota sources with the provision of suspension of a member for its failure to repay its loan arrears. This was intended to put further pressure on the developing countries. The developed countries have always used such tactics to put pressure on the developing countries. The developed countries, particularly the U.S.A., have been trying to control the economic policies of the developing countries indirectly through the IMF, World Bank and other International financial institutions. Needless to mention that their trade and investment pattern has always been such as to meet their own economic problems by exploiting resources potential and economic policies of the Third World countries. The control over international trade and investment coupled with the control over international economic institutions and world economy further strengthens the hold of the developed countries over the developing countries. By virtue of their dominant position, the developed minority finds it easy and expedient to determine at will the allocation of world resources in tune with their desired objectives.
15.3 ROLE OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (MNCs) The growth of multinational corporations as powerful non-state economic actors, playing a key role in international relations, particularly economic relations, has been phenomenal. Their emergence has played a key role in changing the world scenario. The MNCs have emerged as sources of transfer of capital, industry, technology and know-how from the developed First World to the developing Third World. These have also made the third world countries more and more dependent upon the developed countries. On the one side these offer opportunities to the developing countries to develop with their help and expertise and on the other hand, these have tended to be a source of neo-colonial control over their economies and policies. Even for the countries of their origin, like the US, UK or Japan, the MNCs have been instruments of profit and health for their economies. These have exhibited the tendency to remain free from the control of government of the state as well as to become a source of unemployment. All this has made the multinational corporations the object of support and opposition. The impact of MNCs can be gauged by the estimate that by the year 2002 half or more of all industrial production in the world was accounted for by a relatively handful of MNCs. One study shows that the number of foreign subsidiaries of 187 U.S. based MNCs grew from just over 2000 in 1950 to nearly 8000 in 1967, roughly a fourfold increase in less than two decades. In the USA., the number of firms with foreign officials in other countries was 2713 in 1972. The World Bank Atlas in its 1979 edition listed 100 top economic entities (billion dollar or more firms and nations) in the world. Out of these 41 happened to be MNCs with General Motors and Exxon outranking all but 22 nation-states. Among the top fifty entities, multinationals accounted for only 9, but in the next fifty 32 happened to be multinationals. Nearly 30,400 business firms, based in nineteen first world nations, have at least one foreign affiliate in one or more host countries. The United States, Britain and Germany have control over half of these corporations. The United States alone accounts for more than a quarter. Although the growth of transnational corporations is a global phenomenon, the major part of all transnational business is located in the developed areas of North America, Western Europe and Japan. Nearly half of British and American firms
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have third world affiliates. When we analyse the MNCs network that has come to spread all over the globe, we find that it is dominated by the United States. In 1976, 54 per cent of all 411 industrial firms (with at least 1 billion sales) were American. Japan and Britain with 12 per cent and 10 per cent respectively were second and third. Among the leading firms were the giants of American firms – Exxon, General Motors, Ford Motors, Texaco, Mobil, Standard Oil of California, Gulf Oil, IBM, General Electric and International Telephone and Telegraphs. In 1977 Bank of America and Citicorp were the two largest banks. Japan accounted for 12 of the 50 largest banks in the world. The trend has been continuing. Amongst them, the US, Japan, Germany and Britain share nearly 90 per cent of the transnational business and profits. The spread of their activity and the potency of their economic potential are important reasons as to why the MNCs have commanded and are still commanding greater attention. The attention has been comparatively greater on the part of the Third World countries, since MNCs are generally more important in developing nations’ overall GNP and in their most advanced economic sectors. Further more, the Third World countries regard MNCs as agencies of neo-colonial control of the developed countries over them. Though the MNCs are non-governmental, private, profit making economic enterprises, these indirectly strengthen the control of their home countries over the economies and policies of the developing countries. The role of the MNCs can be analysed in two parts: the MNCs impact on the host nations and their impact on the home nations.
15.3.1
Impact of MNCs on Host Nations
Multinational corporations have been important transmission belts for movements of goods, diffusion of technology and managerial know-how across national boundaries. The MNCs and their supporters believe that these have produced the movement of capital and production from the First World to the Third World and it has been a big gain for the latter. Firstly, the MNCs satisfy the foreign investment needs of the developing nations. Secondly, they pay higher wages, keep more honest records, pay more taxes, and provide more managerial know-how and training than do local domestic industries. Thirdly, the MNCs usually provide better social services for their workers, and certainly provide fancy career opportunities. Fourth, these constitute the main channels through which the developed technology flows from the developed to the developing countries. The Third World nations, however, find the costs associated with the MNCs usually excessive. The capital, jobs and other benefits they bring to the developing economies are recognised, but the terms on which these benefits come are seen as unfair and exploitary and as robbing the new nations of their resources. The flow of technology to the Third World countries through MNCs makes the former dependent. The North gets the chance to impede local development. It limits, if not kills, local initiative and retards the process of industrialisation, economic development and self-reliance. MNCs are profit-making organisations and these always seek to maximise profits of their shareholders who mostly reside in the parent countries. The capital flow from the developing to the developed countries is excessive and is not reinvested in the Third World countries where
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production occurs. The fees MNCs charge for transferring the technology, giving know-how and granting licenses is exorbitant and constitute a big strain on the economies of the host countries. The ‘transfer’ pricing mechanism is another device used by multinationals that can effectively increase the MNCs profits while minimising their tax burdens. The raw, semi processed or finished materials produced by a parent’s subsidiaries located in different countries are in effect traded among the subsidiaries. Since the same company is sitting on both sides of the transaction, the safe or ‘transfer’ prices of these import-export transactions can be manipulated so as to benefit the parent firm. The net effect of all this is increased capital flow from the South to the North. The MNCs do confer benefits to the host states at great cost. MNCs have a harmful and negative impact on the economies and developmental drives of the developing countries. While analysing the ill effects of the activities of the MNCs on the developing states, Joan Edelman Spero has observed: “Multinational corporations often create highly developed enclaves which do not contribute to the development of the larger economy. These enclaves use capital-intensive technology, which employ few local citizens; acquire supplies from abroad, not locally; use transfer prices and technological agreements to avoid taxes and send earnings back home. In welfare terms the benefits of the enclave accrue to the home country and to a small part of the host population allied with the corporation.” The Third World countries fully subscribe to this view and hold the MNCs responsible for increasing and aggravating their dependence upon the First World.
15.3.2
Impact of MNCs on the Home countries
The role of MNCs vis-à-vis their home countries is again a matter of concern. Undoubtedly these help their parent countries to secure economic gains; yet the costs are quite high in terms of the problems they often create in their economies, and production and employment markets. Critics of the MNCs charge that these shift the productive facilities abroad for avoiding demands of powerful labour unions for higher wages. The practice of moving from industrially advanced countries to industrially backward countries, where labour is cheap and labour unions are weak, is the cause of structural unemployment in the home countries, because capital is more mobile than labour. Often the MNCs, because of their economic power are in a position to influence the policies of the host countries in their favour. In turn, the home governments try to use the MNCs as tools to further their foreign policy objectives particularly in respect of the Third World countries. The MNCs, because of their abilities to transfer capital, goods and technology to various parts of the globe, can avoid the measures adopted by their home governments for making the domestic economies healthy and strong. For example, tightened credit policy of the home country can be avoided by the MNCs by sending the Multinational enterprise to other rich countries. The MNCs can aggravate the balance of payments problems in the home countries by withholding remissions of profits from overseas. These can avoid an increased cost of local labour by shifting production overseas. As the profit of an MNC grows, it becomes less and less amenable to control of the home country. It can, by subtle economic and management moves negate the results or targets expected by the home countries. Their ability to operate as powerful non-state high profit making enterprises can be a source of trouble for their home countries. The foreign policy objectives,
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both political and economic, of the home countries can be undermined by the MNCs. Thus, in the contemporary era of international relations, MNCs have come to influence the governments of both their host and home countries. These have emerged as giant economic actors—non-state and non-governmental actors of contemporary international relations. Politics of multinational corporations constitutes a big slice of international politics. Their role has been the object of strong criticism by the critics and the third world countries as well as an object of support by several other scholars and economists who regard these as important agents of international interdependence, human welfare, modernisation and now too powerful to be ignored by the analysts of international relations. No account of contemporary international relations can be complete without discussing the role of the MNCs. To sum up, we can say that the supporters of the MNCs regard these as instruments of economic, industrial and technological developments, which are serving both the developed and the developing countries. As such they hold that the need is to properly channellise the resources of these international giants for securing a world free from wars, under-development and poverty. The critics of MNCs particularly in the Third world countries regard the emergence and the growth of the MNCs as a big menace of contemporary times. They advocate strong and stringent measures against the MNCs for preventing them to act as instruments of neo-colonialism. This can be done only by national and local regulations as MNCs, because of their powerful status, have become immune to the control of the United Nations and other international economic institutions. The MNCs are the realities of contemporary international relations. No one can hope to eliminate these, nor should one try to put the hands of the clock back. What is needed is to introduce better regulation of MNCs with a view to prevent them from inflicting harm upon the humankind. These can pose and are in fact, to some extent, already posing a danger to the economies and power of the host as well as home countries. As non-state economic giants these can harm and limit the role of their parent nation-states in international relations by influencing and even controlling their policies and laws in their own favour. These are already acting as road-blocks in the way of transfer of capital, technology and know-how from the developed to the developing world. Hence, the need is to initiate measures for controlling the activities of the MNCs with a view to make these as instruments of modernisation and development and prevent them from developing into bigger and stronger means of neo-colonialism and economic inequalities in the world. Both, the supporters and the critics of the MNCs should realise that since these have already developed as powerful non-state actors in contemporary international relations, every attempt should be made to harness these for serving as instruments of international peace, security and development. These should be prevented from harming the world, both the developed and developing. For this it is essential to end their present status as instruments operating outside national and international, legal and political jurisdictions. All the Nation-states must establish national and transnational institutions capable of controlling these economic giants, the MNCs. Any failure to move in this direction would surely make their menace bigger and dangerous in the st 21 century.
15.4 REGIONAL COOPERATION The existence of a large number of regional organisations along with the United Nations and 6
other international institutions can be legitimately described as one of the most important developments of international relations since 1945. No one can dispute the fact that the regional organisations or arrangements or alliances, have been, since ancient times, the instruments of international interactions, but at the same time one must accept that their phenomenal growth took place only in the post-war years. During the first twenty years of the post-war period, alliance-politics remained a key, almost a deterministic part of international relations. Regional Organisation/Alliances served as major instruments of the Cold War between the two super powers. Presently, their role particularly of the military or security alliances appears to have declined; nevertheless, these continue to be regarded as important instruments of international interactions. Non-security functional regional alliances have gained a good and healthy ground in contemporary times. Now, nations regard regional economic groupings like SAARC, ASEAN, EU, etc. as necessary and helpful instruments for conducting institutionalised relations and for promoting regional economic cooperation and development. Security oriented regionalism is definitely a harmful practice. Regional security arrangements like NATO, SEATO, and WARSAW PACT etc. have been sources of militarism and tensions and not of peace, security and stability. Warsaw Pact is now dead but NATO continues. However, the emergence of several Regional Functional Associations like ASEAN, SAARC, etc. has been a source of strength for the promotion of international cooperation, collaboration and development. These can play a meaningful role in harmonising international, economic and cultural relations and thereby international politics itself. In fact, in contemporary times a large number of regional functional organisations have been acting as important instruments for the conduct of international economic relations. Some of the important institutions engaged in securing regional economic cooperation that deserve mention are: ASEAN, SAARC, IOR-ARC, APEC, and EU etc. These are the landmark institutions, which are harbingers of exemplary success in the field of regional economic cooperation.
15.4.1
ASEAN
ASEAN, The Association of South East Asian Nations was created by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand in the year 1967, moved by an urge to establish a regional economic association for development through mutual efforts. Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia joined the organisation at different periods. India is now a full dialogue partner and wants to join this regional functional organisation as a full member. The ASEAN is a non-military and non-security economic and cultural regional association of the South East Asian states. Its main objectives are: (i) to accelerate economic growth, cultural development and social progress in the region; (ii) to promote regional peace and stability; (iii) to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on the matters of common interests in various fields; (iv) to promote mutual cooperation and assistance in providing training and research facilities to their people; (v) to promote South East Asian studies; (vi) to collaborate in the development of agriculture, trade and industries; and (vii) to maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international regional organisations with similar aims and purposes. On 8 August 1997, the ASEAN completed thirty years of its existence as a regional association for promoting socio-economic cooperation for development of its members. It is trying to emerge
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as a strong and integrated regional association. It has enabled its members to attain an economic growth rate of around 7 to 8 per cent. It is now trying to strengthen the infrastructure for undertaking a concerted programme for development in the South East Asia and Indo-China regions. It is trying hard to take and maintain a lead in this era of increasing competition and globalisation. It is now working hard towards the creation of ASEAN Free Trade Area by the year 2003. ASEAN is currently developing as an important active and useful agency of regional cooperation for development among the member countries. India is also associated with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an institution for security and strategic concerns.
15.4.2
SAARC
On the lines of ASEAN, the countries of South Asia also decided to form a regional organisation for promoting economic and cultural cooperation among its members. Hence, the seven South Asian countries joined hands to form the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). They were India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives. This body was formally launched in December 1985. Since the very purpose of forming SAARC has been to promote regional cooperation among the South Asian states, the leaders tried to realise this objective by agreeing to remove trade barriers for gradually evolving the SAARC into a collective economic system. However, to translate this into a reality appeared to be a distant dream. The existence of political differences, particularly between the two major SAARC members—India and Pakistan and the attempts of the latter to sow seeds of discord between India and Sri Lanka and India and Bangladesh limited the SAARC attempts towards increased economic cooperation. Pakistan always thinks in terms of parity with India, wants to keep India limited and does not hesitate to create troubles for India. Its most recent example has been furnished by its attempt to raise the issue of Gujarat riots at the SAARC meet. It has been trying to woo Bangladesh and Sri Lanka into its game. Such moves are destined to curtail the objectives of SAARC for an increased economic cooperation in South Asia. Despite a ban on the discussion of the bilateral issues in the SAARC Charter, Pakistan continues to harp on Kashmir, ‘the core’ issue between India and Pakistan. India, being territorially the biggest, population wise the largest, technologically and industrially the most developed country of the South Asia, has played and continues to play a major role in the successful operationalisation of SAARC programme for cooperation and development among the member countries. India has accepted SAARC as a voluntarily organised association of sovereign equal states for consolidating and expanding regional cooperation for development. India firmly believes that the SAARC spirit can help the countries of South Asia to develop, and to resolve their bilateral issues outside the SAARC platform. But the existence of bilateral problems among the SAARC states and their inability to secure a high level of political and economic cooperation among themselves are keeping the progress of SAARC limited. SAARC’s decision to introduce preferential trading within the region has hardly taken off, and the proposal for free trading (SAFTA) has also been in the Cold storage. Even the annual summits of SAARC have been at times disturbed. Thus, SAARC is losing significant opportunities of regional cooperation.
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15.4.3
IOR- ARC
A broad based international organisation—the Indian Ocean Rim—Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) was created on 5 March 1997, in the Mauritius capital Port Louis. The 14 members of the IOR-ARC who came from the three continents of Asia, Africa and Australia are India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Oman, Yemen, Tanzania, Kenya, Mozambique, Madagascar, South Africa and Mauritius. The Organisation is designed to act as a major step of the Indian Ocean countries for enhancing regional cooperation and inter-continental trade. However, the security issues and human rights were to be kept out of the grouping’s charter. The scope of activities and work programme is to focus on ‘those areas of economic cooperation which provide maximum opportunities to develop shared interests and reap mutual benefits.’ These include in particular, investment, promotion of scientific and technological exchanges, tourism, development of infrastructure and human resources and movement of service providers on a non-discriminatory basis. It does not, at present, constitute a preferential trade arrangement but leaves it open for the member states to pursue trading arrangements among themselves. The organisation pursues the principle of non-discriminatory treatment to each other by member states and grants the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment by the WTO members towards the members of the new association. The case of IOR-ARC is unexceptionable. The Indian Ocean, historically a trading basin, remains the only one left out of an economic grouping like NAFTA, ASEAN and APEC. Also, at a time when globalisation and ocean-centric trade relations are becoming powerful determinants of regional growth, a rediscovery of the littoral community for its potential as an economic bloc was inevitable in the long run. There is little disagreement on the rationale for IOR-ARC; the Indian Ocean offers a wealth of unique prospect, apart from tourism, which can be turned to good profit if the littorals remain firm in their resolve to stick to economic goals.
15.4.4
APEC
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the APEC as Pacific Rim forum unites some of the world’s most powerful economies in free trade. The 21 nation Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was formed in 1989 at the initiative of the Australian Prime Minister. The present members of APEC are Australia, Brunei-Darrasalam, Canada, Chile, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua-New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, USA and Vietnam. The APEC members endorsed the declaration of a framework of principles for economic cooperation and development in the APEC. The member-states were asked to intensify work on sustainable growth and to report on their progress. The body is working closely with both national and international institutions. It is engaged in facilitating the movement of business people, enhances investment flows and strengthens investment protection and involves the private sector in infrastructure planning. APEC is an epitome of great success in regional economic cooperation.
15.4.5
European Union (EU)
The European Union is the most effective and well-organised economic grouping. In its present 9
form (as European Union) it is based on the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992. It entered into force on November 1, 1993. The EU is the expanded and revised form of the European Coal and Steel Community set up on 1 January 1952. Its six members were Belgium, France, West Germany, Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands. The six countries had decided, to begin with to pool their coal and steel resources for economic cooperation and eventual integration. Later, as a result of 1957 Treaties of Rome, the six countries also created the European Economic Energy Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Together known as the European Community (EC), it was joined in January 1973 by Britain, Ireland and Denmark. Having restored democracy Greece sought the membership in 1977. It became a member in 1981. Spain and Portugal became EC members in 1986, raising the membership of the Community to 12. As the community became EU in 1993 with restrictions on trade and travel removed, many more countries sought its membership. Austria, Finland and Sweden were admitted to EU in 1995, making it a 15-member body. In 2002, the EU agreed to admit 10 more members by May, 2004. These are Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and the island countries of Cyprus and Malta. That would make the EU a 25-member grouping. Its institutions include a European Parliament, European Council and the European Commissions. India is working to strengthen its ties with the EU. The EU-India summits held in 2002 went a long way in the EU investment in several projects in India. The Organisation has emerged over the years as a developed economic community with an integrated economic base. It is now having a single currency Euro and a single Banking Union. However, UK, Denmark and Sweden have still not adopted the Euro. Its success in the economic field has been so overwhelming that it is now trying to supplement the existing economic integration with a viable political integration of the European Union. The narration of the above account makes it amply clear that regional cooperation has been the single most important event in the contemporary international economic relations. There has been a significant increase in the number of global institutions as well as regional organisations. While the former are engaged in securing global cooperation for peace, prosperity and development, the latter are trying to increase regional cooperation for development among their members and all this has resulted in several important changes in the nature of contemporary international relations.
15.5 SUMMARY The above discussion on the four aspects of economic issues namely the international trade, investment, the role of multinational corporations and the growing importance of regional cooperation leads us to a conclusion that there is a growing trend towards international integration despite the fact that there still exists a wide gap between the rich and the poor countries of the world. There is a growing feeling in the minds of the scholars that sooner or later these two extremes are bound to merge in their own interests. The reasons as to why it is likely to happen can be traced to the distinct advantages that the international integration and regional cooperation offer to the world community. The integration of the Western Europe bears out the fact that it augurs well for an all-round development and prosperity. It can secure the benefits of progress through mutual cooperation, collaboration and accommodation, although it can also be admitted that it is going to be a slow and steady problematic process.
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15.6 EXERCISES 1) Critically examine the issues of international trade and investment in the contemporary international economic relations. 2) Critically examine the role of MNCs in the contemporary international economic relations. 3) Discuss the role of growing regional cooperation in the contemporary international relations.
UNIT 16 SOCIO-CULTURAL ISSUES Structure 16.1 Introduction 16.2 Role of Ethnic and Religious Movements 16.2.1 16.2.2 16.2.3 16.2.4 16.2.5 16.2.6
Ethnic Movements : A case study of Sri Lanka LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government Religious Nationalism Global Fundamentalism Liberation Movements Post-communist Societies
16.3 Human Rights 16.3.1 16.3.2 16.3.3 16.3.4
Origins of UN’s concern for Human Rights Human Rights: The U.N. Charter Framework and Beyond The International Bill of Rights Human Rights in India
16.4 Humanitarian Intervention 16.4.1 16.4.2 16.4.3 16.4.4
Role of Human Rights Monitors Role of the UN System’s Human Rights Umbrella The International Humanitarian Law Role of Non-Governmental Organisations in promoting and protecting Human Rights
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16.4.5
NGOs and the UN
16.5 Environment 16.5.1 16.5.2 16.5.3 16.5.4 16.5.5 16.5.6
Stockholm Conference on Human Environment (1972) 1975 Ratification of Global Conventions concerning Environmental Protection Global Change Meet (1997) March 1997 Meet of Alternative Environment Congress (AEC) of Environment Liaison Centre International (ELCI) The Kyoto Meet on Climate Change Buenos Aires Convention on Climate Change (1998)
16.6 Summary 16.7 Exercises
16.1 INTRODUCTION This Unit covers several topics and each different in nature. Therefore, it needs detailed examination of all the subjects, mainly the problem of ethnic and religious movements. Although ethnic and religious movements are inseparable, they need exclusive treatment. As such both the topics have been thoroughly examined. The role of ethnicity or ethnic movements had been explained by highlighting the case of the Sri Lankan ethnic crisis. Likewise the contribution of different elements in the religious movements in the light of the secularisation theory which tried to negate the role of religiosity or religious movements of different nature in different parts of the world is also deeply examined. Then there are two inter-connected topics that is human rights on the one hand and their violations by
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UNIT 16 SOCIO-CULTURAL ISSUES Structure 16.1 Introduction 16.2 Role of Ethnic and Religious Movements 16.2.1 16.2.2 16.2.3 16.2.4 16.2.5 16.2.6
Ethnic Movements : A case study of Sri Lanka LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government Religious Nationalism Global Fundamentalism Liberation Movements Post-communist Societies
16.3 Human Rights 16.3.1 16.3.2 16.3.3 16.3.4
Origins of UN’s concern for Human Rights Human Rights: The U.N. Charter Framework and Beyond The International Bill of Rights Human Rights in India
16.4 Humanitarian Intervention 16.4.1 16.4.2 16.4.3 16.4.4 16.4.5
Role of Human Rights Monitors Role of the UN System’s Human Rights Umbrella The International Humanitarian Law Role of Non-Governmental Organisations in promoting and protecting Human Rights NGOs and the UN
16.5 Environment 16.5.1 16.5.2 16.5.3 16.5.4 16.5.5 16.5.6
Stockholm Conference on Human Environment (1972) 1975 Ratification of Global Conventions concerning Environmental Protection Global Change Meet (1997) March 1997 Meet of Alternative Environment Congress (AEC) of Environment Liaison Centre International (ELCI) The Kyoto Meet on Climate Change Buenos Aires Convention on Climate Change (1998)
16.6 Summary 16.7 Exercises
16.1 INTRODUCTION This Unit covers several topics and each different in nature. Therefore, it needs detailed examination of all the subjects, mainly the problem of ethnic and religious movements. Although ethnic and religious movements are inseparable, they need exclusive treatment. As such both the topics have been thoroughly examined. The role of ethnicity or ethnic movements had been explained by highlighting the case of the Sri Lankan ethnic crisis. Likewise the contribution of different elements in the religious movements in the light of the secularisation theory which tried to negate the role of religiosity or religious movements of different nature in different parts of the world is also deeply examined. Then there are two inter-connected topics that is human rights on the one
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hand and their violations by different national governments and other bodies on the other. Both these topics needed separate treatment. We have first explained the concept of Human Rights and subsequently the intervention by many International Institutions and other NGOs to protect their infringement. And lastly, the current and latest topic of Human Environment has been dealt with—the role of various international conventions and conferences and how various international institutions implemented the directions of these bodies. It is pertinent to mention here that all these subjects have been dealt with duly taking into consideration the role India played.
16.2 ROLE OF ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS Ethnic and religious conflicts are inseparable from the dynamics of nationalism, which is a universal concept. The conflicts are caused usually by a majority group, to gain control over the political and legal life of the inhabitants of a particular territory, using ethnicity and religion to justify their claim to power. Huntington in his book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order has discussed the role of ethnicity and religion in nationalist movements. He first presented his thesis on “The Clash of Civilizations” in Foreign Affairs in 1993 and has since published a book on the subject. Essentially, he says that the world is driven by deep cultural divisions and that nations and peoples belonging to different cultural groups—for example, Western, Islamic or Confucian—holds markedly different values regarding democracy, human rights, and religious tolerance. He concludes that it is wrong for the West to impose its value system on the rest of the world in what can only be a futile contest of “the West against the rest”. But the most pertinent question to be asked here is whether the thesis of Huntington is justifiable? David Little, Director of the U.S. Institute of Peace, is very critical of his analysis and contradicts it by saying that there is no “clash of civilisations” as such. Rather it is important for the West to see itself not as alienated from “the rest,” but as partners with them in a common venture. On the other hand, the West needs to recognise that other regions of the world must adapt and apply the norms of tolerance and nondiscrimination to their own settings in their own ways. But there is no denying the fact that ethnicity and religion have been playing prominent role in different parts of the world. Underneath, we shall discuss the same. Five major religious and ethnic movements in the world justify the prominence of the role that these movements have played in different parts of the world. These are (i) Religious Nationalism or Nationalist Movements (ii) Global Fundamentalism (iii) Liberation Movements (iv) Pentecostalcharistimic Movements basically Christian movements and (v) Religious revival in the postcommunist cultures.
16.2.1
Ethnic Movements – A case study of Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka today is amidst chaos following the continuing ethnic conflict between the Tamils and Sinhalese. To understand how the seeds of this were sown a little bit of recalling the sociopolitical developments leading to the present ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka and some facts would be relevant. The first point to remember is that historically the trends of migration from India have led to the current demographic composition of Sri Lanka. One is talking about at least three to four centuries before Christ. The first trend of migration was from East, Central coastal India stretching from
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Orissa to almost Bengal. These are today’s Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. The second trend of migration was from Tamil Nadu and Tamil-speaking people of what is now Kerala. There were also migrations of descendants of Arabs and Malays. These constitute Sri Lankan Tamils today. In more contemporary times since the third decade of the 19th century, more Tamils were taken to Central Highlands of Sri Lanka as indentured labour. Today, of the total population of Sri Lankans, about 15 per cent people are Tamils while the remaining majority is Sinhalese. Language and religion contributed to the separate identity of the majority and minority communities in Sri Lanka. Buddhism came to Sri Lanka during the time of Emperor Ashoka in the Mauryan dynasty of Indian history. This is the religion of majority. The Sinhalese language is derived originally from Pali with further philological contributions from Bengali, Portuguese and Oriya languages. Its script is of Brahmi style. The Tamil speaking people are either Hindu or Muslim. Their language is derived from ancient Tamil dialects. The Sri Lankan history right up to the advent of western colonial powers like Portuguese, Dutch and the English in that order is replete with trends of invasions from Southern India into Sri Lanka and Sinhala attacking the southern tip of the Indian Peninsula and part of Tamil Nadu. The western colonial powers played the Tamils against Sinhalese and Sinhalese against Tamils to gain domination over the island. The British were most successful in this exercise when they took over Sri Lanka late in the 18th Century. They played the divide and rule tactic to the hilt of which Tamils were major beneficiaries, socially, administratively and economically. So at the time of Sri Lankan independence after the Second World War, the seeds of Tamil-Sinhala antagonism already existed. With the advent of a democratic form of government based on universal adult franchise, Sinhala majority naturally moved to redress the imbalances of previous Tamil influence in the polity and economy of the country. But by the late fifties this attempt on redressing the imbalances of Sinhalese got converted into process of discrimination and later persecution of Tamils. Attempts were made by senior Sri Lankan Tamil leaders like Poonam Balun, Chelvanayakam and Thiruchelvan with Sinhalese leaders like Dudley Senanayake, John Kotelawala and S.W.R.D. Bandarnaike to ensure that the Tamils get proportionate and fair share in the power structure, administration and economy of Sri Lanka. But after coming to agreement, the Sinhalese leaders invariably backed out of these agreements. This is the background in which Tamil militancy emerged from the mid-1970s in the island. Matters came to a head when Tamil militants killed Sri Lankan soldiers in Jaffna in July 1983 which led to massive anti-Tamil riots in the Sinhalese areas. Nearly two lakh Tamils fled to India as refugees. India got involved in the Sri Lankan situation in 1983 and remained involved till the withdrawal of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from the Island early in 1990. This is the over-simplified version of broad trends in Sri Lankan history and contemporary politics. India tried, from time to time, to help Sri Lanka to overcome the ethnic conflict. The agreement signed in 1953 by prime minister Nehru and Sri Lankan prime minister John Kotelawala tried to regulate the relations of Tamils with Sri Lanka. It provided that the names of all people of Indian origin who desired to stay is Sri Lanka are allowed to stay back and those who did not wish the Sri Lankan citizenship would be sent back to India. Another agreement in 1964 called Shastri-Sirimavo Agreement, sought to solve the problem of about 9 lakh 75 thousand stateless persons in Sri Lanka. The fate of 1 lakh 50 thousand (who were not covered by the 1964 agreement) who sought to be settled by Indira Gandhi-Sirimavo agreement of January 1974. As the situation caused by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) demand for recession of 3
Jaffna and neighbouring areas, and creation of Eelams took a violent turn, the Sri Lankan president invited prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1987 and persuaded Rajiv to send an Indian Peace keeping Force (IPKF) to restore normalcy. This decision proved disastrous, as neither the Tamils nor the Sinhalese welcomed the Indian troops. In practice the IPKF lost hundreds of men in fight against the LTTE. In view of the total failure of the the IPKF experiment, then prime minister V.P. Singh finally withdrew the Indian troops from Sri Lanka in 1990. The new government under president Chandrika Kumaratunga came to power in 1994 and immediately made peace overtures to the LTTE. The LTTE after some initial response did not consider the Sri Lankan Government’s peace initiative enough and resumed hostilities. The Tamils of Sri Lanka are divided into three groups, the original Tamil migrants in the North and East of Sri Lanka, Tamil workers and Tamils known as Tamils of Indian origin who were in Central Highlands of the country and thirdly, Tamil Speaking Muslims who now claim separate socio-cultural identity. Then, there are many Tamil militants and political parties; the LTTE is the most disciplined, dominant and effective Tamil Group who claims to represent the Tamil interests. And they are in no mood for half-way compromises. Their main demand is of a separate Tamil country in Sri Lanka, Eelam. In the interim phase they may be agreeable to complete autonomy, devolution of power, etc. though what the Sri Lankan Government can give in response, does not seem to be sufficient. President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s attempt at making peace was in disarray earlier but, is now paying dividend and there is peace for the time being in Sri Lanka.
16.2.2
LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government
Anybody interested in the strategic dilemmas of Sri Lanka should keep in mind that unless the Sri Lankan government meets the Tamil demands for autonomy and self government and a fair share in the power structure of Sri Lanka the ethnic conflict might eventually break up into two countries which would be an unfortunate development from every point of view. It must be emphasised that compared to the presidents and governments which have governed Sri Lanka over the last four decades, the present president of Sri Lanka has both vision and the courage to work for an amicable solution of the ethnic problem with her Tamil patriots including the LTTE. When Kumaratunga came to power she tried assiduously to come to terms with the LTTE. The LTTE, however, felt that all the initial and preliminary concessions that she had given to facilitate discussion on substantive political issues have not been enough. The consequences have been the renewal of hostilities, between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. At the height of LTTE hostilities president Kumaratunga asked a number of friendly countries for defence supplies and cooperation. But she did not ask for anything strategically significant from India except that the Indian Navy to take preventive action in the Palk Straits against LTTE acquiring weapons and supplies from Tamil Nadu where they still have sufficient connections. Newspaper reports indicate that the Indian Navy did undertake some such operations. Prabhakaran warned the Sri Lankan government and the world at large that LTTE has taken on the Sri Lankan Army successfully, that it has taught IPKF a lesson and LTTE is capable of teaching similar lesson to the US forces if president Chandrika Kumaratunga invites any such force to help her in confronting the LTTE.
16.2.3
Religious Nationalism
In much of the world, ethnicity and religion are frequently inseparable with the former drawing
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immeasurable motivation and legitimacy from the latter. Religion has a highly volatile role in many nationalist struggles. Religious movements had played important role in the awakening of nationalism in India in the nineteenth century leading to national movement and establishment of the Indian National Congress. But, at times religious feelings may be aroused by vested interests to create rift and conflict in the society. Thus, in the former state of Yugoslavia, the animosities between Croatians, Serbs and Slavs are grounded in ethnic disputes, but these tensions have underpinnings in religious confrontations between Orthodox, Romans and Muslims. The struggle to achieve some semblance of peace between the Jewish state of Israel and its Muslim neighbours, as well as the Palestinians within Israel’s has lasted many years. The confrontation between the Central Russian government and the Republic of Chechnya draws dramatic attention to the ethno-religious tension that traverses the southern borders of Russia in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Religiously grounded nationalist movements are by no means restricted to the geopolitical regions of the world where large Muslim populations are found. In Northern Ireland the conflict is between Protestants and Catholics, though majority of people of Uster (Northern Ireland) are Protestants, yet Catholic minority desires union with Ireland. For this terror is being used against the UK. Likewise the turmoil in Sri Lanka is between the Tamils (Hindu) and the Sinhalese (Buddhist). Religious nationalism expands the number of cases where people are acting in the name of religion and contradicts the argument that the role of religion should be receding in the modern world.
16.2.4
Global Fundamentalism
In the early 1980s the occurrence of the Iranian revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini and the rise of the fundamentalist-led Christian Right in the United States helped give a name to the phenomenon of religious militancy. A five year research programme by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences to examine the relationship between fundamentalism and modernity has established the following conclusions: i)
most of the movements examined cannot appropriately be characterised as anti-modern;
ii) many fundamentalist movements embrace the technologies and organisational character of modernity; that the tension with modernity stems from modernity’s cognitive style, which rejects any legitimate place for the sacred in modern cultures; iii) Fundamentalist movements see a casual link between the rejection of the sacred and the social ills of modern societies; and iv) for the most part, outside of the Islamic World, fundamentalist movements do not pose an imminent threat to the existing political regimes, but they are, more usually a force that political authority must take seriously.
16.2.5
Liberation Movements
Liberation theology was born as an aftermath of the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) and the General Conference of the Latin American episcopacy held in Medellin, Colombia (1968). The 5
aim of the conference was to pursue what they had characterised as a “preferential option for the poor”. The concept of liberation theology was initially employed to characterise the emergence of small grass roots “base communities”. In Latin America, theologians have produced the largest literature on liberation theology. In the broadest sense, liberation theology has come to stand for liberation from all forms of human oppression: social, economic, political, radical, sexual, environmental and religious. Many liberation theologians have come to see Marxist analysis and the action imperatives of the church as inextricable. There has been severe criticism of the liberation theology. While some argued that it entails an almost wholesale and uncritical religious legitimating of revolutionary violence the other said that theological teachings are secondary to the agenda of human liberation. However, liberation theology like fundamentalism and religious nationalism offers evidence of the continuing adaptability of religious dogma to the problems of the contemporary world. It has inspired and motivated people to become engaged in the quest for change in the social and political order. And, moreover, liberation theology legitimates the activities of those who take up the cause. It figured centrally in the popular insurrection that overthrew the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua. Nelson Mandela was the undisputed hero of the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, but it is hard to imagine this historic event coming to fruition without the support of religious leadership. Roman Catholic Cardinal Jaime Sin’s public opposition to the repression of Ferdinand Marcos was critical in mounting the insurgency that drove the Philippine dictator from power. In Haiti, Roman Catholic Church was similarly important in driving Jean-Claude Duvalier into exile and installing Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a Catholic priest, in the presidency. The fact is Liberation theology continues to grow and find expression in much of the Third World—Latin America, Africa and Asia.
16.2.7
Post-Communist Societies
Marxist analysis shared, with secularisation theory, the belief that religion would gradually wither and disappear. Seventy years of aggressive atheist propaganda and the accompanying campaigns to crush organised religion under communism did not succeed. When Mikhail Gorbachev initiated his radical restructuring (perestroika) and open public criticism (glasnost), he spoke of the “moral values that religion generated and embodied for centuries” and proclaimed that the same “can help in the renewal of our country”. Gorbachev pursued and facilitated the renewal of spiritual values in the former USSR and in less than a decade, change swept across the former Soviet empire. Often overlooked in efforts to account for the staggeringly swift disintegration of communist jurisdiction in Eastern Europe is the role played by religious groups in many countries. The role of religion in the collapse of communism is best known in Poland where the Roman Catholic Church had taken risks in its opposition to the communist regime long before forming an alliance with and providing sanctuary for the Solidarity movement. The priests and pastors offered invaluable leadership in societies, which had few other opportunities to nurture authentic leader.
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In Russia, there are many manifestations of spiritual renewal. Most highly visible is the rebuilding and the reopening of Russian orthodox churches, but a survey of the Russian-speaking citizens, conducted by the international social survey in 1991, produced evidence of religious revival, between one-half and three-quarters of Russians believe in God depending on how the question is worded. “One out of every five Russians has moved from rejection of God and religion to acceptance of both”. Approximately, the evidence of spiritual renewal can be found in an energetic and spirited influx of foreign missionaries both to the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. A directory of Christian missionary organisations working in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries in the early 1993 listed 674 groups; this data base had grown to over 1,600 foreign and approximately 2,000 indigenous organisations by the summer of 1993. What is clear is that the Soviet’s efforts to hasten the demise of religion have failed. In-depth studies of countries such as Sri Lanka, Ukraine and Sudan show that the “key contemporary patterns of cultural, ethnic and religious confrontation exist not so much between civilisations as within nations”. In these and other countries, as part of an effort to create a nationstate, majority groups have sought to assert exclusive ethnic domination over minority ethnic groups, which in response try to evade or restrain the majority’s effort to dominate. Generally, the majority group legitimates its claim to power by appealing to ethnicity, and further bolsters its claim by arguing that it advances and defends “certain sacred values and ways of life” embodied by a particular religion. In their effort to avoid domination by the larger ethnic group, minorities usually appeal to human rights standards that prescribe ethnic and religious tolerance and nondiscrimination. Minorities widely advocate human rights solutions, not because they are internationally proclaimed and sanctioned, but more importantly, because they are regarded as offering the only truly satisfactory basis for stable ethnic and religious peace in a multi-ethnic nation. The struggle of minorities to cope with the ethnic nationalism is as apparent in the United States, Canada and Western Europe (for example, among Native Americans in the United States, Quebecois in Canada and Roma in Europe) as it is in far-flung countries and regions. The struggles of minorities in the West are not different from what is happening in the rest of the world. The kinds of laws and policies in favour of ethnic and religious tolerance and nondiscrimination that are found in the West have come to be embraced, as a result of a very painful history. For example, Dalai Lama advocates the “separation of church and state” in future Tibet to guarantee non-Buddhist minorities, their rightful claims to freedom and equality. In Sudan, there are substantial Muslim constituencies who oppose the present Islamic government and who advocate, sometimes at considerable risk to themselves, greater compliance with human rights principles. Minority populations in southern Sudan invoke principles of nondiscrimination and religious freedom. Also, it was the recent adoption of human rights norms in Moldavia, Guatemala, and the Philippines that provided the basis for a peaceful settlement of ethnic disputes in those countries. These examples help to demonstrate that there is no clash of civilisations as such. Rather, it is important for the West to see itself not as alienated from “the rest”, but as partners with them in a common venture. At the same time, the west needs to recognise that the other regions of the world must adapt and apply the norms of tolerance and nondiscrimination to their own settings in their own ways.
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16.3 HUMAN RIGHTS Human rights are fundamental privileges or immunities to which all persons have moral claims. The International law views human rights as personal-legal entitlements and liberties that include prohibitions against certain types of conduct directed against persons by States and Governments. Neither approach regards human rights as “gifts” to be withdrawn nor withheld at will. The concept of human rights is rooted in the most ancient values and religions of our global heritage and incorporated into the eminent philosophies and political doctrines of the world. In the beginning Universal Human Rights law came about as a result of the First World War. The League of Nations, the forerunner of the UN, required a commitment by the administering power in the Trust Territories to safeguard the welfare of the local population. The treaties enforced by the League were signed to protect the rights of ethnic minorities in newly created States in the Central and the Eastern Europe. The International Labour Organisation (ILO), which was established after the First World War, advocated minimum standards of labour and welfare. All these gave rise to hundreds of important human rights conventions.
16.3.1
Origins of UN’s concern for Human Rights
The terror waged by the Nazi regime led to the rebirth and internationalisation of human rights concerns. The global movement for human rights is founded on and inspired by the UN Charter. The UN Charter was the first multilateral treaty to embody human rights concern in its provisions. It is the foundation upon which the large body of human rights laws has been built.
16.3.2
Human Rights: The UN Charter Framework and Beyond
The UN Charter makes seven references to human rights. Article 1.3 provides that one of the four purposes of the World Organisation is the promotion and encouragement of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without the discrimination of race, sex, language or religion. Article 1.3 para 1(b) directed the General Assembly to initiate studies and make recommendations in this regard. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was given the same function under Article 62. More than any other provision of the UN Charter Article 55 describes, clearly and expressly the extensive purposes of the UN in the field of human rights. These include “respect for the principles of equal rights” and “self-determination of peoples”, promotion of “higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development”; solution of “international economic, social, health and related problems”, and “universal respect for, and observance of human rights for all”. Article 56 contains a “pledge” of member-states for taking joint and separate action in cooperation with the UN for the achievement of these goals. Article 68 provides that the ECOSOC should create a permanent commission on Human Rights. Lastly, Article 76(c) provides that the human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons living in Trust Territories be encouraged. The UN’s relevant activities in the field of human rights over the years can be classified into four distinct categories: a) Setting Standards—which includes defining and clarifying the rights of individual; b) Promotional Activities—which include studying particular human rights, or human rights in 8
particular places, and recommending measures for their fuller realisation; c) Humanitarian Functions—such as providing assistance to the victims of human rights violations; and d) Implementation—which entails protecting violations in specific cases.
16.3.3
The International Bill of Rights
Five major UN legal instruments exist to define and guarantee the protection of human rights: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the two Optional Protocols to the latter Covenant. The Declaration of 1948 adopted by the General Assembly is a manifesto with primarily moral authority. The Covenants are treaties binding on the States which ratify them. Together they constitute the document known as the International Bill of Human Rights. Preparation of an International Bill of Rights was the fundamental preoccupation of the UN. The UN Commission on Human Rights, under the chairpersonship of Eleanor Roosevelt, took up as its first task, the definition of basic rights and freedoms. On 10 December 1948, the first pillar of 20th Century human rights law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was adopted by the UN General Assembly. Intended as a “common standard of achievement for all peoples”, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights spelt out basic civil and political rights and fundamental economic, social and cultural rights which human beings everywhere were entitled to enjoy. Through this basic text, the international community solemnly proclaimed its faith in the fundamental rights of individuals and in the dignity and worth of human persons. Many newly independent countries have cited the Declaration or included its provisions in their basic laws or constitutions, and many human rights covenants, conventions and treaties concluded since 1948 have restated their principles. Several of these rights find a place in the Constitution of India, as justifiable rights. Some others are mentioned in the Directive Principles of State Policy (non-justifiable yet fundamental in the governance of the country). The Universal Declaration has inspired at least two regional human rights instruments. The Council of Europe adopted a European Convention on Human Rights in 1950, and the Organisation of American States also adopted a similar Convention of Human Rights in 1969. Important among the rights and freedoms found in the Universal Declaration’s thirty articles are: •
Equality before the law;
•
Freedom of movement and residence;
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Freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
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The right to seek political asylum from persecution;
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Freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
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The right to vote and participate in government;
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The right to education;
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The right to work and to form and join trade unions;
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The right to an adequate standard of living;
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The right to health protection;
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•
The right to participate fully in cultural life.
Following the adoption of the Declaration, the UN Members turned towards the drafting of the rest of the International Bill of Rights, i.e., a treaty of human rights. But, while the Declaration was drafted in just over 18 months, the Covenants and Optional Protocol took 18 years. This delay can be attributed to several reasons. Firstly, the Covenants were the most comprehensive Human Rights treaties ever prepared. They contained not only the basic rights of the individual—civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights—but also provided measures for their implementation. Secondly, since the UN membership was increasing while these covenants were being drafted, it became difficult for the UN bodies to accommodate or harmonise the interests of all nations. Finally, the UN bodies (especially the General Assembly) were over-burdened with the work of maintaining and keeping peace in crisis situations in many parts of the world. During the drafting stage, the General Assembly decided to divide the rights enumerated in the Declaration into two legal instruments: (a) a Covenant on Civil and Political Rights embracing the traditional civil and political rights recognised in western cultures and, (b) a Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to satisfy the aspirations of the Socialist and Third World societies. The provisions of the former were meant immediately to be legally enforced, whereas those of the latter were meant to be achieved progressively through long-range education, planning and promotion. With the adoption of these covenants in 1966 and other relevant instruments, a solid legal foundation of human rights law was laid down for application at all levels of society -local, national and international. Both were unanimously adopted on 16 December 1966 and opened for signature and ratification the same day. However, it took another decade before these covenants were ratified by a requisite number of states to bring them into force. The International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights entered into force on 3 January 1976 (as of 1 July 1993 it had been ratified or acceded to by 123 states). The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocol entered into force on 23 March 1976 and as of 1 July 1993, this Covenant had been acceded to or ratified by 121 States (and the Optional Protocol by 29 States as of 1 June 1983). The Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1989. This Protocol seeks to do away with capital punishment. It has been ratified by 18 States but is opposed by some countries on the grounds that the death penalty is consistent with their laws and customs and serves as a deterrent to crime. Together, they take the Universal Declaration a step further by making provisions legally binding and opening the door to international monitoring of human rights practices. Generally, the two covenants reflect rights and freedoms set forth in the Universal Declarations. There are a few instances, however, where the Covenants have departed from the Declaration. This was the case with the right to property and the right to self- determination. Owing to the opposition of the Socialist Countries, the Commission on Human Rights decided not to include the right to property in the Covenants, although the same right appeared in the Declaration. On the other hand, the Covenant includes the right of self-determination, which was missing in the declaration. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights represents the “second generation” of human rights. These rights, for a long time, were not acceptable to the capitalist countries and their jurists as human rights. But the Socialist Countries with the support of the newly emerging countries of Asia and Africa created an environment where the economic, social and cultural rights were not only recognised as human rights but were also codified in a legally binding Covenant. Today, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is
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an important and integral part of the International Bill of Human Rights. A country ratifying and acceding to this covenant acknowledges its responsibility to promote better living conditions for its people. It recognises everyone’s right to work, to fair wages, to social security, to adequate standards of living and freedom from hunger, and to health and education. It also undertakes to ensure the right of everyone to form and join trade unions. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights largely represents the traditional rights and freedoms which have been popularised as the “first generation” of human rights. A country ratifying this Covenant recognises the right of every human being to life, liberty, security and privacy of person. It also recognises freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of opinion and expression; the right of peaceful assembly and of emigration; and freedom of association. The Covenant prohibits slavery, guarantees the right to a fair trial and protects persons against arbitrary arrest or detention, torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. However, there are provisions for certain reasonable restrictions to be imposed on the enjoyment of some specified rights and freedoms, provided these are necessary to protect the national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others. Many countries have taken advantage of this arrangement and they have also exercised their powers by derogating from their obligations under the Covenant.
16.3.4
Human Rights in India
Human rights are given a place of honour not only in the Constitution of India, but also in the entire socio-political system. As mentioned elsewhere, many of the civil and political rights are enshrined as Fundamental Rights in Part III of the Constitution. They are justifiable and protected under the Right to Constitutional Remedies. Besides, several socio- economic rights are included in Part IV as Directive Principles of State Policy. The State has endeavoured to implement most of these principles. The Right of Education which was included in non-justifiable Part IV was, in 2002, made a fundamental and justifiable right. India has high-powered National Human Rights Commission comprising eminent persons and chaired by a former Chief Justice of India. It looks into all cases/complaints of alleged violations of human rights. The violations are sometimes alleged to have been committed by state authorities or even police and security forces. For instance when a trial court acquitted several accused in 2003, alleged as being involved in rioting and murders in the Best Bakery case in Gujarat, the NHRC took up the matter at the highest level seeking the retrial of the accused who were let off due to lack of evidence. The NHRC is vigilant about proper protection of human rights of all Indians. Besides, several states have also constituted State Human Rights Commissions to ensure that there are no violations of human rights, and if any violation occurs, the guilty must be punished.
16.4 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION The UN Secretary-General has at his disposal a confidential diplomatic mechanism by which he may raise urgent human rights problems with the governments of Member States. Cases might include the release of a political prisoner or the commutation of a death sentence. The SecretaryGeneral’s efforts to intercede are discrete and rarely, if ever, publicised, but he continues at the same time, to make public appeals on behalf of respect for human rights in general.
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Envoys entrusted with the politically sensitive and sometimes dangerous task of compiling information on human rights violations in a specific country or on certain kinds of violations are appointed in their individual capacities but not as government representatives. They gather facts, maintain contacts with local groups and government authorities, visit prisons and other detention centres, interview victims of human rights violations and make recommendations on how human rights institutions might be strengthened. Besides, the UN communicates with the concerned governments in order to clarify or improve human rights situations or launch an investigation by objective experts.
16.4.1
Role of Human Rights Monitors
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Jose Ayala Lasso, has also established a Human Rights Hotline—a 24-hour fascimile line that will allow the UN centre for Human Rights in Geneva to monitor and react rapidly to Human Rights emergencies such as the 1994 crisis in Rwanda. In addition, a human rights database will be created at the UN centre for Human Rights in Geneva to gather information for use of special rapporteurs. Moreover, states which are parties to human rights treaties are obliged to report periodically to international bodies on measures they have taken, on progress they have made and on any difficulties they have encountered in living up to the various instruments. But, it should always be borne in mind that Human Rights agreements depend not only upon the will of the States but also on their capacity to implement their provisions.
16.4.2
Role of the UN System’s Human Rights Umbrella
Other parts of the UN system undertake specialised human rights activities: • UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF): Continues to publicise the recently adopted convention on the Rights of the Child. • Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): Extends legal protection and humanitarian assistance to millions of refugees. • UN Commission on the Status of Women: Focuses on elaborating the rights of women. • International Labour Organisation (ILO): Has concluded over 300 treaties pertaining to the rights of workers. • UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO): Responsible for studies, conventions and recommendations on human rights in its field of work.
16.4.3
Role of International Humanitarian Law
International Humanitarian Law deals with protecting victims of armed conflicts from violence and other violations of human rights Standards have been codified in the four Geneva Conventions (1949) for the protection of war victims and in two Additional Protocols (1977). The combined goal of these instruments is to restrict the use of violence against those who are not engaged in armed fighting and to prohibit methods of warfare that cause unnecessary suffering or damage to the environment. Four conventions, which have been ratified or acceded to by 181 states, cover the sick and wounded on land; wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea; prisoners of war; and civilian victims. The first Protocol, signed by 125 States, covers victims of international conflicts. The Second Protocol, signed by 116 states, seeks to protect victims of internal conflicts among other agreements negotiated by the UN which are also part of
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the international body of humanitarian law, are the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) and the Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict (1974). The UN has invoked the Geneva Convention and Protocols often, most recently over the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.
16.4.4 Role of the Non-Governmental Organisations in Promoting and Protecting Human Rights The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) defines a non-governmental organisation as “any international organisation which is not established by inter-governmental agreement”. This broad term encompasses private voluntary organisations, community groups, professional and trade associations, labour unions, academic and scientific organisations and others. The contributions of NGOs and countless individual lawyers, journalists and other activists have helped greatly to further respect for human rights throughout the world. At the international level, NGOs such as Amnesty International (winner of the Nobel Prize for Peace for 1977), the International Committee of the Red Cross and Human Rights Watch (with its divisions: Africa Watch, America Watch, Asia Watch, Helsinki Watch and Middle East Watch) conduct on-site investigations, disseminate detailed reports and wage advocacy campaigns in international and domestic forums. Operating amidst far less public awareness and with far less physical protection than their transnational counterparts are domestic human rights organisations, which, wherever possible, monitor the actions of their respective Governments. Among these groups are the Tutela Archdiocesan Legal Protection Office of San Salvador (El Salvador), Vicaria de Solidaridad in Chile and the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines.
16.4.5
NGOs and the UN
Article 71 of the UN Charter provides for the participation of NGOs, on a consultative basis, in the work of ECOSOC. Among the 930 NGOs with consultative status with the UN are Amnesty International, Federation of Red Crescent Societies, the Andean Commission of Jurists and the Regional Council for Human Rights in Asia. The UN maintains contact with a wide range of NGOs through the Department of Public Information and the Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS), sponsored jointly by several agencies and programmes of the UN system. NGOs provide information to the UN experts who monitor human rights and generally try to influence the decisions of the many UN bodies whose work touches the human rights aspects. NGOs are independent and willing to take risks in areas which Governments and Intergovernmental Organisations consider politically sensitive. They have, by their very nature, a freedom of expression, a flexibility of action and a liberty of movement which enable them to complement the role of the UN in the promotion and protection of human rights. The end of the Cold War created a series of tentative attempts of defining the new world order. The resulting confluence of peoples and cultures has resulted in an increasingly global multicultural world teeming with tension, confusion and conflict in the process of its adjustment to pluralism. There is an understandable urge to return to old conventions, traditional cultures, fundamental values and the familiar, seemingly secure sense of one’s identity. This climate of change and acute vulnerability raises new challenges to the ongoing pursuit of universal human rights.
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Largely through the ongoing work of the UN, the universality of human rights has been clearly established and recognised in international law. These achievements in human rights standard spread over nearly five decades of work by the United Nations system. Like most areas of International law, universal human rights are neither representative of, nor oriented towards one culture, to the exclusion of others. Every human being has the right to culture, including the right to enjoy and develop cultural life and identity. However, traditional culture is not a substitute for human rights; it is a cultural context in which human rights must be established, integrated, promoted and protected. Such an approach recognises cultural integrity and diversity without compromising or diluting the unquestionably universal standard of human rights. From the Balkans to the Horn of Africa, human rights are an integral component of situations in which humanitarian assistance is required. The victims might be refugees, people displaced within their own countries or other civilians caught up in public disturbances. Their plight is the same: their human rights are likely to have been violated; they need protection from abuses during the upheaval; and their rights must be respected once the emergency has passed and they seek to resume their lives. The UN system has led the international community’s response to the evergrowing number of humanitarian challenges. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the new Department of Humanitarian Affairs(DHA)have been at the forefront of this effort, working with Governments, international and regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and many others in the non-governmental community.
16.5 ENVIRONMENT The need for the protection of human environment can be legitimately described as the international objective of primary importance. The protection of environment has today gained recognition as the common concern of all the civilised states. Consequently, the protection of environment through global and collective efforts constitutes one of the major areas of activity in contemporary times. The deterioration of environment due to the unprincipled use of natural resources, industrialisation, urbanisation, use of pesticides and because of the existence of problems like poverty , poor housing, bad public health, malnutrition and inadequate employment which characterise life in almost all the developing countries, have together compelled the mankind to devise ways and means not only for checking the deteriorating environment but also for recouping the environment through conscious efforts and planning. All this has given rise to the need for the regulation of behaviour of nations at international level, both for the prevention of future deterioration of environment as well as for the adoption of ecofriendly technologies. This has also given rise to the need to ban certain chemicals and technologies of daily use which have been the main culprits guilty of deteriorating the environment. The concept of protection of the environment involves the attempt to prevent pollution, particularly global pollution or environmental degradation. One of the accepted rules of International law has been that no state should act in a manner or permit the use of its territory in a way which can be injurious to other states. This rule is taken to mean in contemporary times as the rule which compels every nation not to act in a way as can cause environmental pollution or degradation. Hence it is well within the scope of the International Law to enact rules for the protection of 14
environment by all the states individually as well as collectively. In fact, it was in the 1960s that the humankind became conscious of the need to adopt a convention on Human Environment. On 3 December 1968, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution favouring an international conference on human Environment.
16.5.1
Stockholm Conference on Human Environment (1972)
Consequently, the UN Convention on Human Environment was held at Stockholm from 5 to 16 June 1972 and it adopted a Declaration on Human Environment. Seven areas were delimited for securing action directed to protect Human Environment: 1) The Declaration on the Human Environment. 2) The Action Plan for the Human Environment. 3) The Resolution on Institutional and Financial Arrangements. 4) Resolution on Designation of World Environment Day 5) Resolution on Nuclear Weapon Tests. 6) Resolution on holding of a second conference on Environment. 7) Decision to refer to governments’ recommendations for action at the national level. a) The Declaration on the Human Environment The UN Conference on the Human Environment 1972 in its section 1 contained the Declaration on the Human Environment. While comparing this declaration with Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, it was observed, that it “was essentially a manifesto expressed in the form of an ethical code intended to govern and influence future action and programmes, both at the national and international levels.” The Declaration on the Human Environment stands divided in two parts: The first part contains general observations like man is both creature and moulder of his environment, the protection and improvement of the human environment affects the economic development of the world and the natural growth of population continuously presents problems on the preservation of the environment. The second part of the Declaration contains 26 principles. These principles reflect the fundamental international responsibility of states regarding environmental preservation and pollution control. b) The Action Plan for the Human Environment The Action Plan for the protection and enhancement of the environment was in effect a grouping, in a more or less logical fashion, of all recommendations for international action adopted by the Conference. The Action Plan for the Human Environment was divided into three parts: (a) An Earth Watch Programme to identify problems of international significance so as to warn against impending environmental crises; (b) Recommendations concerning environmental management or in other words the application in practice of what was shown to be desirable or necessary with regard to the environment , and (c) Supporting measures such as education, training, public information and others.
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c) The Resolution on Institutional and Financial Arrangements This resolution recommended the establishment of a 54-member Governing Council for Environmental Programmes. The members of this council were to be elected for a three year term on the basis of equitable geographical distribution. However, the UN General Assembly on December 1972 established a 58-member Governing Council (instead of 54 members) for Environmental programmes. This Governing Council was directed to keep under review the world environmental situation in order to ensure that the emerging environmental problems should receive appropriate and adequate consideration by governments. In order to assist the Governing Council its Executive Director prepares, every year, a report on the state of the environment. This resolution also recommended the establishment of a small secretariat in the United Nations to ensure a high degree of effective management within the United Nations. The resolution recommended the establishment of a voluntary fund for addition of finances for environmental programmes. To provide for the maximum efficient co-ordination of the UN environmental programmes, the Resolution recommended the establishment of an Environmental Co-ordinating Board. Decision to refer to governments recommendations for action at the National Level The Stockholm Conference on Human Environment also referred to the state governments recommendations for action at the national level. Besides these measures, the conference recommended that the draft articles of a convention on Ocean Dumping be referred for adoption at a conference to be convened by the United Kingdom towards the end of 1972. Some of the decisions and recommendations of the Stockholm Conference were implemented by the resolutions of the UN General Assembly in its 27th session in 1972. Through one of these resolutions, Resolution 2997 (XXVII), a 58-member governing council for the UN Environmental Programmes (UNEP) was established. It was to hold annual sessions. It was to act as leader, catalyst, stimulator and co-ordinator for the environmental action centres being located in different parts of the world. It was to come into effect and supervise the implementation of the resolutions and recommendations of the Stockholm Conference as well as of the UN General Assembly. After the Stockholm Conference and the subsequent establishment of the UNEP, a global environmental protection movement began taking shape. The Habitat—the UN conference on Human Settlement, provided a great help in this direction.
16.5.2 1975 Ratification of Global Conventions concerning Environmental Protection The year 1975 witnessed a big push forward for the environmental protection movement when seven important global conventions were ratified by a number of states. These were: • The Convention on International Convention on International Trade in endangered species of Wild Fauna and Flora (1973). • The Convention on Wetlands of international importance especially as waterfowl Habitat (1971). • The Convention concerning the protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972).
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• The International Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in cases of Oil Pollution Casualities (1969). • The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969. • The Convention for the prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircrafts (1973). •
The Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter (1972).
In 1982, the tenth Anniversary of the Stockholm Conference was celebrated and the Nairobi Declaration was adopted. The commitment to observe and implement the decisions taken at the Stockholm Conference was reaffirmed. The UN Convention on the Law of the Seas 1982 also contained provisions for the protection of marine environment. The Earth Summit held at Rio de Janeiro 1992 did a good job in strengthening the global awareness and efforts towards the preservation of global environment and protection of our planet mother Earth.
16.5.3
Global Climate Change Meet 1997
In January 1997 a three day meet on global Climate change was organised by the Development Alternatives, an NGO, under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change for developing countries at New Delhi. It explored the possibilities of business collaboration between the developed and the developing countries for solving the problems of poverty, environment and resource management. The ways and means needed for checking the emission of Green House Gases (GHG) were discussed. It was agreed that a reduction in fuel consumption was the immediate need. Earlier the first issue of the biennial Global Environment Outlook (GEO) was released in Nairobi, in January 1997. It identified seven major environmental trends in seven regions of the world and called upon the people to give immediate and crucial attention to effective global environmental governance.
16.5.4
March 1997 Meet of AEC of ELCI
The Alternative Environment Congress (AEC) of the Nairobi based Environment Liaison Centre International (ELCI) was held at Tilonia (Rajasthan) in March 1997. It was attended by 100 environmentalists from 38 countries, who gave a call for the delineation of a sustainable and practical approach towards environment protection involving people at the grass root level.
16.5.5
The Kyoto Meet on Climate Change
The Third Conference of the parties to the UN Framework Convention of Climate change was held in Kyoto, Japan, from 1 to 11 December 1997. One hundred and fifty countries participated in this meet and attempted to draft a treaty that would initiate definitive, tangible and time bound steps to limit the emission of six green house gases (like CFC) that cause global warming. The failure of the post-1992 years, i.e. post-Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro years to produce something substantial for reducing the emission levels of green house gases had made this Kyoto 17
summit very crucial. However, at the two day Kyoto meet also serious differences appeared between the developed countries on the one hand and developing countries on the other. The European Union agreed for a 15 per cent reduction and Japan called for a 2.5 to 5 per cent reduction in emission level of GHG (Carbon Dioxide, Nitrous Oxide, Methane, HFCS, PFC and Sulphur Hexafluoride). After initial hiccups, the USA offered to make a 5 per cent reduction in emission level provided the developing countries also accepted such a norm. The developing countries wanted that the polluters i.e. the developed countries should foot the costs. After much debate and bargaining, the final Kyoto Protocol was adopted on 11 December,1997. The main features of the Protocol are as under: ‘Annex l’ countries to reduce emission levels by an average of 5.2 per cent relative to the levels prevailing in 1990. (The Annex 1 countries include the 24 original members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, members of the EU and 11 Eastern European countries.) Broadly, the US was to cut emission levels by 7 per cent by the year 2012; the 15member EU by 8 per cent; Canada by 6 per cent and Japan by 6 per cent; Russia was to stabilise emissions at its 1990 levels; Australia was to be allowed to increase its emission levels by 8 per cent over the same period. The developing countries were exempted from making targeted reductions but were to measure their emissions. Cuts were to apply to all six greenhouse gases. The commitment period was to be 2008 to 2012. Inclusion among the cuts of sources and removal of defined ‘sinks’ or carbon absorbent material was limited to afforestation, reforestation and deforestation since 1990 (US proposal). The acceptance of trading, joint projects implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) toward fulfilling emission cuts were undertaken. These three aspects called for ‘voluntary’ participation from non-Annex l or developing countries. The CDM, along with emission trading and joint implementation, was defined in the protocol for funding of the project in the developing countries for mitigating climate changes, that would allow the developed countries to gain credit for investing in the developing countries. It was, however, not clear whether the CDM would be operated by the World Bank or the Global Environment Facility. There was a complete absence of any mechanism to ensure compliance with commitments or punitive measures. These were to be considered at the next meeting (COP4) in Buenos Aires in 1998. The Protocol was open to signatures by parties between March 1998 and March 1999.
16.5.6
Buenos Aires Convention on Climate Change 1998
The fourth session of the Conference of the Parties of the UN Frame-work Convention on Climate Change (COP4) was held from 2-14 November, 1998 at Buenos Aires, Argentina. The conference was convened primarily to discuss the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol of 1997. The Kyoto Protocol prescribed targets for the reduction of emission levels in the case of six GHGs by the industrialised nations, which were mentioned in Annexure 1 of the protocol. COP4 considered communications from various parties detailing national positions on various parameters related to the emission of GHGs, and discussed issues relating to the transfer of 18
technologies, particularly those related to the energy sector. It also debated the three controversial ‘flexible mechanisms’ Clean Development Mechanism, International Emission Trading, and Joint Implementation. However, the politics and economics of global warming which played a crucial role at Kyoto, continued to dominate the proceedings at Buenos Aires. Issues raised by the US at Kyoto also burdened the agenda at Buenos Aires. At Kyoto, the US had accepted a 7 per cent cut in the 2008-2012 levels relative to emission levels in 1992. Environmental groups estimated that the US emission levels in 2010 could actually be 20 per cent higher than the 1992 1evels. Bargaining by the US had resulted in multiple loop holes in the agreement. The International Emission Trading Regime, for which the US had been vociferously advocating, allowed less polluting countries to sell their quotas to more polluting ones. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) provided for government and private participation to undertake emission reduction. The Joint Implementation scheme allowed parties to take credit for emission abatement projects. At this conference, the US adopted a hard-line market-friendly approach, rebuffing the demands of the developing countries led by the G- 77 and China, that technology transfers be made easier so that the objectives of the convention may be achieved. China, and later India, demanded that distinction be maintained between the ‘luxury emissions’ of the developed nations and the ‘survival emissions’ of the developing nations. The question of voluntary commitments for the developing countries was raised again at Buenos Aires. Although Argentina introduced this in the agenda, the developing countries led by the G77 and China strongly opposed this. The announcement by Argentina and Kazakhstan to assume commitments unilaterally, threatened to split the cause of the developing countries. As such the Kyoto Protocol remained virtually unratified. Protection of Environment continues to be a priority item on the agenda of humankind for the 21st century. The most healthy and positive development in the drive towards environment protection has been the increasing human consciousness in favour of this primary objective. There is no denying the fact that almost all the countries of the world are seized of this serious problem of environment protection notwithstanding the fact whether they are developed countries or the developing ones. Although as explained above, the biggest danger emanates from the industrialised world, the need of the hour is the collective and vigorous approach on the part of all the countries of the world. Environmental protection continues to be a priority item on the agenda of humankind for the 21st Century as is evident from the various conferences held till date and various conventions signed by both the developed and the developing countries of the world. We can safely conclude that the most healthy and positive development in the drive towards environmental protection has been the increasing human consciousness in favour of this primary objective.
16.6 SUMMARY Humankind is faced with several issues concerning its survival. These include the problems of
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environment protection. Besides, a number of ethnic and religious movements and conflicts have been causing concern to humanity. Some of these conflicts, as for example, the problems of Tamil minority in Sri Lanka and its decades old demand, agitation and terrorist activities have direct bearing on the Indian polity and India’s foreign policy. Human Rights are now universally protected through the United Nations system. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1948 became the basic guiding instrument for the protection of socio-economic as well as civil and political rights. Subsequently, the UN adopted two conventions to provide a binding framework to the civil and political rights as well as the socio-economic rights. Besides these, two optional Protocols constitute the International Bill of Rights. The countries that have ratified the conventions are bound by their provisions to ensure the respect for human rights. The United Nations System, various intergovernmental agencies, governments of Member Nations as well as several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are engaged in the protection of human rights. India, like many other countries, has a National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to check and secure punishment of human rights violations. The environmental protection has now become a major concern of the UN and its agencies. The Earth Summits, in which India has also actively participated, have been working to ensure that pollution is minimised and the earth becomes a more secure place for all the living beings.
16.7 EXERCISES 1) Discuss the role of ethnic and religious movements. Do you agree with the view that religious and ethnic conflicts are inseparable from the dynamics of nationalism? 2) International institutions and NGOs are quite conscious of their duty to preserve the human rights. Discuss. 3) “Environmental protection is the key to our survival”, do you agree? Critically examine.
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UNIT 17 POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC ISSUES Structure 17.1 17.2
Introduction United Nations 17.2.1 17.2.2 17.2.3
17.3 17.4 17.5 17.6 17.7
War and Peace Racism, Colonialism and Human Rights Development
Regional Organisations Non-aligned Movement Globalisation Summary Exercises
17.1 INTRODUCTION The world affairs we witness today are no doubt very complex. The problems the humankind and the basic territorial units—which we may call states—face are diverse with issues like peace, human rights, development, environment protection, trade, and so forth. States—whether big or small—are unable to address these problems individually, without working with other states, near and far, for negotiating, for narrowing differences and expanding areas of agreement. Since the problems and the parties (states) involved are multiple, country-to-country contacts may not always be sufficient. Forums engage governments in dialogue and negotiations on pressing or long standing issues on a regular basis and have become beneficial features of the modern world affairs. India has gained long and rich experience in tackling issues of concern to itself and also to the international community in global forums like the United Nations and the Non-aligned Movement and the regional level organisations like SAARC, ASEAN.
17.2 UNITED NATIONS To India, the United Nations holds the key to a world order wedded to peace and prosperity. The United Nations represents universal values like democracy, equality and justice, which guided India’s history through ages. In fact, one of the basic principles of India’s foreign policy has been active cooperation with the United Nations and international bodies, which are seen as protectors of the interests of the newly independent countries. India has actively participated in the activities of the United Nations with reference to the maintenance of world peace, peace keeping, achievement of economic progress, protection of human rights, etc. Let us turn to some of these issues and India’s role.
17.2.1
War and Peace
Independent India saw its security as part and parcel of the world security. But world security and stability has faced problems of different kind right from the early days of the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. Those days, the prime cause for worry to India was the East-West Cold War, pitting the United States and the former Soviet Union against each other as rivals. 1
While constantly engaged in the acquisition of sophisticated nuclear and other weapons, these two big powers acquired superpower status with global influence. They fought their battles (proxy wars) not in Europe but by fanning tensions and conflicts between states in Africa and Asia. Divided Korea became the first major battle ground for staging the Cold War competition. In addition, neighbouring countries fought wars often with the military and political support from the Cold War blocs over disputed borders or over other problems. Wars in West Asia between Israel and the Arab countries, the Iran-Iraq war, in the horn of Africa between Ethiopia and Somalia come under this category. Besides, the United States or the Soviet Union militarily intervened in some countries. Dominican Republic, Grenada in the case of the United States and Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan by the Soviet Union exemplify this trend. There has been clear Cold War dimension to the conflicts in Cambodia, Nicaragua, and last but not the least in IndiaPakistan subcontinent. In all, nearly 250 small and big wars occurred during the Cold War period. Although the clouds of Cold War had vanished in the early days of the decade of 1990s, global order of peace and stability has continued to be threatened in both old and new ways. Notwithstanding the two wars on Iraq, foreign invasion as a major danger to peace has diminished in importance. Instead, the civil strifes in state after state in Africa, Asia and Latin America have played havoc with political systems, economies of nations and even the lives and rights of innocent men, women and children. Societies of Yugoslavia, Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Angola, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and many more countries have become victims of this disturbing trend. Nearly 6 million people lost their lives in such wars in the past 12-13 years. At the United Nations, India disapproved forcible occupation of the territory of any state or interference by one state in the matters of other states, which are violation of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, and advocated settlement of problems through negotiation and other peaceful methods. India strongly supported the sovereign rights of Egypt, Hungary, the Congo, Lebanon, and demanded immediate and unconditional ending to fighting whoever started it for whatever reason. India remarkably was flexible in its approach for peace. We preferred moderation whereby the countries that might have violated rules are given an honourable escape route for restoration of normalcy. This approach was successful and effective in the context of the invasion of Egypt by the United Kingdom, France and Israel in 1956. Similarly after the 1967 war between Israel and its Arab neighbours, India joined other members in the Security Council in providing a framework for the coexistence of both Israel and its Arab neighbours within secure boundaries after withdrawal from occupied territories. The blend of principles with pragmatism became more necessary to respond to situations after the end of the Cold War. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and refused to withdraw, India supported the military action by the US-led coalition—blessed by the United Nations Security Council—to free Kuwait. Although many would see softness towards the United States in India’s positions in the United Nations, India opposed the American military action (2003) to remove president Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, an action the United States launched unilaterally in violation of the UN Charter. India is among the many countries that are worried about the weakening of international institutions and the tendency to impose unilateral preferences over others. To guard against these unhelpful trends, the wings of the United Nations must be suitably
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strengthened. There is no more important organ of the United Nations than the Security Council, which needs to be reformed to correct some of the founding weaknesses in its composition and powers. India has argued since 1992 that the Security Council needs democratisation in tune with the changed realities. There is something specific to be noted here. Based on its contribution for world peace and security, the appreciation it receives as the world’s largest and functioning democracy, its economic performance and potential, many in India are convinced that India deserves a permanent seat along with a few other developing countries. With only China as a permanent member presently, Asia is grossly underrepresented, whereas Africa and Latin America do not have any representation in the inner circle of this important organ. Although consensus on the issue is yet to be reached, India is patiently waiting for a favourable outcome at a future date. India believes that the cause of peace could be promoted not just through cautionary advice but through concrete action on ground. The peacekeeping activity is the strongest symbol of that action under the United Nations umbrella. UN peacekeepers in military uniform and also from various civilian professions worked to cool tempers in a war-torn nation either by impartially helping the warring armies, honour their word not to resume fighting or helping reconciliation through implementation of a negotiated accord already signed. Among nearly 55 peacekeeping operations the United Nations launched so far in Europe, Asia, Central America, Africa and Europe, India is counted among top 10-15 nations contributing soldiers and civilians not to fight wars but terminate them peacefully. As a nation we should be gratified about our contributions in 35 such operations – whether in Suez, the Congo, Cambodia, Mozambique, Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The United States sought India’s contribution in a force being mobilised outside of the United Nations framework for restoring order in the occupied Iraq in 2003. India refused to send its troops without an explicit UN mandate.
17.2.2 Racism, Colonialism and Human Rights The issues grouped in this section are close to India’s heart. Foremost among them is the racism— the controversy centred on South Africa’s official policy of racial discrimination. In the very first session of the General Assembly, India took up the matter and mobilised support from the world community to pressure South Africa to end apartheid. India worked hard to build an anti-apartheid coalition in world politics that did not hesitate to launch actions like ban on participation in sports events, ban on participation in international forums and ban on sale of military equipment, to pressurise the White minority government of South Africa. In this context, it is a matter of great satisfaction that in 1993- South Africa declared itself apartheid-free following which a freely elected democratic government assumed power under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, Mahatma Gandhi’s spiritual heir. India is credited for taking up liberation of subject population, i.e. the peoples under the yoke of colonial rule in different parts of the world. Being one of the first to gain freedom after the end of the Second World War, to continue the struggle against colonialism elsewhere is natural to India. The cause of Indonesia for freedom from the Dutch colonialism was one of the first issues India took up in the late 1940s. The freedom fighters in numerous parts of Asia and Africa—IndoChina, Algeria, Angola, Namibia, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Tunisia—looked to India for diplomatic and political support and guidance. During the 1960s, India led the anti-colonial cause by heading the UN Committee charged with speedy implementation of the Declaration on Decolonisation. Statistics speak for themselves: There were nearly 75 crore colonised peoples 3
when the UN was founded and now only half a crore remain to be decolonised. Most of the liberated territories have become members of the United Nations taking the tally from the original figure of 51 to 191 now. As a democratic country, India is naturally wedded to the cause of human rights like civil rights, viz. right to life, freedom, to be free from torture or unlawful detention, etc. But India, joined by nearly the whole of the Third World countries and also the former socialist countries felt that the civil and political rights would have to be achieved in conjunction with, and are indeed inseparable from, the economic, social and cultural rights. They go hand in hand, not one at the expense of the other. Among the political rights, the right to self-determination is among the most controversial issue. Whether the right is to be applied in the context of foreign, colonial rule in the context of foreign, colonial occupation, or to be extended to the ethnic, cultural minorities to secede from a country is among the most hotly debated questions. Another issue is: whether those using violence to secede from a country could enjoy the protection of rights as freedom fighters, or are to be put on a different plane as terrorists? Are states accountable to the world outside on account of gross violation of human rights? Can foreign powers militarily intervene citing human rights violations? India has taken a tougher, if not conservative, stand in favour of the unity and sovereign authority of states.
17.2.3
Development
Economic and social development is an issue at the core of human rights debate as well. Again it is a vital concern that makes India and the United Nations partners. India’s basic position is twofold. First, economic development is a necessary precondition for peace. World peace can be durable only when conditions like poverty, hunger, exploitation that breed conflict are alleviated. Secondly, the newly acquired political independence of most of the erstwhile colonial countries would be incomplete without the economic and social development. In other words, the development element of the world order is critical. India devoted considerable energies for the establishment of scores of UN bodies dedicated for assisting the economically backward nations, viz. the regional economic commissions, the UN Development Programme, and UN Conference on Trade and Development. In the 1960s and 1970s, India was in the forefront raising demands and grievances with regard to unstable prices of agricultural products in the Western export markets and also the unhelpful terms of trade that worked to the benefit of the rich and industrially advanced countries. The Third World (also known as the “Group of 77”) came to be identified as a distinct (though diverse) entity in diplomatic conferences and negotiations. One of the dream themes of this group that echoed in the UN forums in the 1970s was the establishment of New International Economic Order based on the principles of democracy, equity, and justice. Let us also note here that India and other developing countries have promoted a holistic approach towards development. As per this approach, major problems like environment, population control, food, human rights, and women empowerment are closely linked to development. For example, the idea of sustainable development underlines the importance of conserving environment in a manner that the present generation can make use of the biological resources without denying the same privileges to the coming generations of humankind. The Earth Summit advocated this approach; and in that Conference India proposed the setting up of the planet protection fund. Let us not ignore the setbacks to the efforts of India and other developing countries. The anticipated
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dialogue between the developed North and the developing South failed to take place. The government to government development assistance levels had progressively declined. So was the case with the resources made available to the development activities of the United Nations agencies. On the other side, the sharp rise in the debt of the developing countries (standing currently at some US$ 2,500 billion) was a source of alarm. Nearly 80 developing countries including India had to turn to the International Monetary Fund for loans to tide over their short term economic difficulties, but at the same time go through a back breaking regime of conditionalities. You need to appreciate the fact that the development activities of the United Nations signify two things. India has been a major beneficiary of the multilateral development assistance, some of which have been channelled through UN agencies like the UN Development Programme. Side by side, as one of the leading lights of the Third World countries in terms of its technical manpower, India has often contributed in a big way through the UN wings like UNIDO, UNESCO, and UNDP for the advancement of other developing nations.
17.3 REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS The existence of regionalism side by side with universalism is a notable feature of our contemporary world. Mistaken as better forums than the United Nations, regional and sub-regional organisations have come up in very many parts of the world, in Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin America, and North America. In recent years, of course, their number has considerably gone up. While the Commonwealth and the Organisation of American States are among the oldest, many like the Organisation of African Unity (now called African Union), Organisation of Islamic Conference, the Association of South East Asian Nations, and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation are of relatively recent origin. India’s attitude to the regional organisations combines both understanding and caution. India never saw them as competitors, but complements to the United Nations mechanism. This view is important to be noted in the context of the establishment and activities of organisations like NATO during and after the Cold War. The NATO activity in Kosovo in 1999 has only deepened those apprehensions. Again, India did not want regional organisations to take a stand on disputes between a member state and a non-member state. For example, the Organisation of Islamic Conference had often endorsed Pakistan’s views on the Kashmir problem, transgressing the boundaries of diplomatic fairness towards India. India has happy experiences with most of the regional organisations. The Commonwealth serves as the most useful example. Soon after Independence, Jawaharlal Nehru agreed to the British monarch becoming the nominal head of the Commonwealth, without compromising on its status as a member with elected head of state. Over the years, India has played active role in helping the Commonwealth play positive role in support of the rights of the Black majority population in South Africa and Rhodesia, in disapproving military coups against democratic governments of member countries as in the case of Fiji, Nigeria and Pakistan, and facilitating cooperation in promoting educational and cultural exchanges. Likewise, India is very pleased with the Association of South East Asian Nations of which India is not a full member. India’s political and commercial relations with ASEAN nations improved, especially after India embraced the “Look East Policy”. India is a full dialogue partner and is a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum -a vehicle for 5
enhancing understanding and cooperation in regional security. India has supported the policies and activities of those regional organisations like Organisation of African Unity (AU) and Organisation of American States for consolidation of political sovereignty and economic advancement in those regions. However, it is a matter of regret to India that these organisations remain weak because of lack of unity among members. Let us now turn to the fortunes of regionalism in India’s neighbourhood. In South Asia, the birth of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation would not have been possible without India’s support in 1985. India welcomed the initiative of Bangladesh. Besides India, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are its members. All these countries have political, cultural, historical, economic and ethnic ties more with India than with one another. There are problems too, the most serious set being the India-Pakistan tensions. At the same time care has to be taken to ensure that the new regional forum would not be misused to score political, propaganda points. Accordingly, it was agreed that it will be a forum to promote greater contacts and understanding among heads of state/government and various other levels of policy makers, and contentious bilateral matters are to be kept out. But unfortunately SAARC has suffered greatly from India-Pakistan tensions. Pakistan has often tried to use SAARC as a tool to twist India’s arms. India has retaliated by refusing to clear the path, sometimes, for convening the SAARC’s periodical meetings. For example, the last Summit, held in Kathmandu in 2002 was held after three years. The next scheduled for 2003 in Islamabad became the prisoner of the bilateral problems. The implementation of the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement or the SAARC anti-terrorism convention is being obstructed. The people to people contacts are also being obstructed. With the result, the SAARC process has considerably slowed down.
17.4 NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT The Non-aligned movement as the biggest peace movement of governments has special significance for India. For, after all, India has pioneered the policy of nonalignment, in the early days of its Independence. The policy represented our desire to retain the freedom to take positions on international issues without being bound by membership in military alliances formed in the context of the Cold War rivalry. Several newly independent countries drew inspiration from the lead given by India and embraced the policy of nonalignment in the 1950s and thereafter. India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia and Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt came together in 1961 to found a grouping or a movement of the non-aligned (NAM) countries. 13 Summit Meetings of the Non-aligned Countries (including the seventh hosted by New Delhi in 1983) were held so far. The last one was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 2003. During all these years, the features of the Non-aligned movement include the near universal in membership, the shift in the focus from anti-colonialism and anti-racialism to development and globalisation. Of course unchanged are the commitments to the rights of the Palestinian people, the need to strengthen multilateral political and financial institutions like the UN and the IMF and the World Bank. The flip side of the additions to membership (some countries did not abandon special military relationships with the superpowers before seeking membership) diluted the philosophical and political cohesion, if not the credibility of the movement. Moreover, military conflicts occurred between member countries of the movement. Wars between Iran-Iraq, India6
Pakistan, Ethiopia-Somalia threw up dilemmas to the membership. Again, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, a founding member and towering part of the movement, was a severe blow. Finally, the end of the Cold War had thrown many non-aligned countries out of gear; they had to quickly reorient their foreign policy as per the new compulsions of the pre-eminence of the United States and its allies. As a result the non-aligned movement declined in importance even among the member countries. Countries like Myanmar and even Egypt suggested that the movement should be disbanded. Although India has not gone that far, it certainly has not done more than lip service to the cause of non-aligned movement. With the changed context, it has been widely asserted by the critics of non-alignment that the non-aligned movement ceases to be relevant and useful to serve the needs of countries like India. On the other hand, it is necessary to point out that the spirit underlying the nonalignment, viz. the wish not to subordinate national policy-making freedom to the pressures and whims of the militarily, economically powerful countries is perhaps more relevant now than before. There may be defects in the way the movement has shaped, or the way the policy was pursued by countries, but the intrinsic worth of the policy cannot be doubted. If India can demonstrate this, it will be a big service not only to the idea of nonalignment but also to a more egalitarian world order. It is intriguing that the weakening of the UN has coincided with the weakening of NAM. That means that they share common destinies. This is a lesson for our present and future leadership.
17.5 GLOBALISATION No doubt, you will agree, globalisation has emerged as the foremost issue of political and diplomatic significance. Thanks to the revolution in the fields of computer, telecommunication and satellite technology, information has become very easy to exchange through Internet facilities. Many— whether individuals, public or private, national or foreign institutions—nowadays, across the world, are beneficiaries in transforming the way we function. For example, mail can be exchanged through Internet between two or more locations anywhere in the world instantly. Likewise, companies are transacting business of selling and purchasing goods across the globe with the help of information and communication technologies. Money is moving from one account to another without the use of a chequebook. Customers can order goods and get them delivered at home and pay for them without moving from their drawing room at home through the use of Internet services. This is called electronic commerce. Companies are moving their production centres from one corner of the world to another very fast. Companies like Microsoft, Samsung, and Citibank with production, marketing and work force in several countries have become household names even in rural areas of a country like India. The multinational companies are earning, investing and moving across companies and countries overnight. Banks, offices, transport services, companies, non-profit organisations, educational establishments, international organisations and individuals are making use of computer software to create their own cyber sites with information to be accessed, printed or downloaded on a floppy disk by any one sitting before a computer with an internet facility. Satellite channels are beaming their programmes directly to homes anywhere in the world. News is being flashed instantly and wars have been shown live. In other words, globalisation is identified with the phenomenon of flow of capital, goods, information and even people across borders at a very high speed through the use of
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information and communication technologies. Suddenly the territorial borders identified with nation states have become less relevant. A global civil society comprising parliamentarians, trade unions, non-government organisations is becoming perceptible. Truly, global village has become a reality. With strengths like well-developed and highly competitive computer software industry, the availability of technical and skilled work force and its potential as a very large middle class market, India hopes to benefit in the era of globalisation. Since 1991, India changed the orientation of its economic policy by injecting pronounced features of privatisation, liberalisation of rules for foreign investment, disinvestment of public sector companies. Customers are flooded with an amazing choice of goods in the market—from motor cars to food products. India’s exports have gone up especially in the service sector, investments have come into the country, and our foreign exchange reserves are extremely comfortable. Overall, India, during globalisation, has emerged as one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Though India is open to beneficial aspects of globalisation, it is concerned over the adverse effects. To critics, globalisation is another name for Americanisation of the world. American companies, currency, channels and weapons have taken over the world. The worrisome consequences of globalisation are political, economic and even cultural. The globalisation process as manifested in the activities of multinational corporations, media giants and non-governmental organisations has considerably undermined the sovereign prerogatives of the state structures. For example, governments have come under great pressure in one conference after another— from Rio to Seattle and Durban. The presence of refugees and migrants is a cause of political upheaval in North as well as the South. Misuse of technology for spreading terror and violence is an important political effect of the globalised world. The income gaps between the rich and the poor both among and within countries have sharply widened. As brought out by the United Nations, nearly one half of the world population (mostly in sub-Saharan Africa and south Asia) subsists with an income of less than two dollars a day. Indeed, the assets of top 3 billionaires in the world are said to be greater than the combined GNP of all the least developed countries put together. And with the rise of market power, much of the developing world has become both unattractive for private investment and non-competitive for export purposes. Moreover, our life styles are undergoing radical change going in the direction of meaningless consumerism, propelled by the advertisements shown on television. To offset the negative effects of globalisation and harness the benefits among all sections of the humanity, India is engaged in working with other countries at the United Nations, regional organisations and also in the Non-aligned Movement. There are some encouraging developments such as the decision by the Group of 8 countries to cancel the debts of some of the most indebted and poor countries. Consensus at the Millennium summit of the United Nations to work for achievement by 2015 of certain socio-economic goals in the area of poverty reduction, child education, AIDS, etc. may help in putting human beings at the centre of positive happenings.
17.6 SUMMARY To India, the United Nations holds the key to a world order wedded to peace and prosperity. India has always emphasised the diplomatic uses of the universal forums for forging common fronts in managing consequences of conflict, poverty and deprivation. It opposed the use of the United Nations for divisive, coercive and narrow ends. Similarly, India’s view of regional 8
organisations as mechanisms of promoting greater understanding and cooperation is also mature, by stressing that they must work hand in hand with the global forums like the United Nations. The reason is the growing interdependence, now transformed into an era of globalisation, needs to be managed to make life on the planet more equitable and fair. In other words, India emerges as a seasoned voice of maturity, moderation and forward looking in world affairs. This characteristic remains despite domestic political changes.
17.7 EXERCISES 1) Identify some of the important aspects of India’s contribution for world peace and security through the United Nations. 2) In what ways has India worked for the economic development of the Third World countries? 3) Discuss India’s association with the Commonwealth and ASEAN. 4) Write a short note on SAARC. 5) Bring out the diplomatic achievements of India’s non-aligned policy. 6) How different is the nonalignment policy from the non-aligned movement? 7) What are the benefits that globalisation has brought about? 8) Identify some of the problems associated with globalisation.
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SUGGESTED READINGS Acharya, Amitav., The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 2000. Agwani, M. S., Contemporary West Asia, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1995. Ahmed, A.F. Salahuddin., Bengali Nationalism and the Emergence of Bangladesh - An Introductory Outline, Dhaka: International Centre for Bengali Studies, 1994. Ahmed, Rashid., Taliban, Islam, Oil and The New Great Game in Central Asia, London: I.B. Tauris, 2000. Alagappa, Muthiah, and Takashi Inoguchi., (eds) International Security Management and the United Nations, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1999. _________________., (ed.) Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. Alley, Roderic., United Nations in the South East Asia and the South Pacific, London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998. Alloworth, Edward., Encounter in Central Asia: 120 Years of Russian Rule, Durham: Duke University Press, 1989. Annan, Kofi A., We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-first Century, New York: United Nations, 2000. Appadorai A., National Interest and India’s Foreign Policy, Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 1992. ____________., Domestic Roots of India’s Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981. Appadorai, A, and M.S. Rajan., India’s Foreign Policy and Relations, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1985. Arnold, Guy., World Government by Stealth: The Future of United Nations, London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1997. Arnson, Cynthia J., (ed.) Comparative Peace Process in Latin America, Washington DC: Washington Wilson Centre Press, 1999. Ayoob, Mohammed., India and Southeat Asia: Indian Perceptions and Policies, London: Routledge, 1990. Azam, Kousar J., Discourse in Trust: US-South Asia Relations, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 2000. Baehr, Peter R, and Leon Gordenker., The United Nations at the End of 1990s, New York:
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St. Martins’s Press, 1999. Bahadur, Kalim, and Mahendra P. Lama., (eds.) New Perspectives on India-Nepal Relations, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1995. Bajpai, Kanti P, and Stephen P. Cohen., (eds.) South Asian Security After the Cold War: International Perspectives, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993. Bajpai, Kanti., et. al., Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia, New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1995. _____________., Afsir Karim., and Amitabh Mattoo., (ed.) Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian Policy, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications Pvt. Ltd. 2001. _____________., and Amitabh Mattoo., (eds.) The Peacock and the Dragon: India-China Relations in the 21st Century, New Delhi: Har-Anand, 2000. _____________., Securing India: Strategic Thought and Practice, New Delhi: Manohar, 1996. Bandopadhyaya, J., The Making of India’s Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1980. Banerjee, D., Problems of Regional Security and Nuclear Proliferation, in K. Warikoo., (ed.) Central Asia, Emerging New Order, New Delhi, Har-Anand Publications, 1995. Baral, Lok Raj., Nepal: Problems of Governance, New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1993. _____________., The Politics of Balanced Interdependence: Nepal and SAARC, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1988. Benner, Jeffrey., Structure of Decision: The Indian Foreign Policy Bureaucracy, Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1984. Bennet, Le Roy A., International Organization Principles and Issues, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995. Berch, Berberoglu., Power and Stability in the Middle East, London: Zed Books, 1989. Beshir, Mohamed Omer., Terramedia: Themes in Afro-Arab Relations, London: Ithaca Press, 1982. Bhargava, Pradeep., Political Economy of Sri Lanka, New Delhi: Navrang, 1987. Bhola, P.L., Foreign Policies of India, Pakistan and China ,Jaipur: RBSA Publishers, 2001 Biju, M.R., India’s Foreign Policy: Towards a New Millenium, Jaipur: National Publishing House, 2000. Bose, Sumantra., States, Nations, Sovereignty: Sri Lanka, India and the Tamil Eelam Movement, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994. Bourantones, Dimitris, and Jarrod Wiener., (ed.) The United Nations in the New World Order:
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The Organization at Fifty, London: McMillan Press Ltd, 1995. Bowman, Larry, and Ian, Clark., (ed.) The Indian Ocean in Global Politics, Boulder: Westview Press, 1981. Brauch, Hans Gunter., Survey of Recent and Ongoing Research in the Social and Human Sciences on Disarmament, UNESCO, 1988. Braun Dieter., The Indian Ocean: Region of Conflict or ‘Peace Zone?’Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983. Brezinski, Zbigniew., Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 19771981, New York: Ferrar Straus, Giroux, 1983. Broinowski, Alison., (ed.) ASEAN into the 1990s, London: Macmillan, 1990. Brown, Michael E., (ed.) The International Dimension of Internal Conflict, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996. Brown, Sheryl J, and Kimber M. Schraub., (eds.) Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992. Capisani, Giampaolar., Handbook of Central Asia, London: I.B. Touris, 2000. Central Asia Today, World Focus, vol. 19, no.3, March, 1998 Chaporham, C., Environment and Human Survival, London: Oxford, 1997 Chari, P.R., Security and Governance in South Asia, New Delhi: Manohar, 2001. Chari, P.R., and Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna., (ed.) Kargil: The Tables Turned, New Delhi: Manohar, 2001. Charles Kegley, Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond., How Nations Make Peace, New York: St. Martins’s Press, 1999. Chatterjee, R.K., India’s Land Borders: Problems and Challenges, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1978. Chellaney, Brahma., Nuclear Proliferation: The US-Indian Conflict, New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1993. Chitty, N., Framing South Asian Transformation: An Analysis of Regional Views on South Asian Cooperation, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1994 Chopra, Pran., The Crisis of Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Wheeler,1993 Chopra, V.D., (ed.) Indo – Russian Relations: Prospects, Problems and Russia Today, New Delhi: Kalpaz, 2001
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Damodaran, A.K, and U.S. Bajpai., (eds.) Indian Foreign Policy: The Indira Gandhi Years, New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1990. Damodaran, A.K., Beyond Autonomy – Roots of India’s Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Somaiya Publications, 2000 Deepak, B.R., India-China Relations: In the First Half of the 20th Century, Delhi: A.P.H, 2001 Derek, McDougall., The International Politics of the New Asia Pacific, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1992. Diehl, Paul F., (ed) The Politics of Global Governance, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001 Diwan Ghufran Ahmad Khan., ‘Evolution of Bureaucracy in Nepal: An Overview,’ in P.D. Kaushik., (ed.) New Dimensions of Government and Politics of Nepal, New Delhi: South Asian Pulblishers, 1996. Dixit, J.N., Across Borders: 50 years of India’s Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Picus Books, 1998 Dowdy, William I, and Russell B. Trood., (ed.) The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena, Durham: Duke University Press, 1985. Draft Report, National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine (Released on 17 August 1999). Dubey, Muchkund, and Nancy Jetly., (ed.) South Asia and its Neighbours, New Delhi: Friedrich Ebert – Stiftung, 1999. Dutt, V.P., India’s Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Vikas, 1987 Fowkes, Ben., The Disintegration of the Soviet Union: A Study in the Rise and Triumph of Nationalism, London: Macmillan, 1997. Frankel, Joseph., The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-Making, London: Oxford University Press,1963. Gaan, Narottam., Environment and National Security: The Case of South Asia, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 2000. Ganguly, Sumit, and Ted Greenwood., (ed.) Mending Fences: Confidence and SecurityBuilding Measures in South Asia, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996. nd Ganguly, Sumit., Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflict since 1947, 2 edn. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994. Ghosal, Baladas., (ed.) India and Southeast Asia: Challenges and Opportunities, New Delhi: Konark, 1996. 13
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